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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Charlotte May Anderson (May, 1977).
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# Contents

List of Illustrations

Abbreviations

Preface  

Introduction  

1. James VI and I and the Early Seventeenth-Century Political Scene  

2. The Rhetoric of Conduct Books and the Realities of Ambassadorial Politics  

3. Ambassadors and their Function  

4. The *Spanish Machiavellik* Don Diego de Sarmiento de Acuña  

5. The United Provinces and England  

6. Conclusion  

Appendix A - A Handlist Compiled from the Database of Foreign Diplomatic Representatives to the Court of James VI and I  

Appendix B - De Tassis Pension List  

Appendix C - Letter from Sir Noel de Caron to the States General 2nd July, 1621  

Bibliography
List of Illustrations

Frontispiece: James VI & I  
(N. Hilliard: Victoria and Albert Museum)

i. Plan of Whitehall Palace, St. James’s Park 164

ii. The Somerset House Conference, 1604. 179  
(originally attributed to Marc Ghéeraert’s II, now classified as Unknown) by kind permission of the National Portrait Gallery.

iii. Patent of Knighthood 220  
(BL. Additional Charter 12777)

iv. Don Diego de Sarmiento de Acuña, Count Gondomar 223  
(G. Goodman, The Court and Times of James I; Grabado de Simone Fassen, 1622)

v. Casa del Sol, Valladolid 226

vi. Doña Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza. 260  
(Real Monasterio de la Encarnación, Madrid)

vii. Caron House, South Lambeth 282  
(Abram Booth's Journal, 1629)
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>AHR</em></td>
<td><em>American Historical Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>APC</em></td>
<td>Acts of the Privy Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellenger, <em>Priests</em></td>
<td><em>English and Welsh Priests, 1558 - 1800.</em> (ed.) D. A. Bellenger (Bath, 1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birch, <em>Court and Times</em></td>
<td><em>The Court and Times of James the First.</em> (ed.) R. F. Williams 2 vols. (1849)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CHR</em></td>
<td><em>Catholic Historical Review.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CRS</em></td>
<td><em>Catholic Record Society</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CSP Domestic</em></td>
<td><em>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CSP Venetian</em></td>
<td><em>Calendar of State Papers, Venetian.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CSP Spain</em></td>
<td><em>Calendar of State Papers, Spain.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DIE</em></td>
<td><em>Documentos Inéditos para la historia de España</em> (ns), vols. 11 - IV: <em>Correspondencia oficial, de Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña</em> (ed.) Antonio Ballesteros Beretta (Madrid, 1936 - 45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>DNB</em></td>
<td><em>Dictionary of National Biography</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Downshire</em></td>
<td><em>Downshire Manuscripts</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>EHR</em></td>
<td><em>English Historical Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finett, <em>Observations</em></td>
<td><em>Finetti Philoxensis: Some choice observations of Sr. John Finett Knight, And Master of the Ceremonies to the two last Kings. Touching the Reception, and Precedence, the Treatment and Audience, the</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Foley, Records


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Goodman, Court

G. Goodman, _The Court and Times of James I._ (ed.) J. S. Brewer. (1839)

_HJ_  
_Historical Journal_

_HLQ_  
_Huntington Library Quarterly_

_HMC_  
_Historical Manuscripts Commission_

Hotman, L'Ambassadeur

J. Hotman, _The Ambassador._ English translation (1603.)

_IHR_  
_Institute of Historical Research._

_Lansdowne Mss_  
_BL Lansdowne Mss_

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_MLR_  
_Modern Language Review_

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_PSB_  
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Abraham de Wicquefort, The Ambassador and his Function. Translated J. Digby (1716)

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This thesis deals with a particular phase in the diplomatic time scale, a phase which has its own prehistory. For the purpose of placing the diplomacy of the seventeenth century into context within this history it is necessary to examine briefly how diplomacy developed.

Diplomacy began as a means by which a sovereign aimed to prevent aggression from his neighbours, and became, by the seventeenth century, and without diminishing the ceremonial role it had always played, an agency for the settlement of trade and mercantile disagreements, the prevention of wars, or for concluding them after they began, and for the negotiating of marriage alliances. Taken from the Greek διπλώ, diploun, which is quite simply a doubled or folded thing, diplomacy is 'the management of international relations by negotiation: the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist.'

As an instrument for the purpose of negotiation between sovereign states and the peaceful management of international relations, diplomacy is an ancient and important field of activity. Even in antiquity ambassadors enjoyed a special position and certain privileges, although then it was not by law but as a matter of religion; the ambassador and his mission were seen as sacrosanct.

Greek diplomacy was a highly developed art-form necessary to negotiate and manage the complex relations between over a thousand separate states. Major states were represented by proxenos, permanent residents who were citizens of the state where they lived, but also having connections with the state by whom they were accredited. From around the sixth century the Greek city states adopted the practice of choosing as their representatives their finest orators and most plausible

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advocates and included amongst their number Pindar and Demosthenes. Continuity was essential, and although no state at this time had an organised diplomatic corps, we nevertheless find individuals returning to the same place on several occasions as well as on missions to other places. Their task was to plead the cause of their city before the assemblies of other city states and foreign leagues. They were not expected to gather information about the countries they visited nor were they required to write reports of their progress - all that was desired of them was that they spoke eloquently. The size of a Greek embassy could be as many as ten persons, depending on the state and the subject to be negotiated. In terms of their responsibility the status of these men was equal, although in practice one man could shape the character of the embassy. 2

The Greek traditions were handed down to the Romans whose contribution to the practice of diplomacy was not so much in the field of negotiation but in that of international law. However, as valuable as this contribution might have been it was more concerned with the theory of diplomacy than with the practice. With that in mind it would be outside the parameters of this thesis to discuss here the difference between the Roman ideas of *ius civile*, *ius gentium* and *ius naturale*. Suffice it to say, the *ius naturale* did imply an understanding of what was to become the practice of international law. The Roman system did, nonetheless, create a profession of well trained archivists who were well versed in precedents and procedure. 3

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Whilst it is possible to argue that the ‘notion of established representation at the political centres of foreign peoples...was unknown in Antiquity’, there is ultimately more truth in suggesting that ‘in the use of the proxenia the Greeks almost exactly anticipated...some form of permanent diplomatic representation in other states’. 7 There are also several other features of ancient diplomacy that are prophetic of diplomacy in the seventeenth century. The euthynac, the detailed reports given by the Greek ambassadors on their return to Athens, suggest the formal relations given by ambassadors on their return from a mission, whilst the basic principle of immunity amongst Greek ambassadors and the lack of consistency in its application is common to both periods. This provides clear evidence that the style of diplomacy in the early seventeenth century evolved as a revitalised version of that which existed in antiquity.

As an art diplomacy has always tended to be shrouded in secrecy, very little, save the names of treaties, being known by the general public. Of the men practising the art itself still less in generally known. The diplomat in popular culture was depicted as either completely good or completely evil. He was pictured by some as a schemer, liar or spy who spent his time negotiating alliances and treaties at his master’s behest, while at the same time flaunting the laws of the state to which he was accredited. Others portrayed him as an honest and dignified officer who, in striving for international peace, appeared to do most of his work whilst attending endless receptions, balls and performances. The only common ground between these two extremes was an acknowledgement of the diplomat’s necessary charm, tact and skill at persuasion which has given the word ‘diplomatic’ a meaning quite unrelated to its original. 8

7 F. Miller, ‘Government and Diplomacy in the Roman Empire during the First Three Centuries’, *International History Review*, p. 369; D. Mosley, Diplomacy in Classical Greece*, *Ancient Society*, p. 93.

8 See Chapter 3 which discusses the wide scope of literature concerning the qualities desirable in the ‘ideal ambassador’.
Towards the end of the fifteenth century, when princes were consolidating early modern notions of the nation-state, resident ambassadors abroad first made their appearance and gave the art of diplomacy its modern significance. The men sent abroad during the Middle Ages were thought to be servants of the wider ‘Christian republic’ rather than of their princes alone.  

Thus their main function was to maintain peace and good relations between the Christian rulers. T. A. Walker describes how the necessities of closer international relations in the sixteenth century brought about a distinction amongst what he calls ‘Public Agents’. These agents of the Middle Ages, despatched for a temporary purpose to a foreign court, survived in the extra-ordinary ambassador or ‘ambassador pro tempore’, whose functions were commonly those of bearing greetings or condolence to members of a royal family. By the middle of the sixteenth century the chief courts of the West were despatching and entertaining as ambassadors ministers regularly resident with the sovereign to whom they were accredited. England had, by this time, several resident agents placed at the European courts, using them for the transaction of purely political business. In return other European countries had established residents in London and by the beginning of the seventeenth century permanent legations became a more general aspect of the diplomatic scene. Early modern diplomatists were, on the whole, faithful to the old idea of the Christian nation states and that each state was morally bound not to encroach on the power and authority of the others, but there was a shift in that while ‘in the Middle Ages the goal of diplomacy was the peace of Christendom; in the Renaissance it [became] the interests of the individual states’.  

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Although examples of the diplomatic art could be found in a few other countries the birthplace of modern European diplomacy is generally accepted as being Renaissance Italy. The Italian city states were interconnected by as many common interests as those which divided them; they were engaged in constant rivalry and preoccupied by any alliances which might make one city state more powerful than another. It was not only the Papacy that developed a ceremonial attached to the dispatch and reception of envoys, but the secular states of Florence, who could boast of Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Machiavelli and Guicciardini amongst her ambassadors, and Venice stand out for their part in the development of the diplomatic arts. Indeed at the close of the fifteenth century the Republic of Venice was at its height and, by virtue of its wealth and its widespread commercial and political connections, the city had the best opportunities for gathering information from abroad.

With their keen insight into the social and political ideas current at the courts in which they served, the rules which governed the conduct of Venetian envoys in particular dated back to the thirteenth century and so were subject to continual revision and updating. The early Venetian service was endowed with relatively strict regulations as this occasionally dangerous and ill-paid function did not prove attractive to everybody. Due to this, the appointees were forbidden under severe penalties, to refuse to serve, except by reason of confirmed illness. The slightest indiscretion was punished and on their return ambassadors were expected to hand over to the public treasury any presents they received whilst abroad; they also had to draw up a detailed report on their diplomatic visits. However, the embassies to which these rules of conduct referred were, until the middle of the

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9 See, M. Mallett, The Emergence of Permanent Diplomacy in Renaissance Italy, (Leicester, 1999); T. Beverley, Diplomacy and Elites: Venetian Ambassadors, 1454 - 1494, (Leicester, 1999); see also Mattingly, Diplomacy, chp. 6.
10 Nicolson, Evolution, p. 33.
fifteenth century little more than missions and special embassies. The first resident embassy, in the modern understanding of the term, was that established in Genoa in the early 1450s by Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan. Five years later Eusebio Margaria, Archdeacon of Vercelli, was sent as the representative of the Duke of Savoy to Rome. It was not until 1479 that any permanent embassy was accredited, when one was established at the court of Louis XI. In 1495 a mission was maintained by Venice at the court of the Emperor Maximillian, and the practice extended to England in 1496 when two merchants were appointed as sub ambasciatores, on the grounds that the 'way to the British Isles is very long and very dangerous'.

Renaissance princes began, as had the Greeks before them, selecting for this function their best men and most famous writers, poets, thinkers and orators and it was through the actions of these men that special treaties were often concluded stipulating for permanent legations, such as one in 1520 between England and the Emperor of Germany. From the end of the fifteenth century England, Spain, France and Germany kept permanent legations in each other's countries. Unlike their medieval predecessors, however, these men were accredited with full diplomatic status. Moreover, unlike their predecessors these ambassadors were sent not for the discharge of a specific mission and then to return, but to remain as the permanent representative of his prince transacting business, gathering information and acting on behalf of their principals in a variety of ways. However, it was not until the seventeenth century that permanent legations became a general institution when

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other European countries followed this example. In fact there are several different historical roots from which the permanent legation might have grown. There are the baiulo - essentially commercial agents, or consuls, and the procurators maintained by princes at the Papal Curia, who were often given the title ambassador. The position of the consul was, however, different in origin and function to that of the resident. Although Consuls have not been included in the Database it is important that the development of this significant adjunct to the diplomatic profession be recognised. As to the procurators there is little evidence of continuity in this office although they were closer in style to the emergent resident. However, the accepted view is that the office developed generically simply because the temporary and ad hoc medieval embassies became more frequent and lasted longer.

At first the early foreign diplomats, powerful men from influential and well-connected families, were regarded with suspicion and, as such, could only be received on the understanding of strict reciprocity. The characteristics of diplomacy were changing from those exercised by the public agents of the Christian republic of the Middle Ages and, with the final collapse of medieval aspirations towards universality they quickly become secular, permanent and secret. For a long time the ambassador's principal business had been the supply of information and it is not difficult to see why diplomacy in this early period has often been described as a form of espionage, carried out by well trained and highly educated men with only

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16 Grotius thought permanent legations to be wholly unnecessary. De jure belli ac pacis (trans.) Francis W. Kelsey (1964); See also R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds.) Oppenheim's International Law, p. 1053.

the interests of their sovereigns at heart. Admittedly, the standards of early
diplomacy were not particularly high, and the diplomats themselves more often
than not provided grounds for suspicion. They bribed courtiers at foreign
courts, they stimulated and financed rebellion, they encouraged opposition groups
and they intervened in the most subversive fashion in the internal affairs of the
kingdoms to which they were accredited.

An ambassador in this period was regarded as an 'honourable spy', a man
whose private and public morality were two separate things. Many diplomats
considered that the 'official' lie bore slight relation to their own morality. The ill
repute enjoyed by the early modern ambassador could, in part, be laid at the door
of the identification of diplomatic practice and theory with the principles of
Machiavelli. Machiavelli's main purpose was to warn the governors of his age
against the dangers of weak government and it was the distortion of Machiavelli's
theory rather than the text itself which caused concern and which created the
epithet 'machiavellian'. And it must be admitted that examination of certain
passages in *The Prince* give good grounds for this impression:

> How laudable it is for a prince to keep good faith and live with integrity, and
> not with astuteness, everybody knows. Still the experience of our time shows
> those princes to have done great things who have had little regard for good
> faith, and have been able by astuteness to confuse men's brains and have
> ultimately overcome those who have made loyalty their foundation...Therefore a prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so
> doing it would be against his interest, and when the reasons which made him
> bind himself no longer exist. If men were all good, this precept would not be
> a good one; but as they are bad, and would not observe faith with you, so you
> are not bound to keep faith with them.

Paragraphs such as these were frequently quoted out of context and from them
arose the incorrect impression that such ideas, rather than honesty and good sense,
were in some way at the root of all international negotiation and were those principles to which any ambitious diplomat should aspire.

Criticism of the art of diplomacy is as old as the art itself. The constant comings and goings of embassies caused a certain degree of concern. Philippe de Commynes’ list of precautions to be taken, for example, are well rehearsed: if embassies came in friendship he believed they should be treated with ‘good cheer’ and should be granted frequent audience. However, a prince should ‘dismiss them soon, for friendship among princes does not endure for ever’. If on the other hand the ambassador was from a hostile court, a prince should ‘send honourably to meet them, lodge them well, set safe and wise men about them to watch who visits them and keep malcontents away’, in short, ‘give them audience at once and be rid of them’. A keen eye should be kept on envoys, especially in time of war and for every envoy sent a prince should, in return, send two, for de Commynes believed that no better spies could be had. 22 This view represented an attitude of mind that obstructed any development of permanent diplomatic relations and one can see that clearly diplomacy in this early period did not achieve its end of a perpetual peace. It may have concluded war and by day to day adjustments prevented fresh outbreaks of fratricidal conflict within the community of civilised states but it was never able to eradicate it completely. At the same time, it is true that peace was not always universally considered to be the first aim of the diplomatist, who, tending to consider himself simply as the servant of his sovereign, saw as his duty the gaining, by personal adroitness, ingenuity and subtlety, of some advantage for his master.

Before the seventeenth century there was no inclination to demand that diplomacy should be open; public opinion counted for very little and the use of secret methods in the conduct of foreign affairs was recognised as a natural and

indispensable way of working. The complaint was not that diplomacy was secret but that it was unnecessarily corrupt. True, there was no general understanding that diplomacy was being put to the wrong use - war was regarded as an essential feature of the relationship between the early nation states and diplomacy the method of waging war without bloodshed rather than a means of preventing it. However, despite this misconception there was considerable criticism of the instrument of diplomacy and it must be stressed that this criticism was amply justified. Undoubtedly the earlier forms of diplomacy were, for the most part, based on treachery and deceit. The diplomatic tradition was corrupt and its first contact with the western world by no means purified it. These early rulers had no scruples about the conduct of their foreign affairs and expected their diplomats to achieve their ends in any way they could. These agents in their turn did what was expected of them, so that diplomacy became exactly what individual princes wanted it to be. As the early modern period progressed so diplomacy gradually emerged as an activity possessed of an increasingly stable and for the most part, honourable body of precepts and traditions. Nevertheless, the code of honour of diplomacy should not be exaggerated - its working practice could never be any better than those of the government whose tool it was.
Introduction

In the early years of the seventeenth century, men of varying talents were being sent to England on diplomatic missions that required great delicacy and tact. These men were the ambassadors from one state, and accredited to the Court of St. James, who were sent to negotiate matters of mercantile importance, arrange state marriages and political alliances and protect the reputation and political status of their masters.

Traditionally work on these men has concentrated on individuals, the country the individuals represented or on specific negotiations in which they were involved. The study of diplomats has become a thriving subject area of memoirs, monographs, papers, theses and articles in specialist journals. Furthermore, the history of diplomacy itself has traditionally focussed on Italy during the latter half

of the fifteenth century. Interest was kindled in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s by such writers as Mattingly, Nicolson and Carter and since then, in more recent times, there has been a renewal of this interest. Some work has also recently been undertaken by G. M. Bell on the representatives instructed by early modern English monarchs to work in courts abroad. Over past years historians have also provided numerous partial listings, some more comprehensive than others, which relate to specific countries and which, alongside the works cited above, demonstrate a certain fascination with the question of diplomacy in the early modern period.

However, very little work has been undertaken on the ambassadorial group as a whole during this particular period and it is therefore the intention of this work to establish which individuals came as diplomats to the English court and to examine the methods by which the diplomatic machine worked at the court of James VI and I.

For this purpose, research has been undertaken on individual residents and an entry for each has been made within a Database. The Database contains details of:

- country of origin
- dates of embassies
- date and place of first audience for each embassy
- type of embassy and the object of the mission

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5 The database is designed for Microsoft Access and a Pentium personal computer. It is my intention to extend this database over a period of time to include all foreign diplomatic representatives to the English Court during the seventeenth century.
place of residence and at whose expense
titles held by the ambassador and details of any honours granted by James
promotions received on return home

In respect of the information gathered together in the Database, the principal purpose has been to identify the diplomats and to provide as accurate a record as possible of their missions. For this purpose a systematic study of a number of sources has taken place. The essential sources surveyed were the various relevant manuscript holdings, as well as the *Calendars of State Papers*, both Domestic and Foreign, the lists and calendars of the Historical Manuscripts Commission and various other collections of correspondence which are listed in the bibliography. In addition, the secondary sources available relating to Jacobean domestic and foreign diplomatic history have been identified and consulted.

The information contained in the Database meets certain criteria set for inclusion. Each man needed to have received from his sovereign official written instructions which ordered him to represent his government at the court of James VI and I. Adhering strictly to this criterion certain representatives have had to be excluded from the Database. Those excluded can be summarised in the following categories:

- Messengers and couriers who, as a rule, did not receive written instructions and did not negotiate. Not included in this category however, were those men who came to England to receive, by proxy, from James honorary titles or orders.

- Military men who were received with diplomatic honours, whilst engaged on a military mission and who were not strictly involved in any diplomatic negotiations.

- Those who were received by James but who represented a person other than his sovereign or prince, for example the many commissioners sent by the Dutch East India Company.
Although one could argue that, in some cases, they were involved in minor negotiations, merchants and consular figures have been excluded from the Database.

Also excluded from the Database are representatives for whom no conclusive evidence that an embassy was undertaken has been found.

The prime objective in providing a Database of foreign diplomatic representatives is to expand our knowledge of these men and their missions to James, thereby furthering our understanding of the diplomatic game played at Court. It is during this period that we begin to see the development of the diplomatic service as a whole and this work will show that, at the beginning of James's reign, very few men were designated ambassador. Most were still agents, a vestige of the old Tudor system, but by the end of the reign the majority of embassies came accompanied by an increasingly large entourage of attendant secretaries, translators and cipher clerks.

Chapter One of this thesis will consider the reign of James VI and I, his foreign, domestic and religious policies and the ways in which they informed the actions and policies of visiting ambassadors. This chapter will pinpoint the important issues and phases of the reign so that discussion may take place of the way in which ambassadors operated within the restrictive confines of James's court.

As a further aid to discussion Chapter Two will examine the ideas and realities of ambassadorship in the early modern period. This will take two forms: first will be an examination of the qualities which jurists and political theorists believed necessary to any man entering the diplomatic service. Second it will explore the realities of early seventeenth century diplomatic office based on analysis of the Database of foreign diplomatic representatives, contemporary writing and the memoirs and relazioni of the ambassadors themselves.

Chapter Three will take an in-depth view of the function of the ambassador at the Court of St. James and examine the day to day workings of the embassy. This chapter will, furthermore, seek to introduce the reader the men who undertook the
daily running of the embassy and the problems caused by questions of protocol and
etiquette between ambassadors and their counterparts from other nations. The two
final chapters of this work will examine in detail the embassies of two of the most
important players in European diplomacy during these early years of the
seventeenth century. Spain, as the undisputed head of the Catholic coalition and the
newly constituted and devoutly Protestant, United Provinces of the Netherlands.
Both give modern commentators a fairly broad image of the workings of the
diplomat during this period. The constant sniping over precedence, recognition and
religion belie the fact that the two nations were officially at peace. Furthermore,
much of this sniping took place at the court in England so that it could be argued
that James's court was the unofficial battleground for this undeclared war.
In any discussion of the place of foreign envoys to England during the period 1603 to 1625 it is important to place these men in the context of the early seventeenth century politics prevailing at the court of James VI and I. In order to understand the diplomats and their place, we must understand the court in which they operated and the politics of that court. It is important that we examine James’s court because, as with all royal courts, it was very much an individual creation, shaped by, and reflecting to a great extent the personality and interests of the monarch himself. Thus, in order to understand the court we need to understand the King whose character played a large part in shaping and creating the personality of the court and determining its mentalité. In this way it is possible to acknowledge how the political atmosphere at any one time could drastically affect the outcome of any commission these men might have.

This chapter will, therefore begin by examining the man whose court it was. Having explored the historiography this chapter will move on to James himself and examine his personality and the intellectual framework that shaped his actions. It will discuss the key features of his reign and the historical context in which he operated. From that point it will be a fairly obvious step to discuss the nature of the Court and its policies. Finally, this chapter will examine the key issues that affected the diplomats: James’s religious and foreign policies, his desire for diplomatic, confessional marriages for his children and his conflict with Parliament over policy and money.

Chronologically placed as he was, between the ‘Virgin Queen’ and the ‘Martyr King’, justice has seldom been done to James either as a statesman or as a theorist. As a monarch his reputation suffered by comparison with the myths and
idealisations of his Tudor predecessors, especially Elizabeth, and by the tendency to view his reign merely as the curtain-raiser to an inevitable Civil War. Furthermore, his merits as a theorist were largely obscured by his own pedantry and the biased inclinations of later historians. It was not until the closing decades of the last century that some considerable revision of James’s reign took place allowing us to see through the bias of earlier times. The traditional view of James is that which Sellar and Yeatman put to such good use in their amusing but irreverent history, which concluded that, as he ‘slobbered at the mouth and had favourites’, he was therefore ‘a Bad King’. This assumption was based on the view that James was an oaf, a man of questionable morals and a political no-body; a view which had a long history based as it was on the slanderous contemporary writings of such as Sir Antony Weldon. The caricature was perpetuated by Sir Walter Scott. In reality, Weldon, who had been knighted by James, lost his post as Clerk of the Green Cloth after writing an unflattering account of Scotland which eventually came to the King’s attention. Weldon took his revenge by writing a scandalous expose of the Stuart court, published posthumously in 1650, in which he gave a vividly painted portrait of a ungainly man slobbering over his favourites. For all Weldon has been dismissed as a scandal-monger with an axe to grind by modern commentators his epitaph to James is oft repeated:

In a word, he was, (taken him altogether and not in peeces) such a King I wish this kingdom have never any worse, on the condition, not any better; for he lived in peace, dyed in peace, and left all his Kingdomes in a peaceable condition, with his own Motto: Beati Pacifici.

Although slightly less scurrilous contemporary histories can be found, these are all inevitably overshadowed by Weldon’s description of James’s court. The writings of Sir Francis Osborne, William Sanderson and Godfrey Goodman, for

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7 A. Weldon, *The Court and Character of King James and of the Intrigues and Tragical Events of His Life... first published in 1615* (1817); W. Scott (ed.) *Secret History of the Court of James the First* (Edinburgh, 1811).
8 A. Weldon, *The Court and Character...*, p. 175.
example, take a more sober and sympathetic view of James’s character. Although
Osborne’s writing was not so biased as Weldon’s, it was, nonetheless, still critical of
the King. He laid James’s impecunity at the door of his partiality for the Scots who
‘hung like horseleeches on him’ and commented unfavourably on what he saw as
the wasteful indulgence and luxury of the Court. Sanderson sought to write an
unbiased account of the reign, whilst Bishop Goodman, wrote what was intended
as a refutation of Weldon’s exposé. The writings of such men, and indeed of James
himself, were largely ignored by contemporary readers, thus creating an
unbalanced view of the King as regards contemporary accounts. Similarly,
throughout the following centuries, up to the latter quarter of the last century,
works which discounted the critical view of the King’s character were almost
completely ignored. As Roger Lockyer rightly suggests, if Charles I’s personal rule
had succeeded and royal authority been strengthened instead of weakened, if not
almost destroyed by the civil war, these highly critical accounts of James’s reign
might have remained unpublished. As it stands therefore, it could well be said
that the plethora of indictments against the King’s character which got into print
were not so much historical facts but rather primarily, politically motivated
criticisms which were commonly mistaken for facts and which were repeated for
some three hundred and fifty years. Indeed, the criticisms published seem to reveal
more about early modern and Victorian society’s preoccupation with scandal than
they do about the actual character of the King.

It seems clear then that these critics should have ultimately heeded James’s
own advice to his critics:

... exercise true Wisdom; in discerning wisely betwixt true and false reports;
First, concerning the nature of the person reporter; Next, what entresse can
he have in the weale or euill of him, of whom he maketh the report; Thirdly,

9 Godfrey Goodman, The Court of James I (ed.) J. S. Brewer, 2 vols. (1839); W. Sanderson,
A Compleat History (1696); F. Osborne, Some Traditional Memoryes on the Raigne of King
James the First (1658).
10 F. Osborne, Some Traditional Memoryes on the Raigne of King James the First (1658), vol.
1, pp. 270-273.
11 R. Lockyer, James VI & I (1998), p. 4
the likelihood of the purpose itself; And last, the nature and by-past life of
the dilated person... The [they] spouse that quarrell... not for any euill or vice in me, but because I was
a King, which they thought the highest euill. And
because they were ashamed to professee this quarrel, they were busie to look
narrowly in all my actions; and I warrant you a mote in my eye, ye a false
report, was matter enough for them to work vpon. 13

There were, of course, other commentators at the Court, the most prolific of
whom were the ambassadors. The Venetian, Zorzi Guistinian, in his relazion of
1607, sent to the Senate an image of a King disinclined to rule, who was much
happier hunting and who left affairs of state in the hands of his council. 14 His
successor, Marc-Antonio Correr, formed much the same opinion of James, finding a
man who:

ardently loves hunting, and makes use of it not only for his diversion, but also
for his health; so thoroughly does he devote himself to it, that he has
abandoned and thrown under foot all other business, which he has resigned
to his Council and Ministers, so that one may truly say that he is merely a
prince by name...This proceeds purely from inclination, seeing that he can,
and knows how to, exercise the art of reigning, and that he is endowed with
an excellent understanding and extraordinary learning...but now he has
entirely abandoned it. 15

Fra Paolo Sarpi in his correspondence, regularly expressed the wish that
England had a more active King. He found James to be more theologian than King; a
man who sought conciliation through talk rather than action; a misguided seeker of
alliances with the Spanish; a man with little vision and not given to swift or
decisive action and a man who, though an enemy of the Pope and the Jesuits,
found himself incapable of taking his rightful place at the head of a united
Protestant coalition. 16 Desmaretz, the French ambassador, writing in the middle
years of James's reign also found the King wanting. The ambassador felt the need to
have frequent audiences with the King because 'in his conversation sometimes this

12 James VI & I, Basilikon Doran, cited in Sommerville, Political Writings, p. 48
13 James VI & I, Basilikon Doran, as previously cited, p. 26
14 L. Firpo (ed.), Relazioni di Ambasciatori al Senato (Torino, 1965) vol. i, p. 528. These
sentiments were to appear time and again in the relazion of the Venetian Ambassadors.
Relation d'Angleterre. Par Marc-Anton Correr (1668) p. 57.
15 Sarpi's attitude is discussed in J. L. Lievsay, 'Paolo Sarpi's Appraisal of James I', pp. 109 -
117 in H. Bluhm (ed.), Essays in History and Literature presented to Stanley Furgellis
(Chicago, 1965).
and sometimes that escapes him.' 17 The King entertained 'a perfectly good opinion of himself' and considered himself the 'arbiter of all Christendom, and specially the protector of France. If his counsels be not blindly followed, he makes such a noise and alarum that one would think him about to do wonders, but all is blown away with the winds. He wants alike money and courage. Always and in every thing does King James insist upon flattery.' 18 The memoirs of his compatriot, Antoine le Fevre de la Boderie, ordinary from July, 1624 to July, 1625, gives us no very favourable account of James or his Court either. 19 The Constable of Castile, however, struck a more optimistic note about James's character in his memo to Philip, dated 22nd November, 1604. James was, he noted, 'a princely friend of learning, gentle, literate, attentive to the practice of virtue and well disposed to the affairs of Spain'. 20

In the years following his death James was not to be remembered as a great or noble monarch but one on whom Royalist commentators such as Oglander and Clarendon could thrust the blame for the errors and blunders of his son. 21 The Thomason Tracts contains what, at first glance, appears to be a promising portrayal of James's character by his son. But upon further exploration this turns out to be nothing more than a justification for the actions taken by Charles himself. 22

During his opening speech to Parliament in 1656, Cromwell commented on James's peace treaty with Spain in a rather dismissive fashion:

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17 A fairly unflattering description of one of these many audiences, that of 2nd July, 1615, can be found in Nichols, Progresses, vol. iii, pp. 96 - 97.
22 Anon, King Charles his defence against some trayterous observations upon King James, his judgements of a king and of a Tyrant (1642) Thomason Tracts, BL E126, no. 32.
And truly, it is true - King James made a peace; but whether this nation, or any interest all the protestant Christians, suffered more by that peace, than ever by his hostility, I refer it to your consideration. 23

Having said that he looked for a precedent when he sought to arrange his own state funeral and decided that the funeral formalities observed for James were those to be followed for his own obsequies, though lack of funds prevented the full pageantry. 24

Very little was written about the character of the King or his reign during the early eighteenth century. Historians in this period viewed James as the ‘father’ of the Stuart line and, given many eighteenth-century writers’ tendency to see history from a Whig perspective, James’s autocratic tendencies, his favourites, the ‘corruption’ of his court and the undue influence exercised there by men such as Buckingham, as well as the fact that James was believed to have encouraged Charles I’s absolutist tendencies, would almost certainly have guaranteed that he was seen in negative terms. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to find even David Hume, who was in many respects anti-Whig, writing in 1770, disinclined towards generosity. He found James wanting and noted that he was, ‘awkward in his person, and ungainly in his manners, ... ill qualified to command respect; partial and undiscerning in his affections.’ 25 This unflattering work and others in a similar vein were those available to the public at the turn of the nineteenth century when Sir Walter Scott published his highly critical ‘secret history’ of the reign. 26 Following the established tradition, Scott ignored the positive image of James portrayed by such writers as Goodman and Sanderson, repeating instead the uncomplimentary words of Weldon. James’s already low reputation was confirmed as a result. Indeed, Scott gave further credence to the view that James

24 W. C. Abbott, Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 1655 - 1658, vol. IV, p. 874
26 W. Scott (ed.), Secret History of the Court of James the First (Edinburgh, 1811).
was little more than a well-read pedant in his novel *The Fortunes of Nigel*, where he gave an account of a man who, although 'deeply learned', was not in possession of any 'useful knowledge'.

Nor was James better served by nineteenth-century Whig historians. Macaulay, writing in the 1840s, held the view that during James's reign, 'all the venerable associations by which the throne had long been fenced were gradually losing their strength', and dismissed James himself as a 'buffoon' and 'pedagogue'. Similarly in the late 1880s and early 1890s, S. R. Gardiner, one of the first truly modern historians, despite going beyond the partisan and sensationalist writings of James's reign, still concluded that, for all his worthy ambitions, James 'sowed the seeds of revolution and disaster'.

During the early years of the twentieth century A. O. Meyer resurrected Weldon's treacherous James, this time in connection with his dealings with the Pope. G. M. Trevelyan's 1904 treatment of the King's character was more balanced, enumerating, as he did, James's many good characteristics whilst seeing also his failings. He concluded his analysis of the King by suggesting that his fatal defect was his inability to 'tell a good man from a rogue, or a wise man from a fool'.

Moving forward to the 1920s, M. A. Hume's several works on James all portrayed the conventional image of the King as a slobbering, ineffectual and pleasure-seeking monarch. This was to remain the standard view of the King until at least the 1970s. William McElwee merely regurgitated much of Sir Anthony Weldon's invective, as late as 1958, and in 1962, when D. H. Willson published what was to become the standard biography of James, he made no attempt to hide his disgust

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32 See for example M. A. Hume, *Court of Philip IV* (New York, 1927).
for him. Why this should be is debatable but one would suggest that it had a great deal to do with the alleged homosexual tendencies of the king.  

The 1960s and 1970s saw a real change in attitude among historians, as a revisionist interpretation emerged which began to modify the old view of James as a slobbering idiot and indeed, this new interpretation, as Maurice Lee notes, presented the King as a seeker of the via media at home and of peace abroad, a man with acute political antennae whose style was anything but confrontational and whose success in achieving that via media, and in keeping peace, was comparable to that of his much-admired predecessor. 

Charles Carter, writing in 1964, noted that far from being in the thrall of the Spanish ambassador, Gondomar, (a question with which we shall deal below) James's approach to foreign policy was both well thought out and perceptive: he was as much the puppeteer as the puppet. At the same time, James's religious policy was also being re-evaluated. The best modern accounts of the Jacobean church can be found in Patrick Collinson's *The Religion of Protestants: the Church in English Society, 1559 - 1625*, published in 1982, and in the two works by Kenneth Fincham, *Prelate as Pastor: The Episcopate of James I* (1990) and *The Early Stuart Church, 1603 - 1642* (1993). Collinson, Curtis and Shriver have also published on the Hampton Court Conference placing James's church settlements and religious policies in the context of the new thinking about the period. A. J. Loomie's examination of the Simancas archive material in his work *Spain and the

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57 D. E. Kennedy, 'The Jacobean Episcopate', *Historical Journal*, vol. 5 (1962); S. Babcock, *Puritanism and Richard Bancroft* (1962). As it is very difficult to separate James's foreign from his religious policy, these two subjects are dealt with together.
Jacobean Catholics sheds new light on the role played by Spain in the religious upheavals of the period, especially during the period of the Spanish marriage negotiations. 40 Thomas Cogswell’s book, The Blessed Revolution (1989) and his chapter ‘England and the Spanish Match’ has much to say about Anglo-Spanish relations and discusses the proposed marriage placing it firmly at the centre of James’s foreign policy. 41

In the early 1980s Roger Lockyer’s biography of Buckingham and Linda Levy Peck’s study of the Earl of Northampton by taking stock of those around James led the way to a further re-thinking about James’s reign as a whole. 42 Two papers which demonstrated the success of James as King of Scotland, Jenny Wormald’s article on the nature of James’s kingship, which had the advantage of looking at his reign from a Scottish perspective, and Maurice Lee’s study of Scotland under James’s rule, followed. 43 Wormald’s article went further than Lee’s in discussing how, in England, the King was faced with an entirely different and unfamiliar set of parameters. In Scotland he had worked with the co-operation of Parliament, but when he tried this approach in England he encountered a larger, far less manageable body concerned with its own privileges and preservation and less prepared to compromise. 44 Arguably, the watershed in this new thinking was reached by Levy Peck’s 1988 conference and the consequent publication of The Mental World of the Jacobean Court, in 1991. 45 In recent years this has developed into an interest not just in the mental world of the Jacobean court but also in its

physical make-up and modification under James. 46 As a result new biographical work has been published recently. Lockyer's work, *James VI and I* (1998), is by no means comprehensive, touching only on the significant issues of the reign, but it does contain a comprehensive bibliographic essay. Lee's *Great Britain's Solomon: James VI and I in his three Kingdoms*, is probably the most balanced recent account, whilst the second edition of Houston's *James I*, contains a good survey of recent work and an excellent bibliography. 47

How then does one explain the differing views of James which have come down through the years? Part of the problem is that intrinsically we have two different James's - James VI of Scotland and James I of England. 48 James of Scotland is seen as an educated man of outstanding political ability whilst James of England appears wanting in common-sense, and is pictured as ungainly, with mumbling speech, habits at odds with his newly inherited court and a predilection towards handsome young men, lavish spending, the pleasures of an indecorous court and alcoholic excesses. 49 The King's drinking caused comment and the French ambassador once reported that James drank 'to such purpose, that he fell on the table, after having sat at it for five hours'. Even his wife was said to have complained that 'the King drinks so much, and conducts himself ill in every respect, that I expect an early and evil result.' 50 If this is indeed the case it is a great shame that James did not follow his own advise in *Basilikon Doron* to 'beware of


49 On the question of James's sexuality see M. B. Young, *King James and the History of Homosexuality* (New York, 2000)

drunkennesse, which is a beastlie vice, namely in a King; but specially beware with it, because it is one of those vices that increaseth with age'. 51 His ungainly appearance and "loutish" habits may not have pleased his English critics, but the Venetian ambassador, at least, saw past his faults and found a man "sufficiently tall, of a noble presence." 52

Why then are these reports of James's character so inconsistent? It is foolish to try to say that in Scotland he was a paragon of virtue - a patron, a cultured and handsome man, the leading light of a gracious and educated court - and that all of this suddenly changed, so that when he arrived in England he had become debauched and uncouth. The main problem was that the English court could not accommodate itself to a King who spoke with a "heathen" accent and who brought with him officials from his Scottish court who he placed in influential positions in England. Nevertheless, it must also be remembered that James was a cultured man, a great patron of the arts (his patronage of Jonson, Jones, Donne and Shakespeare must not be overlooked) and a well-read author himself. 53 In England, the King was criticised for his passion for hunting, but, long before 1603, sources in Scotland had also criticised this very same passion. 54 Ultimately these differing views are the result of the reality of kingship crashing headlong into the ideal image of the king. Kings should be "civilised" and their courts even more so.

In addition, the King in England possessed two further personalities - the King in London and the King in the country - which bore very little resemblance to each other. James heartily disliked the hustle and bustle of city life and much preferred the retired privacy and ease of the country. He maintained that his health required constant outdoor exercise, but assured the Privy Council that he would

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51 Sommerville, Political Writings, p. 51
53 On James's patronage see, in particular, the work of L. Levy Peck, Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I (1973); "For a king not to be bountiful were a fault", Perspectives on Court Patronage in Early Stuart England, Journal of British Studies, vol. 25, pp. 31 - 61 (1986); Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (1993).
return promptly to the capital if or when events necessitated it. 55 What he most wished to escape from was the legacy of the Elizabethan court: the perplexing and exhausting diversity of counsel, the unending importunity of petitioners and the oppressive and formal etiquette and decorum of Whitehall. When in the country, the restraints of speech, ceremony, even morals, could be cast aside and a relaxed King could enjoy the intimacy, joviality and carefree idleness of life away from court. Thus we find him, for example, enjoying, with his small retinue, one of his regular visits to the ‘cramped quarters’ of Sir Noel de Caron’s country-house at Bagshot. 56

Many early defenders have suggested that James’s posthumous reputation would have been higher had he succumbed to the serious illness which attacked him in 1619. Certainly some observers noted the King’s feebleness of mind and body after this date and, as the 1620s progressed, found that the Duke of Buckingham commanded increasing control over the direction of policy, in the process making himself one of the most distrusted and feared men in the country. 57

In James’s defence, a recent publication, Purple Secret, claims to be able to throw light on the problems surrounding James’s changing character. 58 The authors suggest that James suffered from Porphyria, the condition said to have caused the rapid decline in George III. 59 This, they contend, turned the cleverest and potentially the ablest of the Stuarts into a dissolute buffoon, leaving him at the mercy of the whims of the scheming favourite, Buckingham. According to the authors, James showed many of the symptoms: sensitivity to light, sudden mood

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57 For example, Valaresso to the Doge, 24th February, 1623, CSP Venetian, 1621 - 1623, pp. 571 - 572; As Lockyer rightly notes, this was the common reaction to favourites in the early modern period. They were disliked not on a personal level but because of the power they acquired - cutting through red tape to get things done and generally upsetting the status quo. R. Lockyer, Buckingham, The Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 1592-1628 (London and New York, 1981) and James VI & I (1998) p. 206.
59 See also I. Macalpine and R. Hunter, George III and the Mad Business (1969).
swings, fits of unconsciousness and delirium, violent pains in the limbs and abdomen and blood-red urine, which the King himself compared to dark Alicante wine. Whether any DNA testing can be done to prove this hypothesis remains to be seen.\textsuperscript{60}

In reality the accession of James I, at the age of 37, heralded one of the most turbulent dynasties in British history.\textsuperscript{61} James had already proved himself as an accomplished ruler in Scotland and he came to England with his political convictions, his great belief in himself and his notions of prerogative already formed. Furthermore, he was something of a philosopher leaving behind a large body of his own writings. As the author of five main works of political theory, two written in Scotland and three in England, he argued against theories of legitimate resistance which flourished in Scotland and on the continent, attempting to impress upon his readers his position as father to his people.\textsuperscript{62} Throughout his works James refers to Scripture for justification of what he firmly believed to be his divinely ordained position. In 1610 he told Parliament:

\begin{quote}
For Kings are not only GODS Lieutenants upon earth, and sit upon GODS throne, but even by GOD himself they are called Gods…Kings are justly called Gods, for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of Divine power upon earth: For if you will consider the Attributes of God, you shall see how they agree in the person of a King.\textsuperscript{63}
\end{quote}

His main theories of kingship had been set down before he came to the English throne in a book of advice for his son, Prince Henry.\textsuperscript{64} Here, he pictured a benevolent despot, both father and shepherd of his people, much in the tradition of

\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, the authors of this work suggest that the disease was passed from the King to his eldest son Henry, Prince of Wales and that it was this which accounted for his early death.

\textsuperscript{61} For a thorough discussion of the dynasty see M. Kishlansky, \textit{A Monarchy Reformed, Britain 1603 - 1714} (1997).

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{The Trew Law of Free Monarchies} (1598); \textit{Basilikon Doron} (1599); \textit{Triplici Node, Triplex Cuneus. Or an Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance} (1608); \textit{A Meditation upon the 27th, 28th and 29th Verses of the 27th Chapter of Saint Matthew} (1619); \textit{His Majesties Declaration, Touching his Proceedings in the Late Assemblie and Convention of Parliament} (1622), reprinted in Sommerville, \textit{Political Writings}.

\textsuperscript{63} James’s speech to Parliament 21\textsuperscript{st} March, 1610. Sommerville, \textit{Political Writings}, p. 181

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Basilikon Doron} (1599).
the ideal prince as perpetuated by the Christian humanists. *Basilikon Doron*, literally ‘the Gift of the King’, describes the dual nature of the monarch: the divinity inherent in kingship and the humanity that belongs to the person of the King. Ideally, he argued, the King should, in every way be the exemplar for the nation: in conduct, action and in the quality of his mind. However, it was the sacred character of kingship to which James paid most attention. He insisted that Kings were chosen by God, who invested in them more than a little of His own qualities - wisdom, mercy, and sanctity. Again James referred to Scripture for confirmation of his theory, reaffirming all the time that the institution of Kings was appointed by God and, as such, would be sustained by God as a viable sign of His authority on earth. Kingship, James argued, is patriarchal, for as God is the father of all men, so the King is father to his people. A King's care is for his people, and they in their turn must give to him their total and unquestioning obedience, as a child would its father:

> By the Law of Nature the King becomes a naturall Father to all his Lieges at his Coronation: And as the Father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the nourishing, education, and vertuous gouernment of his children; euen so is the king bound to care for all his subjects. As all the toile and paine that the father can take for his children, will be thought light and well bestowed by him that the effect thereof redound to their profile and weale; so ought the prince to doe towards his people. 66

As well as fitting into a patriarchal society the images of father and child in *Basilikon Doron* resound with language which usually described the relationship of God with his people.

In this treatise James was, in fact, acting in the spirit of his earlier, more realistic treatise, *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies*, published in 1598. James always stressed a ruler's obligations but admitted that the fulfilment of these obligations should be judged by God alone. The political theory expressed in this

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treatise used to be characterised as 'absolutist', but current thinking now swings away from this idea with recent commentators emphasising instead, that James, like most of his contemporaries, believed that King's should not act arbitrarily, that it was their duty to preserve the well-being of their subjects and that, ultimately, they were accountable to God. 67

From the point of view of an answer to Papal claims to the right to depose heretical monarchs and the Pope's releasing subjects from their allegiance to any such monarch, undoubtedly more important than any of James's treatises was the Oath of Allegiance introduced in 1606, which practically broke the final vestiges of Catholicism in England by setting Catholic against Catholic. To the question of Rome's renewed attacks on England James devoted nearly three quarters of his political writings (1608 - 1615), enlisting such distinguished assistants as Andrewes, Donne and Causabon along the way.

These were the theories of the man who first united England and Scotland. But how did James's ideas of kingship, developed in Scotland, tally with the maintenance of a court in England? The accession of a Scots King was a secretly and carefully planned political bargain which was completed before Elizabeth's death. Mutual political advantage guaranteed both Cecil and the Howards pre-eminence in James's court. Certain policies, the most important of which was peace with Spain, were agreed by the Privy Council at the end of Elizabeth's reign, but it was James who took the lead by bringing to London the Spanish delegation to negotiate the treaty which ended an expensive war. James truly believed that the way to lasting peace lay in arbitration and not through force of arms, telling Parliament

that ‘it is an unchristian thing to seek that by blood which may be had by peace’. 68

It must also be remembered that James’s accession to the throne of England and Ireland, for the first time brought the British Isles under the rule of a single monarch. 69 Although constitutionally speaking, the three kingdoms kept their several legal, church and parliamentary systems, from an international viewpoint the three kingdoms acted and were regarded as one. In general, the changeover went smoothly, much having been settled beforehand. The actual organisation of the regime was a different matter, however. 70 This revolved around the King’s freedom to retain Scots advisers and courtiers and whether or not they should be granted English office. Cecil and Howard trod carefully and in the process destroyed two sub-factions at court by portraying Ralegh and Fortesque as exponents of a policy of Scots exclusion - a claim which held both truth and hypocrisy in it. Cecil and his allies were negative about the Scots holding office in England, preferring that the existing regime remain, with just the transferral of the crown from one monarch to another. James, of course, had other ideas and it was rumoured that he wanted a 50 - 50 split between the Scots and the English. A compromise on the division of offices reached at the conference held at Theobalds on 3rd and 4th May completed the ruin of Ralegh and Fortesque, whose offices, ironically, were given to the Scots they had fought so hard to keep out.

Along with the throne of England, James inherited fiscal and administrative weaknesses which he tried, albeit relatively unsuccessfully, to alleviate. 71 Inflation throughout the previous century had seriously eroded the monarch’s income. Elizabeth had managed to pay her way, but only by employing a parsimony which created as many problems as it solved. James, on the other hand, found it impossible

68 James’s speech to both Houses, 8th March, 1624, *Journals of the House of Lords*, iii, pp. 250 - 251.

69 James was to be disappointed by his failure to effect a true union of the two countries and many Englishmen remained suspicious of their new King on the grounds of his foreignness. For the make-up of the new court see N. Cuddy ‘The Revival of entourage: the Bedchamber of James I, 1603 - 1625’, in D. Starkey (ed.) *The English Court*, pp. 175 - 225.

70 See the writing of N. Cuddy, L. Levy Peck, J. Wormald as above.
to practise such economies. Even he admitted in 1607 that his time spent in
England so far ‘were to me as a Christmas’. He was expected to be, and
indeed was, generous. The English court embarked on an orgy of extravagant
spending in order to welcome the new King and James participated wholeheartedly
in a round of masques, dinners and other pleasures. Many flocked to the court,
desirous of winning the King’s attention and thereby some gift or another of money,
lands, titles, offices or wardships. In 1605 a commission reporting on the state of
the King’s finances noted that if James did not cease to spend in such a way the
Treasury would soon become bankrupt. The King, however, ignored these warnings
and continued in his own way so that he was soon to be unable to pay his
government officials proper salaries. He remained continually short of funds so that
the underpaid civil service was to be assisted by a volunteer army of unsalaried
officials who reimbursed themselves by ‘embezzling’ their share from any revenues
that passed through their hands. James had no agents of central government
working in the provinces nor did he have a standing army to impose his will.
However, the dispensation of royal bounty provided a means whereby central
control could be maintained. To the court came those seeking office or favour, so
that, by patronage the King could select and secure for himself loyal servants, who,
in exchange for his favour, would do his bidding. The system of patronage, which
was a feature of early modern government, although not inherently corrupt by the
standards of the time, did nothing to enhance the King’s chances of financial or

72 James’s Speech to Parliament, 31st March, 1607. Sommerville, Political Writings, p. 166.
For example see Chamberlain to Carleton, 11th March, 1612/13, ‘Lord Harrington, in
recompense for £30,000 spent in attending Princess Elizabeth is granted a suit for coining
brass farthings.’ Commenting on this, Chamberlain notes; ‘you might think we are brought
to a low ebb, when the last week the Archduke’s Ambassador was carried to see the ancient
goodly plate of the House of Burgundy pawned to Queen Elizabeth by the General States,
and to know whether his princes would redeem it, for otherwise it will be melted’... In the
same vein he further notes that ‘Sir John Digby took up £1000 of Sarmiento, the new
Ambassador, at his coming out of Spain, and gave him bills of exchange to the
commissioners of the treasury, which were paid, though with some difficulty.’ 9th
September, 1613 cited in T. Birch, The Court and Times of James the First, pp. 233, 271.
administrative reform. 74 Many have argued that James ruined the system by his waste of royal revenues, his inability to select able men and his over-dependence on his favourites. James's decision to rule by a favourite through the Bedchamber was a deliberate policy conditioned by his experiences in Scotland; however, fitting this experience to English conditions took time and caused many problems. 75

In England the organisation of the court, as instigated by the early Tudors, remained practically unchanged until 1603 when James imported French ideas from his Scottish court. The ceremonial system which he inherited was one which had evolved over several centuries and to this he added the French ideas practised at his court in Scotland. Behind this idea lay two fundamental axioms. One was the medieval idea that a monarch's power and prestige should be expressed by a large entourage which filled his house in the pursuit of his favour. Gentlemen coveted positions at court, not just for the rewards they might receive but they vied and jostled with each other for the honour such a position conferred. Alongside this, a crowded court could only add to the King's honour, confirming his position at the head of society. The second fundamental principle required that the King and those surrounding him should be displayed in magnificence. He should display his prestige by elaborate festivities, banquets, feasts and grand entertainments. The ceremonial which took place at James's court was not just a form of pomp - it was a way of forming important social and political alliances. Even the details of deportment and behaviour in the King's household took on an importance since it expressed the degrees of honour and favour bestowed amongst a fiercely competitive elite. This explains the development of a complex set of rules concerning precedence and courtesy in royal households which created a system of honour, whilst reducing the occasion for quarrels amongst those competing for symbolic victories over their rivals at court. The King's right to regulate behaviour

75 See in particular the work of N. Cuddy cited above.
and to indicate his esteem for favoured individuals was an important form of power which sometimes involved his officials in settling disputes over precedence, particularly in the case of foreign representatives, as demonstrated by the regular outbursts of sniping between the French and Spanish ambassadors which usually broke out over questions of such matters as title or seating.

James's dealings with the ambassadors were coloured by the way in which his court operated and the European diplomats fitted well into this court, with its French innovations, which made access to the King easier and which suited their continental style of diplomacy. Chapter 4 of this work will explore in detail the way the foreign representatives operated in James's court.

In his dealings with Parliament James sought to impose on this establishment the ideas and accommodations which he had experienced in Scotland and which he laid out in his theoretical writings. Characteristically he sought to show the English Parliament what he believed to be its true role in the state. For James, Parliament was nothing more the King's Council, assembled, to his mind, for the express purposes of interpreting old laws and making new ones, to advise the King (on subjects on which he felt inclined to be advised) and to point out any disorders which may have escaped him. As we can see from his writings he certainly did not believe it was for Parliament to meddle in his business or to attempt to teach the King his job. During the first half of his reign, when he was guided by Cecil, these quarrels with Parliament were sufficiently marked, and, after his chief advisor's death, James endeavoured to avoid any further disagreements by calling Parliament as seldom as he could. His choice of Cecil as his chief adviser and the contemporaneous imprisonment of Ralegh for complicity in the Main Plot of

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76 Evidence of James's attitude can be found time and again in his own writings. See, for example, A Speech to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at Whitehall, on Wednesday the XXI. Of March, anno 1609, and His Majesties Declaration, touching his proceedings in the late Assembly and Convention of Parliament, reproduced in Sommerville, Political Writings, pp. 179 - 203, 250 - 267.
1603, proved to be the triumph of the peace-party over the war-party. In 1604 the Treaty of London ended the Anglo-Spanish war and five years later the Truce of Antwerp, which was negotiated under the mediation of France and England, brought to a formal end the hostilities between the United Provinces and Spain.

Following the treaty of 1604, Stuart politics became much more overtly peace-centred, so that the struggles between court factions and debates on foreign policy became more closely linked. James's foreign policy was tied inextricably with his religious policies and his desire to act as *Rex Pacificus* to all Europe. The pro-Spain faction at Court might well have tended to associate themselves with the King but their opponents, lacked a leader with the charisma to form a cohesive opposition. Although Elizabeth, as Queen of Bohemia, played a symbolic role in the pro-Protestant cause her sex and indeed, her absence from the country never allowed her to be placed at the head of such a faction. However, during the last two years of his life Prince Henry did take on this role, albeit briefly.

In 1610 the people of Great Britain were justifiably proud of Henry, their newly invested Prince of Wales. Seen as courageous and serious, loyal to his friends, devoted to honour, high-minded and devoutly Protestant, the prince aroused in his people an admiration which was, in part, a reaction to his father's perceived failings. The qualities which endeared Henry to the nation were those he did not share with his father - the king and his son were two disparate characters. The one, as we have seen was a pedantic, sometimes coarse, middle-aged man with an interest in handsome young men. The other was a young, good-looking man-at-arms, an aesthete and an egotist, who revelled in public appearance and was obsessed by his own image. More importantly he was 'a solid Protestant, abhorring not only the idolatry, superstition, and bloody persecutions of the Romish

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In the absence of any real leadership within the royal family the leaders of Protestant foreign policy tended to be found amongst the descendants of Elizabeth's ministers: the Earls of Essex, Southampton, Pembroke and Bedford.
synagogue, but being freed also from the Lutheran leaven which had then so far spread itself in Germany, and hath since ruined it'.

It was obvious, even early on, that the prince appeared in complete contrast to his father and this was to be one of the chief topics of conversation at court and an apparent source of interest to those who bore James ill-will. In 1607 an account of the growing friction between father and son was given by the Venetian ambassador, Guistinian, who noted that although the prince was marked by a 'gravity most certainly beyond his years' and might attend to his studies, it was not, 'with much delight, and chiefly under his father's spur' so that he was often 'admonished and set down' by the king for his lack of diligence. Indeed, according to the ambassador, James became so exasperated by his son's inattention to his books, he gave him a stern lecture, in which he threatened to leave the crown to his brother, who was 'far quicker at learning and studied more earnestly'. Henry appeared unimpressed by his father's threat: 'It is not necessary for me to be a professor,' he is quoted as saying, 'but a soldier and a man of the world. If my brother is as learned as they say, we'll make him Archbishop of Canterbury'. The ambassador suggests that the king took this retort in bad part and, furthermore, was not over-pleased 'to see his son so beloved and of such promise that his subjects place all their hopes in him'.

Henry demonstrated early in his career a taste for martial arts and military glory. Indeed we are assured by Sir Charles Cornwallis that even as a child the prince showed 'a Noble and Heroick Spirit', enjoying nothing so much as 'the sounding of the Trumpet, the beating of the Drumme and the roaring of Canon.' As he grew older Henry desired to be surrounded by military men and such was his interest in things military word soon passed around that here was a prince in the

78 Goodman, Court, vol. i, p. 248
80 Sir C. Cornwallis, An Account of the Baptism, Life, Death and Funeral of the most incomparable Prince, Frederick Henry, Prince of Wales... (1751), p.18
old heroic mould, ardent for military glory, another Black Prince or Henry V, and
'a true lover of the English nation'. 81 It was not just the military which held a
fascination for the prince. He also showed a great interest in the navy, seeing it as
central to England's power and prosperity. Henry firmly believed that his future lay
in the military and indeed Cornwallis notes that in every way the prince was
preparing himself for such an office - 'fitting himself into the office he was born
unto'. 82 A strong navy would, he believed, be the vanguard of Protestant might
which would vanquish that of Spain. For this reason Henry looked to reform the
navy, with improvements to its administration accompanying a boom in
shipbuilding which would double the existing fleet. In every sense he was acting as
befitted the Lord Admiral, a position he felt should be his, despite his youth. His
father, however, was not of the same mind and granted the office to his younger
son, the Duke of York. Perhaps it could be argued that this was James's way of
showing the son that absolute power still rested with the father and that he was
unimpressed by Henry's show of 'heroical intentions'. Whatever the reason
James's action served to further convince the prince's supporters that the king
would better serve his country by handing the reins of government to Henry.

It would be easy to assume from these and others of the documented
outbursts between the two, that the king was becoming increasingly jealous of the
prince, but one would suggest that this assumption is incorrect. A son's arrogance
might well worry a concerned father. Henry appeared so self-assured, so ambitious
and was so much at the centre of the country's hopes and the fact that he stood next
in line to the throne and could, once crowned, execute unhindered all his plans and
ambitions obviously worried the king, who was clearly aware of the motivating
forces behind the furthering of Henry's reputation and knew which men had the

81 Goodman, Court, vol. i, p. 248
82 C. Cornwallis, 'A discourse of the most illustrious Prince Henry, late Prince of Wales',
(1626) in Harleian Miscellany, vol. iv, (1809), p. 322
prince’s ear. Nevertheless, whilst the prince and his cronies made their plans and
dreamt of a zealous Protestant future under the Godly rule of Henry VIII, James
got on with the day to day realities of ruling the kingdom. James, as we know,
determined on peace and sought to stay clear of contention and, although his
subjects might put his love of peace down to fear, his motives for steering his
country away from conflict had a sound basis. England possessed no standing army;
and, the navy, despite the prince’s romanticised ideas concerning its reform, was, in
fact, in considerable decay. More importantly, there was no money for raising and
maintaining a standing military force. Yet Henry, the practicalities of finance
notwithstanding, attracted and attached to himself those who wished for nothing
more than a holy war on the continent. What James feared was that Henry would
attempt some action towards the fulfilment of Protestant hopes and plunge the
country into a war it could neither afford nor win. At a time when Europe was
dividing itself for war, it can hardly be wondered that the peace-loving James
should be so totally against the representation of his son as the aggressive leader of
the English Protestants.

It is well known that James was not particularly adept at distinguishing
between good and bad counsellors: Henry was not much better at this, but the
people thought he was. His courtiers gave the impression of being more sober and
God fearing than those who surrounded the king and this was seen as a positive
difference between father and son. So the differences between the two ultimately
depended to their ability to inspire comparisons with a mythic, chivalric role and
then display it. Henry understood and actively pursued the role whilst James
wished only for peace, both at home and abroad, and was plainly unable to project
this image without appearing foolish in the eyes of his subjects. Henry’s image
suggested what might be, whilst his father had an history which everyone knew
and could translate to suit their own prejudices.
The contrast in character and symbolism between father and son took on a further significance when Henry set up his own establishment at St James's Palace. By removing himself from the dissipated court of his parents to establish a more Godly household, he demonstrated his strength of character to his admirers. The king, who tended to be indirect and devious greatly enjoyed the extravagant praise and adulation of those who surrounded him, while Henry, on the other hand, despised flatterers and sycophants. Henry's court, in stark contrast to his father's, was seen not only as a place where virtue and learning could be found but, more than that as the exemplar upon which any court aspiring to virtue could model itself.\textsuperscript{83} His contemporaries admired the Prince for the sobriety and good manners displayed at his court which were in marked contrast to the laxness of his father's court. James was well known for his foul language and coarse tongue, but at his court Henry maintained an 'admirable and laudable abstinence from swearing, cussing and banning' and kept 'swear boxes' about his court.\textsuperscript{84} In his management of his finances he was again in marked contrast to his father. As the king got further into debt, so the young Prince, if not rich, was at least thrifty and managed to remain well in the black. In fact, both Bacon and Cornwallis go further by suggesting that the prince was more than thrifty and describing him as 'rather frugal'.\textsuperscript{85}

Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising that such a seemingly virtuous young man was to become the centre of well-being in the state. One would suggest that it might have been better for the Prince to have failed in the management of his affairs occasionally, for his success made him inclined to be arrogant about his own virtues and too confident of his own abilities. This can clearly be seen in his over-eagerness to participate in the affairs of government.

\textsuperscript{83} F. Douce, \textit{A copy of an original MS containing orders by Henry, Prince of Wales to his Household, (1610), Downside Abbey Library, 13269/F41E.}

\textsuperscript{84} Bacon, \textit{The Praise of Henry}, p. 517.

when he began to interfere in matters which were the King's prerogative. It was found that the Prince was encouraging subordinates in the various royal offices to make reports to him of any defects they encountered in the administration of affairs, and perhaps working on information received in this manner, the Prince became openly critical of the workings of various of his father's offices. Goodman notes that the Prince 'did some times pry into the King's actions and a little dislike them', and such was Henry's ambition that he aspired to be 'steersman to keep the ship from sinking'. 86 Robert Johnson noted in 1611 that Henry sought to have the king appoint him President of the Privy Council and taken in the context of what we already know of Henry's ambitions, it would be completely in keeping with his view of himself and his abilities. 87 Certainly, given the Prince's constant niggling at his father, it is hardly surprising that James was reported to have grumbled that the prince wished to bury him before he was dead. 88

From any discussion of the Prince of Wales it will be seen that his religion was of great importance to him and from his religious observations we are able to gain a larger picture of the prince as servitor to the higher principles of God, Church and State. He retired three times a day for his private devotions and every member of his entourage was expected to attend daily prayers. 89 But, more importantly, he upheld the Protestant religion, both at home and abroad. The puritan atmosphere of Henry's court, to which he refused entry to Catholics, was far removed from the catholic/crypto-catholic undercurrents found in the courts of both his mother and his father. His father's support of the bishops and his perceived tolerance of the Catholics caused such grave fears of popery and arbitrary government that Prince Henry came to be seen, for those few short years, as the

89 See C. Cornwallis, 'A discourse of the most illustrious Prince Henry, late Prince of Wales', (1626) in Harlían Miscellany, vol. iv, (1809), p. 319
only real champion of Protestantism, holding 'all the eyes of Christendom intent upon his youthfull hopes'.

As far as adventures with women were concerned, evidence suggests a sexual abstinence which was positively out of place in the period and which was out of step with the general promiscuity of the Jacobean court. As Bacon comments he 'passed that dangerous time of his youth...without any remarkable imputation of gallantry'. However, in the matter of the negotiations, begun in 1612, for his marriage to a Catholic princess he rather surprisingly, showed some filial duty. When asked his opinion of the proposed brides lined up for his selection, Henry refused to make any choice in the matter on the grounds that, 'My part to play, which is to be in love with any of them, is not yet at hand'. Here we see the Prince acting in a scrupulously correct manner in a matter which would have tied him up with a Catholic princess. This is certainly strange but it is possible that Henry's acquiescence was nothing more than a cover to his not intending to make a Catholic match at all, but rather to tour Protestant Germany and seek a bride of his own choosing for, 'he was resolved,' we are told, 'that two religions should never lie in his bed.' Whatever his intentions may have been they mattered very little; within weeks of the negotiations beginning he was dead.

Had Henry lived the scheme for his marriage would have presented a major clash of ideologies. The king believed completely in his plan that religious conciliation and European harmony would be achieved by a Catholic alliance, whilst Henry would have pursued a policy of polarisation. In early seventeenth century terms it is understandable that Henry should be cast as the hoped for leader of Protestant Europe against the domination of Catholicism. By a Protestant

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92 T. Birch, The Life of Henry, Prince of Wales, p. 311.
marriage he could have drawn together the Protestant states of Europe in an alliance which would, once and for all, rid the continent of the Catholic Habsburgs and their allies in Rome. At no time in his career does Henry appear anything other than violently anti-Catholic and, considering the conflagration any alliance orchestrated by the prince would have been a prelude to, one must have sympathy with the idealism of his father.

The Treaty of London, which brought to a close hostilities with Spain, did not resolve the problems of Anglo-Spanish rivalry over trade in the Indies, nor did it prevent England from continuing to aid the United Provinces. Cecil was decidedly sceptical about both Spain and France and saw the Anglo-Spanish peace as a means of negotiating between the two states. Still his foreign policy depended very much on a continuation of the war in the Netherlands, so that the signing of the Truce of Antwerp in 1609 was to bring the future of such policies into question. The direction of the second phase of foreign policy was determined by the death of John William of Cleves-Jülich in March, 1609 and the consequent dispute over the succession to his lands. Initially James had sought to act as mediator in the matter but the onset of hostility between the Protestant claimants and the Emperor in 1609 and the decision of France and the United Provinces to intervene the following winter, made James decide to join the anti-Habsburg alliance. This intervention led to a reopening of proposals from the Palatine that James should head the Evangelical Union and with a further proposal that the Elector Palatine should marry James’s daughter. At first James resisted these suggestions but the assassination of Henri IV increased the pressure on James to create an alliance along confessional lines. The marriage between Elizabeth and Frederick was agreed in

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53 Such was the English suspicion of the Spanish that when the peace was finally declared in 1604, its announcement was met by an ominous silence in the streets of London, and, as Godfrey Davies put it, "friendship with Spain - ran contrary to the prejudices of most Englishmen." See Gardiner, *History*, vol. I, p. 214; G. Davies, *The Early Stuarts, 1603 - 1660* (Oxford, 1950) p. 48.
principle in the spring of 1611 and in the following year a treaty of alliance was
signed with the Evangelical Union by both James and the United Provinces.

Although James had not agreed to any formal leadership of the Union his
participation in the Protestant alliance and his intervention in the Dutch religious
disputes suggest that the King was now following a foreign policy based on
confessional lines. This was not entirely true, as James's real concern - to act as
mediator in the problems shaking Europe - was revealed by his intervention into
the second Cleves-Julich affair of 1614. His successful mediation, which had been
accepted by both France and Spain, in this case allowed the King to consider his
experiment as a success and inspired him to consider acting in the same manner in
the Bohemian crisis of 1618.

The death of Salisbury in 1612 had made James resolve to be his own chief
minister, and to trust only his personal friends, for fear that his ministers were in
the pay of the Spanish. Some of these intimates, notably Francis Bacon, who became
Lord Chancellor in 1617, were men of practical ability but in the main the most
prominent of James's friends did not rise above the level of Court favourite. Such
men were Robert Carr, Duke of Somerset and his successor, George Villiers, who
was quickly elevated to the rank of Earl of Buckingham (1618), Lord High Admiral
(1619) and Duke in 1623, and who for ten years was the most prominent
personage in England. Cecil's death and James's decision to act as his own minister
brought about a further phase in James's foreign policy. From this point on tension
over foreign policy became more institutionalised - a divided Council suited James
as it allowed him to play one faction off against another. However, it also
discouraged the formation of a decisive policy during the years after the Bohemian
revolt. On the one hand James was encouraged to seek mediation through a Spanish
alliance whilst on the other he was encouraged to give his support to Frederick.

Between 1618 and the final collapse of the Spanish marriage negotiations
James sought to obtain a settlement of the Bohemia question but his policies were to
be upset first by Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown in 1619 and then by the Spanish invasion of the Palatine in 1620. Despite this James still remained hopeful that Spain would agree to the restoration of the Palatine. Spain, for her part, was not averse to a settlement in the area especially if it allowed them to withdraw from the marriage negotiations without alienating James entirely. Restoration of the Palatine would undoubtedly pacify James and hopefully discourage him from heading up a Protestant alliance in the support of his son in law. Furthermore, in 1622 Spain quite happily offered the restoration of the estates to Frederick's heir, Frederick Henry, on condition that he converted, was allowed to be educated at the Imperial court and married a Habsburg princess. James obviously did not fully understand the implications of this offer and besides, any concessions made by Madrid required to be balanced against the desires of the other parties involved: Isabella in Flanders, Ferdinand II and the Duke of Bavaria. James continued in his desire to act as mediator and sought to prevent any expansion of the German war whilst at the same time managing to alienate his Protestant allies. He discouraged any intervention by other powers and tried to distance the happenings in Germany from the newly resurrected Spanish-Dutch war. Still the position in the Palatine needed stabilising and to do this James recalled Parliament in 1621 who promptly offered their support to the Protestant cause. James was unprepared to go this far, and, opposed as he was to ending negotiations with the Spaniards, he again dissolved Parliament.

95 For the Habsburg view on these events see the correspondence of Carlos Coloma in Sanarcos, legajo L8775 - E8787.
96 By this time Philip III had decided that the marriage could not take place without the conversion of Prince Charles or the restoration of civil rights to the English Catholics. Isabella sought to maintain a hold on the lands occupied by Spain in 1620; Ferdinand had no inclination towards allowing Frederick back into Heidelberg whilst the Duke of Bavaria had been promised the Palatinate and the Electorate in return for aiding the Imperial cause.
98 Declaration of 4th June, 1621 and Petition and Remonstrance of 1st December, 1621.
The fall of the Lower Palatine in 1622 and the terms under which the Spanish were prepared to negotiate in 1623 led to the final collapse of James's policy of mediation. It now became clear that the completion of the negotiations depended entirely on the conversions of both Frederick Henry and Charles. Charles and Buckingham, following their humiliating experiences in Madrid were by now wholly anti-Spanish and looked for a war of revenge against Spain, with James heading an anti-Habsburg coalition. The King, however, still sought mediation and still maintained a hope of more satisfactory terms from Spain. Earlier writers have suggested that at this stage James handed over the direction of foreign policy to Buckingham. This has now been proved incorrect. Over the remaining months of the King's life he refused to declare war on Spain, he still sought for a Catholic marriage for his son, he refused to support any action in the Palatine without a military alliance with France and refused to allow Mansfeld's troops to be employed in the relief of Breda in early 1625. As Adams suggests it was, in fact, Buckingham who was responsible for accepting the over optimistic reports of the ambassador to France that the French were eager to enter into both a military and a matrimonial alliance with England. 101 This in its turn led Buckingham to make increased concessions to France in the marriage treaty in return for the hoped for reciprocal concessions in the military alliance. In this respect Rex Pacificus was to die a frustrated man.

As we have seen James sought to conduct his foreign policy along confessional lines so it is now necessary to examine briefly James's conduct of policy in Scotland, before moving on to consider how this reflected the policies he was later to follow. Before his accession to the throne of England, James, as King of Scotland, had enjoyed a far less eminent and powerful position. The Scots had provided themselves with the kind of Presbyterian church which a section of the

101 S. Adams, 'Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy', in H. Tomlinson, Before the English Civil War (1983) p. 98.
English puritans hoped for, and which did not allow the King to impose his own policy on ecclesiastical matters. The puritans, hopeful of the new King's Calvinistic upbringing and education, were speedily disillusioned when, during the King's journey southwards to London, some ministers unsuccessfully pressed their claims on James in the Millenary Petition. Their petition amounted to a deferential request that certain ritual practices, for example the use of a ring in the marriage ceremony, and the sign of the cross in Baptism, should be dropped and other traditional customs left optional. James was to remain unmoved. However, some attempts at settlement were made when he presided over the 1604 Hampton Court Conference between the two wings of the Church of England at which the Bishops were required to defend the status quo with supporters of the Millenary Petition. Plans were discussed for making the Church of England more broadly based thus allowing for the liberty of alternatives. The issues raised included ceremonies, confirmation (in connection with the authority of the Bishops) and doctrine. James was gratified by the supremacy in church affairs he gained as King of England and he reacted strongly against puritan attempts to weaken the power of the bishops, the upholders of his doctrine of divine right. The King supported the bishops against their puritan opponents and the bishops in their turn encouraged their flocks to offer no resistance to the King's decrees. The close alliance between the King and the Bishops, and remembering James's own words - 'No Bishop, no King' - it is hardly surprising that nearly all the puritan's demands were rejected except for that of a new translation of the Bible, which appeared in 1611. James's oft repeated phrase perfectly summarised his belief that those who wished to bring about new reforms to the established church were also likely to undermine his divinely appointed position as sovereign. Thus, a situation existed in which no criticism could be made of Church or state: for to criticise the King was blasphemy and opposition to the established church seditious. Imposing such checks on free discussion at a time when traditional assumptions about political and religious
authority were being actively questioned could only increase resistance to the King and his bishops, though for the time being opposition was not strong enough to challenge their reactionary power. When it did come, popular rebellion was all the more determined for its grievances having been suppressed for so long.

James's accession also brought with it a feeling of optimism in one other group of his subjects. The English Catholics saw for the first time in many years a hope for the toleration that they had so long desired. After all, they argued, had not his mother suffered martyrdom in their cause? In 1603 Sigebert Buckley, the sole surviving member of the pre-1559 Benedictine monastic establishment, and formerly a monk of Westminster Abbey during the reign of Mary, marked the new mood of optimism by renewing his religious vows - thus, he believed, putting himself in a position to transmit all the rights of the Benedictines of medieval England to the monks of a new generation. 102 In May of that year the mood of leniency began to affect the laity whose fines were no longer collected, and, in the same mood the new King restored the earldom of Arundel to the Howards. On 8th May, 1603 the Venetian secretary, Scaramelli, had met with Edward Bruce, Lord Kinloss, a Scottish member of the Privy Council to discuss matters touching on religion. At this meeting Kinloss informed the secretary that James was grateful to Clement VIII and spoke of him as 'truly Clement', because, although urged by other princes to do so, the Pope had not excommunicated James. He added that the English Catholics had nothing to fear from James so long as they remained 'quiet and decently hidden'. Scaramelli replied that he thought many people expected much more from James; namely, that he would 'restore the Kingdom of England to

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102 At this time this 'venerable piece of antiquity' was a prisoner at Wisbeach Castle along with various other members of the English Catholic priesthood, including one Christopher Bagshaw. It would appear that Bagshaw was the first to draw attention to the use Buckley could be put to. The argument was that the Benedictine order constituted a legal corporation, and, as such, its rights were inherent in any surviving member, so that a member could transmit these rights to others admitting them to membership of the body and thereby ensuring continuity of the order and maintenance of its rights. J. Bossy *The English Catholic Community, 1570 - 1850* (1975) pp. 29-30; D. Lunn, *The English Benedictines, 1540 - 1688* (1980) pp. 92 - 97.
the Roman Cult'. But this it would seem was too much for the King. He might have had ideas of toleration for the Catholics but a complete about face and a return to Rome was far beyond anything he would, or indeed could, countenance.

