

*AN EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE TO THE IDEOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE SYMBOLIC: A CONTENT
ANALYSIS OF IMAGES OF THE GENDERED DICHOTOMY.*

CAROLINE BARNES

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of West of England,
Bristol, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Bath Spa University College

Faculty of Applied Sciences, Bath Spa University College

February 2005

ABSTRACT

This thesis offers a critique of the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism and its associated semiotic analyses. Their utilisation of Lacanian notions of the Symbolic, structured by the Phallus, leads this model, and its cultural examinations, to define woman as 'lack', which renders identity a Symbolic effect. I suggest that if the Symbolic determines the form representation can make, and if these representations go on to constitute gendered subjects dichotomously, then sexual dichotomisation should unambiguously structure representation. However, I contest this and support it with evidence from a content analysis I conducted, which analysed 500 fashion images. I offer a methodological defence regarding the use of content analysis, arguing that if meaning is understood as operating conventionally, it is sufficiently stable to quantify (Goffman: 1979). The defence is based upon the contention that meaning, which serves an ideology, cannot be also polysemic and elliptical. My results show that the cultural representations are free of a whole range of variables that are supposed to secure a dichotomously determined and subordinated femininity. Moreover, the data showed that there was no longer a marked gender difference between codes used; in fact, an increasing homogeneity between the images of men and women was recorded. Thus, images of men are equally commodified. Culture cannot therefore be said to secure gender identity. My results show that representation does, however, reproduce the discourse of the dimorphic body. Thus, in the light of this, I offer a tentative means of bringing the body into the social without the body reassuming its place as the primary determinant of the social. I do this by offering a model of the body that seeks to emphasise the interrelatedness of the body to society, and to sex and gender in particular. I offer the model of family resemblances as a means to escape the dualistic tendency of sex/gender because it is not dependent upon a unitary based classification scheme.

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INTRODUCTION

There has been a long-standing interrogation by feminists regarding the interrelationship between the female body and the social category of 'woman'. Of particular import is the resistance to the notion that femininity is a naturally subordinate correlate to masculinity. The subordinate position of 'woman' is deemed morally legitimate because it stems from natural sexual differences between the bodies of men and women. Early critiques, most notably the sex/gender distinction, have been criticised for not deconstructing sufficiently the association of the female sex to nature. Lacanian postmodernism/feminism has become the central theoretical model that challenges this dualism, but I will suggest that their challenge rests upon dissolving the corporeality of the body because they do not give the body a material dimension outside of discourse. The influence of the Lacanian model of psychoanalysis is crucial here because sexual difference is elevated to the level of the Symbolic. The Symbolic is then defined as constituting sexual difference, that is, rendering the body a discursive and Symbolic effect. Significantly, the Symbolic is always prior to, and determinant of, the subject and so this model is ahistorical; hence it often describes the Symbolic in terms of the 're-presentation of the feminine'. Therefore, it follows that if gender dimorphism is *solely* an outcome of the Symbolic, dichotomisation must be the key feature of the Symbolic. Bodies and representation must directly correspond to that dichotomisation. I challenge this description of the Symbolic universe. Using evidence generated by a content analysis, I demonstrate that a large number of the signs, said to mark sexual difference, simply were not present. The evidence derived from the content analysis shows that conventions used to construct an image are significantly less dimorphic than this model can allow or account for. I suggest that this has major repercussions regarding this particular model of the formation of the subject.

I develop this by suggesting that drawing attention to corporeality need not lead to the re-naturalisation of specific historical and social formations of gender. I offer an alternative, suggesting that sexual difference ought to be understood as *an* element, amongst others, of the category of sex. Only by engaging directly with the body is it possible to identify where and when the body fails to determine the discursive category of sex. In this way, I think it is possible to begin to understand corporeality as an entity that has some existence outside of discourse, yet equally, the body is not wholly independent of such discourse. I think it is necessary to attempt to theorise outside of the constraints of the dualism established by sex and gender and what is therefore necessary is a model that does not give causal priority to 'sex' or 'gender'. Essentially, I think that the category of sex incorporates much more than genital difference. Until the body is tackled directly, the ideological position of the body and/or sex as fundamentally and absolutely distinct from society will continue. Thus, I suggest that postmodernist/feminist theorising, especially that underpinned by Lacanianism, will tend to be confined within dualistic strictures that it politically identifies as a target. Therefore, I will be placing emphasis upon practice so that the practices that intervene on the body to help produce 'sex' can be examined. I suggest images, and their potential influence, need to be included as part of the practice of gender, not the determinate of gender. This opens up a vital space, in my view, to theoretically emphasise that discourse is not uniformly effective. This is necessary if a move toward a non-reductive version of gender is to be achieved.

Guillaumin encapsulates the issue regarding the relationship between 'natural bodies' and 'social selves' thus: 'all human beings are natural but some are more natural than others' (Guillaumin:1996:72). Her rhetoric endeavours to undermine the singularly important maxim of patriarchal ideology: the natural order is just and thus sacrosanct. Implicit within her rhetoric are the principal aims of the feminist project:¹ to de-naturalise the current patterns of femininity by exposing their constructed form; to delineate the power and inequality inherent within them in order to break apart 'natural sex'. Initially, this theoretical and political project was elucidated through the sex/gender distinction, which theorises by making an epistemological differentiation between the body and society: sex is the objective biological category and gender is the social correlate (Oakley:1972). The distinction also elucidates the causal relationship between the constituent parts by radically inverting the direction of causation upon which the ideological maxim depends: gender becomes the mechanism through which feminine identity is formed, not sex. Essentially, the aim was to understand femininity as being produced in the body, not the essence of the body.

The sex/gender critique offers a dual attack. First, that our cultural representations are not about the actual cultural lives of women. Ostensibly, therefore, these representations are, at best, misrepresentations and, at worst, blatantly ideological. Second, that women's cultural lives are not of the fixed biological body, but are cultural patterns and thus are open to being undertaken differently (Oakley:1972). This normative challenge culminates in the following forceful conclusion: there is nothing natural about women's subordination. By taking up the distinction between the biological body and the social category of gender, the critique was able to establish a social connection between representation and women, namely that the restricted nature of the representation was unduly limiting the potential social roles women could fulfil.

Paradoxically, however, the sex/gender distinction cannot keep the body in view because 'sex as an objective category' remains, thus effectively attributing gender to the domain of personality or mind (Connell:1987; Spelman:1982; Fuss:1990). Consequently, essentialist versions of the body re-emerge and reassume a primary role in the constitution of gender. Delphy (1996) argues that this is because an order of sex is established by means of a classification of its essential properties that are deemed independent of, and prior to, any social practice. The problem of 'sex', argues Delphy, is that it leads us to treat as objective properties things that are socially and historically constituted. Herein lies my critical endeavour. I argue that the radicalisation of this distinction by the postmodernist/feminist programme cannot keep the body in view either, and therefore, the postmodernist/feminist position depends equally upon a body that falls outside of the forces of social construction. In short, I argue that their political programme depends upon essentialist foundations from which to theorise the feminine; the pre-Oedipal and/or *jouissance* often fulfil this role. Only then can they 'find something outside' of the comprehensive forces of cultural reproduction. Thus, the critical principle that Guillaumin weaves into her rhetorical device is paradoxically the very logic from which postmodernism/feminism theorises. Postmodernist/feminist theory has failed to overcome the dualistic nature of the sex/gender distinction (Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams:2002; Burkitt:1999; Lloyd:1984), which it claims to

¹ The initial parameters, which questioned directly the notion that biology is destiny, were set by De Beauvoir: 1975.

have deconstructed (Butler:1990; Flax:1990). Essentially, within both approaches, the body remains an un-interrogated, self-evident unit upon which discourse sits. Thus, the body 'disappears' (Ostrander:1988) or slips underneath the discourse that is allegedly constituting it. If the body is immaterial, what places us in the world?; what gives us a perspective in and on the world? We *have* a point of view because we *are* our bodies (Burkitt:1999). I propose therefore that the body is not reducible to discourse and ought to be thought of as an unfinished entity (Shilling: 1993)

Therefore, I suggest that sexual dimorphism is a consequence of intervening and transformative practices, which contribute to the naturalisation of sex in a significant way. These practices are, however, *treated* as the natural and inevitable outcome of the primacy awarded to sex. I have the following example in mind: 'women don't have facial hair, therefore I pluck mine'. The unintended consequence is, of course, to confirm the initial socially based assessment that 'proper' women are hairless. Thus the practices aim to manage the secondary sexual characteristics, like muscle, breasts, hair and so forth. What is crucial is that practices naturalise current patterns of gender appearance. Thus, while these secondary characteristics are deemed to be a direct, unchangeable biological disposition of the body, it takes various social practices to achieve this (Connell:1987). Essentially therefore, the variation of secondary characteristics is measured and regulated against the normative body. My central proposition is that 'natural sex' ought not to be placed outside of the social, as if the biological and social spheres are readily separable, but seen to combine the body one has with the social practices that sustain it, be that in terms of health or gender practices. Thus I seek to include the social intervention upon the body as a part of 'making sex' (Laquer:1991) and that sex needs to be included within the ontological assessment of self (Giddens:1991; see Lash and Urry (1994) for a cogent critique of Giddens' reproduction of the mind/body dualism).

Finally, there is that part sphere of sex that pins sexual/personality characteristics to a set of genitalia. This is what was initially referred to as gender. These characteristics vary a lot as many personality traits belong to the condition of being human rather than derived from the genitals/chromosomal/genetic. Again the normative body makes its entry here because, while it is recognised that a woman can be aggressive, she ought not to be (Franks:1991; Garfinkel:1967). One can hear the residue of the ideas of the 'fairer sex' here. Essentially, therefore, by stressing that practices have an equal role in the functioning of the category of sex, I seek to explore how 'sex', be it genital or chromosomal, underdetermines the social category of sex. Moreover, I believe it offers a space to explore how practice intervenes to reproduce bodily appearance and character that is then naturalised. Images, I suggest, are best understood when they are located within this dynamic rather than being treated as determinates themselves.

I address these questions across the following chapters. In chapter 2, I offer a detailed account of the shift from the sex/gender distinction to the formation of the subject via the semiotic operations of meaning. I argue that this model ejects the body from analysis by over-emphasising the determining effects of meaning. I suggest that this is problematic for a number of reasons: first, the body loses its corporeality in the world and becomes a symbolic effect; second, this ejects the very entity we have to act in and on the world in order to transform, resist or continue current social practices; third, because the subject is reduced to an ideological effect, postmodernism/feminism of this kind cannot account for

their own consciousness without calling upon the residues of non-socialised desire, namely an essentialist notion of the feminine. Hence, postmodernism/feminism of this kind, and its associate semiotic deconstructions, depend upon certain Lacanian psychoanalytic models with which to formulate a model of the subject. I will present the case that utilising Lacanian concepts in this way leads the postmodernist/feminist critique to depend upon functionalist logic, despite the polemical language in which this logic is embedded. Likewise, they eject the body from the social domain, just as Parsons (1951) did before them.

In chapter 3, I offer a methodological defence for the use of content analysis as my chosen method. Drawing upon the work of Goffman (1979), I argue that codes operate conventionally and that this establishes sufficient stability within which to quantify the contents of the images. Moreover, conventions guide how we use codes and signs so that, providing one is attentive to these conventions during codification, the quantitative data generates a macro view of the modes of representation that semiotics cannot achieve. The content analysis consists of 25 variables, which contain some 350 sub-variables. Using this coding frame, I assessed the manifest content of 500 images. The data is assessed using the Chi test of association. The sub-variables reference the ideological features that are said to secure the 'feminine as passive'; for example looking away aligns the gaze with the passive (Dyer: 1986; 1992). It also looks at the formation of the image and how it functions so that a representation is accepted as an 'authentic version of myself'². I draw upon Goffman's *Gender Advertisements* again here to establish that the flow of social life has to be over-emphasised to make it visible to us. He also draws attention to the symbolic effect of representing a three-dimensional world in a two-dimension frame, which allows me to examine the symbolic relationship of space projected within the physical limits of an image.

In chapter 4, I analyse the data generated. My data shows that representation is sufficiently ambiguous to raise serious doubts as to the explanatory adequacy of the postmodernist/feminist position. The data furnished shows that many of the variables said to anchor femininity as lack or passive or 'the other' are simply not present. Thus I conclude that, far from quintessentially defining the feminine as passive, these codes are regularly applied to codify men's bodies. Consequentially, the categorical description that aligns the passive forms of codification to the production of femininity is undermined. I conclude that the codifications are sufficiently ambiguous as to be unable to define whether the woman represented identifies with the Symbolic order and thus her own subordination; in fact, it was often only possible to code the body as female. Thus images target the dimorphic body. I do not make any inferential statements as to the actual lived patterns of femininity, as I do not award the image any causal affectivity independent of its location in practice. This requires empirical research (Bourdieu:1997; Waquant:1993) and I will address this in the conclusion.

Lastly, in chapter 5, I offer some tentative steps that might be taken to resurrect the sex/gender distinction, by emphasising the dynamic between the body and the social order, so that neither entity is given undue theoretical significance (see for example Douglas:1966; 1969; Mauss:1973; and more recently Waquant:1993; Davis:1995;1997). Most importantly, I wish to emphasise that sex and gender are not distinct objects but are, in fact, fuzzy because the body interacts

² This is necessary if the images are to operate within Lacan's mirror phase.

with the social and is modified by the social. Shilling's (1993) notion of the 'unfinished body' is pertinent here. I explore how we might theorise 'gender' in a way that maintains an eye both on the differences and similarities between bodies. I do this by drawing upon Lakoff's work (1987), which offers an opening that can integrate various social practices with the corporeal as a normative object targeted by discourse and as the living entity that places us in the world. Most importantly, I think, is that Lakoff's development of the concept of 'family resemblance' does not force us to hierarchise these elements, replacing this with concepts of maps and sets that stress the interaction between the elements. This way it is possible to examine the body in a way that integrates internal differences amongst women yet maintains equal attention to the public, normative classifications to which women are subject. His model explores the social and embodied implications of the category 'woman', without having to capture the essence that unites all embodied 'women', alongside the complex ways a category is lived. I am particularly interested in the ways that this maintains an emphasis upon the dualistic abstractions, which align the masculine with the active, for example, but equally renders this construction mythical: the average man is no more the 'One' than the average woman is the 'other'.

I conclude this thesis with an overview of how I seek to develop this research empirically. I have emphasised that my theoretical priority is to explore 'women' as internally differentiated at certain points, brought together corporeally at other points, and collectively targeted by the discursive productions of the normative. My engagement with the image is based on accepting that they are influential but not causally determining of the individual. I aim to extend this analysis by examining two groups of women in order to tackle the differences within the category head on. These are young women, who are intensely targeted by images produced within the cultural sphere, and older women who are largely absent. I aim to examine how a sense of oneself, as a woman, is negotiated within two differing contexts, focusing in particular on the contrast between being an overt target of the normative body as the body beautiful and a potentially reproductive body and those who are defined as the opposite, in the sense that they are deemed to be in the 'twilight' both in terms of reproduction and beauty. Theoretically, this provides a context within which to explore the explanatory efficacy of the notion of family resemblances.

This chapter explores the alleged radicalisation of the sex/gender distinction offered by postmodernism/feminism. Representations are made up of signs that collectively make up the Symbolic. The Symbolic is understood as constituting or producing subjects, which is theorised through various mechanisms derived from the psychoanalytic model. Thus, bodies become subjects within the pre-existing cultural formations and, because these formations are ordered by key patriarchal hierarchies, they go on to order gendered subjectivities hierarchically. Thus, the theoretical target of my critique is the model of the Symbolic constitution of the subject, which is highly dependent upon the psychoanalysis of Lacan (1977), as well as Althusser's (1971) concept of interpellation. Proponents argue that this de-centres the subject, deconstructs the myths of the speaking 'I', and, with it, the fallacious notion that the subject is the source of meaning rather than the product of meaning. Their concern is with the constraints that language as a system, that is the Symbolic, imposes and the various ways language organises the polymorphic desires of the infant. Hence, this axis integrates the social system to the production of complicit sets of identities and aims to account for how they feel fixed, personal, instinctual, that is, how cultural formations come to feel 'of the body'. Neither masculine nor feminine subjects belong to the realm of nature but are demonstrably cultural products. This is what I will describe as postmodernism/feminism and I examine, in particular, those who seek to apply this within the cultural images that subjects consume. I propose that Mulvey's work (1975;1993) continues to hold a paradigmatic position in terms of those who seek to deconstruct cultural images in the light of the above critique as to how a specific image of the Symbolic determines subjectivity.

However, I contest that this model effectively de-naturalises the Subject because the dependence upon interpellation and the linguistic construction of the 'I', at best, displaces the body and, at worst, dissipates the body. Without tackling the body head on, it is not possible to tackle the *cultural* dimorphism by which bodies are said to be naturally organised. Therefore, this model has not tackled the constancy of sex and its association with an ahistorical natural order. On the contrary, I propose that this model is utterly reliant on the constancy of sex, by pinpointing the ways the body is drawn upon when postmodernists/feminists theorise even though they never directly address this dependence. While postmodernists/feminists appears to be offering a radical model of the constitution of the subject, through signs and discourse, their dependence upon psychoanalysis reveals how they are dependent upon the body: what throws the girl into the Oedipal crisis is the sight of the penis. Therefore, this model fundamentally problematises fleshy, corporeal bodies. In theoretical terms, it also continues to theorise within the dualisms it claims to deconstruct, emphasising instead the cultural over the biological. Arguably, postmodernism/feminism fails therefore to go beyond the strictures of sex/gender dichotomy.

In order to do so, I trace some of the weaknesses identified regarding the sex/gender distinction, which entails focusing on the theoretical challenges that postmodernists/feminists have launched against the distinction. This necessitates concentrating upon the critique that the sex/gender distinction does not sufficiently challenge the nature/culture dichotomy, which aligns the feminine to the domain of nature and thus legitimates the exclusion of women from the social, economic and political realms. Essentially, the postmodernist/feminist charge is that these realms are not sufficiently

interrogated historically so do not sufficiently de-naturalise our sense that our current order is related to nature in some way. (Guillaumin:1996; Lloyd:1984; Gatens:1996).

Having outlined the central weaknesses of the sex/gender distinction, I trace how postmodernism/feminism has sought to go beyond these limitations. A particular focus will be upon the shift to a notion of the Symbolic and the idea that culture and/or language is largely responsible for the constitution of the gendered subject. Equally, the Symbolic is deemed to be largely responsible for the discourses of the nature/culture dualism. This requires that I present the briefest of overviews of Lacan's reconfiguration of Freudian psychoanalysis in order to provide a context for both how it is used and where I think it fails. I will then explore in some detail how theorists, such as Mulvey (1976), Doane (1991) and Cowie (1997), describe the Symbolic and how the Symbolic goes on to (re)construct masculine and feminine subject positions and provide an account of the structural negation of active female heterosexual desire. Since only the feminine is passive, all sexual objectification is done to the feminine, irrespective of sex assignment of the body in question. By implication, all active heterosexual sexual desire is masculine. A particularly important concept used to (re)present the masculine and feminine is psychic oscillation (Mulvey in Easthope:1993), which aims to mobilise the polymorphic directions that desire can take within the gendered dichotomy. In this way, when a body assigned as male is sexualised, the Symbolic³ determination of that body is feminine. (He) is said to have undergone the process of feminisation (Neale:1992). I ask what, then, is the body? A container?⁴

I argue that Mulvey continues to hold a paradigmatic position *viz a viz* cultural analysis and the formation of the subject because her work remains central to the semiotic engagement with the Symbolic, that is, how meanings construct the feminine. Her work began with the inscription of the masculine/active and feminine/passive into our Symbolic universe. Developments have not superseded this but have merely added to the number of structural positions available by working through the possible combinations. Hence, central to my critique is the assumption that the semiotic function of the sign maintains a determining function between femininity and passivity and its associate dualisms. Moreover, I argue that this is central to its explanatory adequacy because without it the Symbolic becomes heterogeneous and thus too varied to secure 'sex as a discursive construction'. In other words, this model must remove interpretative indeterminacy of culture if culture is to reproduce the social order.

The way that these structural positions are theorised deploys what Connell (1987) has described as categorical logic. These categorical units reorganise the examples that, on the surface, contest the validity of this model's explanation. The emphasis upon construction means that a sense of possible social or cultural change is lost, as is the possibility of variation in representation. By describing the eroticisation of the male body as an instance of 'feminisation', this model is able to maintain the coherency of the key sexual hierarchies; that is the permanent denigration of the feminine. Note that this explanation only works if the self-evidence of the male body is presumed. Primacy is awarded to the structural ordering of the Symbolic, which reconstitutes the body as a circuit of subject positions. In order to do so, it must eject the body, while implicitly drawing upon it in an uncritical,

³ Capitalisation of this kind reflects the embedment of such theory within the Lacanian paradigm.

⁴ I argue that there is a worrying echo of the mind/body dualism here and I suggest that this is derived from their central dependence upon psychoanalysis.

common-sense way.⁵ Hence, current forms of codification go by unrecognised, both politically and empirically. Furthermore, using Nayak's (1997) examination of the Haagen Dazs advertising campaign (1997), I show how the categorical logic that informs the feminist analysis of this kind equally orders the analysis of the representations of 'race'. Moreover, introducing the postmodernist analysis of 'race' reveals the extent to which theory of this kind is unable to combine two or more structures at any one time: does the *white* woman hold the gaze or the black *man*?

Finally, I conclude with an analysis that suggests that this explanatory model implicitly draws upon functionalist reason, as outlined by Parsons (1951; Parsons and Bateson:1956). Parsons also turned to psychoanalysis to explain how a specific set of values, working for the collective good, operate on a deeper level than rational choice: social actors fulfil various social roles because they feel bad if they transgress such obligations. Parsons argued that what are effectively socially contingent and historically specific practices must be internalised and made one's own, and he looked to stereotypical representations to fulfil, in part, this function. Therefore, both models have made identification a system problem, and within both models, the social order is structurally over-determined. The influence of Althusserian thought⁶ on postmodernism/feminism is particularly important to my argument because Althusser's concept of interpellation connects directly the ideological requirements with the formation of the subject, effectively ensuring that the system requirements correspond to the actor's motivated actions. It effectively plays the same role as internalisation. This is the point where the normative departure from Parsons makes its entry. Likewise, both reduce the social order to an internalised psychological state thereby failing to provide an adequate account for both the sources and occurrence of sustained, rational resistance, and the instrumental manipulation of norms according to the expediency of the social context (Goffman:1969). I suggest that 'subject position' and 'social role' perform the same explanatory function and therefore both models fail to address action that falls outside the social order and its norms. At best, action is non-conformist or transgressive, that is temporary, and by implication pathological. One is only left with those residues that have not been 'successfully' socialised; a melancholic performance perhaps?⁷

Equally, therefore, I critique this model arguing that it treats signs as functioning in much the same way as stereotypes. By this I mean that the meaning of the image is homogeneous, determinate and possibly monolithic because anything other than a structurally homogeneous Symbolic cannot secure identification. Furthermore, I argue that signs operate on behalf of the subject position in much the same way as stereotypes were thought to function on behalf of the social role. Thus, I argue that what differentiates postmodernist/feminist cultural analysis from Parsons is not the postmodernist/feminist creation of a radical alternative but merely a difference in their respective normative orientation.

⁵ Therefore, this model draws attention to the uncritical upon the background that naturalises gender patterns rather than making this their object critical analysis.

⁶ I was alerted to the comparative logic by A. Frank (1991). He addresses Turner's analysis of the body. He argues that because Turner addresses the body as a social order problem, the contingency that the socially produced body can force into the interaction is removed from view. The outcome is that the body tends to be a passive receiver that fulfils the system's needs.

⁷ See Riviere (1929)

However before I proceed, a delineation is necessary as to who and what is meant by the cluster 'postmodernism/feminism' because this is by no means a self-evident set of headings, and conceals what is, in fact, a dauntingly heterogeneous movement. I have used this cluster as an abbreviation for those who adopt and apply the psychoanalytic framework to the de-centring of the subject and combine this framework with the concept of interpellation. Thus, theoretical framework of the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism is applied to the cultural visual form. Semiotic analyses attempt to explore the operations of the subject position *already constituted*. Thus they draw heavily on the strong programme and, in my view, reveal some fundamental weaknesses in that programme. Thus, the emphasis upon Lacan has tended to mean that the theorists I critique here concentrate upon the semiotic and ideological formation of the subject by the sign, visual or linguistic. This therefore sets these theorists apart from other feminists who engage with the postmodern, who, like Benhabib (1992) or Scott (1992) consider subjectivity in non-naturalistic ways and yet maintain a distance from some of the stronger claims of postmodernism. I have in mind here the rejection of meta-concepts by Riley (1988), or the rejection of the material base to the world, for example Harbord and Campbell (1998). Adams (1996), for example, consistently explores the production of sexual difference through its Symbolic signification, which continues to be organised by the hierarchy imposed by the Phallus, while Gatens, seeming to offer us a de facto position on the body, reconfigures it through the Oedipus complex. She states:

Given that in this society there is a network of relations obtaining between femininity and femaleness, that is, between the female body and femininity, then there must be a qualitative difference between the kind of femininity 'lived' by women and 'lived' by men.
(Gatens:1996:10)

All well and good. This is certainly something that strikes a chord with a proponent of corporeality as 'in' and 'affecting' the world – as something other than real through its discursive materialisation (Butler: 1993). But then she goes on to state:

Freud's neglect of the effect of the menses on the pubertal girl's psyche is significant. That the flow of blood would have profound psychical significance for her is clear and that this significance would centre around ideas of *castration*, *sexual attack* and socially reinforced shame is highly probable. (Gatens:1996:10)

Why should the menses be linked psychically, or otherwise, to castration, when she previously states a de facto reality to sexual difference? It is the real beginning of the possibility of reproduction, a corporeal possibility, and thus its symbolic significance should surely be rooted in the material base of the body. The use of psychoanalysis, both theoretically and in terms of its semiotic application, rules out other ways of experiencing, visual experiences included. I cannot reconcile the facticity of the body with the psychic determination of the body through castration, an act which has never been carried out or is even close to the corporeal experience of that body. Moreover, I hear a strong echo of Doane here,

who unreservedly asserts that the sight of the penis by a little girl secures the knowledge of her lack. Hence, my main target is those united by their commitment to a strong programme of postmodernism (Benhabib:1992) operating in combination with psychoanalysis and who seek to trace this via semiotic analyses of visual culture.

Equally, I do not wish to unite political aims of those who theoretically contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the 'postmodern', one of the core dividing lines being the sense in which 'women' as a political category should be maintained as the focus and purpose of theorising (Harding: 1990; Gatens: 1996; New: 2003; Scott:1992; Guillaumin:1996 for example) or whether it is overly homogenising and thus potentially dominatory through the negation of difference (hooks:1981; Young:1995; Flax:1990 for example). I therefore aim to challenge the explanatory and political efficacy of a model that places a singular emphasis upon the causal determination of the cultural domain. Thus, part of what emerges from this analysis is the exposure of the theoretical tenet of postmodernism/feminism that is forced to combine psychoanalysis with the immaterial operations of the Symbolic in order to have a distinct field of analysis. To quote Harbord and Campbell, it requires:

a continued dialogue between cultural theory and psychoanalysis...(because) without psychoanalysis, cultural theory has little to challenge the discourses of materiality and with it the rational....In the absence of a psychoanalytic framework, cultural theory lacks a model of subjectivity, a model that is crucial to understanding the way in which culture is *produced* and *operates*. (Harbord and Campbell:1998:1) (my italics)

I argue that using a quasi-transcendental and idealist notion of the feminine – this is what remains, after all, once the material and the rational have been ejected – leads to the inversion of the sex/gender distinction, rather than the surpassing of its limitations. Thus, theorising of this kind reproduces the very sort of dichotomous essentialism it nominally rejects. The crux of my critique targets the postmodern/feminist assumption that the body is 'in the world' through its Symbolic signification only. In contradistinction, we need to hold onto a body that can act in and on the world so that we engage directly with the entity that materially, empirically places us *in* the world (Shilling:1993; Crossley: 1996). As thinking bodies (Burkitt:1999), we negotiate structures and meaning by incorporating and managing them within the micro-practices we undertake.

