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The First Heritage International(s): rethinking global networks before UNESCO

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Abstract: The paper discusses the global networks that shaped the making of heritage in the modern world. While most accounts of heritage internationalism have focused on the period since the foundation of UNESCO, the paper suggests a longer chronology to better understand the tensions between nationalism and internationalism. It proposes a framework for conceptualising the waves of successive and parallel heritage internationals since the 18th century and problematizes coherence and diversity within them. While not disputing a strong European dominance, the paper draws attention to the participation of non-Western actors and discusses spaces of collaboration and subversion. By adopting a long chronological perspective and paying attention to the multiplicity of actors that co-existed, the paper aims to also contribute to a better understanding of contemporary developments in three ways: It reveals the deep roots of heritage internationalisation and suggests modes of conceptualising disruptions and continuities. By thinking about a period in which no single institution represented these heritage internationally like UNESCO today, the paper secondly proposes to use a similar multi-actor perspective for the present; finally by discussing the relation between oppression, collaboration and subversion, it suggest ways of paying more attention to individual agency.

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I. Rethinking Heritage Internationalism

Attitudes to heritage have long been a subject of national rather than international history. Recent years, however, saw a remarkable growth of scholarship with a global perspective.¹ In this literature, UNESCO’s role has been particularly central through a proliferation of institutional histories and discursive critiques, and as part of the broader historicization of

international institutions as transnational sites.\(^2\) Even so, understanding the effect of UNESCO on the ground remains, according to Jean-François Sirinelli, chair of the independent International Scientific Committee for the history of UNESCO, ‘une histoire à suivre’.\(^3\) There also is a need to widen the focus to understand the governance of heritage as an aspect of globalization in the era since the Second World War more broadly. As Tim Winter pointed out, ‘we have yet to detail the story of the ongoing dance that has taken place between nationalisms and the ethos of cosmopolitan internationalism in shaping the global expansion of institutionalized conservation. As a consequence, the analytical frames capable of making sense of the systemic problems that now face the flagship of heritage conservation, the World Heritage movement, still need to be constructed.’\(^4\)

I propose to take this historicization one step further and place the post-war developments in their longer trajectory. Heritage internationalism remains often seen as a relatively recent phenomenon, linked to the wish to overcome nationalist approaches to culture after the Second World War and ‘to build peace in the minds of men’.\(^5\) But its roots go much deeper. A number of international movements formed since the late eighteenth century through diplomatic and civil efforts. Some pursued the idea of world heritage; others were more focused on strengthening national heritage through likeminded international alliances. Yet all


reveal that international and national agendas have been in constant tension for more than two centuries.\textsuperscript{6}

Many ‘critical heritage scholars’ have chastised modern heritage internationalism, and UNESCO in particular, for imposing a Western heritage concept on the rest of the world, thereby perpetuating the legacies of colonial dispossession.\textsuperscript{7} While the emergence of heritage concepts and heritage institutions were deeply linked to the history of imperialism, they were not only made by Western elites, but through the interactions of a range of actors from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds. For a more rounded picture it is necessary to reflect not only on acts of dominance but also on subversive as well as collaborative approaches. By adopting a long chronological perspective and by paying attention to the multiplicity of international networks and international interactions that co-existed, the paper aims to help understanding the role heritage played historically in the ‘transformation of the modern world’ and vice versa.\textsuperscript{8} However, by doing so, it also hopes to advance comprehension of contemporary developments: First, by showing that the international making of heritage has deeper, more complex and less linear histories than generally thought, it invites to reflect on how the legacies of these histories still shape current attitudes. Second, by looking at a period in which no single institution represented heritage interests internationally like UNESCO does today, the paper also proposes that a similar multi-actor perspective could be fruitful for the analysis of the present. Finally, it suggests that it is necessary to pay more attention to the strength of individual agency and not to assume that all forms of heritage internationalism derive automatically from a hegemonic, or even coherent ‘authorized’ discourse.\textsuperscript{9} Rather, it proposes to understand how the international