The honeymoon was soon over and it is difficult to assess whether James ever sincerely looked to grant toleration to the Catholics. In 1600, he had already made promises to the English Protestants which appeared to rule out any such hopes. Although, and indeed perhaps because of being raised in a Calvinistic atmosphere, James had little liking for the puritan, but he and his advisers never saw in them a political threat. The puritan was not a tool of the Pope nor of his agent the King of Spain. The Catholic, on the other hand, would always remain an outsider, potentially aloof and contemptuous, owing allegiance to a foreign power. In the pay of the Spanish, he could, at any time, rise up and unite with a foreign foe against his lawful King. There was to be no change in policy; as always Popery seemed to mean Jesuits, Spain and tyranny and the problem remained as it always had: an urgent and immediate threat which required a 'final solution'.

James's handling of his Catholic subjects was inept in the extreme. Any desire for toleration, which was mainly fostered by the Howards, was short-lived; the renewal of recusancy fines in November, 1604 and the prompt dismissal of priests and Jesuits, those 'venomed wasps and firebrands of sedition', left Catholics in no doubt that Cecil's policy to extinguish the Catholic religion from the kingdom was still a major object. As in the time of Elizabeth, attendance at Church made a test of orthodoxy and loyalty, and those who absented themselves were subject still to heavy fines and imprisonment. Constantly in fear of a new Armada and ever suspicious of Catholic Spain, the new government, convinced that treason in

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England was aided and abetted by the Catholic clergy, arrested, proscribed and hanged those Jesuits and priests so unwise as to have left the warnings unheeded. In his Lord Chief Justice, Edward Coke, James had an adept right-hand man. Coke appears to have had an abiding hatred of Catholics and used his undoubted skills to rake up all the old statutes against them and put them into force. He told the Papists in open court that they must embrace the Church of England and renounce the Pope or risk losing the King's favour, their freedom and their possessions. 'His Majesty is fully determined to drive you to such extremetie', he told them, 'that you will be destitute even of common necessaries. He thus expects to rid his kingdom of Jesuits, priests and the like pests, by starving them out.'

The stop-go policy on the enforcement of the penal codes so enraged the Catholic ultras that the desperate reply by some recusants was the 'monstrous, rare...never heard-of treacherous attempt' against the King, Council and Lords in Parliament. No gesture by a group of hotheads could have been better calculated to alienate the King (always terrified of assassination), and no move could have done more to discredit Roman Catholicism in the eyes of the general public. In the event, all that exploded was public opinion which, thrilled by the drama and furious at an attempt to plunge the country into chaos, turned the fires intended to consume the King and his Parliament into fires of celebration, marking the escape, once again, of the Protestant from Catholic outrage. The propaganda victory which the Catholics handed on a plate to the Protestants led to Guy Fawkes and his plot being commemorated up and down the country by processions, bonfires, and anti-Papist oratory; and indeed, an official service of thanksgiving for the nation's deliverance was authorised for use in churches until as late as 1859.

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108 James in his *Triplici nodo, triplex cuneus*, Downside Abbey Library, F76E/73187
109 The most up to date accounts of the Plot can be found in A. Fraser, *Faith and Treason. The Story of the Gunpowder Plot* (New York, 1996); A. Haynes, *The Gunpowder Plot. Faith in Rebellion* (Stroud, 1996)
Horrific though this plot was, it turned out to be the last of the old-style Catholic subversion. Most Catholics could have been expected to condemn the plot and, indeed, this was the case, with many prominent Catholics speaking out against so ill-advised an action. Benjamin Carier, for example, condemned the rashness a decade later, admitting to James that, 'your Majesty had a great cause to be then thoroughly angry, and so had all good men, whether Catholics or Protestant.' 110

Intensified fear and hatred following the plot brought down on the Papists further penalties, harassment and restriction. The Jesuits, of course, were believed to have been aware of the plot and paid the price. 'Good and prudent laws' against the 'corrupters of the people in religion and loyalty' excluded Catholics from every aspect of public life, from professional careers and from the universities. Without a warrant from the King they were forbidden to come to Court and allowed no closer than ten miles of London. To counter fears that the Catholics owed allegiance only to Rome, in 1606 James issued his Acts for the better discovering and repressing of Popish Recusants &c... which contained the famous Oath of Allegiance. This oath acknowledged:

Our Sovereign Lord King James...lawful rightful King of the Realm. The Pope neither himselfe nor by any authority of the Church or See of Rome...hath any power or authoritie to depose the King...or to discharge any of his Subjects of the allegiance and obedience to his Majesty. 111

Denial of the Papal claim to depose princes (clause 3) brought denunciation of the Oath from Rome. The Pope, Paul V, issued a Brief in October, 1606 in which he reminded the English Catholics of the peril to their immortal souls if they took such an oath to the King. Consequently, many Catholics refused to take it.

The assassination of King Henry IV in 1610 left France in Catholic hands and, as new fears emerged from Continental Europe, so new persecutions were levelled at the English Catholics. The Jesuits incurred condemnation as the

110 B. Carier, A Treatise Written by Mr. Doctour Carier (Brussels, 1614).
instigators of Protestant Henry's murder and were immediately ordered to leave England. As the country became more and more paranoid, suspicious of every stranger who was regarded as a potential assassin, priest or Spanish agent, so the condition of the English Catholic became correspondingly worse. Toleration, a repellent prospect for so many, was not to be reconsidered for several more years. Priests who disregarded warnings to leave the country were hanged at Tyburn and the Penal laws enforced to the letter. James remained ever suspicious of his Catholic subjects and in his opening speech to the 1612 Parliament he reiterated his intention to root out this 'insidious evil'.

But even the stringent enforcement of the Penal laws failed to exorcise Catholicism from the country entirely. The Papal Nuncio in Brussels reported in 1613, that, according to information supplied him by the English Catholics, six hundred new priests had entered the kingdom. In addition, despite stricter port controls introduced in 1615, a steady stream of Rome's 'jugglers and conjurors' still managed to slip in unnoticed. Concerned by the continuing and unresolved state of religious differences the King issued his religious treatise God and the King: or a Dialogue Shewing that King James Being under God doth rightfully Claime whatsoever is refused by the Oath of Allegiance, in which he proposed to again acquaint his subjects with the divinely bestowed authority of their monarch. Strict attention to this book was demanded of the archbishops and all James's subjects, both Protestant and Catholic alike, were instructed to obey.

For all the continuing restraints on the Catholics, during the latter months of 1613 and the early part of 1614 there appeared to be a slight relaxation of pressure when James anxiously sought a policy of conciliation towards his Catholic subjects. This came about, in the main, as a means of counter-balancing the power of the malcontents in Parliament. But toleration, when granted not from any sense

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of justice, but for the furtherance of the King's political policies, would have been an extremely questionable policy.

The Venetian ambassador, Pietro Contarini, reported in 1618, that many Catholics, 'in order to escape extermination remain secretly good Catholics but accommodate themselves to necessity. The number of these is much larger than those who openly declare themselves. Those who are recusants are in the worst condition of all.' However, despite this sorry picture of the state of England's Catholics, official policy had begun to relax. Hope, ever eternal, began to revive, but in a way dangerous to any long term popular revival of Roman Catholicism. For the hope that recusants would be tolerated was soon bound up with the expectation that the government would be forced to make concessions at home in the interest of its foreign policy.

Probably the major factor impacting on English foreign policy during this period was the religious division in Europe created by the Reformation. By the end of the sixteenth century a consensus had developed in English politics which demanded that English foreign policy be conducted in defence of the Protestant cause. The accession of James I saw no real change to this and, so long as it in no way endangered the country's economic interest, policy remained much as it did under Elizabeth, a product of the old Anglo-Dutch alliance against Spain. This alliance was based on an assumption that there existed a Rome-led Catholic union which sought to re-impose Catholicism throughout Europe. The events of 1609 - 1611: the creation of the Catholic League in 1609, the assassination of Henri IV in 1610 and the Franco-Spanish marriage alliance of 1611, seemed to confirm that this league was still in existence and could only be countered by a strong Protestant coalition, united to fight the forces of Popery. The Bohemian uprising in 1618 was seen as the divinely inspired opportunity to do just that. Sir Edward Herbert,

The full text of Contarini's *relazioni* can be found in *CSP Venetian 1617-1619*, pp. 414 - 422.
ambassador to Paris, who strongly supported the acceptance by the Elector Palatine of the Bohemian crown noted that:

> God forbid he should refuse it, being the apparent way His providence hath opened to the ruin of the Papacy. I hope, therefore, his majesty [James] will assist in this great work. 114

The war in Europe was, above all, a war of religion. Those in England who supported it believed that the Anglo-Dutch alliance should be extended into a more general Protestant alliance prepared to support Frederick, both in the Palatinate and in Bohemia, at all costs. However, involvement in a war along confessional lines was the last thing James wanted. Although he had identified the Pope as the Antichrist as early as 1608 he considered the idea of a Catholic league to impose Catholicism more of a possibility than a fact. This scepticism was reinforced when the Queen-Regent agreed to join him in mediating over the Cleves-Jülich crisis in 1614 and again when Philip III agreed to accept his mediation of the Bohemian crisis in 1618.

Equally important to James’s desire not to join an overtly Protestant movement was his dislike of the revolutionary implications of Calvinism, which not only coloured his attitudes toward the United Provinces, but also underlay his refusal to support his son in law in his acceptance of the Bohemian crown. The King’s only support for Frederick in protecting his hereditary rights in the Palatine was motivated more by dynastic than family loyalty. It was his intention to support Frederick not by joining in a war he could ill afford to finance but by diplomacy. It was now to become a central feature of James’s foreign policy that the Protestant marriage of his daughter to Frederick should be balanced by Catholic marriages for his son, thereby establishing himself firmly amongst the powers of

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114 Herbert to Naunton, 9th September, 1619, BL Add Mss, 7082 fol. 40b
Europe. Related thus to both Catholic and Protestant royalty James would be placed in a strong position to take on the role of pacifier and mediator he so much desired. In short, if a prince of England were to marry a Bourbon or Habsburg princess then undoubtedly the Protestant lamb could safely lie down with the Catholic lion.  

The idea of a Spanish match was first mooted as early as 1604. The Venetian ambassador, Nicolo Molin, commented on this fact when he reported a meeting of a number of Privy Councillors in the Queen’s apartments at which a future marriage with Spain was discussed. ‘Almost all of them’, he wrote, ‘and the queen foremost, showed themselves very favourable to this match much more so than to the French.’ This was likely, for Henry IV, quite aware of Anne’s opinion of him, had cautioned his ambassador, Beaumont, to attempt to win the Queen’s favour at all costs.

Anne, who, in the ranks of Queens of England, was renowned neither for her beauty, wit or wisdom and attracted little attention from the intellectuals who frequented her husband’s court. Nevertheless, she was to become the focal point in the patronage of such men as Jones, Jonson and others through her support of the masques, plays and pageants so popular at the early Stuart court. Her apparent lack of political influence, her love of the theatre and the ambivalence of her religious persuasion was enough to suggest to Cardinal Bentivoglio, Papal Nuncio in Flanders, that the Queen was of a ‘facile and changeable character’. There was considerable talk regarding the Queen’s religious beliefs and the suspicion that a Catholic court existed within the Royal Household drew Catholics to her. However, Anne’s religious beliefs were, at best, ambiguous. Even before her arrival in England rumour had it that she was ‘well inclined’ towards Rome; a fact which lead

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115 Henry’s death in 1612 was not to deter James from his ultimate goal so that the planned Catholic marriage was to be made for Charles.  
116 See Isaiah 11: 6 - ‘and the lion and the sheep shall abide together’.  
117 CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, X, 208  
the puritan to a concern that there could be Papal influence on the King's policies and that the Queen would seek to influence her children over matters of religion. In Scotland Anne had sought the company of Catholics, such as Henriette, Countess of Huntley, and this in its turn led to fears of a Catholic influence on the young and impressionable girl. However, her conduct in London was discreet enough to confuse commentators. The Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Scaramelli, noted in early 1603 that she went regularly to Anglican services with her husband but that at the coronation, although consenting to receive the crown from the hands of a Protestant Archbishop, she remained firmly in her seat during the communion leaving her husband to partake by himself. As promising as this at first appeared to the English Catholic community they were soon to complain that she had no real love for anything other than festivities and amusements, and throughout her life she attended the services of the Anglican church just enough to enable the government to claim that she was never a Catholic but merely objected to England's puritanical strictness. The following letter of Winwood, dated 29th October, 1603, concerns an audience the Queen gave to Sir Noel de Caron, the Dutch ambassador. He writes:

Monsieur Caron followeth the Court to Winchester; with much ado he spake first with the Queen, and afterwards with the Prince. I was glad I was made the instrument under my Lord of his accesses; for otherwise, without his assistance, I fear me he had never spoken to her; for let me tell you in your ear without offence, she is merely Spanish, and had promised Arenbergh not to speak with Caron. But the best is, she carrieth no sway in State matters, and preter rem uxoriam hath no great reach in other affairs.

This one short paragraph is wholly indicative of the attitude towards the Queen in her early years in England. It is true, however, that Anne was far more inclined towards Spain than she was to France, and confided to de Zúñiga that she hoped to work on the behalf of the Catholics 'as far as she could'. In response

119 CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, pp. 40, 68, 81.
122 de Zúñiga to Philip, 27th November, 1605, Simancas, E2584, no. 84.
Philip advised the ambassador to encourage the queen to steer clear of anything which might lead to suspicion of Spain’s intentions, although de Zúñiga believed she was powerless to assist the Catholics anyway. It was not until 1607 that the ambassador became aware that Anne was showing a more Catholic stance and this was confirmed in a private audience with her in March, 1609 when it became obvious to him that what ‘little religion she had was Catholic’ although, he admitted, she would not take up the cause with her husband. Nicolo Molin had also expressed his doubts about the Queen’s religion in his relazioni to the Doge and Senate. Nevertheless, other envoys still saw Anne as a champion for the Catholic cause and each new Catholic ambassador followed the same pattern; that of changing from a reluctance to believe in Anne’s Catholicism to a conviction that she shared his faith.

A concern for the state of religion in England was one issue at least in which both Anne and the majority of ambassadors had a shared interest. The condition of James’s Catholic subjects and the position expected of the King with regard to Protestant Europe were intently watched and commented upon in the reports of the ambassadors. The King was placed in an especially difficult position and every move was intently examined and scrutinised by heads of the European states in an attempt to pre-empt James’s next moves.

Despite a lack of influence with her husband, Anne had selected a few subjects on which she expected to be heard. Her concerns included an interest in the condition of her alleged co-religionists but the most prominent of the issues on which she wanted a voice were those directly connected with the diplomatic marriages of her children. During his short visit to England to oversee the signing

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123 de Zúñiga to Philip, 30th May, 1606, Simancas, E2585, no. 36.
124 de Zúñiga to Philip, 5th March, 1609, Simancas, E2587, no. 16.
125 CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, vol. x, no. 513.
126 The French ambassador, Beaumont, notes in a letter to Louis dated 13th August, 1603, his impression of Anne’s character, the result of a two hour conversation he had just then had with her. He found her spirit ‘tres viv et courageux.’ BL. Kings Mss, n. 124, f. 18.
of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty the Constable of Castile had been made aware by
Anne of her wish that Henry should marry the Infanta Ana, eldest daughter of
Philip III, and heiress to the Spanish throne. The Constable, no doubt excited by the
proposal, expressed his opinion that his master would welcome the match,
providing he could obtain some guarantees concerning religion. When he left
London he passed instructions to de Tassis to advise James that before negotiations
could be started some further assurances would be required and, what at this time
could not be thought of, Henry would be sent to Spain to be educated a Catholic.

As part of a deal over the Netherlands, the idea was again discussed in July
of the same year. Although James would not act as an intermediary between Spain
and the Dutch he would, he said, ‘ask the States whether they would be willing to
accept his son [Henry] as their sovereign’. 127 In this way, James saw an end to the
conflict in the Low Countries. However, Spain, perhaps never really intending that
the match should be other than a ploy to move James away from an alliance with
the Dutch, began to raise objections on the grounds of Henry’s Protestantism and
the negotiations fell by the wayside.

In 1607, the scheme was renewed by the Spanish, but this time was coupled
with a further demand that Prince Henry should convert, saying in effect, that
without conversion there could be no marriage. 128 Again the negotiations fell by
the way but were reinstated, in December of that year, when a new proposal from
England was put to Spain. This new initiative involved a marriage between the
Duke of Savoy and the Princess Elizabeth. 129 Throughout the next three years
proposals and counter proposals were being passed backwards and forwards
between England and Spain. In May 1610 Alonso de Velasco was reprimanded by
his superiors for exceeding his instructions concerning the marriage when he

129 Winwood, Memorials, vol. II, p. 23. At the same time these discussions were taking place,
Frederick Ulric, Prince of Brunswick, a cousin of James’s children, came on an abortive
mission to promote a marriage between himself and Princess Elizabeth.
suggested to James a marriage between Henry and the Infanta Ana although she had already been promised to the young King of France. However, Digby, reporting from Spain, advised the King that should the Prince of Wales be content with the Infanta's sister Maria, Spain would be ready to negotiate. This proposal was made firmer by the arrival in July, 1612 of the new ordinary, Pedro de Zúñiga, Marquis Flores Davila, whose return to England was ordered, according to Digby, because when he was formerly ambassador he had made 'profers for the matching of the Infanta with the Prince ...which were not hearkened unto.' 130

Around the time that Savoy was making suggestions for a Savoyard match for Elizabeth the Polish King, Zygmunt III, was making friendly gestures towards the English. Amongst these signs of friendship was a portrait of himself accompanied by his son, the Prince Wladyslaw. It is difficult to judge exactly what was behind the gifts - was it just courtesy or was some deeper meaning implied? (A plan to bring together the two dynasties, perhaps?) The visit of Zygmunt Myszkowski and Jakub Sobieski to London in 1609 gave some credibility to this suggestion when they suggested the prince as a candidate. Elizabeth, herself, met with the two Polish visitors in her apartments and they are said to have reported that the portrait of Wladyslaw was hung in her bedroom. However, the two gentlemen were not authorised to treat and the matter went no further. 131

Despite the Savoyard proposals of December, 1607 it was not until March, 1611 that Claudio Ruffia, Count Cartignana, extra-ordinary ambassador from Savoy, made a definite offer of the Infanta Maria for Prince Henry and the Prince of Piedmont for Elizabeth. 132 Ruffia's instructions allowed him authority to treat in this matter only on condition that both proposals were acceptable but even on these

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130 Digby to Edmondes. BL Stowe MSS. vol. 172, f. 206. According to Gardiner it was Velasco who made the previous proposals.
131 E. A. Mierzwa, Anglia a Polska w pierwszej połowie XVII w (Warsaw, 1986), pp. 34 - 35.
132 Also, on 23rd June, 1611, an unsuccessful suitor for the hand of the Princess Elizabeth appeared at the English Court in the person of her second cousin, Otto, Prince of Hesse. He was the son of the Landgrave Maurice, and had received, it is said, an invitation from Prince Henry. Stow, Annals, fol. 1631.
terms he was unable to guarantee the free exercise of her religion to Elizabeth. It is possible that Salisbury would have rejected these proposals out of hand had not Northampton and his party, looking for Catholic restoration, stepped in. However, this offer was not acceptable to James, despite the size of the Infanta’s dowry, and the offers were rejected on the grounds that the prince was ‘poor, turbulent and under Spanish domination’. 133

At the same time that discussions were taking place on the subject of a Savoyard alliance, Cecil made definite overtures to Ottaviano Lotti for the hand of a sister of the new Grand Duke, Cosimo II, for Prince Henry. 134 The outcome looked promising. The Florentines were popular in England: Cosimo was wealthy and influential. His sister, Caterina, unlike some others proposed for Henry, was free and of marriageable age and England would guarantee freedom of worship for the princess and her entourage. Once more the marriage would depend upon the amount of the dowry and the privileges granted to Catholicism before the negotiations could proceed any further. According to Florentine reports the affair looked to be moving towards a happy conclusion when the news arrived that the Pope would only sanction the marriage if Henry changed his faith and liberty of conscience was guaranteed to all James’s Catholic subjects. The Florentine court exerted every effort to persuade Paul V to change his mind, skilled historians and theologians were found to prove the desirability of the match and Lotti was asked to procure evidence that the English Catholics looked forward to the match. An impasse was reached and Lotti returned home to seek advise and help continue the negotiations. 135

Prior to his accession James had actively sought an alliance with Florence

134 PRO SP 70/80 - 81.
135 October, 1611.
and contemporary evidence makes it plain that what James wanted from the alliance was money which the Grand Duke was unprepared to advance. Consequently, the Grand Duke retired behind his insistence on the necessity of Papal sanction. James's attitude to the Catholic alliance is aptly summed up by the remark alleged to have been made by him soon after Elizabeth's death, 'Na, na, gud fayth, wee's not neede the papists now!' The failure of this negotiation serves to demonstrate the foreign policy of the King. It reveals the intense desire to succeed Elizabeth which dominated his years in Scotland, his willingness to hold out a hand to Catholicism while yet posing as a Protestant candidate for the English throne, his love of secret diplomacy, his readiness to abandon a long discussed alliance as soon as his ends were gained and his constant need for ready cash. However, almost as soon as he was secure on the English throne James returned to his plan to marry Henry to a Catholic princess; but as he considered the son of the King of England to be more lofty than the son of the King of Scotland, he let the Florentine match drop and concentrated his efforts on the Spanish match, which was discussed, without much enthusiasm by both sides until 1610.

Lotti returned to England on 11th September, 1612 with further proposals for James. By this time James appears to have been holding some kind of an auction for his son's hand, having courted France, Spain, Savoy and Florence. Lotti re-entered the arena by making an enhanced offer of a million ducats dependent on the condition that the English Catholics were granted freedom of worship and that James dropped the renunciation of the Pope from the Oath of Allegiance. In order to assist the smooth path of these negotiations Lotti, who had himself been

137 Foscarini to the Doge and Senate, 14th September, 1612, *CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613*, p. 422
secretary to the Grand Duke, had been sent Andrea Chioli, secretary to Belisario Vinta, secretary to the Grand Duke to assist him in negotiating the proposed match. 139

By November, 1611 Ruffia had returned again to England with instructions to ask for Elizabeth alone. Salisbury threw his weight against the proposals while James inclined towards an alliance with the young Frederick V, Elector Palatine. The proposal being rejected, Cartignana left disgruntled, complaining of the indignity done to his master by James’s preference for a Protestant German elector. 140 The negotiations for the marriage treaty between Elizabeth and Frederick were dealt with between April, 1612 and June, 1612 by the Elector’s ambassadors Volrad de Plessen and the Count of Hanau. This match, according to Chamberlain, was acceptable as, ‘all well affected people’, he wrote, ‘take great pleasure and contentment in this match, as being a firme foundation and stablishing of religion, which...was before suspected to be in bransle’. 141

James’s endorsement of this match did indeed appear to some as a revival of the old Elizabethan policies. The death of Henri IV, which placed new pressure on James to head a Protestant coalition against the Habsburgs, and the death of Salisbury seemed to make it possible to shift to a slightly less pragmatic and more firmly Protestant policy. In May 1612 James signed a treaty with the German princes, which, allied to the alliance with Frederick, strengthened English ties with the United Provinces and the French Protestants.

By 1613, war with Spain was expected at any time. Sarmiento de Acuña was sent with instructions to propose a re-opening of the marriage negotiations, only this time for Charles. He was also to watch events in England but take no active

steps in favour of the English Catholics. Shortly after his arrival he recorded the state of play of the parties in England. Archbishop Abbot and the Chancellor, Ellesmere, he reports to be alone in demanding that the future Queen of England should be a Protestant. The Lords Lennox and Fenton, along with Lord Zouch and Sir Julius Caesar supported the traditional plans for a French alliance. Now that a Spanish match seemed to be impossible the Howard group, who preferred an alliance with Spain over one with France, fell back on the old project to marry the Prince of Wales to a Princess of the House of Savoy. Savoy was not to be put off by James’s previous refusals and in May 1613 the Marchese di Villa reopened the question of a Savoyard marriage. This offer was reinforced again in March 1614 by Antonio, Count Scarnafes.

Despite his personal success in the English court, failing health led to Sarmiento’s return to Spain in the summer of 1618, but not before the Spanish Council had granted him the title of Count Gondomar. During Gondomar’s absence his confessor, Fr. Diego Lafuente, was instructed to assure James that the marriage treaty was going forward although by this time it was seen as nothing more than a ploy to get James to mediate in Germany. As early as the summer of 1619 it was decided that Gondomar, as the fittest man for the job, should return to England. It was believed that the King’s confidence in the Count would free his mind from any suspicions of Spain’s intentions in Germany, and that Gondomar would be able to make James believe that a clause in the proposed marriage treaty would allow for the restitution of the Palatinate. However, he wrote to Philip on 15th September, 1619 that the ‘affair of the marriage of the Infanta Marie with the Prince of Wales is in no hurry, nor is it advisable to hasten it on, but rather to...take advantage of the opportunities which naturally and with good appearance may delay it’. His idea was, of course, that the longer he could spin out the negotiations the more

142 See Chapter 4 below for a fuller discussion of the Spanish negotiations.
143 SP Spain, Digby’s despatch, 27th May, 1613.
144 Simancas, Legajo E2515, Gondomar to Philip, 15th September, 1619
pressure could be brought to bear on James, exacting from him the utmost in religious concessions.

When Gondomar returned to England in March, 1620, he was to find many changes amongst the men surrounding the King. The Howards, to the delight of those who hated Spain and Catholicism, had fallen from favour, while Nottingham, Wallingford and Lake had all been compelled or induced to resign their offices. These men had been pensioners of Spain but their places were now filled by men who disliked Spain and supported Frederick. From this time on, despite the ambassador's efforts and James's enthusiasm for the match, the negotiations wavered and eventually ground to a halt - the question of religion ultimately proving too big an obstacle to be overcome. By 1623 it was obvious to all concerned that the proposed Spanish marriage alliance was at an end. Once Charles had lost interest in the Spanish match a selection of Dutch and German ladies had been presented for his inspection and all were politely declined. What England needed was an alliance which brought with it, not just a handsome dowry, but also military strength and France's army was second only to that of the Habsburgs. However, James was 'resolved not to break with Spain, nor to give them any reason to break with him, until he be secure that France will join very close with him, and the other Catholic princes and States which have the same interest against the greatness of Spain; as being of opinion that all Protestants in Europe would be too weak a party to oppose it, and that if they should join against Spain without drawing of the other Catholic princes into the action, it would be understood to be a war of religion.' 145 James refused to be deterred and determined to hold on to his position as Rex Pacificus, straddling the great divide between Catholic and Protestant by resurrecting negotiations for the marriage of Charles to a princess of France.

Suggestions for a French match were first broached in April, 1612 when Henri de la Tour, Duc de Bouillion, Vicomte de Turenne had come to suggest a marriage between Prince Henry and Princess Christina, sister of Louis XIII. She was only seven at the time and he ten years older. James believed that such a match might be politically expedient, bearing in mind the state of Europe at that time and the very fact that the suggestions had come from France showed James that the Queen-regent was not disposed to place herself unreservedly in the hands of the Spanish. Negotiations took place in France between Edmondes and Villeroi, the gist of which was whether, bearing in mind the extreme youth of the princess, she might be brought to England at an early date and raised in the English court. James, of course, saw this as an ideal opportunity to induce the young princess to embrace the religion of her future husband. The Regent, for her part, begged for a little more time in which her daughter might be fully instructed in her own religion before she left home. 146 In early November, 1612 Edmondes was able to report that the Queen-regent was ready to allow her daughter to be removed to the English court. However, by the time this report reached London Henry, Prince of Wales was dead.

Despite the setback caused by Henry's death the French went ahead with their plans for an Anglo-French alliance when in May 1619 François Juvenal, Marquis Tresnel was instructed to negotiate a marriage between Charles and Henrietta Maria. The proposal was re-opened in August 1620 by M. du Buisson who came as extra-ordinary ambassador during the embassy of Count Tanneguy Leveneur de Tillières. 147 The Count was known to be against the alliance and was eventually removed from his office when he became too outspoken in his rejection of the match. 148

146 For a contemporary discussion of the suggested marriage alliances at this time see Ralegh's 'A Discourse touching a Marriage between Prince Henry of England and a daughter of Savoy'. Works, vol. viii, p. 237.
147 SP Domestic, vol. cxvi, no 59, 3rd August, 1620.
During the height of the negotiations with Spain the Anglo-French match had been kept alive in the background so that, after Charles and Buckingham's abortive journey to Madrid, and the collapse, in the autumn of 1623, of the negotiations between Spain and England, the French were able to reopen negotiations with James's ministers for a match which had gained the support of Buckingham who was now wholly anti-Spanish. In February, 1624 James made overtures to Louis XIII that Charles should marry Louis's sister, the princess Henrietta Maria. A marriage along these lines offered both sides certain political advantages. On the English side James hoped to gain military help for the restoration to Elizabeth and Frederick to the Palatine which had been seized after the outbreak of the Thirty Years War. For their part, the French looked to England for support of their anti-Habsburg foreign policy and for assistance against the Spanish forces on the sea and in the Netherlands. The desires which each side harboured acted as a spur in the early stages of the negotiations so that both James and Louis looked to remove any obstacles to the success of such an alliance. Matching with France may have seemed like good sense to James but it seemed to some contemporaries that it was simply a question of one Catholic princess being exchanged for another and the spectre of Popery raised its head yet again.

In April, 1624 William Bishop, Bishop to the English Catholics, had died and from the outset the French saw that the choice of a new bishop would have a certain influence on the success of the alliance. Many of England's Catholics still saw Spain as their traditional ally, and still harboured a grievance against France for not supporting them during Elizabeth's reign. From this point of view it was necessary to France that a bishop should be appointed who wholeheartedly supported the new alliance and could carry the majority of English Catholics with him. The French Secretary of State, Ville-aux-Clercs subsequently wrote to the French ambassador in London, Tillières, that it would be well to see established in England a bishop well-disposed towards France, and that he would pass Tillières
suggestions on to Richelieu. So, a month after the death of William Bishop France was able to gain the support of English Catholics for her policies by persuading them, through Richard Smith, that their only hope of toleration could be found in an Anglo-French alliance. 149

Smith urged on Richelieu the need to insist, as a condition of the treaty, that greater concessions should be granted to the English Catholics which were, at least, as generous as those he had been prepared to accept in the Spanish treaty the year before and both Louis and the Queen Mother agreed that they would never accept the alliance on anything less. However, in England a new proclamation carrying stricter penalties against priests and those who harboured them was issued in early May. Smith, in spite of this setback, still felt optimistic about the alliance as he firmly believed that James was not ill-disposed to his Catholic subjects and had only agreed to the publication of the proclamation under pressure from the Commons which had refused to grant the King subsidies unless he intensified the persecution of Catholics, although, oddly, the Anglican clergy had made no such demands of the King.

Smith it seems, had completely failed to see the implications of this situation; the fact was that despite the King's personal feelings towards the Catholics and no matter what concessions towards toleration he had promised he was, at the end of the day, powerless to oppose the will of the puritan majority in Parliament. James could not alter the law without Parliament and, if he were to act in an arbitrary manner, that institution could refuse to grant the subsidies on which his policies relied.

Negotiations for the Anglo-French marriage were opened at Compiègne at the beginning of June, 1624. Louis's Chief Minister, la Vieuville and Richelieu headed a special commission for France whilst England was represented by two

extra-ordinary ambassadors, Viscount Kensington and the Earl of Carlisle. Despite the high hopes for this meeting it was to end in an impasse with Louis insisting that the treaty contain a clause similar to that agreed upon in the abortive Anglo-Spanish Marriage treaty and James refusing to proceed on these terms. James had already made clear his feelings in his instructions to the English negotiators, 'The constitution of our estate', he wrote, 'cannot bear any general change or alteration in our ecclesiastical or temporal laws touching religion for so much as concerns our own subjects.' In an attempt to break this deadlock la Vieuville suggested privately to the English negotiators that if James were to make the promise of concessions to the Catholics in a private letter to Louis then he might be prepared to waive this clause in the treaty. However, although hopes were raised, it is questionable how much Louis knew of this promise made in his name, but at least after the arrival of a new ambassador in London the talks were resumed. At the end of June, Tillières, who had never shown more than an half hearted support for the match between Charles and Henrietta Maria, had been removed from office and was replaced by the more ingratiating and subtle Antoine Coeffier Ruze, Marquis d'Effiat.

The resumption of negotiations was short-lived. At the beginning of August Louis disclaimed the proposal made in his name and dismissed la Vieuville from office. In spite of this setback the negotiations reopened in Paris with Richelieu repeating the old demands. Eventually a compromise package, which was not that much different from that which la Vieuville had suggested, was worked out. Both sides agreed that the treaty itself should contain no promise on the part of James, of concessions to the Catholics, but that the King and Charles should sign a separate agreement which allowed that he would grant his Catholic subjects freedom to pursue their faith and a suspension of conviction under the penal laws. The

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151 Gardiner seems impressed by the abilities of d'Effiat, describing him as having 'much of the tact and ability of Gondomar'. History, vol. v, p. 253.
agreement which James finally accepted went somewhat further than la Vieuville's original suggestion and was largely due to the influence the ambassador, d'Effiat, had succeeded in gaining over Charles and Buckingham. In September James accepted the French proposals and on 1st October, 1624 prorogued Parliament until the following February in the hope that by that time the marriage would have taken place so that he could then present the Commons with a fait accompli. In December, 1624, with the successful completion of the negotiations, Henry Augustus de Lomenie, Baron Ville-aux-Clercs, secretary to Louis, was sent to obtain ratification of the marriage treaty between Charles and Henrietta Maria, which had been signed by Louis and the English ambassadors on 10th November, 1624. The final ratification took place on 12th December, 1624 in the presence of the King and the ambassador. 152

Accordingly, plans were set forward in Paris to celebrate the marriage as soon as possible so that James could present his fait accompli. At the same time, however, discussion was taking place in Rome concerning the dispensation for the marriage of a Catholic and a Protestant. These discussions revolved around two major points: first, what conditions needed to be imposed in order to safeguard the future Queen's religious rights and second, what concessions to the English Catholics the Pope should insist upon in return for the dispensation. Finally, the special congregation set up by Pope Urban, although making certain reservations and additions, agreed to accept the terms upon which James and Louis had already settled. However, the final text of the articles, appended to the dispensation which arrived in Paris in February showed that the conditions were, in fact, far more stringent than had been expected. Urban insisted that the promise James had made relating to freedom to practise their faith for the Catholics should be made publicly and not in a private exchange between himself and Louis. This, understandably,
brought the negotiations to a shuddering halt with James refusing to sign the
articles and warning Louis that unless they were withdrawn England would herself
withdraw from the alliance. To hammer his warning home further the King
prepared to reopen negotiations with the Spain by sending, in early March,
messengers with letters and a safe-conduct to Gondomar.

Louis, still intent on the marriage taking place, informed James's envoy,
Carlisle, that he proposed to make one more appeal to Urban, and promised that no
matter what else happened, the marriage would take place within the month. Smith
noted that,

of late the match was like to have broken upon conditions ...which his
Holiness had put into the dispensation, which our king would not admit, and
I feare that some of our Theatins 153 seeke under some such good pretext to
breake al, as is thought they did in the Spanish match ...But now God be
thanked, all points are agreed upon and our Duke expected here within this
month. 154

Louis pledged his word to the Pope that James was acting in good faith. But
it soon became clear to Urban that both sides wished for the match so sincerely that
they were prepared, if necessary, to proceed without the dispensation. For all that,
neither James nor Louis really desired to proceed without it; Louis saw it as
necessary for the sake of Catholic unity and to avoid any scandal attaching to the
marriage, while James saw it as confirming the validity of the marriage in the eyes
of the Catholic world, fearing that without it the legitimacy of his heirs might at
some later time be called into question. In order to avoid any scandal being attached
to the dispensation Urban decided to withdraw the articles and to accept the
promises which Louis had extracted from James.

From then on all was plain sailing and the marriage was celebrated in Paris
on 1st May 1624 with the Duke of Chevreuse standing proxy for Charles. The new
Queen arrived in England in June, 1624. As for the Catholics, that same month
Smith confirms that:

153 Jesuits.
Monsr de Fiat... obtained of the King, letters to the Treasurer, Chancellor and Archbishop for to surcease all persecution of Catholiks and to set all libertie at prisoners, and restore all moneys taken since Trinitie term last:... he... received very good word of his majestic in behalf of Catholiks and assurance that he wold performe what he had promised... 155

By November, news of the marriage was public knowledge and there were great celebrations in London. Yonge tells that 'The 21 of November, being Sunday, were divers bonfires made in London, upon notice given that the match between our Prince Charles and Henrietta, sister to the King of France, was concluded.' 156

_England and France, Hand-in-Hand_, one of many popular ballads published in late 1625, encapsulates the nation's relief that the marriage was finally settled. It ran:

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Such narrow seas run between both the lands
Dover and Callis almost may shake hands:
Let then the Ayre echo with lusty peals,
Bonfires call people forth, and let them sing,
England on France bestowes a wedding Ring. 157
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It is clear from this ballad how easily and quickly the English Protestants forgot their dissatisfaction with a Catholic match for the heir to the throne. This leads one to surmise that it was not so much a dislike of Catholicism that was the problem within the nation as a whole, as a mistrust of Spain's intentions generally and her ambassador's in particular.

Admittedly, such a match would make for a stronger Europe to help curb Spanish pretensions, but it would appear rather naive of the English to have assumed that the French would not demand toleration for their co-religionists, and it seemed that popular myth rather than any real facts supported these assumptions.

In their thinking James and his son had overlooked the thirteen years of Louis' reign which provided ample evidence of his anti-Protestant and pro-Catholic sympathies and which they ascribed to a small group of Catholics and the dreaded Jesuits.

Louis, they believed, only needed some slight encouragement from the English to

155 Smith to Rant, _Westminster Archives_, Series B xlvii, no. 20.
156 'The Diary of Walter Yonge', _Camden Society_, vs. vol. xli (1847) p 77.
assume his father's role as a firm supporter of Protestantism against Catholicism. Yet as Cogswell observes, 'More substantial reasons also encouraged a belief in French pliancy. Earlier in 1623, as Spanish demands rose, Englishmen recalled with longing the Anglo-French marriage treaty which granted religious toleration exclusively to the household of Princess Christine, Henrietta Marie's elder sister'. It was this 1613 arrangement, which James had rejected in favour of the Spanish match, which had comforted Protestant Englishmen and led them to believe that the treaty could have been resurrected with few significant changes.

This then was the social, political and religious atmosphere in which foreign representatives worked and played. 'Played' might appear a strange choice of word to the casual reader but it has been chosen purposely because, as we have seen, James believed deeply that his position required great pomp and ceremony, so that he was able to display this to the full advantage of the ambassadors constantly arriving at his court. James's training in Scotland played an important part in the formation of his ideas and these, along with the French innovations from his Scottish court influenced the makeup of his court in England. Essentially he was a peace-loving man and it is evident from the correspondence of many ambassadors that he sought the role of peace-maker in Europe. He genuinely believed that his intervention into European affairs would be decisive in the cause for peace but, at the end of the day, he was unprepared to take that chance. Instead of active military support James chose the pacific role by mediation and the marriage of his children along confessional lines. We have seen how the acquisition of a Protestant partner for Elizabeth found favour with the king's Anglican subjects and the difficulties that were encountered on the way towards a Catholic marriage for, in the first instance, Henry, and then for Charles.

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Although James’s laziness and love of hunting might be commented upon the king was not considered politically inconsequential, much less the fool described by many contemporary and some modern commentators. But, as much as James’s reign forms a great landmark in British history it was due only in part to his own force of character. Although learned and possessing a keen political insight he had little tact or practical skill in dealing with his fellow men. However, despite the fact that many of his contemporaries might have found the King wanting, his good points can be discovered documented in the reports of the foreign ambassadors to London.

Later in this work Chapter 4 will examine the ways in which ambassadors adapted to James’s court and how they used its make-up to their own advantage. Many diplomats, as we shall see, were able to gain political advantage over their rivals by their closer relationship with James which developed on the hunting field, at the theatre or, as in the case of the Dutch ambassador, in the garden. Grand banquets for foreign emissaries were common at James’s court and later we shall examine the extent to which these played a role in diplomacy. The policies of the court also played a decisive role in the acceptance and entertainment of foreign ambassadors, so that men were able to judge from the outset which amongst their ranks would be met with ‘good cheer’.
Chapter 2

The Rhetoric of Conduct Books and the Realities of Ambassadorial Politics

Ambassadors have no battleships at their disposal, or heavy infantry, or fortresses; their weapons are words and opportunities. In important transactions opportunities are fleeting; once they are missed they cannot be recovered.¹

Questions which this work must address about the foreign representatives of the early years of the seventeenth century are those concerned with the kind of men they were, the special attributes and characteristics required of them and with the expectations they had of the way in which they should manage the day to day routine of the embassy. To help answer these questions this chapter will examine the abundant literature of manuals and treatises which purported to teach men aspiring to be diplomatists their duties and impress upon them the crucial importance of their calling and their mission. This section will discuss, through the evaluation of the Database ², how far these ideals existed amongst the men chosen for diplomatic service and will demonstrate the evolution of the diplomatic structure in place in the early years of the seventeenth century.

The accession of James VI and I brought no immediate changes to the European diplomatic scene, nor did it affect in any dramatic way the structure of the diplomatic corps, although an increased number of ambassadors reached England in the early years of the seventeenth century to offer commiseration on the death of Elizabeth and congratulations to James on the smooth transition of the crown. Many ambassadors were recalled at the end of Elizabeth's reign, but the new agents sent in their place were, for the most part, from the states who had already had ambassadors here. But not even the changes in personnel were

² Appendix A of this work contains the full listing of all those men sent to James's court, giving the dates of their missions and other relevant details concerning the conduct of that mission.
complete. Sir Noel Caron, the States General’s ambassador, who had first come to England in 1590 was to remain in London until his death in 1625 and the French ambassador, Christopher de Harlay, Count de Beaumont, although unpopular, stayed on until November, 1605. It was at this time that Venice sent her first permanent embassy to London and when Spain first began to think about restoring diplomatic relations with the crown of England.

At the beginning of James’s reign very few men were designated ambassador; most were still agents, a vestige of the system already in place. During Elizabeth’s reign no ambassadors were received from Spain or Venice and those countries which did send high-ranking diplomats usually sent them with no supporting staff. By the end of James’s reign the majority of embassies came accompanied by an increasingly large entourage of attendant secretaries, translators and cipher clerks, and it was during this period that the position of embassy secretary emerged as a distinct office. By the mid-sixteenth century, capable royal secretaries were aiding their masters in the administration of foreign policy, though they rarely exercised much influence over its formation. The successors to these men evolved over a period into foreign ministers, though often still retaining the title of secretary, as in Britain and the United States.

During this period the growing professionalism of the diplomatic service is unmistakable. Studying the systematic preparation and choice of ambassador, and the repeated embassies by certain experienced men, shows that it is no longer possible to argue that there were no professional diplomats. The continual use of such men as Gondomar gives clear evidence that these men were generally preoccupied with diplomatic affairs both at home and in Europe generally. That these skilled men continued to serve the demands of domestic diplomatic discourse after their recall only goes to strengthen the claims that there was a growing professional bureaucracy during the period.
During the twenty-two years of James's reign some two hundred and thirteen men were received on more than two hundred and fifty diplomatic missions from thirty-one countries. Of these embassies only France, Spain, Venice and the United Provinces maintained permanent embassies in London.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Represented</th>
<th>Number of Representatives sent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bohemia</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Emperor and Imperial Diets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorraine</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manhia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neuberg</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palatine</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>Papal States</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Persia</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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*Table 1: Numbers of representatives sent from each country*

The permanence of these few reflected the importance of foreign affairs and commercial interests between those nations and England. The seventeenth century diplomat was the personal representative of his prince to a foreign head of state, and, although such expressions as 'Envoy from The Hague' or 'Ambassador from France' were commonly used, these men were legally designated 'Envoy from the States General to James I' or the 'Ambassador from the Most Christian King to James I' and all diplomatic papers described foreign representatives in this way. This
shows that diplomats were, in theory at least, chosen, accredited, instructed and
recalled by their Kings and princes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Represented</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Commissioner</th>
<th>Extra-ordinary</th>
<th>Ordinary</th>
<th>Secret Envoy</th>
<th>Special Envoy</th>
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<td>TOTAL BY TYPE</td>
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<td>108</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>258</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Style and numbers of ambassadors

Of the two hundred and fifty-eight missions noted in Table 2 some 17% of the representatives were ambassadors in ordinary who came as official envoys to maintain the status and authority of their masters and to represent the concerns and interests of their countrymen resident in England. Alongside these ordinary ambassadors worked a select élite of extra-ordinary ambassadors, some 42% of the whole, who were sent to deal with specific treaties, alliances and depositions.

Unlike ordinary ambassadors who were, in general, career diplomats, the Extra-

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3 See Table 3 below.
ordinary ambassadors were noblemen or high-ranking government officials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No Received</th>
<th>Percentage of those sent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>15.90%</td>
</tr>
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<td>17.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Envoy</td>
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<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Type of Embassy by Percentage Received

In several cases these extra-ordinary ambassadors were James's own subjects who were resident, for various reasons, at foreign courts. Francis Nethersole, for example, who had accompanied Princess Elizabeth to the Palatine after her wedding, apparently combined his service as secretary to the Queen of Bohemia with acting as an intermittent agent to England for the Protestant Princes of the Union. He had several extended returns to England during this period. 4 Alongside Nethersole we also find Sir Abraham Williams acting as agent for the Queen of Bohemia in November, 1619. Sir Andrew Sinclair, a Scot, acted as extra-ordinary ambassador from Denmark on several occasions and Sir Robert Sherley, represented Persia at James's court on two separate occasions. 5 After his mission from James to Gustavus, Sir James Spence (Spens) was then ordered back to England to represent the Swedish King. The King's physician, Dr Theodore Mayerne, a Swiss subject, was

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5 Sir Robert Sherley accompanied his brother Sir Anthony to Persia in 1598, and remained in that country for several years after his brother's departure. In 1609 Sir Robert was employed by the Persian monarch as ambassador to several princes of Christendom, for the purpose of uniting them in a confederacy against the Turks. Sir Robert came to England with his Persian wife, Teresia, daughter of Ismael Khan, a Cicassian Christian, of noble birth, whom he married in 1607. His son, Henry, was born in England on 4th November, 1611. The Prince of Wales stood godfather to the child. See Nichols, Progresses, vol. ii, pp. 431 - 2; E. P. Shirley, The Sherley Brothers: an historical memoir of the lives of Sir Thomas Sherley, Sir Anthony Sherley and Sir Robert Sherley, Knights (1848); T. Middleton, 'Account of Sir Robert Sherley' (1609) in E. Cobham Brewer, Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (1898). DNB sub nomine.
sent by the King to Switzerland. Having completed this mission he was ordered back to England to represent the Swiss. The Vicomte de Ségur, who, in all probability was Robert Creichton, Lord Sanquhar came to England as Special envoy representing France for a few weeks in April, 1605. 6

Guicciardini, in his Ricordi, notes that 'So many people understand things well but either do not remember or do not know how to put them into practice!' 7 This is an interesting statement as it leads us to ponder just how different theory was from practice in the diplomatic field during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We are, of course, unable to assess whether or not the representatives ever read any of the abundant literature of conduct books addressed to them and their masters, and, although it would be pleasing to be able to say that such and such an ambassador had been provided with a copy as part of his tools in trade, unfortunately we cannot positively do so. These two hundred and thirteen men entered an arena hedged in by ceremony and protocol and it is easy to see why such a large body of literature arose dealing with the issues pertinent to the correct execution of the diplomatic mission. This conduct literature, which flourished from the end of the fifteenth century, appeared in all the civilised languages and sought to describe the art of diplomacy, the function of the ambassador, the qualities such a man should possess, the means to which he should resort and those from which he should abstain. 8 They discoursed at great length on the principles upon which

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6 His name is also spelt 'Sagar', 'Sagart', 'Sagard' and 'Sguar'. See DNB sub nomine.
7 F. Guicciardini, Maxims and Reflections of a Renaissance Statesman (Ricordi) (trans.) M. Domandi (New York, 1965) series c, no. 35, p. 31
8 See for example the writing of: B. Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier (trans.) G. Bull (1967); F. de Callières, The Practice of Diplomacy (trans.) A. F. Whyte (1919); F. de Commynes, The memoirs of Philippe de Commynes (ed.) Samuel Kinser (trans.) Isabelle Cazeaux (1973); A. Gentili, De legationibus libri tres (trans.) G. J. Laing (New York, 1924, reprinted New York, 1995); H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis (trans.) Francis W. Kelsey (1964); J. Hotman, The Ambassador, English translation (1605); N. Machiavelli, The Prince (trans.) G. Bull (1981); Francis Thynne, The Application of Certain Histories Concerning Ambassadors and Their Functions (1651); B. du Rosier, Ambassadeur Brevilicus (1436); E. Barbaro, De Officio Legati; A. de Wicquefort, The Ambassador and His Function (trans.) John Digby (1716); A. de Wicquefort, Memoires touchant les Ambassadeurs et les Ministres Publics (Cologne, 1676 - 1679); Juan Antonio de Vera, El Embarajador (1620); also that of Rosergius, Barbaro, Dolet, Braun, Maggi, La Mothe-le-Vayer, Tasso, Paschall, Hotman, Gentili, Marsellaer, Machiavelli, Boccaccio, de Cuniga, de Chamoy, Pecquet and a host of others.
ambassadors should be trained and chosen, and gave hints on their dress, table, manners, speech, secretaries and servants, wife and whether she should accompany her husband, their rights and privileges and many other topics: in short a complete schooling.

These manuals were especially numerous in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and are of great interest, not simply on account of the subject matter, but for the insight they give to the manners and morals of the age. Generally there are seven questions which this genre of writing attempted to answer:

- What is an ambassador?
- What class of person should be sent on missions to different princes?
- What should their entourage consist of?
- Are resident missions a good or a bad idea?
- Is a hierarchy of ambassadorial styles required and, if so how should this be managed?
- What is the basis for ambassadors’ immunities and privileges?
- How important is it that a diplomat should be honest and principled?

The writing of this period falls into two distinct categories; that written for the most part at the time of the Renaissance or influenced by it, and that which appeared from the latter half of the seventeenth century which sought to change the idea of the conduct of the diplomat and his mission. Furthermore the treatises on the resident envoy were largely of two kinds: either the work of lawyers interested in the status of envoys, or essays depicting the moral profile of ‘the perfect ambassador’. Having said that, much of the writing remained essentially what it had been in the earlier period. Antoine Pecquet’s *Discours sur l’art de

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9 See B. Behrens, ‘Treatises on the ambassador written in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries’, *English Historical Review*, vol. 51 (1936), pp. 616 - 627.
negocier is typical of much that was being written in the later period. The envoy, he wrote, should be modest, self-controlled and discreet. He must possess good judgement and, whilst being patient, should be firm in his negotiations with foreign princes and in maintaining the reputation and interests of his own prince. He must be fluent in languages and have the ability to speak persuasively. The envoy should be able to keep up a good appearance and his general style of living should be such that it would impress upon others the status of his mission. No sixteenth or seventeenth century commentator would have disagreed with this.

Many of the most important earlier theorists of diplomacy, Bernard du Rosier, Ermolao Barbaro, Machiavelli, Hotman and de Cuniga, for example, had diplomatic experience and this experience is conveyed in their writing. This chapter will deal first with these earlier writers whose manuals enumerated the qualities demanded of the perfect ambassador.

Although writers of this type of literature could be found in England the most influential writers where to be found on the continent and it is these writers whose work has endured to the present day. Bernard du Rosier frequently served as an ambassador and his background as a lawyer and a cleric made him eminently suitable for such a posting. His Short Treatise on Ambassadors, is the first European tract to deal exclusively with the envoy and his duties, and does so in a practical way. In this work du Rosier drew up a list of some twenty-six virtues he saw as essential in a diplomat: fundamentally he expected his man to be upright, modest, discreet, kindly, honest, sober, and just. Much of the advice given and the protocols described remain valid to this day, but the framework and spirit of the tract is that of medieval Europe with its assumption that Christendom was united and was governed by a common moral code based on Christian ethics reinforced by custom.

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10 A. Pecquet, Discours sur l'art de negocier (Paris, 1737).
11 For English texts see for example T. Elyot, The Boke named the Governor, (1531); Francis Thynne, The Application of Certain Histories Concerning Ambassadors and Their Functions (1651); F. Bacon, 'Of Negotiating', Bacon's Essays, including his Moral and Historical Works, with Memoir, Notes and Glossary (published in London but undated), p. 87 - 88.
and Roman law. He repeatedly stressed that ambassador’s work pro utilitate publica (for the general welfare) because their business was peace and insisted that anyone obstructing them in this work therefore obstructed the public good and the peace and tranquility of Christendom as a whole. However, should an ambassador, for whatever reason, transgress the moral code then he himself should be severely punished by the authorities of the country to which he was accredited. In du Rosier’s writing we see the medieval theory of the ambassador’s duty and diplomatic immunity. 12

Writing towards the end of the fifteenth century Ermolo Barbaro wanted the diplomatic representative to have ‘hands and eyes as pure as those of the priest officiating at the altar’. Barbaro was the first to write a tract devoted wholly to resident envoys, a class of diplomat that had been unknown to du Rosier. However, being a student of antiquity, Barbaro felt compelled to call them by the classical Latin name for ambassador, legatus. A Venetian patrician and humanist, Barbaro had diplomatic experience himself. After being sent on a special mission to the Emperor Frederick III he became Venetian resident, first in Milan and later Rome, where his short tract De Officio Legati was written in 1490. This tract takes the form of a letter to a friend entering the Venetian diplomatic service and much of the advice it contains is of a similar strain to that given by du Rosier some sixty years before. Barbaro argued that the resident should be diligent, virtuous, tactful but firm and honest, and he condemned fraud, bribery, assassination and spying, on moral grounds and on practical grounds. He saw these traits as counter-productive, destroying the reputation of the envoy with those men he sought to influence. However, Barbaro’s ideas were as secular as du Rosier’s were Christian. Du Rosier’s insistence on the medieval ideals of the ambassador serving the public good of Christendom was replaced in Barbaro’s writing by a desire that the

12 B. du Rosier, Ambaxiator Brevilegus (1436) is explored in V. E. Hrabar, De Legatis et Legationibus Tractatus Varii (Livonia, 1905).
ambassador’s first duty was to do, say, advise and think whatever might best serve the preservation and aggrandisement of his own state. In this tract Barbaro expressed the ideals of what was to become the modern diplomat, but for the next century and a half, at least, most theorists continued to write of ambassadors in the terms used by du Rosier. By the end of that time the diplomat’s view of his world and his duties was to undergo a revolutionary change, but for now, the Renaissance view remained that of the majority of theorists. 13

Like his Italian counterparts the Pole, Kraysztof Warszewicki (Varsevicius), was raised in cosmopolitan circles where Renaissance ideas mingled with high affairs of state. He had served as a page at the Viennese court of Ferdinand, King of the Romans, and had witnessed the marriage in Winchester of Mary Tudor and Philip II in 1554. During the 1560s he was secretary of the Bishop of Pozna and during the reign of Stefan Batory (1576 - 1586) was a regular envoy to Muscovy and Sweden. In 1603 he was designated ambassador to England but died before he could leave.

In the practice of diplomacy, Warszewicki advocated a straightforward policy of honour, piety, prudence and magnanimity. He saw the ambassador as a Christian missionary as well as a servant of his prince. Virtue and honesty pay because ‘God does not will protracted success to those who deal in impiety and fraud’. Furthermore, he wrote,

To behave like a King, is to attract many men by one’s bounties, even when one knows that few are really faithful ...to direct one’s wrath more against things than against persons, and not to be moved by the ingratitude of others. 14

He drew a distinction between prudent reserve and deliberate deceit, and excused a certain degree of prevarication, but at the same time insisted that a diplomat’s word was his bond, and that treaties were made to be respected. He placed loyalty,

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handsomeness, honesty, and education, above noble birth as qualities expected in
‘the perfect ambassador’, and quoted Virgil, Tacitus, Aristotle, and a host of
contemporary examples as references for his ideas. Bishop Dantyszek was praised,
as was the historian, Martin Kromer. Examples of poor diplomats were given -
Andreas Dudith, one-time imperial agent in Poland, was censured for ‘levity’, and
Jean Monluc, ambassador of Charles IX of France, for his ‘vanity’. The Muscovites,
for their ‘ridiculous arrogance’ and ‘perfidy’ were not to be counted among civilised
negotiators. For Warszewicki different qualities were required of men destined for
particular countries:

To Turkey, it is necessary to send steadfast and generous envoys (fortes et
liberalis), men who are also honest. There is no point in sending cowards or
misers, since these might weaken under the browbeatings to which the Turks
habitually subject them. And they must know how to dispense largesse. The
position in Moscow is suited to wary men (cautos in Moscoviam), for there
‘The Greek faith’ is practised, and nothing can be obtained without lengthy
disputes. For Rome, pious men must be appointed, men noted for their
devotion to religion (pii et religionis observantia noti), but laymen in
preference to clerics, since the latter tend to bow to the authority of the Holy
Father. For Spain, individuals of a calm temperament should be sent, men
devoid of adventure, since in that country one has to lead an ascetic sort of
life whether one wants to or not. In Italy, in contrast, it is right that the state
be represented by civilised and courteous men (humanes et officiosi) since
questions of manners and etiquette cause continual problems there. France is
a place for versatile men of speedy intellect (ingenio celeri aut potius
versatili), who can adapt themselves quickly and grasp the point of an
argument. In England, handsome, high-born envoys are best suited (formosi
et proceres), for the English have great respect for that sort of person, telling
them apparently that it is a pity they are not Englishmen themselves. In
Germany, diplomats need to keep to their promises (promissorum tenaces),
the Germans being famed from time immemorial for their constancy and
perseverance. Everywhere, diplomats must be temperate and abstinent
(continentes et abstinentes). As Davies notes, these remarks, made nearly four hundred years ago, are not
entirely obsolete.

Alberico Gentili, the Italian jurist, made a lasting impression on
international relations by his application of medieval learning to the questions
current in diplomacy. In 1584 he was consulted by the English government as to

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15 Jan Dantiscus (1485 - 1548) reputedly the first Polish diplomat.
16 C. Varsevicii, Equitas Poloni, De Legato et Legatione Liber, Illustrissimo Domino Achatio
Przybecue, Castellano Oswiecmenseis, cited in N. Davies, God’s Playground: a History of
17 N. Davies, God’s Playground: a History of Poland, p. 392.
the proper course to be pursued in the case of the Spanish ambassador, Bernardino de Mendoza, who had been detected in plotting against Elizabeth I. It was his thinking on this case which he developed in his ‘handbook’ for diplomats, the *De legationibus libri tres* (1585) which had, by 1598 further developed into *De jure belli libri tres*. In contrast to earlier writers who dealt with international questions on an individual basis and with submission to the Church, Gentili examined as a whole the relationship of one state to another. He used the reasoning of both civil and canon law and combined this with the ideas of natural law and in this way sought to address problems independently of the authority of Rome. To the modern reader Gentili’s work might appear pedantic, but a comparison of *De jure belli* with the treatises of other early writers shows that he greatly improved upon their ideas by placing the subject of international law on a foundation independent of theological differences. Furthermore, a comparison of this work with Grotius’s *De jure belli ac pacis* of 1625 reveals the latter’s indebtedness to his sixteenth century predecessor. Gentili preferred that ambassadors possess a good political understanding rather than anything else, and, although he believed a good personal appearance was important, high birth was not a necessity. The ability to make a swift, competent decision, in Gentili’s opinion, far outweighed the need for skills in oratory. Although the study of history and moral and political philosophy must be considered important, nothing could substitute for a good basic grounding in the affairs of state. Like Bacon, Gentili saw some small justification for lying but only in certain circumstances. In his essay *Of Truth* Bacon admitted that generally ‘a mixture of a lie doth ever add pleasure’, but when it came to the truth of ‘civil business’ he, like Gentili, found that truth was ‘the honour of man’s nature’. 19

18 A. Gentili, *De legationibus libri tres* (trans.) G. J. Laing (1924); *De jure belli libri tres*, 2 vols. (trans.) J.C. Rolfe (1933).

19 *Bacon’s Essays, including his Moral and Historical Works, with Memoir, Notes and Glossary*, pp. 2 - 3.
Fidelity, temperance, fortitude and prudence were, for Gentili, the most important virtues to be looked for in an ambassador. 20

Writing around the same time as Gentili, Francesco Guicciardini's reflections on diplomacy, contained in his *Ricordi*, revealed the ideas current about diplomacy at a time when diplomacy as we know it was being established in Renaissance Italy. 21 However, Guicciardini did not offer a comprehensive theory for diplomacy, for, as Berridge notes, he ignored some of the more important questions being focussed on in this area by other writers. 22 His writings contain a rather superficial treatment of diplomacy, which do not originate primarily from any study of theory but from his reactions to the political situations which confronted him. However, where he does go into detail his writing soon reaches the crux of the matter; for example, in his discussion of the continuing practical problems of the diplomatic art. His writing on this subject is the result of his personal experience, first as ambassador to Spain, and then as a Papal administrator. Guicciardini addressed such critical points as the inclination of resident ambassadors to 'go native' and the obvious importance of concealing from his opposite number any contingency plans he might have in negotiations. 'If you want to disguise...your intentions', he advised, 'always take pains to show you have its opposite in mind, using the strongest and most convincing reasons you can find'. 23 His discussion on how far a prince should take his ambassador into his confidence is one which was addressed by many writers in this period and in this event his view is not so very different in tone. He noted that 'some princes confide in their ambassadors all their secret intentions' while others 'deem it better to tell their ambassadors only as much as they want the other prince to believe' and

20 A. Gentili, *De legationibus libri tres*, pp. 136 - 172.
23 F. Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, series c, nos. 132, 153, 199; pp. 74, 80, 92.
suggested that both these opinions were valid. He continued, by suggesting that ‘an ambassador who knows his prince means to deceive, will hardly be able to speak and treat as warmly, effectively, and firmly’ as he would if he believed the negotiations to be sincere and not a sham. He continued: ‘... a prince who has prudent and honest ambassadors, well-disposed towards him, and well-provided for, so that they have no reason to depend on others, would do better to reveal his intention.’ However, if the prince should be unsure of the character of his ambassador he would be better ‘to leave them ignorant’. For Guicciardini the man chosen to represent his prince should be ‘a man of extraordinary ability’, but admitted that ‘such men are rare’. He also had a great deal to say on the general conduct of diplomacy and, in particular, the importance of preserving relations even with those one mistrusted or disliked. Guicciardini’s writings, especially in his Ricordi, were intensely personal; in them Guicciardini reflected on his own short diplomatic career and, furthermore, they demonstrated that he held a firm grasp on the major functions of the diplomatic office some two centuries before these ideas were developed fully by de Callières and Wicquefort.

In his account of the history of diplomacy Harold Nicolson laid especial emphasis on the writings of Machiavelli, stressing what they reveal about diplomacy in the Renaissance period and the influence his writing had on later commentators. Like Guicciardini, Machiavelli’s writing was imitated by the seventeenth century writers and indeed, Wicquefort specifically included his writing in the list of required reading for all those aspiring to the rank of ambassador. For Machiavelli diplomacy was an important instrument of the state to be used for the advancement of that state. However, his only dedicated investigation of the art of the ambassador is to be found in his letter of 1522, later

24 F. Guicciardini, Ricordi, series c, no. 2, p. 40.
25 F. Guicciardini, Ricordi, series c, no. 3, p. 41.
27 A. de Wicquefort, The Embassador and his Function (trans.) J. Digby (1716), pp. 52 - 53.
entitled, *Advise to Raffaello Girolami when he went as Ambassador to the Emperor.* 28 What he had to say in his later writings, amounted to little more than a summary of the current conventional wisdom and was somewhat lacking in substance. If we look at his writing as a whole we find that Machiavelli saw the ambassador as having five specific duties:

1. To encourage the prince to whom he is accredited to act in a way which is beneficial to the interests of his own prince

2. To refuse to accommodate policies which would be hostile to them (this might, legitimately, involve a certain degree of political sabotage)

3. To submit advice to his own prince and, above all, defend his princes honour and reputation

4. He must, if his instructions demand it, engage in negotiation

5. He must be especially vigilant in obtaining and reporting home all information he can about the prince and country to which he is accredited 29

Machiavelli patently saw diplomacy as an on-going process: a Prince, he insisted, should keep at least one resident ambassador in all courts, both friendly and not so friendly. Such ambassadors should be provided with sufficient funds to maintain themselves and their entourage in a style which would show that they and their princes were neither impoverished nor mean. Money was also needed, as we shall see, to bribe court officials and others. Machiavelli was also one of the first to insist that keeping an agent abroad was not enough - a prince should also provide the means by which their agent could be constantly, rapidly and, above all, securely in contact with home. It is not difficult to see why Machiavelli was at pains to insist that continuous diplomacy was necessary. It was important that someone be on the spot to take advantage of opportunities; to gather and disseminate information and to consolidate and conclude agreements made by special ambassadors sent by his own master. Furthermore, princes, he believed, liked to have high-ranking

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ambassadors in attendance on them and not to maintain a permanent legation might appear churlish and insulting.

Those same ideals as laid down during the Renaissance were expressed in the following century by such men as Hugo Grotius, François de Callières and Abraham de Wicquefort. One of the most comprehensive descriptions of the qualities with which the representative of an independent state should be possessed can be found in the writings of François de Callières, who laid down the qualifications for the ideal diplomat. De Callières argued passionately that the diplomacy of a nation state should be handled by professionals and complained of the great harm which could be done by 'novices in negotiation'. 30 He defined the skilled negotiator as an excellent linguist, who must be single-minded, refusing to be 'distracted by pleasures or frivolous amusements'. He should be possessed of 'an observant mind' and 'sound judgement'. 31 Above all he must be aware of the state of mind, the weak points and the strong points of those with whom he is negotiating. In short, a man who kept his own counsel, able to listen to those he met. An open manner is essential if ambassadors should want people to impart confidences, although they should not permit secrets to be drawn from themselves. The good negotiator should 'show that the ordinary sentiments of the human heart move in him' and must not appear cold or unapproachable. 32 The surest way, de Callières thought, to gain the goodwill of a prince was to gain the good graces of those who were able to influence him. This would be achieved by the judicious outlay of gifts in the right quarters. These gifts should, of course, be given carefully, without offence to the recipient; for 'a gift presented in the right spirit, at the right moment, by the right person, may act with ten-fold power upon him who receives it.' 33 Above all ambassadors must always act in complete good faith, for, no matter

31 de Callières, Diplomacy, pp 18 - 19.
32 de Callières Diplomacy, p. 21.
33 de Callières Diplomacy, p. 25.
how the clever negociator might be in the art of deceit, 'a lie always leaves a drop of poison behind,' and this may have terrible consequences. In this respect de Callières differs from the earlier exponents of the art of diplomacy who based themselves on what was to some extent a misunderstanding of the principles of Machiavelli. Furthermore, de Callières noted that diplomats had to be careful in their choice of secretary and personal staff, arguing that they should avoid employing 'light-hearted, frivolous or indiscreet men', as any indiscretion or lapse on the part of these men could be seized upon and exploited by a clever man. 34 If the custom of the court to which they were accredited allowed it, women, according to de Callières, should on no account be neglected. Therefore envoys should have the required graces to place both themselves and their masters in a favourable light, for it is well known, he argued, that the 'power of feminine charm often extends to cover the weightiest resolutions of state', and that the 'greatest events have sometimes followed the toss of a fan or the nod of a head'. However, he continued by reminding ambassadors not to overdo their gallantry, warning them that 'Love's companions are Indiscretion and Imprudence' and that the moment they became entangled, no matter how wise they might think themselves, they ran the risk of no longer being the master of their 'own secrets'. Finally, diplomats should be 'men of peace.' These are the attributes de Callières believed to be the 'beginning and the end of all diplomacy'. 35

Grotius, the Dutch lawyer, diplomat and philosopher, is regarded by many as the father of modern diplomatic theory, although many of his tenets were not altogether new. However, unlike previous theorists he accepted the existence of a world of equal sovereign states who, while promoting their own self-interest, still argued for the medieval principles of the Christian state. His arguments, in contrast to earlier writers, were based, not on Christian theology and custom alone, but also

34 de Callières Diplomacy, pp 97 - 98.
on the exercise of reason. He argued that it was necessary for sovereign states to abide by certain natural laws in their conduct of international relations and that doing so would be advantageous to their own long-term survival. 36

In the preface to his work on diplomacy Abraham de Wicquefort said that it was high time someone wrote a book of practical advice for diplomats, since most of the existing work idealised the 'perfect ambassador' and showed little understanding of either the diplomat's job or the nature of the real world. For him the opposite of the 'perfect ambassador' was not as Keens-Soper notes, 'a guileful opportunist' but a man educated in the knowledge of the 'long-term interests of his and other states', and possessed of good judgement, prudence and loyalty. 37 He would not, he said, argue that ambassadors should be men of high moral virtue for such men, in an age of corruption, would be hard to find. 38 His aim was to hammer out rules of conduct derived neither from religion or natural law, but revealed in the actual practice of statecraft. For him the best ambassadors were men with normal virtues and vices added to what Satow described as 'the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments of independent states' which made them competent representatives of their prince in a foreign state. 39 To facilitate this ideal Wicquefort required that any man aspiring to be an ambassador on a ceremonial mission should come from a high ranking family but, having said that, saw no reason why anyone who did not come from a mean background should not be an ordinary ambassador. Like many other theorists he believed that ambassadors should be well educated in Latin, classical literature, especially Horace, and conversant with civil law. Most important for Wicquefort was the study of history and in particular the memoirs of Phillipe de Commynes

37 M. Keens-Soper, 'Abraham de Wicquefort and Diplomatic Theory', BL, National Reports Collection, m00/18976, p. 3 - 4.
38 Wicquefort, Embassador, p. 5.
and Machiavelli, whom he thought had the most diplomatic knowledge to offer. As others before him, he believed that experience counted for much more than birth or education alone. 'I cannot tell,' he wrote, 'whether the Men of Letters are fitter for Embassy than Tradesman: but I shall not scruple to say, that an Embassador is not better form'd in the College than in the Shop'. Furthermore, it would be wise, he suggested, to avoid sending clergymen on diplomatic missions, mainly on the grounds that they could not be punished for their misdeeds. Above all diplomats should be agreeable to the court to which they are sent. 40 The ambassador's loyalty to his prince was paramount and required a reciprocal feeling of confidence and trust. Any reluctance on the part of the prince to allow his envoy to act independently, when necessary, was a reflection on the wisdom of that prince's choice of representative and could only result in the destruction of the prestige and authority of his representative's position. In negotiation especially, there was nothing more detrimental than the realisation that the envoy sent had no authority to treat. This is well demonstrated by the frustration expressed by James when certain of the commissioners from the United Provinces were not given authority to treat fully on matters concerning the Greenland fisheries and the East Indies problems. 41

One of the most important prerequisites for the emergent diplomat was the need for a good education. The general view was that the sending of ambassadors should be wide ranging and on-going. Grotius, writing in 1615 to his friend Benjamin Aubéry du Maurier, gave his advice as to the proper course of study and reading for the education of an ambassador. 42 Assuming that the diplomat's assistant would have more time on his hands than his master Grotius suggested he should be assigned the 'task of running through all the best commentators to collect

41 See Chapter 5 which discusses the Dutch Commissions.
bit by bit the information which he will then measure out...in large quantities.’

Grotius placed great emphasis on the study of logic since it was the ‘common instrument’ of philosophy, and suggested close study of the works of du Moulin and Crell. Logic was to be followed by physics and metaphysics, which he saw as the fundamental principles of philosophy. The student should then turn his attention to practical philosophy. For this study he believed the ‘supreme master’ to be Aristotle although close attention should be paid to all the classical writers. After covering this ground Grotius highly recommended the study of law, not as he said, private law, but the law of nations and public law. For this course of study he recommended Cicero, Plato and Thomas Aquinas. Finally, ‘if one be well versed in these branches of learning, the reading of history will be of remarkable value’. 43

Hotman believed that the worldliness acquired by foreign travel, practical experience of affairs of state and a good knowledge of history would be of more use to a prospective ambassador than would any course of study. He wanted prospective ambassadors to have knowledge of not just history, but of moral and political philosophy, foreign languages, and civil law also. These subjects he believed would teach the envoy ‘how to talk and answer, to judge of the justice of a war, of the equity of all pretensions and requests...how to weigh reasons and escape sophisms and subtleties’. 44 If the appointee were to lack education he should, once in office, endeavour to acquire as much knowledge as possible, although Hotman is of the opinion that it would be rather late in the day to start.

An anonymous manual of the seventeenth century urged ambassadors to prepare themselves well for their appointment by reading the histories and chronicles of the country to which they were going. Also of advantage was a knowledge of the laws of this country, an understanding of the privileges of its provinces, the usages and customs of its peoples and most importantly their

character, temperament and inclination. This particular treatise, thought to have been written by a member of Ronquillo’s staff, not earlier than March, 1696, was one of the most comprehensive on the rights, duties and prerogatives of the perfect ambassador. It opened with an enumeration of the different types of embassies and their relative importance, the style and dignity of ambassadors and discoursed on the principles on which ambassadors should be chosen and trained. Credentials and instructions were considered and stress laid on the knowledge of foreign languages and upon the importance of maintaining precedence and the dignity of the embassy. The nature of dispatches was discussed and importance placed on keeping copies of all correspondence. How far ambassadors should obtrude their own opinions and advise on their government was then considered and demonstrated by anecdotal examples. Sources of information were investigated and the writer warned ambassadors to keep a careful watch on envoys from other countries and to beware of political spies and their ‘venality’. 

The writer continued by giving a detailed account of the ambassador’s official arrival and of the ceremony usual upon these occasions, which does not differ materially from other accounts. He then urged the need to maintain custom and advised on methods of communication with the court and government to which the ambassador was accredited and discussed the maintenance of amicable relations. In particular the position of extra-ordinary ambassadors was considered and advice given regarding their work in concluding special treaties. Finally, an account was given of the privileges and immunities of ambassadors and also of the abuses thereof.

Received wisdom, which appears to go against that demanded by the jurist and commentator of the period, suggests that men who served as diplomatic

representatives abroad were chosen in a haphazard and random fashion from amongst a pool of grasping courtiers on the watch for advancement and that, as such, they were usually poorly educated, badly prepared and therefore ineffective. This seems hardly conceivable when one considers the actual value which princes placed on their ambassadors and what was expected of them on their missions. Analysis of the data provided in the Database suggests that the contrary was, in fact, the case, and that, on the whole, these men were well-educated, well-trained and carefully selected for the specific job in hand. For this work the men selected required a wide knowledge of historical precedents, the customs and fashions pertaining to the country which was to receive them and a certain knowledge of legal theory - all qualities suggested by the authors of the conduct books discussed here.