To reiterate, the combinations of postmodernisms/feminisms is often bewildering, almost to the point that the area where these cohere can only be stated negatively, that is, one can best come away with a sense of what they are not. However, the result is that one is left with a troubling, vague idea of what they actually are. What is the relationship between those who explore these themes in terms of their cultural application and those who pursue them theoretically? What links the cultural application of Riviere's story (Doane:1991) and those who utilises it theoretical and in a more complex way (Butler:1990)? Theory ought to engage in some way with the subjects on whose behalf it theorises, namely women and the discursive constructs that target them. Mulvey's work does undertake an analysis of what the strong programme 'looks like,' in terms of its cultural contours, and the subject position the Symbolic is alleged to form. She is, in some senses, attempting to apply the theoretical

targeted: it considers how the various processes order a specific notion of the 'feminine as role' and how these are integrated with the body to produce the appropriately socialised subject. Parsons' response is that the system's norms become the individual's values and norms. Most importantly, Parsons has adopted Freud's concept: internalisation is the mechanism by which the system is inculcated into the individual. Therefore, the feminine is an internal state made up of the norms and values required to sustain the social system.

The descriptive detail concerning gender can now be grafted on to this model of causation. Hence, role theory¹⁰ is the approach to social structure which locates its basic constraints in stereotyped interpersonal expectations. In this sense, the space or split between biology and society with regard to gender can be identified. It is not our biological make-up that makes us the women and men that we are, but rather the interpersonal exchange of role expectation and role sanctioning that is internalised to become subjective states. Thus, internalised social norms become the reason individuals give for action, which again re-emphasises the importance of representation as a means to convey the social norms to be internalised.¹¹

Oakley's distinction mirrors too closely the notion that the natural cannot be changed. To borrow from Cearley-Harrison and Hood-Williams:

Oakley simply echoed and exacerbated what we 'knew' already....Talcott Parsons' (1949) attempt to argue that the purpose of sex-role differentiation was to minimize the potential strain produced by the occupation system in a mobile class-divided society – which is a wholly and self-containedly sociological explanation – rests finally upon the allegedly biological 'fact' of the bearing and nurturing of children. Two separate explanatory principles, the sociological and the other biological, are at work and the latter constitutes the ultimate basis for the former. (Cearly-Harrison and Hood Williams:2002:18)

Hence, we have come full circle because we find ourselves faced with the following: how much is social therefore?

This reveals the fundamental flaw with the sex/gender distinction, argues Delphy (1996), because it does not sufficiently tackle head on the notion that biological aspects of the body are *socially determining* in a profound way. Thus, it continues to operate within the field that is her object of critique. For example, in the much quoted introduction, Oakley asks: "(I)f biology determines male and female roles, how does it determine them?" (Oakley:1972:15). Men and women's natures need to be worked through in order to sort out the residue of culture that is left. This pushes culture into a derivative, secondary position, thus the naturalisation processes of culture go by unchallenged. This is the part that is open to political transformation because only this falls outside of the (presumed) transhistorical features of natural bodies. The issue has been locked into how much of the social is a

¹⁰ I recognise that the distinction can be applied in other ways, for example psychoanalysis. However, its application within role theory has been central. As New (2003) notes, the realist model lost its way a little for not being sufficiently critical.

¹¹ Although, deeply embedded in this is the struggle between the sense that action is voluntary (Parsons' allegiance to Hobbes) and internalised action (Parsons' indebtedness to Freud).

result of our natures, which is demonstrable by the endless debate regarding nature/nurture. Hence, bodies are defined as unproblematically 'there', constituting the solid, unquestionable common sense entities we call men and women. Bodies are free from symbolic elaboration and thus free from the discursive effects these may have. The cultural domain, which is open to dispute, is thus the world of representations and learning, that is the domain of socialisation. We are socialised into roles; we learn through scripts and stereotypes. This represents an insufficient analysis of culture and its relationship to bodies.

The sex/gender distinction carries over the mind/body dualism also. Again, this reflects, in part, a reliance upon social role theory. For example, Parsons' (1951) logic brings him to the conclusion that norms are the causes of social action; hence, consensus becomes the primary feature of the social order. The effectiveness of role theory¹² is dependent upon accepting that actions are motivated by reasons, and that reasons are, in effect, society's beliefs and norms, which produce the appropriate motivation for action.¹³ Consequently, Parsons needs to explain how the system's requirement for consensual public norms, and thus a functioning society, become internal subjective dispositions¹⁴. Thus, socialisation only targets the mind, while the body is left fully outside of the social realm.

The circularity is repeated with regard to the social order. In order to sustain a social order, it must reproduce its population. Therefore, it is necessary to socialise two distinct sets of people into a functional division of labour: those who reproduce the population and those who reproduce the social structures, the aim of the division being to stress that sexual division of labour was not an outcome of biology but of social functions. However, this becomes even more unconvincing when the notion of universalistic and particularistic values are integrated¹⁵. It rapidly mirrors the constructs of women's natures and thus their affinity to this role. The bodily realm is feminised and the realm of the mind masculinised. Oakley's notion of the role struggles against this conclusion as the sexed body remains firmly separated from the culture and thus she fails to tackle a core dualism that denigrates the feminine.

Therefore, Delphy argues that while Oakley aims to move beyond the remits of biological determinism, she ends up operating within it because she has not tackled head-on the constructed features of the nature/culture dichotomy. Fundamentally, Oakley has awarded ontological primacy to the field of nature. For example, 'women's biological roles' are placed as the foundation upon which issues of gender are placed. I think that the sex/gender distinction falters because it assumes a *strong* causal connection between a bodily function and the cultural understanding derived from that function. I argue that this is far more indeterminate than her framework permits. There are examples where the understanding or meanings that construct gender do not neatly map onto the sexual difference – male/masculine and female/feminine. One need not look to the exotic but to our histories where we can trace the emergence of sex as dualistic and opposite (Laquer:1990). Significantly, the distinction tends

¹² Be it gender role or social role more broadly.

¹³ See J. Bohman (1991) for a more detailed explication of how norms become reasons for action - esp. p. 77.

¹⁴ This attacks head-on the social order problem as defined by Hobbes: that society must overcome the randomness of individual desired ends and conflicts of interest.

¹⁵ Most clearly formulated in Parsons and Shils (1962).

to treat sex and gender as autonomous spheres when perhaps fluidity, or a sense of their interrelatedness may have been, and potentially is, a more fruitful form of theorising. In fact, left as distinct spheres, the distinction tends to mirror Levi Strauss's notion of the raw and the cooked.

This strikes me as central as I aim to open up a space between the historical constancy of sex, things like the process of reproduction which requires both a man and woman who are both able to produce healthy sperm and ovaries, and the huge possibilities regarding what that might mean for a society. Not all bodies, unproblematically defined as man and woman, are allowed or should engage in reproduction, according to society's values. For example, are two bodies, both unambiguously female, awarded the moral sanction to proceed with reproduction?; or, indeed, teenagers who become pregnant or older women who also become pregnant; what does this do to the 'experience' of being pregnant? Alternatively, we can look to menstruation where the cultural symbolism that engulfs it fundamentally alters how it is understood and possible even felt. For example, does a woman within the West understand and experience menstruation in the same ways as a woman who must enter *Purdah* during this part of her cycle? Within this is the discursive intervention that constructs the natural, but the discourse is not 'making the body'.¹⁶

In this sense, I wish to move further than the sex/gender distinction allows. I aim to consider that the cultural is more than the political, in the sense of the rights due a respective body (New:2003). I aim to use this as a means to move issues of corporeality and culture from the strictures of sex/gender and nature/culture dichotomy. This represents part of the postmodernist/feminist challenge, a challenge that I argue is unsuccessful. They merely reverse the causal direction so that culture becomes the paradigm from which 'sex' emerges. Consequently, the body is 'silenced' so to speak; for example an infertile woman cannot be materialised through discourse into being fertile (Butler:1993). Moreover, I argue that postmodernism/feminism, and the accompanying cultural analyses, refer to the corporeal body as obviously and unambiguously sexed, that is in common-sense ways. They use the apparent self-evidence of the body when they need to anchor ideology and its discursive constructions. Without this, one cannot describe semiotic function as feminising; feminisation requires that one carries over ideas about the dimorphic body.

Despite the problems outlined above, the feminist movement, using the sex/gender distinction, produced a formidable critique of the supposition that the division of labour, based upon gender, was equitable or functional. Emergent evidence, and critical reflection, merged with political action to delineate the position that the division of labour was in fact an outcome of sectional interests; those of men's at the expense of women's. This position proffers a number of fundamental challenges to the consensus model of the social order. It stipulates that these respective sets of interests are in conflict and therefore the presumed reciprocity of interests is broken; this problematises the presumed natural basis of rights. In addition, the space between biology and society that the sex/gender distinction forged meant that the relationship between current patterns of representation and gender formation could be the cultural contours were traced and contested¹⁷. This provided a significant critique to many of the

¹⁶ This is where Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams and I part company. They move too far away from the corporeal, and that elements of the body are extra-discursive.

¹⁷ I recognise that these two contributors do not flow from the same methodological or theoretical position, but the interrogation of culture undertook many forms.

structuralism, namely that “in order to make sense of the epistemic object one need (not) appeal to an epistemic subject at all.” (Benhabib:1992:208) This anti-humanist position has been very influential. Now language is the source of our sense of self – it is prior to us and limits and constrains fundamentally what it is we can say. De Saussure (1972) offers a model of language that sees meaning operate through difference. This meaning is relational in the sense that it requires the combination of the signifier and the signified. These often work as a set of structural opposites: masculine/feminine for example. The signified then builds up into chains of connotive associations which work through substitutions: the rose a sign of love, or coyness as a connotive element to the feminine. Such patterns are traceable through semiotic analysis. But the significance reaches further than this; it offers the possibility of discarding notions of human nature and replaces it with an entity that is an effect of various historical, social and linguistic structures. This de-centres the subject as, unlike Descartes’ thinking subject, we cannot stand outside of these structures from an Archimedean point, and neither can we pledge that the source of what we know or think is derived from an application of an objectivist, rationalist system of knowledge.

This departure is fundamental. ‘Man’ is not a unitary thinker but an outcome of competing structures. ‘He’ is the outcome of language and competing desires. Gone is the ‘myth’ of a self-transparent entity, reaching for full autonomy. The Subject is replaced by subjectivity – a product of competing discourses, controlled by desires, needs and forces whose effects shape and constitute the make-up of subjectivity. This is a fundamental attack upon the presumed unity of the Cartesian subject, therefore it also provides a framework to undo the dualisms that are said to have locked women into subordination. There is no Subject from which women are excluded because of their bodies. Instead, the Subject is rendered fictitious and thus both masculinity and femininity are products of social and discursive forces.

What is of central importance here is the affinity between the de-centred subject and the split subject as theorised by psychoanalysis. To reiterate, this is theoretical context within which the cultural analyses critiqued here were conducted. The human psyche is not unified but fundamentally split. Lacan (1977;1984) argues that the ‘I’ is a linguistic construct, the outcome of the organisation of desire into its socially sanctioned form. The residues are locked into the unconscious, ever present but never directly utterable. Thus, Lacan’s radical re-reading rests with conceptualising the unconscious as the structuralist system of language. Meaning, coming from the unconscious, is contained in the material signifier, or conscious speech. These signifiers are cast out from the signifying system, as they cannot be integrated in conscious discourse since patterns of desire of this kind are socially taboo. In particular, Lacan and Freud are concerned that the incest taboo be repressed¹⁹. Thus desire can only operate through displacements or substitutions of the signifiers that attach the forbidden desire onto something else. For example, the fetish is said to operate in this way. The fusion of Freudian analysis to structural linguistics leads the symptom, as an expression of the unconscious, to be treated as a signifier which *fixes the subject to another signifier*. This fundamentally undoes the pretension of the Cartesian Subject because the subject is a construct through which language speaks and therefore the object of

¹⁹ Although they both recognise that such repressive practice induces trauma, hysteria and other patterns where the unconscious erupts into conscious life.

analysis is the formation of identity as a linguistic function. Importantly, speech is not treated as intentional expression because the constellation of signifiers does not signify for the subject. Thus, the unconscious is awarded priority as the core of subjectivity.

The next important element to consider is that language is now the system through which Oedipalisation occurs. Thus, Lacan places equal emphasis upon directing desire toward the genitals and toward heterosexuality. Thus, the formation of the 'I' is an outcome of the Oedipal complex that organises sexual drives so that the primacy of the genitals is attained to secure heterosexuality²⁰. Lacan de-centres the process by elevating language as the mechanism through which we enter the Symbolic and assume a subject position within that Symbolic universe. Hence, Lacan's model offers a non-rationalist explanation of how sex is translated into sexed subjectivities. Equally, it provides a paradigm with which to connect the formation of the subject to the cultural representations semiotically deconstructed. What is most crucial here is that the Phallus becomes the core signifying mechanism that institutes the normative order of heterosexuality. Subjectivity is formed under the rule of the Phallus which forecloses the possible characteristics the feminine/heterosexual can assume. Lacan concludes the two following problems are crucial to the formation of subjectivity: what is it that produces sexual difference and how does this fix the relationship between the sexes so that gender dimorphism comes to be experienced as an asymmetrical and unequivocal fact of existence? As Grosz states:

For both sexes, though in quite difference ways, the phallus serves as a means of access to the 'domain of the Other'. The Other is understood here in two senses: as a socio-symbolic network regulated according to language-like rules; and as a psychical structure, representative of the social Other, internalised in the form of the unconscious.
(Grosz:1990:117)

What a formidable challenge. It offers up real possibilities for challenging the dualism that naturalises current forms of femininity. Moreover, it offers a frame work within which to embed the images that are critiqued here. Sex no longer stands outside of the culture but is drawn in and constituted by culture. Thus the political focus remains on culture but the system through which culture was interrogated has changed. Culture is formative of the subject and thus the content of that culture is intimately bound to the subjectivities it constitutes. Philosophically, this model offers a system that profoundly challenges the naturalisation of inequality, which ideologically construes that inequality as a natural outcome of sexual difference.

Yet, there remain normative issues here because the order of the Symbolic, which elevates the phallus as the core symbol of sexual difference and the social law through the Father, has been definitively identified as patriarchal. It was noted above that Lacan seeks to structure the unconscious like language and that language operates through difference: thus the phallus is symbolically functional

²⁰ This gauges Butler's insistence that gender is meaningful only through the heterosexist matrix (1992).

because the feminine (body without) symbolises lack.²¹ This poses some problems for feminist politics. What of those sectional interests served by the various cultural constructions, for example? The current cultural and linguistic configurations dominate women, organise inequality and mark the feminine as the other to masculine. The feminist re-configuration of Lacan seeks to work through the consequences for feminine subjectivity. One of the central ways this is done, in terms of cultural analysis at least, is by combining Althusser's (1971) model of culture as ideology to the formation of the subject through interpellation. The mirror phase and interpellation combine mechanisms that make self-identity something that comes from the outside and the concept of interpellation makes the exterior culture riddled with ideology. Again, this demonstrates the extent to which this theory provides the theoretical context for the assessment of the image. In fact, ideology is said to operate in the very constitution of the subject.

What will now follow is an account of the incorporation of semiotics as the method with which to best interrogate culture, alongside the integration of interpellation to link the cultural constructions to an ideological position compatible with feminism. Thus, the aim of the cultural analyses was to incorporate Althusser's notion that cultural configurations are ideological with Lacan's model of the mirror phase. The combination ensures that identities are formed through the identification with cultural configurations. Crucially, ideology is engaged with directly and placed at the heart of the formation of subjectivity. The reign of the phallus is deemed to be an ideological construction rather than a necessary structuring to ensure gendered subjectivity and heterosexuality, as Lacan would argue (Fink:1995). Thus, what is crucial here is the normative departure between the feminist application and that of Lacan.

SIGNS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY

One of the problems that stalled the political development by the sex/gender distinction is that it failed to tackle sufficiently critically the issue of whose reality is the real one. The challenge offered by the cultural and linguistic turn is that it re-defines all images as false, thus removing the need to deal with the various realities of women's lives and images that depict this. Moreover, the analyses critiqued here are able to move directly from the theory upon which it draws to the formation of subject, thereby by-passing issues of action and the social practices that potentially resist the current ideological patterns that subordinate women. Despite paradigmatic shift, they nevertheless took the following questions from the analysis facilitated by the sex/gender distinction: if femininity was not inevitable, what other ways could the feminine be constituted?; what does the symbolic system contribute to this? These questions were best interrogated by semiotics, which offers an analysis of how the signifier and the signified combined to produce the sign.

Semiotics defines representation as a form of cultural practice that belongs to the overall form of discursive production, a normality that allows a strictly de-limited range of variations that are based upon a network of mutually referring references (Barthes:1972; Eco:1976; Panofsky:1970). These references can be seen as legitimators of the hierarchical relations that justified and naturalised

²¹ Lacan's notion of A: not A, the 'not A' denotes the feminine as 'without penis', that is castrated.

gender patterns. The move to examining images within a semiotic framework means that the image is not treated as an icon, dominated purely by a figurative element. Rather, the sign consists of signifying elements that have to be decoded as part of their interaction within a specific visual configuration. In making such an interpretation, one must connect the implied meaning directly to the material signifier through which the meaning is generated.

This shift implies that careful analyses of the single specific construction of the feminine body, the specific modes and sites of representation, as well as discussion of how the signs address the imagined spectator, made a superior contribution than content analysis upon which so much of role stereotypes relied.²² 'Woman' is defined as the sign that functions in the (re)production of sexual differentiation for which a certain body image is a signifier. Representation was identified as one of the many social processes by which specific orders of sexual differentiation are ceaselessly constructed, modified, reconstituted and potentially resisted. The adoption of semiotics was based upon the Saussurian model of language, its omnipresence and synchronic structures that are prior to the subject and hence, 'woman as sign' aimed to transcend the idea that representations are symptoms of objective causes external to them. Thus, it *aimed* to bring the body into the process of cultural signification. Signs were analysed in their active role in the production of the categories of sexual differentiation. Thus signs constitute sexual difference – not bodies. Corporeality is not confronted and as a result the ideological elements that are bound to that corporeality are not confronted either.²³ Given this emergent theoretical environment, the appropriation of Lacanian analysis, particularly by merging of the synchronic system to the order of the Phallus, provided a system to integrate 'woman as sign' to a more thorough model of subjectivity.

The notion of 'woman as sign' is an attempt to bring together the fact that 'woman' is already a category constituted in society and thus subject to the various signifying ideological practices that sustain this category. The project has now been identified as one that explores the relationship between 'woman' and sign in signification systems like film. Pollock summarises the endeavour thus:

Images of women places the emphasis on the problem of the images with regard to the contested ideas about what women are like or would be like. The concept of 'woman as sign' makes us doubt that images signify women at all, though they undoubtedly circulate the sign Woman incessantly – and with the purpose of seducing persons of the female persuasion to recognise themselves in these signs and places. Visual images that proffer iconic figurations of the feminine body through rhetorics technically and ideologically aiming at the reality effect – this is, the disavowal of their rhetorical character behind the illusions of direct reproduction, transcription and replication – play a particularly important role in this masquerade. The visual signifier 'woman' is potent precisely insofar as the forms of representation, especially those associated within photographic processes, naturalise their constituents and presents

²² The debate in part reflects the broader discussions concerning the appropriateness of the positivist method that dominated at that time.

²³ See Kessler (2000) for an empirical investigation of the normative sexed body. My concern here is that the dichotomy is not tackled and thus the fact that bodies do not secure that dichotomy is left unaddressed.

themselves as mere description of a neutral content. Woman can therefore be simply seen, that is, in 'images of women. (Pollock:1991:205).

The shift to semiotics integrated the critical discussions of ideology, forcing the question of how an all-pervasive ideology functioned within a culture. Specifically, Althusser's influence (1971) extended the reach of ideology beyond its initial remit of the 'ruling ideas of the day' to its permeation into every level of society, even down to a handshake. Henceforth, ideology was understood to serve a system of domination in four key functions. First, legitimisation extends sectorial interests so that they become society's interests. Second, the various state institutions (ISAs) function by targeting and forming the subject so that identification with the social order operates at an unconscious level. Third, culture interpellates the subject: ideology consists in the very process of constituting individuals as subjects of effects of recognition and identification, the outcome of which is that individuals recognise themselves in those ideological patterns. Finally, ideology provides a bridge between the imagined representations, which project a set of conditions that are not really one's own, and the actual material conditions of the subject. False-consciousness belongs, therefore, to the cultural domain: the cultural domain is coterminous with ideology. Mulvey attends to this by examining how an image or *mise-en-scene*²⁴ can be semiotically decoded so that the meaning and the subject position identified.

Mulvey (1975) combines Althusser's definition of ideology, that is, the 'imaginary relationship of individuals to their real relations of existence' (1971:164) with Lacan's theory of the subject's constitution in language. By connecting the two, the relation between power and the subject could be explicated. For example, the reason given why women were not embracing the politics of feminism was because of the connection between ideological cultural patterns and the ideologically-constructed patterns within the unconscious. This position, in particular, is the object of my critique. Thus, my analysis is fourfold:

1. I aim to demonstrate the degree to which Mulvey's initial work continues to set the parameters of the debate, especially with regard to the use of codes and their structural determination and their consequent incitement to pleasure;
2. I challenge this model because it theoretically blocks any notion of a feminine heterosexual desire that is not masochistic and passive in form. I will argue that this reveals the extent to which much of this theory remains dependent upon the notion of the subject position;
3. I will explore how this feminist normative critique is sustained by deploying functionalist logic as the mode of explanation; without it, there is no need or possibility for feminist critique, given the theoretical closures within which this model operates;
4. I will show that their reliance upon psychoanalysis displaces the body by shifting emphasis upon the internal organisation of desire and, with the body lost from analytical view, that such analysis is dependent upon categorical logic to sustain 'the female' as coherent entity;

²⁴ I have not attended to the shift in cultural form because this paradigm does not attend to its potential consequences.

THE DOUBLE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTION OF 'WOMAN' IN FILM

Mulvey addresses the structures of identification and the mechanisms of pleasure that accompany them. She argues that the cinematic use of classical narratives, which are modelled on realism, stimulate and satisfy scopophilic desire. The position of the spectators in the cinema is one of repression of their own exhibitionism and the projection of that repressed desire on to the performer/character. The cinema reproduces the mis-recognition of the mirror phase, thereby stimulating both narcissistic and scopophilic desire. Scopophilia is essentially active since its pleasure is derived from subjecting the object to a controlling gaze. This is said to parallel the spectator's position regarding realist film: one is able to look into a social world without the reciprocity demanded by belonging to that world. Voyeurism is therefore said to define the functioning of the filmic form. Thus, filmic form stimulates narcissism because the spectator projects the desire of self love into the more perfect image, for example the hero who has full diegetic control over the other characters. Mulvey extends the homological analysis by arguing that the narcissistic desire is satisfied through the identification with the alter-ego so that the screen image stands in for the subject's own image. Thus, the film image mimics the more perfect view of the self identified in the mirror phase, which stimulates identification. Most crucially, identification processes have a meaning within the symbolic order that articulates desire.

At this point, the phallogentric binary opposition is shown to be essential: scopophilia is an active pattern of desire and therefore bears the mark of the masculine, thereby instituting female as passive. The subject whose scopophilic desire is satisfied is the man and his selected object is the female. The libido, defined as the active erotic function, is equally aligned as masculine. The identification process is based upon rendering the female form fearless to men by representing it using codes that satisfy in themselves to and for men. Woman becomes simultaneously looked at and displayed. Her appearance is marked with strong visual and erotic codes and she is reduced to being a passive, erotic spectacle, while the man comes to connote narrative or the active subject. With each step, Mulvey builds upon the dualisms: masculine/feminine; active/passive; subject/object of the narrative. The castration complex is central to Mulvey's model because it requires that the image of the woman be a fetishistic one in order to disavow the threat of castration that her body symbolises.

Mulvey goes on to assert that the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of sexual objectification *cannot* be borne by the male figure because those who are 'already in a state of castration' cannot disavow phallic presence. This is why the main narrative is deemed masculine; in addition, it provides space for the identification with the ego ideal, which further demonstrates her dependence upon the mirror phase, reflecting the conception/recognition of the ego. Filmic structures thus give the (male) spectator the pleasure of omnipotence. The male star personifies the more perfect, more complete, more powerful ideal ego. He is *never* the object of the erotic gaze; he is never iconic, unlike woman. Here we see the uncritical use of the female body as castrated. This needs to be critically addressed and the relation to the corporeal tackled – the female body is the male body minus the penis. Moreover, no attention is paid to the shift from the male – a pre-discursive entity – to the cultural inscribed masculine

spectatorial position. If sexing the body is a discursive process, then these elements need to be problematised.

The process of objectification, which fetishises the female body, provides an avenue of escape for men from the fear of castration; therefore they cannot transcend it. Castration does not act upon woman's psyche as a threat but as a real *lack* of her penis. The desire to make good that lack makes the phallus symbolic: 'she is said to speak of castration and nothing else'. This inability to transcend the castration complex means the woman is rendered 'other', bound by symbolic order in which man can live out his fantasies through the linguistic command by imposing them on the silent image of the woman.

Mulvey's original piece, by instituting a generalised dichotomy of the active/passive structure, identifies the negation of female spectatorship contained within realist film. The polemic of her analysis establishes the masochistic nature of feminine desire constituted through the identification between woman and the objectified woman on the screen. In 'Afterthoughts...inspired by *Duel in the Sun*' (in Easthope:1993), Mulvey begins to explore whether the female spectator can experience a deeper, more complex relationship to the filmic text, and whether there is a substantial change in spectatorship with a woman lead. However, Mulvey makes it explicit that she has a particular spectator in mind, namely one who is 'masculinised and is secretly enjoying the freedom, action and control over the diegetic world that identification with the hero provides' (Mulvey:1993:126).

Mulvey draws upon the inherent instability of femininity, which is said to be a direct consequence of a woman's inability to fully resolve the Oedipal and castration complexes: *femininity as a subject position is produced by the condition of being 'castrated', therefore the feminine cannot develop fully the regulative function of the super-ego*. This is ambiguous: is the state of castration metaphoric or the real psychic determination of the feminine? Freud describes the woman's recognition of castration as an awareness of her wound of narcissism. This produces a sense of inferiority: the clitoris is likened to a scar. I argue that this presents the feminine with three structurally determined options:

1. If she holds her mother responsible for her castration and her lack, this will cause her to despise women as men do, which makes her neurotic and inhibited (defined as pathological);
2. She can refuse to abandon the pleasure of the active clitoris, the amputated penis, but must remain masculine (defined as pathological);
3. By exploiting the passive elements of her instinctual drives (reflecting that bodies have the propensity for both the masculine and the feminine) she can transfer her sexual attentions from her mother to her father, first wanting his phallus and then analogously his baby, thus requiring the transfer of pleasure to the vagina (defined as normal).

Therefore in seeking out the masculinised woman in 'Duel in the Sun', Mulvey is exploring a female protagonist who has no stable sexual identity. The feminine subject is seemingly resistant to the Oedipal norm, torn between passive femininity and regressive masculinity. This is played out through her position as determined by her two brothers: passive femininity is established through the brother

who has fully resolved the Oedipal complex, satisfied with his heterosexual object choice and marriage, with the Symbolic at his disposal; regressive masculinity is explored through the brother who struggles against the Symbolic and revels narcissistically in the desire to embody phallic omnipotence. Thus the female protagonist must oscillate between her acceptance of her 'correct' feminine position, via the first brother as object-choice, and her narcissistic brother who guarantees her resistance to femininity. Already, the pre-Oedipal is being drawn upon. Her inability to follow one of the paths fully, to achieve a stable sexual identity²⁵, is said to reflect the positioning of a certain female spectator, namely the type who relinquishes femininity and engages in the masculinisation of identification. Here is another example of the confusion regarding the corporeal. She describes the spectator, which is a social entity, as female and yet uses female in the sense of the objective category of sex (Delphy:1996).

Psychically, oscillation draws upon the inherent instability of the feminine by returning to the active phallic stage before its repression. The 'lack' of the penis renders the feminine unstable because she lacks the necessary capacity for psychic resolution that the castration complex provides. This reflects the positioning of the female spectator, for if she is to receive pleasure she must also engage in the masculinisation of identification. If a woman is to access this desire in the language of the text, she must oscillate uneasily in her 'borrowed transvestite clothes'. Hence, Mulvey's interest in the 'Duel...' lies in what she describes as a 'series of transformations that comment upon the function of "woman" (as opposed to "man") as a narrative signifier and sexual difference as personification of "active" or "passive" elements in a story' (Mulvey, in Easthope:1993:129). Combining of the Lacanian model of the subject and the filmic form works to give desire cultural materiality by inscribing desire in the language of the text. Yet, the terms are all over the place, with corporeal and the cultural used interchangeably – is the absence of the penis an instance of real lack?