\textsuperscript{7} Laurajane Smith, \textit{Uses of Heritage} (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
\textsuperscript{9} On the idea of an ‘authorized heritage discourse’ see Smith, \textit{Uses of Heritage}. 
sphere, despite unequal power relations, functioned both as a ‘site’ and a ‘resource’ for different actors.¹⁰

Looking at a period that did not possess a formal international institution, or even the word ‘heritage’ in its current broad meaning, poses obvious methodological challenges with regard to how widely one casts the net.¹¹ Despite the growth of transnational histories of preservation over the last years, the mapping of transnational, let alone global networks of preservation is still very much a work in progress. Few, if any of the studies that engage with connections beyond the nation, are truly global in the sense of offering comprehensive coverage. Rather they approach global connections through particular localities. Given the gaps in research, it is still too early for a synthesis of any sort. There are, however, now enough studies on different periods and geographical contexts to think about how broader patterns might be conceptualized.

In addition to the research on UNESCO’s role, and earlier works on conservationist thought and the codification of international law,¹² a range of historical studies has looked at the cross-cultural construction of different aspect of what is now called ‘heritage’.¹³ Focusing

largely on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these studies show the strength of exchanges across different national and imperial borders from Peru to Japan, as well as the emergence of particular international structures set up to facilitate exchanges. Methodological frameworks differ as a result of disciplinary and linguistic traditions and vary between ‘comparative’, ‘entangled’, ‘transnational’, ‘transcultural’, ‘imperial’ or ‘global’ history approaches. It is not my purpose here to advocate in favor of one over the other. Often methodologies are complementary rather than exclusive. None has a single definition and each can be understood as the broader of churches. While all can be fruitfully applied to understand processes rather than spaces, the appropriate method does to some degree depend on particular geographical and temporal context. What is more important here than to determine the merits of particular approaches is to reflect how, for mapping the development of networks that shaped heritage internationalism, the framework one chooses might determine what kind of connections one sees as dominant in a particular period.

In the face of often overwhelmingly national and nationalist uses of heritage, the primary aim of many studies using a transnational or cognate methodology has been to establish that connections existed at all beyond current national borders. For many contexts empirical

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16 A transnational framework makes for instance sense when looking at entities that understood themselves as nations, but less for so for understanding for instance imperial networks, see Tamson Pietsch, Empire of scholars: universities, networks and the British academic world, 1850-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).
research is at best at the beginning and it remains important to refute essentializing definitions of heritage by showing how concepts have been changed through processes of transfer, translation and acculturation across cultures. Yet, it is also time to go beyond the statement that heritage is a concept made in transit. Analyses need to compare what happens in cross-cultural processes (do the same or different mechanisms appear and why?) and to think about the relation between the different networks uncovered to reflect whether the contacts that shaped heritage are indeed different, only loosely touching, networks or part of something much more interconnected.

II. The Heritage Internationals

I titled the paper, somewhat awkwardly, ‘the first heritage international(s)’ with the plural in brackets to indicate both the existence of a relatively coordinated, coherent, and self-aware movement before the creation of twentieth-century international organizations,\(^\text{17}\) as well as the plurality of successive and parallel initiatives. Both ‘heritage international’ and ‘heritage internationalism’, like ‘heritage diplomacy’ are of course contemporary terms. Similar to ‘heritage diplomacy’, ‘heritage international’ and ‘heritage internationalism’ can help make sense of the ‘international flow and circulation of ideas, people, funding and policies in the space of heritage’.\(^\text{18}\) Often congruent, the different terms can however also assist in directing the gaze towards different aspects. While ‘heritage diplomacy’ helps to emphasize the process, ‘heritage international’ draws attention to the structures. Moreover, while internationalism shaped \textit{heritage in diplomacy} and \textit{heritage as diplomacy} and vice versa,\(^\text{19}\) not all international heritage networks had a diplomatic or internationalist function. In contrast to the ‘Socialist Internationals’ from which the term ‘Heritage Internationals’ borrows, the various movement that were concerned with the preservation of the cultural and natural environment, as well as with form heritage that we would now call intangible, never labeled