The majority of those sent to James's court had received some kind of formal education, and, although not all attended the universities, a significant number held doctorates of one kind or another. This is not to say, however, that any lack of formal education precluded a man from diplomatic services. Most, if not all, could claim the benefit of some kind or another of informal education - private tutors and the 'grand tour' were acceptable accomplishments which formed part of a diplomat's education. There were also those for whom education came in the form of practical experience, either in the service of a foreign prince or potentate, through military service overseas or as merchants trading abroad. Foreign languages were also extremely important and the manuals of the time insisted that ambassadors should be well versed in all the modern languages - before all things they should be 'careful to learn the language of the country or at least the language most used there'. Not only was care in the matter necessary but a lack of knowledge 'almost unpardonable', in view of the risk and embarrassment ministers and their
business would incur, if secrets had to pass through a third party. 48 The idea that English should be one of the languages learned never seems to have occurred to any one of our writers, and to this commentator's knowledge, was not included in any list drawn up at this time. Even Callières list of preferred languages, which dates from the second decade of the eighteenth century, omits English. 49 Only Latin, Italian, Spanish, German and French are recommended. Traditionally the language of diplomacy was Latin although, through the ascendancy of France in the mid-seventeenth century, it later came to be French.

Those chosen for this profession were, as a rule, well prepared by education and experience to shoulder the responsibilities the job would entail. The conclusion must be, therefore, that such diplomats were not just randomly picked from a pool of men or that they received their appointments solely on the basis of patronage, although that would, of course, have played an important role in some cases. These men can be seen as a highly educated group with a firm grasp on the importance of their missions, men well versed in historical as well as current politics.

Every government relied heavily on this skilled force of diplomats and their staff to maintain the smooth running of their foreign affairs and it was an unusual ambassador who served on only one mission. Many of those who came to James's court had spent time posted to other European cities and were to do so again after leaving England. Of the men who served in England during this period, approximately 17%, or thirty-four of the two hundred and thirteen representatives profiled came on more than one occasion; their return either requested by James or by their own master. Of these men fourteen also served three or more missions.50 The repetitive service demonstrated by this analysis also belies the notion of random selection and unpreparedness. Further evidence to show that these men were not

49 de Callières, Diplomacy, p. 168.
50 Table 4.
randomly selected but were, on the contrary, experienced men is provided by examining the ages of those sent on missions. The average age is 46 years, although the youngest serving representative was seventeen and the eldest seventy-three.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Missions</th>
<th>Country Represented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BELLIN, Christian von</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARISIUS, Dr Jonas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINCLAIR, Sir Andrew</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOISCHOT, Ferdinand de</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOBOKEN, Baron Conrad Schetz,</td>
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<td>Flanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE, Jean Baptiste van</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BODERIE, Antoine le Fevre de la</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>THOSPITAL, Louis Gallucio de, Marquis de Vitry</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAUPES, Charles Cauchon de, Baron du Tour</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohna, Baron Christopher</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERSOLE, Sir Francis</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Faul, Andreas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flessen, Volrad de</td>
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<td>Palatine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schomberg, Count Meinhard von</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schomberg, Henry de, Count of Nanteuil</td>
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<td>Sherley, Sir Robert</td>
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<td>Lewis Frederick, Prince of Württemberg</td>
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</table>

Table 4: Number of Missions served

This age range is well within the limits suggested by Wicquefort, who, in contrast to others writing on the subject, believed ambassadors should be chosen from the ranks of those aged between forty and sixty, on the grounds that experience came with maturity. Not surprisingly, the two men at the extremes of the age range, George Lewis, Count Schwarzenberg and Otto, Prince of Hesse, did not come to England as major diplomatic players. Count Schwarzenberg was sent on missions of

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51 Table 5.
cerepy while Otto came on an unsuccessful mission to propose a marriage between himself and Princess Elizabeth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Embassy Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Age</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>George Lewis, Count SCHWARZENBERG</td>
<td>c. 1549-1653</td>
<td>Emperor &amp; Imperial Diets</td>
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</table>

Table 5: Age at start of Mission

By the beginning of James’s reign, instead of the grand entry of an occasional envoy, which excited attention and advertised, by the very fact of his presence, that his was a mission in which great issues were at stake, the development of Machiavelli’s permanent diplomatic resident was seen. He became a
familiar figure at court, one who spoke the common language of diplomacy, behaved as a man of the world and was accepted as a member of an international profession. His profession led him to pursue two objects; the first to furnish correct information and the second to help his master to maintain the balance of power on which the safety of each nation state relied.

Early twentieth century commentators, in agreement with their seventeenth century counterparts, usually divided diplomats into two main categories: ministers of the first order, meaning extra-ordinary or ceremonial ambassadors; and ministers of the second order, meaning special envoys, ordinary ambassadors, who usually served a term of three years and generally attended to the daily routine of diplomacy and agents. The former it was suggested was an altogether more notable person, usually a nobleman who came with a retinue of hundreds. His stay was usually fairly brief and he returned home when his mission was completed. Recent research moves away from this idea and stresses that the title an envoy held was no guide to the nature of his embassy, and furthermore, this research shows that, as a rule of thumb, the ordinary ambassador, unlike the extra-ordinary, was obliged to remain in his post until recalled by his master. The difference between an ambassador and a resident in the early seventeenth century was not, as was previously supposed, determined by the duration of his embassy but lay in the status of the country he represented or his position in the order of precedence at the court to which he had been accredited. The Dutch, for example, raised their residents in London and Paris to the rank of ambassador after the signing of the peace treaty between themselves and the Spanish.

The envoy, a rank more modern than the resident, served on a mission which required less authority than one calling for an ambassador. These men were

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53 CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, 16th June, 15th July, 1609, pp. 285, 300.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country Represented</th>
<th>Embassy Type</th>
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<td>German States</td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRUCE, William</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRUNEAU, Jacques</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUCH, Cpt</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARON, Sir Noel de</td>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLERC, M. le</td>
<td>France</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORSO</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d'ARLAC, M. d'Herlai</td>
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<td>Agent</td>
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<td>DUJARDIN, Mons.</td>
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<td>GABELEONE, Giovanni Battista</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAFUENTE, Fr. Diego</td>
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<td>LOTTI, Ottaviano</td>
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<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTA, Francesco della</td>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUFFIA, Claudio, Count Cartignana</td>
<td>Savoy</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEGUR, Vicomte de (probably Robert Creighton, Lord Sanquhar)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMONWITZ, Thomas</td>
<td>Muscovy</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOBIESKI, Jakub</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASSIS, Juan de (Taxis), Count of Villa Mediana (1603)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>Muscovy</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
<td>Savoy</td>
<td>Special Envoy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 6: Ambassadors by Embassy Type
usually designated ‘Special Envoy’ to insure that they received better treatment than the more lowly agent. 54 A proportion of those who attended upon James during his reign were special envoys. Although those included in this work represent some 10% of the representatives recorded, many more, those who came for just a few days and whose names were never recorded, have obviously had to be omitted. The job of the special envoy was, in many cases, just to deliver a letter or some other kind of communication either to James or to a specific ambassador already in residence. Having said this, others, like Francesco della Rota and Ottaviano Lotti, stayed for several months and acted in the capacity of ambassador; Lotti to negotiate for the hand of a sister of the new Grand Duke, Cosimo II, for Prince Henry, and Rota to offer proposals for the restitution of the Palatine, assistance for the Palatine to become an eighth Elector and to ask that the eldest son of Frederick be ‘kept near’ the Duke of Bavaria. 55 In cases such as these the representatives were not given a full diplomatic title, not because of the mission he was on but because of the status of the state he represented. At the bottom of the scale was the agent whose concerns were almost exclusively mercantile. These agents were maintained at courts where a government’s political interests were small but where commercial advantages might be gained if a spokesman were on the scene.

The sending of an extra-ordinary ambassador was a sign of honour and friendship; the most common reason being the extension of congratulation or condolence. He travelled with more pomp than his fellow diplomats and was expected to return as soon as he had accomplished the mission on which he had been sent. James’s accession, for example, brought embassies from the United Provinces, France, the Spanish Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Venice, Florence, 

54 Wicquefort, _Embassador_, pp. 36 - 39.
55 Rota was a Capuchin Friar, Alexandre d’Alix, sent with the consent of both Bavaria and Mayence by the Papal Nuncio in Brussels. These proposals were seen as being made out of a mistrust of Spain. See Valaresso to the Doge, 29th December, 1623, _CSP Venetian_, 1623 - 1625, pp. 177 - 179.
Poland, Savoy and Lorraine, and several German States, the Palatinate of the Rhine, Würtemburg, Brandenburg, Brunswick and Cleves. When the King survived plots against his life he received ambassadors with congratulations and when Anne died in 1619 condolences were sent. There was a certain amount of one-upmanship in this, so that, on the death of Prince Henry Dudley Carleton was moved to note rather smugly, that the Venetians sent 'two principal senators, with a secretary, both of the same quality as those they sent to the French ambassador upon the death of the late King; whereas to the Spanish, for the Queen of Spain, they sent a secretary only.' In his reply to this letter Chamberlain noted that an extraordinary ambassador from the Duke of Louvaine had come to London to give condolences over the death of the Prince and, rather inappropriately one feels at this time, to offer a match for Charles. 'He had audience on Monday,' he wrote, 'and is a very proper, comely man, being bastard...to the Cardinal of Guise.' On 7th January he remarked that there was also an ambassador from the Prince of Conti arrived to offer condolence.

Negotiations for treaties or for the making of royal marriages also required special ambassadors and alongside them the resident ambassadors were constantly engaged in a wide variety of formal and informal negotiations with the governments of the countries to which they were accredited. The resulting agreements took several forms of which Satow notes at least fourteen distinct types of instrument including treaties: peace, alliance, commerce, navigation, extradition, compensation, boundaries, arbitration, conventions, accessions, adhesions, arrangements, declarations and confirmations. Negotiations could proceed in any number of ways but the continuous exchange and amendment of drafts and

58 For a full discussion of these different classes see E. Satow, A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 4th ed. (1957).
counter-drafts of the desired treaty until agreement was achieved over the final text seems to have been the most frequent way forward after initial exploratory discussions. The agreed text was then set out in orderly fashion as Articles of Agreement, of which at least two examples were prepared. The plenipotentiaries formally affixed their personal seals or signed the documents which were then transmitted to the delegates prince’s for agreement before final ratification. Once the instruments of ratification were completed and exchanged the terms of the treaty came into force. The signing of a treaty and its ratification required men of very high calibre so that in 1611, for example, a Marshal of France came with a huge retinue to take James’s oath to a treaty between the two countries, and in 1623 no less than three ambassadors extra-ordinary from Spain came to England to try to keep alive the marriage negotiations. Not all extra-ordinary ambassadors came on such important missions however, in 1605 Henricus Ramelius, secretary to Christian IV of Denmark, arrived as proxy for his master when he was to be invested with the Order of the Garter and similarly in 1613 the Duc de Bouillon arrived from France to return the Garter of the recently dead Henri IV. To celebrate the anniversary of his investiture to the Garter Frederick, Duke of Württemburg sent a large embassy to England in April, 1604. No less than four ambassadors, Count Philipp von Eberstein, George Leopold, Herr von Landau, Christopher von Laymingen, Kilian Brastberger and Melchior Bonacker, arrived on the 15th accompanied by a large entourage which included a riding-master, a clerk, a one-horse vehicle, a trumpeter and various assorted servants. The riding-master and two horses, chosen from the Duke’s own stud, with their trappings (one set of these being all of silver) were to be presented as gifts. The Count was the Duke’s representative at the forthcoming festival and von Landau was to take the Count’s place should any accident befall him. Bonacker was deputed to deliver the address and, with Brastberger, to present the arms and shield of the Order. The arms and escutcheon were to be borne by the first ambassador, and afterwards, in the
presence of the entire assembly, they were to be hung up in the Chapel of the Order, next to those of the King of Denmark. The Duke had given von Eberstein an offering of 200 ducats which he was to ‘shoot out of the purse into the basin upon the altar, and there to lay the purse near it.’ Meanwhile the Duke held his own celebrations in Stuttgart. A year later the Duke sent Daniel von Buwinckhausen and Friedrich Dägker with presents for the King and the royal family to celebrate the anniversary of his investiture. To the King he sent his own portrait, painted in the regalia of the Order, together with a description by Cellius of the ‘pompous solemnity’ celebrated in Stuttgart in 1603. To the Queen he sent an elegant Wunderkasten or writing desk. To Charles and Elizabeth guns and silver jewel-cases were sent. Although some early modern diplomatic missions would appear to the modern mind as rather inconsequential, in the seventeenth century matters of manners and questions of protocol were supremely important to the outcome of a mission. We are thus able to find missions such as that of Count Meinhard von Schomberg, Grand Marshal of the Palatine, one of whose errands was to ask James not to remove Anne, daughter of Lord Dudley, from her post as a lady in waiting to Princess Elizabeth. Anne had accompanied Elizabeth to Germany as Chief Lady of Honour and court gossip held that she only accepted this office because of her feelings for Schomberg. It appears that he was successful in this mission for they married in early 1615 although their life together was short as Anne died the following December in childbirth.

Before a representative left for his mission in London he was provided with all the papers necessary for his mission. His sovereign gave him letters of credence addressed to James which indicated the name and rank of the ambassador, the

59 Probably a miniature.
60 Sattler, *Geschichte des Herzogthums Würtemberg unter der Regierung der Herzögen* (1772).
61 Chamberlain to Carleton, 23rd December, 1613, *SP Domestic*, vol. lxv, no. 52.
general purpose of his mission and a request that full credit should be given to what the ambassador had to say on behalf of his government. Because a diplomat was accredited to a sovereign and not to a nation the death of either head of state invalidated his credentials and a new set were required before he could proceed with his mission. Before an ambassador could leave his post he required a letter of recall from his head of state, a copy of which was also sent to James. On several occasions James expelled envoys from his court. James dismissed Father Creichton, a secret envoy from the Pope, after only one month at court on the grounds that neither the envoy nor the King could convert the other. Sir Robert Sherley’s second embassy to England came to an abrupt end when he was asked to leave after quarrelling violently with another envoy from Persia, Najdi Beg, in 1625. 63 Antonio Donato, ordinary ambassador from Venice, outdid both of these men by being twice banished by James: first he was banished to the verge of the court and on the second occasion banished from London; ‘which’, wrote Sir Henry Wotton, ‘was a much as could be done with presentation of national immunities’. 64 Walter Yonge reports a rumour that around the 4th July, 1606, the Spanish ambassador was ‘banished the court’. Presumably this refers to Pedro de Zúñiga who was ordinary ambassador to London at this time. The other Spanish representative, the Marquis of Inojosa, was acting as special envoy. Yonge sheds further light on this matter in September of that year when he reports that there were eighteen articles drawn up by the Privy Council which proved that the ambassador was guilty of treason and that there were ‘divers things daily proved against the Spaniards for their treachery to the state of England’, and warning that, if this was the way the Spanish conducted themselves, ‘the peace ‘twixt us will not long hold’. 65

63 E. P. Shirley, The Sherley Brothers: an historical memoir of the lives of Sir Thomas Sherley, Sir Anthony Sherley and Sir Robert Sherley, Knights, p. 88; Nichols, Progresses, vol. iv, p. 430n
64 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the privileges and immunities of foreign diplomats.
65 The Diary of Walter Yonge, pp. 9; 10; 11.
Bearing in mind the type of man sent on a mission overseas one of the most fully discussed points raised by the jurists and commentators on early modern diplomatic practice was that of how a representative should conduct himself. This revolved around ideas relating to questions of precedence, privilege and immunity and received extensive attention. 66 Ambassadors, insist the conduct books, must be careful to maintain the authority of their position and to assert their prerogatives, for example, in not giving the door or the right hand to any minister or individual, whether of his own country or of another, and least of all to those who hold the same position in his own office. 67 This refers to the custom of offering precedence at the door, to a chair or to the right hand seat of the coach. This injunction is qualified by confirmation that these observations refer to formal not friendly visits where ambassadors are acting in their official capacity and not as individuals. Quarrels over precedence were a common feature at the court and are demonstrated below in the constant outbreaks between the French and Spanish ambassadors. The ‘Most Christian’ kings of France considered themselves without peers: their right having been recognised at the meeting of more than one council. The quarrels continued until the d'Estrades incident in 1661, when several people died as a consequence of disagreement over precedence between two ambassadorial carriages.

Writing on the privileges of ambassadors, the jurists were in communion in insisting that foreign agents were not inviolate amongst the people to whom they were sent, but that, nevertheless as men of peace, they ought to be treated courteously. This idea can be summed up thus: men sent for purposes of espionage should be refused admission, or if they had already been admitted, expelled. A sovereign might refuse to receive an embassy, but only on good cause, if, for example, he considered the embassy to be officious. Sovereigns are warned that

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66 A full discussion of these subjects can be found in Chapter 3.
those who violated *jus legationis* in the persons of ambassadors must look for retaliation against his own ministers. Robbers and pirates and those who have revolted against their sovereign should not under any circumstances be made envoys, although heretics could claim such rights. However, offences committed by individuals before the assumption of their office should not be held against them. Not only ambassadors, but their suite and goods were deemed sacred, and to the term suite, many of our writers gave a generous interpretation. In respect of ambassador's civil liabilities, however, they would admit only very restricted privileges. A contract made by an ambassador during the time of his embassy should, they are clear, be held enforceable; otherwise ambassadors would have the power to defraud others of their goods, so that as a consequence no one would wish to deal with that ambassador. But more importantly, envoys should be absolutely exempt from the operation of the local criminal law of the land to which they are sent. For residents could not satisfy the demands of their masters unless the prince to whom they were accredited accepted that they worked on their master’s behalf and, as such, should be allowed to operate freely, even though their instructions might be seditious and their reports untrue. Even if they were to conspire against the prince to whom they were accredited, punishment should be limited to a declaration that the envoy was *persona non grata* at that court and their master requested to recall them. So the conduct of the English government in dismissing the Spanish ambassador, Don Guerau Despés, who plotted against Elizabeth, was entirely correct. Similarly, the arrest of the Bishop of Ross, ambassador from Mary, Queen of Scots, on an accusation of attempting to ‘raise Rebellion’ against Elizabeth was also correct. This case raised several questions relating to ideas of ambassadorial privilege, the most important of which was whether:

> an Ambassador, that raises rebellion against the Prince to whom he is sent, should enjoy the Privileges of an Ambassador, and not rather be liable to Punishment as an Enemy?

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68 See *British Library*, Cotton Mss, Galba c. iii, f. 156.
The response by the jurors, Henry Jones, William Aubrey, Daniel Lewis, Valentine Dale and William Drury was that

Such an Ambassador, by the Law of Nations, and the Civil Law of the Romans has forfeited the Privileges of an Ambassador, and is liable to Punishment. 69

Diplomatic service, which led to a period abroad and thus isolation from the court, has traditionally been perceived as the wrong route for those looking for advancement. 70 This data shows conclusively that this notion is incorrect. Without exception men actively sought after diplomatic office and the overwhelming majority of those men who had been resident at James’s court were to be found at some stage in their careers in a variety of significant domestic offices. Examination of the experience of the major players in diplomacy will show that these men were well qualified to engage in the negotiations of the policies on which they were sent to treat. Princes relied on experience at the highest level to guide their kingdom’s foreign affairs. At the top of the pyramid of those conducting affairs in England on behalf of their masters were to be found the principal officials of state: experienced men who had previous diplomatic responsibility. During the years of James’s reign fifty-nine of the ambassadors (some 22%) who came to the court were from this highly experienced group.

Furthermore, these same men were to be found involved in many different capacities once they returned home. Pedro de Zúñiga, Marquis Flores Davila, for example, had been Gentleman of the Chamber to Philip III, a Commander of the Order of Santiago and Master of the Horse prior to his embassy to England. On his return he was promoted to Councillor of State under Philip IV. Similarly, Jacques Bruneau had been the Secretary to the President of Flanders. On his return from England he was made President of the Chambre des Comptes in Lille, and later Secretary of the Council of Flanders in Madrid. Maximillien Bethüne, Marquis de

69 “The Case of the Scots Ambassador, the Bishop of Ross, Accused of attempting to Raise Rebellion against Queen Elizabeth”, Harleian Miscellany, vol. ii, pp. 460 - 462.
70 See particularly Mattingly, Diplomacy, p. 236.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Titles/Position prior to English Mission</th>
<th>Country Represented</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHARISIUS, Dr Jonas</td>
<td>Councillor to the Danish Court</td>
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<td>FRUS, Christopher</td>
<td>Chancellor of Denmark</td>
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<td>RAMELUS, Henry</td>
<td>Secretary to Christian IV</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>George Lodovic, Prince Landgrave of Litemberg</td>
<td>Lord Chamberlain to Rudolph II</td>
<td>Emperor Imperial Diets</td>
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<td>BOISCHOT, Ferdinand de</td>
<td>Licentiate, Chancellor of Brabant</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROTTI</td>
<td>Secretary to Archduke Albert</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXIA, Diego de</td>
<td>Governor of the Castle of Antwerp</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
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<tr>
<td>RICHARDOT Jean Grusset</td>
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<td>VERREYKEN, Ludovic</td>
<td>Audiencer</td>
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<td>Marchel de Laverdin</td>
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<td>Attendant of the Prince of Conde</td>
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<td>CLERC, M. le</td>
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<td>DAVIET, Gaspard, Count Desmaretz</td>
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<td>Chevalier des Ordres et Capitaine des Gardes</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>ROHAN, Benjamin de</td>
<td>Sire de Soubrière</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Chamberlain to the Pope</td>
<td>Lorraine</td>
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<td>HUTTON, Daniel</td>
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<td>Neuberg</td>
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<td>PAUL, Andreas</td>
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<td>GABELEONE, Giovanni Battista</td>
<td>Auditor Fiscal of the Duke of Savoy</td>
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<td>BRUNEAU, Jacques</td>
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<td>COLOMA, Carlos</td>
<td>Governor of Cambray</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>MENDOZA, Diego Hurtado de</td>
<td>Knight of the Order of Santiago; Captain of the Province of Alava</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td>MENDOZA, Juan de, Marquis of Inojosa, Marquis of San Germano</td>
<td>Governor of Milan, Viceroy of Navarre, Councillor of State</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROVIDA, Alessandro</td>
<td>Senator of Milan</td>
<td>Spain</td>
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<tr>
<td>TASSIS, Juan de, Count of Villa Mediana</td>
<td>Knight of the Order of Santiago; Court Chamberlain and Correo Mayor to Philip III</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VELASCO, Juan Fernandez de, Duke of Frias, Constable of Castle</td>
<td>Governor of Milan (1592 -1598), member of the Councils of War and State</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rosny, Duke de Sully, a minister of Henri IV, who during his youth, had been a successful military campaigner, was created Grand Master of the Artillery in 1618 and Marshal of France in 1634; Jean Baptiste van Male, after appointments as Flemish agent was promoted to the Council of Finance in Brussels in November, 1623. Hippolytus von Colli a Swiss jurist, author of several legal treatises and Chancellor to Christian, Prince of Anhalt who represented Württemburg in 1610 later became Privy Councillor to the Elector Palatine, Frederick IV, by whom he was employed in several embassies. However, it has to be acknowledged that not all men returned home to such honours. After becoming an agent of Duc de Richelieu,
Francois de Carondelet, the Archdeacon of Cambray who had come to England as a special envoy at the beginning of 1622, ended his days in prison in Antwerp in 1635.\footnote{Biographia Nationale, vol. 1, p. 690; vol. 3, p. 351.} Antonio Foscarini, Venetian ordinary between May, 1611 and December, 1615, despite being well thought of by James and friendly with the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Earls of Somerset and Suffolk, had a lonely life at court. His relationship with other ambassadors was not of the best. He refused to see the ambassador of Savoy in 1613 owing to a dispute between Venice and the Duke and coolness existed between Foscarini and the successive Tuscan representatives, Lotti and Quaratese.\footnote{Christopher Surian to the Doge, 31st October, 1616, CSP Venetian, 1615 - 1617, p. 340.} Lotti never paid him a farewell visit and Quaratese never called on him at all. With Boischot he was engaged to the very last in a dispute, supposedly, about precedence. The dispute came to a head in August 1614, but both ambassadors left the country while the question remained undecided.\footnote{James to the Doge, 15th December, 1614, CSP Venetian, 1613 - 1615, p. 276 and note.}

However, the Venetian \textit{State Papers} suggest that the dispute between the two was of a more personal nature than it first appears. In fact, there were suggestions that the real reason lay in an accusation that Foscarini was involved in 'an intrigue with the wife of the Ambassador of Flanders' (Boischot).\footnote{Articles of Accusation against Antonio Foscarini, 22nd January, 1616, CSP Venetian, 1615 - 1617, App. 905 - 912, pp. 592 - 606}

Antonio Donato, a nephew of Niccolò Donato, Doge of Venice came under suspicion when Gabeleone, agent from Savoy, made an accusation of misconduct to the Doge and Senate. He was recalled in May 1619 and found guilty of 'misdemeanours' and embezzlement whilst he was ambassador to Savoy.\footnote{Of part of the subsidy paid by Venice to the Duke of Savoy.} Deprived of his ambassadorship and nobility, his goods were confiscated and he was banished by the Republic on 20th June, 1619. He returned to England in July,
1619, where he retired to Putney. Some cases were particularly bizarre. Vicomte
de Segur, Robert Creichton, Lord Sanquhar, special envoy from France in 1605,
ended his days on the scaffold before the gates of Westminster Hall on 29th June,
1612 for causing the murder of one Turner, a fencing master, who had blinded
him in an earlier fencing match.

Of all the representatives reviewed here arguably the most important were
those sent by Philip III of Spain. These men were formidable artists of diplomacy
and in the few years between the peace of 1604 and the Thirty Years War, Spanish
diplomats were offered a unique opportunity to foster good relations between
England and Spain. Spain may have made peace with the Dutch and the English,
the influx of gold and silver from the Americas may have been drying up and the
revenue dwindling at a time when the court spent more, but the King of Spain was
still seen as Europe’s most powerful monarch. Whilst he continued to rule Belgium
and France-Comté, Milan, Naples, Sicily and the islands of the western
Mediterranean and the Iberian peninsular, a whole army of diplomats worked at
regaining the domination of Europe, which had been lost since the time of the ill-
fated Armada. There were many brilliant men working towards this goal but four
must stand out above the rest: Balthazar Zúñiga and Inigo Vélez de Guevara,
successive ambassadors to the Austrian Habsburgs, Alfonso de la Cueva, Marquis of
Bedmar, resident at Venice and by far the most brilliant, in this writer’s view, their
contemporary, Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, later Count Gondomar (1617),
ambassador to England from 1613 to 1618 and again from 1620 to 1622. In
these four men the Spanish genius for diplomacy peaked. Aristocrats by birth, they
were men of considerable culture, tact and charm, devoutly Catholic and intensely
patriotic, determined to regain for Spain her past glory. Mattingly notes that they

76 CSP Venetian, 1617 - 1619, pp. 461, 521 - 522, 489 - 491, 509, 561 - 562; CSP Venetian,
1619 - 1621, pp. 73 - 85.
77 See DNB sub nomine.
78 Gondomar’s career in England is discussed below in Chapter 4.
determined to do this despite a 'do-nothing king and incompetent ministers' and the laxness with which Spanish policy was conducted at Madrid. De la Cueva, Zúñiga and de Guevara were exceptional diplomatists and an examination of any of their methods would serve to illustrate the variety of an ambassador's activities in the early years of the seventeenth century and the scope for individual initiative, which the office offered the gifted man.

The religious situation in England and the proposed marriage alliance between the two houses resulted in ambassadors of an extremely high calibre being sent between the two countries. This was a cause of great concern amongst commentators and pamphleteers, who feared any entente with Catholic Spain, so that her ambassadors were to become the most disliked of all representatives at the early Jacobean court. Of the Spanish ambassadors, the most important were those who attended the long awaited peace talks at the beginning of James's reign, which resulted in the ratification of the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty on 28th August, 1604. These men, their opposite numbers from Flanders and the English commissioners, were to set the pattern of peace which was to remain in place until the return of Charles and Buckingham from Madrid in 1623. Of course, not everyone was happy that James should look for peace with Spain so that, for example, the French ambassador, Rosny, in addition to giving formal congratulations to the new King, was instructed to try, if he could, to dissuade James from coming to any understanding with Spain. This sudden outbreak of peace also provided a check, for a time at least, to the anti-Spanish pamphleteers. With Spain once more on technically cordial terms, James could not permit the steady flow of anti-Hispanism which had been so characteristic of Elizabeth's reign. Typical of the new attitude expected of Englishmen were those expressed in a pamphlet issued on the peace negotiations themselves. The author, Robert Treswell, pictured the Spanish as exuding good-will, which they demonstrated by their intercession for a English

sailor who had been sentenced to hang by his own captain for striking a Spanish priest. 80 Treswell's fellow countrymen, especially the English clergy, who saw the peace as a betrayal of English Protestantism, did not share this optimistic view. 81 As Foscarini noted in 1612, 'the mass, both of nobles and people, desire war; nor is there any rank of person which conceals the satisfaction it would feel if leave were given for reprisals on Spain as in the time of the late Queen.' 82

Although arguably the most important embassies came from Philip III they were far out-numbered by the representatives of the United Provinces who sent 42 men on 14 separate missions to England; most of whom took the diplomatic title of Commissioner. 83 As five of these men returned for two or more missions this computes to roughly 20% of all embassies during James's reign. The commissioners from the States General were involved in the negotiation of treaties and several commissions were received by James in order to settle disputes over the North Sea and Greenland fisheries and mercantile disagreements, especially between the East India Companies of the two nations. 84 Their ordinary ambassador, Sir Noel de Caron, was the longest standing ambassador to the English court. He had continued in England as agent after James succeeded to the throne and was promoted to the title of ordinary in 1604. In total he served in England continuously for thirty-four years, dying whilst still in office on 1st December, 1624. 85

But what of the ambassadors' function - their raison d'être? Resident ambassadors had a variety of concerns: they were to look out for the interests of their fellow countrymen who were trading or residing in the country to which they

80 Robert Treswell, A relation of such things as were observed to happen in the Journey of the Right Honourable Charles, Earl of Nottingham, Lord High Admiral of England, his Majestys Ambassador to the King of Spain... (1604) in Somers Tracts, vol. II, pp. 77, 96.
81 Foscarini to the Doge, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, p. 6.
82 Foscarini to the Doge, CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, p. 335.
83 Compare this to the 20 representatives sent by Spain.
84 For the purpose of this work only commissioners instructed by the States General have been included here. There were many other commissions which were expressly sent by the East India Company.
85 Sir Noel de Caron had first arrived in England in 1585 and became the United Provinces agent to Elizabeth in 1590. See below, Chapter 5, for a discussion of his embassy.
were sent; they acted as agents for acquiring works of art and reported on the movements of disaffected émigrés, running counter-intelligence operations to report on their plots. Both de Callières and Wicquefort saw the ambassadors' primary function as the delivering of letters, observation of the court to which they were accredited and the protection of their masters' subjects. However, to this list must be added the task of negotiating with foreign governments. Ambassadors might be involved in arranging a formal diplomatic agreement, as in the case of the Anglo-Spanish peace commission in 1604 and the several commissions from the States General to deal with the problems arising between the two East India companies, or they could be expected to work on problems which did not require specific written agreements.

However, the chief charge of the resident ambassador was to uphold the honour of his master, to speak for his government, to seek the views and policies of the court to which he had been sent and to inform his own government of such policies. Whatever the circumstances of an embassy and the temptations faced in a foreign land, ambassadors were reminded never to forget their paramount duty as laid down in their written instructions. The duties of ambassadors were, as summarised by all the manuals of the time, the implicit fulfilment of these written instructions. These concern what should be observed, asked, claimed or negotiated in their office. Representatives, some suggested, must 'obey these instructions inviolably'. However, theorists do not all agree and other advisers note that, being on the spot, ambassadors must use their discretion. Hotman wrote:

> a number of things must be left to the discretion of a prudent Ambassador without thus tying his tongue and hands... But when he has played the part of a man of worth, 'tis ill done to repay him with a disavowal; and such princes do not deserve to be served by people with worth, especially when these have done for the best. Industry and diligence are of ourselves; a successful issue is of heaven.\(^87\)

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Unlike the theorists, who could not make up their minds on this point, governments insisted that their ambassadors act within the prescribed limits of their instructions and in most cases men were reluctant to assume any personal responsibility in matters they were not authorised to deal with. However, at times ambassadors were asked for their opinions on important policy questions - after all these men were on the spot and in a position to gauge the feelings of James and his ministers. Occasionally, ambassadors who felt that their opinions were respected by their masters, would venture to express their concerns or otherwise on policy. Of necessity diplomats had a certain amount of autonomy and authority in determining when and where they should negotiate, and because of the inevitable delays in communication and the changing political atmosphere in England, ambassadors had to make these decisions. However, this did not mean that their decisions were acceptable to James. In 1604, for example, the Constable of Castile decided that, due to ill health, the peace commissioners should come to him in Brussels instead of meeting in London as originally planned. James rejected this idea out of hand and the negotiations were held up for several weeks. Ambassadors were, of course, hesitant to act without or against their instructions. Most went about their business in an acceptable fashion; occasionally receiving rebukes from their government if they did not carry out their responsibilities to the satisfaction of their Secretary of State. Occasionally, however, it became necessary for them to act independently. At such times they did what they believed was best and depended on their explanations being accepted. This was not always the case as can be seen from the fate of the Venetian agent, Pier Antonio Marioni, who was reprimanded by the Senate in 1619. Although expressing their approval of his having read James a letter from the Senate he was severely reprimanded for having disclosed to the King
his instructions. In consequence he was instructed not to go 'again to audience of the King or of the principal ministers unless expressly requested to do so'.

Having to keep their governments well-informed ambassadors should neglect no opportunity to make themselves aware of what went on about them. It was necessary, therefore, that the perfect ambassador keep up a correspondence with the other ambassadors of his country in different lands, and also be kept well informed of events in his own country, relying for this information on the Secretary of State there or friends and even paid informers, ‘not grudging two or three hundred crowns for this if need be’. Above all, in their quest to keep their masters informed, ambassadors should study the country to which they are accredited and do so personally. Ambassadors were frequently advised by their governments about the individuals at court who should be courted or who should be avoided because of a previous friendliness or antipathy. They should see people of all ranks and should talk with them, in an effort to understand the trends and opinions at play there. If spies are employed ambassadors should be on their guard as these men could not be trusted, doing and saying anything for money.

The routine into which the new seventeenth century resident ambassador had to settle was more varied and exacting than early writers have represented it. Although expected to be more than a liaison and information gathering officer, this still formed the major part of a resident’s employment. Collection of information by the resident ambassador was a fairly complicated business. Mattingly lists the methods used to maintain the flow of information from embassy to master:

- Gathering the views and receiving the communications of the prince and his counsellors for transmission home
- Trading items of political information by offering items useful to one’s hosts
- Gathering items of political background by ordinary observation

88 Doge and Senate to Marioni, 11th September, 1619, CSP Venetian, 1619 - 1621, p. 5.
89 Hotman, L’Ambassadeur, p. 24.
Cultivating informant, a method which might range from ordinary social courtesy, through the doing of special favours for probably useful persons to the payment of ‘pensions’ to highly placed officials and plain bribery to underlings.

Espionage and the employment of undercover agents often not officially connected with the embassy.

Conspiracy with political malcontents, usually the Ambassador’s co-religionists, whenever the opportunity offered.  

In their role as foreign correspondents ambassadors needed to organise their own newsgathering services. Hotman suggests that this should be the first exercise undertaken on arrival at a foreign court. They should see that they are kept abreast of news from other countries and, what is more important, should do everything in their power to penetrate the secrets of the country in which they are serving. Hotman maintained that ambassadors should entertain lavishly in order to loosen tongues, should suborn both high and low and remember, above all, that money would open most doors. In short ambassadors must establish a personal secret service.  

Several methods of espionage were used. The first and probably the easiest method was the securing of secrets, in return for money or other valuable gifts, from officials and courtiers. The Duc de Sully made abundant use of gold and presents and indeed he is credited with having begun ‘that angling fashion.’ This practice, which today would be considered as open bribery, was clearly acceptable. In the seventeenth century presents and tokens of esteem were constantly on the move, between princes, counsellors, ministers, ambassadors and members of the court so that it was to become almost impossible to determine where civility stopped and corruption began. Most manuals specify that ambassadors should refuse to ‘accept any gifts or presents, either from the prince to whom he is sent or

from any of his people for any cause whatsoever, unless having already taken leave...' 93 The very nature of illicit financial transactions involving bribery makes it difficult to determine whether it was a successful way to gain information. Many ambassadors we know had agents placed in strategic positions who kept them informed of affairs which should have remained secret.

Most, if not all, ambassadors played this game of espionage and outright bribery could, it is true, on occasion procure secrets of real value. Although it was the custom for sovereigns to dispense pensions through their ambassadors to certain councillors and others at foreign courts and it is true that both Spanish and French ambassadors had claims on a number of courtiers, whereby they were able to secure court gossip and news, whether their pensioners actually betrayed state secrets is another matter. The value of news obtained by private contact with persons at the court and its surrounding environs depended on how highly placed such an informer was. True, among the payments made by Gondomar for instance, was one to a servant in the employ of Sir Thomas Lake, for supplying summaries of dispatches and another to a person who had provided copies of English treaties but how universal this was remains a tricky question. J. E. Neale argues that it was not pensioners amongst the nobility who told ambassadors most, but malcontents. 94 If an ambassador's relationship with the court were not friendly it was easy for his sympathies to be played upon by the dissatisfied section of society and this in its turn could lead to involvement with factions which could cloud his discretion. The religious and political contentions of the time gave sovereigns their chance to undermine one another by encouraging the disaffected in each other's states, with the result that the ambassador's residences were prone to become some kind of centre for intrigue.

93 Hotman, *The Ambassador*, p. 35.
Alongside the problem of who would be likely to sell state secrets to ambassadors we have the case of the Venetian ambassador, Foscarini, who was himself accused, among other things, of selling state secrets to the English through the offices of Lady Arundel. While in England he had impressed James with his diplomatic skill and made many friends at court, unfortunately he also aroused the enmity of one of his own secretaries, Guilo Muscorno, who made more or less hysterical allegations against him - principally about the sale of state secrets, but also of sexual misbehaviour (particularly with the wife of Boisschot, the Archduke's ambassador), religion and fraud. Accusations were also made that Foscarini had ordered the murder of the said secretary.

The investigation of this affair was slipshod from first to last. Initially Scaramelli, the ambassador's secretary, had been accused of selling the Foscarini papers and was recalled. The accusations by Muscorno, Scaramelli's replacement, outlined in a pamphlet published jointly with Giovanni Biondi, led to this secretary's recall and a summons to appear before the Inquisitors of State, to whom he gave a derogatory report of Foscarini's embassy. In turn Muscorno was replaced, this time by Giovanni Rizzardo, whose confidential report to the Council led to Foscarini's recall and imprisonment. Further investigation in Venice resulted in the ambassador's acquittal on the charges of attempted murder. It was at this point that Lady Arundel became implicated in the affair, when Foscarini was reported to have visited her unaccompanied. The main charge was not that he visited a lady unaccompanied, but that he used these visits to carry out clandestine negotiations with representatives of the Emperor and Spain, and that he was Spain's pensioner to the tune of '6,000 gold crowns' a year. He was rearrested on 8th April, 1622, found guilty and beheaded on 20th April, 1622. He was afterwards

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95 See CSP Venetian, 1615 - 1617, pp. 595 - 606, 940.
96 Sir Giovanni Francesco Biondi, 1572 - 1644, a Venetian settled in London. See DNB sub nomine. It is possible that he came on a special mission and remained in England. The pamphlet was entitled Sayings and Doings of Ambassador Foscarini.
97 Some accounts say he was beheaded and others that he was strangled.
judicially declared to be innocent, the real culprit being the ambassador's valet, Robazza, who had been bribed by a French spy, named Forêt, to admit him to the ambassador's residence during his absence, where he copied the papers he found. The valet lost his right hand and was imprisoned for twenty years. For all his personal problems Winwood was to write of Foscarini that 'howsoever he was not the wisest man, yet in his negotiations, he did approve himself to be an able Ambassador'.

Whilst the collection of information by such methods was an acceptable form of news gathering there was another, secret, method which, although not openly admitted, was generally encouraged by princes. How then was this secret newsgathering done? De Callières recommended that ambassadors, whom he describes as honourable spies, gather to themselves a well-chosen network of agents, as these would 'contribute more than any other agency to the success of great plans', because 'there is no expense better designed...than that which is laid out upon a secret service'. In this matter he recommended the actions of the Spanish who never neglected their secret agents, a fact which he insisted contributed to the success of their ministers in many important negotiations. He added that it was doubtless the success of Spain's agents which led to the establishment of the custom of the Spanish court to give her ambassadors an extraordinary fund, called *gastos secretos*, to enable the recruitment and payment of their secret service.

The criticism or promotion of spies and intrigues was not just the preserve of the jurist and pamphleteer. Jonson, in an epigram entitled *Of Spies* ridicules spies and intelligencers by contrasting the useful work they do for their masters with their low origin and probable violent end:

Spies, you are lights in state, but of base stuffe,
Who, when you have burnt your selves down to the snuffe,
Stinke, and are throwne away. End faire enough. 100

These harsh words recall similar condemnations of espionage that can be found in many of Jonson's works. Volpone's Sir Politic Would-Be is possibly Jonson's most famous commentary of the trend towards political espionage in the later Elizabethan and early Jacobean age. 101 Both he and his companion, Peregrine, are the comic heroes whose travels to the continent on intelligence gathering missions for both their own and their country's good are described. When Stone, the jester, dies Sir Politic comments that he had been one of the most dangerous agents at court and that he received weekly messages from the Low Countries in cabbages, and relayed his own intelligence to foreign ambassadors by means of other foodstuffs:

While he liu'd, in action,
He has receiu'd weekly intelligence,
Upon my knowledge, out of the Low Countries,
(For all parts of the world) in cabages;
And those dispens'd, againe, to Ambassadors,
In oranges, musk-melons, apricocks,
Limons, pome-citrons, and such like: sometimes,
In Colchester-oysters, and your Selsey-cockles. 102

In Sejanus, Jonson is at pains to convey to his readers what spying and dissimulation, under a centralised intelligence system, can do to the state and its citizens, giving an accurate picture of the way power operates, something of which the author was soon to be reminded. 103 Shortly after its completion Henry Howard hauled Jonson before the Privy Council on vague charges of sedition and popery that may have been connected with the play. Later, in Timber: or Discoveries he notes that the just prince 'needs no Emissaries, Spies, Intelligencers', for, we are told, 'sufficient Lords are able to make these Discoveries themselves'. 104

Although corruption, a good measure of intrigue and the use of spies might
be admitted by contemporary commentators as being a necessity one questions
whether an ambassador would be justified in doing wrong if so ordered by his
master? Was involvement in local politics allowable? For most writers the question
has to be discussed; first they find that, as lying is a mortal sin, an ambassador must
never lie; however, most qualify this by admitting that, in certain circumstances, he
must. If a prince orders something unjust, the ambassador must try to open his eyes
to his mistake but, if this fails, the ambassador must obey. Although agreeing that
ambassadors must carry out their instructions no matter how unwise they may
think them, many believed they are not bound to obedience if their prince's orders
contravene moral law. It was felt that however bound by obedience an envoy might
be the prince, for his part, owed a certain obligation to his ministers and on this
subject Machiavelli, who had himself been sent on several diplomatic missions
abroad, gives this advice:

The choosing of ministers is a matter of no little importance...and their worth
depends on the sagacity of the prince himself. The first opinion that is formed
of a ruler's intelligence is based on the quality of the men he has...When they
are competent and loyal he can always be considered wise, because he has
been able to recognize their competence and to keep them loyal...To keep his
minister up to the mark the prince...must be considerate towards him, must
pay him honour, enrich him, put him in his debt, share with him both
honours and responsibilities. Thus the minister will see how dependent he is
on the prince; and then having riches and honours to the point of surfeit he
will desire no more; holding so many offices, he cannot but fear changes.
When...relations between princes and ministers are of this kind...they can
have confidence in each other...otherwise the result is...disastrous for both
of them. 105

The second and possibly most successful method of information gathering
was that in which the Spanish excelled: the giving of pensions. The English court,
like so many others in Europe, had a long-standing reputation as a place where
money opened doors and the only change James's succession made to this
reputation was that it now needed more money to open those same doors. Indeed,
since the early days of the Anglo-Spanish peace commission the open-handedness

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of the Dutch representatives had pushed the sum one might expect right up. As one discontented ambassador is reported to have remarked, 'In this country, if one wants to negotiate a matter one has to put up the money.'\(^{106}\) The French ambassador Desmaretz noted in his despatch of 22\(^{nd}\) February, 1616 that 'Secretary Winwood has been with me, and promised to serve me faithfully...which means, if...I am liberal in my payments.' He concluded by promising that 'in any case I will take care that the English shall not get our money without doing us service.'\(^{107}\) His successor, Sully, in order to complete his negotiations for England's support of the Dutch, found it necessary to lay out large sums in bribes. The Queen was given jewels valued at about 13,000 crowns, while certain members of the Privy Council were offered 1,000 crowns a head, 'in the King's name'. Some Councillors, reported the Venetian envoy, 'made a difficulty about accepting the gift, and the question was discussed in the presence of the King of England, who declared himself content that each shall take all that was offered him.'\(^{108}\) That James was perfectly aware of this situation, but felt unable to do much about it is confirmed by Marioni. 'If I were to imitate the conduct of your Republic', James told the Venetian ambassador, 'and begin to punish those who take bribes, I should soon not have a single subject left.'\(^{109}\)

Spain was particularly generous in the payment of pensions as a means of gaining sympathetic support for her ambassadors and maintaining useful connections. There was considerable speculation as to what sums of money the Constable of Castile brought with him to achieve his ends, although the most typical was that of the Venetians who estimated a sum of some '300,000

\(^{106}\) Arembert to Albert [London], 27th June, 1603. Lonchay, Cuvelier and Lefèvre (eds.) Correspondance de la Cour de Espana sur les affaires des Pays Bas au XVII siècle, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1923 - 1937) vol. 1, p. 298.


\(^{108}\) Molin to the Doge, CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, p. 175

crowns'. Among her pensioners in the English court were Northampton, the Countess of Suffolk and the King and Queen. The case of Robert Cecil is a mystery. Gardiner suggests that he took a Spanish pension although there does not appear to be any mention of this in the Constable’s accounts. Notably the Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of Suffolk, refused a pension when offered one by de Zúñiga in 1604. James did not regard his pension from Spain in any way suspect, any more than he had felt his pension from Queen Elizabeth meant he was a traitor to Scotland. Both pensions, one might argue, could be regarded as evidence of friendship between two monarchs. The pensions paid to his ministers were another matter entirely. There must always be a risk that a minister might pass beyond the bounds of what could be considered correct and divulge information that he should keep to himself. In themselves the pensions were not treasonable but they could offer temptation. Pensioners could, in an excess of gratitude, let ambassadors in on certain information that was of a confidential nature.

Spanish pensions caused great concern amongst commentators at James’s court. During the latter years of Elizabeth’s reign there had been no resident Spanish ambassador at court. On James’s succession regular diplomatic relations were resumed with the arrival of Don Juan de Tassis, Count Villa Mediana, who was later to be one of the peace commissioners overseeing the Treaty of London. In negotiating the peace a good deal of largesse was dispensed, both in promises and cash. He is reported to have paid out pensions of around £10,000 per annum to English officials, including considerable sums to several leading members of the Privy Council. Many officials saw these payments as their due until they became public knowledge and were published in tracts and preached from the

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110 Molin to the Doge, CSP Venetian, 1608 - 1607, p. 175.
112 Details of the ambassador’s pensions, bribes and other secret expenses can be found in Simancas, Contraduria Mayor de Cuentas, 2a época 42. Their first estimates of some 29,000 felipes (approximately £7,250) finally rose to some 36,500 felipes - (approx. £9,125 per annum).
pulpit. On his departure Villa Mediana left a recommendation to Pedro de Zúñiga, the first permanent ambassador, that a pensions list be set up and suggested who should be included on such a list. In this memorandum, which advised of sympathetic persons in positions of authority in England, were listed those who might be of use to the Spanish both at the time and later. It contained details of ‘their quality, their position, their offices, or their services which they have rendered’ and what ‘gifts’ de Tassis felt should be given to them. However, for a person to be ‘in the pay of the King of Spain’ did not mean that in practice they would actually got paid. In fact, the payment of pensions was always well in arrears. On 15th November, 1617 we find Gondomar commenting on the fact that arrears in pension had reached some 23,500 ducats and that some pensioners, such as Socrates, Florian and Alexandro were owed for eighteen months. Piramo, Lady Suffolk, had been unpaid for two and a half years, while the Earl of Somerset was due three years pension and Buckingham was still owed 6,000 ducats from the previous year.

However it might be obtained both government and theorist insisted that ambassadors convey all information gathered to their governments. This, in its turn, raises the question of whether they should send data which might displease or upset their own prince? Without doubt the writers agree, adding one proviso. That is except when the sending of such information would cause useless irritation and endanger any entente between the two nations concerned. If, however, such an untoward incident took place publicly an ambassador would have no choice but to advise his government. The matter would be different if, in full council of the prince, or in the pulpit by preachers, or on the stage by comedians, or by writings or lampoons, an ambassador saw his master’s honour defamed. Then he must send

113 Gardiner, History, vol. 1. p. 214. The practice of giving pensions dated well back into the previous century. This report from Juan de Tassis to the Spanish court, which can be found, dated 28th June, 1604, in Simancas, Legajo E841 f. 118, reflects more the pious intentions rather than the achievements of the government of Spain.

the information at once and crave justice and reparation from those who owed it, using however moderation, so not to make the harm greater than it already was.\textsuperscript{115} No matter how the information was gathered, or by whom, the evaluation of the intelligence received was the task of the ambassador. Forwarding the dispatches containing all this news came up against the difficulties of keeping the contents secret. Almost as soon as ambassadors began their news gathering function so royal ministers began to instigate counter measures. The security of their dispatches was a prime concern for the ambassador - how could dispatches be communicated to his own government without interception? In an attempt to safeguard official communiqués ambassadors turned to private couriers to avoid the risks of the regular post and employed ciphers in an attempt to outwit potential spies.\textsuperscript{116} But, although couriers could be found, they were scarce on the ground and not always reliable, being marked men. Even when couriers were used dispatches were often intercepted and copied, their crude ciphers easily broken. Cipher tables were an essential part of the embassies equipment and by the seventeenth century these usually came in the form of large printed sheets of tables which contained systematic lists of words, names, letters, parts of words opposite which numbers or signs were written. Appended to these tables were extra, meaningless characters solely intended to confuse. For the same purpose secretaries frequently held several different ciphers; the French ambassadors to England were regularly furnished with as many as six. When in England Sully kept Paris informed of his activities in London with a triple set of despatches; one in plain writing; one in cipher to which

\textsuperscript{115} As in the case of the public performances of plays such as \textit{A Game at Chess}, which was performed while the chief protagonists were still alive.  

\textsuperscript{116} On the risks of a courier during this period see E. John, B. Allen, \textit{Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe} (The Hague, 1972); see also M. Mallet, ‘Ambassadors and their audiences in Renaissance Italy’, \textit{Renaissance Studies}, vol. 8, no. 3, September, 1994, who suggests that it was quite common during the 16th century for diplomats who were able to acquire secure courier systems to dispense with ciphers even for confidential dispatches, pp. 239 - 240.
only the Council had the key; and one in cipher to which Henri IV alone held the
key. The reports show that Sully was required to keep his reports to the King brief
as Henri found it as difficult to decipher them as Sully to write them! 117

The cost of an effective code or cipher was extremely high and most
diplomatic ciphers were accordingly old or simple and could be broken by experts
without much difficulty. Moreover, if ciphers were too complicated, they confused
the correspondents much more than they confounded the enemy. There are
repeated instances in the letters of diplomats of men receiving the wrong cipher or
losing the key to the current cipher. Even in the hands of private secretaries
dispatches were not always safe. De Callières notes the case of a private secretary of
a French ambassador who sold the private cipher of the embassy to an officer of the
state in which his master served for a large sum in order to pay off his debts. 118 In
this way the ambassador’s dispatches were intercepted and read, resulting in very
bad relations between the two countries. Some governments extended the courtesy
of the diplomatic pouch to visiting ambassadors but security there could not be
guaranteed so that most ambassadors only sent harmless communiqués by this
means. Some used the services offered by merchants like the Merchant Strangers’
Post which carried letters from London to Antwerp for a fee. This system might be
slightly more secure than others but it was also decidedly slower. But no matter
which method was used to send dispatches home none could be deemed absolutely
safe from interception. 119

To demonstrate these problems it is interesting to record how John Digby
successfully foiled Gondomar’s attempts to dispatch to Spain all he had learned,
through his network of informers, of government affairs in England. He took
elaborate precautions to get this information secretly back to his masters in Spain,

117 An account of Sully’s embassy to England can be found in Memoirs of Maximilien de
Bethane, Duke of Sully. Translated from the French by the author of the author of the
female Quixote (1757) 5 vols.
118 de Callières, Diplomacy, p. 97.
119 Mattingly, Diplomacy, p. 236.
using ciphered letters. Digby, by the same methods, having managed to obtain copies of the ambassador’s dispatches, sent them back to James. In turn, one of Gondomar’s spies in England, usually Calvert, let him know each time one of his secret dispatches had been intercepted and disclosed to the King and Privy Council. This continued for years to the exasperation and cynical amusement of all concerned. Gondomar regularly changed his ciphers and his couriers, and begged the powers in Spain to make sure his papers passed only through selected hands. But, despite constant surveillance Gondomar was unable to discover the source of any leak at the Spanish embassy. 120 In fact no source existed. As the Spanish were able to keep track of, and copy, England’s despatches so too could James’s men intercept the ambassador’s papers which the English found as easy to decipher as the Spanish.

All this newsgathering, as in any modern embassy, generated a considerable amount of paper and ambassadors were expected to retain all originals of their dispatches and other documentation. This resulted in papers relating to each embassy being maintained in two files - one by the ambassador and one by the royal secretary. However, throughout the period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the files remained the ambassador’s personal property so that when he returned home his files, if not destroyed, went with him. This often resulted in weeks of wasted time for an incoming ambassador while he picked up the threads of current business. Whatever files the new ambassador required had to be obtained, if possible, from the royal secretary before he left for his new appointment.

However, the establishment of resident ambassadors at the various European courts and the files and documentation they accumulated brought into existence a class of document which in its bulk was to become a major source of interest. In the present day it is still the duty of ambassadors to keep their government informed of

120 Mattingly, Diplomacy, p. 248 - 249.
events and opinions in the country in which they serves and it is quite possible that in their efforts to do this they may be in line with the ambassadors of the early modern period. However, this duty has lost its original importance - the *raison d'être* for today's ambassadors is not the newsgathering of their predecessors but more the preservation of peaceful co-existence. It is in this change of role that they are chiefly distinguished from their counterpart in the seventeenth century. The dispatches of the seventeenth century ambassadors were practically the sole regular source of foreign news and, since the diplomacy of James and his fellow princes was framed on this news, the success or failure of their envoys depended on the accuracy of these reports. Their dispatches created an elaborate diary of court affairs and national events, which contained whatever news could be gleaned: court gossip, meetings of the council, policy trends, events and rumours. It is this diversity of information which gives diplomatic correspondence its value for the historian. Having gathered their information ambassadors were required to notify their government. Here they were faced with a problem, for, in addition to their official dispatches, it was often necessary for ambassadors to correspond with influential councillors at home. For example, an ambassador would address letters to his sovereign and the secretary charged with foreign affairs - this was his official correspondence. However, the King or his ministers did not handle all the correspondence from his diplomatic representatives; certain other influential officials required information also, not merely to frame their personal policy but to maintain any power and position they might hold at court and in the council. Ambassadors dare not ignore the wishes of such powerful men, so that correspondence between these parties became almost as voluminous as the official dispatches ambassadors sent, and, in many cases, certainly more intimate. In some cases these dispatches gave more details of something already mentioned to their master but they could also reflect ambassadors concerns over finance, protocol and so on.
In their correspondence ambassadors placed emphasis on the personality and physical characteristics of James and his family, since these factors played an important part in diplomacy. Even information on minor illness or accident was considered newsworthy as such could lead to death and a change of monarch. When Charles escaped injury in a riding accident several special envoys arrived to congratulate him on his good fortune. Ambassadors were particularly careful to send accounts of the events surrounding the death of anyone close to the King. Such things as the last words spoken, how they conducted themselves in death and whether it came easily or not, who was present and details of the funeral were all of great interest and carefully recorded and dispatched.

Military information was also valuable - this took two forms; in the first instance information about the size, methods of organisation and regulations, which might be useful in the maintenance of their master's forces and secondly information which could be useful should any attack be made on England. Of course, ambassadors were concerned with other types of information from the minutiae of day to day life, to the plague and general court tittle-tattle. However, the significant place held by diplomatic correspondence in no way implies an estimate of its reliability. It must be remembered that ambassadors in England were conducting business in a country whose language they invariably could not understand. By all accounts when Juan de Tassis was received by the King and Queen at Winchester he delivered his message in Spanish and, that ended, one of his people delivered it in Italian to the King. The King delivered his response to Sir Lewis Lewkenor in English who in turn delivered it to the ambassador in Spanish! Furthermore, because of his ignorance of the English language it was often difficult for an ambassador to sift the truth from all the information he had gathered.

Having gathered their news together and found a relatively safe method of communication with their masters how often should ambassadors send dispatches home? As a rule of thumb diplomats, it was agreed, should send their dispatches as
often as was required by their instructions. As a result diplomats were expected to write often and regularly, even if they had nothing of import to impart. In return he could expect to hear from home almost as often. For the most part the frequency with which dispatches were exchanged depended on the political climate at the time and the need for information to be disseminated. Generally speaking letters from the ambassadors at James’s court were very long, giving not just political and diplomatic news but also noting rumours, and other interesting though trivial information. George Pagès described the practice thus:

Diplomats - of the seventeenth century at least - did not try to be concise...One of their most useful qualities was that of speaking without saying anything; thus, as a matter of habit, they wrote the way they spoke. A letter of ten or twelve long pages can almost always be summarised in a few lines. 121

No matter how frequently diplomats wrote or how informative their letters might be, they were still expected to render a precise account of their embassy upon returning home. The State Papers contain a translation of a Dutch treatise on diplomatic reports which advises that, 'it is a custome on all well governed Governments that Embargo returned from their ambassage are to deliver over a verbal or written Relation of what they have negotiated'. 122

The value of many ambassadors lay not in who they were or what they did but in what they saw. In the game of European politics the Venetian ambassadors played the part of on-lookers - neither wishing to join the Protestants in their resistance of Papal authority, nor, as Catholics, to join the Pope and Spain against the Protestants. In stead they concerned themselves with watching both sides and reporting what they saw. This group of ambassadors left behind voluminous and remarkably informative diplomatic writings which originate in the reports on their missions made on their return home. Originally Venice’s ambassadors had

122 PRO SP/9/166, f. 417.
presented oral *relazioni*, which, as early as the thirteenth century, had been written down by a clerk of the Senate as they were delivered. A decree of 1425 then made it law that returning diplomats should present a written report of his mission before the Doge and Senate, generally within a fortnight of the ambassador's return. 123 Since Venice drew her ambassadors from the élite patrician classes the dispatches sent were often elegant and sophisticated in style. The typical *dispacci* and *relazioni* are more than mere reports on the details of a diplomatic mission. In addition to reviewing their work, the Venetians added to their reports a geographical, social and political description of the country so that from them we can discover Venetian thinking as it relates to England. Robert Barrington reminds us that the *relazioni* can, and indeed should, be read as documents which form part of the Anglo-Venetian discourse which began in Padua at the end of the fifteenth century and culminated in the identification of Venice with the republican cause of the mid seventeenth century. 124 Perhaps it was the largely commercial character of the Venetian State and the traditions of diplomatic service that made its ambassadors amongst the ablest and most detached observers of foreign court life. Their observations have the advantage of being generally very shrewd and objective and the comments on personalities are often notable.

The *relazione* and *dispacci* of the Venetian ambassadors have thus been seen, since their first publication in the nineteenth century, as an important source of information for historians, although there is some argument as to their real value. Whilst the *relazione* themselves seem to contain valuable information, the *dispacci*, sent home on an almost daily basis, have been condemned as a next to useless account of gossip and intrigue. We are, therefore, faced with the

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123 CSP Venetian, I, xliii; *relazioni* of the Venetian Ambassadors to James's court can be found in PRO SF/8. The Venetian ambassadors alone wrote these descriptive reports of the countries where they resided - only one exception has been discovered, and that is a report of the State of France, written by Sir George Carew on his return from that country in 1609 and addressed to James.

reconciliation of the well-informed ambassador of the *relazione* and the gossip-mongering ambassador of the dispatches. Garrett Mattingly, however, defends the tittle-tattle of the dispatches by arguing that the resident ambassador’s primary objective was to observe and report politically useful information. ‘Inevitably’, he comments, ‘a great deal of worthless stuff got into these long daily screeds’. 125 He also suggests that this superfluousity of information was ultimately politically useful, for the minister receiving the information could analyse and compare this information with that received from ambassadors in other countries in order to evaluate trends and developments which the resident ambassador might not see. Though positive about the usefulness of such dispatches Mattingly always appeared surprised at their gossipy nature, reflecting that Venetian ministers were not only anxious to note the activities of their counterparts in other courts but were also insatiably hungry for mere gossip. 126

Charles Carter, on the other hand, considered that the lack of content in the dispatches was evidence of the general inefficiency of the Venetian system. He saw the dispatches as one example of the fundamental problem he found in the structure of Venetian diplomacy. Whilst he acknowledged the organisation of Venetian diplomacy and the quantity of information reported he suggested that the low quality of the information and the repetitive nature of the *relazione*, ultimately shows the ineffectiveness of the Venetian system. 127 Horatio Brown, a nineteenth century commentator saw the quantity of dispatches as indicative of the decline of the Republic, suggesting that the dispatches acted as a substitute for the military force the state did not actually possess in the seventeenth century. 128 Conversely,

Queller argued that though the system used by Venice to choose and deploy ambassadors was riddled with questionable practices, and the ambassadors themselves were not the selfless servants they have often been depicted, the dispatches and *relazione* highlight the overall quality of the Venetian system. Indeed it is clear that the official and more organised *relazione* might well provide the historian with tidy records of the seventeenth century Venetian ambassador's knowledge of the country to which they were accredited but it is in the less organised, chatty and subjective dispatches that we find a better insight into the activities and habits of the seventeenth century court. This is because, in the main, the Court itself, as we shall see, reflected these attributes.

Such was the growing paperwork of the embassy that during this period governments began appointing, and paying at a fixed salary, officials whose job it was to take charge of embassy records, keep letterbooks and assist in the work of preparing reports. Since the early seventeenth century the secretary had been formally appointed, accredited and paid by the monarch acting through the Secretaries of State. Nevertheless in practice the Secretaries of State normally accepted the ambassador's nominee. These official secretaries, as opposed to those employed by ambassadors in a purely private capacity, were not, as yet, constant members of every mission, although some states, such as France, Venice and Spain, always sent permanent secretaries to aid their ambassadors and these often outstayed them. The post of Secretary of Embassy was one that able young men of moderate birth and income sought after as it was a position that offered the prospect of eventual promotion in diplomatic or royal service.

A number of representatives can be seen to have risen through the ranks of the diplomatic hierarchy in just this way. A young man might first appear in the records as part of an ambassador's entourage; later he would appear as a legation or

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commission secretary and finally he would head his own assignment. In one instance, during 1617 - 1618, Constantijn Huygens could be found, having travelled from The Hague with Sir Dudley Carleton, residing with Sir Noel de Caron, the Dutch ambassador. Here he served an apprenticeship of sorts - meeting the visitors, both royal and political, who paid calls on the ambassador. His father had been a diplomat and consequently the young Huygens found himself, from a very early age, surrounded by English diplomats such as Bodley, Winwood and Wotton. He was to return to England again in the official capacity of Secretary of Special Embassages under three consecutive Princes of Orange between 1621 and 1624. Thus in this way he and many of the men included in this work were trained in diplomacy and were, consequently, much better prepared for the job than has previously been suggested.

Certain details emerge from interrogation of the Database about the importance of the role played by the embassy secretary in the diplomatic mission. The secretary himself was often nominated separately from the rest of the embassy staff. He handled not just the normal everyday secretarial tasks and day to day business life of the mission but in many cases was to become the mainstay of an embassy. Such men often acted in negotiations, talking to the monarch, ministers and council or even acting in the role of chargé d’affaires after the recall or sudden demise of his ambassador. That this was far from being a minor role is clear when one notes that approximately 18.5% of embassies in the period ended abruptly, either by dismissal or death, for the principal diplomat. In many cases it was the secretary, acting in this role, who provided continuity in the embassy. For example, M. le Clerc, who was secretary to Desmaretz, remained in England as agent until

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130 For example, the Marquis de Vitry, Louis l’Hospital was taken ill during a hunting party at Royston and died the following day, 20th November, 1611. His body was returned to France. The ambassador of Venice, Gregorio Barbarigo, died in office on 27th May, 1616, seven months after coming to England. Baron Achatius Dohna was forbidden the court in January, 1621 for accusing James of promising more than he could deliver in respect of affairs in Bohemia.
September, 1618 when he was called before the Council who reproached him for his part in the attempt to help Raleigh escape to France. 131 He was forbidden the Court in September, 1618 and left England in October, 1618. 132

Julian Sanchez de Ulloa, secretary of ciphers to Gondomar during his first embassy remained as agent until his return in March, 1620. 133 Following Gondomar’s return to Spain in 1622 de Ulloa remained in England and acted as secretary to Carlos Coloma during his extra-ordinary embassy and the Marquis of Inojosa during his second embassy. 134 Giovanni Scaramelli, secretary to the Venetian Senate, who was sent as agent by the Doge to congratulate James on his accession, returned in May, 1611 as secretary to Antonio Foscarini, until he was dismissed for misconduct in June, 1612. The secretary to the embassy of Gregorio Barbarigo, Lionelli, remained as agent after Barbarigo’s death in May, 1616. During this time he also acted as secretary to the extra-ordinary embassy of Pietro Contarini 135. Pier Antonio Marioni, secretary to Antonio Donato remained in London, as agent, after his master was recalled in disgrace in May, 1619. He returned home when Girolamo Lando arrived with his own secretary in December, 1619.

In the case of the private staff employed by diplomats, terms of service frequently overlapped the tenure of several ministers and many of the young men who accompanied ambassadors to England had, as we have already seen, either been agents, or returned to England as agents, in their own right. In 1611 the Venetian ambassador, Foscarini, reported to the Doge that there had always been an English Catholic employed in the embassy as an interpreter and who had always

131 See Gardiner, History, vol. iii, pp. 139, 144.
132 John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 14th October, 1618. SP. Domestic, vol. ciii, no. 33.
133 1613 - 1618.
134 April, 1622 - October, 1624 and June, 1623 - June, 1624 respectively.
135 October, 1617 - November, 1618.
attended Mass unhindered. He went on to explain that the 'same goes on in the French and Spanish embassies, to his Majesties entire satisfaction'.

Very little is known about these men or the job they were employed to do, other than that James turned a blind eye to their public non-conformity. Fortunately in several cases at least, enough evidence remains for us to discover in some small part what type of man could be selected for service in a foreign embassy. These men were; Robert Taylor, the Archduke Albert's envoy to the English Catholics and Secretary of Letters to the Spanish Embassy, 1603 - 1609; Francis Fowler, English Secretary to the Spanish Embassy, 1609 - 1619, Henry Taylor, secretary to the Spanish Embassy, 1622 - 1625 and Richard Berry, Catholic Adviser to the Spanish Embassy, 1613 - 1622 and Language Secretary to the Spanish ambassador 1619 - 1622.

Robert Taylor was born in Yorkshire although he spent most of his youth on the continent. He studied and lectured in law at the university at Douai, where the doctoral degree of *Utriusque Juris* was conferred on him in November, 1602. He sent reports of the 1600 peace conference at Boulogne to the papal nuncio, Ottavio Frangipani, in Brussels. In May 1603 he was sent secretly to England to observe and report on Catholic affairs and, in the summer of that year, through a brother in the household of the earl of Cumberland, he obtained secret interviews with Cumberland, the Countess of Suffolk, Thomas Lake and others on the prospects for peace with the Spanish before the arrival of Juan de Tassis.

The original of Taylor's reports do not survive, instead there remain three different Spanish summaries. Two of these were made from decoded dispatches sent by the Archduke and the third is a more general report prepared by de Tassis.
The first report was a report of Taylor's mission to England, the second is an altogether more significant report telling what Taylor informed his associates in England about the intentions of the Archduke during the coming peace negotiations and their reactions to these intentions. The final report was one that was given to de Tassis. One of the most interesting items in Taylor's report was that of his meetings with the Earl of Cumberland who told the envoy that he was willing to do what he could for peace and toleration for the Catholics, although he admitted that should the Council vote for war he must go with them.

During his secret mission to England, Taylor had as companion and adviser a man named Anthony Skinner, who, it seems, was also an intermediary with other members of the English court. Skinner was formerly a servant of Cardinal Allen, and had tried to enter the Society of Jesus but had been rejected. He remained on the continent, serving in the Spanish navy until sent to join the land forces in Flanders. In the spring of 1592 he returned to London and was promptly imprisoned where he confessed (a confession he later retracted) to a part in a plot to murder the Queen. He escaped the death penalty by the intervention of Sir Thomas Heneage. Little more is known of his activities other than that he was well protected at court, for, at the height of anti-Catholic fever in 1606 he was able to obtain a license to 'go to any parts beyond the seas and return without molestation.'

It was through Skinner that Robert Taylor met the Countess of Suffolk and Sir Thomas Lake. Taylor presented the Countess with a written statement that showed details of a plan for liberty of conscience for the English Catholics. The Countess then informed the envoy, unofficially, that, in return for certain pensions,
there were those in the Council who would be favourable to Spain. At Taylor's interview with Sir Thomas he was advised that there were three factions in the Council, one wanting peace, a second wanting war and a third group who would undoubtedly want war, being pensioners of the Dutch already. Five days after this interview Lake informed Taylor that should the financial arrangements be suitable there would be enough councillors willing to look for peace. Before Taylor could see either Cecil or the King he was advised to ensure that there were written assurances of the promise of money.

As Taylor's reports emphasised that money, either as gifts, pensions or outright bribes, would answer all of Spain's objectives in England, Taylor's usefulness to the Archduke was simply as a gatherer of information. The Spanish considered that he had been too coy in seeking only personal and private worship for the English Catholics and it appears that Taylor was viewed only as a partisan of the Archduke's policy to end the war with the Dutch and to secure the English removal from the cautionary towns. The Archduke, it would seem, had decided to abandon the English Catholics to Spain. Taylor joined the ambassador's entourage in July 1603 and served as translator, interpreter and as liaison officer between the ambassador and the court of James until his death in 1609.  

After the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot he sheltered Fr. John Gerard S.J. in his home. In 1606 he took possession of the straw which was supposed to bear a miraculous image of the martyred Fr. Garnet, and showed it to the Spanish ambassador. In November, 1607 Taylor was accused by the informer William Udall of involvement in the importation of the Douai Bible. He was certainly in a position to obtain copies of the Bible soon after its publication because his sister,
Ann, and her husband, John Fowler, were well known as dealers in Catholic books from their house on Fetter Lane, close to the Inns of Court. 144

Francis Fowler joined the entourage of Don Juan de Tassis, most probably as a protégé of his brother-in-law, Robert Taylor, who, as we have seen, was already in the confidence of the Archduke Albert and the Constable of Castile, in 1603. Very little is known of his activities during his time with the Archduke and it is not until the arrival of the next envoy, de Zúñiga, that his work begins to come to light.

We know that in the summer of 1606 he acted as courier to Spain and indeed, prior to his return to England, Cornwallis had entrusted his letters to 'one Fowler, the Spanish ambassador's servant'. 145 Several months later we learn that Thomas Howard needed to defend himself to Salisbury against complaints made to him by 'Fowler, the Spanish Ambassador's man' that he had prevented the enforcement of a commission set up to arrange settlement over Dutch shipping. 146

In the winter of 1606 Fowler again travelled to Spain and this time Cornwallis was able to 'set a marke upon the late running dispatches sent hither by the Spanish ambassador first by one Fowler that serves him there in his house.' 147 Cornwallis was curious about this journey since a rumour was circulating that an order for 50,000 escudos was to be taken to London for de Zúñiga's use. Enquiry elicited an assurance that the money was for embassy expenses and aid for needy Spaniards in the city. 148 In August 1608 Fowler came to the attention of Sir Julius Caesar, Master of the Court of Requests, who suspected that a recent consignment of books from the continent was being distributed about London because 'Fowler...uttereth them from the Spanish Ambassador's house'. 149

144 Salisbury MSS, vol. 127, no. 63. John and Ann Fowler are mentioned in Gee's The Foot out of the Snare... (1624).
145 PRO SP 94/1436, 'A noote of several dispatches from Sir Charles Cornwallis'.
146 HMC Salisbury MSS. vol. 19, pp. 50, 511 - 512, Bindon to Salisbury, February, 1607.
148 de Zúñiga 'kept in his house sixty persons and was furnished with three coaches'. HMC Salisbury MSS., vol. 20, pp. 21 - 22, Cornwallis to Salisbury, Madrid, 18th January, 1608.
was not the only Habsburg servant under scrutiny; enquiries were also being made regarding the residence of the ambassador to the Archduke, Baron Hoboken, in which it was suggested a printing press was housed.

On the death of Robert Taylor in 1609 one of de Zúñiga's last decisions before his return to Spain was to promote Francis Fowler into his position on the staff of the embassy. This appointment was confirmed in June 1610 by de Zúñiga's successor, Alonso de Velasco, who considered Fowler a 'satisfactory person'. Fowler was not without talent: he had trained in the law, probably at Douai and was to participate, later, in some important exchanges between highly placed courtiers at James's court and Gondomar. In late 1613, Fowler travelled to Royston to see James and Robert Carr (Viscount Rochester) to present a carefully worded protest about the treatment and arrest of Doña Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza, which, as secretary he had composed in English at Gondomar's dictation, and translated the King's oral reply into a lengthy Spanish version for Gondomar. Fowler's responsibility here was to supply an accurate assessment of the situation between two sensitive and volatile personalities. His journey the following December to Newmarket to see the King is of more importance in the study of diplomacy at this time. The subject was the severe crisis that had arisen between the Duke of Savoy and the Spanish governor in Milan.

At Newmarket he was received by Carr, now Earl of Somerset, to whom he made clear the anxiety Gondomar felt over the report that aid was to be sent to the Duke of Savoy, as well as the ambassador's concerns over the role of representative for the interests of Savoy which Henry Wotton was playing. Somerset assured Fowler that he was unaware that any decision had been made to send help and that should it be found that Wotton was acting in such a way the 'king of England would be deeply pained and [would] punish the Ambassador severely'. Sir Thomas Lake explained to Fowler, that James would not 'desire to involve himself in it'. Furthermore, in an act which showed that Fowler had acquired some kind of
acceptance at James court as a reliable person to whom English policy could be explained, the King offered to show the secretary the actual text of Wotton's first instructions.

This confidence can be seen again in January 1616 when Sir Thomas Erskine, First Gentleman of the King's Bedchamber, approached Fowler to take a discreet message to Gondomar. As previously the secretary prepared a complete report in Spanish of what had transpired, which the ambassador then sent to the Council of State. In essence, Erskine proposed that Fowler make it clear to the ambassador that James was interested in a Spanish match for his son and, more importantly, made it clear that the Privy Council considered the previous proposals made with France were now null and void.

This was in all probability the last major office Fowler performed for his Catholic employers. By the time Gondomar left for Spain in July 1618 the decision to remove Fowler had already been made. Rumours that he had been drinking heavily made it impossible for Gondomar to entrust anything of importance to him. 150 Francis Fowler left London that summer, travelling via Brussels to Madrid, where he died on 6th April, 1619.