To reiterate, the Oedipal complex offers three options, two of which are pathological, offering only temporary transgressions from the passivity of heterosexual femininity. The concept of oscillation encapsulates this by defining the feminine as open, since she is unstable because she cannot fully resolve the Oedipal complex. I suggest that this reflects the normative order of psychoanalysis insofar as the feminine is not properly formed, which directly invokes the dichotomous order that defines the masculine with Reason. Thus, the formation of heterosexual femininity is defined by the absence of active desire. Only within the masculine are the residues of active phallic²⁶ desire to be found, therefore showing how fully operative the phallographic logic is. The dualism of subject/object is being re-inscribed into the explanation, and is thus failing to operate outside of terms that are said to contribute to the subordination of women.

DEVELOPMENTS OF MULVEY'S PARADIGM

Doane's work further contributed to the dichotomy of the feminine as passive by adding the iconic to it. The conceptualisation of 'femininity as iconic' is defined as the "over presence of the image –

²⁵ If she is already in the state of castration, and thus cannot fear the law, then her patterns of desire are more free not less surely? What threat prevents transgression of the already castrated body?

²⁶ Note that this ought also to imply the clitoris, but this element is left out when the 'phallic feminine' is discussed.

she is the image.” (Doane in Caughie and Kuhn:1992:223) Theoretically, Doane supports this assertion by drawing upon what she describes as the significant degree of congruence between certain theories of images and theories of femininity. Doane argues, following Freud, that woman is too close to herself and, hence, she is unable to establish a critical distance between herself and her image that enables her to achieve a ‘second look’. This closeness is likened to the closeness of iconic sign systems, for unlike language where a superior distance is created between the signifier and the referent, the iconic cannot disengage itself sufficiently from the real. Thus, woman is a writing in images, but a writing that is not for her, only *of* her. Woman cannot mobilise the gap or distance that voyeurism requires. The proximity between femininity and image is a direct result of the immediacy of knowledge that the little girl gains upon the sight of the male anatomy. ‘Freud claims that the little girl, upon seeing the penis for the first time, “makes her judgement in a flash’. She has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it. (Doane in Caughie and Kuhn:1992:223).²⁷ This writing of images assigns a special place for woman in the cinematic form and representation while denying her access to that system. Again, there are issues about what the subjectivity is. Is the corporeal involved at all? If so, what are the consequences to describe the feminine as the image? This seems to me to be moving further away from a model that seeks to explore the cultural inscription of the body. Instead, it feels more like the disembodied ‘signifying interior’ that Berthelot (1995) identifies. This model moves ambiguously between the fleshy penis and the symbolic phallus; consequently, is castrated feminine the state of woman? If so, what lies behind this construction? From where or how do they gain the critical distance for their analysis? Something that lingers beneath the constructed perhaps? If their model is to move into the analysis of the formation of the subject, then I suggest that they ought to address these issues.

This shifts language from being the Master of subjectivity to being the tool of the Masculine Master. Hence, Doane follows Mulvey in arguing that the masculinising of the female spectatorial position through the process of oscillation is necessary if Woman is to gain access to the cinematic pleasures. Hence, the feminine proximity to her own body, the image of the body on screen, can only remind her of her castration that cannot be fetishised away. Doane is arguing that the dual effect of the sublimation and repression of femininity has come to determine the cinematic form, both in the plot and the *mise-en-scene*, which psychically re-enacts the dual effect, placing the feminine figure in situations of fetishistic idealisation or voyeuristic punishment. The moment of knowledge for the girl is the initial sight of genital difference and, therefore, Doane is not theoretically floored, in psychoanalytic terms, in developing the notion of femininity as iconic. The nexus of recognition that defines femininity is not signified in language at all because only masculinity can achieve that essential distance to enter the Symbolic and language; the Symbolic (or socially sanctioned) order is again masculine. Thus the structural logic orders the feminine with the passive and now the iconic. This merely extends the dualistic logic and further condemns the feminine to the passive. Where fluidity is integrated, it exists only insofar as unconscious desire shifts

²⁷ This draws directly upon Freud’s analysis of the constitution of femininity within the girl child. In contradistinction, the little boy considers his first sight of female genitalia as insignificant. Only with the threat of castration does he re-read the image he has seen and endow it with a meaning in relation to his own subjectivity. The boy experiences a distance between the look and the threat, and thus his knowledge is achieved through that all important distance. The gap between the visible and the knowable enables him to disavow what he has seen and enables him to fetishise what is fearful later on in adult life.

between the structural positions. Moreover, this fluidity stems directly from the inability of the feminine to form a stable subject position. Hence, this merely reasserts the logic of the phallographic dualism.

Thus, Doane extends Mulvey's position regarding the instability of femininity: by mobilising this instability, woman is able to use femininity as if it were a mask. Riviere's (1929) case study of an intellectual woman showed that in order to compensate for her assumption of the position of the subject (masculine, according to the binary opposition) of discourse rather than its object, she had produced herself as an excess of femininity.²⁸ Doane sees masquerade as a method whereby the woman can achieve some distance, or 'a simulation of the missing gap or distance' (1991). The masquerade is described as being subversive in its ability to use the space available to destabilise the male gaze by destabilising the image, but it is not an escape because it is a 'pathological response', according to the Symbolic order. It renders the image, femininity, as artifice. Lacan suggests the instability of femininity, its pathological elements, leads to women experiencing desire in a mediated form as 'desire for the unsatisfied desire', while Doane coins the phrase 'the desire to desire' (1991). As Butler notes, resistance, through masquerade, is an ambiguous experience, in the sense that the simulation Doane alludes to is partial and temporary, therefore is not a subject position as such, but rather a transgression that is always melancholic (Butler:1990:104-05).²⁹ It also brings to mind Irigaray who attempts to imagine a femininity that would emerge in a language that was not of the Masculine Master, but rather would let the female body speak (1985a,b). While offering varied critiques of patriarchy, their emphasis upon language, as structure, leaves little outside of discourse. Increasingly, the body is known only as a discursive product. How do they achieve the distance to develop such a position within language?

The detailed discussion of these two highly influential writers shows how the narrative is defined as masculine: only the masculine can assume the position of activity in order to drive the narrative forward; conversely, the feminine subject position provided by the narrative institutes a spectatorial position that is masochistic and pathological in orientation.³⁰ Moreover, the iconic status of the feminine renders the active female spectator a mere simulated, masculinised position.

Other writers have attempted to correct the feminine as passive but because they remain within the psychoanalytic paradigm, this is limited to expanding other subject positions, notably the homoerotic. It therefore stays firmly within the existing paradigm. This entails two distinct avenues: first, by turning to the specific pleasures that women can gain from the images of women; second, by attending to the various modes by which 'masculine as active' is constructed. Byars (1991) and Stacey (1988; 1995), for example, turn to Chodorow (1978), while Studlar (1991) turns to Deleuze as a potential source of pleasure, which necessarily entails accepting the feminine as a fetishistic object. Others, like Erens (1990), Seneca and Arbuthnot (in Erens) examine the pleasures of the subtext. Re-examining the 'masculine as active', but still within structural categories, includes the possibility that the male body may be erotically encoded, which institutes subversive subject positions. Neale (1992),

²⁸ Note also that the notion of transgression as a form of resistance is also limited because to transgress is implicitly to re-affirm the institutionalisation of the Law.

²⁹ Note also that the extent to which transgression is temporary is revealed by its reaffirmation of the law.

³⁰ I refer back to Freud's model that only passive femininity is normal.

for example, argues that this cannot be adequately attended to without looking at how the 'masculine as active' functions visually. My interest concerns the scope of this model to integrate, or at best offer a theoretical space for, an active heterosexual pattern of feminine desire. However, before I turn attention to this, I briefly discuss the structural relationship between the feminine subject position and the feminine (homoerotic) image.

THE PLEASURE OF THE (FEMININE) TEXT OR THE WITHDRAWAL INTO THE PRE-OEDIPAL

The central facet of this alternative approach stems from the narrative structure of melodrama. Byars (1991), for instance, argues that the female-centred narrative, when combined with a distinct mode of camera work, produces points of view that provide specific and positive expressions of female desire. This structure operates in two ways: first, it is assumed that they are watched by an all-female audience; second, the emotional intimacy played out between the characters stimulates 'feminine connectedness'.³¹ The ordering of desire that is produced by same-gender exchanges produces an outlook based upon its relationship with the other rather than disconnected to it. This sense of interconnection with others is reflected in the narratives of melodrama. Melodrama draws upon the remnants of the feminine attachment to the mother, left over from her tenuous resolution of Oedipus complex. The recognition evoked by the women on the screen produces pleasure that can be considered a specific form of female gratification constructed out of the dominatory formations of the family. *Identification between subject and text remains vital to the analysis.* This is why I argue that the mirror phase, instituted by Mulveyian paradigm, maintains its centrality. Moreover, by turning to 'connectedness', Byars seeks to utilise a distinct pattern of desire derived from within the pre-Oedipal. However, this leaves intact the hierarchies of the Oedipal order that has locked the feminine to 'connectedness', that is, the connection between subject and Mother as one, into the pre-Oedipal in the first place.

Arbuthnot and Seneca (1990) examine the capacity for these texts to be read against the grain. The chosen text is *Gentlemen Prefer Blondes*. While they recognise that the surface of the story concerns the quest to find a husband, the main characters are independent and strong, and the exchanges between them reveal a subtext in which they struggle to maintain their intimacy and resist male objectification. For example, while Monroe and Russell are constructed as objects for the male gaze, nevertheless, they always defy the objectification by staring back, assessing the potential 'market' of husbands. However, this assessment is done with solidarity and genuine affection; they point to their tactile intimacy. Moreover, the primacy of this affection is secured by the double wedding. This closure, they argue, secures their relationship and thus makes this film feminist via its subtext. Therefore the pleasure is derived from reading against the grain. Yet, this marks a return to models of thought that Mulvey sought to correct: if reading against the grain is that 'easy', then representation ceases to be of such a central concern.

³¹ This draws upon Chodorow's reconfiguration of Freudianism, as well as potentially integrating the concept of *jouissance* by reflecting that the feminine is less individualised than the masculine.

Stacey also looks at the desiring interactions between two females. In 'Desperately Seeking the Spectator' (1988), Stacey examines the fixation by a housewife upon the formidable counterpart in the film 'Desperately Seeking Susan'. The anchor is derived from the housewife's assumption of her 'mirror image', brought to life by Susan; narratively conveyed through memory loss. In return, Susan, in seeking to identify her impostor, occupies the domestic sphere from which the housewife has taken flight. The narrative concludes when the two characters are finally united. Most importantly of all, this resolution is not accompanied by violent termination of one or both characters. Stacey argues that such a narrative fundamentally undermines masculinisation by centralising the lesbian basis of desire. Therefore, the narrative and visual codes do not allow pure identification or erotic codes of one or other – the exchange exists between the feminine. However, whether this overcomes the problems posed remains uncertain. First, it remains unclear to what extent Susan is in fact the mirror image since the housewife uses Susan as an avenue of escape, not identification. Second, it centres on the potential for lesbian-based desire between women which has had its pathological elements ejected, replaced by a somewhat utopian bond. Third, the centrality of Madonna as Susan locates the film within a wider cultural terrain, at a time when she was intensely heterosexual. It remains to be seen whether the foreground given to the subversive readings maintains the political momentum that initiated the examination of the relationship between representation and the social order in the first place. Does it not in fact suggest that patriarchy is quite a different entity if so many plural positions, readings and pleasures are possible? Perhaps we ought to be thinking more carefully about who are doing these readings (Hermes:1995).

There are a number of points that need to be raised at this point:

1. The notion of the subtext is introducing an empirical subject through the back door because different interpretive elements are being brought to bear that fall outside the psychoanalytic remit;
2. Moreover, the clash between the empirical and the unconscious is more evident when the potential for the homoerotic is pitted against a 'star' with a specific and, in this case, explicit heterosexual persona;
3. Yet these manoeuvres do not deconstruct the phallocratic binary but instead they retreat into a utopian sense of the connectedness developed from the normative departure. They are merely championing what is usually dis-privileged. This invokes the second tenet of liberalism: 'different but equal', which fails to undermine the phallocratic order implicit within it (see Heckman's application of Gadamer here: 1990:16);
4. It still empirically blocks active heterosexual femininity, since the structural regime remains intact.

Cowie equally seeks to move away from what she argues is a premature foreclosure of the Imaginary. The Imaginary fixes the subject but it is also the point at which a central mis-recognition takes place. The outcome is that the subject is never fully fixed and so the subject is able to mobilise this instability in fantasy.³² Thus, the *mise-en-scène* of desire can produce multiple places for the subject of the fantasy and for the viewing subject, who, through identification, may similarly take up

³² Cowie is equally drawing upon Lacan and Rodowick (1982).

any of these multiple positions. These may be defined as active, passive, masculine, feminine, parent or child, mother or daughter, father or son. Cowie argues that the complex of identifications arising for the subject are a result of the castration complex, but that Oedipal relations are not determined by active and passive aims, instead they emerge as passive or active as a result of exigencies of the subject. Cowie in effect asserts that, within the unconscious formation of fantasy, the subject can assume any subject position, thus the feminine is able to oscillate within the unconscious so that desire can assume multiple forms. However, Doane (1989) counters this by arguing that if pleasures within fantasy are accessible and multiple, despite the patriarchal nature of much of the imagery, there remains little for feminism to critique. She argues that feminising (the position) must deal with the constraints and restraints of reading with respect to sexual identities – in effect, the question of power and its textual manifestations resides with the closure of these free forms of fantasy. Cowie's position not only places the (constructed) subject in a spurious position, but it also effectively forecloses both the necessity and possibility of feminist critique.

Each time, the feminist model develops more complex models to 'find' feminine desire, while remaining silent about an obvious source, namely the erotic images of men. Does this open up patterns of meaning that secure different identifications? Apparently not. Moreover, Cowie leaves us with nothing other than a retreat into the unconscious, which negates the conscious level of existence, namely, the patriarchal order which is the source of the problem in the first place. The corporeal body is rapidly being replaced by a cluster of desire that moves between subject positions defined by representation, and yet sex as an objective category continues to be utilised in order to make the 'subject position' coherent and to remind us of the object being represented.

THE CODING OF THE MALE BODY AND ITS PROPENSITY FOR PLEASURE

I begin with Neale's 'Masculinity and Spectacle'.³³ Neale turns his attention to the various codes that produce the male body as an erotic spectacle through the use of close-ups. He argues that the male gaze is turned upon the male protagonist who incites narcissistic identification through the fantasies of power, omnipotence, mastery and control. Therefore, the close-up *triggers desiring patterns in the male viewer*. The central figure remains the male hero, upon whose will or project the external world can impose no limits. Neale argues that narcissism is integral to the fantasies produced by the narrative and its source is the exhibition of the phallic power displayed by the body in action. Most importantly, the close-ups concentrate upon the body in action, in movement, that is, as the embodiment of power. Thus, the narcissistic identification with a hero is a strategy of fantastic identification with the power of the phallus, which the male lacks. Note that this position is fundamentally different to that of the female because feminine narcissism is pathological, because its source of the desire is produced through identification with the passive object on screen. Also, the codes used to make the body erotic are fundamentally different from the feminine because they remain bound to producing the male body in action.

³³ See also Jon Stratton (1996) Nixon (1996)

By implication, an additional dimension to the pleasures experienced is the repressed homoerotic desire satisfied by the erotic codification of the male body. Neale argues that the repression of any explicit avowal of eroticism in the act of looking at the male is structurally linked to a narrative content marked by sadomasochistic fantasies and scenes. The organisation of fetishistic desire dictates that the male spectator will desire to internalise, consume and possess the phallus. In essence, the male body must be combined with violent action in order to assist the disavowal. He concludes by arguing that, given that the central spectatorial axis is organised for the male, it is necessarily the case that the relationship between the spectator and mainstream cinema is repressed and disavowed. If not, mainstream cinema is faced with the spectre of invoking homosexual desire.

Combining the erotic spectacle of the male body to narrative control by the masculine subject leads Neale to argue that the female spectator still cannot look directly. Again, women must experience their desire in a mediated form in order to make good that lack. Any desire that is contained within the film tends to be built up around the diegetic ambiguities between the male protagonists using masculine body codes of representation that are implicitly homoerotic. So, men can be sexual spectacles to women in certain instances, but only via implicitly homoerotic spectacles. Once again, if the female experiences actively-structured desire, she must assume the masculine subject position and thus undergo oscillation.

Alternatively, argues Neale, the male body can be feminised in order to incite the repressed homoerotic desire in men. He singles out Rock Hudson as the object of an erotic look in films usually identified as being aimed at the female audience. He gives an example of a scene in which Rock Hudson is framed in a doorway, caught with his shirt off. However, Neale argues that Hudson is not masculine in his moments of eroticism for women, but rather has become feminised, has adopted the feminine 'object' position. In this approach, the man must undergo an act of oscillation to become feminised so that he can become passive. The character/actor/body is secondary to the structures into which they are inserted, no matter how improbable the structures may be. Neale argues, in confirmation of Mulvey's perspective, that the codes of eroticism are such that 'only women can function as the objects of an explicitly erotic gaze' (Neale:1992:286). The commitment to the structural order persists despite a growing number of examples that appear manifestly to contradict the Symbolic order. This requires ever more complex layers of theory to reorientate or, perhaps, contort the meanings to fit the structural order. I will show that such gymnastics are repeated in order to a) maintain the central axis of the active/passive dichotomy and b) impose the number of subject positions from which the inferences regarding the formation of subjectivity can be drawn.

Alternatively, one can turn to Finch's (1990) development of gay pleasures from programmes organised along a heterosexist diegesis. Addressing the convention that defines melodrama as a feminine genre, Finch asks whether the male viewer can occupy the feminine subject position in order to access the desire organised by a feminine textual form, namely, take the male as an object of desire. Hence, he must implicitly attend to whether oscillation is necessary for a male viewer to gain pleasure for a narrative such as *Dynasty*. My interest stems from whether the absence of the masculine narrative drive where action is controlled by the male lead allows access for feminine desire. Finch develops the nature of the address by introducing a negotiation between 'textual subject place' and the 'spectatorial social position'. This is explored in two ways: first, by assessing the subject positions constructed by

the diegesis; second, through the empirical considerations of how the gay audience use camp to queer their viewing. Having established that the melodrama is on the surface aimed at women, he queries the capacity of *Dynasty* to operate directly for women's pleasure. This is partly attended to via his analysis of hyper-realism of the narrative drive, which blocks the usual structures of identification.³⁴ For example, the character Fallon nearly dies several times, and when she is finally dead, doubt is re-introduced because the body cannot be identified, leaving open the possibility of her return once more. Most importantly, Finch established that, contrary to filmic conventions, men are in the state of undress in *Dynasty*, not women, yet he rebuffs resolutely the notion that this establishes the male body as an object of erotic consumption by women; such an assumption is defined as 'naive' (1990:68).

Finch argues that Mulvey's model explains the various modes through which the codification of the body is produced, especially the use of fragmentation and fetishisation. However, his emphasis upon the spectatorial social position would apparently lead him to reject the way she maps pleasure. In this way, he argues that the pleasure that women gain from *Dynasty* is *not* from erotic contemplation, but from the mirroring of the codification practices so that men's bodies are treated in the same way as women's. He rejects the idea that heterosexual women can experience an active desire from men who are 'caught in moments of undress'. Therefore, the exposure and eroticisation of the male body can be dealt with only through the gay man's position.

Finch identifies the weaknesses of Mulvey's position as the initial negation of a distinct address to women within the woman's genre and the exclusion of extra-textual constructions by the spectator, especially in the determination of sexuality. Usually, when women are eroticised textually, lesbian and heterosexual male spectators are most easily accommodated. The lesbian's transgression, achieved through oscillation, is blurred by the fit of conspiring in the eroticisation of heroines, alongside the masculine spectator. Hence, the lesbian develops the modes of address to access the erotic construction of the feminine. He follows the logic of the Mulveyian paradigm by arguing that

for the female heterosexual spectators, a non-masculine position is an impossible one, for along with gay men, they have to work to convert the hero's actions into spectacle. But women are *not trained*³⁵ to objectify bodies as men are, which implies that *Dynasty's* codification of men along a *Playgirl/Cosmopolitan* discourse enables a gay erotic gaze at men through the relay of a woman's look.....[I]n a hierarchy of erotic pleasure, the gay male spectator who occupies a culturally constituted feminine position is perhaps the one for whom the (erotic) system works. (Finch:1990:69) (my italics)

This produces a somewhat anomalous outcome: despite the overt heterosexism of the diegesis, as Finch identifies through his analysis of the surface liberalism introduced through the characters' exchanges, the most problematic formation of desire is for women looking at the men's bodies, even though they are manifestly on display, and a direct outcome of that very narrative. I argue that it is only if the

³⁴ Note that this point reveals the broader acceptance of the Mulveyian paradigm.

³⁵ Read socialisation?

organisation of desire, as defined by Mulvey, is assumed to operate can Finch state that it is the gay male who has the most ready access to the codification of the male body.

Finch and Neale examine the codification of men with the aim of tracing the potential for a homosexual gaze of men by men. However, despite considering the feminine subject position, neither can provide access to the male body from the feminine subject position. Others have sought to correct this by taking up the issue of masochism introduced by Rodowick (1982). Each time, new levels of complexity are engaged with in order to 'find' pleasures that are blocked because of the ways in which they have defined the Symbolic and its structural organisation of identity. Moreover, because these structures are primary to the formation of the subject, they cannot look directly to what the subject might do. They have excluded the possibility of action from the frame, and thus must look to unconscious circuits of desire to find something other than total domination – except, of course, if the subject identifies with feminine heterosexuality, when she must resign herself to the desire for desire.

Studlar (1991) draws upon the pairing of fetishistic scopophilia with masochism³⁶ by juxtaposing the identification of the masculine spectator with the hero who has diegetic control over the action with the subject position produced when the narrative does not create control over the object. Usually, the masculine character carries the narrative forward through his command of the objects and events, thus serving both the male gaze and the narcissistic desire of the ego-ideal. However, when the narrative is not driven by the command of the hero/ego-ideal, the subject position produced is masochistic because it signals the inability to ensure that control of the sexual object/woman. Studlar is keen to avoid the implied positioning of the woman in the sadistic role and thus turns to Deleuzian notions of masochism because it locates masochistic desire back into the pre-patriarchal symbiosis of plenitude between the mother and child.³⁷

In effect, Studlar's model removes the necessity for the mediation of the male gaze and thus establishes a direct look *between the woman-to-woman gaze*, invoking pre-Oedipal, and thus non-patriarchal sexual pleasure. Studlar concludes that:

Although Dietrich may be constructed according to a masochistic male gaze, the absence of male mediation of the look, as well as the sexual ambiguity of Dietrich's erotic image, encourage a female looking that defies heterosexual norms and the accepted dominance/submission agenda of patriarchal sexual politics. The mechanisms of masochism disturb the power of the 'phallic' gaze to create space for an erotically charged female gaze fixed on the woman star. The result is a system of looking that elicits both the female spectatorial identification with and desire for the powerful femme fatale. (Studlar:1991:248)

³⁶ Studlar is also drawing upon Rodowick here.

³⁷ Within Deleuzian psychodynamics, the masochistic unconscious fantasy aims to disavow the father, thereby re-instituting the connections with the all powerful pre-Oedipal mother. Therefore, unlike the sadist who pursues Oedipal negation of the mother through her destruction, the masochist idealises her, submits to her so that he can be punished by her thereby symbolically punishing and denying the father in himself. The rejection of the father within himself is simultaneously the rejection of phallic sexuality.

The structural determination of the subject/object relations and the positioning of subjectivity *it forms categorically* block any consideration of the positioning of the male star in Marlene Dietrich's films. Hence, there is little consideration of the erotic potential of Gary Cooper in *Morocco*. Where he is discussed, his visual codification is defined as feminised. Therefore, if the female viewer is to access Cooper erotically, and if she is to 'remain' feminine, she can do so only by accessing the 'pathological' patterns of self-objectification. Alternatively, the female viewer can submit to the filmic form, undergo oscillation and access Cooper from the masculinised position. Yet, despite the introduction of the Deleuzian twist, the structural determination persists. Again, the turn to pre-Oedipal does not disrupt the categorical order, but rather introduces ever greater contortionist moves in the endeavour to find a way out of categorical determination of the subject position that defines the feminine as passive.

Ultimately, the turn to Deleuzian analysis merely emphasises the pre-Oedipal elements of psychic formation, which leaves the Oedipal operations intact. I argue that this reflects the broader political normative position: Deleuze's revolutionary position seeks to find a space through which the domination of the Oedipal organisation can be undermined; in contrast, Lacan and Freud look to the formation of psychic energies that supports the current order. The oedipalisation of desire, with the concomitant organisation of subject positions by the Symbolic, is always put beyond question by this model. Thus, to accept the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity is necessarily to accept the emphatic subordination of the feminine because psychoanalytic applications cannot escape the primary and privileged status of the phallus/penis. The dispute rests with the normative evaluations made of the various levels of the psyche; is the inculcation of the social order necessary to avoid the destruction of unlimited desire?³⁸ I draw parallels with the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism here because, in my view, their mutual reliance upon the Oedipal complex, recast as a structuralist operation, necessarily produces these various closures brought about by the structuralist determinism upon which they rely.

Another strategy to wrest Mulvey's paradigm away from these closures is offered by Lewis and Rolley (1997). In '(Ad)dressing the Dyke: Lesbian looks and lesbians looking', they trace the possible lesbian visual pleasures offered by fashion imagery in a field of cultural production that targets exclusively the female and overtly heterosexual audience of 'Cosmopolitan' magazine. Their aim is to explore critically the convention of understanding the process of women's consumption of images as one in which women passively identify with the 'woman-as-sign', subjected to the active male gaze. They contest the over-simplification of the forms of identification and desire inherent within Mulvey's initial theorisation, suggesting that it can be re-configured, by differentiating "desiring *to be*" from 'desiring *to have*', thereby introducing new identifications.

This is explored via women's capacity to assess other women's bodies developed by the use of women's magazines. They argue that the effectiveness of the image is dependent upon a sexual exchange of looks between the photographer, mostly male, and the female model and is initially structured by a heterosexual exchange. This implicitly references the assumption that the manifest

³⁸ This reflects the continued engagement with the Hobbesian problem of the social order.

features of the image will 'obviously' be those that objectify the female model for the male gaze.³⁹ Yet it is known to be consumed only by women, that the female model's desiring looks are consumed by women. This emphasises that the images and the codifications that aim to incite sexual desire are constructed with women in mind; the heterosexual pitch is thus marginalised. The lesbian is able to draw upon the codes in themselves, alongside the knowledge of other lesbian readership and community.⁴⁰ In contradistinction, the heterosexual woman has to relocate her gaze back into the broader structures that codify the woman's body ultimately intended for the male gaze and thus identification must take place among erotically charged images. Again, the broader location of the psychoanalytic model is central, for it offers a means to treat as secondary the empirical or conscious identification replacing them with 'real' lesbian identifications.

This is theoretically substantiated by the core concept of distanciation, understood as dealing with both objectification and narcissism. First, it is concerned with the distancing from the male gaze that objectifies and implicitly dehumanises the woman represented. Thus, the core structural position, namely the passive objectification of the woman in the image, remains of integral importance. Second, it addresses the over-identification that organises the relationship between the female viewer and the image. Ultimately, if she is to remain a part of her conscious identification, the female viewer must place the image and its associated desires back into the heterosexist logic that orders the representation. Only then can she negate the problematisation of her sexuality inherent with women looking at women. She imagines herself into the position of the model and thus projects herself as the passive object of (male) desire. The structural operations work to ensure that the female gaze is defined as masochistic because she submits to the objectification by which her subject position is defined. Therefore, from the heterosexual feminine identification position, the woman can desire only to *be* the passive object, which suggests that Doane's dictum, 'to desire to desire', remains pertinent. The objectification in her case is complete for she can desire only to *be* the object of desire. The central point of differentiation between this and the lesbian gaze is that the latter can encompass the tabooed position denied the heterosexual woman because the lesbian is able to embrace the desire to *have* the woman. Moreover, it reflects also the narcissistic desire of the active stage; implicitly, the subject position is both active and masculine. This illustrates the primacy of the psychoanalytic theory to their model of subjectivity.

However, the feminist normative position leads Rolley and Lewis to seek an escape from the pathology assigned to the (heterosexual) female viewer. Hence, their argument is forced to make another turn. Despite defining this relationship as psychic fantasy, they must reintroduce the conscious level in order to redefine the heterosexual woman's pattern of desire as lesbian, thereby ejecting the pathological elements. This is achieved by emphasising the *empirical* context of a fashion magazine where the viewer is known to be almost always female. Since the image is produced for women's magazines, Lewis and Rolley argue that this viewing context undermines the heterosexual fantasy because the model is knowingly looked at *by other women*. The conscious knowledge of who 'owns' the gaze secures the pleasure as lesbian: the narcissistic projection of the self as the model, coupled

³⁹ Again, this means that the images in general circulation will be marked overtly by the gendered active/passive dichotomy.