\(^{18}\) Winter, “Heritage Diplomacy”, 10.
\(^{19}\) Winter, “Heritage Diplomacy”, 11.
themselves as ‘Internationals’. They generally also had much looser forms of formation, affiliation and dissolution. By choosing the term, I do not want to suggest that the ‘Heritage Internationals’ were like the ‘Socialist Internationals’;\(^{20}\) I propose it rather as a metaphor to structure the profusion of international, transnational and transcultural activities and networks concerned with heritage and to problematize relations. Moreover, like scholars who speak of ‘religious internationals’ to capture the formation of global religious movements during the nineteenth and early twentieth century,\(^{21}\) I find the term useful to draw attention to the fact that the internationalization of heritage preservation was part of a broader move toward internationalization. While the looseness of networks might not always make the label of ‘International’ with a capital I seem fitting, borrowing the idea of successive internationals from the socialist also helps to think about reasons for disruption and continuity in relation to the history of ‘internationalism in the age of nationalism’ more broadly.\(^{22}\)

Questions about continuity inevitable raise questions about origins. Very different starting points could be chosen. A history of the international and diplomatic uses of heritage could begin in the ancient world (a multitude of incidences from the restoration of Cyrus tomb by Alexander the Great, to Cicero’s *In Verrem*, to the various post-antique *translatii imperii* come to mind).\(^{23}\) Or it could start with the transformation of the international order and the emergence of the diplomatic system in the Early Modern Period.\(^{24}\) Or with the fundamental changes brought by European expansion since the fifteenth century. But if we are interested in a more self-conscious heritage internationalism, it is best to begin with the late eighteenth century, as it was only in this period that a strong sense of internationalism and of heritage

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\(^{24}\) Winter, “Heritage Diplomacy”.

protection came together for the first time.\textsuperscript{25} To frame the debate about the nature of the heritage internationals, I will therefore begin with movements that mobilized internationalism to safe heritage, or heritage to champion internationalism, and which had universal aspiration if not membership. I will then relate these to other forms of international heritage networks. In the broadest sense, self-conscious heritage internationalism can be divided into two periods: a first, between the French Revolution and the First World War which was characterized by informal internationalism, and a second, shaped by formal international organization within the frameworks of the League of Nations and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{26} However, it also makes sense to divide the periodization further as there were distinct regimes of heritage internationalism reflecting broader shifts in international relations. I would suggest five main 'Internationals' and two intermediary ones.

Triggered by the spoliation of art works and scientific objects by the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Armies, a 'First Heritage International' emerged as a Paneuropean effort to return the objects. While not questioning the growing pillage of works of art and science from outside Europe, this first heritage international was shaped by the enlightenment belief in a common heritage of mankind. As Quatremère de Quincy put it in his Letters to Miranda: "You know that the arts and sciences have long constituted a republic in Europe. All political and philosophical efforts must be employed to maintain, strengthen and augment this community."\textsuperscript{27} Ultimately, the plea for the return of art works was successful, but what had started as a defense of cosmopolitan values by artists and writers ended with a diplomatic solution through the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and the triumph of national understandings of heritage.\textsuperscript{28} The 'Second International' has no single, clear starting point. In contrast to the First, and the Third and Fourth, it was not crisis driven. In many ways it started as soon as peace was established in 1815: learned exchanges were formalized again and diplomatic

\textsuperscript{25} Swenson, Rise of Heritage, ch. 1.
\textsuperscript{26} On this periodization see Swenson, Rise of Heritage, 336.
\textsuperscript{28} Savoy, Patrimoine annexé.
services were used to exchange ideas to set up national heritage preservation systems across Europe, often drawing on contacts created during the restitution debate. But the Second Heritage International’s true growth was linked to the idea of free trade internationalism and the world’s fairs and international congresses, which this idea engendered. Between the 1870s and 1914 exchanges on heritage were particularly intense, facilitated by numerous international exhibitions on preservation, a plethora of international congresses on tangible and intangible form of heritage, a range of transnational campaigns to save monuments and natural sites across the globe and a drive to codify the protection of works of art, history and science during war. Though dominated by European countries, the Second International’s range was broader than the First’s and the Third’s. Congress representatives for instance frequently included Japanese, Chinese, Mexican and Brazilian delegates.  