In England Fowler, as Secretary of Languages had translated Spanish and English papers as well as acted as interpreter. Although he never dealt with ciphered messages he did act as courier for important dispatches to Madrid. He represented the embassy in the English courts on occasion. His most important role, which is of greater interest, was to act as an informal liaison between high-ranking officials at James's court, the Spanish ambassador and ultimately the Spanish Council of State. During his second embassy Gondomar relied for these services on Richard Berry.

In September 1612, John Digby, the English ambassador in Madrid, alerted

150 Gondomar to Philip III, 30th December, 1617, DIE, vol. 1, pp. 171 - 172
James to the fact that the English Catholics were dissatisfied with the King's response to Alonso de Velasco's activities on their behalf. He warned that with the arrival of the incoming ambassador (Gondomar) large sums of money would be available to 'revive and re-establish the means of Intelligence'. But it was not so much espionage that the Spanish had in mind as information gathering about the condition of the English Catholics who, Digby considered, had placed their dependence on Spain, and this dependency was something which no envoy wished to forfeit. The Council had always relied for this information solely from the dispatches of their ambassadors, but now, it was felt, one man would better fulfil the task specifically, an English Catholic employed at the embassy. The Englishman chosen for this role was Richard Berry. Francis Fowler was already working in the embassy and before him Dr. Robert Taylor had performed the role. These three men are noted in the embassy's accounts as language secretary or secretary of letters, and indeed, when Fowler left the embassy in 1619 Berry added his responsibilities to his own.

Another young Englishman, Henry Taylor, entered Gondomar's household, aged nineteen, in 1621 when, according to James Wadsworth, the ambassador offered him 'house room and diet and afterwards, perceiving his dexterity of wit, made choice of him for his secretary.' He returned to Spain with Gondomar and took charge of the installation of his books and manuscripts in his new residence, the Casa del Sol, at Valladolid. In March, 1623 Taylor joined Gondomar in Madrid when Charles and Buckingham arrived.

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152 The remit of an Englishman in the embassy was fairly wide. He could, of course, translate both Spanish and English correspondence, although he would not have handled ciphered messages, and could act as an interpreter when required. Possibly his most important role was that of informal liaison officer between high ranking officials at James's court and the ambassador.

Hugh Owen, intelligencer for the ambassador to the Archdukes, Baron Conrad Schetz Hoboken, provides an interesting case in point when discussing Englishmen in the pay of Catholic ambassadors. Owen, a Catholic Welshman, was active during the reign of Elizabeth and appears to have been involved in a project to secure the release of Mary, Queen of Scots, which consequently made residence in England perilous to say the least. 154

By the 1580s he was employed by the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the Duke of Parma, as the organiser of an intelligence network which enabled him, in some part, to counteract the espionage system established by Sir Francis Walsingham. Parma describing Owen as ‘diligent, very discreet and suitable for any business’ passed him on the Archduke Albert. 155 He was certainly active in England during the early years of James’s reign, as de Tassis reported to Philip that ‘the name of Hugh [Owen] is more hateful here than that of the devil’. 156 Later that same year Owen was implicated in the Gunpowder Plot and, although there was only scanty evidence to suggest that he might have been involved the Court, led by Salisbury, did its best to secure extradition on the grounds of complicity. Nevertheless, James’s ambassador in Brussels was able to secure the arrest of both Owen and William Baldwin. Salisbury refused to offer any documentary proof to the Flemish ambassador, Hoboken, and only sent to Brussels a doctored version of an extract from one of Guy Fawkes’s alleged confessions, although assurances were made that more condemnatory evidence would be forthcoming. 157 Meanwhile, in London, Hoboken reported the Privy Council’s determination to have Owen extradited. However, due in the main to the efforts of de Zúñiga to mollify James, Owen was not extradited and he was eventually released in 1606 and was allowed to go to

155 15th November, 1596, Simancas, E613/123.
156 de Tassis to Philip, 7th May, 1605, Simancas, E2584/17
157 HMC Salisbury Papers, no. 17, pp. 497 - 646.
Madrid. As a consequence his counter-espionage ring appears to have been completely ruined. 158

In addition to secretaries and intelligencers, envoys from the Catholic nations had a chaplain in their household. Ordinarily the embassy chaplain returned when a mission was concluded, although one of Gondomar’s confessors, Fr. Diego Lafuente, acted as agent in England during the periods October, 1618 - October, 1620 and April 1623 to June, 1624 to deal with the marriage treaty. Augustin Pérez, who was embassy chaplain to de Zúñiga during the period July, 1605 and June, 1610 and again between July, 1612 and July, 1613, remained in the interim as secretary to Alonso de Velasco, May, 1610 to August, 1613.

From analysis of the Database certain important indicators have become clear. First, is the evidence of a growing professionalism amongst men chosen for diplomatic service. The calibre of the men chosen and the growth in size and importance of their entourage demonstrated this. From a single man bearing congratulation at the beginning of the period the embassy soon grew so that men were accompanied by their personal secretaries, translators, chaplains and attendants. With the evidence of preparation of diplomats, the criteria for their selection and the constant and repeated use of certain men it is no longer valid to suggest that there was no professional diplomatic service during this period. Second, the office of secretary, which had developed from that of the personal attendant of the Tudor period into a formal diplomatic position, emerged as the essential element of the diplomatic mission servicing not only the usual secretarial duties but in several cases negotiating independently of the ambassador. Evaluation of the data collected thus gives clear evidence that during the first quarter of the seventeenth century, at least, the office of ambassador became more formalised,

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their responsibilities grew and became more specialised; the size of their personal staff also grew and this in its turn became more professional. It shows positively that during the period there can be found definite indications of the modernisation of the diplomatic service.

For two centuries ambassadors worked towards the establishment in Europe of a diplomatic system which gradually replaced the Christian republic of antiquity. The earlier model had for its basis brotherly love; the later model, more practically, was grounded in safety. The moment one power became so powerful that it might dominate others, these others, by instinct or by treaty, united together for the preservation of the status quo. The maintenance of this order of things gave occasion for numerable treaties and negotiations in which ambassadors were able to show whether they answered the requirements laid down in the many manuals presented by diplomatic theorists. Most did and it must be placed to their credit that many of the treaties at which they negotiated are amongst the most notable events in the history of the time.

It is true to say that the qualities required by the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth century theorists were of such a high order that they could hardly ever have been embodied in a single person. However, the fact still remains that no matter how theorists might urge that diplomats be experienced statesmen, well read and well educated, fluent in languages and worldly wise, when it came to selecting members of the diplomatic corps, in the early seventeenth century, at least, those who had to find men to serve abroad were influenced more by their assessment of the candidates' loyalty to their master, their family connections and, above all things, the depth of their pockets than by any theory put forward by these writers. Guicciardini summed up the actuality of an ambassadorship when he wrote, 'A man who esteems honour highly will succeed in everything, since he takes no account of toil, danger, or money...the actions of men who do not have
this burning stimulus are dead and vain'. It is hardly surprising that for most commentators this paragon of virtues, this 'perfect ambassador' could not be found in this world.

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159 F. Guicciardini, *Ricordi*, series c, no. 118, p. 71
Chapter 3

Ambassadors and their Function

This chapter will discuss the function of the office of ambassador and the elaborate and stylised ritual that surrounded his activities. It will ask several important questions of ambassadors. First, how did they operate within James's court? Second it will ask about the management of their embassies and what staff would be employed therein. From the moment of their arrival in England, through the conduct of their missions, up to their leave taking, a pattern of rigid ceremony defined ambassadors for what they were: the embodiment of the sovereign power they represented. All monarchs wished their representatives to reflect their own glory so that certain ceremonies formed an important part of all missions. This chapter will examine the public entry into London, the first audience with James, and will discuss how these and the correct exchange of visits with other ambassadors formed the framework upon which recognition of friendship was based.

Once having been selected for a mission abroad several months often passed before a designated ambassador departed. The appointment of their staff and household took time and there was often much haggling over mundane questions surrounding the dignity of the ambassador's person such as salary and expenses and the allotment of ceremonial plate for the ambassadorial table. Designated ambassadors was expected to learn as much as they could of the political and social background of the court to which they were to be accredited and they had to read through all the recent correspondence from the out-going representative so as to glean information about the customs pertaining at the English Court and to prepare for their own arrival. It was also necessary to contact James's envoy at their own court and any compatriots who had worked or had close connections with England or her merchants. In the meanwhile instructions, additional instructions and secret
instructions were being prepared and prospective ambassadors might require clarification on the finer points before they were put into their final form. When staff, equipment and documents were ready the ambassador would take formal leave of his masters when he would receive his official letter of appointment and credentials, other introductory letters, his passport, instructions, and other papers such as his cipher table and lists of pensioners. The ambassador's journey was often a lengthy one that required considerable organisation, and in many cases, involved subsidiary missions en route.¹

Before leaving for their posts abroad, ambassadors were provided with magnificent plate to enable them to represent their masters worthily. Officially this plate was supposed to be returned once the mission was completed but this rarely happened - when not pawned or sold during the mission as a means of meeting their expenses, it was kept by them and their families as guarantee against the payment of their salaries and expenses.

During these early years of the seventeenth century great emphasis was placed on the ceremonial aspects of diplomacy and it is important to examine the reasons for the significance of ceremony in the early modern world. Ceremonial symbolised the relationship between two countries, so that any change to that ceremony implied a change in that relationship. An innovation that paid less honour to a representative was seen to imply that James was less friendly towards that envoy's master. The opposite was, of course, true when more honour was paid to an ambassador than had been paid to his predecessors or his associates from other countries.

The seventeenth century can hardly be understood unless one realises how much importance was attached to such matters. At the beginning of the century

¹ Jerzy Ossoliński, for example took three months to travel from Poland to England in 1621, leaving in early January and arriving on 27th March. For an idea of the 'extraordinaries' required for such a mission see D. B. Horn, 'An Early Seventeenth Century Bill for 'Extraodinaries', EHR (1930), vol. xix, p. 626.
every independent European state, except Turkey, had a diplomatic corps of some kind or another, and it was the duty of the members of this community to insist on the assiduous observation of international etiquette as well as to maintain the status of the prince and country they represented. In its turn the extreme punctiliousness on which these men insisted created an atmosphere of tension between states which generated 'incidents' which, on a personal level, led to outbreaks of sniping amongst ambassadors and on a political level could lead directly to threats of war. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the question of peace could hang on the seating arrangements at a banquet or the order of a public procession.

Ambassadors were received with such elaborate protocol that James felt the need to appoint a special officer to oversee such matters. In 1605 he officially appointed Sir Lewis Lewkenor to the job he had unofficially performed since the beginning of the reign. As Master of Ceremonies he was charged to 'receive and entertaine, ambassadors, and Princes, during their abode in England: in all honourable manner as is used in France and other places'. Sir John Finett, who was Lewkenor's assistant and held the office himself under Charles I, wrote a book whose title defines the implications of the job: *Finetti Philoxensis: Some choice observations of Sr. John Finett Knight, And Master of the Ceremonies to the two last Kings. Touching the Reception, and Precedence, the Treatment and Audience, the Punctilios and Contests of Forren Ambassadors in England.*

When James inaugurated the office of Master of Ceremonies he brought to the English diplomatic scene a practice which was long established on the continent. Since the mid fourteenth century the clerks of the papal office dealt with the ceremonial of the liturgical activities of the chapel as well as those of the

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2 Turkey first maintained an agent in Vienna in 1606.
3 See *DNB, sub nomine.*
visitors attending services. This inevitably led to the duty being incorporated into the regular workload of the Roman master of ceremonies. These duties were to become in effect the duties of the officer appointed by James. He was to provide a fitting welcome, suitable lodgings, a schedule of appointments with the King and his council and, probably the most important of all, consider tactfully the thorny problem of precedence amongst visiting diplomats.

During Elizabeth's reign the reception of foreign diplomatic representatives had, at best, been erratic; the Queen followed her father's custom of picking, at random, a noble to present a welcoming speech to a visiting dignitary. 5 James however was not prepared to continue this haphazard approach. The office of Master of Ceremonies was inaugurated at Greenwich on 21st May, 1603 and Lewkenor, as a 'gentleman well languaged of good education and discretion', received a formal appointment by patent, with a salary of £200.00, on 7th November, 1605. 6 The holder of this post was expected to be 'alwaies attendant about the courte with his servants and horses, himself and them fitly furnished...to entertyne and receave sutch foreyn ambassadors as shal repayre into this realme to do his majesty honor and service'. Additionally he was to 'take care that they bee conveyently and fitly lodged' and to have carriages to carry them 'where the court shall them remayne'. He should arrange 'theyr times of access and audience' with the King and councillors and be fully advised about the 'severall ranks, qualityes and degrees' of the visitors. 7 At the same time James established by another warrant the office of Marshall of the Ceremonies, to act as assistant to the master, with a stipend of £100.00 per annum. But for James not even this was enough and Sir James Murray and William Button were ordered to 'give attendance for the receipt and entertainment of all Ambassadors.' 8

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5 See for example, CSP Spain, 1558 - 1567, p. 364; CSP Spain, 1568 - 1579, p. 54.
7 PRO SP 14/16/26a.
8 PRO SP 15/135/126.
For the reception of foreign ambassadors the English court exerted itself to show its splendour and opulence and the moment an ambassador set foot in the country his reception began. 9 A newly arrived ambassador would have first arranged the time and particulars of his entry into the city with the Master of Ceremonies. Lewkenor then chose the courtiers who were to accompany the ambassador at his reception and arranged any accommodation required on the London-bound journey, and he usually expected some kind of material consideration for his efforts. If of sufficient importance, that is if the envoy represented a crowned head or the republic of Venice, he was received personally by the Master of Ceremonies, who would escort him and his retinue to Gravesend and from there make his formal entry into London in the King's barge. At the Tower the Lord Mayor and the aldermen of London who would escort the entourage through the City to their lodgings met the ambassador. This would be the first opportunity for the ambassadors to display their numbers and wealth to the London crowds. Finett tells us of the ceremonial surrounding the welcome provided for the two Russian ambassadors, who arrived in London on 5th November, 1617. On landing they were welcomed with a volley of great Ordinance from the Tower, and shippes, and were encountered on Tower Hill by the Aldermen of the City, in their Scarlet Gowns, and other Citizens in their velvet coates, and Chains of Gold, all on Horse-back, and thence conducted to their House in Bishopsgate-street, where they were lodged and defrayed at the Charge of the Muscovy Company. 10

Following the ceremonial entrance into London and settling into their accommodation the King would receive ambassadors. Careful protocol was

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9 This was not to be always the case. On 23rd August, 1603, Sir Lewis Lewkenor, newly installed as Master of Ceremonies, wrote to Cecil regarding the imminent arrival of de Tassis and enquiring how de Rosny and other ambassador's had been received. In response he was told to dispense with ceremony on account of the plague. CSP, Domestic, 1603 - 1610, p. 34.

10 Sir John Finett, *Finetti Philoxensis: Some choice observations of Sr. John Finett Knight, and Master of the Ceremonies to the two last Kings. Touching the Reception, and Precedence; the Treatment and Audience, the Punctilios and Contests of Forren Ambassadors in England* (1656) p. 38.
exercised at their reception when the guests might expect to be greeted at the Court Gate first, then by a second group of courtiers in the first courtyard and finally by a third group at the Guard Chamber door, before being ushered through to the royal presence. This rather elaborate treatment was generally reserved for the most senior ambassadors, while those of lesser status had to make do with as little as one reception at the court gate. Nevertheless, whatever their standing, having been escorted through the Guard Chamber, ambassadors were then passed on through to the Presence Chamber and the King.

WHITEHALL PALACE

Hans Jacob Wurmsser von Vendenheym, secretary to Lewis Frederick, Prince of Württemburg, gives us an insight into the protocols surrounding the first days of an ambassador's visit. He notes that, having arrived at Gravesend the entourage were met, on Saturday 14th April by Lord Willoughby and twenty gentlemen, 'well equipped, to receive His Excellency in his [James's] name', who conducted them to
London where they lodged in the Black Eagle. Of the Prince’s audience in April, 1610 he writes,

Monday 16th His Majesty sent four coaches to fetch his Excellency, in order to give him audience in the great hall of the Palace. His Majesty was seated under a canopy of cloth of gold, together with the Queen, the Prince, the Duke of York, the Princess, Madame Arabella and the Prince of Brunswick, a great number of earls and lords of England - all Knights of the Garter - were standing round the throne; the other parts of the room were filled with nobles and ladies...

After dinner [20th April], the Queen sent two of her coaches for the purpose of giving an audience to his Excellency, who received great honour from her Majesty. 11

According to John Chamberlain, Francois Juvenal, Marquis Tresnel, Seignior des Ursins travelled to his audience with ‘almost three-score coaches of fowre horses and had a great dinner and banquet...he came home accompanied by both the Marquesses Buckingham and Hamilton that came to towne overnight to fetch him with much other nobilitie and courtiers.’ 12 In an earlier letter to Dudley Carleton, Chamberlain gave a brief description of the Venetian ambassador’s audience at which Donato arrived in a cavalcade of thirty coaches with the intention, Chamberlain assures his friend, of putting on all the ‘pomp and show he can to uphold their declining reputation’. 13 The Persian envoy, Sir Robert Sherley, caused a stir when he was first presented at Court. He made his first two respects, we are told, with his turban on before removing it for the third, laying it ‘at the King’s feet’. This extraordinary punctiliousness was put down to his ‘whole habit being Persian’. 14

Having presented his credentials, kissed the sovereign’s hand the ambassador delivered a set speech of rather florid compliments. That given by Jerzy

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11 ‘A relation of the Journey which I, in company with his Serene Highness the Duke Lewis Frederick of Wirtemberg, have with God’s help undertaken and happily accomplished, through part of the Rhine country, Holland, Zeeland, England, Scotland, Friesland, likewise part of Germany; and which has been briefly penned in the French language by me, Hans Jacob Wurnssee von Vendenheym (1610)’, cited in Rye, England, pp. 58 - 59.
12 8th May, 1619, SP. Domestic, vol. cix, no. 18.
13 John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 7th November, 1618.
14 Nichols, Progresses, vol. ii, p. 963
Ossoliński on 11th March 1621 was reported to have been so impressive a Latin oration that James asked for a copy of it and requested several translations to be sent to other European royal residences. The ambassador would then present the King with gifts from his master. The gifts presented to the King aroused great interest, so that some ambassadors displayed their gifts as they progressed through the streets to Whitehall. The Russians, Posdeyev and Volynsky who came to court in 1617 presented James with a wide range of gifts that included:

...sable Furres, black Foxes, Ermynes, Hawkes, with their Hoods and Mantles...all embroydered with Gold and Pearle; two lining sables, a Persian dagger, and a knife set with stones and Pearles, two rich cloath of Gold Persian Horse-clothes, a Persian kettle Drum to lure Hawkes...Besides many other Sables, and black Fox furres...16

Herbert notes the excellence of these gifts which were graciously accepted and ‘the haukes the King seemed most too wellcome and be glad of’. Chamberlain notes that the gifts were ‘the greatest that ever came thence, the very furres being estimated by those who are skilfull at better than £6,000, though some talk of much more...The King was much pleased, and more when he understoode Queen Elizabeth never had such a present thence.’ Sir Thomas Roe, serving as a representative for the Great Mogul, brought James, ‘two antelopes, a straunge and bowtifull kind of red-deare, a rich tent, rare carpets, certain ombrellaes, and such like trinkets’. However, not all gifts were gratefully received. A correspondent writing in 1611 noted that whilst the ambassador from Savoy had brought the King some excellent horses, the ‘rich furniture’ that accompanied them was ‘somewhat wore’.

15 Nichols, Progresses, vol. iv, p. 669. The oration was edited in English under the title A True Copy of the Latine Oration of the Excellent Lord George Ossoliński, Count Palatine of Tenizyn, and Sendomyria, Chamberlain to the Kings Maiesty of Poland, and Suethland, and Embassadour to the most Excellent Majesty (1621) cited in E. A. Mierzwa, Anglia a Polska w pierwszej połowie XVII w. p. 49, n.106; Davies in God's Playground: a History of Poland, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1981), p. 159 refers to this speech as taking place on 11th March, 1620. I have found no other evidence that Ossoliński was in the country this early.
16 Finett, Observations; p. 39.
17 Herbert to Carleton, 14th November, 1617, PRO SP 64/28
18 Chamberlain to Carleton, 15th November, 1617, PRO SP 64/30
Not all ambassadors' receptions could be seen as unmitigated successes. Dudley Carleton records the fate of the Venetians who arrived in London in late 1603. Having been brought from Southampton to Salisbury by two of the Kings' coaches, they were 'welcomed by the foulest day that came this year' only to find that their lodgings only provided seven beds for an entourage of 'seven score'. The lodgings provided for Duodo and Molin were so very poor that they complained loudly and after some twenty citizens of Salisbury were imprisoned for refusing to give up their houses the ambassadors were furnished with beds and chambers scattered all about the town.

On the day of their presentation at court in London the authorities had mustered all the coaches they could find to transport them to Whitehall and, no sooner had the party reached the Presence Chamber, than the courtiers repossessed their coaches leaving the Venetian delegation to travel home on foot. Carleton notes also that 'the knavish Frenchmen laughed at their disorders, and say they are served like right pantaloons; but', he continues, 'they deserve to be better styled. For they are come in best show and fashion of any I saw yet and do all things with as great magnificence.' In fact, the whole mission was to turn out a dismal affair for the two envoys. They had come to complain to James of the depredations of the English buccaneers in the Mediterranean. James's response was that, although he detested such actions, he was helpless in the matter. He frankly admitted to the Venetians, that he was still new to English government and was handicapped by his old Elizabethan ministers and could not, therefore, deal with everything at once. Which was a diplomatic way of saying that it was far too profitable a business to be given up so easily.

Russian etiquette insisted that foreign negotiators should comply to the letter

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with Muscovy’s ambassadorial procedure and applied this not only to representatives at the Tsar’s court but also demanded the same treatment for the Tsar’s ambassador’s abroad. Consequently, Zyuzin and Vitovtov, who had to await James’s return from a hunting trip before they could be given their first audience, three times refused an invitation to the pageant celebrating the installation of the Lord Mayor on the grounds that the crowd could not be allowed to see them before they had seen the King. Only the threat of the King’s displeasure and a promise that they would be concealed from the crowd finally persuaded them to attend. Their first audience finally took place on 7th November in the Queens’ apartments, where James and Prince Charles joined them. 21

The Marquis de Rosny’s embassy in 1603 was fraught with problems of protocol almost from beginning to end. He embarked on an English warship at Calais that had been sent by the King. The Governor of Calais, M. De Vic accompanied him as far as Dover with two light French ships, the ambassador’s train being dispersed amongst the three ships. As the ships set sail the English Admiral signalled that the French ships break their ensigns - took no notice and one ship even took the lead over the English ship, whereupon, without more ado the English ship fired three shots over the French ship - one cutting the shrouds and putting the ship in immediate danger. Thereafter the French ship hoisted his sail and fell back into place. 22

Having overcome that problem the Marquis was carried to his audience at Greenwich with 120 of his gentlemen in the King’s barges. He intended that his following should be dressed in black in mourning for Elizabeth, although he had been told that no one was admitted into the King’s presence wearing black. He wrote:

One part of the orders I had given with regard to the ceremony of my audience, was, that all my retinue should appear in mourning, to execute with propriety the first part of my commission, which consisted in

21 Chamberlain, Letters, 11th November, 1613, p. 485
22 See CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, 6th June, 1603, p. 54.
complimenting the new King on the death of Queen Elizabeth, though I had been informed at Calais that no one, whether Ambassador, foreigner or English, was admitted into the presence of the new king in black.

Beaumont had warned about this, insisting it would be ‘highly disagreeable to the court’, but Sully, concerned that his action would ‘cast a reproach on the king and all England’ would not change his mind, his ‘orders hereupon were positive’. On his behalf Beaumont wrote to ‘Erskine and some others, who were best aquainted with...court ceremonials’. Erskine’s reply was that ‘the whole court considered [his] intention as a premeditated affront, and that [he] had so offended the king by it, that nothing would effectually prevent the success of my negotiations, from its very commencement’. He complied, ‘only through necessity’, after being met by the Earl of Northumberland who conducted him into the Royal presence. 23

Even at the last he was seriously displeased with his treatment while in England. While waiting on the pier at Dover with Sir Lewis Lewkenor, he was handed a packet of letters which included one in the King’s hand addressed to the French King and addressed ‘A mon trescher Frere la Roi trechretion’ whilst the French King had addressed James as ‘A Monsieur mon Frere &c’. De Rosny requested Sir Lewis to dispatch a courier back to James to alter the style of address, as he could not ‘deliver it as it is without great scandal to his master and imputation to himself’. 24

Rosny was not the only ambassador to be dissatisfied with their treatment by the English. Others found themselves waiting over an hour in an antechamber because slack management at court had brought them there before the King was ready for them. Sometimes the King could not be bothered to travel to London so that ambassadors were expected to travel out to Theobalds, Royston or even Newmarket to see him. The two Russian ambassadors, Fosdeyev and Volynsky were

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not presented to the king immediately upon their arrival in London as Chamberlain tells us that the ambassadors,

wold faine have had audience before the K's going, but his furniture and some of his companie being not yet come to town, the King wold not stay his pleasure, though he have brought some presents to his liking, as white hawkes, live sables, and I know not what els. 25

The Dutch commissioners who arrived in April, 1610 found that very little could be achieved from their mission owing to the news of the death of the French King and the absence of James from London, whereat the commissioners, it is said, 'felt themselves neglected and aggrieved.' James, who at the time was enjoying the pleasures of the countryside, for his part complained against the States that 'they had sent men of such quality to the King of France, and served him with mean pensioners of Townes'. For his part Cecil tried to pour oil on what could have been very troubled waters by assuring Winwood, the English ambassador at The Hague, that the commissioners had been treated in England with the greatest respect:

First, for their reception, that their own purpose to come in their ships up to London, and their refusing to go on to land at Gravesend, hath prevented us that they were not brought into the city with such lustre as is reported their colleagues were at Paris. Yet we did what we could to send barges to meet them by the way (as they did), and coaches to bring them to their lodgings; wherein we hope they have had no cause of mislike. At their access to his Majesty, they received all the honour that is here usually done to the ambassadors of the greatest monarchs. 26

The deputies could have had little to complain of and one feels that their complaints were unjust. They were conducted everywhere to view the treasures and rarities of England and they were feasted on St. George’s Day. On 24th May they were entertained lavishly by the King at his own table, after which the four ambassadors were knighted. After taking leave of the King and Queen, Princess Elizabeth and

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25 Chamberlain, 8th November, 1617, PRO SP 64/12.
Prince Henry the ambassadors went to visit Prince Charles who was sick with the measles. On 28th May they made their departure, carrying with them many handsome gifts.

Having once paid their ceremonial homage to the King, which marked the formal beginning of their mission, ambassadors would proceed with their negotiations. However, there was plenty of time in which they could amuse themselves, with state dinners, entertainments and masques. Banquets provided an ideal occasion for the English court to show off its resplendent grandeur and wealth. Thomas Birch describes the banquet given for the Emperor's ambassador, Schwarzenberg, in April 1622. It was a banquet at which:

...sugar-works represented a complete army of horse and foot, with drums, ensigns, &c. ...There were six cartloads of plate, brought from the Tower, at this banquet, wherewith two stately stages were furnished, one very large and spacious, valued at £200,000; and the other far less but valued at £500,000. 27

Scaramelli, the Venetian secretary observed that, at a solemn banquet for the representatives of Denmark and Brunswick on 15th August, 1603, the King and Queen observed the same ceremony as they had for the French ambassador, de Rosny, but at this banquet 'the drinking was German rather than French'. 28 This banquet had taken place a couple of months before on 29th June, 1603, when de Rosny and Beaumont had dined, along with two hundred of their retinue at Greenwich.

London and its environs provided many sights and entertainments for the foreign visitor. In a contemporary diary it is related that 'His Excellency Lewis Frederick, Prince of Württemburg' visited several great houses and gardens including 'the royal House of Nonesuch and that of Beddington, belonging to Mr. Francis Carro [Carew].' Beddington he describes as 'one of the most pleasant and

28 Scaramelli to the Doge, 20th August, 1603, CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, p. 113.
ornamental gardens in England, with many beautiful streams; in the house is to be seen a handsome cabinet, the walls of which are of branched work of wood gilded, enriched with beautiful pieces of marble with the floor the same: over the door of the cabinet there is to be noticed a small wax figure, which I take to be the emblem of the house.' While in England he also visited Theobalds, Cambridge and the 'superb house of Audley End'. On Tuesday, 1st May, 1610 secretary Wurmssser noted in this diary that Lewis Frederick 'went to Eltham Park to see the perpetual motion'.

A visit to Bankside was usually included in the itinerary of foreign visitors to London. In a town which was growing rapidly it was worth the while of a variety of professional entertainers such as acrobats, actors, ballad-singers, bearwards, clowns, fencers, puppeteers and the like to put on a virtually continuous performances. If visitors wanted to hear ballads sung, they would go to London Bridge; if they wanted to watch a bear-baiting, they would go to Bankside, and so on. And while the vocal moral minority frequently denounced these places, they were to remain extremely popular. Lambeth marshes and St. George's Fields provided scope for races and open-air games, and music and dancing were provided reasonably cheaply. Medicinal water and music on most days cost threepence, while on Wednesday there was a concert for which one shilling was charged. In addition to these more light-hearted amusements, Bankside was the chief home of the rougher and crueler delights of bear-baiting and bull-baiting, both favourites with James, which consisted largely of harassing and tormenting an animal with dogs. This was a popular pastime in which several ambassadors were able to join the King. John Chamberlain, in a letter to Dudley Carleton, wrote that on 12th July, 1623, 'The Spanish Ambassador [Coloma] is much delighted in bear

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29 Cornelius Drebbel, patronised by James I and in all probability given apartments at Eltham Palace, presented the king with his perpetual motion machine. Drebbel is also credited with the invention of the submarine. On one occasion James is said to have gone aboard this vessel and taken a short ride. An etching of the perpetual motion machine can be found in the British Museum. See Rye, *England*, pp. 58 - 59.
baiting. He was the last week at Paris-garden, where they showed him all the
gleasure they could both with bull, bear, and horse...and then turned a white bear
into the Thames, where the dogs bated him swimming; which was the best sport of
all.’ 30 One example of the range and savagery of this sport is drawn from a
Jacobean notice for a Thursday exhibition at one of the Bankside bear-gardens:
‘The gamstirs of Essex,’ it advertises, ‘chalenge all comers - to plaie .v. dogges at the
single beare for .v. pounds and also to wearie a bull dead at the stake.’ In addition,
there was to be ‘plasant sport with the horse and ape and whipping of the blind
beare.’ The popularity of baiting is shown by the simple fact that there was not only
baiting in Paris Gardens, but also two rings in the Clink Liberty, and in the
Southwark High Street, nearly opposite St. George’s Church, there was permanently
established a bull ring to which an animal could be tied for the purpose. 31

Theatre going was a popular pastime amongst the foreign diplomats.
Chamberlain records that Gondomar went with his entourage to the Fortune in
1621 and that he subsequently banqueted with the players. 32 The Venetian
ambassador, Guistinian, together with the Secretary of Florence and the French
ambassador, Boderie, and his wife saw Pericles at the Globe in 1608. 33 On Monday
30th April, 1610 Prince Lewis Frederick of Württemburg went with James to see
Othello; ‘the history of the Moor of Venice’, performed at the Globe and in 1617
the Venetian ambassador, Contarini, and his train attended a performance of The
Duchess of Malfi at the Fortune. 34 Orazio Busino, the embassy chaplain, leaves an
account of the play that forms part of the general complaint of the time that the
Catholic Church was presented in a very poor light on the London stage:

On another occasion they [the actors] showed a Cardinal in all his grandeur,
in the formal robes appropriate to his station, splendid and rich, with his
train in attendance, having an altar erected on the stage, where he pretended
to make a prayer, organising a procession; and then they produced him in

31 Bulls were, as a rule, baited to death, but the bears were not.
33 CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, p. 600.
public with a harlot on his knee. They showed him giving poison to one of his sister, in a question of honour. Moreover he goes to war, first laying down his Cardinal’s habit on the altar, with the help of his chaplains, with great ceremoniousness; finally, he has his sword bound on and dons the soldier’s sash with so much panache you could not imagine it better done. All this was acted in condemnation of the grandeur of the Church, which they despise and which in this Kingdom they hate to death. 35

The French ambassador, Boderie was seriously offended by Chapman’s Byron plays which he saw in March, 1608 and in which were depicted scandalous scenes in the contemporary French Court. 36 Chapman had included a scene in which the Queen of France accosted Henri IV’s mistress (Mademoiselle Verneuil) with harsh words and had boxed her ears. The ambassador sent an account of the affair to Secretary Puisieux:

Environ la micaresme ces certains comediens à qui j’avois fait defendre de jouer l’histoire du Marechal de Biron, voyant toute la cour dehors; ne laisserent de la faire, et non seulement cela, mais y introduirent la Reine et Madame de Verneuil, traitant celle-ci fort mal de paroles, et lui donnant un soufflet. En ayant eu avis de-là à quelques jours, aussi-tôt je m’en allai trouver le Comte de Salisbury, et lui fis plainte de ce que non seulement ces compagnons-la contrevenoient à la defense qui leur avoit été faite, mais y ajoutoient des choses non seulement plus importantes, mais qui n’avoient que faire avec le Marechal de Biron, et au partir de-là étoient toutes fausses, dont en vérité il se montra fort corroucé. Et dès l’heure même envoya pour les prendre. Toutefois il ne s’en trouva que trois, qui aussi-tôt furent menés à la prison où ils sont encore; mais le principal qui est la composituer échapa. Un jour ou deux devant, ils avoient dépêché leur Roi, sa mine d’Écosse, et tous ses favoris d’une estrange sorte; car après lui avoir fait déplorer le Ciel sur le vol d’un oiseau, et fait battre un Gentilhomme pour avoir rompu ses chiens, il le dépeignoient ivre pour le moins une fois le jour. Ce qu’ayant su, je pensai qu’il seroit assez en colère contre lesdits Comédiens, sans que je l’y misse davantage, et qu’il valoit mieux faire referer leur châtiment à l’Irreverence qu’ils lui avoient portée, qu’à ce qu’ils pourroient avoir dit desdites Dames, et ce je me résolut de n’en plus parler, mais considérer ce qu’ils ont fait. Quand le Roi a été ici, il a témoigné être extrêmement irrité contre ces maraults-la, et a commandé qu’ils soient chasies et surtout qu’on eût à faire diligence de trouver le composituer. Même il a fait défense que l’on n’eût plus à jouer des Comédies dedans Londres pour lever laquelle défense quatri autres Compagnies, qui y sont encore, offrent déjà cent mille francs, lesquels pourront bien leur en ordonner la permission; mais pour le moins sera-ce à condition qu’ils ne représenteroient plus aucune histoire moderne, ni ne parlerent des choses du temps à peine de la vie. Si j’eusse cru qu’il y eût de la suggestion en ce qu’avoient dit les Comédiens, j’en eusse fait du bruit davantage; mais ayant tout sujet d’estimer le contraire, j’ai pensé que le meilleur eût été de ne point le remuer davantage, et laisser aud Roi la vengeance de son fait. Toutefois si vous jugez de de-là, Monsieur, que je n’en aye fait assez, il est encore temps. 37

After Boderie’s protests to Salisbury, the scene was removed and certain of the actors arrested. At this time Chapman appears to have sought the protection of the Duke of Lennox. This would seem to have been a wise move - he went unpunished and retained his position in the royal household. Why James acted with such leniency is the subject of some conjecture. The arrest of the actors and the censoring of the play could have been taken merely as a political sop to appease the French ambassador but the fact that Chapman was a close friend of the Prince of Wales might be one possible reason for his having escaped censorship himself. However, one might wonder whether this leniency was, in fact, a result of the playwright’s generous support of James’s political views.

While serving abroad the conscientious ambassador was expected, on important anniversaries, such as his master’s birthday or name-days and the anniversary of coronations, to hold large receptions to which ministers of the government to which he was accredited, other ambassadors, his fellow countrymen and local notables and their ladies would be invited. On these occasions ambassadors would dine in state, and a firework display and a ball would often accompany the reception. The greater the occasion, the greater the festivities.

By the same virtue deaths were also observed, and there were various degrees of mourning into which the assiduous ambassador could throw himself; the most expensive being for the ambassador’s own sovereign, when the whole of the household, the furniture, the coach harness and the horses, had to be dressed or draped in black for a considerable period. Next in line of costliness was the death of the reigning monarch of the country to which the ambassador was accredited. This involved almost as much outward show of mourning as for that of the ambassador’s own prince. 38 Mourning for a minor member of the host royal family, on the other hand, could be brief and relatively inexpensive. Only the most important members

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38 See, for example, the account of the Marquis de Rosny’s arrival in England in 1603, A. de la Boderie, Ambassades de Monsieur Antoine le Fevre de la Boderie en Angleterre (Paris, 1750), vol. 3, p. 135
of the household had to wear mourning and this needed only to consist of grey, white or purple suits.

Of all the extra-ordinary embassies sent to England in James’s reign, none was more splendid than that sent by the Spanish in 1604. The arrival of Juan de Velasco, Duke of Frias, was preceded by Juan de Tassis, Count of Villa Mediana, as the first permanent representative to the English court for many years. Having made Somerset House available to the ambassador James then furnished the apartments with his best furniture and richest tapestries, assigning an extensive staff to attend on the Duke and his entourage when they arrived. But it was not just James who prepared to give lavishly. It was reported from Antwerp that prior to his departure for England the Constable of Castile ‘bespoke many and sundry jewels of great price’ for distribution on his arrival in England. Curiously he refused to accept the jewels from the jeweller unless he could have them on a ‘sale or return’ basis. The correspondent notes that the ‘jewellers found strange this demand, but he [the Constable] more strange that he was refused.’ The Constable also spent lavishly whilst in England and, as the money had been provided by the Spanish Treasury, kept a careful record of all his accounts. Gifts were showered not only on the King and Queen but also on all the people of importance at court: on the English delegates to the Peace Conference, the Earls of Dorset, Nottingham, Northampton, and Devonshire, and on many of the court officials. As one might guess none of the members of the court circle were averse to receiving large sums of money and presents of jewellery, plate and precious stones. The Venetian ambassador noted that Villa Mediana, the Constable’s almoner, was ‘making presents every day’. Amongst the gifts showered on James and his court was an

40 A detailed account of this embassy, the Constable’s itinerary &c. can be found in W. R. de Villa- Urrutia, ‘La Jornada del Condestable de Castilla a Inglaterra para las Paces de 1604’, Ochos Diplomaticos (Madrid, 1927), pp. 24 - 48. These accounts, which were made available to S. Parnell Kerr, have been preserved in the family archives of the Duque de Frias. See ‘The Constable kept an Account’, Notes and Queries, April, 1957, pp. 167 - 170.
41 CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, p. 175.
agate vase, adorned with diamonds and rubies, purchased in Antwerp, for the King.
To the Queen he gave three pendants of large diamonds purchased from a London
ejeweller, a gold cross studded with two hundred and sixty diamonds and a crystal
'shaped like a serpent', which had been bought in Brussels. Next came a long list of
presents for the ladies of the court. Of these, the Countess of Suffolk, a potential
pensioner of the Spanish, received the largest gifts; a cash sum of some 200,000
reales, jewels worth another 160,000 and a golden box. The Countess of Bedford,
patron of Jonson, Drayton and Daniel, received a 'plumage’ with one hundred and
six diamonds, to the ‘Daughter of Cidney’ 42 a diamond ring. He notes that two
rings are mentioned: the other, amongst several other jewelled gifts, going to Cecil.
Many other ladies at the court received valuable gifts of jewellery. Gifts to the
gentlemen of the court were equally numerous. The Prince of Wales received a
Spanish horse, with a harness of embroidered velvet. The Earl of Southampton
received two gold boxes and a diamond jewel; Pembroke shared a large sum of
money with one ‘Cuinglas’. Wotton also received a large sum of money. When he
completed his mission, the Constable surprisingly, left many gifts of gold and silver
plate, altar cloths, chasuble, hassocks and a bronze Christ on an ebony cross for the
Royal Chapel at Whitehall. Also included in the Constable’s accounts is one item
that runs as follows:

To boatmen, musicians, and players, gifts to King’s Household, to the violins,
flageolets, and drums, and to some soldiers, and alms to Holy Places and to
poor...4780 reales. 43

The payment of money to the ‘players’ seems to have raised a certain amount of
conjecture that the King’s Company performed at Somerset House before the Peace
commissioners. However, as the overall sum concerned in this entry was a trifling
one for the number of recipients, about £100.00, and the Accounts of the Treasurer
of the Chamber show that a payment was made to ‘Thomas Green for allowance of

42 This was the daughter of Sir Philip Sidney who had been godson to Philip II.
himself and four of his fellow grooms of the Chamber and the Queen’s Players for masquing and attending upon Count Ardenberg and the rest of the commissioners at Durham House by Commandment the space of 18 days; several commentators suggest that it appears to be little more than speculation. Having said that, the fact that the Queen’s Players performed at Durham House does not preclude the King’s Players from having attended at Somerset House, also the trifling sum paid is no indication that they did not appear. The King’s Players were under license to James and, as such, would have had to appear by command of the King had he desired it.

Having settled into Somerset House, the Spanish commissioners met there with the representatives of the Archduke and the English to negotiate the terms of the peace treaty. An unknown artist has preserved the sumptuous scene for us. In this painting we see the traditional long table of diplomacy, covered by a rich brocaded cloth, on both sides of which sit the gowned and ruffed negotiators in formal high-backed chairs. On the left of the table are seated the Spaniards; the Constable of Castile, de Tassis, and Alessandro Rovida. Seated beside them are the representatives of the Archduke: John de Ligne, Count of Aremberg, Prince of Barbançon, Jean Richardot and Ludovic Verreyken. On the right hand side of the table we see the English representatives: the Earls of Dorset, Devonshire, Northampton and Nottingham and Robert Cecil.

45 The Somerset House Conference, 1604, originally attributed to Marc Gheeraedts II. On the picture the following inscription has been added at a later date: Juan Pantoxa de la fecit (1594). This is obviously incorrect. The most likely theory is that it was painted by a Spanish artist in the train of the Constable, who made sketches during the conference. By permission of the National Portrait Gallery. Reg. No. 665.
46 Aremberg is variously noted as Karel or Charles. Aremberg’s audience with the King was put off time and again due to the ambassador’s ill health, according to Nichols, Progresses, vol. 1, p. 163, he suffered badly from gout. There were very unfavourable reports about the ambassador, mainly on account of his gout and his poor English. James remarked to Rosny that ‘The Archduke hath sent me an Ambassador who can neither walk nor talk: he hath demanded an audience of me in a garden, because he cannot come up stairs into a room’. Nichols, Progresses, vol. 1, p. 161. Eventually he asked the King to send a member of the Council to him instead. He was met by Cecil. Rapin, History, p. 161. He was implicated in the plot to set Arabella Stuart on the throne. See Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain, 27th November, 1603; Rapin, History, p. 161. See also CSP Domestic, 1603 - 1607, vol. II, no. 64, 93; vol. III, no. 24. Despite this, on leaving he was given a jewel worth £260.00 by the Queen. Warrant SP Domestic; vol. ix, no. 51, 6th September, 1604.
Even at this important meeting the rivalry amongst even representatives of equal standing is noticeable. Although the Archdukes had been allowed to select their own representatives to the peace talks, Aremberg was instructed to accept whatever terms the Constable of Castile could secure. While at the same time the Constable was reported to have complained that the Archduke's representatives 'behaved themselves more as our masters than as our companions'.

Following the ratification of the treaty on 29th August James entertained the commissioners to a feast in the Banqueting House, which even the Spaniards found to be 'sumptuous and profuse'. The Audience chamber at Whitehall Palace was, we are told, 'elegantly furnished, having a buffet of several stages, filled with various pieces of ancient and modern gilt plate of exquisite workmanship.' A further buffet was to be found which contained 'rich vessels of gold, agate and other precious stones.' The table, five yards in length, was set up behind a railing to keep onlookers, curious to see the richly dressed commissioners, at bay. The dishes were brought in by gentlemen and servants of the King, who were accompanied by the Lord Chamberlain. The Earls of Pembroke and Southampton acted as gentlemen-ushers. The royal party entered after the Constable and other guests 'placed themselves at their throne', the Constable took his place next to the King and Count Villa Mediana by the Queen and all stood for grace.

Our correspondent notes the seating arrangements thus: 'Their Majesties sat at the head of the table, at a distance from each other, under the canopy of state, the Queen being on the right hand...and at her side, a little apart, sat the Constable, on a tabouret of brocade with a high cushion of the same, and on the side of the King the prince was seated in like manner. On the opposite side of the table and on the right sat Count Villamediana, and next to him the Senator Rovida opposite the Constable; and on the same side with the senator, nearly fronting the Prince, were seated the President Richardot and the Audiencer; a space in front being left vacant owing to the absence of the Count d'Arembergue, who was prevented by gout from
attending.' Many toasts were drunk - each pledging the health of the other and wishing that the 'peace be happy and perpetual'. During the feast yet more gifts of great value were exchanged. The dinner was followed by a ball, at which Prince Henry danced a galliard for the assembled dignitaries. When the dancing was at an end they 'all then took their places at the windows of the room which looked out upon a square, where a platform was raised, and a vast crowd has assembled to see the King's bears fight with greyhounds...Presently a bull, tied to the end of a rope, was fiercely baited by dogs.' After this tumblers, tightrope walkers and equestrians entertained the guests. When the entertainments were over the Lord Chamberlain personally escorted the guests to their coaches, and fifty halberdiers with torches lit their way home. Our correspondent continues his account by noting that on Monday 30th May, 'The Constable awoke with a slight attack of lumbago' that one can only assume was caused by his exertions of the previous night.

The close of a mission was generally marked with formalities similar to those that attended its opening. Ambassadors would receive official letters of recall or revocation from their master, one addressed to them and the other addressed to the King. The mission formally ended with a leave-taking audience, rather resembling the first public audience. During this audience the departing ambassador would deliver the letters of recall addressed to the King and be handed his 'recredentials'. At these final audiences the departing ambassador distributed gifts, also at this meeting the ambassador or envoy was usually given a gift of regard. A distinguished ambassador might be knighted, but royal portraits set in diamonds or

47 Relacion de la jornada del excmo Condestable de Castille, a las pazes entre Hespania y Inglaterra (Antwerp, 1604).
48 Curiously de Tassis does not mention in his records the most valuable gift given by James to the Constable. This was the Royal Gold Cup. Parnell Kerr outlines the history of this piece. The Constable, it would seem, made a gift of the cup to a Spanish convent where it remained for some two hundred and fifty years. The nuns, apparently needing money, then sold it to a Baron Pichon for 9,000 francs, from whom it was acquired, indirectly, by the British Museum. The Constable's gifts to the king and Queen have long since disappeared, in all likelihood casualties of the Civil War. "The Constable kept an Account", Notes and Queries, p. 169.
49 Relacion de la jornada del excmo Condestable de Castille, a las pazes entre Hespania y Inglaterra (Antwerp, 1604).
in jewelled rings, gold medals, or golden boxes were common diplomatic gifts and gilt, plate, and jewels changed hands. 'The custom is', wrote Rousseau de Chamoy, 'that, on occasions, the prince give, as a present to the ambassador, his portrait set in diamonds or some similar object, and that he cause to be sent to his secretary a golden chain with his medal or something else.' 50 Before his departure the ambassador might also be given precious gifts for his master. To Schwarzenberg James gave a portrait of himself, 'set in Gold richly inchaced with Diamonds, and hung at a Chaine of Diamonds, Rubies and Pearles'. 51 Juan de Tassis noted that 'the King gave to the Condestable when he left, a fine ring, telling him it was for the marriage of the peace and the firmness of it, and afterwards he sent him a very fine buffet of silver, and a half dinner set of pieces in gold.' 52 Occasionally, as has been noted, there was no formal leave-taking audience and the new ambassador presented his predecessor's letters of recall with his own credentials.

Visits, like entries and audiences, had their own rules. Protocol required newly arrived ambassadors to inform all others of their arrival. After, those of equal or inferior rank paid a first visit, which was expected to be returned within a short time. If, however, representatives were inferior in rank to ambassadors already in residence in London they were expected to pay the first visit to them. The Württemburg secretary, Wurmsser, in his relation of Lewis Frederick's embassy in 1610 notes who called on the Prince and whom he visited. His entries include:

Tuesday 17th (April). Mons. de la Boderie, Ambassador of the most Christian King [Henry IV], came to pay a visit to his Excellency...
Thursday, 19th. The Ambassador of Venice came to see his Excellency at nine o'clock in the morning; he is styled the most illustrious Cornao... 53

51 See for example, *SP, Domestic*, vol. IX, 30th August, 1604, which contains a warrant to pay John Williams £1,000 for gold chains to be given by the king to ambassadors and another to the Treasurer of the King's Jewels and Plate to deliver certain parcels of gold and silver plate for presents to the Spanish and Austrian ambassadors; vol. X, 8th November, 1604 has a warrant to pay the king's Goldsmith £9,056.5s 3½d for plate etc. given to ambassadors, and 8th December, 1604 has a further warrant to pay the Treasurer of the Chamber £1,000 which was to be disbursed of extraordinary charges of the ambassadors; vol. XLIV, 30th April, 1609, shows a warrant to pay John Williams and others £5,774.11s 6½d for plate, jewels etc. given by James as New Years gifts to ambassadors.
52 Simancas, E. 41.
53 Marc-Antonio Correr.
Friday, 20th. The Ambassadors of the States of the United Provinces came to visit his Excellency at nine o'clock in the morning...

Wednesday 25th. His Excellency returned the visit of the Ambassadors of Venice and of the States at nine o'clock in the morning; after dinner he went to see the resident Ambassador of the States, Mr Carron, who lives out of the city, opposite Westminster, in a very fine house of his own, well furnished, and with beautiful gardens round about; it is called South Lambeth. 54

The ceremonial use of language in diplomacy, which involved questions of the language to be used for diplomatic papers, formal audiences and treaties, was a perplexing one. 55 The manuals of the time list the languages of which the ‘perfect ambassador’ ought to have a working knowledge. The generally accepted rule was that diplomats spoke their own language and used interpreters for ordinary business matters, as very few were skilled enough to negotiate in Latin. Formal documents were still written in Latin and it was the common language for state treaties.

We have already noted the sometimes uneasy association between James and certain of the diplomatic envoys but what of relations between ambassadors and the ministers of James’s court? Obviously it was to the advantage of the diplomat to be able to gain the support of someone close to the King and the higher ranking the officer the better. In their intervention into English politics foreign princes naturally expected their envoys to pay attention to James’s ministers and favourites. However, too much importance should not be attached to the influence that could be gained in this way. True, there were both ‘Spanish’ and ‘French’ parties amongst ministers as we have already seen, but it would not be true to say that they were under the control, or indeed, even under the permanent influence of the ambassadors. Similarly, the influence of Gondomar over James has be exaggerated and it was probably no greater than that of Noel de Caron. In any event, foreign

54 A relation of the Journey which I, in company with his Serene Highness the Duke Lewis Frederick of Wirtemberg, have with God’s help undertaken and happily accomplished, through part of the Rhine country, Holland, Zeeland, England, Scotland, Friesland, likewise part of Germany, and which has been briefly penned in the French language by me, Hans Jacob Wurmesser von Vendenheym (1610)’ in Rye, England.

policy was far less important for ministers than the internal struggle for power, position and influence, in which their relationship with James were far more significant. Nevertheless, a man could not expect much success in his mission if he was to gain in some way the displeasure of those same high-ranking officers. Baron Achatius Dohna, for example, came to England in January 1620 to raise a volunteer force for the service of Bohemia. His was to be a turbulent and unsuccessful year in England, for, having declined Buckingham's suggestion that Edward Cecil should command volunteers, he chose instead Vere. This choice caused a quarrel between the ambassador and Cecil, which led eventually to the ambassadors' dismissal from court. Carlos Coloma, who came to England in 1622, showed great intelligence and tact in his dealings with the English parliament and in particular with Buckingham's faction, who were clamouring for war with Spain. This tact was remembered by Charles five years later when he was welcomed back as ambassador extra-ordinary to aid the conclusion of the peace with Spain. 56 Both Antoine Coeffer Ruze, the Marquis d'Effiat who came to arrange a French match for the Prince of Wales in the summer of 1624, and Louis's secretary, Henry Augustus de Lomenie, who was sent to obtain ratification of the marriage treaty between Charles and Henrietta Maria in December, 1624, found a supporter in Buckingham. The ratification of the treaty, however, was only part of Lomenie's mission. He was also instructed to attempt to embroil James in a war with Spain and to obtain permission for Mansfeld to relieve Breda. In this he gained an ardent ally in Buckingham, who by this time was wholly anti-Spanish.

In contrast Juan de Mendoza, Marquis of Inojosa, Marquis of San Germano who arrived in London on 28th June, 1623 to observe the completion of the articles for the marriage treaty was not quite so tactful in his dealings with Buckingham. Whilst in England he quarrelled with his Lordship and soon became the butt of his

anti-Spanish campaigning. The ambassador's final months in England were a painful ordeal when charges of subversion were levelled at him. He left London, amid signs of mistrust and undisguised hostility against Spain, without the usual public audience, a snub that effectively labelled him persona non grata, and was not provided with coaches for the journey to Dover. The hapless Francis Bacon also gave his support to the Marquis d'Effiat and a deep friendship grew between the two men. Rawley notes that it was the Marquis's expressed wish on his appointment, and after the fall of Bacon, to visit him 'after which they contracted an intimate acquaintance, and the Marquis did so much revere him that, besides his frequent visits, they wrote letters one to the other under the titles of father and son.'

The French ambassador, Gaspard Dauvet, Count Desmaretz, certainly hitched his star to the wrong wagon when he promised Ralegh help in escaping to France. The embassy interpreter and the secretary were both examined by the Council during Ralegh's trial. Because of his support for Ralegh the Count was never popular at the English court and was snubbed to the end. His departure present was meagre and he was kept waiting for three hours for his final audience.

Any study of protocol during the seventeenth century shows the emergence of two themes. The first of these is the desire of a sovereign to insist on such details of procedure as to uphold his national reputation and secondly the emergence of a form of ceremonial on which subsequent diplomatic protocol was to be based. The idea of ambassadorial immunities and privileges was tied up very much with the

57 CSP Venetian, 1623 - 1625, p. 307 - 312
58 Gardiner, History, vol. v, pp. 244 - 245. When he left he had, disguised in his entourage, the escaping Fr. John Gerard. Nichols, Progresses, vol. iv, p. 980; see also CSP Domestic 22nd April, 1623; 3rd July, 1624.
59 See also Chapter 4 regarding the relationship between Bacon and Gondomar.
60 W. Rawley, Life of the Honourable Author..., introduction to Renascitio, (1657) vol. i, p. 15.
61 8th April, 1618. Lyons, Gondomar, p. 65.
question of protocol. The modern practice of diplomatic immunity evolved pragmatically and quite independently of theories that attempted to justify changing practice. It took many decades before the theory of extra-territoriality became generally accepted as providing a satisfactory basis for modern practice. It was first formulated by Pierre Ayrault, a French lawyer, in the second edition of his work *L'Ordre, Formalité et instruction Judiciaire dont les anciens Grecs et Romains ont use es accusations publiques conferé au stil et usage de nostre France.* The appearance of this edition of Ayrault's book coincided with a renewed interest in diplomacy, brought about, in part, by a reaction to the religious wars raging on the continent, which found expression in several new works on the ambassador and his duties.

By the seventeenth century prominent aristocrats, accustomed to such positions of responsibility generally filled diplomatic posts. An inflated sense of importance often led ambassadors to make distorted claims about such familiar concepts as sanctuary, independent jurisdiction, ambassadorial immunity and freedom from prosecution under local law and their exercise of a certain limited authority over their fellow nationals abroad in order to procure an extension of ambassadorial rights. From demanding immunity from civil and criminal law for themselves, their suites and their houses it became but a small step to demand immunity for the whole neighbourhood of their residences. As a result large areas became islands of disorder where the native authorities dared not intervene for fear of provoking diplomatic incidents, but where ambassadors were neither able nor entitled to exert any control.

An inevitable consequence of the new found interest in diplomacy and its practice which developed in the early modern period was the appearance of a crop of questions of disputed precedence and the necessity for the re-examination and

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definition of the rights and obligations of the resident. State etiquette became the
subject of a regular science and the diplomatic history of the period furnished rich
material for such masters of ceremony as Finett and Wicquefort. Full ambassadors,
unlike diplomatic representatives of a lower grade, had to be most sensitive about
where they stood or were placed on official occasions attended by other
ambassadors. For their position relative to the other ambassadors reflected the
comparative esteem in which the courts to which they were accredited held their
masters. Since the pre-eminence of the Pope's representative, the Nuncio, followed
by the ambassador of the Holy Roman Emperor was accepted without dispute, at
least in Catholic courts, the rivalry for position was one of a series which affected
the ambassadors of other countries. The dispute between French and Spanish
ambassadors for third place was particularly bitter. Traditionally France had filled
this, but during the great days of Spain in the century after about 1550, Spanish
ambassadors, like Gondomar had often usurped it. As French power began to
recover under Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV, French ambassadors reasserted
what they believed were their rights vis-à-vis Spain with ever-greater energy. The
Spanish ambassadors, however, replied with equal vigour.

Seemingly petty disputes over apparent trivial matters such as one's place in
a procession or over the shape of a table have given diplomats a bad name. This is
somewhat unjust, for such behaviour usually reflects differences so profound as to
make negotiations - the diplomat's work - well nigh impossible. If relations are
generally good and a ruler wishes negotiations to take place such disputes can
easily be avoided. Thus, before the twentieth century, envoys were generally
appointed in preference to full ambassadors, and ambassadors anxious to avoid
disputes found pretexts, such as diplomatic illnesses, for absenting themselves from
potentially awkward ceremonies. When disputes occurred they were almost
invariably intentional and symbolic of a far deeper malaise or of an intention to
avoid or delay negotiation until a time more favourable to the 'trouble-maker'.

Disputes continue to this day, but those over precedence, as illustrated here, were finally ended by the Règlement of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 that ranked ambassadors according to length of their residence in the host country.

Three main rules as to the determination of precedence seem to have been generally accepted:

1. The Pope’s ambassadors (Nuncios) were, in the courts that admitted them, given precedence over the representatives of all lay rulers.

2. The ambassador of the Emperor was allowed precedence of the representatives of all lay rulers.

3. The representatives of monarchs regularly claimed and commonly secured precedence over the ministers of republics. Venice, however, as the holder of the kingdom of Cyprus, was admitted to rank with crowned heads, and her ambassador followed immediately after those of kings. (The representatives of the United Provinces succeeded, at Munster, in obtaining the right to rank with those of Venice, and the power of England under the Commonwealth was too great to permit her relegation to a lower place.) 63

Beyond the limits of these few rules there were, of course, frequent fierce disputes over rights and privileges. The negotiations at Boulogne in 1599 - 1600 between England and Philip III were broken off at the outset in consequence of a lively dispute between the negotiators over the claims advanced by the English to precedence over the Spanish. 64

Contests such as this were the direct outcome and formal expression of the realisation of the concept of national sovereignty. Agents were classified in accordance with the terms of the credentials with which they were furnished as being representative or non-representative, so that when the representative nature of a minister was recognised, the regulation of etiquette between agents of states claiming equal rank was no longer a trivial matter. Under the same conditions the reception and recognition of a minister was seen to involve far-reaching

64 This was on the grounds of ancient practice with regard to Castile.
consequences, affecting as it did the possible claim of the sender to sovereignty. So, for example, until the formal recognition of the United Provinces by the Peace of Westphalia, the Spanish ambassadors regularly protested against the presence of her ambassadors at the state ceremonial of the courts to which they were accredited.

Within the rigidly prescribed ceremonial form at James's court the representatives of different nations quarrelled, and at times fought, over minute observations of protocol which the seventeenth century diplomatic world considered indicators of international prestige. Maintenance of national prestige was a duty that needed prudence on the part of the ambassador for the prerogatives of his master were to be preserved at all costs. The question of precedence was an important one for seventeenth century ambassadors who were extremely protective of their own position and also of the perceived view of their own country and there are many examples of contention that arose in this connection. For example, Finett reported that at a reading that took place in the Middle Temple in January, 1616, the ambassador of the States General, de Caron, had been placed below that of the Duke of Savoy. The Dutchman it would appear had found no problem in ceding precedence at the time but had since questioned the protocol and made it clear that this would not be tolerated again. 65

Even from early in the reign outbursts over precedence between the ambassadors took place and the majority of the quarrels that took place where promoted by the Spanish. 66 The Masque of Blackness, performed during the Christmas holidays of 1604/5, at which both the Spanish and Venetian ambassadors were seated by the King caused probably one of the first upsets between ambassadors. Beaumont, the French envoy, who was no so seated, found much to complain of in this, even though they were all invited as private persons,

65 Finett, Observations, p. 31.
66 Dudley Carleton in a letter to John Chamberlain dated 15th January, 1604 noted that there were many disputes between ambassadors over precedence. SPDomestic, vol. vi, no 21.
the Spanish ambassador even appearing ‘incognito’. Among his other complaints
was the fact that he believed ‘the whole court [to be] Spanish’. 67 We have already
seen that, due to their claims on Holland and their inability to accept the United
Provinces as a sovereign state, their ambassadors were unable to accept the
promotion of Sir Noel de Caron to the status of ambassador in ordinary and refused
to acknowledge him. On Twelfth Night 1615 Gondomar caused a sensation at court
by refusing to attend a state masque in the company of Caron although his
predecessors, it must be said, had shown no scruples about attending affairs at
which the representative of the United Provinces was present. 68 However, it was
not just the United Provinces with whom Spain had problems. Another incident had
taken place in late 1608 when the Spanish ambassador refused to address the
Venetian envoy in the correct manner since, he argued, he represented only a state
and not a monarch. It would seem that the contention arose when the Venetian
ambassador greeted the Spaniard with the accepted title of Excellencia, but he, in
his turn saluted the Venetian ambassador as Illustrissimo Signoria, of which the
Venetian complained bitterly to the Papal Nuncio. 69 Learning of this the Spanish
ambassador sent a secretary to the Venetian who tell him that ‘his State is not to be
compared with that which belongeth to so mighty a King as the King of Spain.’ The
Venetian responded by insisting that Venice ‘hath ever been respected as a
kingdom, and the ambassador thereof so accepted of and entertained’, and added
that the State of Venice had also a kingdom under them; for they were ‘Kings of
Candia’. The Spanish ambassador seemed unimpressed by this and retorted that in
his opinion the State of Venice was little more than ‘a State and Head of a company

69 However, it was not just the Spanish who felt themselves unable to accept the Venetians as
their equals. Finet, Observations, p. 96, provides a long account of a difference between
the ambassador of the Emperor and that of Venice on whether the title of Excellency should
or should not be given to the latter.
of factious, mutinous and rebellious peoples.' 70 So fierce was the Republic's insistence on her status that James and Salisbury had to listen to many heated demonstrations that Venice ranked amongst the crowned heads. 71 Relations between the two ambassadors were to remain strained for many months and for some considerable time Gondomar refused to return Foscarini's visits. Eventually Gondomar broke the ice by offering to call and impart some important information to Foscarini. However, relations between the two embassies were never to be entirely cordial.

One of the best descriptions to be found of the mutual dislike and distrust between the various embassy staff members at Court can be found in a report by the chaplain at the Venetian embassy, Orazio Busino. His report demonstrates the contemporary view of the dominance of the Spanish ambassadors. In 1618 he wrote:

In the king's court...after Christmas day there begins a series of sumptuous banquets, well-acted comedies, and most graceful masques of knights and ladies.... On the 16th of the current month of January, his Excellency was invited to see a representation and masque, which had been prepared with extraordinary pains, the chief performer being the king's own son and heir, the prince of Wales.... At the fourth hour of the night we went privately to the Court, through the park. On reaching the royal apartments his Excellency was entertained awhile by one of the leading cavaliers until all was ready, whilst we, his attendants. All perfumed and escorted by the master of the ceremonies, entered the usual box of the Venetian embassy, where, unluckily we were so crowded and ill at ease that had it not been for our curiosity we must certainly have given in or expired. We moreover had the additional infliction of a Spaniard who came into our box by favour of the master of the ceremonies, asking but for two fingers breadth of room, although we ourselves had not space to run about in, and I swear to God that he placed himself more comfortably than any of us. I have no patience with these dons; it was observed that they were scattered about in all the principal places. The Ambassador was near the king.... About the 6th hour of the night the king appeared with his court, having passed through the apartments where the Ambassadors were in waiting, whence he graciously conducted them, that is to say, the Spaniard and the Venetian, it not being the Frenchman's turn, he and the Spaniard only attending the court ceremonies alternately by reason of their disputes about precedence. 72

The occasion of the wedding celebrations for Princess Elizabeth to Frederick, Count Palatine in 1613 was to prove another prime example of the constant

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70 HMC, Report on the Manuscripts of Lord De L'isle and Dudley, preserved at Penshurst Place, vol. 4, p. 91.
71 See, for example, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, pp. 227, 233 - 234, 239 - 241, 255 - 256.
72 Busino had seen Jonson's Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue, performed at the Banqueting House. CSP Venetian, 1617 - 1619, pp. 111 - 114.
outbreaks of sniping which were to take place throughout James's reign. An anonymous letter writer notes that,

The Ambassadors make frequent visits at this time, both to the Queen and prince, hoping to be invited to the Feast. On Sunday last the Archduke's Ambassador Lady danced before the Queen at Somerset House, and the following day the Ambassador himself had audience of her at Whitehall; which officiousness proceedeth from his concurrency with the Venetian, fearing that Foscarini may be invited, and he left out.

But as yet it is resolved to invite none, though if the Spanish Ambassador continue sick, as he is at present, perhaps another resolution may be taken, and the French may be there, when there will be no strife of place. 73

When the guest list was finally announced we find according to Chamberlain that

The Ambassadors that were at this wedding and shews were the French, Venetian, Count Henry and Carew for the States. The Spaniard was or would be sick, and the archduke's Ambassador being invited for the second day, made a sullen excuse; and those that were present were not altogether so well pleased but...every one had some punctilio of disgust. 74

At this same celebration we can gauge the lengths to which this punctilio went if we note the upset caused by the simple stool. Chairs were uncommon at this time and, even though Prince Charles condescended to sit on a stool at the wedding feast, the French and Venetian ambassadors, arguing that they were representatives of sovereign states refused to do so; the bride and groom had chairs so their status demanded they too should have chairs. On the evening of the wedding we are told 'the French, Venetian, and States...dined...with the bride. The Spanish Ambassador was sick, and the archduke's was invited for the next day, but would not come.'

In the latter weeks of 1613 the atmosphere between the warring envoys was no better. In an attempt to clear the air the French and Venetian ambassadors were invited to the second Twelfth Night masque [Sir Francis Bacon's], with the excuse that they 'could not be so well at the first...for avoiding of competition of place and precedence with the Spanish ambassador, who had never seen any of our shows

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74 Chamberlain to Mrs Carleton, 18th February, 1613, Chamberlain is more forthcoming in his report, dated 25th February, 1613, to Carleton, N. E. McClure (ed.) The Letters of John Chamberlain (Philadelphia, 1939) vol. 1, pp. 423, 431. There was a degree of anti-Spanish pageantry during Elizabeth's wedding festivities; a quadrille of dancers with the faces of apes which do not appear to have been mentioned in the official descriptions of the affair. See F. von Raumer, History of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Illustrated by Official Documents. II (1835), p. 228.
before; but the best masque was reserved for them. The French seemed to take it well enough,' we are told, 'but the Venetian [took it ill that] he should be excluded, and the archduke's admitted, who he presumed would not once make offer to take place where he was.'

The rivalry between the French and Spanish envoys found continual expression in quarrels over precedence at court which the Spaniards usually won. The French envoy, Boderie, concerning his exchanges with de Zúñiga, was given some consolation by the Secretary Puisieux who noted, '...it is no miracle that Spanish have the advantage, it is the fruit of their gifts and presents...'. Such bickering over protocol may appear ridiculous to modern perceptions but to the seventeenth century diplomat it was a serious business and the struggle for primacy at court was to cause many such storms. The battle that raged at James's court between the French and Spanish ambassadors caused such tension that the King decided not to invite either envoy to join the celebrations for the creation of Prince Henry as Prince of Wales in 1610. Fortunately for all concerned the Frenchman was unable to attend anyway, being in deep mourning for the recently assassinated Henri IV, so that the Spanish ambassador was included with 'all the rest of the Ambassadors', thus avoiding yet another unpleasant scene between the two ambassadors. However, this did not resolve the constant rivalry for precedence between the two and on Twelfth Night, 1619, it all came to a head. Boderie's compatriot, Desmaretz was so disgusted when a dispute with Gondomar over precedence was settled in Spain's favour that he left the court forthwith. Gondomar had let it be known that he could attend the festivities only if he was given precedence over the French ambassador. Owing to the friendship between

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75 The first masque was on the occasion of the marriage of Lord Norris to the Lord Chamberlain's daughter. Chamberlain to Carleton, 5th January, 1614, N. E. McClure (ed.) The Letters of John Chamberlain, vol. 1, p. 499.
76 Ambassades de M. Antoine le Fevre de la Boderie, vol. 3, p. 117.
77 Dudley Carleton to Sir Thomas Edmondes, 17th June, 1610, cited in Birch, Court and Times, vol. 1, p. 114.
78 Nichols, Progresses, iii, p. 476.
the two men, or perhaps in a vain attempt to alleviate the problem in some way, James gave the Spanish ambassador assurance that he would be given priority. Desmaretz demanded the decision be reversed and when James refused he wrote to Paris that the honour of France was at stake and demanded that he should be recalled. The French government recalled him and Gondomar adroitly and effectively disrupted relations between England and France, at a time when the two, acting together, could have caused a potential threat to Spain. Only such adept ambassadors as Gondomar knew how to play this game so well as to achieve their political ends.

Try what he may James seemed unable to have got it quite right - whoever he invited to entertainments and wherever he placed them one ambassador or another found some personal slight or injury to his prince. At a jousting performed by Prince Charles and the Marquesses of Hamilton and Buckingham in March, 1620 the King ventured, not without hesitation we are told, to invite all the ‘Foreign Ambassadors together; and great disputes respecting precedency were the natural consequence.’ The King should have foreseen the problems a move of this kind would create. Despite the fact that the French and Spanish ambassadors were to be placed equidistant from the King at opposite sides of the Tiltyard, Tillieres at first refused to attend on the grounds of his ‘right of priority’ but eventually forbore to do so. The Bohemian, Venetian, Savoyard and States ambassadors appeared happy with their places at the lower end of the Tiltyard although upon consideration the Savoyard and States ambassadors chose not to attend. In these constant manoeuvrings, so long as neither yielded and with each man claiming precedence over the other, it often became impossible to communicate.

79 He had prepared to leave immediately but was taken ill so that he never actually left until April, 1618. However, some reports say his departure was delayed because of his wife’s illness. See for example, Nichols, Progresses, iii, p. 476; Finett, Observations, p. 48.
The only solution was that employed by the Spanish ambassador; one of the parties negotiating would retire to bed making it possible for the other to call on the ‘invalid’ without any surrender of his dignity. Thus the game continued throughout James’s reign and to the very end, when the Venetian envoy refused to attend the King’s funeral, despite being provided with a suit of mourning clothes, because the Master of Ceremonies had forgotten to send him a formal invitation.

Other considerations, such as the courtesies of the hand and door, that is, the extending of the right hand to a visitor in one’s own home and accompanying him to the door, were a point of contention during this period and made this simple formula more difficult. Should an ambassador of a higher rank offer his hand to an ambassador of lower rank or to an Agent or envoy? Such questions caused grave soul-searching on the part of representatives at James’s court and even with the aid of the type of literature already discussed battles over precedence continued throughout the period.

As we have seen previously ambassadors were extremely protective of their own position and also of the perceived view of their own country. Privileges due to diplomatic envoys, apart from traditional ceremonial honours, arose because these men represented nation states and, further, because they could not exercise their proper functions unless they enjoyed such privileges. Were they liable to legal and political interference like ordinary citizens and therefore, were more or less dependent on the goodwill of the court to which they were accredited, they might have been unduly influenced by personal considerations to a degree which could have seriously hampered their ability to exercise their function usefully. For example, if full and free access were liable, as was often the case, to interference, the objects of their mission could not be fulfilled, since it would have been impossible to send independent and secret reports to, or receive instructions from, their master at home. For these reasons the privileges which began to be accepted at this time seem inseparable attributes of the diplomatic function.
It was to become the general view in the seventeenth century that the ambassador's immunities began as soon as he stepped foot on English soil and stopped on his departure. However, this posed a problem: what if the proposed ambassador was already living in the country? The common-sense view maintained that the immunity commenced only with his acceptance as ambassador and, if he remained in the country after the expiry of his mission, his immunities ended with the completion of that mission.

The rights of ambassadors to conduct, within the walls of their residence, religious services according to their own beliefs was a highly valued privilege which was generally admitted, subject, in general, to the limitation of their domestic staff only attending. This was a privilege that caused much quibbling over the years, especially in the English embassies in Spain and vice versa. When a Protestant state like England viewed its Catholic subjects as potential traitors one can only guess at the bitter resentment with which the fanatical mob viewed the freedom of religious observation allowed to foreign envoys from Catholic realms.

Enjoyment of freedom from religious constraint was almost universal in the period and went practically unchallenged by the authorities so long as certain limitations were adhered to. Yet, while religious feelings were very strong, religious freedom had no foundation or support in law, the conception that it was personal to the individual was ignored and again and again, across Europe, subjects were required to espouse, at least outwardly, the faith of the ruler, while the exercise of faith was looked on almost as an attribute of sovereignty. Ambassadors, however, could not be refused complete freedom of religious observance for to do so would be to offer a desperate insult to the sovereign whom they represented, so that this privilege established itself as a *sine qua non* of diplomatic intercourse in the midst of the religious storms which swept Europe during the period.