⁴⁰ This seems to me to be rather important insofar as it introduces the issue that meanings are derived from practice, in this case lesbian practice, and it is here where their efficacy is derived.

with the desire to be loved as that object/model, is undertaken even when the (empirical) viewer is 'known' to be a woman. They are able to conclude that the pleasures gleaned from women's magazines are lesbian in structure by reintroducing the conscious level, thereby negating the dubious political consequences of the unconscious operations of the heterosexual feminine subject position.

Stacey (1995) offers another example of the clash between the empirical and the unconscious. She attempts to synthesise the empirical descriptions of the pleasures women experienced when watching Hollywood melodrama with the deeper psychoanalytic identifications. The outcome is that the two elements of the book remain thoroughly disconnected insofar as she fails to relate or integrate the unconscious subject positions to the actual explanations given by the women interviewed. This is important for were one to provide some empirical evidence, confined as they be must within conscious utterances, these would be dismissed for they fail to fit with the 'real' unconscious structures. For example, public utterances of active female heterosexuality found in many problem pages, in 'Cosmopolitan' for example, would not be read literally but as utterances that disguise the actual source of the desire as defined by the primary axes within the unconscious. Interpellation and the mirror phase define how the subject is constituted. The Symbolic is ordered by the Phallus, therefore active feminine sexuality is not possible. Once constructed, the subject is fixed and thus the Phallic symbol must reign, which renders the model ahistorical. The Symbolic constitutes a re-presentation. This axis constitutes the subject and thus is awarded primacy over utterance.

In summation, we find the same problems reappearing:

1. When is the empirical or conscious feature to be treated 'as it is' and not a deeper unconscious substitution? The problem of dealing with the empirical leads postmodernism/feminism to talk of 'women as women'.
2. The structural order is sustained so that the subject position is also sustained. Psychoanalysis can be used in this way as the base to imply the actual desire of the subjects and the identifications formed.
3. However, this ensures the continued negation of the active feminine heterosexual desire: it does not exist because it is always redefined as another psychic position.

I suggest that active heterosexuality simply cannot remain a subject position known only through negation, never embodied or lived within the practice of heterosexuality (Jackson:1995). Moreover, I argue that this emerges as a problem only if one fails to recognise that the 'Masculine heterosexual Master' is an ideological fiction just as the absolute negation of active heterosexual femininity is. I argue that this negation is upheld only to sustain a political agenda that seems hell bent on ensuring that patriarchy, as a system that structures the psyche as well as defining the language system in its entirety, dominates at all time, so much so that Harbord and Campbell, for example, are prepared to reject both materialism and reason as the illusions of such a master. I suggest that this is an inevitable outcome of embedding subjectivity within a psychoanalytic paradigm, particularly when the sole emphasis is placed upon identification.

THE PRESENTATIONAL FEATURES OF THE MALE PIN-UP

In contradistinction, I argue that any empirical examples that unambiguously and unquestioningly present an erotic masculine/male figure must present problems for the dichotomous logic I have critiqued. I turn therefore to Dyer (1992) who presents a direct analysis of male images. Dyer addresses the block between the heterosexual woman and the male body. What makes Dyer's article of particular interest is his attention to the empirical evidence of the way in which looks are produced and situated in the context of an interaction. If, asks he, the interaction between the viewer of the image and the subject of the image is constituted through power, how exactly is the relationship within the interaction played out?

Dyer argues that women do look at men, which is at least a break with the structurally led categoricism that defines the Mulveyian paradigm, and singles out the male pin-up model and the male 'star' as two key instances. The images of male stars are defined by a certain instability, particularly when model is encoded as sexual spectacle because sexual objectification of men by women is a violation of the codifications that differentiate the male from the female. He argues that the codification is altered through the personalisation of the mode. By this, Dyer means that each star has his own look defining how his presentation is to be viewed. Therefore, he centres his analysis on how the model organises the looking axis while he is being photographed.

The first codification traces that men do not look modestly away (Berger:1972), but rather look up and off from within their position in the visual environment. Looking off outside the photographic frame, Dyer argues, signifies the lofty heights of the soul and intellect, something that the female cannot reach: 'higher is better than lower; the head is better than the genitals below' (Hoch:1979: Nayak:1997). In addition, Dyer acknowledges cases where the model does not avert the gaze but that the returning stare of the male pin-up differentiates it from the coy, partial but submissive look of the female model. The stare reaches beyond the boundaries of the field of vision established within the frame of the image, asserting his subjectivity. In contradistinction, the female gaze stops at the boundary of the field of vision between the viewer and the model. He then attends to the potential desire available to heterosexual women, noting what has previously been missed, namely that heterosexual women, as 'already castrated', have nothing to fear from transgression since there is no threat.⁴¹ How then is the phallogoc order of the image sustained? First he argues that the male gaze utilises the semiotic to block such identification patterns; hence the importance of the lofty stare. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Star's embodiment, contained within the pin-up, calls upon conventional codes of active masculinity; for example, the man must be doing something.⁴² Dyer identifies how structural relations can be made to work visually and using the most mundane sources to

⁴¹ Again, this draws on a common-sense, unequivocal corporeal fact and leaves unattended the relationship between the corporeal, as flesh, and the fact that this fleshy entity underdetermines the category it is naturalistically supposed to mirror or determine.

⁴² Neale identified that display is often combined with the narrative, often during moments of aggression, so that the spectre of homosexuality is disavowed. Likewise, it has been noted that in *Dynasty*, men were often 'caught' in a moment of undress. Hence the predominance of grooming on these occasions. Suzanne Moore notes this when she addresses the female heterosexual pleasures; see *Here's Looking at You, Kid!* (1988).

codify. Alternatively, the muscular body is emphasised, through lighting and posture, thereby connoting the promise of activity and power. He talks of the strain shown on the body, often signified by the visibly bulging veins. I will return in detail to these elements in my taxonomy as they trace the performance of masculinity and the body rather than defining the image through its relationship to the Oedipus complex. Dyer develops the argument further stressing the integration of the discourses of race with physicality. He notes that this embodiment is one that is 'of the jungle', impetuous and unreasoned. These themes will be taken up again with Nayak's piece (1997).

CRITIQUING THE PHALLIC SIGNIFIER AND THE DETERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION

In summation, I began with a critical account of the sex/gender distinction, identifying that it continued to use sex as an objective category in an insufficiently critical way. To this, I traced the broader re-evaluation of language, the central importance of which is the prior-ness awarded to meaning. The significance is that the analysis of language aimed to deconstruct the subject/object dualism, rendering both the subject and the object fictions generated by meaning. This built upon the existing ideological critique and its causal effect through representation. The development is premised upon the omnipresence of meaning and its active role in category production. To this, postmodernist/feminist critique fused a model of the subject, as defined by Lacan to Althusser's position of the ideological role of culture. Henceforth, this causal nexus aims to trace and explain a number of elements:

1. The unconscious and the sexual desiring patterns thus formed ceased to be treated as pre-given facts, as something essential to the human form. Instead, they must be thought of as constructions, as objects that have histories within and from which the subject is to be found.
2. This institutes the following order: the body is born into language and it is within the terms of language that the human subject is constructed; language is always prior to and constitutive of the subject.
3. In consequence, speech never belongs to the speaker, rather, the 'I' is the outcome of the position within which we emerge in language.
4. Therefore, the Cartesian subject is displaced by the production of subjectivities within the matrices of the structural positions within language. This encapsulates the fundamental appeal that Lacan has to feminist critique. It positions the subject as outcome, as construction, rather than essence, by placing language at the heart of what subjectivity is.
5. This integration of meaning to the social order, organised under the patriarchal banner of the Father, marks the entry of the first structural organisation of meaning: the feminine is passive.
6. Mulvey has applied the dialectic logic of Lacanianism to the seeing/seen axis and integrated into this the second axis of the active/passive.
7. Via the mirror phase, Mulveyian paradigm asserts that the feminine image of the screen must reflect the feminine position of lack. Therefore, the feminine must present itself as the object of desire, but equally disavow the lack that is her symbolic function. Therefore, the feminine as

sexual objectification is categorised as universal and permanent because of the Symbolic order. The essence of the feminine body is to signify lack since, corporeally, she cannot ‘grow’ a penis. It is this point, in particular, that raises the charge of biological determinism.

This oppositional interplay is played out by the objectification inherent in the ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ as well as active function of display.

Thus, the following dualisms are structurally secured:

MASCULINE	FEMININE
SUBJECT	OBJECT
ACTIVE	PASSIVE
DESIRE	TO BE DESIRED
DISTANCIATION	PROXIMITY
SEEING	SEEN (TO-BE-LOOKED-AT-NESS)
NARRATIVE	ICONIC
FETISHIST	FETISHISED

These sets of dualism are supposedly dislodged by the introduction of the tabooed homoerotic desire. However, it can do so only by leaving the feminine/passive axis in place. This reflects the central importance of oscillation: woman mobilises her desire, which is less fixed than the heterosexual masculine subject position, and returns to the phallic stage and disavows her castration.⁴³ She returns to her active stage and the eroticisation of the clitoris, and adopts the position of the masculine. Therefore, the pleasure of the feminine is tied to the pre-oedipal stage where the girl child remains masculinised by means of the active function of the phallic organ; hence the silence that defines the active, heterosexual woman. This is a development of Mulvey’s initial paradigm: heterosexual women’s desire to desire is brought about by their objectification (Doane: 1991). Therefore, the structural order persists and has been expanded, further producing a circuit of subject positions:

1. Men actively desire women and are therefore heterosexual and masculine; defined as Oedipalised desire.
2. Men actively desire men and are therefore homosexual and narcissistic; the object of desire is ‘the same’ and reflects the narcissism prior to Oedipalisation; it is therefore active.
3. Women actively desire women and are therefore homosexual; the object of desire is ‘the same’ and reflects the active phallic stage which is masculine achieved through oscillation. This represents a division between the fact of ‘woman’ and the unconscious desire as masculine.
4. Women that desire to be loved by men are therefore heterosexual, which is an outcome of Oedipalisation and is defined by passive objectification; she can desire only to be the *subordinated* object of desire.

⁴³ However, this is at the cost of her (conscious) moral development, as define by Freud and Lacan.

These structural orderings of desire and identification result from the foreclosure of the content of the image. By fixing the subject through the Symbolic order, they are able to introduce a series of structural relations that stabilise meaning. This emphasises the synchronic features of language: those who are formed by a system, those that have assumed the 'I', are in no position to alter the structures because they define who the 'I' is. Identification is therefore defined by either the failure or success of assuming the Oedipalised subject position. This effectively removes the potential of history and, by implication, social practice to change meaning, which equally reflects the ambiguous position the empirical holds in their explanations. At certain points, it is re-configured as another instance of the unconscious, for example Cowie. At other times, it demonstrates the identification structures, for example Lewis and Rolley.

Hence, the relationship between the Symbolic and the structuralist legacy forecloses categorically the forms the feminine may take because the structures are awarded primacy in the determination of the meaning and subjectivity. I argue that this leads directly to the overly homogenised analysis of cultural forms, thereby sustaining the inferential relationship between passive femininity as the subject formed and language as the causal mechanism that secures it. The semiotic function combines with the structural legacy to impose the universality of the active/passive.

Second, I return to the example of Harbord and Cambell who argue that the psychoanalytic model of the subject is central to the *production* of culture. They are therefore stipulating that the Oedipus complex is primary to the cultural formations we have, which I argue must lead to an additional closure: the 'story' of culture is the (re)presentation of the Oedipus complex. For example, Cowie (see also Gallop:1982; Rose:1986; Emberey:1989) trawls through numerous films identifying how each replays the heterosexual relationship via the complex of exchanges between the mother, father and child. The postmodern project means that feminists of this kind are bound to the 'end of history', but not as synthesis; as Hegel would have it (Descombes:1980), but as the eternal return of the linguistic order. I argue that this is where the idealist model of language is derived. The subject is defined as the outcome of the linguistic order, therefore language is awarded causal priority so that no subject acts on language, uses or transforms language to alter the Symbolic subject positions. Therefore the argument is essentially circular, each element depending upon the other for its coherency. Moreover, because the subject does not 'act'⁴⁴ they must look beneath the subject to the unconscious desiring flows for a trace of non-dominatory desire; hence the need for the theoretical gymnastics (Flower-MacCannell:2000; Harbord and Campbell:1998; Balibar: 1994; Copjec:1994).

To reiterate, the castration complex orders the codification and organisation of the visual presentation. The image of the feminine must be coded through fetishisation in order to disavow the threat of castration that personifies the feminine. In addition, each form of codification situates each subject position. This institutes the third closure. It begins with the location of the feminine as the absolute other of the masculine, and the ejection of the third term, namely the Other as language. Lacan uses the capitalisation as a means to denote that *both* the masculine and feminine (men and women) are subordinate to the Other, that is, language that constitutes them as subjects. This emphasis reflects his position that subjectivity is the outcome of signification through language. This is how language speaks

⁴⁴ Defined as a metaphorical illusion.

through the subject. This re-working establishes the two clear subject positions, namely the deadlock of the subject/object opposition. The tripartite relationship⁴⁵, which is fundamental to Lacan's model, is reduced to a dichotomy so that the feminine functions through her desire to make good her lack: 'she is said to speak castration and nothing else'. The dualism means that only the feminine is subordinate. The feminine cannot transcend this state, and thus cannot alter the state or mechanism that defines her as lack. Again, I would argue that the corporeal is used uncritically.

Another example of the same reductive logic is the seeing/seen axis. Mulvey et al. remove the dialectic operation *within* the subjectivity and redefine it by, and align it with, the existing dichotomies. This dichotomisation further solidifies the structure of 'the feminine as the absolute subordinated other'. Thus, no subject both sees and is seen, rather the Master masculine subject sees and the feminine (slave) is seen. This is how the structural positions emerge when Lacan is reworked according to a feminist normative position: the positions are dualistic rather than tripartite. Only by making the masculine and the feminine dialectic opposites can feminists overcome Lacan's position that both subjects are subordinate to the Law: the power of the Father does not 'belong' to the feminine, neither does it belong to the masculine (man).⁴⁶ Moreover, this dualistic reorganisation implicitly collapses the penis and the phallus because the masculine subject has been conflated with the Law.

Language is treated as a 'quasi-free-standing entity' which is reflected in the 'ness' Mulvey awards the feminine. The centrality of culture is given precedence over and above the things the subject may do. Moreover, the cultural domain colonises the unconscious, the place from which motivation is derived. The unconscious is the source of the real motivations and meanings, thus the truth lies behind the surface patterns of speech. Following this, the significations ordered by the phallus prescribe what is really going on: the active woman is really masculine, because the linguistic regime orders it so. Most importantly, the re-alignment of Lacan's model into a dualistic order introduces categorical logic to the postmodernist/feminist model; hence, the centrality of the 'ness'.

The 'dilemma' between the conscious as regulated (ideological) speech and the unconscious levels of desire is not something that Lacan faces. Lacan argues that to speak the 'I' is to submit to Symbolic order. His normative orientation aims to bring desire that is socially tabooed into the realm of what is socially sanctioned. Therefore, his aim is to bring the Real into the domain of Oedipalised desire. There is, then, a level at which conscious discourse is central. However, by making Lacanianism a proto-ideology, feminists are forced to reject conscious discourse because it is enveloped by what the illegitimate social order requires. Therefore, conscious speech becomes the equivalent part to the ideological position, namely passive femininity, and our speech acts bring forth the normative regime of patriarchy.⁴⁷ By rejecting the order of the Law of the Father, they seek to lift that taboo and thus

⁴⁵ Fundamental to Butler's analysis. It reflects that her analysis is considerably more sophisticated.

⁴⁶ Lacan argues that those men who also make the fallacious assumption that their phallus and the Phallus are one often suffer from impotency caused by the latent fear that the penis will not meet the power of the Phallus. See B. Fink (1995)

⁴⁷ The full impact of this is sometimes ignored, particular by those who seek to manipulate Lacan for libertarian purposes, by which I mean that they seek to liberate the identities and desire produced through the failure of Oedipalisation. Logically speaking, with that failure comes the failure of the 'I' that speaks. I argue that they cannot turn to the notion of the non-discursive language because of their deployment of Derrida elsewhere. He argues that there is no outside from which the insane can speak.

release the 'legitimate' desiring flows of lesbian and gay identifications and so forth. However, this again merely inverts the phallocratic order; it does not deconstruct it sufficiently.

AND THE WOMAN'S BODY?

I have argued that the structural orientation forecloses the analyses of the representations as well as the sorts of identities it is said to form. Most importantly, the ideological over-determination of the Symbolic has removed women and the activities they do from the analyses. Thus, the analysis cannot be anything other than ahistorical and reductive because, by making the social order reside in the psyche, the analysis removes any potential action from consideration, and thus the capacity to change things. This is a direct result of the over-emphasis upon the interpretative effects that form subjectivity. Consequently, this greatly simplifies the richness and diversity of the social world. In fact, as demonstrated in the numbered points above, they have reduced the human condition to four basic categories.

The feminist theory addressed thus far turned to psychoanalysis to account for the fixity of identity and aimed to inscribe the body into social process. The sex/gender distinction was abandoned precisely for its failure to do so. The sex/gender distinction leaves the body outside the domain of social organisation by remaining implicitly dependent upon the mind/body dualism. Butler refers to this as the 'raw body'. The body is treated as a self-contained and ordered entity that biologically fulfils its capacity. Yet, when the sexed body meets with its social organisation, suddenly two essential bodies emerge, reflecting the ideology of a natural hierarchical order of Western culture. This process draws the body into the 'cooked', a product of the discourses of power/knowledge.⁴⁸ These discursive orders are imposed on and constitute the entity of the body itself. As Butler continues, feminism shows that there is nothing but the cooked:

How are the sex/gender and nature/culture dualisms constructed and naturalised in and through one another? What gender hierarchies do they serve, and what relations of subordination do they reify? If the very designation of sex is political, then 'sex', that designation supposed to be the most raw, proves to be always already cooked.

(Butler:1990:38)

Discourse as representation is prior to and formative of 'I'; the feminine is therefore that which language fixes as a position. This model by-passes the body by submerging it beneath the linguistic effect. The absent body, ejected by the discourses of the Symbolic, has been replaced by the subject position. The causal force awarded such construction pushes the corporeal body out of view because

We are left, then, with desiring patterns that are absolutely unknowable or a subjectivity that *is* the ideological subject position.

⁴⁸ The switch to Foucauldian language does not conflict with the psychoanalytic backdrop, because Butler (1990) or Braidotti (1991) for example, argue that the two can be synthesised because both are fundamentally anti-Cartesian.

there is nothing to the body apart from the cooked.⁴⁹ The corporeal is not deemed to bring anything to the cultural, bar the raw material. Again, this emphasises the extent to which the subject is merely an affect of meaning. The discursive forces appear to take on a form of their own and organise the subject position independently of the body. I suggest that if the phallus is, as Lacan (sometimes) argues⁵⁰, merely the signifier of power, rather than bodily difference, then subject position that discourse defines is all there is: the masculinised is a redundant term because this only signifies that shift to the masculinised assumes a female body in the first place. If this were not the case, why is the 'male' category always behind any analysis of oscillation if the signifiers have effectively feminised body? Why the maintenance of the biological signifier? I argue that the fact we must refer to masculine men in order to maintain a feminist position suggests that there is in fact a deeper commitment to the biological body than their chimeric vocabulary suggests. Without the biological body, the subject becomes a product of language as a 'quasi-free-standing entity', and thus there would be no problem regarding the absence of 'women as women'. In fact, it ought not present itself as a problem. To illustrate, I quote Grosz:

(Irigaray's) aim seems to be the exploration of a new theoretical space and language which may be able to undermine the patriarchal and phallogentric domination of the sphere of representations, and, more positively, provide a mode of representation for women as women. If, she argues, women's bodies are inscribed as lack by dominant representational systems which leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity, their limits need to be recognised and transgressed. (Grosz:1990:168-9)

This implicitly refers to the body because without it we are left only with a metaphysical entity.

Returning to Macey's points: to speak is to assume the subject position in language: we are where ideology has positioned us. This reflects the earlier emphasis that the postmodernist/feminist programme puts on Althusser. This closure is responsible for that the postmodernist/feminists' inability to 'find' women as women who could undertake practices of self-determination. Woman, as a 'cooked' subject position is always already in the signification, that is, is already constituted or interpellated by the ideology. Thus, they have defined 'self-determining woman' as a utopian moment. By making the body a Symbolic entity, action is always in full service of the Symbolic, thus there is nowhere to create an alternative subjectivity. Is this not why 'women as women' is such a philosophical conundrum.

Furthermore, postmodernist/feminists owe us another explanation as to how they 'escape' the domination of the rational, so that they are able to rationally theorise the source of their total domination. Unlike Althusser, they have no myth of science with which to assume a position outside of that which language provides (1971:168-70). This is where the essentialist base to their critique is exposed: they draw upon their *jouissance* with which to represent a feminine subject that emerges out from under the full weight of the Symbolic construction. Yet, the very moment that the *jouissance* produces representation ironically locks it back into the Symbolic domain. They have not broken down

⁴⁹ Reflecting the Levi-Straussian legacy, this institutes another dualism.

⁵⁰ See Fink for a thorough if complex account of this 'ambiguity'.

the dualistic term that subordinates it in the first place (Gadamer:1979). Moreover, the absence of any sustained methodological reflexivity (Bourdieu:1992) has caused them to overlook their own activity, the social institution from which it takes place, and consequently, their power. This cannot be recuperated as an instance of masculinised identity because that would make a mockery of their agenda. Perhaps, their inability to account for their own social power stems directly from the fact the 'empirical woman' is such a theoretical conundrum for them. It leads them to overlook the empirical reality of their own lives.

Criticisms of this kind have been registered within feminist debate (Butler and Scott:1992) but the particular offerings of Benhabib (1992) seem to me best placed to identify a space between the closures of subjectivity contained within the Enlightenment programme and the closures that appear within the postmodern programme. *Situating the Self* explores several aspects that have informed directly the analysis provided here. While she engages in the offers made by the postmodernist/feminist programme, she queries the efficacy of inverting the dualistic logic formalised within the Enlightenment project (Pateman:1988; O'Brien:1989; Gatens:1996) by drawing upon the hermeneutic position that explores how this logic merely reasserts the initial direction of the hierarchy (Gadamer:1979; Heckman:1990). I refer here to the essentialist residues of desire that reside beneath the construction. Elements of her work have informed my engagement with practice⁵¹, but here I merely wish to trace how she creates a theoretical space between the radical constructionism of the postmodernist/feminist programme and the philosophic traditions of the Enlightenment. Benhabib concentrates on Flax's ideas (1990) but I think this critique equally applies to the work of Adams (1996), Adams and Cowie (1990) and Probyn (1996) for example.

Benhabib delineates three spheres that unite the concerns of feminism and postmodernism, namely the 'Death of the Subject', the 'Death of Metaphysics' and the 'Death of History'. I will concentrate upon the Death of the Subject since this informs the problematic of the active subject identified above; in my case, active heterosexual desire in women. Benhabib argues that it is possible to take on board the rejection of all essentialist conceptions of human being but only through radical situatedness and contextualisation. Furthermore, it is possible to turn away from ideas of pure consciousness by engaging in the structures of language without essentialising those structures in turn⁵². She argues that the 'Death of the Subject' rapidly leaves the theorist nothing other than a fictional entity that has:

"dissolved into the chain of significations of which it was supposed to be the initiator". Along with this dissolution of the subject into yet "another position in language" disappear concepts of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity and autonomy. The subject that is but another position in language can no longer master and create that distance between itself and the chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can reflect upon them and creatively alter them. (Benhabib:1992:214)

⁵¹ This will be introduced as part of the rethink as to the power of the image.

⁵² See Eco for a scathing critique of the essentialisation of 'la' and 'le'.

I suggest that the analysis above shows exactly how that dissolved subject is produced within the Symbolic. The subject that is left is two-dimensional. Following Benhabib, it is our capacity to creatively alter the conditions of existence that makes us human: it is our embodiment that makes us radically situated.

Therefore, that radically situatedness need not force a silence on the body. On the contrary, it is the body that places us in the world and it is the body that forces a person to take a point of view. Bodies are complex and interrelationship between the culture and the body is clearly complex. However, in my view, treating bodies and society as interrelated rather than distinct entities offers us a hermeneutically sensitive alternative to the raw and the cooked. I am a social being partly because I am a body. And as Gatens points out, being a social being is premised on the fact that my body is female. It throws me down certain structured paths, but the paths do not determine fully what sense I will make of them. My body gives me agency to act not only in the world, but on it, in a transformative way. Thus, I challenge the model assessed above by seeking a space between 'sex' as an object outside of society, free of discourse and the subject position that fully constitutes my sense of self. The 'I' is not independent of either but is a product of their interrelatedness.

AND THE HETEROSEXUAL WOMAN?

Throughout, I have been drawing attention to the theoretical negation of the possibility of an active heterosexuality experienced and lived by women. I rebel against the negation because of its ahistoricism: I do not have, nor can I ever have, an active form of sexuality. This seems to me to be premature. Nor does it tally with the changes within which heterosexuality is being explored by women. I do not necessarily think that going to see male strippers is an 'advance' but it seems to suggest a shift in the possibilities to experience desire by women in the act of looking. They do not watch in silence, alone, unlike the setting of a peep show, but view collectively and experience, what may still be transgressive, the desire of looking and are excited by the exhibitionism of the male stripper. I do not see that this can be recuperated into the subject positions offered by psychoanalytically-based cultural analyses.

There are other theoretical issues to be considered too. I can best engage with these by turning to the debates regarding pornography where the link between vision and the erotic is most apparent. One of the points that anti-censorship feminists (Snitow et al.:1984) make is that often defining male sexuality as active introduces an unhelpful dichotomisation, namely that female sexuality is essentially tender and anchored in the connection between mother and child. The ahistoricism of the psychoanalytic model tends to accept uncritically the assumption that heterosexual women's desire is essentially missing, lodged as it is within the notion of the gentle and tender. The dichotomisation is self-defeating. Moreover, it does not really tally with the 'sex talk' documented; for example, Friday's (1992) collection of women's sexual stories. Hardy (1998) suggests that there may in fact be much more in common between the heterosexualities of men and women than is generally acknowledged. I sympathise with this position as it connects with my critique of men and women as opposite rather than different in some ways and the same in others.

Hardy, I think, offers some insightful thoughts about the heterosexuality, and most importantly, he does not shy away from the part power has to play in it. He argues that active/passive structures do enter the sexual imaginations of some men. However, his research suggests that thinking about patterns of desire within a fixed structure of active/passive re-confirms rather than challenges men's thinking regarding the differing sexual patterns of women. Moreover, he argues that positioning the variability of men's actual patterns of desire within the hegemonic formations, as structured in pornography for example, offers an opening for men and women to generate differing patterns of sexual intimacy, rather than locking 'sex talk' to the active/passive structures that Snitow et al. identify as self-defeating. Perhaps a part of that ought to be an opening of the notion of desire women gain from looking. Moreover, as my results show, there has been a marked shift in the codifications of men's bodies, in particular the absence of a social setting with which to negate the objectification implicit within the image.

FUNCTIONALISM THROUGH THE BACKDOOR

I have emphasised the extent to which the cultural analyses above stress the structural reproduction of subjectivity. Thus, there appears to be no voice outside of the positions offered by the Symbolic. Equally, functionalist logic finds itself with the same dilemma. I argue that cultural analyses above do in fact carry an idea of the social self but one that is confined to the 'roles' it has been assigned. Both end up with a bankrupt version of the social actor, one that is two-dimensional. Moreover, both ultimately reside in categorical logic. In order to argue fully how these closures implicitly deploy functionalist reason, I will show how this same logic has been transferred to analysis of representation of race, exposing again the implicit dependence upon interpellation, and psychoanalysis more broadly, in order to connect desire, identification and the social order. By showing how this logic applies equally to representations of race, focusing particularly on how a subject is unable to hold two positions simultaneously, I isolate how fundamental the functionalist reason is to this mode of theorising. I therefore argue that the postmodernists'/feminists' reconfigurations of Lacan operate using a functionalist logic, and hence fall at identical hurdles. Moreover, the categorical logic and the processes of identification critiqued above can be best illustrated using Nayak's analysis of advertisements. The reason I shift to post/colonial theory here is to expose how neither model is able to deal with embodiment, that is, the lived patterns of belonging to more than one social classification at any one time. I will illustrate this below.