The First World War, and the willful destruction of Belgian and French artistic treasures by the German army, ended the patterns of this long period of exchange. At the same time, the First World War, like the Napoleonic wars before it, reinforced the belief in the necessity of international protection. This manifested on both sides of the conflict. While the German army created its Kunstschutz program to disprove allegations of barbarism, civilians from the entente countries solicited the help of (then still) neutral America to formulate protest petitions and met in Geneva to create a ‘Red Cross for monuments’. We might call these later initiatives (which replaced Germany with the Unite States as a major player in the international preservation movement) the ‘2 1/2 Heritage International’ (mixing and matching labels from the socialist Congress at Zimmerwald that stuck to its pacifist aims and refused to accept the dissolution of the Second Socialist International after the European socialist parties had voted in favor of war credits in 1914, and the 2 1/2 international founded as an

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alternative to Lenin’s Third). After the end of WWI, however, a truly new phase of the ‘Third International’ started with the foundation of UNESCO’s precursor, the ‘International Committee for Intellectual Collaboration’ (IICI) of the League of Nations in 1922. While previous meeting had mostly employed internationalism to promote heritage, the League now explicitly used ‘the protection of cultural heritage as a tool in the promotion of internationalism.’ To ‘counter purely nationalist interest, the League fostered the notion of common cultural heritage’. The belief in a common heritage of humanity, and in its peacekeeping effect, prevailed also after the Second World War ended this ‘International’ again and still animates UNESCO’s mission. Between the League and the UN, one could again locate a ‘3 1/2 International’ in the shape of the ‘Monuments Men,’ and other effort to prevent the loss of cultural heritage during the war. Although the institutional framework has stayed the same after 1946, in many ways a Fifth International began gradually through the ‘Winds of Change’ in the 1960s and the slow, but effective challenges to western-centric ideas of heritage from within UNESCO.

The formation, and demise, of successive ‘Heritage Internationals’ seems thus most clearly driven by major shifts in international relations. Yet more complex, and sometimes more counterintuitive, patterns also underpinned exchanges. Although the periodization suggested is useful to draw attention to the repeated revival and challenge of internationalist ideas, it risks masking the substantial continuities that persisted across wars. Considerably more research is needed to understand to which extend wars (in particular the major multilateral conflict from the Napoleonic Wars and the two World Wars) did indeed disrupt heritage internationalism or whether they should rather be understood as crucial for the formation of new international networks that came to fruition once peace was restored. Moreover, these ‘Heritage Internationals’ are not the only international ways to think about the internationalization of heritage. On the contrary, at any given moment, multiple heritage

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33 Kriigel, Les internationales ouvrières.
networks existed in parallel and overlapping forms. Rather than ordering them through their attitude towards internationalism as a principle, one can also think about them in terms of membership, agenda, geography or materiality.