The increasing view that ambassador's residences were inviolate only strengthened the freedom of worship allowed to foreign envoys so that the law of
the land found it impossible to dictate the religious observance of ambassadors and
their suites. De Wicquefort upholds this privilege but while other writers believe it
should be extended to any whom cared to visit the embassy, he limits it to
ambassadors and their entourage. Admission to the embassy chapel should, he
believes, never be allowed to the subjects of the sovereign to whose country he is
accredited, although he admits that there may be problems in excluding
ambassadors' own compatriots resident in that state. 81 The conditions laid down by
de Wicquefort are essentially those in place today, although many still maintain
that ambassadors should not advertise the presence of a chapel in their embassy and
that it should remain a private chapel solely for the use of the ambassador, his suite
and his fellow countrymen. 82

Indirectly it was possible to make foreign forms of worship difficult to
practice in the embassies. In England there were those who tried to deprive native
born secretaries and chaplains serving in Catholic embassies of their immunities on
the grounds that they could not rescind their national responsibilities by entering
the service of a foreign prince. This particular attack on ambassador's privileges
was, however, short-lived, reaching its peak in James's reign but dying out after the
Restoration when religious fanaticism was on the wane. One case in particular
demonstrates how customs tried to play a part in making the practice of alien
religions difficult and shows, amongst other things, that there was a growing
assumption that ambassador's goods were exempt from the customs. In England, as
in Spain, customs examination was concerned not merely with the levying of duties
but also with the exclusion of religious books that might be seen as undermining
the national religion. In 1612 the Spanish ambassador complained bitterly to
Northampton that crates of missals destined for his chaplain had been seized by
customs officials and opened. Howard, in an attempt to pacify the ambassador said

82 E. Salow, *Diplomatic Practice*, vol. 1, pp. 326 - 328.
that he believed the officers had opened the crate believing it to belong to an
'ordinary person' and that an investigation would be made. Foscarini reported that,
when approached about the matter, the King said that customs officers should
decide these matters for themselves and referred the case to the Privy Council
where it was quietly forgotten. 83

The embassy chapel question was a vexed and re-occurring one with which
the English government, under both the Tudors and the Stuarts, had to deal.
Following the deaths of Philip II and Elizabeth I, when the Catholic and Protestant
countries of Europe found it in their interest to once again resume diplomatic
relations by the exchange of resident envoys, a precondition for renewed relations
was the recognition by all sides of an envoy's right to practise his religion. The
problem was a perennial one that arose whenever the Roman Catholics attempted
to avoid the prohibitions of the penal laws by attending the religious services of the
various Catholic embassies in London. In this course of action they were
encouraged by the ambassadors, who maintained English chaplains on their
embassy staff to preach in English. When Catholics diplomats attempted to
circumnavigate the penal laws by wrapping worship at their chapels by native
Englishmen in a cloak of diplomacy the government was faced with the problem of
maintaining public policy without upsetting the delicate balance of relations with
foreign princes. During the greater part of James's reign there were always several
Catholic ambassadors at court, so that the problem arose when these men, seeing a
large proportion of the population as oppressed co-religionists, opened the doors of
their private chapels to his subjects. By far the worst offenders in this connection
were the Spanish, who felt aggrieved when James took measures to prevent his
subjects attending embassy Masses. The Spanish embassy caused considerable
concern to the authorities since they were practically unable to stop scores of

83 PRO SP Dom. 29/79 and 82, September, 1612. Foscarini to the Doge, 15th October, 1612,
CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, p. 433.
Londoners attending Mass and other devotions. It became a distinct issue from the traditional right of a Catholic diplomat to provide Mass for his household and other compatriots and from the custom of Sephadic Jews to gather at the embassy for Sabbath worship when they desired. While the practice of Londoners to attend Mass secretly had developed early in the reign of Elizabeth by the end of James's reign sizeable numbers began to frequent the Catholic embassies in London.

Attempts were made, albeit unsuccessfully, to stem this growing problem. Between 1606 and 1611, when James asked the foreign diplomats not to allow English Catholics to attend their chapels or English priests to celebrate Mass there, only the Venetians complied. In August, 1606 a number of persons were arrested as they left the Spanish embassy after attending Mass there. This was felt all the more when no action was taken against those who had attended services in the French and Venetian embassies nearby, although the authorities made it clear that others should take warning from what had happened at the Spanish embassy.

During Pedro de Zúñiga's first embassy a scandal had been created by, not only Mass being celebrated at the embassy chapel, but a large procession forming in the embassy garden. Despite several more warnings, all of which appear to have been completely ignored, in July 1610, as the Venetian ambassador reported to home that, 'the King had warned all Ambassadors not to admit any of his subjects to the Mass, nor to allow English priests to celebrate in their chapels.' He concluded that 'such activity is unusual and, as a rule, some of the Ambassadors are allowed to employ English priests...'. Reaction to these repeated warnings were predictable; several ambassadors replied that the dignity of their country would not allow the

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84 The term Sephadic is used loosely to refer to the Jews of Spain, the Mediterranean and the middle east. Considered at law to be Spanish Catholics, see D. S. Katz, Philo-Semitism and the Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603 - 1655 (1982) p. 2n; p. 3.
86 Duodo to the Doge, 30th August, 1606, CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, p. 395.
87 For example, that of 26th May, 1610, which stated that '...all repair of English subjectes to the houses of forron ambassadors to heere Mass be restrained'.
88 Correr to the Doge, 7th July, 1610, CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, p. 3 - 4.
embassy doors to be closed to those who wished entry, the Spanish ignored them and the Venetian ambassador said he would do his best to prevent English Catholics from attending his chapel. However, as the warning seemed to have little effect, the Spanish embassy was watched to see who was still attending Mass there. Predictably again, the Spanish ambassador protested at this and was asked to appear before the Privy Council in an attempt to find a solution that did not interfere with the diplomatic privileges he enjoyed. The ambassador blustered, saying he did not know who attended his chapel and the Privy Council threatened to send the authorities, if necessary, to arrest any Englishmen found there. So indignant did the ambassador become when informed of this proposed action that the Council realised it had gone too far and that such an action could cause a serious breach between the two nations. Nonetheless a watch was still kept on the embassy and on Christmas Eve 1611 Sir George Freer was arrested as he left the embassy after Mass. Again the ambassadors were summoned to appear before the Council to discuss the matter and find a solution acceptable to all parties, but without any success. The Venetian ambassador continued to insist he did not admit Englishmen to his chapel and the Archduke’s representative wrote home for advice. Alonso de Velasco noted that the Archdukes ambassador, when summoned before the Council to answer a complaint against those who resorted to his chapel to hear Mass, responded that ‘his master would sooner lose a million than one soul of his subjects’. 89 Meanwhile the Spanish ambassador refused point blank to keep his chapel doors locked and the French ambassador pleaded that as the English ambassador in Paris was allowed to admit all who wished to attend to his services he should be afforded the same courtesy in London. To this final case the King replied that the cases were not the same, for in France there was universal freedom of conscience which did not happen in England. However, the problem lay not with the French, Venetian or Archduke’s envoys but with the Spanish, who even rang a bell to call the faithful to

89 Alonso de Velasco to Philip III, 14th April, 1612, Simancas, E2589/24.
Still nothing much was accomplished; in February Sir Thomas Lake wrote
that the King was still determined to keep a watch on the Spanish embassy and
arresting those Englishmen found attending services there. Again in 1612 he was
once more writing in the same vein, this time after Blackman, the Jesuit
Confessor of the English College in Rome was arrested at the Spanish embassy in the
Barbican. Two others, Blount and Pelham, who seem to have escaped, were still
wanted. The embassy was again placed under surveillance and in September two
more priests were arrested carrying notes and memoranda showing extensive
correspondence between the order and the embassy and that Philip was freely
giving money for their support. Despite the actions taken against the
ambassadors still, as late as 1621, the House of Commons insisted that one of the
major causes for the increase in Popery was the way in which Catholics were
allowed to frequently attend Mass in the embassy chapels. Writing in 1621 John
Chamberlain commented that Gondomar had 'almost as many come to his mass,' as
had attended 'the sermon at St. Andrewes over against him.' While Prynne, in his
Historiomatrix, notes that the last passion play to be performed in England, Christ's
Passion, at which 'there were thousands present', took place under Gondomar's
roof. Even the Prince of Wales's retinue was not immune from prosecution. In
January, 1623 two of the prince's musicians, Angelo and Drew, were dismissed.

90 Venetian Ambassador to the Doge, 7th July, 1610, 21st April, 1611, 5th and 20th Jan, 10th
February, 9th March, 1612, CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, pp. 4, 136 - 138, 267, 277, 286 -
287, 303 - 304. See also R. Stanfield, 'Proceedings against Catholics for attending Mass at
the Spanish Embassy on Palm Sunday, 1614', CKS no. 9, pp. 122 - 126; A. J. Loomie, 'The
Spanish Ambassador and the Pursuivants', Catholic History Review, no 49 (1963), pp. 203
- 206.
91 Dr. Bellenger has suggested to me that this is John Blackfan alias Blackman (1560 - 1641).
92 Possibly Richard Blount SJ, born 1563, see Bellenger, Priests, p. 40.
93 Possibly Alexander Fairclough SJ, born 1575, see Bellenger, Priests, p. 58.
94 Foscarini to the Doge, 19th August, 1612, CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, p. 412 - 413.
95 PROSP 61/103, 24th February, 1611; SP 68/60, 9th February, 1612; SP 124/4, 3rd
December, 1621; CSP Venetian, 1621 - 1623, p. 187, Petition of Commons to the King,
3rd December, 1621.
97 E. Beresford Chancellor, Private Palaces of London (1908) p. 22.
from his service for assisting at Mass. However, they, like so many before them, were restored at the intercession of the Spanish ambassador, although this time it was Coloma. 98

In April 1624 the Commons repeated their complaints and James in his reply promised to consult with the Privy Council as to how this might best be remedied. As James noted there were great difficulties in such dealings with the ambassadors, ‘It is true,’ he wrote, ‘that the houses of Ambassadors are privileged places and though they can not take them [the English Catholics] out from their houses, yet the Lord Mayor and Mr. Recorder of London may take them as they come from thence, and make some of them examples.’ In the early part of May both Francis Nethersole and Dudley Carleton reported that the Mayor and Recorder had received their instructions. Sadly for James this action seemed as doomed as any other taken to stop the ambassadors opening the doors of their chapels to the English Catholics and it was to remain a problem until long after the King’s death.

The crux of the embassy chapel problem was whether the extraterritorial nature of the ambassador’s chapel safeguarded a person from prosecution under the penal laws, which insisted on attendance at Anglican services, penalised non-attendance and which forbade the saying and hearing of Mass. The regulation of religion in seventeenth century was the sovereign right of the monarch and, as attending Mass at the embassies was considered a violation of the law and a failure to obey a specific command of the King, the English government had two legal alternatives; domestic law and international law, under which it could prosecute its Catholic subjects. Allowing the public use of embassy chapels was one of the most important steps taken towards the practice of modern ambassadorial immunity, since nothing an ambassador could at that time have demanded could have been more injurious to a ruler’s sovereign jurisdiction. And, once accepted, other

privileges followed without much difficulty. In the course of the seventeenth century the remaining problems of ambassadorial immunity, mainly in the field of civil law, such as freedom from prosecution for debt and immunity from excise and other duties, were well on the way to being settled on a pragmatic basis. The result varied slightly from court to court, depending on reciprocity, the power wielded by the envoy's master, and the envoy's own ingenuity and strength of character.

The reappearance of embassy chapels on a permanent basis resurrected other more thorny problems, however, particularly that of the immunity to be enjoyed by the ambassador's chaplain and hence the rest of his staff, including native Englishmen. Unlike the ambassador's personal immunity this affected large sections of the native population as victims, or creditors of the ambassador's staff and was much resented by them. To this day the full extent of this immunity has not been agreed upon.

Another associated problem was the immunity of ambassador's residences, which was disregarded whenever guards acting on behalf of the court to which the ambassador was accredited invaded the chapel to seize natives who were worshipping there. Such invasions frequently occurred in England before the middle of the seventeenth century, and caused consternation to both ambassadors and their masters. Failure to take this action, however, infuriated the native law-abiding population. Accordingly ambassadors and host governments were forced to negotiate over the issue and by the end of the century broad agreement had been reached throughout Europe. Nevertheless the precise extent and nature of the immunity of diplomatic buildings remains in dispute to this day.

Throughout the period the doctrine of immunity for ambassadors, their residences and entourage was clearly acceptable by all nations, including England. But no jurists held that the 'right of chapel' existed beyond the service of the diplomatic suite. Any abuse of this ideal was tolerated simply because of the sympathies and philosophies of individual states or from the necessity of
maintaining good relations with other nations. The general practice in England, therefore, became one of non-interference except when public pressure made it necessary and by seizing Catholics when they left the embassy environs.

The same general policy was directed towards English Catholic priests employed as chaplains at the embassies. So long as they remained on embassy property they were protected by the extraterritorial nature of the embassy. But if they attempted to leave the ambassador’s residence they became liable to arrest and expulsion from England. This in its turn presented government with another problem. Ambassadors could, on the grounds of diplomatic immunity, claim immunity for their chaplains based on their rights as a member of a diplomatic suite, and although James’s government explicitly denied this right, it avoided any diplomatic incidents by means of compromises in individual cases.

The personal exemption of ambassadors from the criminal law of the state to which they were accredited was fast becoming an accepted dogma by the beginning of the seventeenth century. 99 However, Chief Justice Coke was firmly of the opinion that ambassadors were not entirely free from criminal law asserting that any foreign minister who committed a crime in England which might be termed as ‘treason, felony [or] adultery’, would thereby lose his privilege and render himself liable to punishment like any private alien. In the case of Rex v. Owen in 1615, the King’s attorney reinforced this view when he laid it down that any ambassador who plotted the death of the King in whose country he was serving, could and should, be condemned and executed for treason, although it was

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99 It was not to be until 1708/9 that an act providing for the immunity of ambassadors from arrest, imprisonment and confiscation of goods for criminal and civil offences was passed. 7 Anne Cap. 12, 1708 - 09 made this allowance, not only, for all ‘Ambassadors and other Publick Ministers of Foreign princes and States’ who had been ‘authorised and received as such by Her Majesty’ but also for their domestic servants, excepting bankrupt merchants and traders who had put themselves under the ambassador’s protection against their creditors. For a considerable time, Britain, the United Provinces (1679) and Denmark (1708) were the only nations with such laws relating to diplomatic immunity, this particular law, which grants far wider diplomatic immunities than many governments would find acceptable even now, has remained the basis for diplomatic privilege in Britain to this day.
otherwise in the cases of other crimes, when the ambassador should be sent home for trial. However, back in 1584 both Gentili and Hotman, when consulted by Elizabeth's council as to the propriety of bringing the Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, to justice when he was discovered in a conspiracy for the overthrow of the Queen, advised that an ambassador could not be punished by death under English law, but must be referred to his own government for sentence. Consequently Mendoza was expelled from the country. Practice from that time set in the direction of the fullest personal exemption of ambassadors from the jurisdiction of the country to which they were accredited, so that ambassadors usually exacted the utmost respect for the immunity of themselves and their suite.

Grotius tackled this problem in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* where he maintained that the security of diplomatic representatives as a class is more beneficial than their punishment as individuals for any crimes they commit, for, he insists, ambassadors were the chief means by which governments remain in contact and therefore at peace with one another, and so merit their traditionally privileged position. At the same time he argued that, since they represented their masters, punishing them could cause bloodshed and even provoke a needless war. Moreover, 'the safety of embassadors is in a slippery place if they ought to render a reason of their actions to any other but him by whom they are sent'. They needed protection from spurious charges that sought to prevent them from doing their duty and therefore rulers were advised to ignore their less important offences. But 'if the crime be cruel and publicly mischievous, the Embassador must be sent to his Master with a request that he would punish him or give him up' for serious crimes must be punished. Thus, concludes Grotius, during their missions they should be considered as 'extra territorium' or outside the country in which they are residing. There are

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101 Gentili incorporated his ideas concerning this into his book, *De legationibus libri tres*.
only three conditions attaching to this theory: the ambassador must be accepted as such by the ruler to whom he is accredited, he may be detained for questioning if a national catastrophe can be avoided in no other way, although he should be released unharmed and he may be killed in self-defence. Grotius also emphasises that the ambassador's suite and his residence are only immune in so far as this enables the ambassador to carry out his duties freely. Thus Grotius finally reconciled national sovereignty and diplomatic immunity.

During the furore over the Spanish marriage negotiations Gondomar, never popular with the London's populace anyway, complained constantly that his person was in danger, demanding that his diplomatic status entitled him to protection. In 1621 the famous 'devil in a dungcart' incident took place in which the ambassador was accosted by a mob of apprentices whilst passing through Fenchurch Street with his entourage. One apprentice is alleged to have asked of another who was passing in a sedan chair, his uncomplimentary reply was 'the devil in a dung-cart!' A member of the ambassador's party objected to this and was knocked down for his pains. The apprentices were arrested and sentenced to be whipped through the city streets but the punitive procession was stormed by a rioting mob, and the victims rescued by their supporters. The King was not impressed by this treatment of the ambassador's staff and expressed his displeasure by threatening to put a garrison into the City and to take away its charter. The punishment was subsequently carried out and although the City became quiet on the surface, but underneath its hatred of Spain continued to smoulder. In response to the affair an open letter to the apprentices, entitled *Londons looking-glasse*, criticised disrespect for diplomatic immunity,

*Seeing it is against the generall law of all Nations, and that the very Turkes, and the most Pagan people of the world do well understand, that all Ambassadours ought to enjoy a privileged freedome, & in no wise to be*

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104 6th April, Meddus to Mead, 7th April, Mead to Stuteville, *Harleian MSS*, 389, fols. 48, 50
This letter in no way condoned the offence but one can see that it was not the attack on the individual which concerned the writer but the attack on the position and status of the ambassador which required to be protected.

Nevertheless, despite claims to immunity, occasionally, as in the case of the Venetian ambassador, Marc-Antonio Correr, in 1609, a resident waived the privileges of immunity for his staff and co-operated with the English authorities, albeit grudgingly. The case in question, the so-called 'Pruritanus affair', was that of the ambassador's chaplain who was discovered to be distributing dangerous, that is Catholic, religious books. The main source of the story of Pruritanus lays in a collection of reports to the Doge and Senate by the Venetian ambassador. In November 1608 William Udall, the informer, provided information to Sir Julius Caesar that books were on their way into England from the continent by the hand of one Henry Parish. Parish was ostensibly a fisherman from Barking but also, as a sideline, made a healthy income from shipping in Papists and their books. On this occasion Parish was suspected of bringing in a book entitled Pruritanus which the English authorities viewed with disapproval since it contained disparaging personal attacks on James and his predecessors and blasphemously applied passages of Holy Writ to Henry VIII, Elizabeth and James. The tract, a damning indictment against the Puritans, castigated James as an ineffectual monarch, with no less than nine of its paragraphs denouncing the policy and person of the King.

105 Londons looking-glasse, sig. A3 (St Omers College Press, 1621). I am grateful to Dr P. Arblaster for this text. The text is discussed briefly in A. Allison, 'A group of political tracts, 1621-1623, by Richard Verstegan', Recusant History, vol. 18, no. 2 (1986).
107 William Udall, whose main pre-occupation was the hunt for imported Catholic books and the search for Catholic printing presses in England. Parish transported Guy Fawkes and an unknown companion to Gravelines and back before the Gunpowder Plot came to light. See PRO SP 216/130. Udall is included in John Gee's list of Popish printers, J. Gee, Foot out of the Snare (1624).
In early June 1609 the ambassador reported to the Doge that a copy of *Pruritanus* had fallen into the hands of the Archbishop of Canterbury and that the King was much put out by it. 108 On 18th June Udall wrote to Caesar that *Pruritanus* 'was lately brought out of France and augmented heare in England by...William Wright'. 109 In July the ambassador noted that the book was circulating widely, despite the risks incurred by those who sold it and that the addition to it of an appendix, railing against the King's book, showed that it had been printed in England and not abroad. 110 It was alleged by Udall that the book was, in fact, printed by one William Wrench of Staffordshire in association with a certain Warren and that 'these bokes are commen in Lancashire and Staffordshire and the countreys adjoyning them'. 111 Later that month Correr was able to report that he had seen the book and that it was indeed scandalous. During that same month a man and his wife, whom Udall named as John and Joan Daubrigscourt, well known distributors of Catholic books, and their maidservant were arrested for selling the book. Four days previous to this Sir William Waad had written to Salisbury enclosing a signed confession from Mrs Daubrigscourt, and recommending that no charge be brought against her maidservant. 112 He went on that he had sent orders to Barking for the arrest of Henry Parish and his son. In an undated note from around the same time Sir William noted that the books (700 in all) had been sent from the continent by Fr. John Wilson of St. Omer, to Mrs Daubrigscourt and that they had been stored in the porter's lodge at the Venetian embassy. 113

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108 Correr to the Doge, 18th June, 1609, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, pp. 287 - 288.
110 Correr to the Doge, 15th July, 1609, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, pp. 299 - 300.
111 Ironically, Wrench was employed in 1610 as bookbinder to the ultra-Protestant Henry, Prince of Wales, after he purchased his tutor's (Lord Lumley) private collection in 1609. The Daubrigscourts were also known as Dabscot and occasionally D'Abridgecourt. Correr to the Doge, 29th July, 1609, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, pp. 306 - 308. See also BL Lansdowne MSS, 153 fol. 22, Udall to Sir Julius Caesar, 24th July, 1609.
112 The Daubrigscourts were also known as Dabscot and occasionally D'Abridgecourt. Correr to the Doge, 29th July, 1609, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, pp. 306 - 308. See also BL Lansdowne MSS, 153 fol. 22, Udall to Sir Julius Caesar, 24th July, 1609.
113 John Wilson directed the printing presses of the English College at St. Omer although he was not a Jesuit. See Foley: Records, vols. 5, 6, 7; Bellenger, Priests, p. 123; Salisbury MSS, vol. 195, no. 108; PRO SP 77/9/290.
Correr was greatly agitated by these events and wrote to the Doge and Senate that a priest whom he had employed at the embassy had caused considerable trouble. He had heard a few days earlier that a copy of *Pruritanus* had been found on one of the embassy servants and on investigation had only been able to discover four copies in the embassy. When informed by the authorities that several hundred were housed in the porter's lodge he interrogated the priest who admitted that they had been there but had been removed when the Daubrigscourts had been arrested. Correr confiscated the remaining books and handed them over to Salisbury and the Privy Council, only to find later several more consignments of Catholic books in his cellar that he also handed over to the authorities. The ambassador consequently arrested both the priest and porter and handed them over to Caesar for examination, although he stipulated that only questions pertaining to the subject could be asked. He also gained a promise that the priest's life would be spared. These events must have taken place prior to 23rd July, for on that date the Earl of Worcester wrote to Salisbury saying how displeased the King was about the whole affair.  

On 1st August Parish was examined by Sir William Waad about his part in the affair, and confessed to bringing over bales of books from St. Omer and landing them near Lord Monteagle's house in Barking. Parish alleged that six bales had been imported but Mrs Daubrigscourt would only admit to receiving four. Two days later Correr reported that the priest, whom he named as Fleming, and still had locked up in the embassy, had concealed more books in the embassy but would not admit that he knew who the author was. Fortunately, Salisbury had been impressed by the ambassador's co-operativeness and the business went no further.

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114 *Salisbury MSS*, vol. 21, p. 92.
115 William Parker, 4th Baron Monteagle had been the first statesman to be advised of the impending Gunpowder Plot. Although he was never involved in the Plot he had strong Catholic leanings. His London home was frequently under suspicion and books ferried across the Channel often found their way to his house. See also *PRO SP* 14/47/63.
116 Dr. Bellenger has suggested to me that Fleming could possibly be Richard Griffiths SJ.
after the books were publicly burned. On 13th August, Henry Wotton appeared before the Doge and Senate to outline the history of the affair and described the book as nothing more than scandal and lies. By the end of August the Senate expressed their regret that the book had been distributed from the ambassador’s residence and banned its circulation in any of their territories. Because the book was not thought to have come out of Flanders the English authorities decided not to proceed against the priest Fleming, but merely to expel him from England. Relieved of any further embarrassment Correr dismissed the porter from his position at the embassy and forgot the whole affair. Sadly, for Udall it was not the last he was to hear of the affair; a year later the printer Wrench, whom Udall had implicated in the affair and caused to be imprisoned, managed to have him imprisoned on the grounds of possessing a copy of Pruritanus.

Following the acceptance of the immunity of ambassadors themselves it was a natural step to query whether the same privileges should be extended to their residence. This was to become a privilege which caused a certain amount of anxiety in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not from anything inherent in the privilege itself but more by the unreasonable extensions to which ambassadors sought to expand it beyond its acceptable limits. The increasing awareness that the residences of ambassadors were becoming inviolate was a worrying phenomenon; for example, members of the embassy staff were escaping the due process of the law and, as we have seen, Catholic embassy staff were in constant trouble for allowing English Catholics to attend Mass in their chapels. In general, however, the sanctity of the ambassadorial residence, otherwise than as a sanctuary for the criminal, was to become a generally recognised practice. However, that is not to say that ambassadors and their embassies were viewed with anything other than

118 Correr to the Doge, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, pp. 319 - 320, 321 - 324, 331.
119 Correr to the Doge, 24th September, 1609, CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, pp. 351 - 353.
120 BL Lansdowne MSS, 153, fols. 42, 43.
mistrust. For example, the fact that Gondomar was given lodgings at Ely House during his second embassy was an unpopular decision. 121 It was believed to be unsuitable that a Catholic should be lodged in a house once owned by a bishop of the Church of England. However, the Bishop of Ely's house at this time was no longer an ecclesiastic establishment having been given some time previously to Elizabeth's favourite Christopher Hatton. 122 When the Spanish closed down their embassy in England for the duration of the war Ely House was returned and the chapel once again used for Protestant services.

The question of whether ambassador's residences could be used as a place of asylum arose when, in 1609, James Ball, an Irishman, variously described as secretary and interpreter to Pedro de Zúñiga, was accused of being involved in a plan to gain the recovery of a fortress, at Sluys in the Low Countries, from England. However, the case was complicated by an attempt to poison a co-conspirator and a suggestion that James should be assassinated. 123 When the plot was discovered James demanded his arrest, but the ambassador insisted that everyone in the embassy be subject to the same immunities as he was himself and asked for time to write home for instructions. James was annoyed that so little importance was given to a plot against his royal person and informed de Zúñiga that no ambassador had the authority to shelter evil-doers, especially those who plotted against the King. The ambassador finally gave way and the King's guard quietly arrested Ball, even though he was still in the embassy, and conducted him to the Tower. For the sake of appearances the ambassador continued to dispute the King's right to insist that his officers of justice be allowed to enter an ambassador's residence. It must be remembered, however, that Ball was an Irishman and, as such, a subject of the King of England, so that any immunity from local jurisdiction for him was always open

121 See John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 30th October, 1619, PROSP Dom.110/149; John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 11th March, 1620, PROSP Dom.113/18.
122 Nichols, Progresses, vol. iii, p. 590n.
to question, far more so than in the case of other members of the ambassador's suite. The evidence against Ball seems to have broken down anyway and he was eventually released. 124 Dislike of the Spanish embassy increased in 1612 when it was discovered that a Spanish priest who had come to England to embrace the Protestant faith had been decoyed to the house and had subsequently disappeared. 'It is believed,' wrote Foscarini, 'that they have either killed him or sent him secretly to Spain or Flanders.' When this leaked out the King immediately ordered the Archbishop to demand his surrender but unfortunately Foscarini is unable to tell us the outcome. 125

The Bishop of Rodez, in a 1601 discussion of diplomatic immunity noted that,

an Ambassador hath alone right of Sovereign Justice in his Palace; but the people of his train are subject to the Justice of the estate in which they are, for these faults they commit out of his palace; and so if they be taken out of it, their Process may be made: and though it be known that this rigour is not generally observed, and that the respect born of the Ambassador's person extends to all those that follow him; yet however this is a courtesy, and not a right. But notwithstanding it is not permitted to go seek the criminal in the Palace of the Ambassador, which is a sacred place, and a certain Sanctuary for his people; yet ought it not however to be abused or made a retreat for wicked persons, nor give Sanctuary to the Subjects of a prince against the Laws and Justice of his Realm; for in such cases, on complaint to his Master, he is obliged to do reason. 126

In 1603 the privileges of an ambassadors suite in respect of local criminal law was tested when Combaut, a member of the entourage of the Marquis de Rosny, having killed an Englishman in a drunken brawl at a London brothel, was tried and condemned to death by a council of members of the embassy. The prisoner was handed over to the Lord Mayor to be dealt with according to English law. James, executing his prerogative of pardon, freed the man but the French ambassador complained that in doing so James had infringed the rights of the

125 Foscarini to the Doge, CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, pp. 412 - 412, 19th August, 1612.
French King. On the other hand, the proceedings that took place within the embassy were as little compatible with contemporary practice as were James's. 127

The privileges of ambassadors and their suites, in respect of local civil jurisdiction, were not, at this time, precisely defined, although it would seem that the generally accepted practice was that ambassadors were recognised as having the right to freedom of worship within their embassies, freedom from molestation for their chaplains and freedom to import books necessary for the observance of their faith. With regard to the limits of their personal exemption from both criminal and civic law of the state to which they had been accredited this had not been fully ascertained. In most cases exemption was allowed but on rare occasions, such as for 'treason, felony, [or] adultery' the full weight of the law was to be exacted. So, in general their suite was allowed a certain measure of immunity but the due process of the law could be brought to bear on serious crime. The majority of commentators, whilst ascribing to ambassadors certain privileges, seem to admit very limited exemption in respect of liabilities contracted during the course of an embassy and at the same time acknowledge that such exemptions were not in common use.

In the early 1600s ambassadors had begun to 'behave as if an injury to their masters subjects was an insult to his crown, and to intervene to protect their fellow countrymen', so that by the end of the century this had become the accepted practice. 128 However, ambassadorial rights and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Diplomatic representatives were expected to help their compatriots engaged in commerce, by assisting resident merchants and by helping the captains of their ships. The envoy in both these cases was concerned with the difficulties their fellow countrymen experienced when dealing with English tradesmen and

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customs. They also had responsibility for their fellow countrymen that were unrelated to commerce, acting for them in disputes with the English authorities and so on.

As embassies developed over the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth century they became less streamlined than their Italian prototype. The confidential secretary, for instance, took on the role of personal servant as well as dealing with the ciphers, filing and the taking of dictation. Ambassadors selected their staff, and paid their salaries and, apart from the underservants, they accompanied ambassadors into their mission and, for the most part, returned when they did.

François de Callières suggested that the careful diplomatist would pay the same attention to his choice of domestic staff as he would to more important subjects. Those about the ambassadors must do them credit, for a well ordered household which is served by well mannered staff is a good advertisement, both of the ambassadors and the country they represent. 129

The staff of an embassy usually included a secretary, one or more interpreters, a major-domo, a steward and a coachman besides other domestic staff. Domestic staff could be hired locally, a procedure which many found to be cheaper than transporting their own staff abroad, although noblemen, used to the comfort of a large domestic staff, might bring their whole household with them. De Zuñiga, we are told, required large sums of money for expenses in London where he ‘kept in his house sixty persons and was furnished with three coaches’. 130 In several cases James provided an extensive staff for the incoming ambassador. Traditionally the English monarch paid a daily sum for an ambassador extra-ordinary - this could range from the £10.00 a day for a visiting Pole in 1621 to the £300.00 allowed to the Spaniards who came to negotiate the peace in 1604. 131 On occasion a royal house could be placed at an ambassador’s disposal; thus in 1604 Spain’s

129 F. de Callières, Diplomacy, p. 97.
131 G. P. V. Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant, p. 57.
envoy at the peace talks was accommodated in Somerset House as was the
Emperor's ambassador, Schwarzenberg, in 1622. At other times a courtier was
expected to house the visitor. In 1624 the Earl of Suffolk had to hand over
practically all of Suffolk House to the French ambassador, Boderie.

Living expenses in London were high and maintaining such large numbers
of foreign diplomats was a severe drain on already stretched resources. 'The Court
of England', wrote the Venetian ambassador, 'is excessively expensive, and the cost
of everything is so great she is certainly unexampled elsewhere in Europe.' James felt the need for some restraint. When, in 1603, there was an assembly in
London of extra-ordinary ambassadors to congratulate James on his accession, it
was decided to give them only lodgings at public expense. All the same the Danish
ambassadors, Frus and Below, lodged at Richmond Palace with a retinue of almost
150, and the Brunswick ambassador at Kingston seems to have received a good deal
of free entertainment that cost the King in excess of three hundred crowns a day. In
contrast, reported the Venetian secretary, the representatives of Brandenburg and
Württemburg were definitely housed but not fed. Even restricting hospitality to this
level proved a strain on the Exchequer so that when in July 1605 an ambassador
extra-ordinary, the Landgrave of Litemberg, arrived from the Emperor, he was
shown to an empty house and told to negotiate with the landlord in regard of the
rent. He was so indignant that he moved out and put up in a public tavern. The
King remained firm and when, later that year an old friend of his, the Baron du
Tour, arrived from Paris to congratulate him on his escape from the Gunpowder
Plot, it was given out that a private gentleman at court had borne the expense of his
board and lodging. In fact it was the King who paid, but by saying this it in no way
set an expensive precedent. In February, 1613 James heard that the French
were about to send an extra-ordinary ambassador to condole on the death of the

132 Lionelli to the Doge, 15th October, 1616, CSP Venetian, 1615 - 1617, p. 324.
133 CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, pp. 47, 81, 262, 309, nos. 72, 111, 404, 463, 12th June, 13th
August, 1603; 27th July, 1605; 6th January, 1606.
Prince of Wales and to offer congratulations on the marriage of Elizabeth. The King wrote to Edmondes, his ambassador in Paris, asking that he do all in his power to prevent this from happening as he thought it unnecessary as the French already had an ordinary resident in London and a special envoy would be too expensive to entertain. 134 When Henry Auguste de Lomenie, ambassador from France, travelled to see the King at Cambridge in December, 1624 he was to be housed at the King’s expense, but the ambassador declined the offer. Agent Pergamo from Savoy was lodged in London at the King’s expense but was told that if he did not like his lodging he might have 12 crowns a day to lodge where he chose. The agent declined this offer. 135 Generally speaking, however, the lodging for the diplomatic household was the responsibility of the ambassadors, for governments were not yet maintaining overseas dwellings for their representatives. York House, in the Strand, was a popular residence for visiting diplomats, as was Exeter House. The merchants companies maintained several ambassadors. For example we find Volynsky and Posdeyev, in 1617, being lodged at the expense of the Muscovy Company. This involved the support and entertainment of the ambassadors and their entourage of seventy-five for seven months. 136 The agent from Morocco in 1611 was housed at the expense of the London merchants, whilst Diego Mexia, ambassador from the Archduke (1623) was lodged at the Spanish ambassador’s expense. During his first embassy to England from Persia in August, 1611, Robert Sherley lodged at his father’s house at Wiston. Sir Noel Caron, the longest serving ambassador at James’s court, owned a house in South Lambeth. 137

Not all the menial staff included in the diplomatic suite were domestics. The size of ambassadors entourages reflected the importance of the men and their mission and a brilliant embassy might include musicians, liverymen, gentlemen of

134 BL Stowe MSS, 173, f. 275.
136 Chamberlain, 8th November, 1617, PRO SP Domestic, 95/12
137 Viscount Fenton to Salisbury, PRO SP Domestic, 43/71.
quality who attended for their own purposes and the young sons or nephews of the ambassador come to learn the business of diplomacy or to gain the polish foreign travel could bring. Probably the largest and most lavish suite to arrive at James's court was that of the Spanish in 1604. Walter Yonge reported that the Muscovy envoy, Thomas Simonwitz brought with him ‘120 citizens on horseback, very rich in trains and apparel’. Travelling with a large household, like the 400 or so that accompanied the Marquis of Cadenet for his ten day extra-ordinary embassy in 1621, more often than not added to the expense of an embassy rather than to its efficiency, so that most embassies to England were quite small.

By the end of James's reign governments were not yet assuming full responsibility for the management of their embassies abroad. Although the more important missions received funding and an official secretary, most representatives had to maintain the whole staff, arrange for transportation and find suitable residences. Their expenses began before they left for England and continued for the duration of their embassies. The functioning of the embassy therefore depended to a large extent on the personal fortunes of the individual, supplemented by some financial support from their masters, which took several forms.

Diplomats' salaries varied considerably from country to country, but in the main the financial rewards offered to men representing their country abroad were not very attractive. No two countries valued their diplomats financially in the same way and salaries were, anyway, rarely paid on time, generally being months, if not years, in arrears. This appears to have been a rather short sighted view in that an unpaid or grossly underpaid ambassador would have been more of a liability than an advantage. By undervaluing their representatives in this way princes left their men easy targets for those prepared to pay for information and services.

138 The Diary of Walter Yonge, p. 45.
Remuneration should be another indicator of the status of the ambassador but it is difficult to analyse this as the ambassadors were paid in different currencies and at different levels making it very difficult to compare the salaries paid to individual ambassadors. But we do know, for instance, that Nicolo Molin, ambassador from Venice (November, 1603 - February, 1606) was to have ‘200 ducats of gold’ per month. A dispatch dated 25th June, 1603 confirms the salary for the Venetian agent Scaramelli as 120 crowns per month, whilst his salary as secretary to Foscarini was ‘95 ducats of lire 6 soldi 4 for the ducat’. French ministers were amongst the best paid of representatives, better in fact than English ministers abroad and certainly better than the Venetians. Spanish salaries were good but, as already noted, payment was regularly delayed so that her ambassadors had to dip into their own accounts. The salary paid to Noel de Caron in 1595, whilst he was agent to Elizabeth, was around £4,200.00 which was increased by 1/6th on 21st June of that year. At the same time he was paid an honorary bonus of £2,400 which increased to £6,000 on 18th March, 1597. By the time he was advanced to the rank of ambassador in 1609 his salary had risen to £8,000 a year.

Sadly many were to finish their duties at a foreign court considerably poorer than when they had started. The bulk of ambassador’s expenses were generally incurred if the court to which one was accredited tended to move from palace to palace, as James’s did. Gondomar, for example, never had enough money to pay his own expenses let alone pay out pensions at the English court. Professor Carter tells us that the ambassador was one of the London moneylenders’ best customers, having a large account with Burlamaqui. Gondomar, after working ceaselessly for the Spanish/Catholic cause in England found he had bankrupted himself in the

140 CSP Venetian, 1605 - 1607, p. xxxi.
141 CSP Venetian, 1605 - 1607, p. 70.
143 For example see Gondomar’s embassy accounts. 1st July, 1619, DIE, vol. II, pp. 182 - 189.
process. It is hardly surprising that Hotman, with a keen sense of the reality of the diplomat's problems should have the perfect ambassador 'rich, not only in the goods of the minde, but also in the goods of fortune'.

Diplomats also received gifts, which helped to supplement their incomes. Men expected these presents to be appropriate to their rank and often cavilled at gifts they considered of inferior value. One particular example shows that the recipient, the French ambassador, Beaumont, who was unpopular with James anyway, felt the gift he received to be shabby rather than princely:

Monsieur Beaumont the French Ambassador went homeward the first of this month, and hath blotted his former reputation with very mecanicall [common] tricks at parting: for having 2000 ounces of plate geven him, he cavilled for 500 more, as having scene a president [precedent] of the like, which being graunted him, he begd two horse's more by name of the King, besides pictures great and small with jewells at his own appointment, and not a noble man or other of his neere acquaintance but he got horses, geldings or somewhat of him...as yf he made no conscience to robbe the Egiptians.

The Master of Ceremonies was responsible for presenting England's gifts to visiting foreign representatives, which ranged from a chain of diamonds worth £2,000 given to Schwarzenberg in 1622 to the £2,000 worth of jewels and £5,000 cash given to Benjamin de Rohan as a farewell gift in August that year. Gifts, in some cases, also took the form of honours granted by James to both ambassadors and members of their staff. Christian, Duke of Brunswick was invested as a Knight of the Garter by James at Christmas, 1624 when he was in London on a mission on behalf of the Hanse Towns; the Auditor Fiscal of the Duke of Savoy, the Cavalier Gabeleone, was knighted by James at the close of his mission as were Marc-Antonio Correr, ordinary ambassador from Venice in 1611, Zorzi Guistinian in 1608 and Nicolo Molin in 1606; Girolamo Lando, on 12th June, 1622 and Valaresso on 19th September, 1624. The embassies which were most honoured

146 Calvert to Carleton, SP. Holland, 3rd April, 1622.
by the King were those from the United Provinces: Albert Joachim, the Deputy from Zeeland to the States General was knighted by James on 17th May, 1610; Jean de Goch, Consul of Zutphen, Eruwout van der Dussen, Consul of Delft and Joachim Liens, Syndic of Tholen on 14th July, 1619; Albert Bruyning, Johan Camerlin, Frederick van Vervou, James Schotte, Albert Soncq and Jonkheer Jacobus Wyngaerdes on 8th April, 1621; Henrik van Tuyl on 1st February, 1623 and the secretary to that particular commission, Capt. Constantijn Huygens on 20th April, 1622. Strangely, James knighted no Spaniards, not even Gondomar. One must surmise that James felt this to be unnecessary on the grounds that the majority of Spain’s ambassadors were already noblemen, most by birth.

Patent of Knighthood, Constantijn Huygens, Westminster, October, 1622
BL. Additional Charter 12777

Despite the financial constraints men were still found to serve faithfully in embassies around the world. As Mattingly notes there was a great attraction in the office of ambassador:

The Ambassador’s lonely task of upholding his master’s honour at a foreign court, aided by no more than his own wit, courage and eloquence, was calculated to excite the imagination of the baroque world, its taste for magnificence, its interest in extraordinary individuals, its appreciation for complicated intrigue.  

This elaborately decorated document is typical of Jacobean Patents of Knighthood. It is designed to impart all that is glorious and good about James’s reign. The patent takes the form of Royal Letters Patent and the preamble justifies James’s practice of rewarding meritorious individuals. It is signed by the king and has the Great Seal appended. It bears Huygen’s family arms beneath the English royal arms. G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, p. 211.
Some eventually reclaimed their arrears and there were other rewards on offer. Titles could be earned and the end of an embassy could result in the offer of high office at home. However, during James’s reign those men who received such honours were amongst the minority so that most returning ambassadors found that long absence from their master’s court and extended association with foreigners was not the road to advancement.

The total cost of a foreign embassy is difficult to itemise and official records do not indicate whether an ambassador ever received the monies to which he was entitled and which he was owed. Almost every diplomat had some trouble in collecting the monies due to him. The chronic arrears in diplomatic salaries can be explained partly by the priority assigned to individual governmental spending. In France, for example, when funds were settled at the beginning of each year, salaries for ambassadors had the highest priority after the King’s household expenses. But France was the exception rather than the rule and inevitably many ambassadors were out of pocket by the end of their missions.

This chapter has examined the function and office of the ambassador and its operation within the ritualised and stylised court of James VI & I. It has concluded that in these men can be found, if one allows for natural vices and virtues, the seventeenth century personification of the ‘perfect ambassador’ demanded by the jurists and political commentators of the conduct books discussed above. As the ambassador’s function and the structure of his embassy became more specific and specialised so the responsibilities of the ambassador also become more extensive. The professionalisation of the ‘corps diplomatique’ is unmistakable in this period and with the systematic preparation of diplomats, the clear criteria employed in the selection of these men and the frequency with which such men served their princes it is now possible to convincingly argue that by the close of James VI & I’s reign there is to be found the dawning of what was to become the modern diplomatic service.
Chapter 4

The *Spanish Machiavelli*: Don Diego de Sarmiento de Acuña and King James

In August, 1613 Don Diego de Sarmiento de Acuña arrived in England as ambassador for Spain at the court of King James VI and I. ¹ Although seen by his contemporaries as the most successful foreign diplomat at James’s court, by the end of his embassy Gondomar had become one of the most unpopular. What the ambassador did is a matter of history; how he did it has exercised the minds of historians over the years. We have, of course, several apocryphal anecdotes drawn from the writings of pamphleteers who seldom found it necessary to provide evidence of the truth of their stories. Subsequent chroniclers who, like their predecessors, made no justification for their claims faithfully reproduced these. Thus, the most confident representative of a dignified European nation came to be depicted as a buffoon and a charlatan: a man who, when his ready tongue and charming manner failed him, resorted to bribery with Spanish gold. The dislike taken to the Spanish ambassador originated at a time when the country to which he had been sent was almost uniformly anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish, so that he was seen variously as the devil incarnate, Spain’s agent in her struggle for temporal superiority and the Pope’s tool in his universal fight for spiritual supremacy.

Sarmiento was born, around 1567, in the Spanish province of Galicia where his ancestors had been *Adelantados* or lords-lieutenant. In 1593, family influence and distinguished service contributed to his being made a Knight Companion of the Order of Calatrava, and in 1600 he was appointed Corregidor of Toro, in the province of Leon. Over the next ten years he rose still higher until in 1610 he was made Governor of Bayona. A devoted servant of Philip III and a fervent believer in

¹ For ease the ambassador will be referred to either as Sarmiento or Gondomar, the title given him in 1617.
the Catholic crusade, he was appointed ambassador to the King of England in 1613. Surviving portraits of Gondomar reveal him as a man of medium height with a dark moustache and beard, and close cropped hair above a wide forehead, with deep-set, dark eyes, a large nose and a firm, sardonic mouth. One must, of course, make allowances for the natural prejudices of English painters who have endowed him with these rather Mephistophelean features. Most portraits show him as dignified, formidable, almost saturnine. Only one portrait, that produced in Godfrey Goodman's *Court of King James I*, (fig. 1) makes him look good-humoured. Compare this to the sterner man portrayed by Grabado de Simone Passeo, in fig 2.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

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The ambassador arrived in England with the alleged object to keep James 'sweet' and prevent the King from entering into an alliance with any other power against the might of Spain. He was to arrange a marriage between the Prince of Wales and the Infanta, do what he could to ease the burden of the English Catholics and at last to bring England back into the bosom of Mother Church. John Digby, the English ambassador to the Spanish court seems to have been impressed by Sarmiento, writing to the Queen in 1612 that he was 'a very noble gentleman and of good reputation'. Sarmiento it appears was undecided as to whether his wife, Doña Constanza, would join him in England. Digby, obviously unimpressed by her looks, assured the Queen that she 'shall hardly ever see so handsome a Spanish lady as she (the wife of Don Alonso de Velasco, the present ambassador) whom you are shortly like to loose.' In the end she did join her husband on his embassies to England, as did his son Don Antonio. Very little seems to be known of Doña Constanza, although there is some evidence that throughout her husband's embassy and until her death she supported the English Catholics, relieving the poor and ministering to their needs. She most certainly flew to the aid of Doña Luisa Carvajal during her incarceration in London and Howell's, Familiar Letters, comments that she and her ladies rose early each day to clean the embassy chapel before Mass.

Originally Sarmiento had expected the usual term of office in London, and indeed there is some evidence to show that the Council of State had seriously considered his transferral to France in 1616, but the preference James I showed towards the ambassador led to his continued stay in England. This seeming influence over the King made the ambassador the focal point for anti-Spanish and anti-Catholic feeling and the central character in many of the tracts and pamphlets

3 F. H. Lyons refers to Sarmiento's wife as Doña Catalina. Digby's correspondence with the Queen refers to her as Doña Constanza. The ambassador in a letter to Philip III dated 16th November, 1613 calls her Doña Costanza. Simancas, E2590/8 and 10.
5 J. Howell, Epistolae Ho-Elianae : the familiar letters of James Howell (ed.) J. Jacobs (1892)
emanating from the Low Countries at this time. From the tracts published around this time, it becomes clear that the general feeling amongst contemporaries was that Gondomar had, by the use of diabolical tricks, brought the King of England firmly into his grasp. This contemporary popular notion of the ambassador and his actions, preserved in the pseudo-historical and dramatic writing of the period, frequently refer to Gondomar as ‘machiavellian’ or a ‘Machiavelli’. Common, modern usage of ‘machiavellian’ as ‘the ends justify the means’ seems mainly concerned with undesirable means being acceptable if the end itself should be justified. But in seventeenth century usage a ‘Machiavelli’ was not only prepared to use dubious means to gain his advantage but preferred it to be that way, in keeping with his evil nature, for, not only were the means evil; the end gained was evil also.

Contemporary usage of the word suggests that it was actually the diabolical end sought and not the means by which it was gained which earned a person the sobriquet ‘Machiavelli’. Since the end Gondomar sought was patently evil, both he, and the means he employed to gain it, must, by definition, be diabolical too. So Gondomar became known as the ‘Spanish Machiavelli’. Recent research, however, shows that the basic ingredients of his legendary influence over James were not evil but nothing more than ‘a pleasing dominant personality, a well-filled purse to pension the venal courtier and an enthusiastic clientele among Catholics, crypto-catholics and a scattering of conservative, or Hispanophile, sympathisers within the Whitehall establishment. Wit, audacity, and candour were reflections of Gondomar’s early perception that he should not expect frequent or early success.’

The first months of Gondomar’s embassy were not pleasant: he was a stranger in a cold and hostile country, he loathed the climate and complained regularly in his correspondence that he had not seen the sunshine since he arrived in England. He had few friends at Court except the Spanish ‘confidantes’.

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7 Such was the ambassador’s love of the sunshine he named his new house in Valladolid Casa de Sol (House of the Sun), see below.
and Boisschot, the Archduke Albert’s ambassador, with whom he formed a close friendship. With the French ambassador he remained coldly cordial but he would have no dealings with the envoy of the States-General and he quarrelled with Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador - a quarrel that was to affect relations not only with that ambassador but with his two successors also. Foscarini is said have spread the rumour that Gondomar had ‘poisoned a Spanish lady’, and as this rumour was circulating at the time of the Carvajal affair one can only assume it to be one of the ladies in attendance on Doña Luisa (especially as one of those ladies was reported to have been ill and later died). Relations remained strained between the two ambassadors, in part owing to the Venetian’s anti-Spanish sympathies but also on the question of title.

It can reasonably be argued that Gondomar was one of Spain’s most proficient ambassadors being highly skilled in the diplomatic arts. He came as ambassador to a power which, only a few years previously, had emerged victorious

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8 CSP Venetian, vol. XIV App. no. 907, p. 598.
from a war with Spain and which stood at the head of Protestant Europe: a nation where the majority of the population viewed Spain and her people with suspicious hostility. Under such a severe handicap, with no army at his back, no family connections to fall back on and no common faith on which to base his appeal, any success Gondomar was to have had to be achieved purely and simply by the arts of diplomacy at his disposal. But, fortunately for him, Gondomar was possessed not only of an abounding confidence in himself and his mission to England, but of the skills required to fulfil his mission. He was possessed of all the major qualities laid down by the jurists and political theorists as essential for the successful diplomat; he was ‘courtly, dignified, beautifully poised and in command of every situation’ all the qualities which Gardiner deemed made him the ‘envy of ordinary diplomats’. 9 He knew exactly what to say and what not to say to each person with whom he had contact. And, having a good insight into character, he was able to direct his diplomatic shafts towards the weakest areas of his opponents’ armour. His ready tongue and ability for tactful speech made him able to converse with equal ease on topics of a grave or a light-hearted nature.

When considering the embassy of Gondomar it is important to remember that his early career was not in the diplomatic corps but within the military establishment. For early historians this was to show throughout his dealings with the English, insisting he displayed no real conception of policy beyond the programme of political and religious aggrandisement of Spain and the Catholic Church. Alongside this it appears they found it impossible to consider that he could have been aware that the changing political conditions in other European countries made it necessary for Spain to reconsider her foreign policies. However, this view is entirely erroneous - Gondomar was perfectly aware that unsuccessful encounters in Europe meant Spain’s ideology had to take on a new shape.

These were critical years for Spain. The union of the crown of Ferdinand and Isabella with that of the Emperor Maximillian had placed in the hands of Charles V the mechanism which could not fail to make his inheritors the strongest monarchs in Europe and this he bequeathed to Philip II. Seen by his contemporaries as a great figure, Philip did much to dignify the history of Spain. He worked towards the establishment of a universal monarchy of Spain, side by side with the universal hierarchy of the Pope, his policy a personal crusade for the forcible re-unification of all Christendom under the Holy See. Sadly, Philip’s world-policy was one of history’s greatest failures, he clung to his ideals while the Netherlands consumed his armies and England continued her domination of the sea. The Spain in which Sarmiento grew up was a Spain assailed by concerns for her position on the world stage.

In April, 1598, ‘El gran Rey Felipe II’ died and his son, Philip III succeeded to his honours. Historians who make a study of rulers and their actions are certainly entitled to view Philip III as the first King to personify the dawning of Spain’s degeneration. Philip came to the throne at a time when it was becoming clear that the monarchy was showing a marked inability to maintain the memorable successes of preceding generations. It was no longer the King but his prime ministers, the *validos*, first amongst whom was the Duke of Lerma, who were to become the administrators of the Spanish empire. Yet any study of Spanish foreign policy at this time will show no major changes and we are unable to find much difference between the epoch of Philip II and that of his son. The idea of a western bloc, as formulated earlier by Charles V, remained the leading principle. The peace with France, concluded shortly before Philip II’s death, was ratified and the two naval attacks on England, in 1601 and 1602, were as unsuccessful as those preceding them. The death of Queen Elizabeth and the ascent of the uncompromising James Stuart in 1603 solved the problems with England in such a way that an uneasy peace could be concluded in 1604 and the old policy of ‘permanent’ friendship
could be resumed, at least for a few years. At the same time, the war with the Netherlands, which had been dragging on since 1572, was finally concluded by a truce of twelve years, signed in 1609. Significantly, Philip showed a clear preference for peace and diplomacy, which was motivated not only by personal conviction but also, in part, by economic necessity. Spain could no longer afford war as an instrument of diplomacy.

As a whole these events were viewed by contemporaries as proof of Spain's greatness, and the fabulous wealth of Spain's overseas territories seemed only to guarantee her permanent power. In fact, at this time, as Chudoba notes, 'Spanish fame seemed to exist almost apart from the realities of Spanish policy. And the spirit of national pride, visible in many a Spanish document of the epoch, was based rather on fame than on realities...Spanish might, although its development was practically halted, continued to grow as a legend and an example - an attractive example, too. As such, it was viewed also by the people in... Europe.'

Philip, timid and self indulgent, left the day to day details of government in the hands of Lerma. In many countries, where the true state of Spain was unknown, Lerma was seen as a great statesman and in England was frequently compared with James's favourite, Buckingham. In reality no politician has ever governed a country with such inefficiency, callousness and disregard for the welfare of its citizens. In an era of powerful nation states Spain's holy crusade was totally impractical and was viewed by her neighbours as an incipient campaign of aggression. But the ideal lingered on in the minds of Spain's politicians, as, unable to admit to any national decadence, they could devise no rational alternative.

However, a slight change in policy was taking shape. No longer was spiritual and temporal unification to be achieved by force. The governments of Protestant Europe were now to be gently wooed and flattered; a judiciously placed

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resident ambassador was to gain the ear of the sovereign and support him against any internal opposition until gradually he would be led over to the one true Church. Withdrawal of the support of the sovereign would eventually lead to a total collapse of Protestantism and the great work of universal monarchy would be achieved. There must be little doubt that it was as promoter of this policy for royal conversion that Gondomar came to England in 1613.

Early historians then, viewed Gondomar’s embassy with suspicion, seeing in it a total contempt for the mass of English people and believing that he deliberately set James to pursue a line of policy which ran counter to the feelings and beliefs of his people, apparently never realising that the latter were likely to prevail in the end. No less fatal than his neglect of the English nation’s feelings was, they agreed, his neglect of the strength of Protestantism in the country. He was convinced that the conversion of England depended entirely on the conversion of the monarch and his court. In the prolonged negotiations for the marriage between Charles and the Infanta public opinion increasingly saw Gondomar concerning himself only with the readiness of James and his advisers to accept the terms that Spain put forward and totally ignored the dislike with which the project was viewed by the vast majority of Englishmen. Any such ignorance of the wishes of Englishmen would have been a grave mistake whether the negotiations were a sham, as has often been suggested, or not, although, Sarmiento’s letters seem to indicate that from 1617, at least, he seriously viewed the marriage as a means of uniting Spain and England, thereby effectively crippling the other Protestant European powers. Furthermore, it has not been sufficiently recognised that Gondomar studied to understand the court of England and the English people. In December, 1615 the ambassador wrote to a friend, the Marquis of Guadeleste, telling him he had ‘gained familiarity with the English nation through conversations with Englishmen...and [have] devoted myself with interest to their histories and annals many years.’ He had, he continued ‘...tried
with a special effort since the start of my residency here to observe and understand their activities.’ 11

By the early months of 1616 the position Sarmiento held at court was unlike that of any other ambassador and rested almost entirely on the strong personal relationship that he had with James. The King found this intelligent man a delight, for Gondomar had qualities that ran deeper than those constantly expounded by his detractors: courage, audacity, strength of character and a ‘fixity of purpose’. He ‘told a merry tale, read Shakespeare’s plays, bought a first folio and liked English wines’. His confidence in himself and his mission showed in his strength of diplomacy and the imperial dignity with which he made his demands inspired deference and awe. Arthur Wilson remarks that ‘Gondomar has as free access to the King as any Courtier of them all (Buckingham excepted) and the King took delight to talk with him; for he was full of Conceits, and would speak false Latin a purpose in his merry fits to please the King; telling the King plainly, He [James] spoke Latin like a Pedant, but I speak it like a Gentleman.’ 12 Whether from tact or personal enjoyment Gondomar joined in all James’s interests. ‘Thus while hunting with the King’, wrote the Venetian ambassador, ‘he vies with him in putting his hands in the blood of bucks and stags, doing cheerfully everything that his Majesty does and in this way chiefly he has acquired his favour.’ 13 He had the distinct advantage over other ambassadors in that he was able to negotiate with James in an atmosphere of informal cordiality. But for all his friendship with the King, all James’s qualities, both good and bad - his hatred of aggression and his love of peace, his prejudice against the Dutch, his conviction in the divine right of Kings, his vanity, his fear of assassination and his growing indolence, were played upon by Gondomar in the interests of Spain. In the spirit of the ‘game’ Gondomar reported to Philip that James

could be easily won over by flattery. It is quite astonishing that a man of Gondomar's intelligence and integrity should seriously believe that a King of James's experience could be so easily swayed - yet it appears that this opinion was generally held. One was able to win the King's favour, wrote the Venetian ambassador to the Doge, 'by praising and admiring him and by making him believe that all those who have the honour to treat with him learn a great deal.'

Gondomar held instructions for three embassies in England although he actually only served two missions. The first between August, 1613 and 16th July, 1618 when he took the diplomatic title of Ordinary and the second from 7th March, 1620 until July, 1622 when he was again instructed as an ordinary. In the summer of 1624 it was rumoured in England that the Count was returning. 14 The Count himself had other ideas, ill-health and not a little disappointment determined him that England, with its grey and dismal climate, would see him no more. However, in the autumn of that year Philip ordered him back to England. He begged, on the grounds of ill health, to be excused but Olivares insisted and, in order to make the assignment more palatable promoted him the extra-ordinary. Gondomar continued to insist that he was not up to the task until eventually the King relented. After a last journey into the Netherlands, where he discussed the German question with the Infanta, he retired to his home province. The ambassador would, one presumes, have liked a post in Madrid but Olivares, who feared his strong personality and way with men also now distrusted Gondomar as the advocate of the English alliance. Exclude from politics, in ever increasing ill-health and desperately short of money after his years of service in England, Gondomar spent the last months of his life in Galicia only making infrequent journeys to Madrid. It was on one of these visits that he died on 2nd October 1626, eighteen months after the King of England.

14 Most commentators agree that it was Philip and Olivares who insisted on Gondomar returning for a third mission in England. However, Loomie, in his article 'Canon Henry Taylor, Spanish Habsburg Diplomat', Recusant History vol. 17, pt. 3, p. 224, suggests that it was the Count himself who suggested his return.
Popular opinion regarded Gondomar’s activities in England as those of a master-spy and pamphleteers satirised Spanish diplomacy unmercifully using Gondomar as the butt of their wit. Thomas Middleton chose to portray him as the Black Knight, ‘the fistula of Europe’, in *A Game at Chess* in which Gondomar recounts his many disreputable activities. Of course, Middleton was only repeating the views of the population that had for years been almost uniformly anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish.

One can reasonably argue that Gondomar was one of the ablest diplomats to come out of Spain, but it is difficult to make a convincing case to prove his reputation as the villain depicted in much of the anti-Spanish propaganda circulating both contemporarily and subsequently. Gondomar had no time for conspiracy nor did a Spanish invasion figure in his plans. He did spend a little money on espionage agents and part-time informers who he used to collect intelligence on many matters including those of a military nature, but this notwithstanding, the ambassador had little time for spies, partly because he trusted no-one who would betray secrets for money and partly because spies rarely had access to information important enough to be of interest to him. Gondomar never really took to the under-cover aspects of his embassy, although of course, he did make certain exceptions, as in the case of the proposed Anglo-French marriage negotiations, when he employed an agent in the French resident’s household and who made Buisseaux’s correspondence available to him.

Not long after his arrival in Madrid, John Digby discovered that with very little expense he was able to obtain access to Spanish government papers. Among the reports he received were the instructions Gondomar was to take to London with

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15 See for example *A Narrative of the Popish Stratagems carried out by Seigniour Gondomore, the Spanish Ambassador etc*; HMC, Joint Publications, no. 6 (1971); R. Cotton, *A Choice Narrative of Count Gondomars Transactions during his Embassy in England* (1659) Reprinted in 1679 as *A Narrative of the Wicked Plots carried on by Seignior Gondomore for Advancing the Popish Religion and the Spanish Faction. Heartily recommended to all Protestants by Rich. Dugdale, gent.*; and the works of both Thomas Middleton and Thomas Scott.
him as the new ambassador. It was from these documents also that Digby found, much to his dismay, that for many years the Spanish ambassadors in London had been gathering intelligence in very much the same way as he had himself employed in Spain and that they had as easy access to his despatches. He wrote in cipher to Thomas Hamilton that he feared for the privacy of his own letters, a friend having advised him that 'copies of many of them have been sent hither, and that the procuring of them cost greate summes of money.' 16 In August Digby wrote to James informing him that there was in existence a paper containing the names of all Spain's English pensioners, and in early September, he reported that some headway had been made in discovering from an encoded list just which of James's subjects had been receiving gifts and money from the Spanish. 17 He found that 'Beltenebros', whom he established as Salisbury, was to receive '6000 crowns yearely pension from the King of Spayne', for 'good endes of firme peace and nearer alliance' with Spain. Furthermore he noted, 'Sir William Mounson, admirall of the narrow sea...[was] a pensioner to the King of Spayne.' 18 His first view of this evidence of Spain's English pensioners left him 'strangely astonished to finde persons of that qualitie and nearness to your Majesties person in the list.' He reflected that these people had received pensions because they were 'esteemed persons, both by the Constable and by the Conde de Villa Mediana, that were fittest to be drawne to this Kings service, and there being then a certeyne proportion of money assigned to be imployed in the secret services of that Ambassage...for the allowance rather of that which they judged convenient to be spent.' 19 It was not until December that he was able to obtain the complete key to the encoded list and Digby returned to England carrying with him the list of Spanish pensioners which

17 Digby to James. 8th August, 1613. SP. Spain.
19 Digby to James, 24th December, 1613. PRO, SP 94/20/189 - 195.
included the names of men in the highest positions in James government.

The key to the cipher used in 1615 reveals the identity of Spain's proposed pensioners. 'Florian' was Mrs Drummond, a prominent lady at court, well known for her Catholic leanings and first lady of the bedchamber to the Queen. It is possible that she was offered such a pension because of her position in the Queen's household. The Spanish went to great lengths to cultivate Anne ('Homero') and it was not until near her death that the Spanish realised that her influence on affairs was worth very little. In the same cipher the King is referred to as 'Leandro'; the Prince 'Petrarca'; Somerset 'Apolo' and Digby himself, 'Alcides'. 'Socrates' was Sir William Monson, Admiral of the Channel fleet, whose young son was set up as a rival to Buckingham, by the Howards. 'Piramo' was Lady Suffolk, whose easy-going husband appears in the list as 'Dante'. In the matter of pensions, the Howards failed to live up to their reputation. From the beginning Suffolk refused to accept and, although Nottingham initially accepted a pension, his name soon disappears from the lists. Northampton stayed on the lists but his pension was years in arrears and he never bothered about collecting it.

In February, 1615 Gondomar had drawn up a statement of expenses in which he itemised moneys paid out to various members of James's court. He declared that he had spent 5,160 reals on a 'curious jug and basin' for 'Florian' and had given 9,500 reals to 'an important person who had twice served the King of Spain'. He also stated that he had paid a further 150,000 reals to 'Socrates' in addition to his annual pension and 40,000 reals to 'Piramo'. The Spanish changed their ciphers frequently, Gondomar fearing that the English system of espionage would allow James access to everything that passed between London and Madrid. As we know, Gondomar was right to be concerned over this.

Despite what later historians were to learn of Spanish pensions there was little doubt in the minds of those at James's court that the ambassador was carrying on a system of bribery and espionage. 'Every day,' the Doge was told, 'they discover
fresh evidence of the ill offices performed by the Spanish Ambassador resident here.' 20 There may have been evidence of subversive activities but most modern commentators are in agreement that Gondomar was a sincere patriot and as honest as any other in his position. Although he may have given bribes, which were, of course, readily accepted at James’s court, the idea of Gondomar accepting a bribe is as ‘strange as the idea of Lerma refusing one.’ 21

The truth of the matter was that, at the end of the day Spain’s policy of buying friends at the English Court was a failure; the fact that there were Spanish pensioners at the court had very little effect on James’s religious, foreign or domestic policies. The most influential pensioners, those of the ‘Spanish party’, were already too wealthy for the pensions to make any great impression on them and lesser men, like Lake, looked to the Howards for patronage not to the Spaniards. Those hostile to Spain and whose friendship was to be bought remained hostile but still expected their pensions.

The total of the pensions granted by Spain ran into several thousand pounds a year, and therein lay the problem; pensions became an accepted part of diplomatic life but payment was not always so easy. Just being on the pensions lists did not guarantee that a pension would be forthcoming, for Gondomar seldom had the money to pay. In fact, he rarely had enough to cover his own expenses, he frequently resorted to the London moneylenders and the payment of pensions was always well in arrears. Leaving aside the actual expense of paying the pensions, it is safe to say that, in the case of the Spanish pensions, the problems and hostilities they caused far outweighed any advantages gained.

Nevertheless, Gondomar continued the tradition of pensions but it becomes obvious that he saw no great advantage in the system. He confided to Foscarini that the ‘amount spent by his King here since the accession of the present sovereign,’

Lyons, Gondomar, p. 117.
was so large that it 'passes belief'. He sincerely believed that the money expended on pensions could be put to use to better advantage elsewhere. He did not like the idea of pensions and expressed these feelings in a letter to the Duke of Lerma saying he believed it to be 'a nasty business being an ambassador since one has to be mixed up in a business like this'. In early 1615 he wrote again suggesting that the money spent in England on pensions would have been better employed in arming the galleons and in November, 1617 he told Philip that in his opinion the money might be spent more profitably in the English and Irish seminaries. But, the ambassador's feelings notwithstanding, Spanish pensions remained an integral part of Spanish diplomacy.

Disliked as he was, the ambassador could claim some English support. This came from a small group of prominent men whom Gondomar referred to as the _bien intencionados_. The most important of these intimates was Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton and his nephew, Thomas Howard, Earl of Suffolk. Also to be included in this group were Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, Lord High Admiral; Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel; Lord Knolly's and the Howard's' protégé Sir Thomas Lake, Secretary of State from 1616 to 1619. This group of men became known as the 'Howard party' or more commonly the 'Spanish party' a nomenclature which actually obscured the very real differences between the aims of the Spanish and those of the Howard faction. There is little doubt amongst commentators that the Howard group was instrumental in arranging the peace with Spain, accepted Spanish pensions and consisted largely of crypto-Catholics, who, along with other Catholics in the country, preferred that Catholics should not be persecuted. But this did not mean they were traitors or acted as tools for Spain's ambition; they were pro-Spanish only in so far as they looked for a Spanish match rather than a French one. As Bossy suggests, fear of this group was to a certain extent unwarranted as, in power, the Howard family kept their distance from the Roman Church. In their resistance against pressure for an aggressive Protestant
foreign policy they looked equally at the advantages of peace and of trade. In return for this resistance Gondomar, and by extension Spain, had a group at court and in the Council that acted as a counter-balance to the Protestant and pro-French lobby. It should perhaps be noted here that the Spanish ambassador himself felt that the only member of this group to be sincerely attached to Spanish interests was Henry Howard, all his other confidants being ‘in it for the money’.  

Having now introduced the idea, current not only during his time in England, but maintained by later historians, of the ambassador’s perceived hold over James and his attempts to influence the course of events in England it is time to examine, in more detail, the association between the idea and the reality of Gondomar’s influence in England. In one case however, the complaints of his subversive activities could perhaps be understood. This was in the case of his efforts on behalf of his struggling English co-religionists. During Gondomar’s embassies the condition of the English Catholics was very much tied up with the processes of the Spanish marriage negotiations. This chapter seeks to examine the way in which James’s policies were conditioned by a desire to unite the Catholic and Protestant thrones and how these same policies resulted in a fresh outburst of anti-Catholicism and how this fear of things Spanish and Catholic was encouraged. It does not claim to be a definitive account of the marriage negotiations but looks at the way in which popular culture saw the situation and the ambassador’s role in it.

As the ambassador’s seeming influence over the King grew, so it enabled him to obtain some leniency for the Catholics and, at his request, some Jesuits were released from imprisonment. Both the State Papers and the Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus document these cases. The Acts of the Privy Council note several occasions when Papists were released from prison at Gondomar’s request. Furthermore, according to Contarini, priests were able, on payment to their jailers of a ‘trifling fee’, to go in and out of jail ‘officiating privily in one house and

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22 See Gondomar to the Duke of Lerma, 25th January, 1614, PRO SP 31/12/35.
then another by which means they maintain themselves and make considerable profit.' 23 In December, 1613, four hundred Englishmen attended Mass in the ambassador's chapel and at Easter, 1615, between eight and nine hundred persons received the Pascal Sacrament in the chapel. In May, 1615, Somerset, still a powerful man, undertook on the ambassador's behalf to secure good treatment for those still confined in prison. When Somerset fell, it was Gondomar's own influence that secured a certain amount of toleration, so that in March, 1616, he was able to report to the Spanish Council that during the three years of this embassy not one person had been executed for a religious cause. 24

Gondomar genuinely looked for friendship between England and Spain, stressing to the King the advantages and security this would bring. An alliance with Spain would cause James's enemies to think twice before venturing to send armies against him and the English Catholics would be brought securely under the King's wing. This last argument seems to have clinched matters, as James saw the English Catholics as the most probable source of plots against his person and soon he began to see his security tied up with the continuation of peace with Spain.

There is to be found in the archives in Simancas a letter, dated 22nd July, 1618, to Gondomar from Sir Francis Bacon in which he informed the ambassador that, on the strict instructions from James, the activities of the pursuivants would be curbed. In this letter Bacon stresses that the King was especially pleased to do this favour for his friend and added to this his own pleasure that this action was being taken. 25 Quite obviously this is an unusual letter - no two men could be such unlikely friends; Bacon, an eminent Protestant lawyer, who could never be accused of pro-Spanish sentiments and the other a Catholic diplomat, representative of a country so long regarded with suspicion and a man mistrusted because of his
alleged influence over the King. Moreover, only the year before James had assured the Privy Council that, so far as the Spanish match was concerned, Spain's representatives had, 'so far declared themselves, as they did neither expect alteration in Religion in the Prince nor any liberty or toleration for his majesty's subjects.' These two contradictory actions on the part of the King raise several important questions, not least of which was whether James had changed his mind about pursuing the Catholics and, if so, why? Were James's instructions ever put into effect? Did Bacon assume the responsibility for what was, to all intents and purposes, a promise of toleration? Most importantly, to what degree was there an understanding between Bacon and Gondomar?

At the beginning of 1618 Gondomar requested permission from Philip II to return home on the grounds of his ill health and in the same despatch hinted at a slight change in policy aimed at easing the enforcement of the penal laws.

However, despite his letter to Gondomar, the following week Bacon announced in the Star Chamber, a stricter control of Catholics. Van Male in his despatches to the Archduke reported that Justices of the Peace had been ordered to report the numbers of Catholics in each county, specifying how they lived and their style and quality and which districts showed an increase or decrease in numbers. Finally, JP's were warned against concealing known Catholics. Clearly then there was some discrepancy between James's official policy and the private hints he allowed Bacon to convey. With this in mind the ambassador visited the King. Van Male notes this meeting and reports that James had, in effect, been playing one group off against

See N. Mathews, *Francis Bacon, The History of a Character Assassination* (New Haven, 1996), pp. 184; 248; 273; 297. She refers to Gondomar as Bacon's 'friendly antagonist' and suggests there was a friendship between the two men. On Bacon's release from the Tower Gondomar offered to interpose on Bacon's behalf with James to try to restore him to favour. 'Having received so many kindnesses and good wishes from your lordship in your prosperity,' wrote the ambassador, 'I deem it one of my greatest misfortunes my not being able to serve you as my duty and gratitude require of me now you are in adversity'; and concluded his offer by declaring himself 'devotedly at the service of your lordship.'


Van Male to the Archduke, 7th March, 1618, *State Archive; Vienna*, vol. 54, f. 68.
the other. Gondomar, Van Male reports, pointed out to the King that such tactics would seriously jeopardise the success of the current marriage negotiations with Spain. The King, for his part, promised to moderate the orders and stressed that he would be understanding of any grievances the ambassador reported to him personally.

This was a trying time for the ambassador, his efforts to gain some relaxation of the recusancy laws for his co-religionists were to cause many upsets along England’s Protestant majority. One Norfolk minister, Willett, became a local hero by his attempts to raise money as a grant for the King so that he need not engage to acquire a Spanish dowry to prop up the failing exchequer. And still James would make no definite commitment to a Spanish marriage. Late in May, 1618 he asked the Privy Council to explore what conditions the Spanish would expect in religious matters and, at the same time, giving Gondomar a hint at a more advanced strategy which suggested that James no longer believed persecution of the Catholics to be necessary. Meanwhile some little leniency was being displayed, for example, a Suffolk Catholic who had nursed Gondomar was assured that she and her family would not suffer ‘for matter of religion’, 29 and the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbott, gave permission for many imprisoned Catholic clergy to travel to Spain with the retiring ambassador, provided ‘that they cleare themselves of all debts due unto their keepers or others, and of all ciuil actions whatsoever.’ 30 Fr. William Baldwin, accused by the apostate Ratcliffe of complicity in the Gunpowder Plot, was found innocent of all charges but not released from prison. 31 It is unlikely that he would have been released at all had not Gondomar ‘petitioned leave to take with him all the Catholic priests detained in the London prisons.’ 32

29 Buckingham to Gondomar, 18th June, 1618. S.R. Gardiner (ed.), The Forresque Papers. PRO, SP 94/23/45, Digby to Buckingham, 16th June, 1618. See also CSP Domestic, 1611-1618, pp. 547; 549.
Robert Branthwait to William Trumball notes, 'The Spanish Ambassador has left taking Father Baldwin with him. Sir Walter Ralegh noe question is well content with his absence, and can finde it in his heart at any time to part with such a friend.' A travelling companion of Baldwin's was to be Fr. Laurence Worthington who had been sent to England in 1612 by the Jesuit fathers. He was arrested and thrown into the Gatehouse prison in Westminster in 1615 where he remained confined for three years. On the intercession of Gondomar he and eleven other priests were released. He was moved from the Gatehouse to Marshalsea and then into banishment. A letter in the State Papers records, 'We whose names are here underwritten, prisoners in the Marshalsea for the Roman Catholic faith do willingly accept the gracious favour his Majesty is pleased to grant us at the insistence of the Earl of Gondomar, Lord Ambassador for the Catholic King of Spain.' On 15th June, 1618 Sir Allan Aspley, the Lieutenant of the Tower, was commanded by royal warrant to release Fr. Baldwin in order that he be taken to Spain in the company of the ambassador. Three other priests who joined this exodus were Fr. Alexander Fairclough, Fr. Bernard Stafford and Fr. Ralph Bickley. However, it is extremely unlikely that these gentlemen every reached Spain. Gondomar had agreed to take them abroad with him, never specifying any particular destination. In all probability they actually ended up in the Low Countries from whence they gradually slipped back into England. In London rumours were circulating that toleration was only a step away. Fear re-emerged and, in an attempt to calm the agitation Bacon summoned another meeting of the Star Chamber at which he gave fresh instructions that all the penal laws were to be rigorously enforced. Many

36 Alexander Fairclough, alias Pelham, 1575 - 1645; Bernard Stafford; Ralph Bickley, 1557 - 1619, Bellenger, Priests; Foley, Records, vols. 4 and 6.
37 I am indebted to Fr. A.J. Loomie, SJ for these suggestions.
were surprised that the same instructions should be re-published so soon.