CATEGORICAL LOGIC, IDENTIFICATION AND THE 'SUBJECT' OF RACE

Nayak explores how the black body is seen as a source of unstable, order-threatening but intense and extreme desire, as against the moral and order-preserving white body. This discourse is drawn upon to mark out the black body as an entity that is beyond regulation and self-control but, most importantly, as a powerful force that can seduce and thus pollute white moral regulation. Hence, discourse produces 'race' by connecting skin colour to a type of human nature. Yet the mutually

exclusive categories establish a powerful source of transgression and fascination. Nayak argues that the Häagen-Dazs advertisements encode the black bodies within this discourse, therefore marking the black body as intensely sexual and corrupting. This initial delineation already establishes the comparative basis of the categorical logic, but also intimates the clash between the subject positions: who is occupying which side of the dichotomy and when? For example, an advertisement for the campaign, entitled 'Feel Me', displays a black male body unclothed, as 'an objectified figure stood still in time' (Nayak:1997:53). The image deploys codes that freeze the body, rendering it statuesque. The back of the body is the 'subject' of the pose, therefore we know nothing about the man: *he is his body*. This permits a fetishisation of the body operating through the athletic and mythological power of the natural physique. Presumably, this is derived from the discourse that defines the black male to be much more 'of the body'; bound to its capacity for musculature and force. This ideological critique is then combined with the notion of the gaze, because, as I argued above, only then can ideological representation be shown to matter, since the gaze connects the image to the desiring subject. The pose ensures that he remains unaware of the voyeuristic scrutiny of the viewer, and thus the photographic subject cannot assert his subjectivity with a returning gaze.⁵³ The combination of the pose and its location within the broader imperialist dichotomy effectively encodes his 'body as object' and the 'white as the mind'. Again, this draws attention to the possibility that one could substitute male and female for black and white, reflecting the closeness of the ideological critique.

Nayak identifies a core code which he describes as the coupling of fear and forbidden fascination; the codes draw upon the symbolisation of *black masculinity as phallus* (p55). He identifies the body posture of the black model as arched, hardened through musculature, erect and straining, the body itself symbolising a large black penis. Upon his back is a dripping white hand that is losing its form. He argues that when this is combined with the hyper-sexuality of the black man's body, it means that the white ice cream could stand for semen and the uncontrolled emissions of a primitive sexuality. The black man as phallus is confirmed by the removal of the head from the visual frame of the reference. This acts as a symbolic form of castration, a timely reminder of where the real control of this fantasy lies. Nayak concludes that the phallic construction of black masculinities⁵⁴ substitutes penis for personality, thereby 'eclipsing the negro. He is turned into a penis. He *is* the penis' (Nayak:54; quoting Fanon:1970:120). The logic is pursued further so that the phallus continues to secure power, but this time, the phallus being defined by the black man.

At this point, Nayak shifts the domain of analysis: the movement swings from the semiotic domain, with its concern with the constructions of meaning and the broader ideological location that gives these signs their weight, to the defining moment of subjectivity:

Significantly, the 'racial' dichotomy is also informative of white *subjectivity* in a doubly defining moment where the construction of the fantastic black Other simultaneously discloses

⁵³ I will be returning to this because it represents a brief example that encapsulates the slips made regarding the gaze, image, identity and photograph. Goffman traces this very well, and I borrow from his complex analysis to support my position that some images, advertisements in particular, are about 'the world' *but only partially*. He argues that representations of this kind hyper-stylise conventions of interaction.

⁵⁴ The first time a plural is used.

the elaboration of whiteness ... Analysing how such *phobic bodily representations* are put together can expose anxieties that lie within white ethnicity ... For Kobena Mercer, the fear and desire surrounding the black body 'not only demonstrates the disturbances and decentring of dominant versions of white identity, but confronts whiteness with the otherness that enables it to be *constituted as an identity* as such.' (Nayak:1997:56) (my italics)

Hence, he has swung from the frame of semiotics into the effects of the meaning. The codification of a specific kind of image, aiming to sell a specific kind of product, speaks about the desiring patterns and their pathological manifestations *as identity*. The ideology constructs desire within white ethnicity. Moreover, his quote shows that Mercer makes the same errors: he moves from the notion of 'version' to the effective constitution of the identity. Implicitly, the dependence upon interpellation remains central because only then can the formation be said to produce 'a mental orgasm that the "perverse" black body appears capable of inducing [which] is informative of the phantasmal and phobic machinations of whiteness' (p55). This mirrors the form of the feminist cultural analysis above. In addition, Nayak argues that the use of single black bodies has the effect of positioning the 'male' viewer as the fantasy organiser, capable of almost entering the scene and the bodies on display. This parallels the fantasy of omnipotence the masculine assumes by having the phallus. The structural orientation and positioning of the subject leads Nayak to fail to problematise who is viewing this advertisement. If the viewer is assumed to be Black then this problematises the analysis of the black objectification insofar as the viewer is presumed to *have* the phallus and therefore cannot *be* the phallus as well.

This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind is determined by the categorical application of the group in question, which is then elevated to the structural organisation of meaning and the corresponding identity. The outcome is that they are fundamentally unable to cope with two oppressed subject positions at the same time. The (male) black model is defined as 'being the phallus', as the object of desire and fear, which is the very entity by which the whiteness and/or white identity establishes itself. Yet, despite the fact that the eroticisation of the body is said to serve as a fetish for the white imagination, this is reconfigured as an instance of transgressive desire integral to the queer look. Thus, the single codification is made to serve both the reproduction of the normative white order and therefore the negation of the other, yet it also secures the very production of the transgressive identification, namely the queer look. Alternatively, how are we to define the subject position of the white woman? Does the representation position the white (woman) as the subject who is constituted through the negation, or the (white) woman as the very source by which the Master knows himself? This is a fundamental contradiction.

In more general terms, Nayak identifies clearly the various uses of black and white to commodify ice cream sexually; therefore the ideological map is insightful. An ideological map does not have to be free of contradiction *unless treated as causally effective*. However, his analysis falters when extended beyond this domain. This is most clearly manifested when the article breaks away from the advertisement, as both a constitution of power and a source of identification, to how the formations of the body represented can stimulate transgressive desire. Nayak includes here readings by black gay

men of Mapplethorpe's photographs, which the first example copies, and attends to 'pleasures of reading against the grain'. Such examples coalesce to create the 'possibility of subversive readings and radical alliance – "evoking female desire, gay looks and affirming black male identity"' (p60). Yet, the ideological analysis previously asserted forecloses such modes of reading. Just like Cowie, he ought to stipulate where such free subversive readings come from, given the assumption of the interpellation of image and subject. Does it not undermine the order of the Symbolic if so many fail to assume its positions and pleasures? The issue of agency forces a space between the pervasiveness of ideology, in this case racist ideology, and the corresponding construction of identity.

Furthermore, and I am indebted to Connell (1987:185) for pointing out this relatively simple inversion, just as the representations do not speak of the real lives of those represented, neither should we assume, *de facto*, that ideological constructions of meaning say anything about those whose power it protects. White people, or men, for that matter, may well have access to illegitimate power, by virtue of their embodiment, irrespective of whether they seek to act on it. However, the point is, and this is a fundamentally empirical point, the power base is there to act on should the occasion arise. In this way, the structural ordering of power can be understood as something that exists among a group, without one having to argue that this power is dependent upon the unified and homogenised identification. The differentiation aims to open up a space for the asymmetry that exists between the structure and its relationship to power and those who act within them: the structures of power cannot be assumed uniformly to determine those who hold power.

IMAGE, IDENTIFICATION AND THE ANALYTIC DEPENDENCE UPON FUNCTIONALIST REASON

I begin with the reflection that the above analysis is united by approaching the body as 'system problem', namely that its organisation is in line with social structural requirements. Thus, the Law, within postmodernism/feminism, or the order of the whiteness, according to post-colonialist theory, is the starting point. Borrowing from the long-standing interactionist critique that structural Marxists and functional theorists were indistinguishable bar their normative departure, I argue that the same critique applies to alleged postmodern shift. Both models struggle to maintain an emphasis on social or interpretive indeterminacy. When included, it tends to lead to such variability that the (illegitimate) normative order stops the causal mechanism whereby reasons, as defined by the normative order, cause action. Ultimately, I argue, this homology is based upon the wholesale failure by a postmodern agenda to deal with the mediations of power *between* action and structure. I will begin with each part of Parsons' model and follow with examples and concepts that follow such reasoning.

FUNCTIONAL LOGIC AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

The Parsonsian backdrop has as one of its defining features the presupposition that the presence of the normative order is insufficient to assume its determining function in organising the social. Parsons begins by addressing the Hobbesian problem of the social order: random or non-unified

pursuits produce a social order that is dictated by force, fraud and social conflict. The normative order is, therefore, the mechanism that removes the discordance of agents pursuing their own individual ends. Furthermore, without coordination, the alternative means and action of others would be impossible to explain and thus their actions and ends are random. Parsons' development therefore rests upon his insight that the ends pursued through individual action must cohere with the actions of others within a common framework. Moreover, this common framework must be a collective of larger social and cultural processes through which actions can be rendered sensible. To conclude, the normative order explains how reasons as causes of action connect individual action to a larger system of actions.

A connection is therefore required between the wide range of values held by individual members and a broad system of values necessary for the good of that society. Hence, Parsons requires a mechanism whereby the *values of the society become an internal position*, which motivates individuals towards appropriate action. Parsons' answer is internalisation,⁵⁵ and through this concept he integrates three elements. He begins by defining social integration as the product of the collective subscription to commonly held norms and values. Next, he stipulates that such values are 'internalised'. These two elements are then combined: the internalised values do not merely limit egoistic tendencies but *become constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire* appropriate for the collective.

Taking his influence from Durkheim and Freud, Parsons requires that actors discriminate between the various objects in the situation and that social objects be invested with accordant positive or negative cathartic significance (Parsons: 1951:201-26). Following on, the social actor must evaluate possible courses of action in relation to them. These three steps are further guided by culturally transmitted value orientations or 'organised sets of rules and standards' (1951:60). The social rules, once internalised, go on to determine the validity of their cognitive judgements, the appropriate cathartic attachments, for example (compulsory) heterosexuality, and the social actions then undertaken.

The central principles of social organisation are the following. The primary anchor is that the normative rules are the causes of action. By deploying the Freudian concept of internalisation, Parsons is able to develop a system in which internalised value standards are uniquely integrated to institutional activity. Moreover, the internalised values are constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire. For example, in becoming heterosexual, we become subjects that the social order requires and this socially determined subject is equivalent to who we think we are, which further motivates us to marry and defines our desires to have children.

The homology begins with the parallel descriptions. First, the functionalist and the postmodernist/feminist structural models argue that the social values of the order assume an internal position, and both depend upon internalisation as a mechanism to ensure that society's values feel like my values. This is why I have emphasised throughout the elements of psychoanalytic models that seek to look at the formation of the subject in terms of a broader social order problem. The Oedipus complex straddles the formation of the subject in terms of familial context and the formation of the super-ego that must correlate with the moral order. Second, both establish the correlation between the (external)

⁵⁵ The concept represents the later stages of Parsons' work at Harvard: *Towards a General Theory of Action* and *The Social System*.

values of the social order and the subject. Third, these external social values, once internalised, are constitutive of the objects of desire and thus responsible for moral regulation. The postmodernist/feminist agenda seeks to intervene in this constitution and its relationship with the 'moral' order, which leaves the feminine as 'less moral'. I argue that the apparent re-location of the Oedipal complex into the domain of language does not alter the broader employment of functionalist reason. Lacanian application has merely brought these organised sets of rules and standards under the banner of the 'Law of the Father' and made the transmission of the rules operative through language. The normative order is not tightly carried through the system of language. Finally, both establish the normative order as prior to the subject⁵⁶ and formative of a subject that acts according to the appropriate norms and values; the normative order is *inside the subject* and thus motivates him/her to act accordingly.

Parsons recognises that this process is a tenuous one. Making the social system an internal one opens the subject up to the threat or strain of not being able to live up to the demands of the social situation and/or role. This causes painful internal conflict and the loss of self-esteem. This challenges the assumption that only the psychoanalytic model of the subject is able to cope with internal conflict. Moreover, Barnes (1979 in Barnes and Sharpin) rightly notes that Parsons' failure was not that he did not address deviancy or social change; on the contrary, Parsons' attention to deviancy was extensive because he understood that the failure fully to internalise norms and values was ubiquitous within his model. Equally, therefore, Parsons recognises that the formation of the 'subject as internalised norms' is never complete, which is why a system of sanctions and rewards is required. Hence, the maintenance of the social system as subjective disposition is further strengthened by negative sanctioning or threat of having love and praise withdrawn. This further exacerbates the threat of internal conflict and the loss of self-esteem. It cannot be argued therefore that Parsons is closed to internal conflict. He utilises these threats further to stabilise the social system as subjective disposition so that deviation from the standard expectations will be immediately met with negative sanctioning, the loss of social standing and other disadvantageous consequences. This directly parallels Lacan's function of the 'Law of the Father' (1989). The fact that postmodernists/feminists seek to magnify this failure is not a negation of the functional reason but its confirmation: the subject position/role becomes an internalised position; subject is what the system's normative order stipulates, so we can only look to its failure to find 'something outside' of the order. Their 'something outside' is transgressive desire. Likewise, the attainment of heterosexuality by the woman is the moment the normative order has colonised the subject, which is why there is no pleasure for the feminine other than the masochistic desire that this identification secures; hence Mulvey's initial formulation of the male gaze.

Ostensibly, by making social system requirements and the internal subjective states equivalent to each other, Parsons has made the social system and the social role mirror reflections. Althusser's model of interpellation parallels this model, bar the normative departure. The social system is coordinated to meet sectional interests as opposed to collective interests and the social system can function with this essential conflict only if the system becomes an internal and subjective condition.

⁵⁶ Parsons' subject no more represents a natural or essential one than does the postmodernists'/feminists'.

Hence, the subject has a set of internalised values that become their own, which is why they work for the system. This forms the basis for the postmodernist/feminist synthesis between Althusser and Lacan because theorists define alienation as a primary feature of subjectivity. Ostensibly, therefore, social role and subject position are the same thing: the subjective conditions *correlate* with the social requirements of the order; neither includes nor accounts for interpretive indeterminacy.

This exposes the fundamental problem with the postmodernist/feminist applications of Lacan: from where is their own normative evaluation made? Recasting Lacanian dialectic from the internal position in the subject to structural opposites between the feminine other and the Masculine Symbolic Law means they have no speech that is not of the Law, and thus no place to account for how they make such a normative departure. Unlike Althusser (1971), they cannot call upon the critical distance between subject and position brought about by the objectivity of positivist science. Hence, the double effectiveness of the Masculine as the Symbolic locks the feminine as subject into the Real, which, like many theories that mobilise functionalist logic for a radical agenda, must look to some 'quasi-space' that lies outside the socialised subject. In conclusion, therefore, this feminist model comes face to face with failure of normative determinism: making the social action an outcome of psychological disposition means that they cannot account for their normative evaluations. Nor can they account for the public nature of meaning.

THE FAILURES OF NORMATIVE DETERMINISM – BOTH FUNCTIONALIST AND POSTMODERN

In principle, Parsonsian functionalism stresses that institutions can be non-coercively maintained by emphasising that normative order assumes an internal position. Parsons was right to identify the existence of macro norms and values as universal and thus move towards a model of society as containing a normative order. Yet this is precisely where Parsons' problems begin, namely that social orders must be explained in terms of the *motivation* for action:

It is through internalisation of common patterns of value-orientations that a system of social interaction can be stabilised. Put in personality terms, this means that there is an element of super-ego organisation *correlative* with every role-orientation pattern of the individual in question. In every case, the internalisation of a super-ego element means motivation to accept the priority of collective over personal interests, within the appropriate limits on the appropriate occasions. (Parsons:1951:150) (my italics)

Thus, action that is outside the role/subject position is always defined as an instance of temporary transgression or deviancy. Parsons and postmodernists/feminists alike simply have no way of dealing with sustained, systematic form of resistant action that is persistent and ordered; it can never be rational. This action is authentic social action, ipso facto. Barnes argues that his notion of the social, being confined to a psychological disposition, is simply too narrow, and with it rational action is never

dealt with comprehensively. Nowhere does he deal with the interpretive practices that individuals and groups bring to the things they do.

Likewise, the postmodernists/feminists have an equally ambiguous position towards action and, in fact, this reflects why it is rarely 'seen'. I return to the quote from Grosz: 'dominant representational systems ... leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity'. They question how, and from where, active femininity may emerge. This is only a problem because they have elevated (illegitimate) norms as the causes of the action and, because the subject position is the outcome of internalisation of those norms and values, they cannot 'find' any action that is not defined by those norms. Therefore, action is characterised by compliance.

By tackling motivation in terms of internalised norms and values, Parsons automatically treats them as the causes of action. This remains one of Parsons' fundamental errors. As Heritage succinctly defines it:

this treatment inexorably draws attention away from the logic of action, that is the interpretative bases in which actions are constructed and understood in terms which are meaningful to the actors involved. Starting from a framework which began with the subjective point of view of the actor, Parsons had arrived at an entirely *external* analysis of the norms and values which he treated as constraining and determining conduct. (Heritage:1984:18)

Parsons made what is truly social a condition of acting in accordance with internalised norms and values. Therefore, what is truly *social* in any order must be the outcome of individualised, subjectively motivated actions, produced through the internalisation of the appropriate norms and values. Furthermore, any action that is to count as social must be caused, via constraint and conditioning, by those very same norms and values. In effect, Parsons has reduced the social to clear unambiguous *psychological* states. Again, this parallels the notion that the normative order, redefined as ideology, occupies the subject: the subject is that subject position: the paternal law, via the universality of language, assumes an internalised, psychological dimension. In fact, by re-casting the normative order into a linguistic entity, Lacanianism secures it further by making the very system through which, and by which, we speak. It is the *determining* function awarded to norms and values, equating them with the causes of action, that fundamentally failed to *integrate the micro-practices that people do with the system*. Thus, despite this endeavour to integrate the system and actors, Parsons ends up effectively with a model of the actor that is unable to undertake *social* action. Hence his failure to account for deviancy and social change. The social order is effective through the psychological make-up of the actor; deviation from that order is symptomatic of a pathology or at least, in Parsonsian terms, the non-rational.

Nayak's work also introduces an additional problem, which reflects the emphasis I placed upon his stipulations regarding the subject positions instituted through the representation. Functionalist reason stipulates that the normative order assume an internal position. How then are we to account for a body that assumes two subject positions simultaneously? Or rather, how is the actor to perform, in accordance with the normative order, in two social roles that conflict? In addition, how is a subject to

respond? Do I respond to you because you are a man who happens to be middle class like me, or do I respond to your difference, namely your gender? Nayak thus finds himself confronted with the impossibility of dealing with two structural locations and thus two subject positions that the body intersects at the same time. This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind has tended to remain silent regarding such intersections. This form of theorising merely extends the categorical logic by adding one category upon another. Never are the categories integrated. This theorisation cannot consider embodiment, which attempts to fuse together these elements. Rather, the analysis is subject to the same problems as the sex/gender distinction by leaving the naturalised classifications intact. It neither integrates them into the flow of life nor deconstructs the categorical logic that underpins the classification.

Thus, just as Parsons loses sight of action, so too do the postmodernists/feminists when they seek to apply their model. Parsons' actor acts on the basis of his internalised position, in accordance with an organised set of rules. In parallel, actions that define the feminine are those actions that support and reproduce the order. I have argued that only if one adopts Flax's position does the empirical problem of 'women emerge. They have made the patriarchal normative order the very 'soul' of the feminine and, consequently, the motivations and desires are caused by norms of that order. Hence, Benhabib's critique that this leaves us without an active and socially-situated subject.

The overly determining function awarded the internalisation of the norms and values extends beyond the failure to address sustained and rational resistance; it equally distorts both Parsons' and the postmodernist/feminist treatment of regular social action. For example, the creative output of a conversation falls outside analysis. One can discuss, one may have a particularly coherent line of argument composed before the conversation begins and one may abide by the rules of conversation, nevertheless, the exchange and identifying where the conversation ends cannot be defined by adherence to those norms. They cannot determine the nuances that really define a conversation (Gadamer:1979). Such social interactions are sustained without recourse to a normative order. The conversation, in any form, is not the re-performance of the norms. I have in mind here the emerging trend to stress that the representation is a re-presentation, thereby re-establishing the feminine as passive and its associate identification. Just as with Parsons, such an emphasis simplifies greatly the complexity and depth of social interaction and/or interpretive actions which an ongoing activity requires. The indeterminacy that Lacan allows through the slipping signifier has to be foreclosed so that the structural relationship between the feminine as other and the Masculine as the speaking 'I' can be sustained. The consequence is that the signifier returns to the feminine as castrated. The feminist normative criteria require the foreclosure of what meanings can be generated and thus spoken. We have two famous instances of this: first, Kristeva, who argues that 'strictly speaking there is no such thing as a Woman' (1986); second, Spivak (Nelson and Grossberg:1988) makes the same error when she asks whether the Subaltern can speak. Therefore, the subject position is even more determined by the normative order than in Parsons.

However, I argue that, on the contrary, feminists are able to make the critiques they do precisely because the normative order does not attain an internal position. They have identified the capacity of individuals to assume other values where circumstances encourage it, which is precisely the skill that confidence tricksters deploy (Goffman:1969). What such examples show is that, far from

internalising norms and values, which makes them stable and fixed, such stability is the outcome of contexts of action, not of the individual. Again this reflects the critical emphasis I have placed upon the requirement that a subject submit to the law to assume the 'I', as argued by the postmodernists/feminists. I have argued throughout that the postmodern agenda cannot merely seek non-identity and maintain the existence of the social order, illegitimate or otherwise. Thus individuals move between contexts because they have the rational dexterity to adopt new situations, to more situationally appropriate norms. It reveals the extent to which individuals utilise instrumental, rational responses to the demands that a context sets. For example, some homosexuals are only out socially, which means that they are able to draw upon situationally appropriate conventions to pass at work. The normative order cannot be both responsible for the formation of the subject and yet too weak to allow it to be set aside if the context so demands. This runs beneath the critique of the assumption that ideology is effective in the formation of the subject, yet so weak as to provide psychic capacity so that any subject position is available within that circuit. We cannot be both formed through such structural positions and yet free to assume any identification our desire demands. Accepting that we live *with* the normative order and rejecting that we *are* the normative order means that we can account for the variability of interpretation without losing sight of the social context that stabilises interpretive acts that gives them meaning. Thus, most importantly, the rejection of the notion that the normative order assumes an internal position means that we return norms and values to the public domain.⁵⁷ Thus, we are able to consider representations reflexively, while maintaining their location within the social world.

Barnes concludes:

Social action is not co-extensive with normatively constrained action; it extends beyond it. Norms and values are not implanted stably in individual minds; they persist in the public realm not the private, the social context not the individual psyche. Norms and values have no inherent implications which enforce and sustain a social order; on the contrary they are provided with implications by interacting human beings, so that what norms imply can in no sense explain how people interact. Accordingly, we can conclude, without equivocation or qualification, that normative determinism fails. (Barnes:1979:36)

Likewise, the postmodernist/feminist agenda equally fails to describe social action because it redefines the normative order as ideological and seeks to locate the effectivity of the normative order within the formation of the subject. This model, in a bid to pursue a radical agenda, equally brings about exclusion of social action, replacing it instead with privatised, highly concealed motivations. Moreover, just as Parsons ends up with a model of the actor who often is unable to give the real determining or motivating forces behind his/her action unless the description happens to correspond with the determinative subjective elements (Bohman:1991:36), the postmodernist/feminist cannot integrate the conscious descriptions and meanings that actors award their own action into the model of social

⁵⁷ I am indebted to Barnes for pointing out that the internalisation of the normative order signals the privatisation of the linguistic, normative domain. I develop this in the conclusion.

causation. This is why pleasure is addressed via the concealed homoerotic orientation, an orientation that is equally concealed from the conscious subject.

IN CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the postmodernist/feminist model assumes an inferential relationship between the representation of the masculine/active and feminine/passive axis and the correlated formation of the subject position as subjectivity. By further embedding this axis within the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, postmodernism/feminism forecloses the forms of codification and meaning that the representation can assume and thus forecloses the subjectivities it positions. Moreover, I argued that the broader psychoanalytic context reveals an implicit dependence upon functionalist reason that ostensibly organises the structural imperatives of the social order as equivalent to the social roles or subject positions performed: the subject *is* the normative order. This description asserts that the nature of the Symbolic operation is such that it will construct modes of codification that categorically distribute the feminine with the passive. Only then can the feminine be utilised to define the masculine as its opposite, with the consequence that the feminine is defined as the absolute Other. I also added that, theoretically, the sign in fact is as the stereotypes were, in the sense that there remains an implicit commitment to the notion that the representation could furnish an authentic identity.

CONTENT ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL REASSESSMENT

The empirical work undertaken here seeks to investigate the validity of the assumed descriptions and codes derived from this inferential relationship. I propose that in order to challenge the postmodernist/feminist description it is necessary to trace anew the extent to which the Symbolic, which assumes sexual difference is the primary difference, remains the pervasive determinant of representation and, if so, in what form. I do so by undertaking a content analysis of fashion advertisements because only by engaging with the manifest and generalised features of a collection of images can we get a sense of the extent to which the feminine is actually *categorically* connected to the passive. I argue that if the feminine as passive defines the Symbolic, then it must be apparent within our universe of representations, fashion advertisements included. Semiotics can readily produce a number of instances where the meaning is clearly marked by the gendered oppositions of the Symbolic. However, I argue that the increasing dominance of semiotic analyses, which produce intricate maps of meaning of a handful of images, is at the expense of the generalisable contours. Resulting from the tendency to give disproportionate attention to *how* meaning is produced at the expense of *what* generalised features are manifest within representation, I propose that we are no longer familiar with the manifest features of representation.

Therefore, I argue that we need to readdress the basic features of images: is it still the case that core-gendered dichotomies of the Symbolic empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of representation? I attend to this by applying a taxonomy of the body that combines specific gendered gestures and postures with the broader techniques that construct the image. Together, these conventionalised features connect to the discursive features of the Symbolic that produce sexual difference. I have isolated codes that are paradigmatic to the postmodern/feminist agenda, as well as identifying codes that correspond to key elements of their agenda. Hence, the taxonomy is guided by two principles:

1. The final meaning ought to ensure that the feminine-as-passive is manifestly apparent.
2. This level of meaning is graspable using content analysis because the meaning attended to is conventional and not unduly complex.

I am suggesting that if content analysis is strictly confined to '*what* is in the image' it can make an effective contribution to cultural analysis.

Principally, content analysis must concern itself with conventional patterns of representation that are regular and manifest. By locating the nature of a category within the conventions that form it, one can place some distance between its historical association with objectivism and inappropriate truth claims regarding a cultural form, while systematically collating generalised forms of representation. I will attend to this level analysis by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, regarding the productive codification of gender. Only if the content analysis strongly indicates that the categorical distribution is empirically dominant can the strength of their claims regarding the fixity of the Symbolic and the sexual difference it produces be considered legitimate. Moreover, I argue that the overt interrelationship between the advertisement image and the economic base within which it is produced limits the complexity of the 'advertisement as text', because advertisements are first and

foremost economic: they must secure consumption. Therefore, I suggest that there is a level of meaning found in the cultural form of advertising that is conventional, regular and thoroughly public. Content analysis is able systematically to access this level of meaning. In fact, it is best placed to analyse the manifest features of meaning providing it is *confined* to its conventional level.

METHOD AND REPRESENTATION

The chapter begins with a discussion of the principal aims of the empirical research and introduces some of the central methodological issues involved. I will draw out from a summary of the postmodernist/feminist model the combined theoretical and methodological weaknesses that are a consequence of sole dependence upon semiotics. I will then follow this by explaining why my aims are best examined using content analysis, despite its weaknesses, particularly positivistic associations, and its supersedence by semiotics. Hence, this initial introduction examines the relationship between the theoretical aims and the methods chosen, particularly their respective strengths and weaknesses.

I go on to describe why fashion advertisements were selected, the magazines from which the sample was taken and the sampling technique and the use of chi-square to analyse the frequency data generated. I also provide a description of the statistics package 'Snap for Windows', explaining the different formats and the impact that filtering and suspending elements of the sample population has upon the results.