There were first of all a multitude of ‘Internationals of Agents’ – multilateral networks led by different state bureaucracies, diplomats, cities, professions and leisure or interest driven associations. None of these networks of agents operated in isolation, but they often formed distinct epistemic communities. Many used their international connections overtly to establish themselves nationally, but there were also a range of secret and clandestine networks, not only for the sake of diplomacy but also to foster the interests of dealers and buyers, and often of looters and forgers. Cutting across these communities were however, what might be termed ‘Internationals of Concerns’. The protection of buildings, nature, peoples or traditions for instance all had their own ‘internationals’. They repeatedly came together before being driving apart by growing professionalization. Some internationals of concerns were crisis driven (by destruction, exportation, theft etc.), other were motivated by the desire to create institutions such as museums or parks, or to modernize planning or sanitation. At some moments in time, it is relatively easy to find connections between different networks, for example through the attendance a list of international congresses, but much more work needs to be done to understand when different heritage concerns coalesced and when not.35

Another way to think about internationals is through ‘Internationals of Spaces’. Here membership was in part determined geopolitically, and in part through the imagination. Ideas about the international, the civilized, the imperial, the linguistic, or the regional shaped who was allowed, which in turn fostered the emergence and enhancement of such concepts. While there were clearly crossovers between networks that self-defined as ‘international’,36 and those that saw themselves more as ‘Anglophone’,37 or ‘British imperial’,38 it is not clear

36 Ibid.
which spaces had the closest links and where connections cut across these imagined communities.

In part this could be achieved by paying more attention to the ‘Internationals of Things’ - and those of Flora, Fauna - and often forcefully - exhibited Human Beings. These ‘internationalas’ were generally not as consciously self-defined as the others, but are perhaps the most pervasive as a multitude of objects, specimens and beings created their own webs not only by moving around the globe, but also by being turned into heritage in situ through the flow of international visitors, and by being appropriated intangibly in far flung corners of the earth through the imagination.39 And then there are last but not least all the ‘Hidden Internationals’ of knowledge exchanges, which took place in the wake of exploration, expansion, and colonization. Their acknowledgement fluctuated over time, was rarely done in full, and often erased completely from the official record, yet they fundamentally shaping ideas of heritage from the ‘periphery’. Their history offers way to decentralize and provincialize the histories of the ‘internationalas’ with which this section began.40

III. Oppression, Collaboration and Subversion

Heritage internationalism is thus best understood as a ‘the network of networks’.41 It is yet too early for substantial conclusions about its precise nature, but from existing studies one might extrapolate a range of factors, which determined where thick connections were

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41 Winter, “Heritage Diplomacy”, 10.
established. Particularly close links often drew on older, early modern, social, cultural, political and economic ties, and their transformation mapped often neatly onto the transformation of geopolitical, diplomatic and economic relations. But new connections were also issue driven. As a result, the global networks connecting nature preservationist were much more oriented towards the Americas, Africa and Australasia than those of cultural preservationist, but here too different foci existed. Those championing historic preservation, for instance had stronger leanings towards the lands of classical antiquity that had started to protect their monuments early on, while those focusing on pre-history had closer ties towards Northern Europe, as the field was shaped in Scandinavia.

How relationships were conceptualized within networks depended often on the diplomatic standing of a given country, however, modes of self-fashioning were highly contextual. The international sphere was as much used to display superiority as to mend perceived inferiorities. Before turning to an analysis of these diplomatic uses, it is, however, important to remember that a) a large proportion of international exchanges did not primarily have political uses and that b) many of the exchanged that did, primarily served to improve a local or national situation. Cultural transfers often helped ‘legitimizing one’s own actions or criticizing those of others in a national debate was one incentive’ for cultural transfer, while ‘trying to find a way out of an internal political impasse by having recourse to foreign examples was another.’ At the same time, imitating, and surpassing, foreign heritage practices was motivated by the wish to improve one’s own status and prestige internationally. Not only the possession of heritage (often achieved through plunder in distant lands) but also its preservation became increasingly a symbol of national advancement and hence part of the civilizing mission. A large part of the international exchanges that existed were therefore exchanges of an unequal nature marked by physical

43 Swenson, Rise of Heritage, 331.
and conceptual dispossession and even genocide.\textsuperscript{46} Not every case of contact should therefore be taken as evidence of a ‘shared’ heritage history, but the hierarchies and exclusions that existed within the global networks in terms of race (as well as in terms of class and gender) need careful observation.