Despite his personal success in the English court his ill-health led to the ambassador's return to Spain in the summer of 1618, but not before the Spanish Council had granted him the title of Count Gondomar. During his absence Gondomar left his secretary, Julian Sanchez de Ulloa in charge of the embassy. This young man was far more optimistic than his more experienced master and, in his letters home, expressed enthusiasm about the way in which the negotiations were progressing. He wrote to Philip that 'every day the affairs of the Catholic religion are improving'. Sanchez was also enthusiastic about Bacon's conduct, describing him as 'a very fine gentleman, well disposed and devoted to Spanish interests...he is pleased that the King has entrusted this affair of the pursuivants to him, because he sees that it is linked to the marriage which is now being discussed...and that the King is of a mind to do whatever is possible that it take effect.' 38

Sanchez also noted other signs of an easing of the load borne by the Catholics. He was pleased that Lord Sheffield, who was violently anti-Catholic, was to be removed as President of the Council of the North and that he was to be replaced by a 'moderate man without malice', Lord Scrope. 39 He was also pleased to note that the death of James Montague, Bishop of Winchester, as this opened the way for the appointment of Lancelot Andrewes to the see. He also appears to have been comforted by a report that James intended to remove 'all officials, whether secular or ecclesiastical' who seemed in any way opposed to the proposed match. Of course, Sanchez was not the only one who foresaw a change in policy towards the Catholics. Again rumours began to circulate so that it became necessary for the future of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations (James could not allow the Spanish to assume that he would so easily give in to their demands) that any ideas of a rapid move towards toleration should be quashed. For the purpose of underlining the

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38 Sanchez to Philip III, 20th July, 1618 Simancas, E2598, fol. 81.
King's intentions John Digby wrote to Gondomar explaining that the matter had been left in the hands of the Lord Chancellor. Bacon's letter, which was enclosed with Digby's, was that of July, 1618 noted above.

Whether the negotiations were safe in the hands of so young a representative as Sanchez or not, as early as the summer of 1619 it was decided that Gondomar, as the fittest man for the job, should return to England. It was believed that the King's confidence in the count would free his mind from any suspicions of Spain's intentions in Germany, and that Gondomar would be able to make James believe that a clause in the marriage treaty would allow for the restitution of the Palatine. 'The affair of the marriage of the Infanta Marie with the Prince of Wales,' he wrote to Philip on 15th September, 1619, 'is in no hurry, nor is it advisable to hasten it on, but rather to...take advantage of the opportunities which naturally and with good appearance delay it'. 40 His idea was, of course, that the longer he could spin out the negotiations the more pressure could be brought to bear on James, exacting from him the utmost in religious concessions. However, the toleration for which he had fought in his first stay in England was not universally sought and in a letter to Gondomar, dated August, 1619, William Baldwin advises that:

There is great discontent in the Spanish Court and particularly in the Roman court...that there has been as much persecution of the Catholics as in the past, but more so because the persecution in Ireland is incomparably greater, and even in England there has been a new enforcement of the law against catholic wives even though their husbands might be of a different faith. 41

When Gondomar returned to London in March, 1620, he was to find many changes amongst the men surrounding the King. The Howards, to the delight of those who hated Spain and Catholicism, had fallen from favour, while Nottingham, Wallingford and Lake had all been compelled or induced to resign their offices.

40 Lyons, Gondomar, p. 82.
41 DNB (sub nomine); Foley, Records, vol. 6, pp. 508 ff.; Simancas, E. 381. c. August, 1619
These men had been pensioners of the ambassador but men who disliked Spain and supported Frederick now filled their places. James's seeming infatuation with things Spanish had not changed however, so that Lando, reporting in 1621, confidently advised the Doge that 'the crown and sceptre of these realms seem at present to be in the hands of the Spanish ambassador almost absolutely. One hears daily of some fresh stroke, and the best ministers appear in great peril, as at the present moment the ambassador is devoting his chief attention to uprooting all plants which do not bend to his breath.' 42 This alleged hold over the King by Gondomar was deeply resented by Parliament. The increase in Popery, which the House attributed to the 'vigilancy of the Pope' and the printing and dispersing of 'popish seditious books and swarms of Priests and Jesuits' presently allowed into the country, was also deplored. 43 The Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbot feared that James was labouring 'to set up the most damnable and heretical doctrine of the Church of Rome, the whore of Babylon' in England, and John Donne, an apostate Catholic, in News from the Very Country, comments on how the numbers of Jesuits to be found around the country had increased saying,

Jesuits are like Apricocks, heretofore one suckled here and there in a great man's house, and cost dear: now you may have them for nothing in every cottage. 44

James underestimated and at times ignored the Englishman's inbred mistrust of Spain and Catholicism and rarely took the trouble to explain his policies to Parliament; hardly a wise action, especially when what he was doing ran counter to public opinion. For most of his life he had schemed to avoid war and pinned his hopes on a permanent entente with Spain. However, his subjects who feared that Spain had both the intention and the military might to strive for universal

42 Lando to the Doge, 5th February, 1621, CSP Venetian, 1619 - 1621, p. 552
monarchy did not like his policies of peace and friendship with that country. In December, 1621 a petition was presented before Parliament that listed the perceived dangers facing the country if the marriage negotiations were to continue. Sir Robert Phillips warned the King against the Spaniards when he noted that 'the designs of Spain are ever accompanied with falsehood, being resting on that great Roman monster, and when another member rose to defend the House of Austria, he was 'quickly stopped by the dislike of the House.' 45 The greatest fear was that the King of Spain was seeking an exclusive temporal monarchy as the same time as the Pope desired an exclusive spiritual supremacy over England. Popery, it claimed, was built on 'devilish positions and doctrines'. Abroad, the King's children were treated with contempt by a confederacy of Popish enemies backed by the King of Spain. At home matters were no better. The expectation of a Spanish marriage and the favour of the Spanish ambassador gave the Catholics such high hopes for the future that they resorted openly to the chapels of the foreign ambassador's, sent their children to the continent to be educated in the seminaries and had the properties which had been forfeited frequently restored to them. Further, their 'licentious and seditious' books were allowed to circulate freely and their priests 'found in every part of the kingdom'. The fear was that if something was not done they would soon place themselves in opposition to the law, and, with the support of foreign princes, they would carry all before them until they had succeeded in the 'utter subversion of the true religion'. James was advised to 'take his sword in his hand' and join with the other Protestant States against the incipient dangers of Spain and Catholicism. *Tom Tell-Troath* reminds James of the two roles he should fulfil:

The one is, to reestablish your owne children in Germany
The other, to preserve God's children in France.

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He goes on to further remind the King of the support he can expect from his subjects, should he choose war, and that his 'faithfull parliament hath already made you a liberall offer of our lifes, and fortunes, and every good Englishman hath since confirmed it in his particular devotion.' 46 Stricter enforcement of the Penal laws and the educating of Papist's children by Protestants were called for; they should be prohibited from crossing the seas and the restoration of forfeited property disallowed. Furthermore they begged the Prince of Wales should marry 'one of his own religion.' 47

James resented the actions of the Commons, and in particular their criticisms of the marriage negotiations, which he saw as an attack on his prerogative. He also felt a healthy concern that a godly foreign policy, as advocated by his critics, would only result in a general religious war, which would also force him into a humiliating dependence on Parliament. The King, 'still well affected to the match; first for the greatness of the portion, which was a million; secondly, that the Spaniards were a grave nation...were not so apt upon every slight occasion to come over and put this nation to charge', chose to continue negotiations, without the assistance of Parliament, as the only way of gaining the peaceful restoration of the Palatine and preventing the spread of war. 48 Although promises of restoration were made, Spain was not in a position to fulfil them. Other interests were involved and Spain was unable to make promises binding on the Emperor, Ferdinand II. Gondomar was delighted with James's action, calling the dissolution 'the best thing that has happened in the interest of Spain and Catholicism since Luther began to preach heresy a hundred years ago. The King will no longer be able to succour his son-in-law, or to hinder the advance of the Catholics.' 49

However, it would seem that Gondomar so seriously misread events that he

49 Gardiner, History, vol. iv, p. 266.
really believed that, by means of a royal marriage, the reconversion of England to Catholicism was a possibility. Like all Papists of the period, the Count greatly overestimated the numbers of English Catholics and was entirely unaware of the depth to which hatred of Rome, and Spanish Catholicism, had taken root in the minds of the mass of Englishmen. The belief that the example of the Infanta, the conversion of the Prince of Wales and the abolition of the penal laws would bring into the open vast numbers of Catholic sympathisers and make way for public and legal Catholic worship was foolish in the extreme. But Gondomar was not alone in his disillusion; James was equally deluded, believing, firstly, that the match could be used as a lever to force the Pope to denounce the Jesuit doctrine that it was the duty of all good Catholics to assassinate their Protestant princes and, secondly, that the Spanish valued their friendship with England so highly they would accept only limited concessions for their co-religionists. Given James's continued negotiations with Spain, it would be impossible to believe, as Michael Drayton hoped, that:

Our King James to Rome shall surely goe
And from his chaire the Pope shall overthrowe. 50

James's popularity was at low ebb during the early years of the 1620s, due mainly to his foreign policy but however unsuccessful his policies may have been, they were at least an attempt to adjust to the changes which were taking place all over Europe. He had, as we have seen, concluded a peace with the Spanish in 1604 and, although the peace conceded nothing that was vital, it did bring about material advantages, so that, as in the time of Henry VIII, economic ties underlined the rapprochement with Spain. James's parliamentary critics, who believed that his rightful place was at the head of the European Protestant interest, united to defy Catholicism, however, did not appreciate this. Advantages in trade, it would seem,

did not outweigh fear of Spain or Catholicism. The view remained that Spain had both the military capacity and the considered intention to strive for a universal monarchy and the reconversion of England to the 'old religion', and that this ambition was supported by the so-called Spanish party at court.

In order to understand the concerns and fears caused by James's policies it is important to remind ourselves of the assumptions underlying his persistent attempts at an entente. Firstly, Spain was the major power in Europe so that, consequently, no general peace could be obtained without her assistance. Secondly, James cannot be blamed for thinking that the long period of religious wars which had beset Europe were coming to an end, so that a permanent equilibrium between the Catholics and the Protestants could be established. James saw himself as the mediator and pacifier who would bring together all beliefs into one common faith, 'to have one religion as there is one King.' However, James was acutely aware that diplomacy could break down at any point, and on 11th March, 1622 he wrote of these fears to Charles saying, 'if my babie's credit in Spain mende not these things, I will bidde fair well to peace in Christendom, during oure tymes at leaste.'

Despite conditions on the Continent and the problems James was having with the Pope's terms for a dispensation the negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish match continued apace. Although as early as November, 1622 the Spanish Council had recognised that they must fail James (and, at least openly, Gondomar) refused to admit this. From the start James had been faced with Spanish demands that the Infanta should be allowed to exercise her religion publicly, that any children of the marriage should be educated as Catholics and that the Penal laws should be repealed. These demands would have been impossible to overcome, especially the last that required an act of Parliament; but James never tried, seriously, to resolve

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51 *CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607*, p. 739.
52 James to Charles and Buckingham in Goodman, *Court*, vol. i, pp. 257 - 258.
them. In spite of every reverse he was as anxious as ever to procure the Infanta’s dowry (set at £600,000) and Spanish mediation in Germany. He could not admit that the whole project had been futile from the beginning and that there was no peaceful means of restoring the Palatine. Between 1622 and 1624 he made concession after concession, as were Charles and Buckingham to do during their stay in Madrid. But the Spanish had also made concessions and in December, 1622 ceased to demand the repeal of the Penal laws and looked only for a promise from the King that he would cease to persecute their co-religionists. D’Ewes noted that ‘notwithstanding the Spanish never intended Prince Charles should marry the Infanta...yet did they not only abuse his Highness, thereby feeding his expectations with fair promises, but the King...also, by sending articles of the conclusion of it, to which his Majesty took a solemn oath’ before Spain’s ambassadors. This act seems to have confirmed in D’Ewes mind that James believed the match could succeed. He sees it further confirmed by ‘innumerable false rumours the Papists or Pseudo-Catholics daily spread of the time and manner’ of its celebration and by the ‘King’s own credulity’ in arranging a royal welcome for his future daughter-in-law and numerous entertainments for her pleasure. 53

Unexpectedly, in February, 1623, the Prince of Wales took it upon himself to travel to Madrid as his own ambassador for the hand of the Infanta. In quixotic mood Charles and Buckingham set off in a romantic disguise to woo her. Why they went must remain a perplexing question, but there can be little doubt that in the circumstances the venture was foolish in the extreme. Public opinion would be outraged, the heir to the throne endangered and the Spanish given a huge diplomatic advantage. Walter Yonge noted in his diary for May, 1623 that:

It is said also that few Englishmen can have access to the Prince at his now being in Spain, and that his own chaplains cannot come near him. Also, that the King of Spain requested that Lady Elizabeth and her children may be with

 Above all the Spanish could not be trusted, they were 'crafty, politque and religious, even to superstition and idolatrie,' and with the Prince in their hands they could then begin to make new demands for the English Catholics. As one contemporary note, 'whiles our prince is in Spaine, the Spaniards gett what they wist from us', whilst another exclaimed that 'alas our hands are now bound by absence of our most precious jewel.' Charles appeared infatuated with a young woman he had never seen, and such was his commitment to the idea of a Spanish marriage it is hardly surprising that James should have described the prince and Buckingham as 'dear venturous knights, worthy to be put in a new romance'. But this does not help to explain what lay behind their flight. Buckingham was later to insist that Charles had decided on the errand only after he had received a despatch from Spain, delivered by Endymion Porter, which was 'fraught with generalities, without any one particular or certainty at all'. Digby, on the other hand, was to claim before the House of Commons in 1626, that he had in his possession correspondence which proved that Buckingham was working hand in glove with Gondomar to bring about the conversion of the Prince of Wales to Catholicism. In Thomas Cogswell's opinion Charles's visit to Madrid was an attempt to put pressure on Spain either to relinquish her claim to the Palatinate or to accept that without it there would be no Anglo-Spanish alliance. He writes, 'if we understand that Charles was testing the Spanish resolutions on the Palatinate as well as fetching the Infanta, the Spanish journey indeed resembles ... a bold cavalry charge'. However, certain correspondence between Charles and Gondomar, leads us to view this journey, not as an impromptu reaction to events taking place on the

54 The Diary of Walter Yonge, p. 68.
57 27th February, 1624, Journals of the House of Lords, iii, p. 221.
continent but rather as the result of a reasonably long-standing understanding between the Prince and the ambassador, of which the King was fully aware. 59

Much of the following year was spent in grim expectation of the demands to be made by the Spanish. It was not a question of when the match would be concluded but at what cost. Nevertheless, in some quarters there were great expectations built on the proposed match. There were, setting aside the question of religion, great financial advantages in an alliance with Spain, and there was great excitement when the prince and Buckingham set out for Spain,

Our eagle is flown to a place yet unknown
To meet with the phoenix of Spain.

The Prince would return from Spain, not only with his bride but much more importantly, her not inconsiderable dowry,

The grandees of Spain
Will load Charles's wain
With the richest rubies that be;
And God what pearl
Will be given the girl
By the ladies of highest degree

And some men do say
The Dutchmen must pay
A great sum to make matters even;
So we shall have gold,
More than London can hold

Were the walls built as high as the heaven. 60

In a letter to his 'Sweete Boyes' dated 31st July, 1623, James reminds Charles of the financial importance of the match and begs his son to 'putte us out of this lingering paine one waye or other' as he 'knowe[s] not quhat to doe, if she come not this yeare, for the uerrie refreshing of my fleete with victalls hath cost mee eight thousands poundes, and thairfore ye hadde neede to haisten the payment of the dowrie.' 61

But the negotiations dragged on, not prospering despite concessions on the English side. Charles's shilly-shallying in Madrid bleached all credibility from his father's diplomacy and, despite the concession he made with the Spanish, he was unable to salvage anything from the ruins of his father's plans. However, one must argue that, no matter how foolish the prince's plan to act as his own ambassador may have appeared, it is James who must bear the ultimate responsibility for the ruin of his diplomacy; only he was in a position to refuse permission for the trip to go ahead but he showed his usual indecisiveness and his inability to deny his 'sweete boyes' any request. When news of the difficulties raised by the Pope regarding the granting of a dispensation, which even Gondomar seems not to have envisaged, began to circulate in England about May, it caused rejoicing rather than regret in the majority:

Now all the news upon the Exchange
Is of the golden Lady,
The Pope will not allow
King James shall be her daddy.

Count Buckingham and Cottington
With their Endymion swain,
Used their best tricks with Catholics
To bring our Prince to Spain.
But now he's there we need not feare,
The Lady must not marry:
God send our Charles safe home again
And let her worship tarry.

Now God preserve our king and prince,
And plague upon their foes,
With those that are Hispanolised,
Or would their country lose.
And grant that those who matches make
Before the parties woo,
May go sell matches up and down
As now poor French folkes do.

In the meantime, the Earl of Bristol, still in Spain, had sole responsibility for the marriage negotiations and the finalised treaty gave him Charles's proxy, placing

62 'I will discover to you the great desire of the King...not only for the conclusion of this business, but also that it should be concluded with brevity, and that the points touching religion give so much satisfaction to the Pope, that he may not only grant us the dispensation...but that he may be obliged to grant it.' Gondomar to King James, 19th September, 1622, cited Goodman, Court, vol. ii, p. 235.

him in a position whereby he might marry Charles to the Infanta at any time.

There were great celebrations when the two returned home and citizens everywhere expressed their relief that the prince had not brought with him a Spanish bride. 'Such spreading of tables with all manner of provisions, setting out whole hogsheads of wine and butts of sack, but specially such numbers of bonfires, both here and all along as he went, as was almost incredible', recorded one commentator, and all in order to celebrate this rebuff to Philip and Rome. 64 D'Ewes noted no less than three hundred and fifty five bonfires between Whitehall and the Temple Bar. And, just as 5th November had brought forth rhymes about 'remember', so 5th October naturally rhymed with 'sober' as in:

...on the 5th day of October
it will be treason to be sober. 65

Church bells rang out throughout the land in celebration of what Thomas Scott considered was due entirely to one fact; Charles had returned 'ALONE - o words of comfort.' 66 Never before had rejoicing so universal and so spontaneous been known in England. 67 The English renunciation of the catholic match provided a rallying point for the Protestants as can be seen from contemporary ballads that expressed the joy of the nation when the negotiations broke down, and Charles returned from Madrid without a bride. One, for example, ran thus:

He was received with a much joy
As was the wandering prince of troy
When he to Carthage went.
Some maudlin drunk did weep, and swore
That sweet Prince Charles should never more
Cross seas without consent.

They vowed they now would show their care,
for they had all in him a share
As to the tavern they all went,
And every fool his verdict spent,
And then the bells did ring. 68

64 Birch, *The Court and Times*, vol. ii, p. 422.
Another ran:

The son of our most noble King
Went to Spayne to fetch a thing,
Perhaps you've heard of it before:
But there was such a doe about her,
As I am very glad therefore.

I would to God his majesty
of Spayne were here a while to see
The jollity of our English nation,
Then surely he would never hope
That either he or else the Pope
Could make here a Roman plantation. 69

John Taylor's *Prince Charles his welcome from Spaine* includes a poem in which we learn that:

The bells proclaimed aloud in every steeple,
The joyfull acclamations of the people
The ordnance thundered with so high a straine,
As if great Mars they meant to entertain,
The bonfires blazing, infinite almost,
Gave such a heart as if the world did roast.
True mirth and gladnesse was in every place:
Thus sure I think, this sixt day of October,
Ten thousand men will goe to bed scarce (&c.)
This was a day a jewell well return'd,
For whom this kingdom yesterday so mourn'd.
God length his dayes who is the cause of this,
And make us thankfull for so great a blisse.

Taylor's description of the celebrations is different from most others in that it does not include any anti-Spanish, anti-Catholic comments or allusions. To Limon's mind this seems indicative of the fact that, at this time, Charles's return from Spain was not automatically associated with the breach with Spain but more with a general rejoicing for a loved one returned from a physically dangerous journey. 70

The seeming popularity of Charles and Buckingham with the people was not repeated with a number of courtiers who were unwilling to abandon the Anglo-Spanish entente. Spanish propagandists who spread the rumour that Charles was

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unable to consummate the marriage with the Infanta chose an apt image, for political impotence was a major problem for the prince and Buckingham, who were far from in control over the winter of 1623/24, despite their attempts to cool Anglo-Spanish relations, to recruit allies and to hold together the Protestant coalition. No matter how impressive their allies and their military plans they were pointless unless they could convince James that the Spanish had never been serious in their desire for a marriage settlement. Eventually, after tales of Spain's perfidy and duplicity, they were able to secure significant changes to both policy and personnel. Despite the demands for war, James was 'resolved not to break with Spain, nor to give them any reason to break with him, until he be sure that France will join very close with him, and other Catholic Princes and States which have the same interest against the greatness of Spain; as being of the opinion that all Protestants in Europe would be too weak a party to oppose it, and that they should join against Spain without drawing other Catholic princes into the action, it would be understood to be a war of religion.'

Gondomar further exhibited the firmness of his determination to aid Catholics in England in the case of Doña Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza, who resided in London. It is clear that this affair requires further investigation as the outcome has generally been seen as a resounding victory for the ambassador and one of the first steps towards his gaining the personal ascendancy over the King with which historians have traditionally credited him. This tradition rests primarily with S.R.

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72 L. Muñoz, Vida y Virtudes de la venerable Virgen Doña Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza. (Madrid, 1631, reprinted 1897); G. Fullerton, The Life of Luisa de Carvajal (1863); there is also a letter from Fr. De Paralta, Rector of St. Gregory's, Seville to Fr. Rodrigo de Cabredo, a former rector of St. Alban's, Valladolid, and dated shortly after Doña Luisa's death in 1614, which tells of her life, work and death in London, and gives an account of the posthumous honours accorded to her by the English Colleges of Seville and Valladolid. There can also be found in the archives of San Albano, Real Colegio de Ingleses, Valladolid a life of Doña Luisa by Fr. Michael Walpole. This work has appended a sheet in the hand of Muñoz which notes that he sent the work to the printer in 1632. I have been unable to find a printed copy of Walpole's life. See also M. E. Williams, St. Alban's College, Valladolid, for the part played by Doña Luisa in the formation of the English College in Valladolid and her assistance to young men who wished to enter the seminary and those newly arrived in England after their ordination.
Gardiner, who has remained the accepted authority on Anglo-Spanish relations during the period. In his view James was so impressed by the ambassadors handling of Doña Luisa’s case that he capitulated completely to the ambassador and was under his influence from that time forward. More recent scholarship rejects the traditional view of the King’s subservience to the Spanish ambassador, somewhat erasing the idea of the ambassador’s ascendency over James while still allowing an impression of the occasional manipulation of a weak King to linger. Writing in the mid-1960s Professor Charles Carter, although apparently agreeing with Gardiner’s view that the ambassador scored a resounding victory over the affair, asserts that it was the Privy Council who capitulated and not the King who yielded to his demands. By implication he leaves James free from any responsibility for Gondomar’s triumph. Calvin Senning, writing later, disagrees entirely with both Carter and Gardiner, arguing that regardless of who was the responsible party on the English side, the view that the affair was an outstanding victory for the ambassador is misleading if not completely erroneous.

A woman of intense religious fervour, Doña Luisa, a family connection of Lerma’s was born in Estremadura around 1566, to parents of the first nobility. Hers was a strict upbringing and from an early age she showed strong inclinations towards a religious life. On reaching her majority she refused to marry and withdrew from society exhibiting a saintliness and religious fervour that were to become the hallmark of her career. It was about this time that she was to come under the influence of the Jesuit Fathers. Sometime in the early 1590s she received a calling which was to take her to England in the service of the Catholics. The Anglo-Spanish peace of 1604 was to make this possible and Doña Luisa arrived in

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73 Descriptions of this incident which are derivative of Gardiner can be found in F. H. Lyons, *Diego de Sarmiento Acuña...*, pp 21 - 23; Wenceslao Ramírez de Villa-Urrutia, *La embajada del conde de Gondomar a Inglaterra en 1613* (Madrid, 1913), pp 38 - 40; F. J. Sánchez-Canton, *Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, conde Gondomar* (Madrid, 1935), pp 31, 97.
England in 1605 with little more than her religious faith to sustain her, and with the express purpose of serving the Counter-Reformation in England.

The vocation Doña Luisa had chosen was a courageous one; the undertaking was highly unconventional for a woman and, furthermore, she was entering a country whose antipathy towards Spain was coloured by fear of, and hostility to, Rome and the Catholic Church. Admittedly James, more naturally disposed towards toleration, did not share his subjects more extreme prejudices, but the Papal deposing power and the Jesuit’s doctrine of tyrannicide, coupled with the King’s own fear of assassination still rendered the Catholic community suspect in his eyes.

The Catholics were a minority, who were disliked, mistrusted and treated with contempt. All around them the Protestants saw plots and intrigue, both real and imagined, some of which nearly succeeded, all of which were directed at the Established Church and the state. Since the time of the Reformation there had been many plots aimed at disposing of the monarch and which left the country in the grip of an anti-Catholic fever. The priests, with their ‘exorcisms, whisperings, sprinklings, censings and fantastical rites’ might be castigated as slaves to the ‘infamous transubstantial solecism’, but it was the Jesuits, those ‘troubler[s] of all Christian waters’, who, credited with fanatical courage and the engineering of intrigues against the state, bore the brunt of anti-Catholic fervour. 75 In Europe the Catholic Church was gradually gaining ground and most Englishmen, identifying Catholicism with absolutism and arbitrary government, believed that it was the aim of Rome, through its Spanish agents, to impose this form of government on England. These beliefs were fostered by anti-Catholic writers and pamphleteers who made sure that there could be no doubt that, should the Catholics succeed, all good

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75 T. Middleton A Game at Chess I, i, line 196. The Society of Jesus was established by the Papacy in 1540 as a special ‘fighting unit’ at the total disposal of the Pope. From the beginning, the Jesuits were conceived in a military mode. Soldiers of Christ, they were given two purposes: to propagate the religious doctrine and moral law of the Catholic Church and to defend the rights and prerogatives of the Pope.
Protestants would face death as they had done during the reign of Mary I, when nearly three hundred men and women had been burned at the stake as heretics. These then were the conditions prevailing when Doña Luisa arrived in England in April, 1605. She settled in London, avoiding the company of other Spaniards, close to the Spanish ambassador’s residence in the Barbican, where she soon became a source of solace to the Catholic laity. Her presence caused considerable annoyance to the Protestant clergy, owing, in part, to her proselytising habits, but also because she was known to shelter Jesuits and other priests and waited on those who had been thrown into jail. Furthermore, in defiance of the law she aided several young men and women to enter religious communities abroad. Eventually, at the request of her family, Doña Luisa was persuaded, for her own safety to move into the residence of the Spanish ambassador de Zuñiga.

Shortly before leaving Spain she had established, from her personal fortune, the first noviciate in the English province of the Jesuits. This institution, at Louvain, was set aside for the sole use of Englishmen, serving as a preparatory school for colleges training priests who would, hopefully, someday carry the Counter-Reformation into England. With the re-conversion of England as its goal it is hardly surprising then that she and her foundation soon became of particular interest to the English authorities. Doña Luisa also became involved in the development of the English College in Valladolid. She held a high regard for the

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76 When Robert Drury, a former student of the English College, Valladolid, was jailed, Doña Luisa visited him on many occasion to discuss the position of Catholics vis-à-vis the Oath of Allegiance.
77 A Jesuit, resident in London at the time, wrote of Luisa's actions thus: It would seem as if this lady had been sent here for the express purpose of shaming our want of courage. The example she sets us by her bold profession of the Catholic faith, and her desires for martyrdom, are a rebuke to our timidity.
78 Doña Luisa's several biographers note that in her will, dated Valladolid, 22nd December, 1604, of which Fr. Richard Walpele was named executor, she left twenty thousand ducats for this foundation. The Noviciate of the English Province, Louvain was established by Fr. Parsons in 1606-07. It opened its doors in February, 1607 with six priests, two scholastics and five Temporal Coadjutor novices. See Foley, Records.
79 Trumball notes that within 4 years she had collected some 30,000 crowns in charitable donations from her acquaintances in London for the work at Louvain. Trumball to Salisbury, PROSF 77/10/116d.
former students of this college who had suffered in England for their religion. She had read of the martyrdom of Edmund Campion and his companions and was particularly affected by the account of the life and death of Henry Walpole, who had been a staff member at the College. Her Jesuit confessor introduced her to the English fathers at the College, and took a small house nearby. She is said to have left this house to the English College and tradition has it that it forms part of the original buildings. Visitors to the College will find that, even after this time, Doña Luisa holds a very special place in the hearts of the staff and students. There is a full length picture of her outside the Vice Rector's office.
contemporaries Doña Luisa was filled with horror by the details of the torture and death of young men in England and it was this which led her to conceive a plan to travel to England to offer her services to Valladolid’s former students who were now missionaries in their own country. As well as providing succour for her co-religionists it would appear that as a propagandist for Rome she was extremely able, and, although conversion to Rome was regarded under English law as traitorous, she never lacked converts. 81 These she gained by her persuasive knowledge of her faith and by distributing alms and other favours to the poor and needy.

However, she was not to escape unscathed and in 1608 she and two other women were arrested for publicly denying Queen Elizabeth’s legitimacy and for trying to convert four or five shop-men. 82 Fr. Michael Walpole notes in a letter to Fr. Robert Parsons that: ‘D.L. was in some trouble these days past...Some blame her of indiscretion, but as she relateth the matter she could hardly excuse anything, she said, and besides spake it with such circumstances and moderation that the hearers took no offence at these words which are most blamed, but only at her being Catholic, and giving so good and resolute reasons of her faith.’ 83 They were released five days later following the intercession of the Spanish ambassador, de Zúñiga, and, advised by him to leave the country, she appears to have become slightly more discreet in her efforts for a short time. In 1610, however, she was again rebuked by the government for continuing to visit Catholics in prison and was warned that such behaviour could not be tolerated. Indeed there is some evidence that the Privy Council contemplated expelling her from the kingdom at that early date.

In 1611 Doña Luisa moved to a hired house in Spitalfields were, although

81 Fullerton, Life, pp. 163, 180 - 181, 203 - 212.
82 Fullerton, Life, p. 219.
83 Michael Walpole, Doña Luisa’s first biographer, alias Christophorson, 1570 - 1620; Robert Parsons, see Bellenger, Priests, p. 94. Foley, Records vol. 2. p. 502.
living 'very frugally', she kept a large Catholic, female staff, whom she trained to the religious life and who had 'veils and religious habits and a bell', 'just as if, blessed be God,' she wrote, 'we were...in a convent.' The new, ultra-Calvinist and anti-Spanish, Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbott, was inclined to agree with the lady arguing that so many Catholic women under one roof looked suspiciously like a nunnery, the inmates making vows and leading the lives of Spanish nuns.

He had made a number of attempts to place a spy in her house but without success. Not to be put off the Archbishop appealed to the King asking for a royal order to arrest Doña Luisa and her ladies. James does not appear to have been unduly worried by Doña Luisa, and in fact, the strict enforcement of the penal laws had been slightly relaxed at this time.

Soon though, a new upset gave good cause for James to listen to the complaints of the Archbishop. In June, 1613 the Jesuit theologian Francisco Suárez published his Defensio Fidei. This book, a worthy successor to those of Robert Bellermine, contained a systematic refutation of Anglican belief, an attack on James’s policy towards the Catholics (in particular respect of the Oath of Allegiance), an affirmation of the papal dispensing power and a defence of the doctrine of tyrannicide. The appearance of this book upset James considerably; he declared it to be a ‘most outragious booke’, which ‘flyeth like a furious mastiffe directly at my throat...’ so that in consequence he was left more inclined to listen to Abbott's concerns over the activities of Doña Luisa.

On 18th October, 1613 some sixty armed men entered her house with the intention of arresting the household.

84 Gondomar's account of the Carvajal affair to Philip III, 16th November, 1613. Simancas, E2590/8 and 10. Fullerton, Life, p. 245. In November, 1613 Gondomar had denied that this was possible 'of a person who possesses such good judgement as this lady'. Simancas, E2590/8 and 10. However he was later to admit that she had a house 'where she founded in it a residence of nuns...' Gondomar to Philip III, 20th June, 1621, Simancas, E2602/14. Fullerton, Life, p. 292.

85 CSP Venetian 1615-1617, vol. XIV, no. 908, p 600.


The magistrates conducted a thorough search of the house but were unable to find anything of an incriminating nature, including the ladies priest, Michael Walpole, who was disguised as a servant. Gondomar and Ferdinand de Boisschot, the Flemish resident, who had both arrived at the scene, appealed to Sir Henry Montagu, the Recorder, to release Doña Luisa into their custody, and allow her to remain in her own house where Gondomar would be personally responsible for her to the King. Montagu, however, refused despite the ambassador’s insistence and the four ladies were delivered to the archbishop’s house in Lambeth. Gondomar sent a second appeal for their release to Abbott but the archbishop again rejected his request. The ladies were questioned but their answers only seemed to strengthen Abbott’s belief in his conviction that they were no less than a religious order. Doña Luisa, he wrote, had ‘set up a nunnerie in London...gathering young women unto her, and using them as in a monastery. She is herself a Jesuitess, and so are all her disciples, apparelled in every respect as the Jesuit’s women.’ Furthermore, he notes, they were ‘a great scorn to the justice of the state’. The ladies were ordered to be detained in jail, Doña Luisa and one of her companions in the Gatehouse in Westminster, ‘amongst heretics and malefactors’, and the other two ‘placed amongst the Catholics’, in the adjoining Convict prison.


90 Fullerton, *Life*, pp. 295 - 296. She notes that there were ‘five young persons’ with Doña Luisa when the house was invaded, ‘all virtuous and holy maidens’. One, however, was seriously ill and could not be moved. She died the next day. Another, who was in the kitchen at the time, subsequently fled. The remaining ladies were taken into custody. Taking Gondomar’s reports at face value, S.R. Gardiner seems to believe that her companions were merely ‘a large retinue of English servants’, and that the rumours of her running a nunnery were nothing more than the paranoia of the English Protestants. Gardiner, *History* vol. II, p. 222. It seems clear to me that, if not actually professed nuns, these ladies were more than common servants.

91 Abbott to Trumball, 29th October, 1613. *Downshire*. vol. iv, p. 239.

Abbott’s description of Doña Luisa as a ‘Jesuitess’ is not without significance. There is some evidence to show that he believed her community to be connected in some way with Mary Ward’s Institution of the Blessed Virgin Mary in London. The name is one that was used for this lady and her community since their order and rule was based on that of the Society of Jesus. The Institute, established in St. Omer in 1609, was an attempt by Mary Ward to create a missionary role for unmarried, Catholic English women whose apostolate was directed towards other women, and the re-conversion of England through the education of young girls. Despite hostility from the established Church the Institute flourished for over ten years.

Once imprisoned it would seem that Luisa’s only request was that she be allowed the Blessed Sacrament to be brought to her. Although warned of the danger in which this act would place her, she was adamant and, despite the watchful eyes of her jailers, managed somehow or another to communicate every day. As soon as the Countess of Gondomar, Doña Constanza, heard of her imprisonment she went immediately to bear the afflicted lady company. Writing to Philip III on 16th November, 1613, the ambassador informed the King that his wife and the wife of the Flemish ambassador, Doña Anna-Maria, had been in ‘constant attendance on Doña Luisa for the three days that the imprisonment lasted by carrying food to her from my house’. To this he added the rider that, although he feared this action on the part of his wife may have been construed as an ‘extravagant proceeding’, he believed that his ‘Catholic Majesty’s Ambassador ought to do all this.’

93 There is some evidence that Doña Luisa may have met Mary Ward in London in 1613. See G. Anstruther, A Hundred Homeless Years: English Dominicans, 1558-1658 (1958), pp. 95-96; A. C. F. Beales, Education under Penalty: English Catholic Education from the Reformation to the Fall of James II, 1547-1689, (1963), pp. 203-204


95 The wife of the Flemish ambassador had taken a fancy to Doña Luisa and visited her often. Between them they arranged that the Blessed Sacrament be housed at the Flemish embassy. The idea caught on, much to the annoyance of the English authorities, and soon France and Venice followed suit.

The chief charges against Doña Luisa and her associates seem to have been that she founded a convent in England, that she tried to persuade everyone she met to abandon their religion and become Catholics and had already done so in many cases. The conclusions of the Council of State were that she should be expelled from the kingdom and returned to Spain. The ambassador appeared before this Council and spoke eloquently on Doña Luisa's behalf, arguing that the accusations did not warrant such a decision and that anyway the facts had been fabricated and could not be proved. Gondomar, determined not to be put off by his unsuccessful attempts with the Council and Abbot, decided to go straight to James with his protests. Since the King was at Royston at the time a letter was dispatched via an embassy secretary on the day after Doña Luisa's imprisonment. As was the ambassador's way the letter was polite but firm, stating Gondomar's indignation over what he considered to be the injustice of the Council towards Doña Luisa. She had come to England, he explained, only for the 'pleasure of living here, as she had done without doing harm or giving bad example to anyone.' The charge that she had set up a convent he considered preposterous, 'as if this could be believed of a person who had such good judgement as this lady', and besides, he argued, how could it have been done without his noticing it. The allegations, Gondomar insisted, where fabricated by Archbishop Abbot and others who had a hatred of Spain. The ambassador concluded his missive by begging 'your Majesty not to permit that I be insulted in this way... and that the lady be handed over to me'. 97 James, having already been informed by the Council of the state of play, had reached a decision on the matter and on receiving the ambassador's letter was able to give an immediate response in the form of a message delivered by the secretary, who was instructed to repeat it to his master. 98

97 Downshire. vol. iv, pp. 231, 240.
98 Remarks of James I to Frances Fowler, language secretary to the Spanish Embassy, 29th October, 1613 in Gondomar's despatch to Philip 16th November, 1613. 841 f. 118 DIE, vol. III. pp. 100 - 103.
What happened when Gondomar received the King's reply is not altogether clear, except that he refused to accept James's terms. It would seem that more negotiations took place between Gondomar and the Council who referred him to a clerk to the Council, 

Francis, Lord Cottington, who was empowered to act in the matter but the discussions always seemed to end with the demand that she leave England. After several days of earnest debate the Council gave orders that Doña Luisa should be released into the care of the Spanish ambassador, on which occasion Muñoz comments that everyone was impressed by the ambassadors' spirited and firm resistance both at the council table and in the private discussions with Cottington'. 101 The whole affair was a fiasco in Gondomar's eyes, 'one of the greatest anxieties' of his career in England. 102 He had been unable to gain the lady's release on terms that he considered honourable, and furthermore, he believed that the affair reflected badly on both his own and his countries reputation.

Meanwhile, both Boisschet and Buisseaux were acting in support of the ambassador and Doña Luisa. Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador, with whom Gondomar had quarrelled quite violently, who neither came to Doña Luisa's aid at the time of her arrest nor afterwards, does not appear to have said or done anything on her behalf, despite knowing the lady for two years, her house adjoining his in Spitalfields and allowing her to make a gateway between their two properties that she might attend Mass as she pleased. Gondomar was unimpressed by such treatment by the representative of a Catholic state and seems to have suspected Foscarini of being an accessory to the lady's arrest. 103

100 It should be noted here that it was only Doña Luisa who was released at this time. The other ladies remained some time longer.
102 Gondomar to the Duc of Lerna, November, 6th, 1613. *DIE*, vol. III, pp. 151, 152 - 153
103 CSP Venetian. vol. XIV App. nos. 906, 907, 908. pp. 595, 598 - 600; *Foley*, vol. VII.
Not to be cast aside so easily, the ambassador took the bull by the horns and decided to force the issue. To the Council's answer that the lady should be released into his care provided he give his word that she should be returned to Spain forthwith, he returned a flat refusal. Doña Luisa he considered to be an exceptionally respectable woman who was blameless of the accusations made against her and he felt that to banish her in this manner was insulting both to her and to the office that he held. However, he asserted that if banishment was the only way to obtain her release then he, too, would leave England forthwith. It is not precisely known whether the Council informed James, who was still out of town at the time, of Gondomar's ultimatum nor whether the King made any response to it but it would seem likely that such a turn of events would have been reported to him by his ministers. At this point the Council did a complete turn-about, departing from the original instructions received from the King, and ordering the release of Doña Luisa into the ambassador's care without any conditions attached. 104

Gondomar, in his account of Doña Luisa's release, is strangely reticent over the part the King played in the Council's decision. Munoz, however, is not so silent, stating quite firmly that 'after four days of earnest arguing on both sides, the King cut the matter short, and gave orders that Luisa should be given up to the Spanish Ambassador'. 105 The annual letters of the Jesuit mission for 1614 also imply that it was the King's actions that brought about the lady's release. 106 There can be little doubt that some royal intervention must have taken place, since the terms under which she was released differed diametrically to those originally given. Either way James is at least as responsible as the Council for Doña Luisa's release.

Gondomar might have brought about the release of Doña Luisa, but it was not totally unconditional. She was released into his care providing that she remained in the precincts of the embassy and had 'no commerce with any of the

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104 Fullerton, Life, pp 298 - 299.
105 L. Muñoz, in Fullerton, Life, p. 299.
106 Foley, Records, vol. VIII, 1053.
king’s subjects'. 107 Free Doña Luisa may be, but the Council was not still, being very much determined that she should leave the country. They eventually set a deadline, demanding that she ‘be shipped out of the Kingdom and a day is appointed’. 108

Despite the fact that Doña Luisa’s release was not a complete vindication of her actions, Gondomar still accepted her into the embassy, intending to keep up his fight to allow her to remain in England thereby defeating James’s ‘wholesome resolution...to send away that gossip Donna Louyse’. 109 On 8th November Gondomar had a meeting with James, who had returned to London, at which he assured the King that the charges laid against Doña Luisa were entirely false and those responsible for the slanders should be summarily punished. James could not agree with the ambassador; not only Archbishop Abbot, but many others had advised him of her actions; she had caused a great scandal and no matter in how high esteem he held the ambassador he could do no more than insist on her removal as soon as possible.

Not being entirely sure that he could prevail on the ambassador to send Doña Luisa home to Spain, the King ordered his ambassador in Madrid, John Digby, to beg Philip to command her to leave England, and to ensure that Gondomar see the order carried out. Doña Luisa, afraid that she would be compelled to leave England, a country where she felt she was needed spiritually, decided to write (20th November, 1613), placing the facts before the Duke of Lerma, entreating him to speak to the King on her behalf. This impassioned letter laid the facts of the case before Lerma. She assured the Duke of her vocation in England and gently complained that the ‘spirit and determination of Don Diego’ had robbed her of the ‘glorious crown’ which seemed within reach, and, she goes on, ‘I have a great hope

107 Fullerton, Life. p. 300; Abbot to Trumball, 29th Oct. 1613. Downshire. vol. iv, pp. 239 - 240
that they will seize on some time or opportunity when Don Diego will not know of it, and wait perhaps till he is no longer here'. She continued to plead her case, requesting Lerma 'never to accede to the desires of those who seek through your means to procure my departure'. This was to no avail, Philip desiring Gondomar to arrange for Luisa's departure to Flanders, where she was to be met by the King's sister, the Infanta, Doña Isabel. Even this does not seem to have shaken the ladies' resolve, informing the ambassador that she would never remove to Flanders of her own accord. It is probable, however, that, had not death released her from the necessity of complying with the King's demands, she would have been obliged to give way.

Doña Luisa's death on 2nd January, 1614, her birthday, at the age of forty-eight, relieved Gondomar of one problem but he was still left with that of her three companions who remained incarcerated. After many difficulties, especially with Abbot, the ambassador finally succeeded in obtaining their release also. Anne Jay, Joan Mills and Frances Needham were ordered to be released on 25th January, 1614 and were taken to the embassy where they joined a maid of Doña Luisa and two of their companions who had avoided their fate. Peace and freedom was not to remain theirs for long - three weeks after their release they were again arrested. Evidently Abbot feared that, as these six ladies continued to live together, there was a grave danger that they intended to re-establish Doña Luisa's community. Again, working tirelessly on behalf of his co-religionists, Gondomar obtained their release for the second time - on the understanding that they would cease to live together.

A Requiem Mass was celebrated for Doña Luisa in the embassy chapel on 12th January, 1614 by Fray Diego de la Fuente OF, confessor to both Doña Luisa and the ambassador. The Mass was attended by the ambassadors of France, Flanders and Savoy along with a number of Italian, French and Portuguese gentlemen and a

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110 A full translation of the text of Doña Luisa's letter to Lerma can be found in Fullerton, Life, pp. 302 - 303.
sizeable number of English Catholics, who risked gaining the King's displeasure in attending. Her remains were entombed in an especially built vault next the high altar, there to await the return of Gondomar to Spain, when he intended to escort her remains himself. However, he was to be disappointed in this desire as her friends and relatives at home demanded that they be returned. In the summer of 1615 they were carried to Spain escorted by Fray de la Fuente and Fr. Michael Walpole, much to the relief of the King, his Council and Archbishop Abbot.

Whatever the reasons behind Abbott’s actions against Doña Luisa and her companions may have been it was bound to produce an angry outburst from Gondomar. From the moment of their arrest the ambassador had devoted himself to their defence. Such interest was, of course, only to be expected from the representative of the ladies native land, However, Gondomar's concern did not derive entirely from the duties of his office. Doña Luisa was his co-religionist whom he 'esteemed as a holy and exemplary' woman, and he was a sincerely devout man who regarded Protestantism as an abomination which should be crushed. A dedicated son of the Church he would do anything in his power to assist Doña Luisa. Also, the lady was a companion to Doña Constanza, and the ambassador himself looked on her as a sister so that her present condition caused him considerable personal distress.

However, recent scholarship suggests that these considerations do not altogether explain the depth of Gondomar's concern in the affair. Doña Luisa was, after all, no ordinary Spanish Catholic lady and, because of the nature of her

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111 Doña Luisa had wished her body to be taken to Flanders and to be interred at the new noviciate she had helped to found in Louvain. Her remains were laid to rest in the Monasterio de la Encarnación, Madrid after services at the English colleges in Valladolid and Seville. She left behind several books of religious poems and other writing and, as several miracles were reported as a result of her intercession, the cause for her beatification was addressed at the beginning of the twentieth century. This was not proven so that very little was then heard of her until recently when moves have again been made towards her beatification. L. Muñoz, Vida y Virtudes de la venerable Virgen Doña Luisa de Carvajal y Mendoza (Madrid, 1631) chp. 39 describes her burial in Madrid and the services held for the repose of her soul at the English colleges in Valladolid and Seville.

112 Fullerton, Life, pp 305 - 308.

113 Fullerton, Life, pp. 148, 183, 246.
mission, she had attracted the attention of several important officials within the Catholic Church, not least amongst who was the Pope himself, who endorsed her work. She was, furthermore, of the Spanish nobility and connected in some way to the most important figures in the Spanish government. Philip himself held her in high esteem and supported her in England with a pension of 500 reals a month. It was only to be expected that so well connected a lady should be assured of the ambassador’s attention.

Authority for this affair originates, as does most of the history of Gondomar’s embassy, from Gardiner. He argues persuasively but one must remember what his sources were making his version of events flawed in several incidences. Gardiner documents the sequel to Doña Luisa’s arrest and Gondomar’s part in her release thus:

Sarmiento as soon as he heard what had been done, directed his wife to go immediately to Lambeth, and ordered her to remain with the lady till she was liberated. Having thus provided that at least a shadow of his protection should be extended over her, he went at once before the Council, and demanded her release. Failing to obtain redress, he sent one of his secretaries, late as it was in the evening, with a letter to the King. James, hearing a stir in the ante-chamber, came out to see what was going on. As soon as he had read the letter, he told the secretary that ever since Donna Luisa had been in England, she had been busy in converting his subjects to a religion which taught them to refuse obedience to a King whose creed differed from their own. She had attempted to set up a nunnery in his dominions. If an Englishman had played such tricks at Madrid, he would soon have found his way to the Inquisition, with every prospect of ending his life at the stake. He was, however, disposed to be merciful, and would give orders for the immediate release of the lady, on condition of her engaging to leave England without delay. The next morning a formal message was brought to Sarmiento, repeating the proposal which had thus been made. There are probably few men who, if they had been in Sarmiento’s place, would not have hesitated a little before rejecting the offer. To refuse the King’s terms would be to affront the man upon whom so much depended. Sarmiento did not hesitate for a moment. The lady, he said, had done no wrong. If the King wished it, she would no doubt be ready to leave England at the shortest notice. But it must be clearly understood that in that case he, as the Ambassador of his Catholic Majesty, would leave England at the same time. The answer produced an immediate effect. That very evening Donna Luisa was set at liberty, and Sarmiento was informed that her liberation was entirely unconditional.

Gardiner is, in fact, mistaken in several minor details of this account.

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114 *Die*, vol. III, pp. 87, 148, 272 - 273. For further discussion of Philip's esteem for the lady see, for example, Fullerton, *Life* pp. 167, 199, 270, 282, 286.

Gondomar did complain to James, who was out of town at the time, and the King in turn sent a message to the Council (which he says he intended to do all along) ordering the release of Doña Luisa on condition that she left the country. The Privy Council duly forwarded the message to the ambassador the following day. However, Gondomar’s refusal to accept the King’s terms for the lady’s release and his ultimatum to leave the country if Doña Luisa left was not made to the King, as Gardiner asserts, but to the Council. Furthermore it was the Council who relented and ordered Doña Luisa’s release without the proviso of her having to leave the country. It was not until sometime later that James and Gondomar were able to discuss the matter, when James expressed his surprise at hearing the lady was still in residence in London. Gondomar expressed a vague suggestion that her health prevented her from travelling and the matter was dropped. Her timely death prevented the matter from causing any further friction between the two men.

It is plain then that Gardiner’s account of the incident contains such minor errors of detail as to alter substantially the nature of the affair. Sadly others, who, in their retelling of the affair, have been unable to provide any new evidence to substantiate their work, have compounded these errors further.

Lyons, for example, tells the story very much along the same lines as Gardiner. He is correct in saying that ‘James sent him [Gondomar] a message offering the release of Doña Luisa at once on condition that she should leave England as quickly as possible’, but omits to note that James intended that the ultimatum should be delivered by the Council. He goes on; ‘Sarmiento coolly replied that...he would leave England too...James climbed down and ordered Doña Luisa to be set at liberty.’ 116 Gondomar by no means accepted the ultimatum coolly, he was furious and made his reply not to the King but to the Council and, as already noted, James did not climb down nor did he order her release; he did not even know until

his return to London that it had been done.

Gardiner at least sees the incident for what it was and does not assign to it any hidden political agenda. Villa-Urrutia, unconcerned by any lack of documentary evidence, expands on both Gardiner and Lyons. When Gondomar received the news that Doña Luisa had to leave the country, Villa-Urrutia maintained ‘our Don Diego looked higher and further’ than would any ‘less expert and less spirited’ an ambassador, and ‘understood that he could never attain anything in the long run with James if he did not subdue him in this; so he decided to give battle, and answered the King that...he would leave with her. That same afternoon they freed Doña Luisa without conditions, and from that time on the King was at the mercy of the Ambassador.’

It has always been accepted that solely the lady’s flaunting her religious beliefs before the authorities brought about the reason for the invasion of Doña Luisa’s house. However, an important point that the accepted authorities on the affair seem to have overlooked is the presence in the house of Fr. Michael Walpole. This eminent Jesuit, apart from having been Doña Luisa’s confessor, was the Superior of the Jesuit’s English Mission. The annual letters of the English Mission for 1614 suggest that the authorities, ‘in order to make sure of his capture’ surrounded Doña Luisa’s house ‘at an early hour’ with ‘a posse of armed men, who made their entrance after forcing six or seven doors’. The report goes on to tell how Doña Luisa burned Fr. Walpole’s letters to stop them ‘falling into the hands of the heretics’. Meanwhile M. de Buserte [Boisschot], ambassador to Prince Albert, having arrived on the scene, saw Fr. Walpole ‘bareheaded, shabbily clothed and disguised as a servant’ and, in order to save him from discovery, ‘called to him an imperious tone’ and, speaking to him in Spanish directed him to take a message to his mistress, thereby leading the constables to believe him to be a Spanish servant to Doña Luisa.

117 W.R. de Villa-Urrutia, La embajada del conde de Gondomar á Inglaterra en 1613. p. 97
On the constable’s departure Fr. Michael accompanied the ambassador to his residence. 118

Strangely this version of events is not suggested by any of the commentators who have written at length on the Carvajal affair and, whether or not there is anything more in it than propaganda on the part of the Jesuits is difficult to assess. Admittedly the authorities would have been overjoyed to have laid their hands on so prominent a Jesuit priest but the fact that no other contemporary writers offer this reason for the raid on Doña Luisa’s house makes one feel that in all probability the presence of Fr. Walpole was not known by the authorities and it was the lady herself they were anxious to apprehend.

The Carvajal incident, on which has been placed so much interest, is, in actual fact, of little particular importance when it comes to considering the development of the two major player’s relationship. Whatever influence Gondomar may or may not have had on the King was the result of a long and intimate relationship based on a mutual friendship. This is not, of course, to say that the ambassador never desired to score a point over James. There can be little doubt that throughout the whole affair Gondomar supported Doña Luisa and acted in an energetic and resolute manner. Furthermore, at the close of the affair the lady herself wrote that he had employed for all to see a ‘zeal for religion and the honour of Spain, which certainly is great and has given much satisfaction’. 119

Incidents such as that at Portsmouth and the Carvajal affair and royal threats of war are obviously at the extremes of the scale and are unusual. No relationship could last as long as this one did if it was based purely on episodes such as these. Documentary evidence confirms that the nature of the relationship between these two men lies firmly at the centre of these two extremes. Garrett Mattingly is probably the most accurate commentator on the relationship between

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118 Foley, Records vol. VIII, 1051 - 1054
119 Fullerton, Life: p. 304.
James and the Spanish ambassador. He writes: 'the real key to Gondomar's success in England lay in his relation to James I. It was not a simple one; certainly it was not, as it has sometimes been represented, just the dominance of a weak character by a strong one; much less, the gulling of a fool by a knave. James was a complex character in whom elements of weakness were surprisingly mixed with traits of real strength; Gondomar, at least, never made the mistake of under-rating him. Nor did he achieve his influence at a stroke...it was the work of years.' 120

120 G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy. p. 262.
Chapter 5
The United Provinces and England

The object of this chapter is to study the aims and objectives of the Dutch ambassador and the several commissions that came to London during the period and to examine their status and precedence and the outcomes of their missions. It considers whether the role of the ambassador of the States General was, in principle, the same as that of the Spanish representatives and asks what were the instructions given to Caron and how his instructions differed from those of the Spanish ambassadors.

The most obvious difference between the two embassies was that the Dutch only had two ordinary ambassadors in London during the years of James’s reign. Of these two men, Sir Noel de Caron and Albert Joachim, de Caron served twenty-two years and Joachim only a few months prior to the King’s death. Throughout his embassy de Caron was supported by three Extra-ordinaries and thirty-four commissioners who came to England on various missions but which were mostly concerned with the trading and fishing problems that arose between the two states. In the same period the Spanish sent five ordinary ambassadors supported by six Extra-ordinaries, four agents, two commissioners and three special envoys, sent on various missions but who were chiefly concerned with negotiations for peace or marriage. The previous chapters have given an in-depth discussion of the role of probably the most well-known of Spain’s ambassadors - this chapter will concentrate on a comparative study of Sir Noel de Caron and the role of the Dutch commissioners and the diplomacy relating to the emerging political and economic confidence of the United Provinces. Noel de Caron was not so flamboyant as the Spanish ambassador, preferring to work steadily to reach agreement on diplomatic matters rather than to make a hue and cry over his affairs. Unlike Gondomar we do

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1 For the purposes of this work I refer only to the commissions sent by the States General. Many other commissions came to England during this period but these were, for the main part, sent by the Dutch East India Company to treat directly with its English counterpart.
not find reports of the Dutch envoy ranting and railing over questions of protocol nor do we find him acting rashly in the heat of the moment. Instead we find a pragmatic diplomat who quietly goes about his business, distributing pensions and largesse where it will serve the best ends.

The diplomacy of the United Provinces at the beginning of the seventeenth century was still relatively uncomplicated: a proto-nation in an on-going rebellion against the Spanish world power could not enjoy the advantage of a long tradition in international affairs. Prior to the Revolt, foreign policy had been the exclusive prerogative of the Habsburg princes, and the only consistent policy of the Provinces had been to financially support as little as possible the Habsburg adventures. The province of Holland, which dominated the policy of the rebels, had previously cultivated only one main foreign interest: that of free fishing and trade rights in the North Sea and the Baltic - in short, the safety of the seas for the Dutch sailors, fishermen and merchantmen.

The rebellion had led the Dutch into a war of survival or extinction, and it was clear that France and England, with their conflicting but mainly anti-Spanish interests in the Netherlands, were its natural allies. The aims of the war party were simple: the security and monopoly of the Protestant religion, independence and sovereign status for all the Provinces, which meant that an offensive war had to be fought until all seventeen Provinces had been emancipated. At the beginning of the seventeenth century there was not yet a policy of warmongering and expansionism, as would be the case in later years. All the political groups were united in these aims, which were the natural result of revolution, and the policy enshrined in them was firmly carried out by Johan van Olden Barneveld, and Maurice, Prince of Orange.

Except for the reconquest of the Southern Netherlands, there were no demands for expansion - the Dutch were content to garrison German fortresses and keep the activities of the German border territories under control. In this respect we
may already talk of a policy of contraction, as opposed to one of expansion which
was to become a characteristic element of the later tradition of neutrality. At the
beginning of the seventeenth century, however, the role the Dutch played in the
struggle against the Habsburgs consisted of a certain European vision.
Commentators from both the Provinces themselves and from abroad felt, and
indeed were not backward in stating, that in the Netherlands the fate of Europe was
to be decided. Yet, as J. W. Smit points out, at this time the concept of Europe as a
diplomatic system was still far from being realised. 2 Europe consisted of a number
of small, and essentially differing, power-systems, which were occasionally loosely
united by a common opposition to Habsburg expansionism. Although they may
have sought assistance from the German Princes they certainly wished to avoid any
entanglement in the problems of the Empire. Nor did they neglect Catholic anti-
Habsburg powers such as France and Venice, and although we see the gradual
establishment of a net of diplomatic relations forming with England and in the
Baltic and Levant we must conclude that all these connections were still somewhat
casual and the result of momentary expediency concerned with the main interests
of the state.

Dutch diplomacy was to lose its naivété fairly soon. Even in the first decade
of the seventeenth century an end to the war with Spain seemed to become a
possibility which staunch republicans like Olden Barneveld were quite willing to
consider a peace on the basis of the status quo. In the crisis that followed,
politicians, the ministers of the Church and the merchants, had to review their
fundamental concept of the new state in order to reformulate their attitude to the
acute problem of the conditions of war and peace. It becomes clear that, in the
Dutch case, the idea of state interest was a very ambiguous one.

2 J. W. Smit, 'The Netherlands and Europe in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', in
J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossmann (eds.) Britain and the Netherlands in Europe and Asia
(1968), p. 17.
The United Provinces of the Netherlands' first permanent representative to England bearing full ambassadorial powers was Noel de Caron. He was born sometime prior to 1530. This Flemish nobleman was thought to be the son of the Sea Beggar Jacques Caron van Schoonewelle who was, from 1530, Magistraat of the Brugge Vrije. Also, through a convoluted family connection, Noel de Caron was related to Simon Stevin, the sixteenth century mathematician. After inheriting his title from his father de Caron became Magistraat and Mayor of the Brugge Vrije in 1578 and served as a Deputy at the States General for the Vrije in 1577, 1578, 1580 and from 1583 until 1586 and as president in 1585 and 1586. He also served as a member of the State Council.

Noel de Caron was an experienced diplomatist whose missions to both France and England in the latter decades of the sixteenth century qualified him for the office of ambassadior bestowed on him in 1609. In order to assess his abilities in this role it is necessary first to look briefly at his record prior to his becoming the Republic's agent to the Court of James VI and I. After the fall of Antwerp Noel de Caron had been one of the first Protestant notables to cross the lines into Zeeland and place himself at the disposal of the Prince of Orange. He supported the Prince in his negotiations with Anjou and dealt in the talks leading to the Treaty of Plessis les Tours in 1580. On 29th July, 1580 de Caron was appointed as Deputy to the Duke of Anjou and, receiving his instructions on 12th August, 1580, he was in Tours within the month where he remained until May, 1581. After Parma conquered Brugge in April, 1584 de Caron fled to Orange. On 15th June, 1584 he received instructions as Deputy to France, returning on 4th August of the same year. Later in that same year we find de Caron acting as a commissioner for the renovation of the Law in Flanders. His next appointment was again as a Deputy to

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3 Sea Beggars formed a sort of pirate army who fought the Spanish during the 80 years war.
4 Sadly, my research to date was unable to uncover a portrait of the ambassador.
5 Stevin's mother, Catharina, had two illegitimate children, Emerantiana and Hubrecht, by de Caron's father.
6 His report on this mission can be found in Algemeen Rijksarchief, S. G. inv. no. 8298.
France to negotiate with the King the protection of the Low Countries and to offer him the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Later in that same year (6th July, 1585 - 27th August, 1585) he was in England as a member of the Dutch delegation which, for the second time, offered Elizabeth the sovereignty of the Low Countries and which negotiated the Treaty of Nonsuch. Following the ratification of the Treaty de Caron was appointed as a delegate to the King of Denmark by Leicester in 1586, returning to England to make his report to Leicester in February, 1587. He came to England again on 15th May, 1591, this time to act as agent for the United Provinces. He remained in this post until the Queen’s death, with the exception of one or two returns to The Hague to advise on the progress of the legation that sought to persuade Elizabeth to continue the war against Spain.

On the accession of James VI and I he was one of only two representatives to retain their post in England. Departing 10th April, 1609 for a few months he returned from The Hague on 3rd July, 1609 having been promoted to the office of ordinary, an office traditionally in the gift of the Province of Zeeland. Although given the title of Ambassador and received at James's court as such the Spanish, and in particular Gondomar, refused to acknowledge de Caron as their diplomatic equal or even as their colleague throughout the whole tenure of his office. To the Archduke's agent, Jean Baptiste Van Male, he was little more than 'the one who takes care of the affairs of those rebels'. For all that he enjoyed a remarkable reputation amongst other residents at James's court. He was, in the King's words,

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7 With Richard van Merode, Johan Hinkaert, Cornelius Aerrssens, Elbert Leoninus, Johan van Gent, Gerhard Voet, Arend van Dorp, Jacon Valke, Johan Rengers, Amelis van Amstel van Mijnden, Jelger Feitsma, Hessel Aysma, Antoni de Lalaing, Quitin Taffin and Lieven Calvaert (Secretary) his instructions were dated 3rd December, 1584, the Commission left on 3rd January, 1585 and returned on 17th March, 1585. They reported on their mission to the States General on 9th April.

8 That de Caron was a diplomat of note can be seen from the fact that he signed the Treaty directly below the signature of the Chief Commissioner, Rutger van Haersolte, and in precedence over Janus Douss and Oldenbarnevelt and the seven other commissioners.

9 His audience with this king took place on 30th December, 1586.

10 His instruction dated 12th July, 1591 can be found in Algemeen Rijksarchief, S. G. Instruction Book, no. 107.

11 His appointment was made on 20th June, 1609.

12 Van Male to Albert, 1st January, 1621, PRO SP 77/57/2 - 5.
'non seulement fidèle amant de sa patrie, mais aussi prudent et, modeste aux comportements en sa charge...qualités qui concurrent bien rarement en toutes personnes', and, on the whole, James had a high regard for the Dutch ambassador. 13 He knew him to be an able diplomat, although at times he found the ambassador rather tiresome. Caron’s English education, wrote James to Cecil, could not amend his native German prolixity, for if I had not interrupted him it had been tomorrow morning before I had began to speak, God preserve me from hearing a cause debated between don Diego [Gondomar] and him...in truth it is good dealing with so wise and honest a man, although he be somewhat longsome. 14

The young Constantine Huygens notes in his correspondence that the ambassador was something of a character who enjoyed nothing more than a game of cards 'avec ces marchants', incurring heavy losses on a regular basis without so much as a grimace. 15

Noel de Caron was one of the few ambassadors to maintain their own property in London, having been granted land at South Lambeth by Elizabeth, on which he erected a large and impressive house. 16 Described in the late eighteenth century...

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13 James to the States, Whitehall, 10th April, 1609, Algemeen Rijksarchief. S. G. no. 3797, p. 355.
14 King James to Cecil, c. 1606, Salisbury MSS, vol. 18, p. 374 (1940).
15 Constantijn Huygens, Lord of Zuylichem, Secretary of Special Ambassages and Secretary to three successive Princes of Orange, poet, playwright and diplomatist, was born at 8, Nobelstraat, The Hague, on 4th September, 1596. He died in 1686. He was the son of Suzanna Hoefnagel and Christiaan Huygens, who had been Secretary to the Dutch Council of State. Constantijn was one of the foremost men of his age. He was outstanding both as a diplomat-politician and as a poet, but he was also extremely capable as an artist, as a musician - and as a gymnast who when in his twenties scaled the spire of Strasbourg Cathedral. In the course of his career he was appointed as Dutch ambassador at Venice, in France and England - where he met and became a firm friend and admirer of John Donne - and at other leading European courts. The young Constantijn had what one could describe as a 'Christian courtiers' education with a career in the diplomatic corps in mind. Here he learned the '3 r's', the rudiments of music and gained a grounding in Latin. His childhood was surrounded by English diplomats: Bodley, Winwood, Wotton. He first came to England in 1617. His boat arrived at Gravesend on Sunday 10th June, 1617 after being becalmed off the coast of Kent near to 'Marigat'. As soon as he touched English soil he found himself travelling about with Sir Dudley Carleton for over a week in search of the king before he could settle down. Carleton had been informed by James that he would be found at Greenwich but when they arrived there the king had left again on one of his many impromptu progresses. The party finally caught up with the king at Theobalds where an audience took place on Saturday 16th June. Huygens returned to London, via Greenwich Palace, and took up residence with Sir Noel de Caron in South Lambeth. His talents were such as to win him a knighthood from James at the age of twenty-six. See Viscount Fenton to Salisbury, PRO SP 14/43/71.
16 Described in the late eighteenth century...
century as a ‘capital mansion’, it took ten years to build and consisted of two large wings connected by a hall. Here he had a large deer-park, which extended to Vauxhall and Kennington. Huygens noted in a letter to his parents that all manner of parties and festivities took place in the house and that, everywhere, he had met ‘fort honeste compagnie’.

Caron House from Abram Booth’s *Journael* (1629)

Abram Booth, a member of a commission to London from the Dutch East India Company, listed the house in his journal as being among the finest private houses in London. Situated as it was behind the village of Lambeth and directly across the river from the Court at Westminster it had, he tells us, ‘in front...a vast field framed all round by very tall trees’. He continues:

> Upon entering by the main gate, over which have been put the words *Omne Solum Forti Patria*, one finds in the middle of a quadrangle, which is surrounded by decorative half-timbered structures, a beautiful fountain. And apart from many fine Parlours, Halls and splendid Chambers, expensively

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18 The house was on the original site of Messrs. Beaufoy’s vinegar distillery. Caron House, with its gardens and orchards, was granted to Lord Chancellor Clarendon by Charles II in 1666, and in the following year was made over by the Lord Chancellor to Sir Jeremy Whichcott, in consideration of the sum of £2,000. It was to Caron House that the Fleet prisoners were removed after the Great Fire. The small part of the house which remained in the late eighteenth century became an academy. It was finally demolished in 1809. See D. Lysons, *The Environs of London..., Counties of Surrey, Kent, Essex and Herts*, vol. 1 (2nd edition, 1810); D. Hughson, *London; The History and Description of the British Metropolis and its Neighbourhood* (1813).

19 The full quotation, taken from Lipsius, reads: ‘Each land, unto a valiant man, his country is’. 
and gracefully hung with tapestries - a long and beautiful, airy gallery, hung throughout with precious and fine paintings and kept in the Dutch fashion graceful and clean. On top of this House are two Turrets which stand out gracefully and afford a very beautiful view of the City of London and its surrounding pleasant hills and valleys. Adjacent to it, it has several other living-quarters where he used to lodge his suite, guests and relations...20

At this house he entertained Elizabeth in July 1599 when the Queen was on her way to Lord Burghley’s house at Wimbledon. 21 In 1607 the ambassador obtained the lease, for twenty-one years, of the Prince of Wales’s manor at Kennington, with all the houses, buildings etc. consisting of some one hundred and twenty-two acres, at an annual rent of £16. 10s. 9d.

Caron House, with its block of guest apartments, was a meeting place for the Dutch community in London and in particular for the merchants with which London abounded. But, as large and sumptuous as Caron House was, there is no evidence to suggest that the ambassador ever provided accommodation for the Dutch commissioners regularly arriving in London to treat with James and his ministers on one subject or another. These men were usually to be found lodging in Bread Street with their costs being defrayed by the Dutch merchants resident in the City. The reason for this was not due to any meanness on the part of the ambassador, indeed we have many reports of his generosity to both Dutch and English alike. There were two fundamental reasons for this; in the first place the distance South Lambeth was from the hub of social and diplomatic life at Court must be considered, as must the fact that Caron House was not in effect an embassy maintained by the States General but Sir Noel’s private residence, owned and maintained by him personally. Having said that we have many reports that give clear evidence that the ambassador used his house for diplomatic purposes, entertaining the King and other ambassadors on many occasions.

In his correspondence to his parents Huygens, who stayed with de Caron during much of 1617/18, speaks of the constant kindnesses shown to him by the ageing ambassador. These kindnesses reached their peak on 10th July when he was presented to the King when he made one of his many unceremonious descents on the Dutch ambassador at Caron House. On this occasion the King arrived in a small procession of three coaches and twenty horses and was accompanied by Prince Charles and by his younger Privy Councillors and the favourites, the Earls of Arundel and Montgomery, and the Marquesses of Buckingham and Hamilton. The object of this visit was not, apparently, to discuss affairs of state but to sample the Dutch cherries that de Caron grew in his garden. The ambassador’s fruit gardens were well known; in the Privy Purse Expenses for Prince Henry are several payments made in 1610 to ‘Sir Noel Carones man’, for fruit brought to the Prince. 22 The Prince’s father was renowned as something of a fruit addict and visited the ambassador on a regular basis to sample the different varieties he grew in his extensive fruit gardens. These frequent, rather private and unofficial visits, which arose from a shared interest, allowed a certain degree of intimacy to develop between the King and de Caron which gave the ambassador a distinct advantage over his rivals. A cold collation and a stroll around De Caron’s well-stocked picture gallery invariably followed the fruit tastings. Finally, before departing, the King would allow his hand to be kissed by a number of foreign visitors presented by the ambassador. On the occasion noted by Huygens the young visitor was amongst those introduced. As the ambassador’s special protégé he had already been singled out for attention during the meal as the son of the First Secretary of State to the United Provinces, who was also able to play the lute and could, therefore, provide the customary background music. The King was suitably impressed by the young

22 SP. Domestic, vol. lvii. There is also an entry which shows a sum of £1 to have been given for ‘a picture to his Highnes.’
man's talent and invited him to perform at Bagshot whence the King was to travel
the following day.

We have already seen the controversies which arose at James's court by the
promotion of de Caron from the rank of agent to that of ambassador. Although the
Spanish had concluded a convention with the Dutch, Spain still chose to regard the
independence of the Provinces as a pleasant fiction which would be dissolved once
the truce had expired and at which time she fully intended to reassert her
sovereignty over the United Provinces. Meanwhile, her ambassadors and in
particular Gondomar, refused vehemently to acknowledge de Caron as a diplomatic
equal so that subsequently the Spaniards regularly snubbed the Dutch envoy. But
James, despite his supposed appeasement of Spain, was not so foolish as to comply
with Gondomar's many protests at the expense of such an ally as the United
Provinces. Philip, on the other hand, declared his ambassador's actions to be in
accordance with his own instructions adding that he was sorry if the protests
caused discomfort to James; and explaining that, although he intended to respect
the Treaty of Truce (of which James had been a signatory), he would, as soon as it
expired, be reinstated to his former right of sovereignty over all the Netherlands a
fact which entirely justified his ambassador's conduct.

The ambassador was a 'worthy and charitable' Anglophile, and was known
for his good works amongst the local community. In 1607 he gave £10 towards the
repairs of Lambeth church and £50 to the poor, while in 1615 he founded
almshouses at Vauxhall, in what is now Fentiman Road, about a half a mile from his
own house. 23 Over the gate of the almshouses was a Latin inscription informing the
visitor that it was founded in the thirty-second year of his embassy, 'as an
insignificant monument of what he owed to the glory of God, in gratitude to the
nation, and in munificence to the poor'. 24 This building housed seven poor

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23 H. E. Maldon (ed.) Victoria County History, Surrey (1914) IV, pp. 50 - 53.
24 D. Hughson, London; The History and Description of the British Metropolis and its
Neighbourhood (1813), p. 33.
women, all parishioners of Lambeth, and upwards of sixty years of age. Although
granted an annual pension of £4 each, the women were also allowed to subsidise
their incomes by the 'exertions of their industry'. These pensions continued, from
his estate, after his death. But it was not just poor and needy Londoners who
received aid from the ambassador; in March 1617 we find de Caron giving a loan
of some £200,000 to the King on behalf of the Strangers of the Netherlands.

James was fond of the Dutch ambassador and, as was his custom with regard
to representatives from republics, Caron was knighted in 1607. 25 A further
demonstration of the King’s affection was exhibited in 1612 when he conferred on
the envoy, for life, the office of Keeper of Bagshot Park. As Keeper of the Game he
was allowed one penny a day and £1. 6s. 8d per annum for his livery. 26

The ambassador remained unmarried 27 and died, whilst still in office, in
December, 1624, leaving the Prince of Wales his heir. 28 He was buried at Lambeth
on 25th January, 1624/25 29 and his helmet, coat of mail, gauntlets and spurs,
together with his arms, were placed in the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Lambeth
as a memorial. The memorial, which was placed in the sanctuary, had been
removed sometime before 1826 and the ambassador’s tomb never survived the
Victorian rebuilding programme. 30

The prime object of de Caron’s embassy was the eventual cessation of
hostilities between England and the United Provinces concerning the trade disputes

25 Two Belgians in de Caron’s retinue, Giles and Cornelius Waterfleet were knighted by James
on 16th March, 1616.
27 However, SP Domestic, vol. 99, no 47 notes under ‘Strangers in Lambeth’, ‘Sr Nowell
Carron, Lord Ambassador for the States of the United Provinces, inhabittinge with his
familiye within the paradise’. Presumably the word ‘family’ relates to his household rather
than to the family as we know it. See ‘Foreigners Resident in England, 1618 - 1688’,
Camden Society, ns. vol. lxxxii(1862).
28 CSP Domestic, 25th January, 1625; G. N. Clark and J. W. J. M. Van Eysinga, Bibliotheca
Visseriana, Dissertationum in Universale Illustratum, xxxiv, p. 18.
29 CSP Domestic, 25th January, 1624/5.
30 The Church is now the home of the Museum of Garden History, run by the Tradescant
Trust. Although there is no documentary proof to confirm the claim, the Tradescant Society
suggest that John Tradescant and de Caron were close friends. However, bearing in mind
the sociability of the ambassador and his interest in his gardens this claim is probably
justified.
which constantly arose between the two sea-faring nations. There were various factors involved in the preserving of close relations between England and the United Provinces during this period. England’s traditional rivalry with France had long made English government sensitive to political conditions in the Low Countries and the establishment of Antwerp as the principal market for the sale of English wool and cloth created strong economic ties between the two countries. Although this commercial partnership had been disrupted by the increasing political instability in the Low Countries it was soon replaced by a political alliance, based on common interests and ideologies. This alliance remained, albeit somewhat shakily, throughout James’s reign even though, during the years of de Caron’s ambassage, there were enough causes of conflict should either side have wished to provoke war. That neither was inclined to resort to war was an essential characteristic of Anglo-Dutch relations during the period and a condition that made de Caron’s job in England slightly easier. However, his task in maintaining this rapprochement, although eased by these ideological and commercial ties, was not without its problems. There were powerful opponents to peace in both governments and the enduring trade disputes aroused a hostility that could have led to a breakdown in relations at any time. A important trend during de Caron’s embassy was the virtual disappearance of England’s influence in the United Provinces - the cautionary towns were restored, the English seat on the Council of State was relinquished and the numbers of English soldiers serving in the Netherlands was considerably reduced.