A detailed description of the taxonomy⁵⁸ follows, paying particular attention to sources and debates that it references and analyses. Alongside the codes identified by the postmodernists/feminists, I have also included a number of variables that draw directly upon Goffman's 'Gender Advertisements' (1979). In particular, I have adopted from Goffman the way frames draw upon specific features of social interaction and stylise them (see Leiss et al. (1986) for an alternative application). In this way, 'hyper-realistic' codifications function by making seemingly 'realistic' representations of ourselves. Through the hyper-ritualistic transformations, images can appear to be 'about our social world' and yet fundamentally divorced from that reality; for example, relative positions in space can be reproduced within the two-dimensional frame and thus convey the same conventions of status. The same model of identifying regular units that guide the composition of the commercial image has been used here. The notion of commercial realism appeals because it foregrounds the centrality of the economic function, and combines this with the mode of representation it produces.

This is followed by a discussion of the methodological departure that is specific to this research. Unlike many forms of research examining sex scales or other stereotypes, I have refrained from defining those features that are feminine as part of the operationalisation. As an alternative, I have isolated a series of codes that have been used to describe gender, but I do not organise, prior to the data analysis, which descriptive term reflects which gender. Connell (1987) discusses the categorical nature of much of the research on sexual type and character, which I argue equally defines the logic that is also present in the feminist studies discussed above. I argue that the alignment of gendered codes to the sexed body prior to the data analysis reproduces the 'truth' that these very same categories continue to

⁵⁸ For a detailed description of the evaluative criteria used for each code developed, see appendix.

describe the gender well. My aim is to avoid such closures as well as expand upon the existing discussion of the categorical nature of much of the research surrounding 'the feminine'.

The final section presents the reasons why I have elected to undertake a quantitative method within a more broadly interpretive model. Attention will focus upon the justification for the quantification of meaning, paying particular attention to defending the position that signs can be dissected according to specific categories, and that these categories do not merely reflect some form of discursive imposition. The notion of the conventional origins, rather than objectivist origins, of the category is central here.

AIMS

The taxonomy aims to problematise the assumptions that underpin the dominant explanatory models in feminist Cultural Studies and the postmodern philosophical models that inform it. They focus upon the deep features of the social order that are determined by essential dualistic terms; terms derived initially from Lévi-Strauss and reconfigured into essential linguistic structures by Derrida⁵⁹ (Delphy:1996; Cowie:1997). I argue that the structural legacy that remains implicit within this model removes the prospect that social dimensions can change and shift in a qualitative sense, rather than emerging as another example or presentation of the same (denoted the neologism '(re)presentation') (Descombes:1986). In particular, it removes from the view the possibilities that representations of gender could converge insofar as they begin to share key presentational features. This would problematise the categoricalism that defines their analysis. I have suggested that one of the outcomes of this theoretical model is its failure to identify both the extent to which the masculine is now sexualised and commodified and, most importantly, that these processes may in fact be converging with the feminine so that the male body is codified using the same visual techniques. In the preceding chapter, I offered a critique of the reorganisation of an example that 'on surface' appears to contradict the Symbolic order as in fact constituting another instance of the Symbolic, often by using the imaginary to reassert the binary logic.

Thus, a singularly important element remains the presumed universality of the signs. This is partly derived from the content analyses conducted during the late 1960s and early 1970s where the universality of certain features were *empirically demonstrated*. Hence, I aim to re-examine the extent to which the dichotomies traced still empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of representation. I will do this by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, between the codification of men and women: how is the body codified and where does the gender differentiation lie? Describing the manifest forms of gender display that advertisements put to use traces anew the general trends in gender advertisements, and this raises a number of core research questions:

1. Is it still possible to describe the modes of representation in dichotomous terms?

⁵⁹ This is important because it is also the source that treats the representation as real in a way a corporeal body is real; that is, the body dissolves into a discursive register rather than being an entity that both limits what that register can be and also limits an individual's capacity to represent a feature of that register, under normal circumstances. Berthelot, *Body and Society*, 1995.

2. To what extent have these representations remained the same over time?
3. Is the core dichotomy of masculine activity and feminine passivity still *the* central ideological feature?

Together these form the following problematic:

4. What are the relationships between men and women and the codes, props, contexts and body positions that maintain objectification and commodification as gendered processes within representation?

I cannot stress enough that *no inferential statement is made or presumed about the relationship of representation to identity*. On the contrary, the overall aim of this thesis is to contest this very inference. Neither do I claim that the data generated can be generalised to extend to the genre of advertisements per se, let alone all representations of men and women. I suggest only that if the postmodernist/feminist argument is to hold true at all then the description it provides ought to be applicable here. I argue that to make an effective critique of the paradigmatic hold that the postmodernist/feminist description and analysis have within the academic community, it is necessary to apply systematically their terms to the images in circulation.

CENTRAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Content analysis refers to a standard set of statistically manipulable symbols representing the presence, the intensity or the frequency of some characteristics relevant to social science.
(Roberts:1997:14)

I elected to conduct a content analysis precisely because it aims to trace *standard symbols* that can be systematically applied to a sample population. This goes some way to balancing the current dominance of semiotics that attends to the detailed specificities of a single image. By producing systematic descriptive data, content analysis identifies the central features that define the representations in that particular cultural field or cultural market. This macro perspective furnishes patterns that are almost impossible to identify unless large numbers are assessed according to the same criteria, and, despite certain issues addressed in a moment, this remains one of its central empirical contributions. In particular, without a 'survey' of representation, we face the following dilemma: one example is presented as an instance of cultural change and another may be offered as a counter example; which application is actually representative of change or social status? In theory, this could continue indefinitely unless a context is provided in which we have a sense of how 'representative' either illustration is. Conducting a content analysis provides systematic organisation and operationalisation of the criteria by which an image is to be analysed. When combined, the systematic framework organises the data in ways that separate the material from the impressions one forms and the tertiary levels of interpretation (Panofsky:1970) in which one readily engages. Yet what one loses in the subtlety of interpretation that attending the tertiary level provides one gains in critical distance.

Berelson (1971) has set a number of methodological parameters that guide the application of this method. First, Berelson argues that content analysis can best follow the scientific research criteria if the operationalisation utilises systematic procedures, which integrate objective practices into the coding frame. Second, he argues that this principle therefore requires that the content subject to statistical manipulation must be of a manifest form only. Therefore, he argues that there ought to be a picture of the general context so that those elements that are factual and their associate meanings can be quantified. There is a specific departure that I make regarding the conventions of content analysis. I redefine my categories as systematic rather than objective. By making this shift, I wish to import the notion that the categories are reflexively constructed so that they connect to both the area under analysis and to specific community interpreters. The assumption that meaning can be unproblematically divided into its manifest and 'latent' forms illustrates one of the grounds on which positivistic applications of content analysis have been so thoroughly rejected. This is why I have endeavoured to pin my categories to those that have emerged from the postmodernist/feminist analysis. Therefore, my categories are not necessarily universal, but they are sufficiently public within the terms of the debates and critiques here to be applicable in a systematic way.

There is an additional impact that treating the categories as conventional and regular rather than objective has upon the status of the statistical analysis. I recognise that 'statistical analysis is only as good as its operationalisation', which is why the contexts, both socio-historical and linguistic, have a direct bearing upon the categorisation and that the specific conventions that I draw upon have been made as visible as possible. Therefore, I make no claim that the categories contained here are final, or 'hard facts', or mind-independent features that reveal something 'fundamentally true'. Arguably, such claims were always outside the remit of content analysis. I argue only that reflexive and systematic application of the codes provides a context so that it is possible to engage in a critical commentary with the postmodernist/feminist descriptions of the gendered body.

Next, the results of such analysis cannot be extended beyond the sample population. This principle is one that Liess, Kline and Jhally (1986) advocate also. This means that any results obtained from the taxonomy cannot be extended beyond the population of fashion advertisements. Therefore, I make no assertions that the shifts that may occur reflect some broader shifts in the Symbolic. Abiding by this strict principle of application does not affect the critique made: the postmodernist/feminist analysis asserts that the gendered dualisms are primary and thus they must be apparent in most mainstream, if not all, representation. Therefore, if these dualisms are not found to organise the representations analysed here, this undermines their claims for the centrality and unity of the Symbolic and sexual difference. Following Berelson, I do not seek to extend the specific features identified here to other forms of representation, but argue that the empirically identified manifest content contests the presumed universality and categorical distributions of the cultural signs in circulation.

Unlike Krippendorff (1980), Berelson (1971) argues that content analysis cannot furnish inferential statements regarding impact or effect of the communication. Again, Liess et al. (1986) equally regard this as outside the remit of content analysis. They argue that the most beneficial outcome of conducting a content analysis is derived from the patterns that emerge from processing large sample sizes. This also stands in opposition to other forms of analysis proposed by Cartwright

(1953 in Berelson:1971), for example, who advocates the extension of content analysis to behaviour observation, such as 'NVC' studies in psychology. This hits at the centre of the debates concerning content analysis among its practitioners: whether content analysis should and can provide inferences regarding the encoding process and what the audiences do with the product. Following Berelson and Leiss et al., I argue this extends content analysis beyond its remit; coding observation removes the centrality of conscious intentional meaning that combines with the embodied performance, which does not lend itself to quantification.

I have also queried the inferential relationship presumed between representation and identity by arguing that the descriptive detail of an image is insufficient to describe the 'effects' on, formation of or interpretations of the subject. This reflects both my theoretical concerns of tracing the general contours of a group of gender representation, as well as providing defining limits of what a 'survey' application can reveal. I will make the case below that advertisements function through simplification of the social world and thus do not operate through anything like the same complexity of exchange that marks streams of interactions within the lived social world. I make no claims that what is presented here is 'a definitive statement' on the representations under consideration. This is not, therefore, the only way these images could be approached.

Shapiro and Markoff argue:

the effort to analyse a society or personality, or to learn something of importance about it exclusively by means of a content analysis of some of its literary products, is, in our view, based upon much more questionable methodological principles than the more modest (but sufficiently difficult) effort to measure one or more variables by means of some kind of processing of the text. (1997:17)

In other words, grappling with meaning is not a sufficient base from which to make inferences about interpretive activities or the formation of subjectivities. This suggests that perhaps what caused content analysis to lose favour is not just the emergence of a paradigmatic shift in the model of signification, but that it had been extended beyond its proper parameters. Content analysis tended to shift from identifying stereotypes to tracing the effects in the formation of sexual character; for example the output of the *Social Roles* journal.

METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

However, demarcating more clearly the appropriate domain of application may improve matters, but it falls short of answering the deeper critique that semiotics launches, particularly those regarding the nature of meaning: semiotics refutes that meaning can be captured when communication is broken down into discrete categories of form and content. The central methodological departure that semiotics introduces is that meaning is an internal structure. The object of analysis is therefore to learn how the signifier, or the material vehicle, carries the signified to the interpreter. This is said to constitute a paradigmatic departure because it rejects outright the notion that meaning can be manifest

or on the surface (Dyer:1993; Leiss et al:1986). The semiotic model argues that meaning is dependent upon the place of any particular item within an entire system. Thus, isolating any element significantly alters the meaning of that element, as well as the whole structure. For example, it may well be the connotive feature of the sign that is the centre of the meaning, but this connotation is secured only through its relationship; 'BEANZ MEANZ HEINZ', for example. This is partly countered by the appeal to the distinction between the denotative and the connotative. The denotation aims to trace a particular concept or category upon which the connotation was placed. Thus, all significations are of this form (denotative) or a derivative of this form (connotative). However, the Saussurian distinction that separates the signifier from the signified is a theoretical distinction only: the meaning is both elements at the same time (Barthes:1978). Moreover, as each derivative develops it builds up these associations, wherein each single signifier generates several signifieds in succession. Thus each concept has a chain of potential associations, each one building up chains of its own so much that the immediate mental concept or denotation becomes more abstract. In the end, the denotation can be impossible to find as it is encompassed by ever more meaning. The denotative object or concept can no longer be merely itself. Thus, stable categories cannot be isolated from this chain because they are in effect the workings of the content and the connotation. It queries whether the object can maintain the meaning of what it merely is.

This is the main area of the critique that is launched at content analysis: one cannot isolate a category because it is 'taking over' play of implied, connotative meaning. Moreover, it is argued that the connotative meaning increasingly assumes central position, that is, the Symbolic order is primary. For example, Sawschuk (1989) examines an advertisement from a Dior campaign and draws our attention to two elements. First, she addresses the gendering of the word 'Coloniales', which she argues signifies woman as the colonised subject at the same time as she is elevated to the level of the exotic. Second, she draws attention to the headscarf, which with closer inspection is in fact the flower anthurium. She argues that the centrality of the flower is not one of illusion necessarily but has to do with the phallic signification of the stamen. Thus, the connotative takes centre stage, defining the meanings by which the woman's face is encoded, which requires both the flower to be the substituted phallus and the feminine 'e' to anchor the meaning of the image. This displaces the importance of quantity or frequency because the meaning of the items within the message has no understandable context, without establishing their interrelation.⁶⁰

However, implicit within this model of signification is the notion that meaning cannot be stable. Only the combination of the context and the specific interactions of the signifier and signified can trace meaning. This may well be the base from which all meaning emerges once the propositional foundations of objectivist models of language are rejected. However, this needs to be combined with the fact that even simple statements are derived from the same interactions, but they are nevertheless a stable feature of social interactions, so that we do not treat basic categories of language as problematic (Goffman; Lakoff; Eco). If we cannot treat language as regular, conventional and stable, that is, stable enough to count certain examples, then we are rejecting the notion that meaning is ready at hand

⁶⁰ This also gives an indication of the case with which difference has been brought into the analysis of commercial culture.

(Cavell:1995). This implies that each set of interactions is equally specific. If this were the case, there can be no generalisable or conventional features to meaning, each meaning being singular and new. This seems to negate the public and conventional nature of meaning, that is, meaning that is in social circulation. I argue that convention is central to how meaning operates, in fact, to how anything is meaningful at all (Cavell:1995; Taylor:1985). It is in this sense that I have emphasised that content analysis (a) must be confined to the manifest features and (b) provides no evidence from which to make inferences beyond the sample population. To this I add that as competent linguistic users, we can practically apply a category at its denotative level, even if in effect this is an artificial distinction in the production of meaning (Cavell:1995). Even if meaning cannot be finalised, this does not mean that meaning can never be stable and thus treated as foundational for pragmatic reasons (Benhabib:1992).

Yet this does not clarify when semiotics is an essential method and when content analysis is appropriate. When is the meaning conventional and when is it more complex, thus requiring an analysis of its specificities? I turn briefly to the three levels of meaning to which Panofsky (1970) refers in order to elucidate how we might differentiate them.⁶¹ The first level he develops is described as that of the primary subject matter, which consists of lights, colour, shape and movement, that is, those features that contribute to the elementary understanding of representation, whether of people, objects, gestures, poses or expressions and the interrelations that comprise events. This level of meaning corresponds well with the notion of manifest meaning, which operates on the surface. I argue that content analysis is able to contend with this level of meaning. The secondary level is associated with the more complex composite and conventional sets of meaning that relate to the wider culture. He gives the examples of particular motifs that are linked to themes and concepts. These motifs combine to form sets of images and combinations of images that form stories and allegories. Where my codes connect to the wider culture they do so because they have been drawn out from the various semiotic readings, and belong to and are recognised by a specific community with whom I am in contention. Finally, Panofsky describes the level of meaning that is most complex as the intrinsic meaning that combines with underlying principles, which reveal the basic attitudes of a nation, a period, class and so forth. This is comparable to Gadamer's notion of the interpretive horizon (1975).

This model establishes some boundaries between levels of meaning to which content analysis can be applied and the levels of meaning that can be grasped only by semiotics. Clearly, opting for a systematic approach to the content of advertisements is necessarily at the expense of the more subtle and deeper engagement with meaning that semiotics provides. However, this in itself is insufficient grounds to reject content analysis, since it mirrors, in a sense, the 'cost benefit' analysis between quantitative and qualitative research: a strength of one is the weakness of the other. When images are treated as a population, we are able to identify generalised trends: when images are examined singularly, we are able to trace the interactions required for the production of meaning. We exchange the 'what' of the image for the 'how' of the image. Yet, despite the strength of semiotics in exploring how meanings connect and interact, it nevertheless faces problems also. My main criticism refers to the absence of a systematic methodological approach with which much of this form of analysis is

⁶¹ Panofsky's study applies specifically to his analysis of paintings, but I think as a guide it is applicable to most symbolic artefacts.

undertaken within Cultural Studies as a whole. One should never generalise from specific and limited examples, however valid the data furnished.

Returning to the historical emergence of semiotics within Cultural Studies, I have embedded this within the broad contours of representation that the survey of the images, that is, content analysis, had established. However, what occurs now is that single images, sometimes a few, are selected and analysed in such a way that they are assumed to describe the macro ordering of ideology. The examples analysed are then taken as examples of the (re)presentation of ideological forces. At no point have the images selected gone through any systematic procedures. Unlike in qualitative analysis in the social sciences, those interviewed have been systematically selected from the relevant sample population. The findings that are generated out of these unstructured interviews are extended beyond the specific individuals; that is, the results are high in validity, because of the strict sampling procedures initially followed. Therefore, the small sample co-exists in regard to its relationship with the wider population. In no cases during my literature research was I introduced to reasons why these particular images were selected. Therefore, there are no checks or balances in place with which to prevent the selection from being guided, consciously or otherwise, precisely because they are instances that reflect their model of argument. For example, in Krockers and Krockers' *Panic Bodies* (1988), Faurshou and Sawchuck both selected the same Christian Dior advertisement to show that the feminine and the oriental are both the Other to the Law of the Father. Alternatively, Doane (1988), Cowie (1997) and Mayne (1993) have all undertaken analysis of *Now Voyager*. This surely carries the implication that the advertisement was picked because it demonstrates the argument, rather than forming or adjusting the argument as a result of the empirical evidence.

Second, I argue that the postmodernist/feminist applications of semiotics, applied as part of a broader ideological critique, readily make inferences regarding the effects upon subject (position formed). This is why psychoanalysis is central to their model of argument. They use it and the meanings produced through the Symbolic both as the base by which the image functions and the base by which the image can be assumed to be representative; the latter being premised upon the universality of the Oedipal story and its subsequent organisation of the feminine as passive. Therefore, they are using an analysis of how meaning is formed and extending it inferentially to describe the identification process the subject positions constituted. I argue that this is equally beyond the remit of semiotics.

Therefore, the appropriateness of content analysis rests with the following issues: what sort of meaning is produced within the form of the advertisement?; how do we get a handle on the various levels of meaning to which a systematic analysis is appropriate? First, I argue that advertisements are not defined by high levels of complexity and that the blanket term of 'text' obscures the considerable differences between them and thus the appropriate methods to analyse them. Second, the methodological link between the complexity and subtlety of the tertiary level and the regular manifest levels of meaning, with which I argue advertisements deal, is convention. A successful advertisement is one where the targeted consumer connects the commodifying meaning to the product in question. Next, where advertisements tell stories, in this case about what men and women are, they do so by drawing from the complex flow of gendered interactions, condensing them so that they are readily identified and

presenting them back as realistic versions of those interactions. Barthes (1972) argues that this is how advertisements contribute the production of modern myths, while Goffman (1979) upon whom I explicitly draw, defines this as the hyper-ritualisation. However, before I discuss in more detail the relationship between the advertisement and the social presentations made, I will describe the sampling procedure and the population source and define the categories operationalised.

Essentially this entails a defence of counting the respective frequencies of the codes as they occur on the bodies of men and women. I counter the charge that the categories I have developed are merely an interpretive imposition in two ways: first, a significant number of the categories in fact identify only the body position, posture and so on that are featured within the two-dimensional frame; second, where more complex codes have been used, these draw upon publicly accepted codes that are recognised as central to representation of the genderised active/passive dualism. The codes are therefore either drawn from embodied categories (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson: 1987) or reference directly ideological patterns that the postmodernist/feminist programme identifies as key to the (re)presentation of the feminine as passive.

To question the homogenised description of postmodernism/feminism requires attending anew to the manifest content of representations. Therefore, I aim to challenge directly the closures identified above in three distinct ways:

1. If the gendered dichotomy is operative in the way postmodernists/feminists define it, then this ought to be readily available to interpretation, by which I mean that it ought to be 'on the surface' rather than requiring complex semiotic readings from all readers. The abstractions that stipulate that representation is an outcome of a phallic order of signification are the primary target.
2. It is necessary to re-engage with what an image 'is'. Goffman argues that in order to understand its relationship to power it is necessary to pay attention to its resource, its production, which is dependent upon those resources, and the cultural meanings involved in the latter; I therefore query that the power lies in the image.
3. The abstractions dissipate the body as an entity and, in consequence, the body as locus of action is dispelled. I return the body by examining what the body must *do* to be self-evidently passive, that is, identifying how the body performs the supposedly determining dualism. I therefore seek to trace the manifest content by examining how the body itself performs these presentational features.

In this way, the taxonomy pays specific attention to the visual conventions of the body - *what is the body doing when it does passivity?* - which are combined with the specific conventions of the image.

I have organised the masculine and feminine according to the ways the body is conventionally positioned and what the body must *do* visually to perform the semiotic effect of passivity, as well as looking at 'who' does that performance. I have attempted to take a step back to see anew what might be involved in this accomplishment. This directly reflects the influence of Goffman's examination of the 'presentation self' (1969) when it is re-cast into the domain of representation (1974). By emphasising the materiality of the body, I have sought to use it as a base, thereby starting with 'body as action' rather than the 'body as system outcome'. I break down the broader ideological contours to identify the

units of the body that combine to produce them. Therefore, the emphasis is placed upon what the corporeal body can *do* in presentation, instead of treating it as the *outcome* of representation. I seek to shift the emphasis a little by considering the ways in which the body is involved in the representation and then locate this representation back into the social world. In this way, I want to think of the representation and its impact in terms of locations in social action where poses may be taken up, perhaps in different domains of social interaction. This shifts the emphasis away from merely defining our postures as the outcome of a prior representation. Thinking about the active body introduces a space wherein we transform ourselves, perhaps only minimally by ridding the posture of its artifice, but at least acknowledging that we are competent users and interpreters of those presentations. I propose that we ought to consider inverting the direction of causes, namely that we have the representations we do because they rely upon our conventions of embodied interaction. This is, in effect, what I mean when I say that we should not only examine the body as system or structural outcome.

As well as addressing the specific features of the body and its codes, I have also drawn upon various codes identified by postmodernism/feminism. My aim here is to apply the codes and turn them back upon themselves, as it were, that is, use their own criteria to assess just how frequently the feminine is represented and codified using the soft focus, for example. A central defence of the use of content analysis rests on the fact that I am drawing upon a bank of established codifications, both as a public source by which to apply the codes, but also that the public recognition ensures that the codes are not merely a set of (private) discursive impositions. Postmodernist/feminist argument is dependent upon anchoring the code of specific sets of meaning that re-confirm the reign of the phallus. Thus, they have isolated codes such as soft focus, different forms of concealing the face, different direction of looks to demonstrate the symbolic production of the feminine as fetish, for example. The elaboration of a semiotic reading from specific codes is not the remit of the content analysis either. I have merely applied these codes on the basis that a majority ought to be prevalent and categorically distributed in order to make the case they do. Therefore, I mobilise their criteria to trace the potential shifts in representation.

FASHION ADVERTISEMENTS

The sample is confined to fashion advertising, notably because if one seeks the specific elaborations of a commodified and sexualised femininity within hegemonic cultural forms, one would expect to find it within this intensely visual domain. Therefore, I argue that this weights the analysis towards re-establishing categorical sexual difference. Hence, I begin with the specific elements that relate to feminist critique. First, fashion directly links the presentation of femininity to the economic realm. Second, the advertisement can utilise almost any social scene, be it within the public or private domain, because clothes are a universal feature of social life. Therefore the image makers have at their disposal a whole range of ideological tools (Lash and Urry:1994; Featherstone:1982:1991; Wernick:1991 Jameson:1984), for example, placing single women in the domestic sphere and always accompanied by men in public space (Goffman:1979). Third, fashion is a central domain for the institution of various disciplines imposed upon the female body, particularly dieting regimes. This links

directly with other contemporary debates on the health of body, for example the stiletto heel: the shoe damages the foot as well as altering the position and shape of the spine, thus placing it under considerable strain (Bordo;1993; Sawuschuk in Krocke and Krocke:1989). Fourth, by examining fashion one is able to integrate the foundation of postmodernist/feminist critique to the wider normative assumptions regarding the essential feminine body. This is the 'real and natural body' that is subject to distortion and control in order to meet the aesthetic of extreme thinness that renders the real woman's body child-like.

Regarding more broadly sociological issues, considering fashion firmly locates us within the problem of the body for it signals the possibilities for intentional elaboration of the body as a manipulable, material surface and form within certain social structural possibilities. Not only is the latter signalled by the increasing capacity of people to integrate various commodities into a specific style, but it also marks the entry of social structure in that this governs the sense that can be made of the development of a style. This connects back to the position outlined above that signs are manipulable within highly regular and structured contexts. Moreover, it reveals the extent to which the corporeal body forms a significant base to these practices (Shilling:1993).

An additional and distinctly sociological interrogation of the body also makes its point for entry here: clothes remain a central and regular practice undertaken to accomplish accurate sex assignment. Plucking eyebrows; shaving legs; walking in way that makes wearing high heels possible, which impacts upon the muscle development in the legs; wearing skirts which alter how one can sit, especially if it is short; colour; the way the shirt buttons up: these are all common-sense, relatively unseen features of accomplishing gender. As we all pre-reflexively assign sex where genital confirmation is not possible, the detail of 'sex' that we read every day is carried by the clothes we wear (Kessler and McKenna:1978; Kessler:1994; Garfinkel:1967). The unquestioning commitment we have to 'two absolute sexes, and that I am most definitely one' is carried through the clothes with which we perform our gender. For example, breasts are more frequently used to convey a social gender than to perform a specific biological function. Thus, clothes play a central role in the discursive construction of sex upon which the decisions as to what clothes we wear is built, as well as the kind of femininity a woman may want to perform. Thus, clothes are central to 'keying' or practical and performative accomplishment of sex.

MAGAZINE SAMPLE

The magazines chosen are *Cosmopolitan*, *Arena*, *The Face* and *i-D*.⁶² They have the same target audience age of 18 to 35 years. There are no lifestyle magazines targeted solely at men outside this target age group and also there are no lifestyle magazines of comparable genre that are targeted at both men and women outside this age group like *The Face* for example. *Arena* and *Cosmopolitan* are single-sex magazines. Both magazines contain generic features on fashion, style, interviews, reviews as well as tips on who should wear what, on what sorts of figures and so on. *Cosmopolitan* magazine

⁶² In addition, I could also be assured unrestricted access as they are all held at national libraries, as well as avoiding the conditions of use that are often imposed by the magazines' libraries.

describes itself as 'an intelligent woman's sparkling best friend. Punchy, provocative, and pertinent articles that inform and entertain'.⁶³ Thus, it sets up its discourse as being for and about the 'independent woman'. It is published by National Magazine Company, one of the biggest publishing houses in the UK, which also has a sizeable share of the US market. The recorded circulation figures for *Cosmopolitan* magazine are large at 456,131 readers (*Willings Press Guide*, 1996). Clearly, then, it has significant power within the market, suggesting that it secures the most hegemonic configurations out of the magazines selected; defined as such by its market position and the assumption that it serves 'sectional interests'. *Cosmopolitan* is, arguably, an example of how the commercialisation of the discourse of feminism has co-opted and de-politicised the feminist agenda by making feminism an issue of lifestyle.

An additional reason for selecting *Cosmopolitan* is that it is the prototype of young women's magazines. It was launched in 1971 and has been central in the production of the 'young woman who can have it all'. This sample has been extended back to 1975, which indicates how the representation seems to have shifted since then. The cases assessed will be examined through a number of key clusters in order to tease out some sense of shifting formations of femininity in a magazine that has a privileged position in defining femininity.

The other three magazines reflect different market shares, as well as supplying both the youth and men's markets. *Arena* magazine describes itself as 'general interest magazine for men on the arts, film and fashion'. This magazine has built up a reputation among its target audience as being for the professional single man who takes an 'interest in all things cultured' while maintaining his 'straight' sexuality (Mort:1996:Nixon:1996). *The Face* and *i-D* are youth magazines read by both men and women. The latter emphasises style and fashion, and concentrates on youth sub-cultures, such as the dance scene. Both these magazines are self-consciously stylistic in the sense that they have redrawn the boundaries between the mundane, design and mass culture by bringing slick design and presentation to the layout and interviews.⁶⁴ They do not contain generic features such as problem pages or guides to achieving a flat stomach in ten weeks (see *Men's Health* magazine). Thus, of the four magazines chosen, two are targeted at single-sex audiences and the other two are 'style' or 'youth' magazines. As stated, the magazines have also been selected on the basis of their varying publishers. *The Face* and *Arena* magazine are both published by Wagadon Publishing Ltd.