However, as has been increasingly pointed out in the literature on colonialism and culture, hegemony is an insufficient framework for understanding what were often more complex processes of interaction.\textsuperscript{47} Without downplaying the atrocities of imperialism, and the role played by heritage concepts in assisting in these, it is also worth noticing how often discourses and practices were subverted. The colonized often watched the colonial authorities closely to use their behavior to attack their laws, as Indra Sengupta’s analysis of the preservation of religious structures in India has highlighted. In the very early twentieth century, indigenous groups employed colonial ideas of heritage to strengthen their own interests and impose limits to colonial authority, for instance by using the clauses on religious monuments in the Ancient Monuments Act for India of 1904. By appropriating the Universalist language of history and aesthetics developed in the West, and by combining it with an appeal to local religious traditions, they not only obtained funding for maintenance from the colonial government, but also at the same time regulated and restricted British access to Indian temples and mosques.\textsuperscript{48}

Complex, multiple, and subservice uses were not limited to the ‘periphery’, but were equally brought to the ‘centre’, as can be illustrated through Cologne Cathedral. Its completion between 1840 and 1880 as the German national monument often serves as the textbook case for the importance for buildings for nationalism and vice-versa. However, the cathedral completion also was an international project, to which private individuals from Denmark to

\textsuperscript{46} Sadiah Qureshi, “Dying Americans: Race, Extinction and Conservation in the New World,” in Swenson and Mandler, eds., \textit{From Plunder to Preservation}, 267-86.


Mexico gave donations, and an important ploy in the diplomacy of several western and non-western states. The Prussian Monarchy systematically brought foreign officials and heads of states to the city on the occasion of cathedral festivals and state visits. European royals were at the centre of these diplomatic ceremonies in the 1840s, but from the 1860s, Prussia’s increasingly global ambitions became apparent in the visitors brought to see Cologne. The first Japanese delegation to visiting Europe was asked by the Foreign office to stop at Cologne on the way to Berlin to visit the cathedral. The diary entries of the delegations’ members reveal some bafflement at the temple they were asked to see, but their visit, like later ones by an Ottoman Sultan and a Persian Shah also show that the diplomatic uses were two-way process. While it allowed Prussia to create diplomatic relations beyond the fields already occupied by the great imperial powers, it offered the representatives of old countries threatened of Western imperialism to establish themselves among the ranks of ‘civilized’ partners. Finally the diplomatic attention was also used locally. The inhabitants of the city (who even fifty years of the Rhineland had been given to Prussia still perceived Prussian rule as a form of occupation) seized the diplomatic importance of these visits to comment on the cathedral project in the matter of Montesquieu Persian Letters. On the occasion of the Ottoman Sultan’s visit in 1867 for instance they circumvented censorship by serializing a fake diary of the Sultan’s, which criticised the cathedral project as too nationalist and too conservative.

In parallel to the domestic and diplomatic uses of heritage, finally, an often truly collaborative world existed. Private letters between preservationists from different countries were marked by affection even in times of war and preservationists sincerely exchanged ideas to assist each other to save heritages across national borders, and fought to establish common standards. With the wisdom of hindsight we can tell that international exchanges did not lead

49 E.g. ‘Her Majesty's Visit To Germany’, The Times, 22 August 1845, 5.
to peace among nations, nor did the international conventions established towards the end of the nineteenth century prevent the destruction of cultural heritage in the violent conflicts of the twentieth century. Yet it is too easy to be cynical about the instrumental nature of the belief in a common heritage of humanity – a belief that survived conflict resiliently and which nourished hopes to shape international relations peacefully. While the history of heritage internationalism has certainly too often been told as a Whig history of a continuous improvement toward universalism, a Foucauldian history of Western control goes too much the other way. Neither does the historic record justice. From a long historic perspective, heritage internationalism appears more complex, fluctuating and multicentered. It was often as much a bottom up process as it was a top down one and it is necessary to pay due attention to the strength of individual agency against forms of dominant discourse.