Unlike James, the Dutch did not have the willingness to eliminate all the grounds for economic grievance through extensive bilateral discussion and trade regulation. The Dutch commercial system, which rested on obscure rights and privileges, could only tolerate regulation as a result of negotiations to settle individual trade disputes because any permanent settlement would establish checks and limits which would clearly define what were formerly vague prerogatives.
Consequently, the history of Anglo-Dutch relations is one filled with tension and misunderstanding and the rivalry between the two largest trading powers in the Far East had much to answer for. In the seventeenth century the Dutch attained the highest point in their economic and political power. Although not officially at war, relations with England were often stretched to breaking point. Nevertheless, Englishmen maintained a great interest in their vigorous Protestant neighbours so that English descriptions of Holland and the Dutch are readily found in the early years of the seventeenth century. One contemporary described them 'forecasting and subtil, of a mean stature, very expert in navigation and very neat in their houses', whilst Thomas Overbury noted that they were 'surly and respectless as in all democracies: thirsty, industrious and cleanly: inventive in manufactures and cunning in traffic'.

During the early years of the seventeenth century, although outright war was never declared, a fierce hostility began to grow between England and the United Provinces, which was fanned by political commentators and pamphleteers alike. The reasons for this hostility can be found in the huge literature resulting from the several commissions sent between the two countries at the time. Much of the invective emanating from the Low Countries during this period sought to open the King's eyes to the inadvisability of any long term entente with the Spanish and to the duplicity of Catholicism in general. At the same time these same writers urged the King to think twice before abandoning his fellow religionists, warning of the dangers in side stepping the problems faced by the Dutch Republic and the Princes of the Protestant Union.

Questions over James's foreign policy relating to the States were raised almost as soon as the Treaty of London was signed. The most important concern expressed by commentators at the time was whether this unprecedented peace with

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Spain was concluded at the expense of the defence of the Low Countries. De Caron, as would be expected, watched closely the developments on which so much of his country's future might depend if, and when, the Dutch war with Spain should be resumed. Several commentators were quick to point out the importance of an Anglo-Dutch alliance to the peace and security of England and that the 'defensive warres of the Netherlandish provinces', were 'juste and lawful' and, therefore, 'not a rebellion'. Sir Robert Cotton explained that by attempting to subdue the Dutch, Spain had broken her promise to uphold the 'Aristocraticall government' of the Netherlands. Thomas Scott, ever vigilant in pointing out the problems caused by Spain and Catholicism, published a series of pamphlets that called for a renewal of the Anglo-Dutch alliance that existed in Elizabeth's time. These included *The Belgicke Pismire* (Holland, 1622); *An Experimental Discoverie of Spanish Practises* (1623); *Digitus Dei* (Holland, 1623, *Robert Earl of Essex's Ghost* (1624) and *The Belgick Souldier* (Dordrecht, 1624). His writings advocated that Christian princes of all nations should 'resist and impeach...the Spanish tyranny', and at the same time urged the King to 'beware of disuniting...from the United States of the Netherlands' on the grounds that the States had 'increased in men, in ammunition, in shipping, and in wealth'. More importantly, and a point which should make the 'knot of unity more strong and fast' he reminded the King that the Dutch were of the 'same true religion, which you profess'. As in the case of Scott's invective against Gondomar and the Spanish match his pamphlets advocating a militantly Protestant foreign policy made good reading for James's subjects and the very fact that the United Provinces continued to maintain their independence from the Habsburgs signified that they, as Protestants, were God's chosen people.

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32 R. Cotton, 'Discours uppon the Kings necessitie to make peace or kepe warres with Spayne' (1603), BL, Cotton Mss, c. xiii, fols, 158 - 159. W. Raleigh, 'A discourse touching a war with Spain, and of the protecting of the Netherlands', *Works*, vol. viii, pp. 299 - 316.

The pamphlet literature concerning affairs in the United Provinces and the relationship between the States and England had first appeared in the latter quarter of the sixteenth century. Couched in unsophisticated language they offered the English reader an insight into the political and religious upsets prevailing in Holland, presented in a concise and accessible format. During the 1580s and 90s this literature reflected on the God given authority of the Dutch to throw off the yoke of Catholicism and Spain and pressed for the intervention of England in the revolt taking place in the Netherlands. The language used against Spain and Philip II in this instance was very much that used some thirty-five years later to warn James of the inadvisability of any alliance with Philip III. However, the polemic used in the pamphlets of the later sixteenth century was to become a problem for the new Stuart regime. Following the accession of James and the consequent withdrawal of England from any active role in European warfare those dissatisfied with the King's passive policies in not defending international Protestantism found the arguments used to justify resistance in these pamphlets persuasive. If resistance was legitimate in Holland could it not also be legitimate in England? Such arguments, used to justify resistance abroad, were totally unacceptable at home and the tone of the pamphlets underwent a subtle change, now extolling the United Provinces as a nation which had thrown off Catholicism, rather than as a nation rebelling against its legitimate rulers, and, pointing to the States as an example, calling for a militant pro-Protestant policy and an end to any alliance with Spain.

However, not all pamphleteers were pro-Dutch. Tom Tell Troath, in his open letter to James, counselled against any and all alliances with ‘adverse parties’, be they Spanish or Dutch. In this treatise we see concern for the economic welfare of England, warning the King that it appeared that the Dutch had ‘forbidde us, under the paine of their highe displeasure’, from dealing in ‘matters of worthe’. They had reserved for themselves, he insisted, ‘the riche prizes, and triumphes of the time, have thought that sufficient of us, to sheere our sheepe, and fetch home
spices to make ginger-bread...the very pedlers, whome wee ourselves set upp for our owne use, are now become our masters in the East-lndyes; and thinke themselves our fellowes in ...Christendome'.

England had emerged from the sixteenth century not merely as a naval power which had been able to defeat the greatest fleet Spain could muster against her but as a commercial power with a wider base than ever before and possessing a merchant fleet set to grow in a corresponding manner. Several factors contributed to this; the most important being the closure of Antwerp, which drove English merchants to trade directly in places with which they had previously dealt through Antwerp and the slackening pace of activity on the part of the Dutch merchants and ship-owners of Holland and Zeeland.

However, the English were not to have it all their own way. By 1600 the Dutch were no longer struggling to survive; they were fighting a successful war which allowed them to devote money and men to the recovery of their commercial interests. Although small and possessing no natural resources, the United Provinces, according to Thomas Mun, 'can and do likewise serve and sell to other princes, ships, ordnance, cordage, corn, powder, shot and what not, which by their industrious trading they gather from all the quarters of the world; in which courses they are not less injurious to supplant others (especially the English) than they are careful to strengthen themselves'. The English naturally resented the Dutch revival in activities in which they had began to profit, but the resentment went deeper when one remembers that the rivalry was with a state which only a few years previously had been under English patronage.

The impact of this revival was felt in England in a number of ways. Most resented were the activities of the Dutch fishermen and anyway the English claimed an exclusive right to the northern whale fishing off the coast of Spitzbergen. This,

34 'Tom Tell Troath', *Harleian Miscellany* (1809) vol. iii, p. 434.
of course, was a claim which the Dutch whalers, who had spent their lives in Arctic waters, could not possibly acknowledge, and it soon became obvious that, unless concessions could be made; the two fleets were on a collision course. During the sixteenth century shoals of herring had established a seasonal pattern of movement along the North Sea coasts of Scotland and England. Considerable numbers of Dutch fishing vessels followed these shoals, fishing close inshore and, occasionally, coming ashore in English ports. As the Dutch fleets grew so too did the hostility at the perceived harvesting of English waters. At this time there were no clear maritime or international laws which could define territorial waters but, nonetheless a large English literature appeared which made extensive claims to English sovereignty of her coastal waters, and Grotius’ work on the freedom of the seas was, in part, a Dutch response to this. From 1607 James repeatedly insisted that to fish in English coastal waters required his licence but menacing words alone could not stop the Dutch fishing fleets. During this same period English vessels whaling around Spitzbergen were joined by increasingly large numbers of Dutch vessels and in the Indies English merchantmen suffered continual harassment from Dutch traders which culminated, in 1623, with the massacre of the English settlement at Amboyna. This naked assertion of Dutch financial and mercantile power was one that England could not answer.

In the Americas the Dutch entered the trading markets at an early stage, supplying goods to Virginia from their port of New Amsterdam and transporting the settler’s produce. They dealt with the British West Indian islands through their own settlements in Curacao and St. Eustatia. In Europe the situation was little better. England’s Baltic trade which had grown steadily in Elizabeth’s reign began to fall rapidly after 1609 and by the 1620s large parts of her Baltic supplies were

36 *Mare liberum* (1609) challenged the right of any nation to claim any part of the open sea as exclusively its own.

37 Oration dated 7th May, 1607. It was not until the 1630s that Charles I was able to back demands for a cessation of these infringements by sending warships out amongst the Dutch fleet and defying them to challenge them.
coming through Amsterdam whilst much of the rest was carried from the Baltic in Dutch ships. Even in southern Europe, after the peace with Spain made it possible, the Dutch rapidly expanded their interests there.

The main basis of Dutch competition with England was a long established and powerful Dutch maritime tradition. The Dutch herring fisheries, originally based in the mouth of the Baltic, had long been operated on a large scale. From these fisheries the Dutch developed an expanding export trade in barrelled herring into the Baltic and returned with cargoes of corn, flax, hemp and timber. Supported as they were by the rich merchants and financiers of Antwerp and other towns in the southern Netherlands these men soon became traders as well as the carriers of these commodities. Their fisheries were so great and the volume of their Baltic traffic so high that by the beginning of James's reign the Dutch had developed specialist ships for each branch of their trade, which they built in the towns of the Zuider Zee where vast stocks of imported timber were held.

But this was not their only advantage over the English. When Protestants fled from the Spaniards into the Dutch Provinces of the Netherlands they brought with them capital and trading networks which connected them to vast untapped markets in southern Europe. With the backing of these new resources the Dutch were able to venture into new areas of trading and maritime activity which challenged England in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean so that in the first decades of the seventeenth century they were recognised as the foremost commercial power in Europe. Their resources out-rivalled all others in organisation and strength; their whaling and fishing, Baltic and transatlantic ships were second to none and their connections amongst the trading families of Europe gave them an advantage everywhere. Only after 1621 and their involvement in the Thirty Years War did Dutch expansion appear to halt causing them to divert their ships, raise freight charges and the close some of their markets.
For over two hundred years there had been a nebulous legal directive that Englishmen should employ English rather than foreign ships. This general requirement had little or no impact, although here and there the employment of English ships was obligatory, as for example in the Bordeaux wine trade and on the coasting trade. Dutch competition in the early years of James’s reign, however, led to a growing merchant campaign for protection which was supported by the argument that a weakened merchant fleet would be unable to supply seamen essential for the navy in time of war. This debate was successful and led to fresh measures being taken against the Dutch. The problems over the herring and whale fisheries have been noted, but alongside this a series of Orders in Council attempted to limit foreign participation in Baltic and colonial trade. However, the efficacy of these orders seems to have been negligible. The Dutch maritime machine continued to exploit the seas both along the English and Scottish coasts and further afield. It was not to be until the outbreak of the first Anglo-Dutch war in the 1652 that Dutch domination of sea trade began to decline.

These issues and those pertaining to James’s support, or lack of, for the Protestant cause in Europe were those which required to be negotiated between the two great maritime nations. Twelve commissions came to London during the first quarter of the seventeenth century: some under the leadership of great statesmen, others composed of burgomasters and pensionaries. The first Commission to arrive in England, in 1603, was a complimentary one, comprising Johan van Olden Barneveld, Jacob Fulke, Walraven Brederode III and Frederick Henry, Prince of Nassau, to congratulate James on his accession and to attempt to persuade James to send troops to relieve the port of Ostend. The mission, which arrived in July 1607 and comprising just two men, James Malderee and Johan Berck, Pensionary of

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38 Jacob Fulke died in England on 29th May, 1603. Frederick Henry was the youngest son of the Prince of Orange. By the Treaty of Hampton Court James promised that, together with the new French king, Henry IV, he would support the Dutch subsidies and allow the rebels to raise troops in England. However, this treaty was neutralised by the Treaty of London in 1604, which effectively took England out of the equation.
Dordrecht, was the first working Commission the States General sent to James's court. It was a short and precise mission, having no other instructions than to give information to the English court on the negotiations taking place in Flanders. 39 After attending a banquet for the King at the Merchant Taylor's on 16th July, 1607, the two men and de Caron accepted the freedom of that company. 40 They took formal leave of James on 19th July, 1607 and departed for the continent in early August, 1607. 41

Anglo-Dutch relations suffered from one fundamental misunderstanding during this period in that James saw, and indeed treated, the Republic as an English satellite whilst the Dutch themselves became increasingly aware of the United Provinces' independent power. Just as the Treaty of Nonsuch had allowed England membership of the Council of State so other Anglo-Dutch agreements had allowed England to assume the role of protector over the Provinces. The obsequious language used by the States General in their diplomatic exchanges with the English appears to be, to some extent at least, an acknowledgement of their lower class citizenship within Europe. 42 James for his part always maintained in his correspondence with the Dutch a fatherly and friendly attachment to their state.

It was under these circumstances that the first major commission from the States came to London, in April, 1610. 43 The mission was ostensibly to thank James for his part in the Spanish-Dutch Truce, and they were to explain to the King, on behalf of the States, their delay in sending this solemn mission. 44 This laxness the

41 Chamberlain to Carleton, 20th July, 1607, PRO SP 14/28/20.
42 Note in particular the view of the Republic taken by the Spanish.
43 The mission comprised five men; John van Duivenvoorde, Seignior of Waremendt; Albert de Veer (Verius) Pensionary of Amsterdam; Elias van Olden Barneveld; Albert Joachim, Deputy from Zeeland to the States General, Lord of Ostend; Johan Berck, Pensionary of Dordrecht. Appointed 24th April, 1610. Winwood, Memorials, vol. iii, p. 135. For the Commission instructions, Rapport van den Heeren Gecommitteerden geweest hebende in Engelandt in den jaere 1610 dated 31st March, 1610, see MS Algemeen Rijksarchief. The language of this mission was full of hyperbole with the sole intention of flattering James into placing himself at the head of the Protestant union and providing a force to support the Protestants in Germany, France and the Netherlands.
States blamed on the tardiness of the Spanish in ratifying the treaty and indecision on the part of the Archduke’s men. Further, and more importantly, they were to make an offer of 2000 foot and 500 horse for the general purpose under Prince Henry of Nassau and, in return, they were instructed to seek a promise from James of men and money and were to propose a closer union for mutual assistance between James, the United Provinces, the King of France and the Electors and Princes of Germany, as such a close alliance would be to the benefit of ‘all Christendom’. They were also directed to open the subject of another, and most constant problem between the two nations, that of the fisheries in the coastal waters of England and to remonstrate against the King’s lately published order, dated 7th May, 1607 which forbade all foreigners from fishing on these coasts. This was set forward as an infringement of both natural law and of ancient treaties and as a source of infinite danger to the national of the United Provinces.

The commissioners landed at Gravesend on 23rd April, 1610 and were met by Sir Lewis Lewkenor. Bad weather forced them on to Blackwall where they were formally received by Sir Thomas Cornwallis and Sir George Carew and from there they were escorted in the royal barges to Tower Wharf. Here royal coaches were waiting in which they were taken to lodgings, which had been prepared for them in the City, by a Dutch merchant and where Sir Noel de Caron awaited them. They received their first audience with the King on 27th April, 1610 at which time they were invited to join the celebrations for the festival of St. George, where they were placed, together with the French ambassador, in the King’s oratorium. Details such as these were important and were immediately communicated to The Hague as such ceremony indicated that England, at least, accepted the nation status of the Republic. This was the first solemn and extra-ordinary embassy by the United Provinces, since their independent national existence had been formally vindicated.

45 Half an hour before the Duke of Württemburg.
to a power that only a quarter of a century before had refused the proffered sovereignty over them. Now that they negotiated on the same level as the representatives of Emperors and Kings (and here the emphasis was on Spain and the Archduke) they found themselves looked upon with different eyes from those which had regarded their predecessors only seven years before. On that occasion the States commissioners, headed by Johan van Olden Barneveld, had gone to congratulate James on his accession and had felt themselves marginalised and treated with no more ceremony or account than the crowds of citizens and spectators mingling in the streets. At this time the French were aware of the feelings of frustration felt by Olden Barneveld and their ambassador, Sully knew that the Dutch envoy was unable to get an audience with the King; it was therefore arranged, perhaps even with James’s connivance, that Olden Barneveld should be secretly introduced into one of the galleries at Greenwich through which James was passing - in this manner he was able to meet the King and the two held a long conversation together. Henceforth Sully and the commissioner, who lived close to each other, worked together with the intention of convincing James of the advantages of going to war with Spain in order to allow the Provinces and France to live unmolested. 46 Within a couple of weeks the two had worked out a formula which they hoped would please James and Sully, satisfied with the outcome of his mission, prepared to leave London. But Sully’s diplomacy on behalf of the Dutch was not altogether successful - James insisting that before he could undertake to aid the Dutch an offensive and defensive alliance with France against Spain was necessary. After much negotiation and the wide distribution of largesse James and Sully signed a provisional treaty, the defensive element of which was to be made public whilst the offensive part, which James was unprepared to admit to at this time, was to remain secret. Spain’s ordinary, de Tassis, and the Archduke’s

46 Memoirs of Maximillien de Bethane, Duke of Sully. Translated from the French by the author of the Female Quixote (1757) 5 vols. vol. iii, pp. 121 - 123; Gardiner, History, vol. i, p. 106; see also Bibliotheque Nationale, MS 3502.
commissioner, Arenberg, watched Sully and Olden Barneveld carefully - they were fully informed of the negotiations and had gained access to the Frenchman’s correspondence. At the same time as he had access to Sully’s correspondence de Tassis also took advantage of the English Councillor’s hostility to the French ambassador, spending huge sums to buy friendship for Spain. However, de Tassis himself was hardly a success in England having antagonised James by presenting credentials which left out the title ‘King of Ireland’, an omission which was probably due more to Spain’s desire not to offend the Pope who considered that Ireland, like Naples, was a Papal fief, than to any desire to offend James.

Despite opposition, not least from the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland, which were growing rich from the war, the peace between the Dutch and Spain was ultimately concluded. England and France were to act as mediators, although James, as usual, acted in a very half-hearted manner. Torn between a desire for Spanish/Dutch peace and a fear that the growing power and commerce of the Dutch at sea would seriously damage English trade, James pursued a torturous policy, for he knew that if commerce were thrown open to the Dutch, the trade and revenue of England would ultimately suffer. However, the treaty signed in Antwerp on March 30th 1609 was not so much a peace concluded as a truce, which presupposed the eventual continuation of the war.

Although on this next occasion the commissioners from the States General were treated with every display of consideration befitting their station when it came to matters of business they were at a distinct disadvantage. If there was one thing James did not intend risking it was to get himself entangled in any disagreements with Spain. His resolve to defend the Protestant princes was not so

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47 A clerk in the French Chancery in the pay of the Spanish had betrayed the negotiations. When he was discovered he fled and during his flight he drowned in the Marne. His body was embalmed and put on trial as if he were alive.

48 Since Tassis was unpopular for his dealings with the English Catholics many were disinclined to accept his gold. Consequently it is reported that he offered to bet 100 to 1000 that the peace between the Dutch and Spain would not be concluded.
strong as to carry him much beyond rhetoric. On 8th May, 1610, the commissioners met in the Council Chamber at Westminster to discuss the matters contained in their instructions with members of the Council: Salisbury, Northampton, Nottingham, Suffolk, Shrewsbury, Worcester and several others. The outcome was not satisfactory - in regard to the demand of the Possessioners the commissioners were told that the King was disinclined to commit himself further having already declared his intention of assisting the Princes with men, artillery and powder. On a further point, with regard to a closer alliance between France, England, the Princes and the Provinces that the representatives had proposed, the King was still undecided, although France had already agreed to treat for an alliance.

What followed was a veiled insinuation against the sovereignty of the States - if James, it was intimated, decided to treat with the King of France then their High Mightinesses would not be excluded, but he had not, at that point, decided whether or not to do so on the grounds that he had yet to consider whether he still retained certain rights over the Provinces. The continued possession by England of the cautionary towns gave colour and credence to these innuendoes. In respect of the fisheries the Privy Councilors were unable to understand why the subjects of the States should feel themselves exempt from the action of a general edict. They did, however, deem it advantageous to look at any existing treaties there might be and set up a joint commission to confer together on the subject. Not much more of importance was transacted at this first meeting. Certainly the Dutch had not succeeded in their main object of forging a defensive and offensive alliance between England and the Republic in accordance with the plan desired by Henry and van Olden Barneveld. Nor had they achieved any satisfactory answers to the questions of commerce.

At the termination of this conference the commissioners delivered to the Council a written summary of the statements discussed. The position taken by the ambassadors might be rightly approved by their government but at the end of the
day no very great result was achieved by this embassy. Apart from the fact that the proposed conferences were to be overtaken by events of 14th May in France, James played his usual waiting game, positioning himself firmly on the fence. No matter what his personal concerns might be for Protestant Europe he could not and indeed, would not, make any decisions that might upset the newly framed peace with Spain. He was to persist in this idea throughout his reign seeing himself not placed at the head of a forceful Protestant coalition but in the role of peace-maker, uniting both Catholic and Protestant by the judicious choice of spouses for his children.

Meanwhile the commissioners had been instructed by van Olden Barneveld to approach James again - he was now to be explicitly summoned to assist the Princes with men to serve the welfare of Christendom which had been threatened by events in France. The Princes, James was told ‘hold this to be the occasion to show to all the world that it is within your power to rescue the affairs of France, Germany, and of the United Provinces from the claws of those who imagine for themselves universal.’ 49 The commissioners concluded by requesting James to come to ‘a resolution on this affair royally, liberally, and promptly’ in order to take advantage of the time and so not to allow the ‘adversary’ to fortify their position in Europe. In this matter the States General pledged to support James in any way they could. 50

Before ever the commissioners communicated these demands to James, the proposed document was to be shown to Salisbury. However, they found the Lord Treasurer neither prompt nor sympathetic in his reply and it is evident that the relations that had recently been established between the States and France had caused a certain degree of jealousy at the English court. Cecil, while couching his response in formal terms, intimated that it was plain that far more had passed between the late King of France and the States than had been revealed by either

49 *Rapport van den Heeren Gecommitteerden geweest hebbende in Engelandt in den Jaere 1610.*
50 The old enemies - Spain and the Pope.
party to James. Further enlightenment was requested of the commissioners - this they declined to offer, claiming that to give anything further would be to surpass the limits of their instructions - so that grave suspicions remained in the minds of the English Council. All arguments on the part of the commissioners to win James and the Council over to their way of thinking, especially in respect of the Cleves-Jülich affair, were fruitless. The English troops, they were informed, which were regularly employed in the State's service, might be used but no more would be forthcoming and the proposals for a closer alliance were coldly refused.

This was all the commissioners were able to salvage from the mission and after a farewell dinner on 24th May the commissioners took formal leave of James, at which audience he knighted the commissioners. The conference of knighthoods on the Venetians in order to show his consideration for their government had become a custom with James and one can only assume that James believed that such a consideration should also be shown to Europe's other republic. However, although cordially greeted at the commencement of their embassy, the commissioners had had several occasions for complaint about their treatment at the hands of the English, so that it could be argued that this grandiose gesture by James was little more than a sop to the States for a disappointingly unsuccessful mission. Indeed the commissioners noted in their report that only 'out of respect to My Lords the States' did they feel 'compelled to allow ourselves to be burthened with this honour.' Having recalled her commissioners it was obvious to the States that little hope of assistance could be expected from England in respect of the Protestant Princes and on 13th July, 1610 the Republic, under the leadership of Prince Maurice decided to act on their own. What was to follow is not the concern of this thesis and can be found documented elsewhere.

Even at times when commercial disputes threatened peace, James perceived

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Report of the Commissioners previously cited.
himself in the self appointed role as the mediator and impartial broker for the settlement of irreconcilable differences between the English and the Dutch Republic. It was in connection with one of the several commercial disputes that peppered Anglo-Dutch relations during the early years of the seventeenth century that Dideric Meerman, Jacob Boreel, Reynier Pauw, Burgomaster of Amsterdam, and Hugo van Groot came as commissioners to England between 22nd March, 1613 and 17th May, 1613.  

The commission's instructions, which were cautious, were given by the East India Company and merely approved by the States-General. Sent to detail why the Dutch should be allowed to close the Moluccan sea to others, they argued that although the Dutch were ordinarily peaceful traders in these waters they had been forced to 'shed blood' in disputing the Portuguese claim to exclude all others. As they still had to maintain warships and forts there they could not allow third parties to profit freely from the situation which their sole efforts had brought into being. At the same time they proposed to discuss a merger of the two East India companies and a union of forces in the East Indies against Spain. Nevertheless the deputies were not empowered to conclude anything about joint hostilities. Furthermore, their instructions contained nothing about the legal issues, so that, in effect, Grotius was given entire freedom and responsibility to handle these matters as he chose.

Negotiations took place between 5th April, 1613 - 20th April, 1613, but were inconclusive so that the talks became deadlocked and a resumption of negotiations,

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52 The inclusion of Grotius in this commission, his first diplomatic assignment, was not well received in England, where he was unpopular for both his political and religious views. Although a young and inexperienced diplomat he was, however, a competent jurist. See G. N. Clark, Grotius's East India Mission to England (1935) See Winwood to James, 23rd March, 1613, CSPColonial, East Indies, 1613 - 1616, pp. 251 - 252; Prince Maurice to James, 25th March, 1613, CSPColonial, East Indies, 1613 - 1616, pp. 251 - 252.

53 Correspondence relating to the grievances of the East India Company can be found in the several Letter Books of the East India Company; CSPColonial, East Indies, 1613 - 1616; see also, for example, Salisbury to Winwood, 4th January, 1612, Winwood Memorials, vol. iii, p. 320.
at James's behest, was held in The Hague in 1615. During the commission's time in England the Dutch were certainly being disingenuous, having no intention of sharing the eastern trade with England or, for that matter, anyone else. Their purpose was to induce the English to join them in an attack on Spanish holdings and shipping there. For his part Grotius had secondary instructions. His was the delicate task of justifying to James and his chief Churchmen the Arminian position which the States believed had been consistently misrepresented in England. He was ordered to clarify the aspects of van Olden Barneveld’s policy and at the same time gain influence with Andrewes and Overall who, with their Arminian leanings, were to be kept interested in Dutch affairs. He was also instructed to ingratiate himself with Abbot. Grotius succeeded reasonably well in this first assignment (a prelude to his political career), and by his own account, his mission was entirely successful. Abbot, however, was not so sure of the success of the mission and was to remark that the King was thoroughly bored by Grotius' display of learning and ‘tedious tittle-tattle.’ Boreel also had a secondary mission. Besides the East India business, he was separately commissioned to negotiate for the retention of the Merchant Adventurers’ staple at Middelburg. This he did successfully.

Following another outbreak of mercantile rivalry between the two nations, Johan Berck, Pensionary of Dordrecht arrived in England to treat with the Merchant Adventurers company of dyers and dressers. This was a follow-up mission to one undertaken two years before by Jacob Boreel, Pensionary of

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54 A brief of these proceeding can be found in the Buccleuch Mss, vol. 1, 1899 and a transcript of Grotius's report on this commission can be found in G. N. Clark and J. W. J. M. Van Eysinga, Bibliotheca Visseriana, Dissertationum ius Internationale Illustrantium, xxxiv, pp. 94 - 96. A report of the mission to the United Provinces, dated 16th February, 1615 can be found in British Library, Harleian MSS, no. 147, fols. 4 - 6. CSP Colonial East Indies, p. 252; PROSF. East Indies, vol. 1, no. 38; P. Geyl, The Netherlands Divided, 1603 - 1643; G. N. Clark and J. W. J. M. Van Eysinga, Bibliotheca Visseriana, Dissertationum ius Internationale Illustrantium, xxxiv, pp. 59 - 81, 96 - 118; Birch, Court and Times, pp. 110 - 187.

Middelburg, who had been in England in connection with Cockayne's project and the Merchant Adventurers Company. James was also hopeful that this new commissioner would be instructed to treat both with himself and the Council on questions relating to the Greenland and Scottish fisheries, but he had not been so instructed and was therefore unable to satisfy the King's demands. Despite the rhetoric of the King and the ambassador on the subject of the cloth trade, the talks were unsuccessful, so that James bid Berck farewell with very little having been settled.

The necessity for these talks came about by a quarrel between the States and England over the exportation of undyed cloths, which had almost caused a total cessation of the woollen trade between the two countries. The English, in an attempt to encourage their own workers, had forbidden the export of all undyed cloths, and the Dutch, in retaliation had prohibited the import of dyed cloths. Olden Barneveld was urging de Caron to bring the matter to the King's attention and sent the commission to reinforce de Caron's approach to the King. James had the sense to see the absurdity of this action and welcomed a new commissioner from the States to confer with himself in order to end the debacle. In a report of a conversation with James de Caron noted the King's comments regarding the problems of the cloth trade. 'Now it is not reasonable,' he quotes the King as saying, '...that our merchants should be obliged to send their cloths roundabout, not being allowed either to sell them in the United Provinces or to pass them through your territories...It is not necessary that one should take everything from them, or that one should refuse everything to us. I am sure there are people of sense in your assembly who will justify me in favouring my own people so far as I reasonably can, and I know very well that My Lords the States must stand up for their own citizens. If we have been driving this matter to an extreme and see that we are

58 May, 1614.
ruining each other, we must take it up again in another fashion... Let the commissioners come as soon as possible. I know they have complaints to make, and I have my complaints also.'

However, despite his innate dislike of rebels and merchants alike James always recognised the value of alliance with the Dutch and claimed to hold their interests 'next to his own in affection.' Yet England shared the role of protector of the Dutch with France and some of James's concerned care towards the Republic stemmed as much from a fear of French influence in the Netherlands as from any real friendship. It was beneficial to England's interests, therefore, to emphasise the ideological ties between the two states, ties which France could not match. As we know, James was immensely interested in the subject of religion, and on occasion this interest led him to interject his authority into the affairs of other states, as he did in the United Provinces over the professorship of Vorstius and at various other times during the years of religious controversy. He had political as well as religious motives for this intervention; as head, albeit reluctant, of the Protestant league, he had an interest in the maintenance of internal stability within the Protestant states and in lessening conflict amongst them and, as the defender of reformed religion, he had a stake in preserving doctrinal purity. For those professing the same faith religion cut across political and national boundaries and, until the mid 1620s when Arminianism took hold in England, the majority of the English clergy and indeed much of the laity, with their Calvinistic leanings, recognised in the reformed church in the Republic close doctrinal and political ties.

59 Caron to the States General, 14th November, 1616, cited in J. L. Motley, Life and Death of John of Barneveld, vol. ii, p. 68.
62 N. Tyacke, 'Puritanism, Arminianism and Counter-Revolution' in C. Russell (ed.) The Origins of the English Civil War (1973), p. 120.
For the maintenance of doctrinal orthodoxy and even for the preservation of the Dutch state James might well justify intervention into her domestic affairs, but a growing realisation that the religious controversies raging internally in the United Provinces were threatening both doctrinal and political stability caused James to interfere more into the affairs of the Republic. Since the early years of the century a rift in the Dutch Reformed Church had been widening between the Calvinists and the followers of Arminius over the question of predestination and free will. These questions assumed political dimensions when each side sought protection for their religious views by appealing to the States of Holland and at the same time gaining for themselves the labels of Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants.63

Once the religious problems of the United Provinces were settled the religious bonds between James and the rulers of the Republic were strengthened in a way acceptable to both sides. The threat of a diplomatic breach with England had passed and growing dependence on France had been thwarted. Furthermore, because the Dutch continued to underestimate the practicability of the Republic as a nation-state, they still perceived their safety as lying in the hands of friendly neighbours. Their own domestic upheaval, the approaching expiry date of their truce with Spain and the general instability in Europe only went to confirm this opinion in the Dutch corridors of power.

With the present state of turmoil in France the Dutch, drawn by ideological, diplomatic and personal allegiance, turned more towards England. Yet there still remained a certain wariness in lying too close in England’s orbit; James had shown a willingness to grant concession to Habsburg interests in the Cleves-Julich affair and was still looking for an alliance with the Spanish. James, for his part, was unprepared to revel in the friendship of the Netherlands, not seeing it in quite the rosy terms as his ambassador painted it.64 However, with English influence now

63 It is not my intention to enter into a discussion of this affair as James’s involvement is well documented elsewhere.
64 19th July, 1619, Carleton to Calvert, PRO SP 84/91/56.
predominating, James was prepared to push home his advantage, believing the States would cow-tow to his wishes, follow his diplomatic lead and serve as the vanguard for the Protestant cause.

These desires took the form of a renewed insistence that the States send their deputies to negotiate a settlement of wide ranging commercial problems. The already long lists of grievances from the fishermen and merchants were acerbated in the late summer of 1618 by the simultaneous arrival of news of violent clashes with the Dutch in the Indies and off the coast of Spitzbergen. There was nothing particularly new in the complaints of either group but the extent of the violence showed that a new phase in Anglo-Dutch rivalry was developing. James discussed these problems at length with de Caron, convinced as he was that the seas had become 'more and more unsafe, and so full of freebooters that the like was never seen or heard of before'. 65 The ambassador agreed, noting that they had 'so increased in numbers...not a ship can pass with safety over the seas.' The King assured the ambassador that should no agreement be reached in the forthcoming negotiations he intended to equip a fleet and send it immediately to sort out the problems on the spot and suggested to de Caron that he advise the States General to take a similar course of action and join the English in the protection of their rights at sea. The States already had several war-ships at sea but, de Caron reported to James, instead of finding help from the English in this regard they found the freebooters to be favoured by the English, especially in the Irish and Welsh ports. However, both governments were sufficiently alarmed to agree that action was needed to end the impasse. Late in September, 1618 James demanded, through his ambassador, Carleton, that the Dutch send a Commission immediately to treat on these matters. Although the States General agreed to send the embassy it was not quite such a simple matter to decide who should be sent. All the evidence showed

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65 J. L. Motley, *The Life and Death of John of Barneveld, Advocate of Holland*, vol. ii, p. 64.
that the Netherlands were in as confused a state and as divided as ever during the months after van Olden Barneveld’s arrest and blamed this and the Arminians for the sad state of Anglo-Dutch relations.

The Commission, which arrived in England 27th November, 1618, and which de Caron was to head, comprised three Deputies and six representatives of the Dutch East India Company: Deputies Eruwout van der Dussen, Consul of Delft, Johan van Goch, Consul of Zutphen, Joachim Liens, Syndic of Tholen and Albert Soncq; Andrew Rickaerts, Anoult Jacobsen Lodestyn, Bas Thierry, Jacob Boreel, and William Boreel. 66 From the outset their incomplete instructions provoked intense ill feeling and threatened the mission with outright failure.

James was not entirely pleased to be informed that this Commission was appointed to deal with the disputes taking place between the respective East India Companies of England and Holland, and to attempt some kind of rapprochement concerning some of the other economic quarrels which beset the two States. Although their instructions also authorised them to discuss matters of religion and to treat further over the Anglo-Dutch disputes in the whales fisheries at Spitzbergen (Greenland) as well as the East Indies trade, they had no instructions with regard to the problems of the herring fisheries that James wanted to be settled. 67 According to Gardiner the commissioners were soundly berated by Bacon for coming with insufficient powers and in response spoke of their claim to the fish being an ‘immemorial possession’. 68 This further angered the King so that the commissioners stood in grave danger of being sent home without a hearing on the matters that they had been authorised to treat. James interpreted the Dutch attitude as:

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66 Dideric Meerman was re-appointed to this commission but excused himself.
67 Greenland. See Contarini to the Doge, Venetian MSS, 5th October, 1618; Naunton to Carleton, PROSP 104/62; Carleton to Naunton SP. Holland, 12th October, 1618; G. N. Clark and J. W. J. M. Van Eysinga, Bibliotheca Visseriana, Dissertationum Ius Internationale Illustrantium, xxxiv, p. 129 - 147.
an imperious fashion of proceeding in them, as if they were come hither to
treat of what themselves pleases, and to give law to his Majesty in his own
kingdom, and to propose and admit of nothing but what should tend merely
to their own ends. 69

However, James relented and the commissioners had their first audience in
Cambridge during December, 1618. For the negotiations five members of the Privy
Council joined the commissioners. The vexed question of the restitution of captured
vessels was the first issue to be discussed and after long deliberation it was agreed
that the captor should make good the damage sustained at their hands. Midway
through these negotiations news arrived from the Indies which certainly must have
convinced those interested in a successful completion to the talks that there was
little time to lose. Two ships that were to relieve Courthope at Pularoon were
attacked and seized by the Dutch. As Gardiner suggests, the only hope James had of
securing a permanent peace in the East Indies and of bringing the negotiations to a
successful completion lay in defining precisely as possible the territorial limits of
the two East India Companies. It was folly to look for a division of the islands so the
English gave the Dutch to understand that if they would agree to a share in the East
India trade, without requiring a merger between the two companies then they
would be ready to negotiate. The commissioners, not long in realising the rivalry
that would arise from a division of the trade, agreed. The treaty touching on these
items was signed 7th July, 1619, and ratified the following week. 70 As the problems
over the East India Companies were resolved by this treaty James was prepared to
postpone discussions on the Greenland whale fisheries until another Commission
could be sent. 71 The commissioners left England on 24th August, 1619.

At the beginning of 1621 the Archdukes agent reported that a ship out of
Amsterdam had arrived at Portsmouth from the East Indies and was promptly

69 Naunton to Carleton, 21st December, 1618, PRO SP 84/87/172.
70 19th July, 1619, PRO SP 14/59/143
71 As was the custom when he was dealing with representatives from Republics van der
Dussen, Jean de Goch, and Joachim Liens were knighted by James on 14th July, 1619. The
commissioners left England on 24th August, 1619.
impounded by order of the King. It was laden with merchandise from those parts to
the value of some several thousand pounds and was sequestered with the intention
of England regaining, to some extent, the losses suffered at the hands of the Dutch
during the previous years. The ambassador was to spend the next days trying to get
the ship liberated, an object in which Van Male believed he would probably
succeed because he was certain that James would not want to anger the Dutch at
that time. In the same despatch Van Male noted that there was also a report that the
Dutch were sending some deputies to England, although he was unable to confirm
what their mission was. 72

A few days after the Dutch ship at Portsmouth had been impounded another
squabble between the two sea-faring nations broke out, this time over the latest
English prize taken by the Dutch in the East Indies. The English insisted that the
damage settlement should be paid in England; the Dutch, although conceding that
reparation was due, insisted that it be paid in the Indies. 73 This was hardly
surprising - to make restoration in England of property seized in the Indies would,
by seventeenth century thinking, have been unfair to those who had committed the
offence. In effect they would be assuming the cost of shipping the goods back to
England, a cost that would have fallen to the English had the Dutch not stolen the
goods in the first place! This, naturally, did not suit the English, who in an attempt
to settle affairs to their liking had sent two commissioners of their own to Holland.
Meanwhile, the Dutch commissioners were still expected in England. However,
before their arrival Van Male's prediction about the Dutch ship at Portsmouth
seemed to have been justified - the embargo was lifted with the blessing of the
English East India Company and claims for reparation negotiated by the English
deputies currently in the United Provinces.

72 Van Male to Albert, 1st January, 1621, PROSP 77/57/2 - 5.
73 Van Male to Albert, 8th January, 1621, PROSP 77/57/15 - 17.
The Dutch commissioners reported by Van Male arrived in England on 25th January, 1621 looking for aid to check Spinola's progress in Germany. It would perhaps be useful at this point to compare the arrival of this embassy with that of Cadenet's recent extra-ordinary mission. Not for the Dutch was there an army of welcomers led by the Earl of Arundel, waiting to escort them up the Thames. Instead Sir Lewis Lewkenor met them at the Tower with one royal coach and a half dozen or so private ones. Nor, like Cadenet, were they provided with a royal palace by the King but had to put themselves up in a common tavern. Neither did their royal reception and audience make up for this lack of ceremony. The King had returned to London on 1st February, but it was to be a further five days before the deputies had their first audience with James. On 5th January the commissioners, Frederick van Vervou, Jonkheer Jacobus Wyngaerdes, Jacob Jacobsz Schotte, Albert Bruyning, Albert Soncq and Johan Camerlin, accompanied by Lord Clifford in one of the King's coaches and twenty other coaches arrived at their first audience with the King in the Council Chamber. The Archdukes envoy, Van Male gives a somewhat biased and unkind account of this audience. He writes to della Faille:

[The] deputies from Holland...like perfect courtesans...and being in the presence of the king, almost forgot to make their bows, and the head of them, who is seigneur de Bentuyysen, in commencing his harangue said in fine terms of courtesy, 'Sire, the prince of Orange commends himself strongly to your favour,' without using any other Ceremony, and then, delivering their letters of credence, they gave the king the one they had for the prince, and the prince the one they had for the king.

They had, he continued, conducted themselves in such a way as to cause the whole town to ridicule them. 74

After a second audience with the King, James handed the commissioners over to the Privy Council who were to deal with the negotiations. They opened by pointing out the great expense, some 50,000 florins a month, to the States General of their support for Frederick, both in Bohemia and in the Palatinate and renewed

74 Van Male to della Faille, 12th February, 1621, PRO SP 77/57/96.
their offer of assistance in the restoration of his lands. Furthermore, they expressed concern as to the exact help they might expect to receive from James should war break out with the Spanish following the expiry of the truce between the two nations. They reiterated the States General's constant complaint that both Albert and Philip had contravened the treaty of truce on many occasions and looked to James for help. At this time this was as far as the deputies went, a fact which gave the Privy Councillors some cause for concern. However, the Privy Councillors for their part, had themselves expressed various grievances on the English side about the way the King and his fleet had suffered at the hands of the Dutch. They informed the Dutch in no uncertain terms that, if they wished to retain the friendship of the King of England, they should look to remedying the many faults on their side. They should, the Councillors told them, get out, once and for all, of the English and Scottish fishing grounds and should seek to reform ordinances that were detrimental to English cloth merchants. Although, according to various sources, the commissioners agreed to report these concerns to the States General, there was no great expectation that the States would do anything about it.

That the mission the commissioners were engaged on was more complex than had yet been divulged was obvious. That they were trying to buy friends at court by the judicious outlay of gifts and intended to do all they could to break up the negotiations for the Spanish marriage treaty was also widely accepted. Far more important to the Dutch than Anglo-Dutch trade differences was their fear for the future once the treaty of truce with Spain came to an end. For reasons best known to himself the Flemish envoy became convinced that the States were looking for a renewal of the truce and would accept a continuation on almost any terms. Bearing in mind the intransigent attitude the commissioners had taken regarding the anti-English cloth trade statutes and the refusal to cease their incursions into the fishing grounds off the English and Scottish coasts it should have been fairly obvious to any observer that the Dutch had no intention of subservience. The Dutch had most
certainly not come to England to beg James to arrange any continuation of the truce - they had come to get him to agree to continue the alliance between the two and to assist the States in a full scale war against Spain.

Noel de Caron's memorial which related to the second meeting between the commissioners and the Privy Council gave a clear insight into the Dutch mind and shed light on the tone of Anglo-Dutch relations at the time. As was usual when the Dutch corresponded with James the text, despite its decision, is couched in conciliatory terms. The principal subject of the mission was to complain about Spain's 'unbridled ambition ...to the prejudice and hurt of ...the State of the United Provinces, and of their Friends, Allies and Confederates.' The King of Spain and the Archdukes, the Dutch insisted, had contravened the truce on many occasions, by unlawfully seizing merchandise and ships of the United Provinces without recompense. The ambassador reaffirmed the States position, showing clearly that they were without hope of gaining anything from the Spanish by peaceful means and confirmed that they had no intention of seeking a continuation of the truce under any circumstances. One thing was obvious from this document; the Dutch felt that nothing could be gained from a prolongation of the truce and meant to have war. Spain, they believed, would continue to exert pressure not only to reestablish the Catholic religion in Protestant Europe but also to continue her long-established secular goal of dominating the whole continent. By enumerating the ways in which the States had supported Frederick and the Protestant cause with cash and troops, they hoped James would be encouraged to respond and stand at the head of a Protestant coalition that would foil Spain in her plans for 'world' domination. In the meantime they looked forward to hearing 'the overtures which it shall please His Majesty to offer us on the subject'. In the Dutch view a continued peace with Spain was out of the question and could only lead to their destruction;

75 Noel de Caron to the Privy Council, 15th February, 1621, PRO SP 57/76 - 78.
the only salvation for both the United Provinces and the Protestant faith lay in opposition to Spain before it was too late. What ultimately becomes clear from this memorial is that the Dutch decision to go to war with Spain did not depend on James’s support whereas when and how did.

James’s response to de Caron’s memorial on 20th February was to ask the commissioners for specific violations of the truce, listing particulars of the offences and stating the truce articles violated. This James proposed to send to his ambassador in France for presentation to his co-guarantor so that England and France could take joint action. As to the expiry of the truce, James felt the Dutch should know their own business best, but suggested that if they were to deliver some proposals to him he ‘would be ready, like a true friend’, to give them his full and careful attention. As to matters of Anglo-Dutch trade James was prepared to welcome new commissioners, providing they, unlike their predecessors, had full powers to treat on business so far unresolved. 76 Having bluntly laid before James their demands for help in excising Spain from Protestant Europe and urging that the King declare himself to renew the military alliance between the two nations the six commissioners left England on 26th April, 1621 with promises that this new Commission would not be long in arriving.

In late June, 1621, two months after de Caron had promised the new Commission, James expressed deep anger to the ambassador that the promised commissioners, who should have been in England before ‘Midsummer day’, had not arrived. This was a situation which also worried the ambassador to such an extent that he wrote to the States General expressing his concern. 77 Despite the respectful tone of this letter de Caron’s worries and concerns are plainly expressed. He talks of the ‘shocking news’ he had received from friends that despite great effort the States

76 Privy Council to de Caron and the Dutch Deputies, 20th February, 1621, PRO SP 57/91 - 92.
77 BL Add Mss, 1325e. 4, Nievs uyt Engelantg gheschzeben dooz den heer Ambassadeur, Noel de Caron.
General had been unable to convince the Dutch East India Company to send delegates to England to help solve the differences between the ‘VOC, the authority of his Majesty the King and the States General’. Furthermore, he added that if he had to tell James that they would not come over after all he was afraid that ‘we will have to assume that contacts with England will be over’. He went on to express his concern that Dutch possessions would be confiscated as compensation for what English merchants were claiming they had lost, and warned that reprisals would be made against Dutch merchantmen travelling to and from the East Indies: ‘His majesty himself has said and even sworn, that he cannot live in peace not offering the same to his own people. How this will encourage our common enemy [Spain] I shall leave to your imagination … To believe that the King will not do so will prove to be wrong since I know very well his feelings about this’. The ambassador was most concerned about the situation and, as a trusted and experienced diplomat, felt himself able to alert the States General to the consequences of ignoring this problem. He continued, ‘if it would come to a separation with England we shall certainly regret that, for in all cases we need the friendship of his Majesty. I think that the friendship of the States General will suit England as well, but …this is not commonly accepted over here. Indeed, many dare to say that friendship with Spain is of more use than ours. In the past people who spoke that opinion were regarded as public enemies but now the subjects of the King become so irritated and aggravated by our East Indian trade, that they …study to practice the same: a serious situation will develop’. He explained that although he had tried to talk to James and apologise for the delay ‘his majesty was not prepared to talk with me as he felt we mock him by not keeping our promises.’ Although James had made a promise to the States that he would remain impartial in this matter, the failure of the States to send over the delegates would allow the King to distance himself from this promise. He continued by relating conditions in England and demonstrating the many ways in which Spain, and in particular her ambassador, Gondomar, was able
to take advantage of the situation. He described a meeting that took place between
the King and the Spanish ambassador and how friendly Buckingham and
Gondomar had become. Gondomar, he notes 'was accompanied back home by Lord
Buckingham, who offered him a place in his litter. They went together through the
City of London to Gondomar’s house enjoying such familiarity and showing
common agreement and shaking hands that it was a great surprise to the City. Some
of my people in the street told me that never before someone has taken his hat off
for him because most of them would see him hanged...nevertheless this Charlatan
enjoys the highest credit of the King.' He then advised the States that, if the United
Provinces wished to maintain its reputation with the James, they should endeavour
to please not just the King but his subjects also and he reminded them of a time
when ‘they wished us thousands of blessings, now I hear very day the opposite, due
to the ‘VOC’, which changed their attitude completely. For God’s will let us rather
spend one - two or three thousand Guilders, which God will repay us at another
moment in a different way. As it is very painful to see that this Gondomar has so
much credit here.’ This was a letter from a very worried man. He daily saw the
heights to which Gondomar was rising and the friendship developing between the
Spanish ambassador and Buckingham. The letter demonstrated the antipathy which
existed between the ambassadors of the United Provinces and Spain and de Caron’s
fear that Gondomar might, in even a minor way, exploit his assumed ascendancy
over the King. It also allows an insight into the petty jealousies between
representatives and the way in which envoys sought to maintain the status of their
princes. 78

In fact, the commissioners for whom James was waiting never arrived until
8th December of that year. The three men, Hendrik Van Tuyll Dirck Bas, and Francis
Aerssen sought to arrange matters between the East India companies of the two
nations once and for all and to deal with questions which had arisen on the whale

78 The full letter in translation can be found in Appendix C.
fisheries between England and the States. The commissioners were to have left in October, 1622 but as there was little or no agreement James requested that they remain in England until such time as some progress was made, but the Commission left in February, 1623, with no real answers to the problems on which they had been sent to treat.

On 8th March, 1624 the last Dutch commission to the court of James VI and I arrived in England. Commissioner Albert Joachim, and the extra-ordinary ambassador, Francis Aerssen, together with the resident ambassador, were instructed to treat for a defensive alliance which allowed the Dutch to levy 6,000 men in England to be paid for by the King. Hopes were high that this commission would be more successful than the last and credence is given to this by an entry in Walter Yonge's diary which notes that 'The States sent their ambassadors into England, who were received with great joy of all the commons.' Happily, and at long last, expectations were satisfied and the treaty of alliance was ratified on 15th June, 1624 and Joachim and Aerssen left England on 29th June, 1624.

Throughout James's reign the political and ideological bonds between the two powers served to alleviate the effects of political disagreement and increasing commercial rivalry to some degree so that in consequence Anglo-Dutch relations remained fairly stable and reasonably friendly. The commissioners moved backwards and forwards between the Netherlands and England, gaining an inch here and an inch there, but in the long term this bargaining had little effect, for the period was to witness a gradual decline of English influence in the internal affairs of the United Provinces and by the second half of the seventeenth century the two

79 Lodged in Bread Street, at the house of the late Lord Mayor, Sir Francis Jones. Their audience with James took place on 23rd December, 1621. The secretary to this special embassy was Constantine Huygens who had been knighted by James 20th April, 1622. As was the custom Hendrik van Tuyll was knighted by James in February, 1623. The other members of the commission were not so honoured, having already been knighted by France and Sweden.

80 See Calendar of Clarendon Papers, no 239, p. 29, 15th June 1624.
81 The Diary of Walter Yonge, p. 75.
82 Joachim returned on 9th January, 1625 as ordinary following the death of Noel de Caron.
countries were at war.
Chapter 6
Conclusion

Five general conclusions can be drawn from this study of the ambassadors to the court of James VI and I. First, the lot of ambassadors was not a particularly happy one. They were, after all, foreigners in a strange land, hampered by a different language and set of customs. Those professing to, and representing, Roman Catholicism were, of course, hampered even further. Second, their pay was irregular and never adequate, so that they lived impecunious, tedious and often dangerous lives in the service of their country. Thirdly, their financial state deteriorated over the period of their embassies. Their expenses rarely arrived, some not at all, so that men financed their embassies from their own pockets, often having reached the point of mortgaging private estates by end of their mission. Fourth, on top of this lack of income we find that an ambassador’s expenditure was crushingly high. As the representative of theirs state and prince they were expected to entertain lavishly, pay out pensions and give expensive gifts in order to smooth their path to the King and his Councillors. Finally, an ambassadorship was an important and dignified position although it did not carry with it the prestige it does today. It was viewed, hopefully by those involved, as a stepping stone to a more lucrative position at home afterwards. Many men were rewarded by positions of power at home whilst others returned from England and were moved on to other postings abroad.

In his book of practical advise, *The Ambassador*, Jean Hotman wrote that ambassadors:

should have a knowledge of many things, especially of philosophy, moral and politic, and before all other, Roman Civil Law; and, moreover, a knowledge of histories will greatly help him, which besides the pleasure of it will increase
In him wisdom and judgement in affairs of his charges, will make him not to be astonished at anything. 1

If not all ambassadors at James's court lived up to this precept they were, nonetheless a competent group of professionals. This was an age of talented diplomatists and if not all displayed the abilities of Gondomar, most came close, comparing favourably enough. Perhaps one might consider these conclusions to be somewhat negative, but there was an up side to the lonely, and often dangerous, life of a foreign diplomatic representative to the Court of St. James. It has frequently been overlooked just how experienced in their art they were - in many cases more so than those in subsequent periods. Those who were particularly successful could be rewarded by honours bestowed at their departure by James or on their return home by their princes. Many more received high value gifts from James and his courtiers which, except in the case of the Venetians, supplemented a meagre, and sometimes non-existent, salary.

Traditionally, historians have viewed with horror the association between James and the Spanish ambassador, Gondomar. However, this work has shown that the relationship between the two men was not that of a weak willed King under the influence of a stronger willed foreigner. In fact the influence which Gondomar had over James was no more sinister, or threatening, than that of the representative of the United Provinces, de Caron. More importantly, we have seen from both contemporary and more modern writing that the way in which Gondomar was seen in England was very much tied up with a fear of Catholicism. In his own time the fears of Catholic duplicity both at home and abroad, combined as it was with an ingrained hatred of all things Spanish, made it impossible for even so well skilled an ambassador as Gondomar to prevail. Despite a quite severely enforced insistence on conformity the decades which followed the process of Reformation had created a

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nation which was religiously plural, and the resulting conflict between Catholic and Protestant, which this plurality encouraged, persisted well into the nineteenth century. As historians wrestled with the problems brought about by the fight for religious equality in the nineteenth century so they turned back to the Stuarts, producing a body of research, both large and scholarly but which caused much friction, in part, because the Victorians saw in the religious controversies of the seventeenth century a parallel with the sectarian strife of their own age. It was in this atmosphere of concern over Catholicism that the activities of Gondomar and his master, Philip, were seen as part of the historical problems caused by the Church of Rome.

I have argued that it is not possible to claim a place for Gondomar amongst Europe’s greatest statesmen, finding this to be due less to any limitations on the part of the ambassador but more to the policies of a government which aimed at the realisation of an ideal which proved totally impossible. His record as an ambassador speaks for itself; the combination of audacity and firmness demonstrates as it does the industry with which he sought to obtain for Spain a supreme position at the English court. Yet the sum of Gondomar’s diplomacy amounted to very little, neither promoting the authority and privilege of Spain in Europe nor really advancing the cause of the English Catholics. Without doubt he infuriated the English clergy and consolidated the traditional English fear of Spaniards into an abiding and enduring hatred, but if Gondomar cannot claim for himself a place amongst history’s great statesmen, he does, at least, compare rather more than favourably with other statesmen of his day and his selfless drive and integrity outshines many of the grasping sycophants surrounding James. Despite the arts of diplomacy and flattery that it was his business to practise, he was a rigidly honest man who in the long years of service to Spain, was guided by one principle - the advancement and ultimate success of Spain, Philip and the Catholic Church. One has to conclude that Gondomar sincerely believed in what he was trying to achieve
in England. He worked tirelessly on behalf of his co-religionists and sought a lasting, peaceful arrangement between England and Spain. He was not the machiavellian monster depicted by contemporary observers in England, neither was he the embodiment of all that was wrong within the Church of Rome; he was an able diplomat trying to come to terms with a difficult job in an hostile country.

It was not to be until the latter half of the twentieth century, when new documents, including the ambassador’s own papers, became available from such archives as those in Simancas, that the reputation gained by Gondomar at the hands of early historians could be challenged. Scholars no longer believe that James was putty in the hands of the Spanish ambassador. Gondomar’s influence over James was not due either to his cunning or the King’s gullibility, but to a friendship based on mutual respect of the other’s good qualities and shared interests. On his return to Spain in 1622 Gondomar’s career as a foreign resident, at least, was over. He had not enjoyed his last months in England; his failing health and the tremendous enmity he encountered in the mass of Englishmen made his last days as ambassador extremely uncomfortable. Yet, despite his strong desire to return home, Gondomar carried out the negotiations entrusted to him with his usual reliability and sense of duty, if not with total enthusiasm. But, more often than not the enthusiasm was still there, especially when the objective further promoted Anglo-Spanish friendship and the negotiations for the marriage between Prince Charles and the Infanta. One can reasonably argue that his death in 1626 released Gondomar before he became fully aware of the failure of Spain to achieve her aims of a universal monarchy, the re-conversion of the whole of Europe to Catholicism and the complete destruction of rising Dutch aspirations.

As for the Dutch ambassador, de Caron, he, like Gondomar, played the diplomatic game with skill and aplomb. He also was able to attach James in a private way by a shared interest in the exotic fruits that he grew in his gardens at Lambeth. In two major respects de Caron differed from the Spanish envoy.
Gondomar, a child of the sun, was never at home in England, he loathed the weather and suffered the disadvantage of practising a religion outlawed by the English government. Noel de Caron, on the other hand, was an Anglophile; he had built a house for himself in England and felt perfectly at home with the English way of life if not entirely so with the language. Most importantly, perhaps, was the fact that he embraced the same religious beliefs as those with whom he wished to deal. In part because of these factors, de Caron got on well with the English, with the result that his long embassy was marked by many achievements which would not have been possible for Gondomar. His continued presence in England gave the English some assurance that James was not wholly Spanish. In this way he served as a steadying influence on Anglo-Dutch relations - keeping the English government from pressuring the Dutch beyond reasonable endurance and the Dutch from giving up on the English alliance entirely out of sheer desperation.

Unlike the Spanish ambassador who generally worked on his own when negotiating de Caron was always backed up by a large group of highly experienced statesmen who came to England whenever matters of great import to the Republic needed to be negotiated. Several of the United Provinces' most experienced men like Johan van Olden Barneveld, Albert Joachimi, Grotius and Francis van Aerssen came to England to support de Caron in negotiation. In effect de Caron acted in the role of master of ceremonies - presiding over the proceedings and adding his signature to the ratified treaties. The legacy of trade disputes represented the greatest failure of de Caron's long embassy. Though he had consistently worked, with the assistance of many Commissions, to settle commercial differences, little or nothing had been permanently concluded. His failure would not appear so great but for the later course of Anglo-Dutch relations. Throughout James's reign and de Caron's embassy when political considerations prevailed, the United Provinces and England, despite several minor skirmishes remained at peace. In later years, however, when
England's interests changed and conflicting economic interests came to the fore, outright war broke out between the former political and ideological allies.

As the period progressed there became a clear distinction drawn between the diplomat and the politician for, although one occasionally assumes the duty of the other, the latter was now directly concerned with the great 'game' of power. Whatever the form of government in which he operated the politician needed to consider primarily the factors which are likely to preserve him in office or, alternatively, to result in his disgrace or dismissal; it was he who took the risks. The diplomat was thus cast in the secondary role. It was for them to offer advice on the best means to gain their master's ends and it was for them to say whether these ends are likely to prevail or be doomed to failure. But, when their government had established its policy there was nothing more for him to do but apply it, no matter what his personal thoughts might have been. Early modern commentators allowed only one exception to this rule; that was when the diplomat was ordered to do something against the laws of God and justice. This rule clearly holds good even today when there is much less agreement as to what actually constitutes the laws of God and justice. Should the diplomat feel he is asked to do something against his conscience (always assuming he has one) there is certainly very little more he can do except, perhaps, resign.

Although one should not see the early modern diplomatic world as being peopled by a special or privileged class there can be no doubt that long experience of working with diplomats from other countries tended to create among the more intelligent negotiators the sort of atmosphere which sometimes resulted in a mysterious improvement in an otherwise hopeless situation. Men who had known each other for many years and who had constantly come across each other in various cities around Europe were at least predisposed to understand each other's concerns. It was just as likely that peace could be built on this kind of relationship as on the speeches delivered primarily for a political purpose. One thing alone
could damage such a benign process - the ideological warfare raging in Europe
during the period. Such ideology permitted of no diplomacy except perhaps in a
very restricted sense; when everything done by one side was met with hostility,
suspicion and condemnation by the other, international relations were outside the
realm of compromise and at the mercy of total warfare. In its place was wanted a
reversion to the earlier assumption of an ideal ‘Christian’ republic that would
transcend warring nationalities.

One final question remains to be settled - does the paragon of virtue
described by the early modern jurists and political theorists have any relevance in
the modern age? True, circumstances have changed considerably since these men
were writing. Some now claim that modern conditions have reduced the diplomat
to little more than a glorified clerk, and that when matters of import arise it is the
business of the foreign minister to transact negotiations or occasionally it is the
head of government who flies in to deal directly with his opposite number. This
being true it is no longer the ‘negotiator’ who actually negotiates. However, it is
also true that, when the minister arrives, it is the man on the spot who is the fount
of all local knowledge and it is his reports that create a climate in which crucial
decisions are taken. Many early modern ambassadors were so terrified of exceeding
their instructions that they adopted a purely passive attitude, and spent their time
writing brilliant reports on situations that had entirely altered by the time their
despatches arrived. Today the advances made in telecommunications have enabled
the man on the spot to make a more precise decision and to contact with speed and
efficiency his masters at home. The fact of the matter is that the modern
ambassador, like his early modern predecessor still retains considerable influence if
he is efficient but very little if he is not.
Appendix A

BAVARIA

1. Francesco della ROTA
   November, 1623 - February, 1624 Special Envoy
   Audience: December, 1623

A Capuchin Friar, Alexandre d’Alix, sent with the consent of both Bavaria and Mayence by the Papal Nuncio in Brussels. Sent to offer proposals for the restitution of the Palatine, assistance for the Palatine to become an eighth Elector and to ask that the eldest son of Frederick be ‘kept near’ the Duke of Bavaria, with freedom of religion. These proposals were seen as being made out of a mistrust of Spain. CSP Venetian, 1623 - 1625, no. 228.
In March, 1624 he went to The Hague to speak to the Palatine.

BOHEMIA

1. Baron Achatius (Achaz) DOHNA
   January, 1620 - April, 1621 Ordinary
   Audience: 6th April, 1620

Brother of Christopher CSP Domestic 14th September, 1620
His mission was to raise a volunteer force. He had a turbulent and unsuccessful year in England. Having declined Buckingham’s suggestion that Edward Cecil should command volunteers he chose instead Vere. This choice caused a quarrel between the ambassador and Cecil. He later tried to convict James of promising more than he could deliver and in consequence was forbidden the court in January, 1621.

BRANDENBURG

1. Christian von BELLIN (Christopher)
   October, 1609 - October, 1609 Extra-ordinary

Arrived in England in the company of Sir James Spens (Spence).

2. Count SOLMS (Philip or Frederick)
   November, 1609 - December, 1609 Extra-ordinary

Unable to find sources which confirm which brother represented which state. Those records found relating to these brothers note that Frederick was the taller of the two!!

3. WINTERFELT
   October, 1614 - November, 1614 Extra-ordinary
4. Christopher STICKE  
   February, 1615 - December, 1615 Extra-ordinary

5. Unknown  
   - November, 1620
Left after being knighted.

6. Christian von BELLIN (Christopher)  
   January, 1625 - April, 1625 Extra-ordinary
Absent in France on diplomatic business between February and March, 1625

DENMARK

1. Christopher FRUS, Chancellor of Denmark.  
   Henry BELOW  
   May, 1603 - 17th August, 1603 Extra-ordinary  
   Lodging: Richmond Palace
Came to offer James congratulations on his accession. Arrived in time to attend the coronation.

2. Ulric, Duke of Holstein, Bishop of Scheverin and Sleswig  
   November, 1604 - Extra-ordinary  
   Lodging: Lord Treasurers Lodging at Court
Queen Anne's brother. His mission was ostensibly to raise 10,000 men for service in Hungary. According to CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, pp. 193, 245, the visit lasted some time and was very expensive. Invested with the Garter, 24th April, 1605

3. Henry RAMELIUS, Secretary to Christian IV  
   31st August, 1605 - 28th September, 1605 Extra-ordinary  
   Lodging: Somerset House  
   Audience: 24th September, 1605
As ambassador he acted as proxy for the King at the investiture of Order of the Garter.

4. Sir Andrew SINCLAIR  
   May, 1609 - Extra-ordinary
A Scots nobleman. Also referred to as M. di SANCLER, de St. CLER and SAINTCLEAR, CSP Domestic. 24th April, 1608.
5. Dr Jonas CHARISIUS, Councillor to the Danish Court  
   October, 1610 - Extra-ordinary  
   Lodging: at royal expense  
   Audience: 21st October, 1610 at Royston  

   His mission was about the princes of the Union.  
   Letter, dated 13th September, 1619, recommending Charisius and Sinclair as  
   ambassadors can be found in ‘Royal Archives of Denmark’, Report of the Deputy  

6. Unknown  
   March, 1611 - Extra-ordinary  

   To demand men and mariners, urging that they should be pressed.

7. Dr Jonas CHARISIUS, Councillor to the Danish Court  
   31st August, 1611 - October, 1611 Extra-ordinary  
   Lodging: at royal charge  
   Audience: 2nd September with the Queen at Oatlands  

   To demand pressed men and mariners, CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, nos. 316, 325,  
   342, 355.

8. Dr Jonas CHARISIUS, Councillor to the Danish Court  
   31st December, 1611 - 20th February, 1612 Extra-ordinary  

   To raise funds and horses

9. Sir Andrew SINCLAIR, Councillor to the Danish Court  
   January, 1614 - March, 1614 Extra-ordinary  

   To ask for assistance in an attack on Lubeck. Letter, dated 13th September, 1619,  
   recommending Charisius and Sinclair as ambassadors can be found in ‘Royal  
   38.

10. Dr Jonas CHARISIUS, Councillor to the Danish Court  
    March, 1618 - April, 1618 Extra-ordinary  
    Audience: 5th March 1618  

    Mission in respect of fishing around Greenland. Dispute caused by Denmark’s  
    claim to all fishing rights in the area, as crowned head of Norway.

11. Sir Andrew SINCLAIR, Councillor to the Danish Court  
    March, 1618 - 15th April, 1618 Extra-ordinary  
    Audience: 5th March, 1618
12. Sir Andrew SINCLAIR, Councillor to the Danish Court  
April, 1619 - May, 1619 Extra-ordinary

For the Queen's funeral.

13. Sir Andrew SINCLAIR, Councillor to the Danish Court  
March, 1621 - August, 1621 Extra-ordinary

To negotiate a treaty which was signed 20th July, 1621 CSP Venetian 1621-23, no. 2.

THE EMPEROR and IMPERIAL DIETS

1. Prince George Lodovic of Litemberg, Landgrave of Litemberg, Lord Chamberlain to Rudolph II  
1st July, 1605 - 22nd July, 1605 Extra-ordinary
Lodging: A public tavern Lombard Street  
Audience: 12th July, 1605 at Whitehall

His mission was to ask for help in Hungary. In response, he was given leave to raise troops but no money. CSP Venetian. 1603 - 1607, no. 404. 'Attended by 3 earls, 1 baron, 24 guests of note, 12 musketeers and others to the number of 100 persons.' See Nichols, Progresses, vol. 1

2. George Lewis, Count SCHWARZENBERG (?1549 - 1633)  
5th April, 1622 - 17th April, 1622 Extra-ordinary
Lodging: Somerset (Denmark) House at the King's expense.  
Audience: 7th April, 1622

FLANDERS (Spanish Netherlands)

1. CORSO  
May, 1603 - June, 1603 Agent

Sent to request safe conduct for Aremberg. CSP Venetian August 1603

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1 There are two separate accounts of this embassy: E. Howes, Annales, or, A generall chronicle of England. Begun by John Slow: continued and augmented with matters forragnie and domestique, ancient and moderne, into the end of this present yeere, 1632. By Edmund Howes (1632) dates the embassy to 1620 whilst Finett, Observations, p. 96 records the embassy as arriving in 1622.
2. John de LIGNE, Count of AREMBERG, Prince of Barbançon
11th June, 1603 - 25th August, 1604  Commissioner
Lodging: Jesus College, Oxford, St. Mary Spittle, Without Bishopsgate, the home of Sir H. Paulauisire, and later at Staines
Audience: 4th October, 1603 with Queen

The Archduke’s chief commissioner at Anglo-Spanish peace talks.

2a. President Jean Grusset RICHARDOT (1540 - 1609), Foreign Minister
Audience: 19th May, 1604 - 25th August, 1604  Commissioners
Lodging: Basing

Commissioners for the Anglo-Spanish peace talks. CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, no. 113. Treaty ratified 28th August, 1604. There is a full report of the negotiator's discussions in SP. Spain, and a copy in Add. MSS, 14033. See also CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, no. 11.
Commission instructions can be found in Simancas, legajo E840.2

3. Jean Baptiste Van MALE
January, 1604 - Agent

4. Conrad Schetz, Baron HOBOKEN
7th May, 1605 - May, 1607  Ordinary

5. Ferdinando di GIRON, Knight of Malta
December, 1608 - February, 1609  Extra-ordinary
Audience: 21st December, 1608
His mission was to encourage ratification of the truce between the United Provinces and Spain. CSP Dom. 23rd December 1608. The truce was ratified in Antwerp in 1609. Duc of Ossuna, the head of his house, advanced him to post. Unpopular - see CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610.

6. Louis de GROOTE
1609 -

7. Conrad Schetz, Baron HOBOKEN
July, 1609 -1610  Ordinary

8. GROTTI, Secretary to Archduke Albert
July, 1612 - Special Envoy

CSP Venetian 1610 - 1613, nos. 584, 585, 668

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According to Jan Den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt, p. 329, this was Karel van Arcenbergh. Also noted by some commentators as Charles.
9. Ferdinand de BOISCHOT  
   January, 1610 - 4th December, 1615  
   Ordinary  
   Secretary: Jean Baptiste Van Male  
   Married: 1607 to a Spanish lady, Anna-Maria de Camudio  

10. Jean Baptiste Van MALE  
    December, 1614 - 1629  
    Agent  
    Promoted to the rank of resident envoy when Boischot returned to Brussels. 
    With Coloma and Boischot, he received an MA from Cambridge in March, 1623.  

11. Count de NOYELLES  
    April, 1619 - May, 1619  
    Extra-ordinary  
    To offer condolences on death of Queen Anne.  

12. Baron of RODES, Knight of the Order of Santiago  
    October, 1620 -  
    Special Envoy  
    He was not given title of ambassador so none of the diplomatic corps visited him.  
    Introduced to King, in a roundabout fashion, by Gondomar.  

13. Gaston, Marquis SPINOLA  
    February, 1623  
    Designated Ordinary  
    Nichols, Progresses, IV, p. 805 suggests this was nothing but a rumour.  

14. Ferdinand de BOISCHOT, Licentiate (1622)  
    February, 1623 - April, 1623  
    Extra-ordinary  
    Lodging: Ely House, with the Spanish ambassador, Coloma.  
    Audience: 26th February, 1623 at Newmarket  
    Sent by the Infanta to agree terms for the surrender of Frankenthal. CSP Domestic  
    1619 - 1623, 12th and 14th February, 1623. Treaty of surrender signed 19th March,  
    1623, ratified 5th April, 1623.  
    Instructions from Isabella to Boischot and Coloma can be found in Simancas E8785,  
    no. 2. This legajo contains copies of the Treaty and the correspondence between  
    James and the Infanta regarding the peace. No. 21 is James's response to the  
    suspension of arms.  
    With Coloma and Van Male, he received an MA from Cambridge in March 1623.  

15. Diego de MEXIA, Governor of the Castle of Antwerp  
    5th November, 1623 - December, 1623  
    Extra-ordinary  
    Lodging: Exeter House at Inojosa's expense  
    Audience: November, 1623  
    He represented the Infanta to congratulate Charles on his safe return from Spain.
FRANCE

1. Christopher de Harlay, Count de BEAUMONT
   January, 1602 - 10th November, 1605 Ordinary
   Lodging: Redcross Street, Barbican
   Salary: 6,000 crowns p.a.
   Secretary: M. Dujardin

   The son of the First President of the Parlement of France.
   Correspondence can be found in Bibliotheque Nationale, MS 33501.
   Transcripts can be found in Add MSS, 30638 - 30641 and P. Laffleur de Kermaingment, L'Ambassade de France en Angleterre sans Henri IV: Mission de Christophe de Harlay, Comte de Beaumont, 2 vols. (1895)

2. Louis Gallucio de l'Hospital, Marquis de VITRY (- 1611), Chevalier des Ordres et Capitaine des Gardes
   6th June, 1603 - 28th June, 1603 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Redcross Street, Barbican
   Audience: August, 1603

   Attached to the ordinary ambassador, Beaumont. Mission to negotiate peace treaty. CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, nos. 113, 141.

3. Maximillien Bethüe, Marquis de ROSNY (1559 - 1641), Duke de Sully (1606)
   8th June, 1603 - 3rd July, 1603 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Crosby Place, Bishopsgate Street, home of Sir John Spencer
   Audience: 22nd June, 1603, Greenwich

   His instructions were, addition to giving formal congratulations to the new King, to establish a close alliance between France and England against the Spanish, if he could, and to discuss the problem of aid for the Dutch rebels against Spain. Memoirs of Maximilien de Bethane, Duke of Sully. Translated from the French by the author of the Female Quixote. (1757) 5 vols. vol. iii, pp. 121 - 123. Also Memoirs..., Bohn edition (1856) vol. ii, p. 364; Gardiner, History, vol. i, p. 106
   See Bibliotheque Nationale, MS 3502

4. Vicomte de SEGUR (-1612)
   April, 1605 - April, 1605 Special Envoy

   His name is also spelt 'Sagar', 'Sagart', 'Sagard' and 'Saguier'. Probably Robert Creichton, Lord Sanquhar.

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5 It would appear from his Memoir that, although he saw James on the 22nd the audience actually took place on the 29th.
5. **M. DUJARDIN**  
   November, 1605 - Agent  
   Lodging: Redcross Street, Barbican

Acted after the departure of Beaumont  
See *Bibliotheque Nationale, MS, 15972*

6. **Count de CRUMAILLE**  
   December, 1605 - Designated Ordinary

7. **Charles Cauchon de Maupes, Baron du TOUR (1555 - ?)**  
   January, 1606 - Extra-ordinary  
   Lodging: Arundel House (Earl of Surrey). Removed to Richmond in September/October, 1606 to avoid the plague.