Wagadon was launched in 1980 with *The Face*. This magazine was considered 'ground-breaking' at the time. Since then, it has come to be a middle-sized publishing company, but with considerable clout because of its original creative input to the magazine markets.⁶⁵ Its circulation figures have fallen since its heyday in the mid-1980s because of the growth of similar magazines but it still maintains a circulation of 107,192 (*Willings*, 1996). *Arena* magazine was launched by Wagadon in 1986. Some difficulties were faced when it was launched as a result of the fact that men as a group were resistant to being identified as such, which is highly significant. As Mort (1996) argues, men were

⁶³ *Willings Press Guide*, 1996. P.348. All other magazine descriptions are also derived from *Willings Press Guide*.

⁶⁴ For a non-academic reference see *The Guardian*, 24th November 1997, or the *Independent on Sunday*, 30th November 1997.

⁶⁵ See *The Guardian*, 24th November 1997 or Mort:1996.

used to being the 'One'⁶⁶ and found the prospect of being defined and identified as having distinct interest from cars to grooming somewhat disempowering. The circulation figure for *Arena* magazine is 76,879 (*Willings*, 1996). *i-D* magazine is published by Level Print Ltd, a small publishing house. Its estimated circulation is about 40,000 per month (*Willings*, 1996). These figures suggest that it is subject to fewer of the commercial pressures dictated by the mass-market sector. It is also a competitor of *The Face*. This raises the issue as to whether the images contained are also non-mainstream and therefore outside the hegemonic concerns of culture.

Together, the magazines provide scope to analyse the extent to which representations of femininity and masculinity are homogeneous, irrespective of the magazine's pitch. For example, is there as high a frequency of macho images of men in both kinds of magazines or do the different target audiences affect the gendered nature of the presentations of the body? If the magazine is aimed at and read by men does it significantly affect the way women are portrayed compared with the way that women are portrayed in a women's magazine? This may reveal any differing stereotypes that one sex has of the other or, alternatively, how one sex wishes the other sex to be represented and thus consumed. Does *Cosmopolitan* magazine predominantly represent men as romantic heroes or as sexual studs, for example?

SAMPLING

The sample is made up of twenty advertisements per magazine and two magazines per year taken from 1975, 1985/7, 1990, 1995. The bulk of the analysis will concentrate upon the time span from 1985/7 to 1995.⁶⁷ The sample is selected from the April and September issues. The six-month period helps to ensure that the results were not overly affected by the pure stylistics of the magazine, thus preventing any results from being an outcome of short-lived trends rather than any substantive shift in the modes of representation. If the former were the case, one would expect a high frequency to cluster around a single period. In addition, April and September were chosen because this would ensure a balance in the amount of flesh revealed, as these months correspond to the 'fashion seasons'. This is necessary in order to prevent the variable that traces patterns of sexualisation from being skewed.

The random sample was selected by counting the number of advertisements per issue and dividing this number by twenty. The random selection starts with the first fashion or perfume advertisement. Thereafter, another image, for example the third, would be selected, thereby achieving an evenly distributed sample of twenty images. The sample to be selected from in each magazine includes the inside cover through to the back cover of the magazine. The front cover of the magazine was not included in the sample as it has a particular semiotic construction that targets the promotion of the magazine's features rather than the commodities selected here. Moreover, the semiotic construction is more discursive in nature, using headline-like, verbal constructions that connect the magazine to sex

⁶⁶ Although he provides little evidence for this. Moreover, should this not produce problems for the Symbolic order since 'to be the One' is an outcome of being able to define the Other?

⁶⁷ The starting years 1987 and 1985 differ because the emergence of men's 'lifestyle' magazines did not take place until the late 1980s. *Arena* magazine was first published in December 1986; therefore, the first issue was taken from 1987.

and relationships to broader discourses of sex. These strict selection rules were adhered to so that the sampling was repeated across the different magazines, ensuring that the differing magazine layouts did not distort the sample.

An important distinction to note is between the sampling unit and the actual cases processed. The sampling unit is the advertisement and the case is the individual body. I chose to select the bodies within an image in a bid to maintain an eye upon the relationships between them. However, this produced an anomaly: while twenty evenly distributed advertisements were selected, the object coded was the body or *bodies* contained within any single image. It went by unnoticed because a majority of the piloting had been conducted on contemporary magazines that rarely use more than one model per image. Hence, while the sampling frame selected twenty advertisements, this would not necessarily lead to the processing of twenty bodies. The outcome was a significant growth in the sample size. It rose from the intended 500 to the actual number of 703. However, the random sampling did also balance out the case distribution across the magazines. The average number of total cases per magazine was 158.25. The largest deviation from the mean was 171. Thus, there is a relatively even distribution. To reiterate, the decision to select the advertisement as the unit of analysis stems from the aim to identify the relative positions and status between the models within each sampling unit. I sought to maintain a holistic sense of the image as a whole. While the method collates the relative distributions, an attempt to convey a more complex set of interconnections was inappropriate. This is discussed in more detail when variable twenty-four is considered.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The logic behind the categorisations is to produce frequency data from which information about the relative distributions of the codes of body elaboration between the male and female figures can be ascertained. The object of the statistical analysis is to examine the extent to which the independent variable (sex) determines the frequencies of the dependent variables (codes of body elaboration). The operationalisation of the taxonomy is such that only nominal frequency data can be recorded, consequently, I use chi-square as the statistical test because it places no upper limit on the size of the tabulation. This test evaluates whether the difference between the observed frequencies and expected frequencies under the null hypothesis can be attributed to factors other than sampling fluctuations or to factors other than chance. Chi-square is a test of difference that shows whether the distributions are statistically significant. Significance is judged by the score, which if of a certain value, strongly states that a relationship exists between the variables measured.

Note also that the variables are unrelated. Thus, the framework does not measure the differing response of the same subject to various sets of conditions and this excludes the possible use of stronger inferential statistics. Unlike correlation, it cannot describe *how* one variable affects another, be it in a positive or negative direction. The chi-square test states only whether *a* relationship exists or not. Inferential statistics like correlation are able to identify overall trends as to where or with which variables the significance lies; chi-square does not. Therefore, where a difference is measurable, it is insufficient to secure the endurance of the dualisms in question. For example, statistical significance

may be a result of marked difference where the masculine has a higher frequency of 'looking down and to the side', a code that we associate with the feminine. Chi does not describe relationships thus and we cannot assume that the difference confirms the persistence of the gendered dichotomy. Therefore, when difference is statistically significant, I have taken care to relate this to distributions of each individual code in order to avoid assuming that the distributions reflect the conventions of the gendered code.

Furthermore, my concern is *not* to produce inferential statistics as this would entail developing a model of sexual scales or stereotypes. These models of sexual scales, no matter how detailed they become, are effective only insofar as they rely implicitly upon sexual dimorphism (Maccoby and Jacklin:1975). I reject the operationalisation of sexual scales⁶⁸ because they most often reproduce the integrity of the masculine and feminine sexual types: correlations like 'the slimmer the model, the more feminine' by definition maintain the dichotomous sets of associations. Connell argues that the operationalisation of much sex scales research is ostensibly responsible for the 'confirmation' and endurance of the internal unity of category of femininity.⁶⁹ Any results found are dependent upon the prior legitimacy of the measures, that is, they are dependent upon assuming that *only* femininity is defined and measurable through thinness. As this logic is extended, it means that different measures for the masculine are operationalised. At best, scales can describe stereotypical expectations. They cannot describe gender because most of the traits selected for analysis describe most men *and* women at some time or other. For example, stereotypically we ascribe aggression to the masculine. Thus, the codification reflects the dimorphic logic because the masculine is all of these things and the feminine is a different set of traits. Even if this staggered into a scale so that the respondent or image is measured by 'more or less' masculine, it still presumes that this trait or code 'belongs' to the masculine and by implication is not of the feminine. Hence, the prior operationalisation rules out that the masculine may be equally associated with thinness. Different frequencies in distribution are seemingly entrenched because the male and the female are always assessed with different criteria (see Millum:1976). In contradistinction, the categories operationalised here are not defined as masculine or feminine *prior to data collection*, instead any potential difference is established by the actual distributions themselves. Potentially, therefore, this could reflect *either* categorical difference or gender plurality. Hence, the test of association describes numerical relationships between the distributions produced.

The last departure concerns the convention of refuting the null hypothesis. Quantitative research stipulates that the null hypothesis be phrased thus: *there is no relationship between the IV (the sex of the model) and the DV (the codes used to represent it)*. The outcome, however, is that researchers are bound to find difference in order to have a body of results. This is particularly important in undertaking gender research because it has the unintended result of seeking to find *sexual difference* rather than *similarity*. I do not seek to prove or disprove anything, contrariwise, my aim is purely descriptive. I do not claim to explain how ideology connects to the social world by conducting a content analysis. I seek only to trace the frequency of use of the categories that postmodernists/feminists assume to be universally present and categorically distributed. Thus, my aim is not to describe the correlation or make casual connections, but rather to identify if the differences in

⁶⁸ This aims to bring Connell's analysis of sexual scales to bear on the method.

⁶⁹ R. W. Connell, p. 171

the frequencies are due to factors other than chance. Neither therefore do I define what those factors may be. To reiterate, the single most important shift to the operationalisation is not to organise the codes into masculine and feminine types or groups. I have elected to allow the results to define what is a masculine code, a feminine one, or whether, in fact, it is empirically used equally across both body types. This research is particularly interested in exploring latter possibility.

DATA AND ITS ORGANISATION

The package allows the coding frame to be programmed in such a way that if certain prior cases were recorded it would automatically mean that some questions would be excluded in the future. This is one reason for the varying sample sizes across the differing variables. The pre-programmed exclusions ensure greater accuracy and save time (see Cottle:1997 www.Soc. Res. Online). As stated, the extent of detail in the taxonomy was included to ensure that any potential variability was recorded. The detail was also maintained because the package can be re-programmed so that those categories with an expected value of five or less could be merged together, which then enables those cases to be statistically assessed. Only those categories that are mutually exclusive can be combined. For example, twisting away and twisting forward may be merged together because the body can be only one or the other. They can either re-group in a more general category or merge into the 'other' category.

Note that the tabulated data included in the next chapter has a slightly different format from the original. This is operative only within a previously designated variable. The amalgamated cells are entitled 'derived'. It was necessary to do this, as the detail of the coding frame was not required. As stated above, the extent of the detail was included in order that the regularity or variability of the image could be traced rather than imposed by pre-determined codifications. The rearrangement of the variable can be examined as it is included in the appendix. Care has been taken to ensure that any amalgamations made are done so in accordance with the logic of the taxonomy. Moreover, I have ensured that each of the sub-variables that have been collapsed together is not counted twice as a frequency.

KEY PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE TAXONOMY

As stated, I have generated a number of codes that target the body in order to examine what the body must do to perform femininity. For this, I have drawn heavily upon Goffman's analysis of the body and its performance within the visual form, as well as Goffman's notion that the naturalistic within representation can function only through its artifice. He argues that this is necessary to make visible or accessible the myriad of behavioural styles that we use but do not recognise:⁷⁰

these expressions turn out to be illustrations of ritual like behaviour which portray an ideal conception of the two sexes and their structural relationship to each other, accomplishing this

⁷⁰ This reflects Goffman's indebtedness to Wittgenstein's notion of the social and linguistic background.

in part by indicating, again ideally, the alignment of the actor in the social situation.
(Goffman:1979:89)

His central tenet therefore proposes that the veneer of social reality in the advertisement is produced by the codification practices of hyper-ritualisation. Hyper-ritualisation encompasses the intensification of standardised and simplified forms of ritual taken from social life. Moreover, we can take this process as real (but temporarily only) because of the absence of complex cues that define embodied social interaction that extends *through time*. Advertisements work, he argues, by condensing social scenes that make them available for immediate consumption. They are idealised representations under the auspices of the way things really are. So, when a man lights a cigarette for a woman the presupposition is that the female is worthy of his assistance, yet this assistance implies that she is limited in some way and that she should be helped out with even the simplest things. The fact that this is taken up from rituals performed in real life and then magnified is not sufficient to collapse the distinction between the social world and the representation. Nor is it sufficient to assume that, because the social act is magnified in the ritualisation, the status differentials represented do not draw upon real differentials in status within the corpus of display from which the code is drawn. By linking the two fields through convention, Goffman introduces a foundation that is sociologically sensitive because he uses our standard practices as the stable contexts, which he then transforms, through hyper-ritualisation, making them distinct from the resources from which they are drawn.

The notion of ritualisation relates more broadly to the idea that advertisements belong to a system of social communication that draws directly upon symbolic forms of behaviour *as a resource*. This genre creates meaningful visual constructs by compressing common sense and familiar features of the social world. Hence, they reference, but do not mirror, many of the conventional features of embodied interaction that we depend upon all the time. In a sense, one can consider these meaningful constructs as part of our vocabulary of body display. Nevertheless, argues Goffman, while realist forms make a resource from this vocabulary, they can make the constructs visible only by grossly exaggerating them. This returns to the social world because they bring into view things that we essentially take for granted. Hence, the rituals are recognisable but they are not the same.

In addition, Goffman draws attention to regularity of the modes of display used. Again, this differentiates embodied display from those represented insofar as the conventionalised elements are considerably more limited in range. This establishes an anomaly in that the images may 'look' like we do, but only by radically simplifying what we do. Goffman's formula, which I have used here, argues that advertisements use units that stylise a scene¹ and social display, which key into our systems of recognition; for example gestalts, poses, gestures, expressions and props. In effect, we are able to use our social competencies, more or less pre-reflexively, as part of our imaginative projections that connect primary gestalts to visual and socialised space. Together, these form conceptual units that emerge from close visual analysis to produce the identification of recurrent patterns of portrayal. The conceptual units in themselves, once formed as part of the coding frame, become 'abstract notions from an empirical perspective' (Jhally:1990:146) and, once abstracted, the codes cannot return to the background whence they came.

THE CODES OF THE BODY

The taxonomy includes twenty-seven variables. The number of codes within each category is variable. The sub-categories number approximately 350. All the variables have 'other' included unless it could be categorically assured that no unanticipated cases could occur. These included the time span of the sample, the sample magazines and the commodities included, namely perfume and fashion items. Note that the detail of the commodity promoted was not included, despite recognising that it may alter the codification of the image under analysis. This is because a single photograph could have any number of items on display on one model. In addition, piloting highlighted that there were instances when the particular fashion item for sale was highly obscured. Identification was always possible because of the anchorage of the fashion label. Thus, the style of the image is entirely dependent upon the model's body, which suggests that there is an intensification of the commodification and sexualisation processes in the images. As stated, the operationalisation of the taxonomy was tightly integrated to the categories traced by existing and accepted research subject to critique here.

Variable one⁷¹ begins with the sex of the body, which is classified as either '*male*' or '*female*', '*androgynous*' or '*other*'. The identification of the sex of the model uses the everyday methods by which sex is assigned in social activity, given that genital inspection is not possible (Garfinkel:1967; Kessler and McKenna:1978; Kessler:2000). Thus, assignment was fundamentally premised upon that background knowledge we use, yet do not 'know', to assign sex. Code three classifies those instances where a part of the body is photographed, without any particular phenomenological key to its sex, or it excludes other common forms of cultural elaboration that conventionally assign sex. I am particularly interested in the codification used to make the gender of the body apparent, namely the secondary and tertiary sexual characteristics by which most sex assignment is undertaken. These are guided by the conventions of the sexed body so that if one were to describe a body as having developed muscle on the arm and as seated with the legs wide open, we are much more likely to assign the male sex to that body than the female sex. If the body turned out to be that of the female, we would tend to treat it as an 'exception' that proves the rule. This is the basic conventional level to which the taxonomy attends. This connects with Goffman's model by drawing upon our social practices of gender and magnifying these elements in order that we key the appropriate sex assignment within representation. For example, the model with its back to the camera will use a number of overt codifications so that we are able to assign the model a sex, when many of these secondary and tertiary features are missing as a result of the body position. Thus, they magnify the elements of 'normal sexed body'. These presentational features, which are treated as evidence for the truth of sex, are conventional practices at the secondary and tertiary level that Agnes⁷² proved to be a master.

Variable two counts the number of bodies included in the image, which includes '*single body*', '*mixed-sex/single-sex couples*' through to '*groups*'. This variable is central for the identification of the

⁷¹ For more detailed description of each individual code and the rules of its application, see Appendix B.

⁷² Agnes showed how sex is accomplished in interaction because she successfully passed as a woman. See 'Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in an intersexed person, part 1' (pp. 116-85) and especially the 'postscript' in Garfinkel, op. cit.

extent to which advertisements are still noticeably marked by the heterosexist imperative. I argue that staging the body within this frame provides the central context that readily anchors both the active/passive elements of the dichotomy but also secures the marginalisation of homosexual relationships and homoerotic desire more generally. In terms of the latter, I am drawing directly upon Lewis and Rolley's (1997) notion of coupling as a means to access lesbian desire. Logically this can be extended to gay desire patterns also. Combining the female sexed model with the male sexed is the simplest way of securing normalisation of the heterosexuality. From this context, many other elements of the gendered dichotomy can be secured with the use of further codification. The ownership and direction of the gaze are of central importance here.

Variable three identifies the ratio of white models to minority ethnic models used. This variable seeks to identify the extent to which Britain's black population has become visible within the frame of the body beautiful and, if so, to trace the extent to which the ethnicity of the body significantly affects the coding of the body idiom, especially the extent of sexualisation and nudity (*see* Nayak:1997; hooks:1981; 1992; 1996; Young:1995; Hoch:1979; Kaplan:1997). Potentially, it is possible to trace the extent to which the overt sexual codification is also racialised, by combining the language of desire and excess of the advertising genre⁷³ to the excess assigned to the black body. The assignment of ethnicity in this category again uses the background knowledge through which the Black body is produced and labelled in everyday life. White and black are discursive productions that deal with and remove the actual ambiguity of embodiment; thus, the background as the criterion for the categorisation does not negate that fact that there are an infinite number of ambiguities within ethnicity. The categories are not independent of the discourse of the everyday where they function. There is no 'truth' to the categories, they are instead the common-sense meanings through which they function, regardless of the fact of the black body.⁷⁴ Again, basic 'keying' or 'common sense' labelling processes are used (Goffman:1974).

Variable four identifies the product advertised, either a perfume or fashion item. This variable considers whether the kind of commodity significantly affects the sorts of coding that the body idiom undergoes. While it will not be subject to specific analysis, I have included a differentiation between the commodities in order to ensure that included in the sample is the specific visual relationship between the commodity and the body included as part of the overall sample. For example, it introduces the scope for extensive use of nudity, as well as including a particularly intense form of commodification in that the smell must be awarded a social and cultural significance. In addition, it provides a space to assess the endurance of a codification to which Goffman explicitly draws attention, namely the extension of the object, its delicacy, for example, through the combination of the product and the fragility of the feminine caress (Goffman:1979:29). The product placement by means of emphasis established by the touch not only enhances the product placement but also genderises the

⁷³ Again drawn from Liess, Kline and Jhally, who historically locate their analysis within the shifts in the pitch of the advertisement. In the first half of the book, they address the expansion of language of desire that is coterminous with the decline of the functional language. In essence, they argue that the shift represents a move from 'what can the product do?' to 'how does this product make me feel?'

⁷⁴ Again, this reflects my overall resistance to the scepticism that often accompanies discursive analysis. There is a materiality to the body upon which racism works, which is quite unlike the discursive construction of patterns of desire.

product and the model. However, these sorts of issues will be examined within the respective codifications rather than leading with the product type.⁷⁵

The fifth variable, entitled '*model*', traces the relationship between the model and any potential commodity or prop, for example, bodily subjugation to a perfume bottle. Here the body itself is made to shadow the shape of the bottle. The variable seeks only to count the number of cases where the model has control of the commodity and the cases where the model is subjugated to the prop or commodity. Thus, it seeks to identify only the *generalised* trends of the positioning of the model (Millum:1975:189). Sampling revealed that this mode of codification is conventional and thus utilises a series of standardised visual techniques to commodify the body, of which the example above is one of the most common. The second mechanism to define the general patterns of power to objects, space and props traces the gendered dichotomy according to the relationship the model has with his or her surroundings. As discussed above, the core guiding rule for this variable is the extent to which the model could said to be in control of his or her environment. Thus, the male who is located in the office is often presented giving instructions to the (female) secretary. To reiterate, the significance of fashion advertising is that clothes have a ubiquitous presence within social interaction. Therefore, the potential of very diverse settings and narratives is considerable. Note, clothes have not been automatically coded as subjugating the model because this tends to conflate clothing items that differ in their potential to be dominatory. For example, excessively frilly clothes lock the female model directly into the traditions of hegemonic, emphasised femininity, in the way that dungarees worn by a female do not, in the sense that they are not conventionally gendered, nor do they hinder or dictate the movement, sitting position and so forth (Connell:1987:183-7). I am not concerned with the particular item of clothing but rather the relationship to social status and the presentations of gendered made through it.

Variable six begins by locating the body in the projection of space, if a naturalistic mode, or on the two-dimensional plane, if not. The codes range from '*dominating the frame*' through to '*less than ¼*'. The amount of space therefore reflects the length of shot but also keys into the symbolic organisation of the two-dimensional plane. For example, if the woman occupies half of the two-dimensional plane and the man occupies only a third, conventionally, we would align this to her greater visibility compared to the male. Contrariwise, if the male is made more central, we would expect this to be accompanied by additional codification that aligns his position with power. These first sets of codes aim to contextualise the other modes of codification. In most normal cases the bigger the space occupied, the more central that figure is made. A notable exception to this is that the first code '*dominates frame entirely*'. Here the body dominates the frame of the image, which has the effect of bringing the body to the surface of the picture frame. The gaze is able to linger upon the detail of the flesh.

This is followed by a series of codes that trace the relative location of the sexed model in space. The codification is based upon the conventional spatial orientations by which we live; for example, we talk of a lowly serf; we look up to role models (Lakoff and Johnson:1980; Johnson:1987). Likewise, if the male is predominately in the centre of the frame, it places the female in a secondary

⁷⁵ For the proportion of the sample that is made up of perfume and clothes items, *please see* Appendix C.

relationship to the space within the image, identified in codes 'centre' and 'off-centre'. The fact that the centre is of primary importance remains a part of the cultural tradition of status relations as well as of core metaphoric organisation: 'he was at the centre of the affair'. Thus, each spatial classification in variable six relates to a certain social position, especially those images that re-create a social setting. 'Higher' and 'central' express greater control and social standing than 'lower' and 'periphery'. The second half of the variable relates to other relative spatial positions between the models photographed, 'opposite', 'centre', for example. This sort of organisation is readily transferred into our visual representation, especially those commercially based that require ready and instant comprehension. Socially, we tend to consider the occupation of space, *relative to others*, the priority of those with power. This clearly connects back to the significance given the heterosexual couple and the gender differentiation of space. It concerns women's inability to command space, for example, needing assistance with the chair to sit at the table.

This is what Goffman describes as the ritualisation of subordination (Goffman:1979:41) He suggests that a classic way that one displays deference, for example, is by lowering oneself physically in some form of prostration. Correspondingly therefore, we can visually display superiority or disdain by holding the body erect and high, the head looking up, which reflects the metaphorical conventions that Lakoff and Johnson trace in *Metaphors We Live By*. Most importantly, Goffman adds that advertisers *draw in and endorse* the claimed universality of the theme (Goffman:1979:40). He then identifies also conventional spaces through which status differentiation could be seen to 'naturally take place'. He isolates places such as beds and particularly floors, where the less clean can be encoded. To this, I add that sexual availability has also been conventionally located in such places.

Finally, included in the spatial variable are two distinct codes, '*perspective*' and '*non-perspective*'. These specify in a generalised way whether the overall frame of the image is realist or otherwise and thus the extent to which the visual spacing establishes a view within the image that 'reflects' that of the naked eye. Note, that the analysis of these sub-categories is combined with the analysis of variable seven below.

Variable seven relates to the camera work and categorises an image according to the length of shot and the focus used. The first cluster identifies the focus length and is divided into three broad categories: '*long shot*', '*medium shot*', and '*close-up*'. Moreover, this type of codification is awarded central importance to the formation of the feminine. For example Cowie (1997) argues that this is due to the removal of time and space from the frame, which facilitates the transvestism inherent in the point of view it establishes. Doane similarly argues that close-up provides the quintessential example of:

the meaningful moment of the close-up, for the spectator, the scale of the close-up corresponds less than other shots to the dictates of perspectival realism. And this being-the-gaze-for-the-other is, of course, most adequate as a description of the female subject (Doane:1991: 47).

Each shot length determines the size of the body within the photographic frame, and thus determines how much of the body is exposed. There ought to be a high degree of correspondence between these

sub-categories and the preceding variable: the longer the shot, the 'smaller' the body and thus the less 'physical' space the body appears to occupy visually. One would therefore expect there to be a higher degree of coincidence between the distributions of the '*dominating the frame*' and the use of the close-up.

Doane, in particular, has argued that the short-length shot has been used upon female bodies as a means to fetishise the female body and thus disavow the threat that this body symbolises to the masculine (see also Cowie and Adams:1990; Cowie:1997; Adams:1996; Erens:1991; Doane:1987; 1991; Dyer:1992; Kaplan:1997; special issue of *Camera Obscura*, 1989; Stacey:1988;1994; Mayne:1991; 1994). The use of the short-length shot means that the camera is able to move across a fragmented body, thereby highlighting the surface of the dissected body and rendering it fetishistic. Conversely, one would not expect this code to be widely applied to the male body if it is not available to the processes of fetishisation as defined by the male body 'having the phallus'. The man must, minimally at least, represent the active autonomous subject and therefore cannot have that subjectivity visually negated. If this is not the case, the man is said to have undergone feminisation, thereby ensuring that the gendered dichotomy is left intact. However, this poses the dilemma: if the model is codified using visual practices that define the feminine, thus is feminised, what are we to make out of this feminisation process, if nevertheless the model is clearly identifiable as male, that is, codified with the magnified social resources that accomplish the assignment as male? The central issue is the clash of the 'feminisation' with the direct and clear codification of male; neither codification is premised upon the assumption that the codification speaks 'the truth of his sex', but nevertheless corresponds to the cultural production of the male.

Returning to the postmodernists/feminists, one would expect these cases to tally with the other sub-variables that code the occupancy of space, as well as to be a determining factor in what parts of the body are represented; hence their importance for fetishisation. Following Doane, one would also expect that soft focus is predominately used upon the female form as a visual means to encode passivity as well as to assist the process of disavowal. Thus, this form of codification is treated as quintessentially feminine. The softness of the image is treated as an extension of the translucent veil that conceals her lack. Moore (1988) and Wernick (1991) have traced the use of soft lighting but limit its use strictly to the *contexts of the man's auto-eroticism*. Therefore, as viewers, the best we can do is peer into his auto-eroticism; hence the extensive use of bathroom and grooming scenes. Moreover, these are 'natural occasions' when the man would be revealing his torso anyway. Thus they argue that the naturalistic setting defines the moments when the male body can be displayed. Moore concludes that it is only in the context of auto-eroticism that the soft focus and mellow lighting can be legitimately applied to the male body without erupting the spectre of homosexuality and the possibility of an overt active female eroticism (Moore:1988:44).

Next, the taxonomy traces the use of specific focuses, which again draws on their argument that the soft focus is a distinct form with which the feminine is represented. One would expect there to be a high frequency of use on the female body. The soft focus is also said to assist the disavowal process by contributing to the substitution of the missing phallus by displacing her lack on to another object. The soft focus is said to contribute to the codification of the feminine as object of desire. By

drawing upon Lacan, postmodernism/feminism positions the image as the reflection of the feminine as lack so that the image signals her status as the object of desire, but also positions the image of woman as threatening. Codifications like soft focus work to suppress the fear through objectification.

These elements are then built upon again in variable eight, which traces the form of the photograph. This has been divided into three sections: '*naturalistic mock-up*', '*stylistic*' and '*neutral*'. The first refers to the widespread and much documented use of realism in photography. Note that the issue of realism is defined above as operating on two levels. The first aspect refers to the 'realism' of the scene depicted. The ideological content has been gauged according to how much like 'real life' it is. This would include scenes such as getting dressed in a bedroom or other daily activities like hailing a cab. These scenes respond to our common-sense expectations of the features of life. In order for the normalcy of the scene to be recognised, argues Goffman, it is necessary to hyper-ritualise these mundane features, thereby bringing them into view as opposed to remaining concealed within the background. The scenes 'look like real life' but in no way belong to the realm of the real. Mulveyian paradigm does not attend to the exaggeration of the codes in the image, but the medium of the photograph is such that it allows the viewer to gaze at it as if it were the more real, more perfect reflection of the self during the mirror phase. Furthermore, the Mulveyian paradigm argues that the realist and its associate narratives are an essential feature by which the feminine is connected to the passive so that the male protagonist is secured in his (sexual) active potency. Thus, this particular coding uses the identification patterns that such an image establishes as its primary means to operate ideologically. Following Mulvey et al. one would expect this to be a dominant feature of the gender representations, and of femininity in particular, confined as she is by her 'to-be-looked-at-ness'.