He had been ambassador to Scotland and had accompanied James to London and left in May 1603.  
For history of lodging fees see *CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, no. 463.*

8. **Antoine le Fevre de la BODERJE (- 1651)**  
   16th April, 1606 - July, 1609 - Ordinary  
   Secretary M. de Vertault, to 27th February, 1608. Winwood, *Memorials*, vol. iii, p.131

See *CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, no. 523n*

9. **M. de la VERDYNE, Marshall of France, Governor of Maine**  
   January, 1611 - Ordinary  
   Lodging: Archbishop's Palace, Lambeth at King's expense  
   Audience: 20th January, 1611

The ambassador was 'accompanied and attended with six score persons, all in mourning habit, for the death of their ould Kinge'.  
27th January, 1611, James swore to 'the new league which was made between the two Kingdomes'. Nichols, *Progresses*, vol. II, p. 407

10. **Antoine le Fevre de la BODERIE (- 1651)**  
    February, 1610 - January, 1611 - Ordinary  
    Lodging: House of Sir Thos. Thynne. Warrant for £100.00 rent *SP Domestic*, vol. LVIII, no 39, 26th November, 1610.

Return requested by James to negotiate over the problem of Cleves. Proposed a French match for the Prince of Wales.  
11. Jean de Beaumanoir III, Marechal de LAVERDIN
   20th January, 1611 - 14th February, 1611 Extra-ordinary
   Audience: Feb, 1611

For the swearing of the treaty between the two countries.

12. Samuel SPIFAME, Sieur des BISSEAUX
   February, 1611 - January, 1615 Ordinary

See Winwood, *Memorials*, III, 232; *CSP Venetian*, 1611 - 1613;
*Bibliotheque Nationale*, MSS 15985 - 7

13. Henri de la Tour, Duc de BOUILLON (c.1550 - 1623), Vicomte de
   Turenne, Marshal of France
   24th April, 1612 - 29th May, 1612 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Suffolk House, Whitehall
   Audience: 8th May, 1612

Had a double mission acting as envoy for the Palatine of the Rhine and the Queen-
503, 516. Joint mission with Count of Hanau. Came to arrange a marriage between
Henry and Christina, sister of Louis XIII. Uncle to Frederick, Elector Palatine.
Returned to France on business late April until 6th May, 1612

14. Louis Gallucio de l'Hospital, Marquis de VITRY (- 1611)Chevalier des
   Ordres et Capitaine des Gardes
   April, 1611 - June, 1611 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Basing

Ostensibly invited to join James in a hunting party.

15. Louis Gallucio de l'Hospital, Marquis de VITRY (- 1611)Chevalier des
   Ordres et Capitaine des Gardes
   September, 1611 - 20th November, 1611 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Royston

Although it was given out that he had returned for more sport, it was commonly
agreed that his mission was to raise troops for Denmark.
He was taken ill on 19th November at Royston and died there on 20th November,
1611. His body was taken back to France.

16. Charles de Choiseul, Seignior de PRASLIN
   February, 1613 - Designated Extra-ordinary

17. M. de SEVE
   January, 1615 - July, 1615 Agent
18. Gaspard DAUVET, Count DESMARETZ (de Marreis)  
19th June, 1615 – 21st March, 1618 Ordinary  
Lodging: Charterhouse  
Secretary: M. le Clerc  
Interpreter: La Chesnaye (Chesnee)  
Audience: 2nd July, 1615  

Absent from July - October, 1617.  
Complete correspondence can be found in Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS 15988, 4172

19. Charles Cauchon de Maupes, Baron du TOUR (1555 - ?)  
January, 1617 - 8th March, 1617 Extra-ordinary  
Lodging: Arundel House  
Audience: 4th February, 1617  

For ceremonial

20. Charles Cauchon de Maupes, Baron du TOUR (1555 - ?)  
October, 1617 Extra-ordinary  

His mission was to seek aid of James ‘for soldiers to suppress the nobility of France, who are proclaimed traitors’. Diary of Walter Yonge, p. 32. John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 11th October, 1617, SP. Domestic, vol. xciii, no. 124  
See also Nichols, Progresses, vol. iii, pp. 535 - 537, 549.

21. M. le CLERC, Secretary of State  
April, 1618 - October, 1618 Agent  
Lodging: Charterhouse  

Acted after Desmaretz left.

22. M. le GRAND  
April, 1619 - May, 1619 Extra-ordinary  

For the Queen's funeral

23. Francois JUVENAL, Marquis TRESNEL, Seignior des Ursins  
1st May, 1619 - 20th May, 1619 Extra-ordinary  
Audience: 3rd May, 1619, Theobalds  

There is some confusion over his name. His instructions style him ‘Tresnel’, the King’s letters ‘Fresnel’ and Camden ‘Tremouille’.  
Probably came for the Queen’s funeral and to negotiate the marriage of Charles and Henrietta Maria.  
His instructions, dated April, 1619, and other documents can be found in Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS, 4112, 15988.
24. Count Tanneguy Leveneur de TILLIÈRES
   August, 1619 - July, 1624 Ordinary
   Lodging: Hunsdon House, Blackfriars
   Audience: 15th September, 1619, at Windsor
   Secretary: M. du Moulin.

   Absent on leave between August - 13th October, 1623. Re-accredited, 25th June, 1624. Removed from office as he was known to be against the match between Charles and Henrietta Maria. Nichols, *Progresses*, vol. iv, Gardiner, *History*, vol. v, p. 253
   His correspondence is in *Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS, 4112, 15988 - 9.*
   See also M. C. Hippeau, *Mémoires Inédits du Conte Leveneur de Tillières* (Paris, 1862)
   Tillières was much involved in English Catholic affairs and was ambassador at the time of the 'Fatal Vespers'.

25. M. de la FERTE, Secretary to Duke of Rohan
   September, 1619 - November, 1619 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Hunsdon House, Blackfriars

   To condole on death of Queen Anne.

26. M. du BUSSON
   3rd August, 1620 - Extra-ordinary

   Proposed a marriage between Charles and Henrietta Maria. *CSP Domestic*, 1619 - 1623, p. 171

27. Albert d'Honore, Marquis of CADENET.
   1st January, 1621 - 8th January, 1621 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Denmark House
   Audience: 1st January, 1621, Hampton Court

   With the Marquis d'Effiat, who was travelling in the ambassador’s suite, he received an MA from Cambridge.
   *Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS, 4112, 15988*

28. Benjamin de ROHAN, Sieur de Soubrise
   June, 1622 - August, 1622 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: At an inn near Denmark House until Sir Henry Rich lent him a house in Drury Lane

29. M. du Moulin
   August, 1623 - 13th October, 1623 Agent
   Lodging: Hunsdon House, Blackfriars

   Charged with correspondence during Tillières’ absence.
30. Baron BONNEVEAU (Bonicio, Bonavo)  
January, 1624 - March, 1624 Ordinary

31. Antoine le Fevre de la BODERIE (- 1651)  
July, 1624 - July, 1625 Ordinary
  Audience: July, 1624, Windsor
  Lodging: Suffolk House

See Bibliothèque Nationale, MSS 15984 - 5, Transcripts of his correspondence can be found in Add MSS, 30642 - 4.
See also A. de la Boderie, Ambassades de Monsieur Antoine le Fevre de la Boderie en Angleterre (Paris, 1750)

32. Antoine Coeffer Ruze, Marquis d'EFFIAT, Lord of Chelly and Longineau, Privy Councillor; Chief Master of the King's Horse; Master of the Mines  
3rd July, 1624 - July, 1625 Ordinary
  Lodging: Suffolk House, Whitehall
  Audience: 4th July, 1624, Windsor

His mission was to arrange a French match for which he gained the support of Buckingham. Awarded an MA from Oxford, 25th August, 1624

33. Guillaume de BAUTRU  
October, 1624 - November, 1624 Special Envoy
  Lodging: with Lomenie at Suffolk House

Complimentary mission from Louis XIII to Charles on his recovery after his riding accident. See CSP Domestic, December, 1624. 
It is possible that this was Guillaume d'Hugues, Archbishop of Ennbrun.

34. Henry Augustus de LOMENIE, Baron Ville-aux-Clercs, Secretary of State  
3rd December, 1624 - 10th January, 1625 Extra-ordinary
  Lodging: Suffolk House
  Audience: 12th December, 1624, Cambridge

Secretary to Louis, he was sent to obtain ratification of the marriage treaty between Charles and Henrietta Maria, which had been signed by the English ambassadors on 10th November, 1624. Ratified 12th December, 1624, CSP Domestic December, 1624. Instructions to Lomenie, 27th November, 1624, Harleian MSS, 4596, fol. 106. 
Text of Charles's engagement can be found in Gardiner, History, vol. v, pp. 277 - 278. The ratification of the treaty was only part of his mission. He was also to attempt to embroil James in a war with Spain and to obtain permission for Mansfeld to relieve Breda. He gained an ally in Buckingham, who by this time was wholly anti-Spanish. Returned to England in May, 1625, with Claude de Lorraine, Duc de Chevreuse.
GERMAN STATES

1. M. de BOISLOREE
   - July, 1615
   Agent

2. Unknown
   August, 1615 -
   Agent

3. M. de MONTBAROT
   December, 1615 -
   Agent

HANSE TOWNS

1. Unknown (Brunswick)
   August, 1603 - 17th August, 1603
   Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Kingston

   Acted as an Officer at the Coronation.

2. FREDERICK ULRIC, Prince of Brunswick
   29th March, 1610 - June, 1610
   Special Envoy
   Lodging: St. James's with Prince Henry.

   Cousin of James's children. Came on an abortive mission to promote a marriage
   between himself and Princess Elizabeth. Not given the quality of an ambassador.

3. CHRISTIAN, Duke of Brunswick
   20th December, 1624 - 1st January, 1625
   Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: St. James's with Prince Charles.

   For his investiture as Knight of the Garter, Christmas, 1624. See Sir J. Hippesley's
   letters. SP: Domestic.

HESSE

1. OTTO, Prince of Hesse (1594 - 1617)
   23rd June, 1611 - 3rd August, 1611
   Special Envoy

   On an unsuccessful mission to propose a marriage between himself and Princess
   Elizabeth. Not really an ambassador but give honours due to his rank. He was a
   second cousin to the royal siblings. Stow, Annals, fol. 1631; Nichols, Progresses, II,
   p. 424; CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, 11th August, 1611, p. 196; Rye, England,
   pp143 ff.; Prince of Hesse' letters in BL Harleian MSS 7008, ff. 81 - 82, 138.
2. **PHILIP, Prince Landgrave**  
   **April, 1622 - July, 1622** Special Envoy  
   **Audience:** 21st April, 1622 at St. James’s Palace

Second son of the Landgrave of Hesse. He was not, according to Finett, a ‘qualified ambassador’ but given ceremonial due to his rank. Nichols, *Progresses*, vol. II

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**LITHUANIA**

1. **Unknown Gentleman**  
   **February, 1605** Designated Extra-ordinary

In February, 1605 the Marshall of Lithuania sent one of his gentlemen with letters and gifts for James. The Dutch ship on which he was a passenger fell to the Dunkirkers and the envoy was thrown overboard into the sea and drowned. *CSP Venetian*, 1603 - 1607, no. 354

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**LORRAINE**

1. **M. de BOURBON**  
   **August, 1603 - August, 1603** Extra-ordinary

A complimentary mission to congratulate James on his accession. Acted as an Officer at the Coronation.  

2. **Baron MAGLIANI**  
   **24th April, 1606 - May, 1606** Extra-ordinary

Stayed less than a month. Sent to congratulate James on his escape from the Gunpowder Plot and to announce the marriage of his heir, the Duc de Bar. In all probability he had instructions on the question of religion as he was also a secret Chamberlain of the Pope. *CSP Venetian*, 1603 - 1607, no. 592; HMC Salisbury MSS. vol. 18, pp. 400, 411.

3. **Prince of VAUDEMONT**  
   **28th June, 1606 -** Extra-ordinary

4. **Unknown**  
   **3rd June, 1619 - June, 1619** Extra-ordinary

To condole on death of Queen Anne.

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6 Carleton to Chamberlain, 27th August, 1604 *SP Dom.*, ix. 25 mentions a complimentary mission from Lorraine.
MANTUA

1. Carlo de ROSSI
   May, 1612 - 
   Extra-ordinary

MOROCCO

1. Unknown
   June, 1611 - September, 1611
   Agent
   Lodging: At the merchant's expense
   Audience: 6th July, 1611, Greenwich

Not given the quality of ambassador, came to discuss commerce.

MUSCOVY

1. Alexei ZYUZIN
   Alexei VITOVOV
   13th October, 1613 - 1st June, 1614
   Ordinary
   Lodging: Bishopsgate Street at the expense the Muscovy Company.
   Audience: 7th November, 1613 in the Queen's apartments

The ambassadors left Archangel on 29th August, 1613, travelling in the company of Sir John Merrick. To discuss affairs of state and commerce, they wanted help 'against the Polish enemy, King Zigismud...with money and gold, and various treasure, and with gunpowder, and lead'. G. M. Phipps, *Sir John Merrick, English merchant-diplomat in seventeenth-century Russia* (Newtonville, Mass, 1983), pp. 77 - 80. See also Merrick to James, 2nd July, 1613, *Buccleuch Mss*, vol. I (1899), p. 137. One of a series of missions sent out by the new Tsar, Mikhail, to announce his accession and to give the official version of the 'Times of trouble' and to explain the legitimacy of Mikhail's election before his enemies, particularly the Poles, could present their version. The ambassadors were given a splendid welcome in London despite doubts as to the permanency of the Tsar's position. Chamberlain, *Letters*, 27th October, 1613, vol. I, p. 482; Mikhail to James, *PROSP* 91/1/238; Throckmorton to Trumball, 1st November, 1613, *Downshire MSS*, vol. iv, p. 242

2. Unknown
   March, 1616 - March, 1616
   Special Envoy

To ask for aid to continue Swedish war or for mediation with a view to peace. Peace concluded February, 1617.

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7 *DNB, sub nomine.* Merrick was a key figure in Anglo-Russian relations. He belonged to the second generation of English merchants operating in Muscovy and spent most of his life there. He acted as the English government's agent, and this time was returning to England having mediated a peace treaty between Russia and Sweden, February, 1617. G. M. Phipps, *Sir John Merrick, English merchant-diplomat in seventeenth-century Russia* (Newtonville, Mass, 1983)
3. Marko Ivanovich POSDEYEV
   Stepan Ivanovich VOLYNSKY
   5th November, 1617 - 13th June, 1618 Ordinary
   Lodging: Bishopsgate Street at the expense of Muscovy Company
   Audience: 9th November, 1617

The ambassadors arrived in England in company of Merrick. Their mission was to negotiate a loan (see Simonwitz below) and to pave the way for a defensive alliance between the two countries at a time when the Tsar of the new Romanov dynasty was looking for moral, political and financial support against the pretensions of Poland to the Russian crown. Failed to arouse any enthusiasm for a treaty of alliance and were unable to gain any substantial support against the Poles. CSP Domestic 1611 - 1618, pp. 494, 497, 530; See SP91/2, ff. 40 - 41 for the Russian Treaty proposals; and SP91/2, ff. 50 - 53 for contemporary translation of the letter from Tsar Mikhail to James.

A discussion of this mission can be found in S. Konovalov, 'Anglo-Russian Relations, 1617 - 1618', Oxford Slavonic Papers, 1950, vol. 1, pp. 64 - 103.

4. Unknown
   1618
   Lodging: Crosby House

5. Thomas SIMONWITZ
   9th October, 1621 - November, 1621 Special Envoy
   Lodging: Probably in Bishopsgate Street at the expense of the Muscovy Company
   Audience: 1st November, 1621

Came to repay a loan (see above) which was lent by the merchants of London in the King's name.

6. Isaac POGOZHEV & VLASIEV
   9th October, 1621 - January, 1623 Ordinary
   Lodging: probably in Bishopsgate Street at the expense of the Muscovy Company

To treat for 'peace and mercantile intercourse'. Ratified 16th June, 1623

NEUBERG

1. BADOERO
   November, 1609 -

8 SP103/61 [Treaty Papers], f. 26; SP102/49 Mikhail to James, 5th May, 1621; SP91/2, f. 97 3rd May, 1624; APC 1621 - 1623, 30th September, 1621, p. 54
2. **Count SOLMS (Philip or Frederick)**  
   November, 1609 - December, 1609 Extra-ordinary

Unable to find sources which confirm who represented which state. Sources found only report that Frederick was the taller of the two.

3. **Daniel HUTTON (HUTTEN), Councillor of the Palatine**  
   24th April, 1610 - June, 1610 Extra-ordinary

Came with the Prince of Württemburg on behalf of the 'Possessioners'.

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**PALATINATE**

1. **Palsgrave of the Rhine**  
   7th June, 1603 - 10th June, 1603 Extra-ordinary

Came on a mission of congratulation.

2. **Count of Hanau**  
   Volrad de PLESSEN  
   April, 1612 - 6th June, 1612 Extra-ordinary  
   Lodging: Somerset House


3. **Count Meinhard von SCHOMBERG, Grand Marshal (1616)**  
   July, 1612 - 15th August, 1612 Extra-ordinary  
   Audience: late July, 1612 at Ashby (Lord Compton's house)

Sent to ask James's permission for the Count Palatine of the Rhine to come to England.

4. **Count Meinhard von SCHOMBERG, Grand Marshal (1616)**  
   December, 1613 - 9th June, 1616 Extra-ordinary

One of his errands was to ask James not to remove Anne, daughter of Lord Dudley, from her post as a lady in waiting to Princess Elizabeth. John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 23rd December, 1613, *SP. Domestic*, vol. Ixxv, no. 52. See Carew to Roe, 18th April, 1615; 24th January, 1616, pp. 5, 21(ed.) J. MacClean, 'Letters from George, Lord Carew to Sir Thomas Roe, 1615 - 1617', *Camden Society* (1860).

5. **WALGRAVE**  
   January, 1616 - January, 1617 Agent
6. Baron WINNINGBERG
   23rd March, 1618 -
   His mission was to invite the Queen and Prince Charles to stand as Godparents to
   the new Prince Charles, 2nd son of Princess Elizabeth

7. Volrad de PLESSEN
   April, 1619 - Extra-ordinary
   To interest James in affairs in Germany

8. Baron Christopher DOHNA
   December, 1618 - January, 1619 Ordinary
   Audience: 27th December, 1618
   Sought the renewal of the alliance between England and the Evangelical Union and
   spoke of the accession of his master, the Elector Palatine, to the Bohemian throne.
   For an account of his mission, see Sir Robt. Naunton to Dudley Carleton, January,
   1619, in S.K. Gardiner (ed.), ‘Letters and other documents illustrating the relations
   between England and Germany.’ *Camden Society*, o.s. vol. xc (1865) p. 32

9. Baron Christopher DOHNA
   August, 1619 - 16th September, 1619 Ordinary

10. Sir Abraham WILLIAMS
    November, 1619 - Agent
    Acted as agent for the Queen of Bohemia.

11. Sir Francis NETHERSOLE (1587 - 1659) Secretary to the Queen of
    Bohemia
    May, 1621 - July, 1621 Extra-ordinary
    His mission in this instance was to beg for aid in the defence of the Palatine. See
    Nethersole to Dudley Carleton, *SP. Holland*, 2nd May, 1621.

12. Andreas PAUEL (Pauli), Secretary to King Palatine
    23rd June, 1621 - August, 1621 Extra-ordinary

13. Henry de SCHOMBERG, Count of Nanteuil
    September, 1621 - Extra-ordinary

14. Sir Francis NETHERSOLE (1587 - 1659) Secretary to the Queen of Bohemia
    January, 1622 - January, 1622 Extra-ordinary
15. Henry de SCHOMBERG, Count of Nanteuil
   August, 1622 - October, 1622 Extra-ordinary

16. Sir Francis NETHERSOLE (1587 - 1659) Secretary to the Queen of Bohemia
   October, 1622 - February (?) 1623 Extra-ordinary

17. Andreas PAUEL (Pauli), Secretary to King Palatine
   November, 1622 - March, 1623 Extra-ordinary

18. Johann von RUSDORF
   December, 1623 - Agent

19. Baron AUNE
   February, 1620 - Special Envoy

PAPAL STATES

1. Fr. CREICHTON
   July, 1603 - August, 1603 Secret Envoy
   Sent to confer with James on religion.

2. Giovanni degli EFFETTI
   August, 1603 - August, 1603 Secret Envoy
   Brought a letter of congratulation to James from the Apostolic Nuncio in France,

3. Virginio ORSINI
   November, 1607 - Special Envoy
   When in Florence Sir Anthony Standen received proposals from the Pope that
   Orsini should be sent as an envoy to James.

PERSIA

1. Sir Robert SHERLEY (c.1581 - 1628)
   August, 1611 - 13th February, 1613 Ordinary
   Lodging: Family seat at Wiston,
   Audience: 2nd October, 1611 at Hampton Court
   From the Shah 'Abbass. He was a loyal servant of the Shah who had distinguished
   himself in the wars against the Ottomans. His mission was to win allies, in the
   shape of the English and Spanish, for the Shah against Turkey and to promote closer
political and commercial links. However, the Levant company used its influence against the project and successfully scorched it. When the ambassador and his wife left England in 1613 they left the child Henry in England, under the protection of the Queen. This child died in England although the exact date is not known. See A. C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Co.* (Oxford, 1935). Captain Christopher Newport was employed by the East India Company in 1612 to carry Sir Robert Sherley back to Persia. See also E. P. Shirley, *The Sherley brothers: an historical memoir of the lives of Sir Thomas Sherley, Sir Anthony Sherley and Sir Robert Sherley, Knights.* (1848); T. Middleton, ‘Account of Sir Robert Sherley’ (1609) in E. Cobham Brewer, *Dictionary of Phrase and Fable* (1898).

2. **Sir Robert SHERLEY** (c.1581 - 1628)
   January, 1624 - March, 1627
   **Ordinary**
   
   **Lodging:** Tower Hill
   **Audience:** 28th January, 1624 at Newmarket

Died in 1628 at Cazbyn, Persia. He was entombed under the threshold of his own house in the city without much ceremony. His wife retired after his death to Rome. About 30 years later, Lady Teresia had his bones removed to Rome. She died in 1668 and they are buried in the tomb in the church of Santa Maria della Scala at Rome. See *CSP Venetian,* 1623 - 1625, no. 216n; Nichols, *Progresses,* vol. ii, p. 430n; Thomas Middleton in *Harleian Miscellany,* vol. v. See also *DNB.*

**POLAND**

1. **Kraysztof WARSZEWICKI** (1543 - 1603)
   September, 1603
   **Designated**

This mission was to have been one of congratulation. Warszewicki was to plead for better treatment of the English Catholics, encourage England to join the Christian fight against Turkey and to improve Polish - English relations. He wrote a panegyric under the title *Ad Serenissimum Potentissimique Principem et Dominum D. Jacobum Dei Gratia Angliae, Scotiae et Britaniare Rege Oratio.* However, he died before he could present this and Cikowski went to London with the oration. See E. A. Mierzwa, *Anglia a Polska wpierwszej polowie XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1986);

2. **Jan CIKOWSKI,** Chamberlain to Zygmunt III Waza and Duty Administrator
   December, 1603 - December, 1605
   **Special Envoy**

His mission was to convince James that, in his fight to re-gain the Swedish crown and to secure the rights threatened by Karol Sudermanski, Zygmunt III was not fighting against his protestant uncle in the interest of Rome. In practical terms Cikowski was to ask for permission to enlist soldiers from Britain, to equip ships which would guard against the Swedish navy, a guarantee of safety for Polish ships in the English Channel and to negotiate an end to oppression for the English Catholics. In return Zygmunt assure the protection of English and Scottish merchants in Poland, and freedom to trade for as long as the merchants would pay foreign duty. It was a successful mission; James supported Poland and promised
twenty ships with eight thousand men (to be enlisted by Bruce). Through the
treatment of the legate many Catholic clergy were released from jail. This
embassy was to begin many years of close and friendly relations between the two
countries.
See Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, 1572 - 1795, vol. ii (Warsaw, 1982); E. A.
Mierzwa, Anglia a Polska w pierwszej połowie XVII w. (Warsaw, 1986)

3. Dr. William BRUCE (fl. 1600 – 1610)
December, 1605 - 1606
Agent

Bruce arrived in England with Cikowski with the task of recruiting soldiers to fight
for Poland against Sweden. When Cikowski left London he was nominated to
represent the Polish republic in England. In early 1606 he returned to Poland as
agent for the East India Company. He was dismissed from service in 1609 for acting
against the interests of the E.I. Co.
See E. A. Mierzwa, Anglia a Polska w pierwszej połowie XVII w. (Warsaw, 1986); G.
E. Bell, A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives, p. 214 which has him
representing James in Poland between 20th April, 1604 and 22nd March, 1610

4. Zygmunt MYSZKOWSKI, Marshal of Poland
Jakub SOBIESKI (1588 - 1646) Wojewoda of Ruthenia
1609
Special Envoy

An ‘unofficial’ embassy to suggest Prince Wladyslaw as a candidate for the hand of
the Princess Elizabeth. The unofficial nature of the mission forestalled any move
towards a possible liaison at this time.

5. Janusz RADZIWILL (1579 - 1620) Grand Hetman of Lithuania, Marshal of
Poland
Late 1612
Special Envoy

Whilst on this mission James proposed that he act as mediator between Poland,
Sweden and Moscow. In 1614 James sent Patrick Gordon to Szczecin to mediate in
the interests of the ‘Christian princes’. However, this was unacceptable to the
Swedes and the conference did not take place.

6. Tomasz ZAMOYSKI (1594 - 1638) Secretary to Zygmunt
August - 2nd July, 1615
Ordinary
Audience: early July in the King’s withdrawing room.

Son of the Chancellor of Poland. To look for support over the problems of Sweden
and Russia.
See CSP Domestic, 1611 - 1618, 31st August, 1615, no, 300.

9 Radziwill was the leader of the Polish Protestants, and as such, had exchanged
correspondence with James.
7. Cpt. BUCH (Buck)
July, 1620 - Agent

Came with the renewal of a previous request to buy horses and raise levies of infantry against the Turks. See Nichols, Progresses, vol. iv, p. 658

8. Jerzy OSSOLIŃSKI, Count Palatine of Sindomerskie (1595 - 1650)
9th March, 1621 - 15th July, 1621 Extra-ordinary
Lodging: Crutched Friars
Audience: 18th March, 1621 at Whitehall

Requested aid against the Turks. Ossoliński's mission was very successful - by the 'cunning of Gondomar' James granted the ambassador £10,000 towards the recruitment of soldiers and, surprisingly, personal expenses for the ambassador himself. In keeping with James's wishes he retained £15.00 for himself and paid the balance to Arthur Aston to finance the recruitment of soldiers. The personal expenses were to become a source of trouble for Ossoliński later when Aston accused him of financial corruption. Later, in 1629, Thomas Roe, attempted to blackmail Ossoliński by threatening to let it become known that Ossoliński had embezzled the funds given him by James unless he supported the East India Co. in Gdansk. Nichols, Progresses, vol. iv, pp. 658, 669. See PSB, sub nomine. See also E. A. Mierzwa, Anglia a Polska w pierwszej polowie XVII w. (Warsaw, 1986); p. 50, n.109; Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, 1572 - 1795, vol. ii (Warsaw, 1982).

Promoted to Chancellor of the Crown (1643 - 1650)

SAVOY

1. Marquis of LUTTIN
November, 1603 - Extra-ordinary
Audience: 22nd December, 1603

A mission of ceremony to congratulate James on his accession.

2. Count della BASTIA
Designate

3. Unknown
January, 1610 -

Errand concerned a present for Cleveland

4. Claudio Ruffia, Count of CARTIGNANA,
12th March, 1611 - 8th April, 1611 Extra-ordinary

Suggested Savoyard marriages, offering the Infanta Maria for Prince Henry and the Prince of Piedmont for Elizabeth. These offers were rejected on the grounds that the duke was 'poor, turbulent and under Spanish domination'. See Gardiner, History, vol. ii, pp. 137, 140. See also John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 27th November, 1611 in T. Birch, Court and Times; CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, pp. 1199 - 120, 126, 130 - 1331, 172, 174, 180 - 191, 182; CSP Domestic, 1611 -
5. Claudio Ruffia, Count of CARTIGNANA
10th November, 1611 - 18th March, 1612 Extra-ordinary
Lodging: Lodged and entertained at King's orders. CSP Domestic. 13th November, 1611
Audience: 11th November, 1611

Returned with instructions to ask for Elizabeth for the Prince of Piedmont.

January, 1612 - December, 1612 Agent

A banker resident in London.

7. Fulvio PERGARMO
June, 1612 - Agent
Lodging: Living at the King's expense. Told that if he did not like it where he was he might have 12 crowns a day to lodge where he chose. He declined this offer. CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613, no. 570

Sent with portraits of the princesses to show James.

8. Marchese di VILLA
May, 1613 - June, 1613 Ordinary
Audience: May, 1613

To condole on the death of Henry and give congratulations on the marriage of Elizabeth. Also to reopen the question of a Savoyard marriage only now for Charles.

3rd June, 1613 - August, 1614 Ordinary

Knighted by James.
To discuss arrangements for a marriage for Henry, Prince of Wales. References after the prince's death seem to suggest that the marriage was settled and Gabeleone described as the man 'who negotiated the late Prince's marriage'. See Lake to Carleton, 18th May, 1613, CSP Domestic, 1611 - 1618, p. 185. See alas W. Raleigh, 'Touching a Marriage between Prince Henry of England and a Daughter of Savoy', Works, (1829) vol. viii, pp. 237 - 252
CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613. no. 855; Nichols, Progresses, vol. ii, p. 642
10. Antonio, Count of SCARNAFES (Scarnafissi)
   March, 1614 - June, 1614 Extra-ordinary

   Offered a marriage alliance with Savoy.

11. Antonio, Count of SCARNAFES (Scarnafissi)
    7th September, 1614 - 31st December, 1614 Extra-ordinary

   Proposed a defensive alliance

12. Antonio, Count of SCARNAFES (Scarnafissi)
    8th May, 1615 - March, 1617 Extra-ordinary

   To discuss a league between England and Venice and to seek aid in Piedmont.

    11th February, 1619 - November, 1619 Ordinary

   From Victor Amedei, son of the Duke of Tuscany.

14. Count Guido di VILLA SILLANA
    September, 1619 - September, 1619 Extra-ordinary
    Audience: Whitehall

   Son of the Marchese di Villa. To condole on death of Queen Anne. Stayed one week.

**SAXONY**

1. Count Ernest MANSFELD (1580 - 1626)
   February, 1610 - March, 1610 Special Envoy

2. Count Ernest MANSFELD (1580 - 1626)
   14th April, 1624 - 25th April, 1624 Special Envoy
   Lodging: St James’s Palace.
   Audience: 16th April, 1624 at Theobalds.

   Made a Knight of the Garter 23rd April, 1624

3. Count Ernest MANSFELD (1580 - 1626)
   September, 1624 - October, 1624 Special Envoy

4. Count Ernest MANSFELD (1580 - 1626)
   4th November, 1624 - November, 1624 Special Envoy

   The object of his last three missions to James were to convince the King of the need to raise troops, in support of his son in law, to fight on the continent. In the
Autumn of 1624 James agreed to allow an army to be raised by Mansfeld, in the name of the Elector, although he would not countenance an open breach with Spain. 12,000 pressed men were levied in England, at the end of January, 1625 they embarked for the continent. See CSP Domestic. 17th September, 1626 for subsequent action by Mansfeld.

SPAIN

1. Juan de TASSIS (Taxis) (- 1607) Count of Villa Mediana (1603)

31st August, 1603 - June, 1605 Ordinary
Lodging: Jesus College, Oxford; Southampton and Somerset House
Audience: 8th October, 1603, Winchester 10
Secretary: Francis Fowler
Interpreter: Juan Baptista de Tassis

From Philip III to convey the greetings of the Spanish monarchy to the new English King.
Details of the ambassador's pensions, bribes and other secret expenses can be found in Simancas, Contraduría Mayor de Cuentas, 2a época 42,
Commission instructions can be found in Simancas, legajo E840.2

1a. Alessandro ROVIDA Senator of Milan
May, 1604 - 25th August, 1604 Commissioner
Lodging: Somerset House
To negotiate at the Anglo-Spanish peace which was ratified on 28th August, 1604
Report of mission can be found in Simancas, legajo E841.48

1b. Juan Fernandez de VELASCO, Duke of Frias, Constable of Castile
(d. 1613)
20th August, 1604 - 5th September, 1604 Commissioner
Lodging: Somerset House
Audience: 25th August, 1604 at Whitehall

Chief Commissioner to the Anglo-Spanish peace talks. Commission to treat dated 1st October, 1603. His instructions from Philip, as the senior member of the peace commission, were to obtain a peace treaty that allowed for free expression of religion in England or at least a mitigation of their lot for the English Catholics. Peace was obtained but on the question of religion there was to be no change.
Reports from the commissioners can be found in Simancas, legajo E841
The peace treaty was signed on Sunday 29th August, and on the following Sunday the Constable left London, having recovered from an attack of lumbago. He travelled to Dover, via Rochester and Sittingbourne, attended by Lord Wotton.

10 The audience should have been at Woodstock but as the plague had killed one of the ambassadors suite it was postponed until the King reached Winchester.
2. Pedro de ZÚÑIGA, Marquis Flores Davila  
10th July, 1605 - June, 1610  
Ordinary  
Lodging: Seething Lane, ‘near St Olave’s Church in Hart Street’  
Secretary: Robert Taylor to 1609,  
Chaplain: Augustin Perez  
Interpreter: John Ball  
Porter: Henry Barber

3. Juan de MENDOZA, Marquis of Inojosa, Marquis of San Germano  
24th April, 1606 - 16th May, 1606  
Special Envoy  
Lodging: Probably with de Ziiniga in Seething Lane  
Porter: Henry Barber  
Sent to congratulate James on his escape from the Plot. Accompanied by Don Juan Blasco de Aragon.

4. Alonso de VELASCO (later Count Revilla) (d.1620)  
early May, 1610 - August, 1613  
Ordinary  
Lodging: Barbican, then moved out of London to Highgate to avoid the hostility of the mob.  
Audience: Sunday 13th May, 1610  
Secretary: Augustin Perez, 1611 - 14, CSP Milan, 1385 - 1618, no. 1040  
Exceeded his instructions by suggesting to James a marriage between Henry and the Infanta Ana. She had been promised to the young King of France.

5. Pedro de ZÚÑIGA, Marquis Flores Davila (April, 1612)  
July, 1612 - July, 1613  
Extra-ordinary  
Lodging: Barbican, then Highgate with de Velasco  
Audience: July, 1612, Hampton Court  
Secretary: Francis Fowler  
Chaplain: Augustin Perez  
Interpreter: John Ball  
Porter: Henry Barber  
His return was ordered, according to Digby, because when he was formerly ambassador he had made... 'profers for the matching of the Infanta with the Prince...which were not hearkened unto.' Stowe MSS vol. 172, f. 206. Digby to Edmondes.

6. Diego de Sarmiento de ACUÑA (1567 - 1626) Count Gondomar (1617)  
August, 1613 - 16th July, 1618  
Ordinary  
Lodging: Barbican  
Secretary: Augustin Perez to 1615;  
Ciphers: Julian Sanchez de Ulloa  
Languages: Cosme de Villa Vicioso  
Chaplain: Thomas Wentworth  
Confessor: La Fuente, Simon d’Arizar  
Porter: Henry Barber
Asst Secretary: Jasper Grant
English Sect: Francis Fowler; Richard Berry

His mission was partly to encourage an Anglo-Spanish marriage alliance, thereby aiding the easing of the penal laws against the Catholics, and in general keep James close to Spain and out of any alliance with the Dutch. Instructions, sent with Digby's despatch of 27th May, 1613, *Spain*.
(Named by Camden as Didacus Sarmiento)

7. Julian Sanchez de ULLOA
   July, 1618 - March, 1620 Agent
   Lodging: Probably at Ely House

Appointed to remain in England as Agent for Spanish affairs during Gondomar's first leave in Spain.

8. Fr. Diego LAFUENTE
   October, 1618 - 16th October, 1620 Agent
   Lodging: Ely House

Gondomar’s confessor, sent to assure James of marriage treaty going forward although by this time it was seen as nothing more than a ploy to get James to mediate in Germany. See Archbishop of Canterbury to William Trumball, 19th December, 1617. HMC, *Downshire Mss*, Papers of William Trumball, vol. v, no. 754

9. Diego de Sarmiento de ACUNA (1567 - 1626) Count Gondomar
   7th March, 1620 - July, 1622 Ordinary
   Audience: 12th March, 1620 at Whitehall
   Secretary: Henry Taylor 1621 - 1623 11
   Thomas Ramirez

Returned as the man thought best able to influence James concerning affairs in Germany and Holland and to further the plans for a marriage between Charles and the Infanta. Correspondence can be found in *Simancas*, E 2514 - 6; E2590
See *Simancas* E8775, no. 1, dated 13th May, 1622, which relates to Gondomar's return to Spain.

    January, 1622 - c. April, 1622 Special Envoy
    Lodging: Ely House, Holborn

At the request of Coloma to serve in the embassy.

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11 Secular priest, see Bellenger, *Priests*, p. 113.
11. Carlos COLOMA (COLONIA, COLOMBO, COLUMNA) Governor of Cambray
27th April, 1622 - October, 1624 Extra-ordinary
Lodging: Ely House, Holborn
Ciphers: Julian Sanchez de Ulloa
Languages: Cosme de Villa Viciosa
Secretary: Henry Taylor to 1623
Confessor: La Fuente
Chaplain: Thomas Wentworth (alias Juan Hidalgo)
Porter: Henry Barber

Although officially Gondomar retained his diplomatic title of ambassador until April of 1624, when he was recalled to Spain to negotiate on the Spanish marriage in July, 1622 Coloma was appointed as ambassador extra-ordinary to look after affairs in his absence. He was amongst the youngest serving diplomats being only about 21 when he came to England. During this period Coloma represented both Brussels and Madrid. With Boischot he agreed terms for the surrender of Frankenthal. CSP Domestic 1619 - 1623, 12th and 14th February, 1623. Treaty of surrender signed 19th March, 1623, ratified 5th April, 1623.

Instructions from Isabella to Boischot and Coloma can be found in Simancas E8785, no. 2. This legajo contains copies of the Treaty and the correspondence between James and the Infanta regarding the peace. No. 21 is James’s response to the suspension of arms.

12. ALCORCANA
January, 1623 - Extra-ordinary

Sent to congratulate Charles on his safe return from Madrid. Rapin, History, p. 226.

13. Fr. Diego LAFUENTE, Padre Maestro
April, 1623 - 21st June, 1624 Agent
Lodging: Probably remained in Ely House
Audience: April, 1623

14. Juan de MENDOZA, Marquis of Inojosa, Marquis of San Germano
16th June, 1623 - 21st June, 1624 Extra-ordinary
Lodging: Exeter House, Wimbledon
Audience: 28th June, 1623, Gravesend
Secretary for Languages: Cosme de Villa Viciosa
Secretary: Richard Berry
Chaplain: Thomas Wentworth (alias Juan Hidalgo)
Ciphers: Julian Sanchez de Ulloa

There seems to be some confusion over this man’s name. Thomas, Historical Notes refers to a Marcus Antonius Columna. However, research shows this to be an error, the person he is referring to is Marc-Antonio Correr, the Venetian ambassador in 1625. The Diary of Walter Yonge, p. 57.
His mission was ‘to congratulate with his Majestie the safe arrival of his Highness at this court: he is also to remain there as an assistant with don Carols de Coloma’.
Aston to Carleton, Madrid 12th April, 1623, PROSP. 94/26/106.
See Lewkenor’s letter regarding his reception at Dover. CSP Domestic, 14th June 1623.

15. Diego Hurtado de MENDOZA
   September, 1623 - December, 1623 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: Bedford House, Wimbledon
   Audience: 23rd November, 1623
   Ciphers: Julian Sanchez de Ulloa
   Languages: Cosme de Villia Viciosa
   Chaplain: Thomas Wentworth
   Porter: Henry Barber

16. Diego de Sarmiento de ACUNA, Count Gondomar (1567 - 1626)
   February, 1624 Designated Extra-ordinary

In the autumn of 1624 Olivares had ordered Gondomar to return to England. In April, 1625, before news of James’s death had reached Spain, Philip had renewed the order ‘so that he try with that King to bring about a discussion of the affairs of Germany by way of mediation’. Philip IV to Count Osuna, 24th April, 1625 in Loomie, Spain, p. xx. That Gondomar was expected is obvious. The Rev. Joseph Mead noted in March, 1625 that Gondomar’s secretary had already arrived to request a safe conduct from the King. See T. Birch, Court and Times, vol. ii, p. 503. In order to make the return more palatable Philip changed the title to Extra-ordinary, but finally gave in to Gondomar’s pleas of his inability to carry out the mission.

17. Diego Hurtado de MENDOZA
   April, 1624 - Ordinary
   Lodging: Exeter House, Wimbledon
   Ciphers: Julian Sanchez de Ulloa
   Languages: Cosme de Villia Viciosa
   Chaplain: Thomas Wentworth
   Porter: Henry Barber

On this mission he was to have accompanied Gondomar whose return was expected but who did not come.

18. Jacques BRUNEAU Secretary to the President of Flanders
   August, 1624 - November, 1625 Agent
   Lodging: Probably at Ely House
   Audience: Oct, 1624

In the interim period between the departure of Coloma and the expected arrival of Gondomar Bruneau quietly acted as agent for the Spanish crown. His discreet communications to Madrid were to stand him in good stead, and after the Anglo-Spanish war commenced he was warmly commended to Philip.
STADE

1. **Unknown**  
   November, 1603 - November, 1603  
   Extra-ordinary

Petty ambassador from the State of Stade to congratulate James.

SWEDEN

1. **Unknown**  
   September, 1610 -  
   Ordinary

Sent to suggest and alliance between Sweden and England against the Poles. *CSP Venetian*, 1610 - 1613, p. 122.

2. **Unknown**  
   March, 1611 - June, 1612  
   Agent

Mission re the controversy with Denmark. *CSP Venetian*. 1610 - 1617 p. 372

3. **John SKITTIUS**  
   28th November, 1617 - December, 1617  
   Extra-ordinary
   
   Lodging: Crutched Friars.  
   Audience: 10th December, 1617

Skittius was in Holland prior to his visit to England. His mission, to both states, was to seek aid for Sweden against the King of Poland. Instructed to ask James to join the German Princes in the defence of religion, allow Sweden to levy men in England and to furnish a loan of some £50,000. According to Christopher Surrian, Skittius left England with 'nothing but courteous words, without anything certain from the King'. In the same despatch Surrian notes that Skittius was strongly urging the States General to 'assist his king by sea and land, telling them that the King of Poland's son was advancing into Muscovy with the intention of invading Sweden thereafter'. See Surrian to the Doge and Senate, 21st January, 1618, *CSP Venetian*, 1617 - 1618, p. 109. At the completion of his mission in England he moved on to Holland carrying a letter from James to Dudley Carleton on the subject.

4. **Sir James SPENCE (Spens)**  
   (fl. 1598 - 1630)  
   1623 - 1627  
   Agent

Acted as intermittent agent between 1623 and 1627 for Gustavus. After his mission to Sweden, March - August 1625, to propose to Gustavus a scheme for a Protestant league ended, he returned to London to represent the Swedish King. *PRO SP./95/2*, ff. 116 - 119; *PRO SP/95/2*. Sent to request help from James for the King of Sweden's army. In February, 1625 Spence was ordered back to Sweden to ask Gustavus to cooperate with Christian IV. *SP. Sweden*, 19th March, 1625.

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SWITZERLAND

1. **Unknown**  
   November, 1603 -  
   Agent

From Geneva to congratulate James on the succession

2. **M. d'Herlai d'ARLAC**  
   October, 1615 - February, 1616  
   Agent

3. **Dr. Théodore Turquet de MAYERNE, 15 (1573 - 1655)**  
   - February, 1622  
   Agent

A Bernese subject he became the King's physician. First came to England in 1606. Whether he remained in England between 1606 and 1610 is uncertain but he certainly remained in England after the assassination of Henri IV. Given a £400 pension by James, £200 and a house in Chelsea by the Queen. John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 20th November, 1611, *SP. Domestic*, vol. lxvii, no. 42.

Sent, by James, on a mission to the Swiss. He was ordered back to England to make representation to James about Valtelline and the Palatine and to ask the King to consider the ascendency of Austria and divert the designs of the Duke of Savoy away from Geneva and Pays de Vaud. *CSP Venetian*, 1621 - 1623, p. 30. See also BL Sloane Mss, 2052.

TURKEY

1. **The Grand CHAOUX**  
   November, 1603 -  
   Special Envoy

Birch notes that all Muslim envoys are styled thus.

2. **MUSTAPHA Aga Casnadar**  
   August, 1607 - 7th November, 1607  
   Special Envoy

Mission to discuss the damage done by English pirates in the Levant and to arrange a supply of powder and arms to the Turks. see Nichols, *Progresses*, II, p. 157n.

3. **The Chiaus HUSEIN**  
   13th September, 1618 - December, 1618  
   Special Envoy

   Lodging: At the expense of the Turkish Merchants
   Audience: 3rd November, 1618 at the Banqueting Hall

To announce the succession of the Sultan Osman. Whilst in England the ambassador's son was touched by James to cure King's Evil although no Christian prayers said were said. Nichols, *Progresses*, vol. iii, p. 484

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15 *DNB* sub nomine.
TUSCANY/FLORENCE

1. Alfonso, Count MONTECUCCOLI (MONTECUCULI)
   September, 1603 - February, 1604 Extra-ordinary Audience: October, 1603

2. Chevalier Alidosio ALIDOSI
   August, 1608 Designate
   His mission to England was confirmed, August, 1608, but curtailed by his arrest by the Inquisition. Although released in February, 1610 he never came to England but resumed his duties as Receiver of Foreigners. *CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610*, nos. 296, 787

3. Marchese MALASPINA
   November, 1608 - Agent

4. Sig. Bardo Corsi
   June, 1609 Designated Agent

5. Vincenzo SALVIATI
   September, 1609 - October, 1609 Agent

6. Ottaviano LOTTI, Secretary of the Grand Duke of Tuscany
   January, 1611 - May, 1612 Special Envoy
   Audience: 18th January, 1611 at Greenwich with the Queen

To negotiate the hand of a sister of the new Grand Duke, Cosimo II, for Prince Henry.

7. Andrea CHIOLI/CIOLI
   6th April, 1612 - August, 1612 Special Envoy

Secretary to Belisario Vinta, secretary to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. To assist Lotti in negotiating the proposed match. See *CSP Venetian, 1610 - 1613*, pp. 318, 327, 332 - 333, 340

8. Ottaviano LOTTI
   11th September, 1612 - August, 1613 Agent

J. D. Mackie, *Negotiations between King James VI and I and Ferdinand I, Grand Duke of Tuscany*. (1927)

9. Sig. Francesco QUARATESE  
   October, 1614 - Agent

10. Amerigo SALVIETTI (Alessandro Antelminelli)  
    January, 1618 - Agent

A merchant friend of Donato. Did not return home, probably stayed on in the company of Donato after his expulsion from Venice, *CSP Venetian*. 1621 - 1623, no. 119. It would seem he was not the accredited agent of the Duke of Tuscany but sent home regular Newsletters that were well received.

**UNITED PROVINCES OF THE NETHERLANDS**

1. Sir Noel de CARON (c. 1530 - 1624)  
   15th May, 1591 - April, 1609 Agent  
   3rd July, 1609 - 1st December, 1624 Ordinary  
   Lodging: Owned Caron House in South Lambeth  
   Salary: From 20th June, 1609 £8,000 with a retainer of £2,000 pa  
   Secretary: Meurs (1610)  
   Calvart (to April, 1621)  
   François Keyns (1621 - 1624)  
   Clerk: Geldre (c. December, 1609)  
   Messenger: Wilbert Spies (1607)16  
   Courier: Jacob Duyst (c. 1619)  
   Adriaen de Mulner (c. 1619)17  
   Man Servant: Balthasar Rouchausen (c. March, 1619)

Caron was agent to Queen Elizabeth. After the accession of James VI and I he remained in England in this capacity. Left during April, 1609 and returned from the Hague, as ordinary ambassador (inst. 20th June, 1609). Left 21st July, 1612 for 6 weeks. *CSP Venetian*, 1610 - 1613, nos. 591, 595. Left again in the late summer of 1615 for consultations with the States General, van Olden Barneveld and Prince Maurice concerning affairs in Europe, returned November, 1615. Died in office, 1st December, 1624. Buried at Lambeth, 25th January, 1625. *CSP Domestic*, 25th January, 1624/5

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16 Algemeen Rijksarchief, Book of Decrees, S. G., II, 167, show his children being baptised at Austin Friars in 1622 and 1625.  
17 Algemeen Rijksarchief, Book of Decrees, S. G. (1619) resp. 32vo and 41vo.
2. Johan Gerrit Reyersz van Olden BARNEVELD (1547 - 1619) Chief Pensionary of Amsterdam (1576); Advocate to the States of Holland (1576 - 1619)
Jacob FULKE (Valck) (1540 - 1603)
Walraven BREDERODE III (1547 - 1614) Seignour de Veejhuizen.
Frederick Henry, Prince of Nassau 18
14th May, 1603 - mid June, 1607 Extra-ordinary (Olden Barneveld) Commissioners

Audience: June, 1603 at Greenwich by the connivance of the French ambassador, Sully.
Lodging: Bishopsgate Street

Olden Barneveld was the first ambassador to arrive to congratulate James on his succession - it was his fifth embassy to England.
This mission was to attempt to persuade James to send troops to relieve the port of Ostend. By the Treaty of Hampton Court, James promised that he and the new King of France, Henry IV, would support the Dutch subsidies and allow the rebels to raise troops in England. 19
Jacob Fulke died in England on 29th May, 1603.

3. Johan BERCK (1565 - 1627) Pensionary of Dordrecht
James MALDEREE (c.1543 - 1617)
July, 1607 - 6th August, 1607 Commissioners

To give information on the negotiations taking place in Flanders. See Winwood, Memorials, vol. ii. p. 325 Ratified 27th June, 1608.
Took formal leave of James on 19th July, 1607. See CSP Venetian, 1607 - 1610, no. 37; SP Domestic, 20th July, 1607.

4. Jan van DUIVENVOORDE (1547 - 1610) Seignior of Waremendt
Johan BERCK (1565 - 1627) Pensionary of Dordrecht
Albert JOACHIMI (1560 - 1654) Zeeland Deputy to the States General, Lord of Ostend
Elias van OLDEN BARNEVELD (1560 - 1612) Pensionary of Rotterdam. (Brother of John.)
Albert de VEER (Verius) (1564 - 1620) Pensionary of Amsterdam
24th April, 1610 - 28th May, 1610 Commissioners

Audience: 27th April, 1610 at Whitehall

The most important part of this commission was to deal with the crucial situation in Jülich-Cleves.
The commissioners were also directed to open the subject of the fisheries on the coast of Great Britain, and to remonstrate against the order lately introduced by James that forbade all foreigner from fishing in these waters. This was to be set forth as an infringement both of natural law and of ancient treaties. See also Winwood, Memorials, iii. p 161

Very little was achieved by the commissioners owing to the news of the death of the French King and the absence of James from London, whereat the commissioners, it is said, felt themselves neglected and aggrieved.

18 Youngest son of the Prince of Orange.
19 This treaty was neutralised by the Treaty of London in 1604, which effectively took England out of the equation.

Jan van Duivenvoorde was instructed to be Chief Commissioner of the mission but he died at Brill, 15th April, 1610, on the way to England.

Joachimi, Olden Barneveld, Berck and de Veer knighted by James 17th May, 1610. See Winwood, Memorials, vol. iii, p. 135

5. Dideric MEERMAN
Reynier FAUW (1564 - 1636) Burgomaster of Amsterdam
Hugo van GROOT (Grotius) (1583 - 1645) Advocaat Fiscaal of Holland (1607); Pensionary of Rotterdam (July, 1612)
Jacob BOREEL (Bourrell) Pensionary of Middelburg.

22nd March, 1613 - 17th May, 1613 Commissioner

Audience: 25th March, 1613

The commission's instructions were cautious and were given by the East India Company and merely approved by the States-General. Sent to detail why the Dutch should close the Moluccan sea to others. They argued that although the Dutch were ordinarily peaceful traders in these waters they had been forced to 'shed blood' in disputing the Portuguese claim to exclude all others. As they still had to maintain warships and castles there they could not allow third parties to profit freely from the situation which their sole efforts had brought into being. At the same time they proposed to discuss a merger of the two East India companies and a union of forces in the East Indies against Spain. Nevertheless the deputies were not empowered to concluded anything about joint hostilities. Having formerly been advocates of freedom of navigation Grotius and his colleagues now wanted restrictions on English merchantmen in the Far East.

Negotiations took place between 5th April, 1613 - 20th April, 1613. The talks became deadlocked and a resumption of negotiations was held in the Hague in 1615. The Dutch commissioners were certainly being disingenuous, not intending to share the eastern trade with England or anyone else. Their purpose was to induce the English to join them in an attack on Spanish holdings and shipping there.

In addition, during this mission Grotius hoped to win James over to the views of Olden Barneveld on the religious disputes in the Netherlands. However, Grotius and James were to remain in opposition - Grotius supporting Olden Barneveld and the Remonstrants whilst James became a supporter of the more strictly Calvinist, Counter-Remonstrants and of Maurice, prince of Orange.


6. Jacob BOREEL (Bourrell) Pensionary of Middelburg.

May, 1614 - May, 1614 Commissioner

It would appear that Boreel had been in England concerning Cockayne's project and the Merchant Adventurers Company.

After the death of Elias van Olden Barneveld who died suddenly 20th July, 1612 amid rumours that he suffered delirium tremens. See J. van Tex, Oldenbarneveld. p. 521.
7. Johan Gerrit Reyersz van OLDEN BARNEVELD (1547 - 1619) Advocate to the States of Holland (1576 - 1619); Chief Pensionary of Amsterdam (1576) January, 1616 - 1617 Extra-ordinary

Sent to treat for the delivery of the States towns that were held by the English.

8. Johan BERCK (1565 - 1627) Pensionary of Dordrecht September, 1616 - Commissioner

In England to treat with the new company of dyers and dressers - the Merchant Adventurers, the governor of which was Alderman William Cockayne.
See Raleigh’s, ‘Observations touching trade and commerce with the Hollanders.’

9. Eruwout van der DUSSEN, Deputy, Consul of Delft
Joachim LIENS, Deputy, Syndic of Tholen
Johan van GOCH, Deputy, Consul of Zutphen
Albert SONCQ
Andrew RICKAERTS
Anoult Jacobsen LODENSTYN
Jacob BOREEL (Bourrell) Pensionary of Middelburg.
William BOREEL (Bourrell)
Bas THIERRY
26th November, 1618 - 24th August, 1619 Commissioners
Audience: 7th December, 1618 at Newmarket

A commission appointed to deal not only with the disputes taking place between the respective East India Companies of England and Holland, but also some of the other economic quarrels. Their instructions authorised them to treat about the Anglo-Dutch disputes over the whales fisheries at Spitzbergen (Greenland) as well as the East Indies trade. Had no instructions concerning the problems of the herring fisheries that James wanted to be settled. See Contarini to the Doge, Venetian MSS, 5th October, 1618; Naunton to Carleton, SP. Domestic, vol. CIV, no. 62; Carleton to Naunton SP. Holland, 12th October, 1618; G. N. Clark and J. W. J. M. Van Eysinga, Bibliotheca Visseriana, Dissertationum Ius Internationale Illustrantium, xxxiv, p. 129 - 147. Treaty signed 7th July, 1619, and ratified the following week. CSP Domestic 19th July, 1619.

As the problems over the East India Companies were solved James was prepared to postpone discussions on the whale fisheries.
PRO SP 14/109/143 is a patent of knighthood for Goch, dated 19th July, 1619. As he was knighted one can assume that those members of the commission who were not already so honoured were knighted at the same time.
Meerman had instructions for this mission but declined them.

10 Jonkheer Jacobus WYNGAERDES, Seignour de Bentusen September, 1620 - Commissioner

To treat about the whale and herring fisheries.

11. Frederick van VERVOU, Seignour de la Haye
Looking for aid to check Spinola’s progress in Germany and support should the Dutch go to war with Spain. All knighted by James on 9th April, 1621

12. Francis van AERSSEN (1572 - 1641) Lord of Somersdyks (Sommelsdijk)  
Hendrik Van TUYLL  
Dirck Jacobsz BAS (1565 - 1627)  
8th December, 1621 - February, 1623 Commissioners  
Lodging: Bread Street, at the house of the late Lord Mayor, Sir Francis Jones  
Audience: 23rd December, 1621  
Secretary: Sir Constantijn Huygens (Huggins) - knighted by James 20th April, 1622

This commission was to arrange matters between the East India companies of the two nations and to deal with questions which had arisen on the whale fisheries between England and the States. The commissioners were to have left in October, 1622 but as there was little or no agreement James requested that they remain in England. CSP Venetian, 1621 - 1623, no. 177.

13. Albert JOACHIMI (1560 - 1654) Zeeland Deputy to the States General, Lord of Ostend  
Francis van AERSSEN (1572 - 1641) Lord of Somersdyks (Sommelsdijk)  
8th March, 1624 - 29th June, 1624 Extra-ordinary  
Audience: March, 1624

With de Caron they treated for a defensive alliance which allowed the Dutch to levy 6,000 men in England to be paid for by the King. See Calendar of Clarendon Papers, no 239, p. 29, 15th June 1624. Treaty ratified 15th June, 1624

14. Albert JOACHIMI (1560 - 1654) Zeeland Deputy to the States General, Lord of Ostend  
9th January, 1625 - c. 1650 Ordinary  
Lodging: Lombard Street
VENICE

(Venice did not establish a regular embassy until 1603)

1. Giovanni Carlo SCaramelli, Secretary to the Senate
   7th February, 1603 - 26th December, 1603 Agent
   Salary: 120 crowns p.m.
   Audience: 27th May, 1603
   Lodging: near the Tower, in a house belonging to Lucca, a Venetian merchant.

   He had been sent as agent to Queen Elizabeth.
   Sent to congratulate James and to announce the coming of two ambassadors, one of whom, Molin, would remain as ordinary.

2. Nicolo MOLINO
   8th November, 1603 - 23rd February, 1606 Ordinary
   Lodging: Salisbury
   Salary: 200 ducats of gold p.m. CSP Venetian, 1603 - 1607, p. xxxi
   Audience: 30th November, 1603, at Wilton House

   Chief subjects of his mission were:
   i) the question of pirates;
   ii) the Levant Company;
   iii) the quarrel between Venice and the Curia Romana.
   Knighted by James at Whitehall 23rd January, 1606

3. Piero DUODO
   20th November, 1603 - 13th December, 1603 Extra-ordinary
   Lodging: see N°. 2 above
   Salary: 600 ducats of gold p.m.
   Audience: 30th November, 1603 at Wilton House.
   Secretary: (?) Giovanni Scaramelli

   Came to complain to James of the depredations of the English buccaneers in the Mediterranean.

4. Zorzi GUISTINIAN
   June, 1606 - 23rd November, 1608 Ordinary
   Secretary: Pietro Vico

   Chief subjects of his mission were:
   i) the question of pirates;
   ii) the Levant Company;
   iii) the quarrel between Venice and the Curia Romana.
   Knighted by James 1st November, 1608

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21 See above.
5. Marc-Antonio CORRER (CORNARO or CORRARO)
   October, 1608 - June, 1611 Ordinary
   Secretary: Christopher Surrian (Suriano)
   Majordomo: Giancomo Varnicoli
   Chaplain: Fleming


6. Francesco CONTARINI
   26th January, 1610 - March, 1610 Extra-ordinary

A report of his voyage to England and his return journey can be found in *PRO Venetian MSS*, f. 6

7. Antonio FOSCARINI
   5th May, 1611 - 22nd December, 1615 Ordinary
   Secretary: i) Scaramelli - dismissed for misconduct, June, 1612. Left July, 1612
   ii) Guilo Muscarno
   iii) Giovanni Rizzardo to 1615
   Steward: Giovanni Battista Casella
   Valet: Ottavio Robazza

*CSP Venetian*, 1610 - 1613, no. 800; *CSP Venetian*, 1613 - 1615, no. 717.
See *CSP Venetian*, 1619 - 1621, nos. 292, 293, 301 - 303. No. 451 is an account for his execution and nos. 735 - 734 relate to the reinstatement of his reputation. See also Wm. Carew Hazlitt, *Republic of Venice*, vol. ii, pp. 238 - 245.

8. Gregorio BARBARIGO
   10th October, 1615 - 6th June, 1616 Ordinary
   Secretary: Giovanni Lionelli
   Steward: Francisco Veercellini
   Audience: 11th November, 1615

9. Giovanni LIONELLI  
10th October, 1615 - December, 1618 Agent

Remained as agent after death of Barbarigo until the arrival of Contarini. Stayed on as Contarini’s secretary.

10. Pietro CONTARINI (CENTARENI)  
October, 1617 - November, 1618 Extra-ordinary
Lodging: St. Mary Spittle, Bishopsgate St. Without.
Audience: 1st November, 1617
Secretary: Giovanni Lionelli
Chaplain: Orazio Busino

11. Antonio DONATO (Donatus)  
17th October, 1618 - May, 1619 Ordinary
Audience: 1st November, 1618
Secretary: Pier Antonio Marioni

Nephew of Niccolò Donato, Doge of Venice. Stopped in Holland on his way to England.  
*CSP Venetian, 1617 - 1619, pp. 461, 521 - 522, 489 - 491, 509, 561 - 562; CSP Venetian, 1619 - 1621, pp. 73 - 85*
His secretary acted as agent after his recall until the expected arrival of Gritti.

12. Piero GRITTI  
March, 1619 Designated Extra-ordinary

Commission dated 15th March, 1619 but fell ill in Genoa, May 1619.

13. Gerolamo TREVISANO  
May, 1619 Designated Extra-ordinary

Was to have come instead of Gritti as extra-ordinary. However, the Senate revoked his commission on June 22nd, 1619 having decided to send an ordinary instead.

14. Pier Antonio MARIONI  
May, 1619 - 14th January, 1620 Agent

Acted until the expected arrival of Gritti, who became ill. His replacement was to have been Trevisano. However, his commission (see below) was revoked. Eventually replaced by Lando.
15. **Girolamo LANDO**

   9th June, 1619 - 18th June, 1622 
   Ordinary

   **Audience:** January, 1620
   **Secretary:** Pier Antonio Zon
   **Interpreter:** Odvardo Watson (Edward Watson)

   Took Donato's house. Knighted by James on 12th June, 1622.
   His instructions can be found in *CSP Venetian*, 1619 - 1621, p. 9
   His allowances are noted in *CSP Venetian*, 1617 - 1619, p. 563

16. **Alvise VALARESSO**

   17th June, 1622 - October, 1624 
   Ordinary

   **Audience:** 20th June, 1622 at Greenwich
   **Secretary:** Pietro Dolce
   **Interpreter:** Odvardo Watson (Edward Watson)

   *CSP Venetian* records him in England in November 1609, it is possible he was acting as a messenger or was on a non-diplomatic mission. Instructions can be found in *CSP Venetian*, 1621 - 1623, p. 291.
   Details of the salary increase for the embassy interpreter can be found in *CSP Venetian*, 1623 - 1625, p. 121.
   His despatches can be found in Add Mss 30,645. Knighted by James on 19th September, 1624

17. **Zuane PESARO**

   26th September, 1624 - Ordinary

   **Audience:** October, 1624
   **Secretary:** Andrea Rosso

   Pesaro was ignored by the establishment and not invited to James's funeral.

**WÜRTEMBERG**

1. **Benjamin BUWINCKHAUSEN de WALMERODE**, Councillor of Frederick, Duke of Württemburg.
   August, 1603 - 17th August, 1603 
   Extra-ordinary

   He made several visits to England, first to Elizabeth I in the service of Duke Frederick, and subsequently to congratulate James on the succession. He made two visits with Prince Lewis Frederick. His correspondence with Sir Robert Cecil on affairs in Germany is lodged with the *State Papers*. In 1620 he was appointed ambassador from the Princes of the Union.
   To congratulate James on his accession to the throne. Acted as an Officer at the Coronation

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22 Watson was considered to be a double spy by Lando, in the pay of the Archbishop of Canterbury and Sir Lewis Lewkenor (though what purpose the latter employing a spy would serve is not obvious). Lando to the Inquisitors of State, 6th August, 1611. *CSP Venetian*, 1621 - 1623, p. 121. Despite this letter to the Inquisitors Watson appears to have remained as interpreter at least until 1626 when Alvise Contarini requested his removal on the grounds of old age and incompetence.
2. Count Philipp VON EBERSTEIN
   George Leopold, Her VON LANDAU
   Christopher VON LAYMINGEN
   Kilian BRASTBERGER
   Melchior BONACKER
   
   15th April, 1604 - end April, 1604 Extra-ordinary
   Audience: 18th April, 1604, London

3. Daniel von BUWINCKHAUSEN
   Friedrich DÄGKER
   
   April, 1605 - April, 1605 Extra-ordinary
   Stayed less than a month.

4. Lewis (Louis) Frederick, Prince of Württemburg (1586 - ?) Second son of Frederick, Duke of Württemburg.
   Benjamin BUWINCKHAUSEN de WALMERODE, Councillor of Frederick, Duke of Württemburg.
   10th August, 1608 - late August, 1608 Extra-ordinary
   Secretary: Hans Jacob Wurmsser von Vendenheym.

Lewis's mission was a politico-religious one. First he came in the name of his brother, John Frederick, Duke of Württemburg, to return his dead father's Garter which had been conferred by James. Robert, Baron Spencer of Wormleighton who travelled to the court of Württemburg to invest the Duke with the Garter, 6th September, 1603 - 24th December, 1603. Investment took place on 6th November, 1603. See Add MSS. 25079, 34079. Second, in which he was joined by Buwinckhausen, was to seek aid for the United Protestant Princes of Germany. Pressed for the marriage of Princess Elizabeth to the Elector Palatine.

5. Benjamin BUWINCKHAUSEN de WALMERODE, Councillor of Frederick, Duke of Württemburg.
   Hippolytus von COLLII (Colle, à Collibus), Chancellor to Christian, Prince of Anhalt (1561 - 1612)
   March, 1610 - 19th May, 1610 Extra-ordinary
   Audience: 27th April, 1610

This legation was to endeavour to induce James to declare himself to be of the union contracted amongst the Princes in the Assembly at Hall. Left in the company of the new ambassador Sir Thomas Edmondes.

6. Lewis (Louis) Frederick, Prince of Württemburg (1586 - ?)
   13th April, 1610 - 29th May, 1610 Extra-ordinary
   Audience: Monday 16th April, 1610.
   Secretary: Hans Jacob Wurmsser von Vendenheym.

With Daniel Hutten, on behalf of the 'Possessioners'. His mission related to 'affairs which concern the public good and the preservation of our true religion'.

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23 A Swiss jurist who wrote several legal treatises. Later he became Privy Councillor to the Elector Palatine, Frederick IV, by whom he was employed in several embassies.
7. Lewis (Louis) Frederick, Prince of Württemburg (1586 - ?)  
August, 1611 - March, 1613 Extra-ordinary  
Secretary: Hans Jacob Wurmsser von Vendenheym.

Commission, dated 22nd August 1611, of Joachim Erneste, Marquis of Brandenburg, Duke of Prussia; George Frederick, Marquis of Baden and Christian of Anhalt to treat for a defensive alliance with England.  
23rd September, 1611, this was extended by commission of John Sigismund, Marquis of Brandenburg, Prince of Prussia;  
5th October, 1611 by commission of John, Count Palatine;  
8th January, 1612 by commission of the Landgrave of Hesse.  
Treaty ratified 28th March, 1612.

8. Benjamin BUWINCKHAUSEN de WALMERODE, Councillor of Frederick, Duke of Württemburg.  
21st February, 1620 - 5th June, 1620 Extra-ordinary  
Lodging: The Strand  
Audience: late February, 1620 at Theobalds

Appendix B

The Pension List of Juan de Tassis, Count of Villa Mediana

The Earl of Dorset - to be given a present in the first instance and to ‘remain under obligation with some annual secret pension’.

The Lord Admiral - ‘in secret some quantity of money should be given and a pension to place him under obligation’.

The Earl of Devonshire - ‘should be given a good present in public and a very good pension should be settled on him’.

The Earl of Northampton - ‘in secret should be given a sum of money and a good pension so that he will always strive to maintain peace and assist in whatever way he can in the cause of the Catholics’.

The Lord Cecil - ‘one large present should be given in public...he be given some secret compensation, for as he is to remain First Secretary of State with his hand on everything he will remain friendly...some presents for his son and daughter’.

The Earl of Suffolk - a member of the Council of State and Grand Chamberlain to the King - ‘in his services he has always tried to satisfy’. The Countess is a Catholic who is ‘well connected with the house of Howard and to Cecil and his party...must therefore keep her satisfied for anything different would be dangerous now and for the future. It will be necessary to satisfy both of them and also their daughter...with another present.’

The Earl of Northumberland - ‘a pension and a worthwhile present for his wife.’

The Earl of Cumberland, a member of the Council - ‘it will be suitable to leave him in some way under obligation.’

The Lord Wotton, Comptroller for the King - it would be good to give to him and his wife a present.’

George Hume, Grand Treasurer of Scotland - ‘he should be left satisfied with a good gift in public’.

Lord Kinloss - ‘should be given a sum of money or some present of plate and left contented.’

The Earl of Worcester - ‘ought to be given a present and something for his wife.’

Thomas Eskine, Captain of the Guard - should be ‘given a present.’

Sir John Ramsey, Keeper of the Royal Bedchamber - ‘should be left satisfied now and for the future by a present and a pension...I have already rewarded him.’

Sir James Lindsey, a Catholic - ‘ought to be given an honourable pension and a grant in aid and he deserves a further reward.’

Sir Thomas Lake, secretary to the King - ‘it must be considered whether he wishes a pension, and if not, a present ought to be given to his wife.’

Sir William Monson - ‘deserving of some reward.’

Doctor Tyler, Doctor of the University of Douai - ‘The Archduke has given him a pension of 25 escudos. He deserves to have it doubled and to be given a grant in aid.’

Lady Arbella - ‘a jewel of some importance.’

Lady Drummond, Lady of the Bedchamber - in addition to a jewel already received, ‘another jewel ought to be given to her and some money and a pension so that she can marry well again.’

The Countess of Bedford, Lucy Harrington - ‘some present should be made.’

Anne Hay, daughter of the Earl of Errol - ‘a present...another present for her father who is a Catholic.’

Lady Rich, mistress of the Earl of Devonshire whom she married in 1605 - ‘a good present.’

The daughter of Lord Sidney - ‘a jewel ought to be given’.
The Countess of Hertford, Frances Howard - 'a jewel ought to be given and to the other titled Ladies of the Princes' chambers should there be need.'
The other ladies of the Presence Chamber who are of less importance and those of the Princes' chambers to whom it is customary to present gifts.
It is necessary to dispense and bestow other gifts - large and small - depending on the persons concerned.
Finally some money should be given to the guards and minor officials of the Royal Palace.
Appendix C

Translation of report from Sir Noel de Caron
‘Nievs uyt Engelandt gheschzeben dooz den heer Ambassadeur,
Noel de Caron.’
(1621)
(Add Mss. 1325e. 4)

News
written from England
By the Ambassador
NOEL DE CARON
To the Esteemed members of the States General
Of the Unified Netherlands
Printed Anno Domino 1621

Letter
Of the Ambassador Caron
To the esteemed members of the States General

Esteemed Gentlemen, Dear Sirs
Via friends I have learned the shocking news that despite great effort SG you have not been able to convince the VOC to send over some delegates to solve the differences between the VOC, the authority of his Majesty the King and the SG. I am afraid that we have to explain to his Majesty that they will not come over as he expected (for which God may protect us). Because if they will not come over we have to assume that contacts with England will be over soon.

I know that it was requested that all Dutch possessions would be confiscated as a compensation for what they claim to have lost. I do not believe that this is going to happen but they will get ‘Markbrieven’ and reprisals against all of our ships coming from and going to the East Indies. His Majesty has said and even sworn, that he cannot live in peace not offering the same to his own people. How this will encourage our, common enemy I shall leave to your imagination (with your great wisdom). To believe that the King will not do so will prove to be wrong since I know very well his feelings about this.

Really Dear Sirs if it would come to a separation with England we shall certainly regret that, for in all cases we need the friendship of his Majesty. I think that the friendship of the SG will suit England as well, but (in my opinion) that is not commonly accepted over here. Indeed many dare to say that friendship with Spain is of more use than ours. In the past people who spoke that opinion were regarded as public enemies but now the subjects of the King become so irritated and aggravated by our East Indian trade, that they envy us in words and study to practice the same: a serious situation will develop. Two or three days ago I have tried to talk with his Majesty to officially apologise for our delayed reaction, but I have to assure the SG that his Majesty was not prepared to talk with me as he felt we mock him by not keeping our promises.

Really Dear Sirs, his Majesty has promised to stay impartial in this matter and therefore we should show our gratitude for that. The original promise of the SG to

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1 Letters of Possession.
the King was to send over delegates and now this promise has been broken the King does not feel bound to his part of the agreement. Many people here are of a good will and it is really a pity that there is no way that the real problems can be faced and therefore I beg you with all respect to pay attention to this matter without any delay. The urgency is related to the other activities of his Majesty and it is expected that he will not travel far and can be contacted in one or two days. There are other matters here that require his presence also.

Several people and noblemen have been kept in prison and interrogated. There are more to follow. I am afraid all these matters are potential causes of great difficulties to the advantage of the common enemy. So let it be your conclusion that it is better to pamper our friendship with his majesty instead of losing it, for God's sake we have plenty of enemies already.

Further letters from Spain to the King, with copies of letters to the Emperor and the Archduke, have arrived here.

It is hard to believe that the King is so convinced that he is going to obtain the Palatinate as if he had it already, which also brings the Spanish Ambassador Gondomar more and more in credit.

Four days ago when Gondomar went to see the King (apparently to deliver the letters) he was accompanied back home by Lord Buckingham who offered him a place in his litter. They went together through the City of London to Gondomar's house enjoying such familiarity and showing common agreement and shaking hands that it was a great surprise to the City. Some of my people in the street told me that never before someone has taken his hat off for him because most of them rather would see him hanged. Nevertheless, Dear Sirs of the SG it must be clear to you that this Charlatan enjoys the highest credit of the King. Therefore, I think we should try to please the King and if possible also his subjects.

I remember the time that they wished us thousands of blessings, now I hear every day the opposite, due to the VOC, which changed their attitude completely. For God's will let us rather spend one, two or three thousand Guilders, which God will repay us at another moment in a different way. As it is very painful to see that this Gondomar has so much credit here.

Some time ago a ship arrived in Plymouth, which was captured in the neighbourhood of Havana in the West Indies, by the Admiral of Sealand. It docked here in an emergency due to storm and bad weather.

Up until now I am following procedures against Spain with the Admiralty Court. Last Saturday the judge of the Admiralty sent me his judgement that the goods were valued at £300.00 and that he was forced by the Admiral the Marquis to give possession to Gondomar and although the Judge is (as I have been assured) an honest man and warm-hearted to the Counties of the SG, he still had to decide otherwise. Immediately I went to the palace to complain but in fact it was in vain, which is a miserable situation. I am afraid I am faking too much of the SG's time, therefore with nothing further to report I end. God begging &c.

Esteemed Sirs &c.

From Duist-Vambeth [South Lambeth] near London, 2nd July/old time/AD 1621

Signed

Yours Noel de Caron
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