The second aspect of realism concerns the particular ways that photography can capture perspective or three-dimensionality within a two-dimensional frame. One of the particular qualities that photography has is its ability to capture a scene 'objectively', as if the viewer were actually there. The *impression* given is that the visual space depicted represents the scene as it would be seen by the naked eye. It assumes that the frame and editing have not distorted the view in any way. However, the actual framing and editing remain implicit, obscuring the perspective and ideology contained within. This sort of construction is more often associated with a voyeuristic position. The Mulveyian paradigm argues that this ideological transformation is something that women are particularly subject to, so much so that this form of encoding has become synonymous with femininity. In addition, this variable draws upon the presumption of identification that underpins much of the work critiqued here.

This variable also addresses the potential for at least minimally more surrealist, non-naturalistic or stylistic modes of photography that was traced during sampling and is treated as anti-realist in its form. This is how it resists the construction of ideological identification patterns. It is achieved through highly artificial gestures, self-conscious or self-referential codes that quote back to the advertisement its naturalistic illusions. These images mock the pose and defeat it as posture or gesture that can be adopted as an expressive gesture by the viewer. Also, within such an image there is the impression that the model is mocking or satirising the act of modelling. The second feature of this code refers to those images in which the model is presenting an ordinary gesture but is set against a contradictory background. For example, the model could be in a fake beach scene wearing winter

clothes and pretending to feel cold. This code does not seek to give this feminine presentation the veneer of authenticity. Collectively, these features expose some of the formal features of construction of realism and thus they resist securing patterns of identification.

The third refers to those images identified as part of the operationalisation process where some images had no explicit setting at all, surreal or otherwise. I observed that the background was often just white or coloured. If there is extensive use of codes two and three, this poses the question of the extent to which identification can be presumed to be a key feature of consuming advertisements. Potentially this could undermine Mulvey's argument since not only does this represent the feminine differently, but it also acts against the Symbolic and its concomitant identification patterns.

Variable nine refers to those aspects of the debates regarding the extent to which the female body is fragmented and therefore commodified and fetishised compared to the male body. The variable ranges from the '*full body*' through to the '*head only*'. The object of this variable is to trace substantively what parts of the body are depicted, how often and what parts of the fragmented body is represented. It is a simple and effective way to trace those parts of body that fetishistic conventions mobilise. This can then be related to the debates concerning the ideological impact of the framing of the body within representation, as well as the extent to which this divides along gender lines. For example, one would expect that there would be significantly more images of women being reduced to a fetishised leg than of men.⁷⁶ Potentially, therefore, the results of this code could confirm Pollock's maxim that the fragmentation of the female body is extensively used to sell, as well as confirm Doane's argument that the fragmentation of the body as image is a necessary form of representation that seeks to disavow the threat of castration that the female represents. The variable also includes the code '*face only*'. This variable also returns to Nayak (1997), who draws attention to the ways in which the concealment of the head is used to transform the body to the object. The dismembered body is free to receive any connotations by way of the viewer's 'reading'. The second benefit that this operationalisation brings to the analysis is that the coding of the parts of the body is effectively free from evaluative influence: the parts of the body are absolutely known within a society. This is a central premise of the taxonomy: that, while the body is subject to symbolic elaboration of the most extensive kind, within that social background and its historicist roots, those categories and symbols are of the most natural kind (see for example, Douglas:1973; O'Neill:1985; Mauss:1973). Bodily metaphors of this kind remain relatively stable over quite long periods of time.

Further detail is added by isolating the various potential body positions (variable ten). The aim of the variable is twofold: first, it seeks to trace how the sex of the model affects the position taken up within the image; second, how these positions relate to the 'subordination' or 'domination' that the various positions impose. As argued above, fashion can be advertised in a seemingly infinite number of ways and therefore it carries no bars as to the ways the models are required to pose. I argue that, because of the universal presence of clothes, the sorts of positions adopted are not determined by the restrictions imposed by the commodity, but stem from the conventionalised presentations of the sexed body. The proposition here is that if the representations of body positions convey stereotypical versions of the sex, thus establishing identification, then these sorts of poses adopted ought to vary markedly by

⁷⁶ See Appendix B, for the ideological associations connected to the other codes.

the sex of the model. Additionally, the various positions may be organised by the conventionalised postures through which subordination and domination are ritualised. Thus, the variable seeks to trace whether the sexed dichotomy is linked to the relations of power between men and women.

The variable has, where possible, enabled me to endeavour to capture the movement of the body, the displays of the body, as well as isolate body positions that tap into the undercurrent themes of the gendering of domination and subordination. Examples of the codes are '*lying on the side*', '*twisting away*', '*back facing camera*' and so on.⁷⁷ Theoretically, these positions have been classed as visualisation of ritual subordination (Goffman:1979). Therefore, according to postmodernist/feminist agenda, one would expect this to be significantly affected by the sex of the model. Specifically, one would expect this to be used extensively upon women because of the implied (sexual) passivity of lying down with regard to another (male) gaze. Each position can therefore be referred back to its context and the ideological significance attributed. For example, following Nayak, one would expect there to be a high frequency of black models whose face was obscured in some way so that the gaze cannot be reciprocated.

The next level of detail refers to the embodied presentations of the model and, in particular, focuses upon the physical appearance of the body. Many of the codes in this variable are drawn directly from the secondary literature, particularly the recurrent codes used within sex scales (Connell:1987). I have directly adopted these classifications where the category of sex is combined with sexual character, for example '*emotional*'. This variable also traces the detailed ways in which the body is gendered and/or sexed. Relating this to my specific concerns, this variable is also where the secondary and practically accomplished marks of sex are accomplished. The marks range from painted nails and long or short hair to the presence or absence of body hair, musculature and impressions of weight. Note that the coding criteria of this variable insists all images are read as they appear, rather than through an empirical lens of how the images are actually composed;⁷⁸ for example, that 'naturalness' is a cosmetic effect. This does two things: first, it avoids speculations concerning the extent of cosmetic intervention to produce the appearance of naturalness in each individual image; second, accepting the image in terms of its final production is much closer to how the image is to be interpreted if it is to function to construct passive femininity. We naturalise the signification process, argues Goffman. If the reader approaches the image 'knowing' that the images are highly structured, then ideology as an entity becomes an entirely different operation. We read images as they appear: signs function when they are treated as they appear.

Variables twelve and thirteen deal with the containment of the body in the represented physical space. This builds upon the spatial location in as much as withdrawing from space is something that is commonly associated with subordination and vulnerability. The first variable delineates who or what contains the model and therefore deals directly with the issue of power. In

⁷⁷ There have been some adjustments regarding the codification of this variable. The actual results did not warrant such a detailed classification. Therefore, some of them have been amalgamated. Note, however, those that have cannot be repeated in other sub-variables and thus there is no distortion produced by some cases being counted twice. See Appendix B for greater detail and definition of application.

⁷⁸ Again, this reflects Goffman's analysis that as consumers of an image, we are quite happy with this blurring between the real and the fake.

particular, a body contained or confined relates to the status ascribed to that body, as well as the level of autonomy that body is constructed as having. In particular, the ascription of status is often marked by the use of the body as barriers to demarcate ownership. Goffman (1979:54-6) argues that often the man will extend his arm into space in such a way that it effectively prohibits any 'intrusion' by another. The variable progresses from the most patriarchal to the least. As it indicates complicity on behalf of the woman, the most dominatory position is classified as the woman who voluntarily contains her own body and therefore withdraws from (public) space. This is followed by the code '*contained by man*', in which a series of blocks may be placed in front of the woman, thus constraining her ability to move through space freely. This is classified as less dominatory because of the woman's potential resistance to his confinement.

I have also included a variable that reflects the potential reversal of this form of containment. For example, it may be the case that the female is now the boss and imposes the same limitations on the lower male workers. Therefore, it would usually require that this reversal be bound by a narrative in order that the relative differences in social status be included as part of the scene. In effect, this sub-variable seeks to consider whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume the dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. I have also extended the logic of Goffman's analysis to the concerns of the cultural critique in that they have been effective in demonstrating that this same restriction or domination can be symbolically carried by an object, usually phallic. Lastly, I have addressed the various codifications that address the mutual containment, in which case all of the above must be absent and both models must be embraced by the other. The sexual consumption of one body by the other, usually male of female, must also be absent. The evidence of sexual gratification has to be equal, as well as the absence of relative positioning to secure differential status and so on.

These cases where heterosexuality meets with patriarchy and heterosexism refer to a complex web of social relations and structures and remains a contentious issue within the feminist movement. However, following Stevi Jackson (1995), it cannot be assumed above all else that heterosexual relationships can mean *only* domination for women and that correspondingly all representations of heterosexual relationships are entirely ideological and therefore pernicious to heterosexual women. It is of course difficult, as the ideology of heterosexist romance is often bound up in the images of equality. However, also within those images, there must also be the codes in which his authority, the primacy of his pleasure and her willingness to please it are manifestly present. It remains to be seen how pervasive these images are, but it is possible that the images represent reciprocal desire, rather than the more general relationship of women being desired and men doing the desiring. If there are enough cases to make such images a minority trend, but nevertheless a trend, there needs to be discussion as to what we think these might mean. Moreover, it may not necessarily be the case that those images that are encoded as mutual desire are heterosexual couples. As Lexis and Rolley (1997) have argued, there has been a shift in the patterns of desire represented so that an accessible lesbian spectatorial position can be adopted regarding 'twin' images. These images are composed of two women entwined and made up to look like each other. They argue that this offers a space through which lesbian desire can be experienced. In such cases, there would be two women embracing mutually and desire in the women

would be embodied in the form of a pout, a smile or semi-nudity. This variable concludes with '*non-containment*', where the body stance cannot be said to be withdrawing in any sense.

The second variable in this cluster details the most regular body positions adopted to signify the various forms of containment. It concerns the embodied positions adopted to perform passivity. This is then a central variable that traces how a body may be positioned in social space to 'do' passivity. One example of self-containment is to have the woman seated with her arms folded around her legs and her legs pulled up to her chest. Another example traces the frequency by which the man places his arm in front of or around the woman, thereby marking ownership. Note that there is an automatic coding operation here in which if the preceding variable is marked non-contained it automatically skips out this variable.⁷⁹

Variable fourteen seeks to trace the various codes used to sexualise or fetishise the model by means of the dress and the various ways the flesh is revealed. By 'reveal', I mean that the clothing is removed, unbuttoned or lifted to draw attention to an area of flesh. This references the psychoanalytical contributions as to how fetishism works. Accordingly, those theorising within the Mulveyian paradigm must insist that this marks the female body categorically, not only that there be marked differences. Furthermore, by including the various ways that the body itself conceals its own nudity, the extent of sexualisation within the image can be specified. Examples are '*revealing of the shoulder*', '*hip*', '*breast*', '*see-through clothing*', through to '*fully naked*'. The latter example reflects the decision to include advertisements that signified through the logo alone rather than restricting the sample to advertisements of specific items of clothing. The code '*fully dressed*' refers to bodies sexualised by facial expressions, for example the pout. The securing of sexualisation via the face is treated elsewhere in the taxonomy. The code '*non-sexualisation*' refers to those images only where the model is fully dressed, devoid of a descriptive background and has no visible facial expressions. In addition, here the model must be fully clothed, without any parts of the body exposed. I argue that this is a non-sexualised image because there is nothing specifically erotic about the codification. I argue that the central features are those that commodify the image rather than commodify *and* sexualise the model.

Variables fifteen to seventeen trace the presentation of the hand. Variable fifteen traces who is touching whose body.⁸⁰ Also included are codes identifying cases where the hand is inactive; both are classified as relatively ungendered. Variable sixteen traces the parts of the body that are touched and variable seventeen traces what kind of touch is involved. Again drawing on Goffman, women were depicted touching things much more than men. The hand is used to trace the outlines of things or to fiddle with things. He argues that this mode of 'barely' touching contrasts strongly with a competent or utilitarian mode of touch, which grasps things or manipulates them. I have applied this by combining it with specific codes that trace what is touched as well as how it is touched. This taps into another convention in which women are seen to caress much more, as part of the private domain of caring. Thus, not only do women touch other people much more but they also touch themselves much more. Additionally, this draws specific attention to the gendering of the hand through daily practical accomplishments such as nail varnish, manicures, length of the nails and so on. One is able to trace the

⁷⁹ All pre-programmed exclusions are listed in Appendix B.

⁸⁰ Note that this includes the commodity itself, following Goffman's observation.

extent to which gender is secured by practice, and is therefore relatively open-ended, rather than the structure or social order reduced to a move in language. The cross-tabulations enable us to trace how gendered the touch is by examining who is touched, by whom and where. Each categorisation relates to the dimensions of the gendered dichotomy; for example, '*utilising*' has distinctly active connotations.

The taxonomy further codifies the body idiom by the positioning of the limbs (variables eighteen and nineteen). By tracing the various positions of the arms and legs, it is possible to trace how the body is gendered through movement: the active body is conventionally connected to the masculine, while the feminine is pinned to a motionless body. Contrariwise, the Mulveyian paradigm has emphasised that action defines the masculine. Regarding my separate concerns, this demonstrates the theoretical commitment to the material body, that is, what does the body have 'do' visually to represent hegemonic patterns of masculinity? Consequently, the taxonomy consistently tackles the material embodied positions adopted to convey symbolic meanings that are not innate to the body. Passivity has to be enacted, not merely assumed to be symbolically imposed by the Law. Therefore, movement as part of the promise of power⁸¹ ought to be one of the consistent ways with which the male body is encoded. To reiterate, I argue that if the structurally determined dichotomy still organises the representation of masculinity and femininity, then this categorical difference must be encoded in part by the movement of the body. The taxonomy is able to build upon this by tracing the respective positions of the 'performative body parts'.

The next cluster of variables (twenty to twenty-four) traces the various features concerning the head, face and gaze and is central to the postmodernist/feminist argument regarding the categorically gendered nature of codification of the body. This cluster directly examines the frequency and the continuing value of the Mulvey paradigm. I argue that the structure of the gaze needs to be empirically present to be operative in the way she describes it. Variable twenty identifies the various positions of the head. The position of the head determines, and thus excludes, possible looks and interactions between the viewer and the model within the image, which is central if we are to examine the structure of the exchange of looks. Again, this variable has isolated the various head positions in detail in order that the image dictate the frequency of use. It includes therefore '*head back*', '*head down*' and so on, leading to '*head in profile*'. Its additional significance is that it exposes the materiality of the body that I argued is lost in models that trace the Oedipal organisation of the body. The symbolic ordering of the body cannot overcome the fact that a structure of exchanges that takes place in looking is negated if the head is looking upwards. Even an example like this exposes the categorical nature of structurally determined description because to argue that this represents the feminine attempting to avoid the masculine gaze is to impose a specific inscription upon the image that reflects the theoretically determined normative position implicitly assumed. The image cannot be always reorganised to fit the structural imperative imposed and justified by recourse to the Oedipal organisation of the body. I have argued above that this is exactly what the notion of 'feminisation' does: it negates certain coding shifts by recuperating them into the linguistically structural and thus universal dichotomy, while ignoring that feminisation assumes a 'common-sense' assign of sex: it has been established 'he's a feminised man'.

⁸¹ Reflecting the analyses of Dyer.

To the head position the mouth is added (variable twenty-one). Examples include '*pouting*', '*kissing*', '*phallic mouth*', '*phallic mouth with object*' and so on. This variable explores the extent to which the mouth is central to the sexualisation of the body. Arguably, the mouth is subject to specific and intensive cultural elaborations, which mark the mouth out as one of the central erotic areas of the body. As a result, the mouth is an intensely symbolic domain, which, if the dichotomies presumed do in fact order the presentation, ought to be clearly marked by categorical difference. For example, using the mouth and cigarette is a central technique for the femme fatale. The eroticisation can be intensified by having the head tilted backwards slightly in order that the viewer can look inside the mouth.

Additionally, it is central to the genderising of the body by means of practical regular accomplishments. For example, this variable draws attention to lipstick to produce a clearly gendered body. If there is a high frequency, it suggests that there has been a massive inroad of pornographic codes into mainstream magazines and, consequently, a marked difference in the expressive mouth will be treated as a significant evidence for the continuation of a subordinated sexual femininity as the postmodernists/feminists define it. Note also there are a number of codes that have been included that specifically target what has come to be known as the 'Lolita effect' (Silverman:1994; Stratton:1996). This may be connected to other codes in the taxonomy where specifically child-like characteristics have been included. The use of child-like poses also integrates the elements of status back into the visual field (Goffmann:1979). This further connects to the debates regarding the discursive discipline of women's 'natural flesh'. One would not expect there to be a high frequency of cases where the male body is encoded in this way. Therefore, if a high frequency is traced within the female sample, specific tables will be built excluding the male population of the sample. It is possible to delineate the extent to which the body is securely coded in this way, or whether other childish postures are set in contradiction to the gaze.

The next variable in this cluster identifies the direction of the gaze (variable twenty-two) as well as the spectatorial address (variable twenty-three). The latter variable refers to the mode of address contained within the image. There are three altogether and the coding follows strictly the descriptions and definitions provided by the postmodernist/feminist model. The variable moves from the most active position adopted by the model towards the imagined viewer to the most passive position between model and viewer. Thus, the primary access in this variable concerns the set-up between the model's gaze and the imagined viewer *at the point when the photograph is taken*. This structures the image so that the relationship is re-established when the viewer sees the image, even if the viewer reads against the grain of the image. Code 1, '*public addressing viewer*', traces an exchange of looks constructed by the model looking directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer in the place of the camera: the gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she positions himself or herself to the image. Hence, to look at such an image is to engage with the model. The description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or her. Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or desire for the viewer, but it need not necessarily be the case. For example, the model appears as the initiator of a sexual exchange by adopting a gaze that makes the viewer the object in the exchange. It can therefore apply equally to male and female models.

This compares with what has been described as '*narrative address*'. Code 2 refers to those images in which the viewer is implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the main axis of exchange between one of the models and the viewer, while clearly excluding the other model/character. For example, the female model looks into the camera and therefore at the viewer, while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby excluding the boyfriend/model from the central exchange of looks. The implication is that the boyfriend/model is being laughed at, therefore making the joke private to viewer and model. This draws upon the film form. The central protagonist in such a *mise-en-scène* is the female model since she both commands the viewer's gaze and dupes her boyfriend. Similarly, the male model could place the viewer at the centre of the narrative by covertly initiating the male viewer's gaze at another woman, while in the presence of the presumed girlfriend. Not only does such a narrative assert the heterosexist assumption, but it also connotes the convention that the exchange is *between* the men because the *object* of exchange is the woman.

Code 3, '*private voyeur*', refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze of the viewer as well as being oblivious to it. Thus, the relationship of the model to the viewer is one where the viewer can peer into the model's 'world' free from the demands of reciprocity and free to see or impose what he or she wants. It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing and, as a result, one would expect this be much more prevalent when used to photograph women. This exposes the extent to which psychoanalysis underpins the analyses subject to critique. If such a frame is used pictorially to represent men, a male gaze that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic usually accompanies it. Dyer defines the instabilities contained in images of men thus: in order to disavow the latent passivity of being an object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity. For example, by displaying his cerebral superiority by looking up to the heavens, the male model makes his own body inconsequential to his true being. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic gaze on men is such that it could suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus is said to determine whether the gaze is gendered.

To conclude, the variable seeks to trace the possible exchange of looks that take place in this 'realistic' medium. More specifically, spectatorial address captures the extent to which the passive position of the female model in a frame and the active position of the (presumed) male viewer structure the *mise-en-scène*. It directly references the ways in which postmodernism/feminism, and Cultural Studies more generally, argue that passivity is visually structured, which then must be negated if the model is male. This directly references Mulvey's paradigmatic position regarding the ways the visual form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the myth of representative realism.

The expression of the gaze (variable twenty-three) adds detail to the above structure of the exchange of looks. It details the extent to which the exchange of the gaze is further disambiguated by the expressions that accompany them. Some codes target the active side of the gendered dichotomy, most notably the codes that identify the '*authoritative*', '*assertive*' and '*other-worldly*' gazes, while the passive features are pinned to codes such as '*coy*', '*dreamy*', '*shy*' and so on.⁸² The expressions encompass both the direction of the eyes and the use of the eyebrows to anchor the meaning further. Note also that certain features of the expressive gaze are secured by the direction of the look and the

⁸² Many of these terms have been lifted from Millum's *The Images of Women*, 1976.

head position, which will have been detailed beforehand. The codes used within the advertisement itself and the operationalisation undertaken here mean that the reading of the code and its mode of display are not treated as synonymous to the gestures used in embodied interaction. The codes of display are not a part of a broader flow of interaction that takes place within time, the conclusion of which is not controlled by either interlocutor. Each gesture works through its stylisation, that is, through the exaggeration of the common features of a gesture. Again, I return to Goffman for justification: these expressions are not complex like the real material social interactions upon which they are based: they function because they are dependent upon conventionalised hyper-realistic forms and this is what makes them instantly recognisable. Therefore, I argue that codes contained within commercial images are both highly staged and thoroughly dislocated from real time and space. Moreover, the staged nature of the image is further compounded by the fact that is seen and 'reflected back', via the directions of the photographer, to the model throughout the shoot, which further problematises the relationship between the viewer and viewed because the image is mediated through the photographer. There are, then, various ways in which the image exaggerates 'naturalistic' expressions in order that it be 'read' as intended.

Variable twenty-four is a departure from those that specifically target the body. Rather, it traces the use of social scenes to stage the narrative presented, thus further removing ambiguity from the meaning. Certain social settings are accompanied by relatively fixed conventions about what is understood to take place there. Therefore, it introduces the ideological elements of social space into the representation: the feminine is equated with the private/domestic sphere. The codes selected range from scenes of a '*lovers' tiff*' to the '*countryside*', '*cafes*' to '*bars*' and so forth. The scenes act as ideological contexts within which the body idiom is located and by doing so automatically exclude inappropriate keying of interpretive practices. Furthermore, the variable extends the ideological grounding of the image within broader sets of hegemonic relations. For example, it provides a mechanism to trace those representations of social space that remain highly dichotomised; the feminine remaining private, for example. Variable twenty-six identifies both the magazine and the year. When used as part of the results, this is broken up into two to facilitate ease of interpretation.

Variable twenty-five traces the macro structural features of the image according to the gendered dichotomies. Each sub-variable contains a hierarchised pair: the first value is the one applied to the man, the second value is applied to the woman. For example, one would expect the masculine to be equated with the assumption of the subject and the feminine with the particular form of objectification; hence the masculine is the mind (as defined by Dyer) and the feminine the body (as identified by feminist cultural theory). If this relationship is reversed, 'the mind' will be positioned as the second value, which has been constructed as the feminine side. The variable contains codes that count the potential frequency of both. The aim was to trace two elements simultaneously: first, the respective distributions of the masculine and feminine as determined by the theoretical account of the dichotomy; second, the interdependence between the active/passive, mind/body, narrative/image descriptions. By doing so, it was intended to identify the extent to which visual representation contributed to its reproduction, or whether there was emergent evidence that the structural dichotomy was weakening.

However, this operationalisation was not successful because it was too cumbersome and thus failed to measure what it set out to identify. This was in part a result of a distinct set of distributions that broke up the logic of the dualisms far more significantly than piloting had suggested. Second, it underestimated the extent to which the method restricted such relational analysis. It was operationalised thus in order maintain a sense of the interrelationship between the two opposites, which was why the advertisement was defined as the coding unit. The cumbersome nature of the coding directly led to statistically invalid results. Unlike the other variable codes, these do not exist as separate entities, which makes the application of chi invalid. I have therefore excluded analysis of this variable. The second major problem with the operationalisation more broadly is that a number of the variables are simply too long and, as a result, many of the findings are obscured by the sheer size of the tables. When this has occurred, I have broken them up into smaller logical clusters.⁸³

In summation, the central emphasis of this taxonomy is to trace the positions, gestures, contexts and photographic codes that, in general terms, produce the images that surround us. When the codes have been more descriptive, I have adhered to the semiotics discussed above for the criteria of application. However, most of the codes contained isolated body parts: how much is shown, what is shown, how the body represents itself in an advertisement in order to 'do' gender. I have chosen the most basic features with which to do this. Therefore, while I recognise the critiques to which content analysis is subject, I suggest that if we are to treat many of my variables as inherently problematic, then we must ask if meaning can work at all. I have sought to restrict the codification to the most basic features of an advertisement, aiming to limit any potential ambiguity that characterises the interpretive meanings that organise social life. I attend to a level of analysis that Goffman defines thus:

[the book is about] the organisation of experience – something that an individual actor can take into his mind – and not the organisation of society. [He makes no claim whatsoever to be] talking about the core matters of sociology – social organisation and social structure. I am not addressing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals have at any moment of their social lives. I personally hold society to be first in every way and individual's current involvements to be second; this report deals only with matters that are second.
(Goffman:1974:13)

This informs my rejection of the inferences that regularly emerge from the axis between representation as social order and identity. As argued, we should desist from assuming that certain identifications are made as a result of the linguistic or representational order. However, I recognise that the adoption of such a tenet is insufficient justification for the return to the quantification of meaning. Thus, what follows is a detailed exploration of certain public practices upon which more complex interpretations are made. I argue that we can treat certain categories as constructed, but nevertheless foundational: the construction operates foundationally once it is taken for granted, that is, it belongs to the social and linguistic background. To this, I add that these basic categories are dependent upon a certain facticity of the body that provides a resting place, as it were, from which language is made meaningful. Therefore,

⁸³ These can be examined in Appendix B.

I reject the radical sceptical position adopted toward language to which content analysis is particularly vulnerable.

To reiterate, Goffman argues that there is a direct relationship between the meaningful social world we live in and the representations that we make of this world. However, he queries the assumption that these representations are more than a direct mirror reflection of the social world they nevertheless encapsulate. He is, therefore, targeting the very assumption I have critiqued above: images can be about the world in which we live in a direct way, but this does not justify the causal leap that the postmodernists make, that somehow *they are that world*. Goffman is explicit as to how the representative and the real are bound to each other, without further pinning this to a structuralist model of social reproduction and its formation of appropriate identities; he therefore excludes the reduction that culture operates as a psychological disposition. He remains sociological about the image but makes fundamental distinctions between the social and the cultural that I think can make a considerable contribution to feminist analysis.

METHODOLOGY, CONVENTION AND THE IMAGE WITHIN THE FIELD OF COMMERCIALISED AESTHETIC REALISM

Goffman⁸⁴ begins by asking what sort of a thing is the photographic image. He argues that ambiguity in photography lies in our linguistic incapacity to distinguish what the photographic image is 'of'. With regard to the stage, we have the semantic distinction between character and actor to discriminate between the real and the temporary, but such a distinction is missing with regard to photography. A photograph can be said to be 'of' the subject, as well as 'of' the model: it merges them both by concealing the difference that is then taken for granted. An example of such a blur is the instance when the framing of a 'model' is staged so that the 'subject' appears surprised by having her photograph taken. Other examples include rigged photographs where the model and the scene are real but are brought together to induce radically wrong inferences about what is taking place so that the viewer is misled. Photographic forms of representative realism work precisely because the number and depth of cues are insufficient to indicate what is really going on. Goffman argues that the result of the failure to sustain the semantic distinction is that we treat photography as if we are concerned with one kind of problem, when in fact we are concerned with another, substantively ignored.⁸⁵ Consequently, the staged nature of image is lost when it is successful in staging the real.

Significantly, Goffman links the staging of the 'material world' to the advertisement form and defines this relationship as 'commercial realism'. This directly draws together the mode of visual presentation to the social field in which it takes place; hence, his considerations are explicitly market oriented. Commercial realism employs *standardised* scenes and props to pass the scene off as a potentially real one. Furthermore, it provides a particularly acute example of the ambiguity between model and subject. For example, an image that depicts a nude but well-known woman will raise questions about the modesty of the *model*; a picture that features some nuns idolising a car is likely to

⁸⁴ The following analysis of Goffman's contribution is taken from section 2 of *Gender Advertisements*.

⁸⁵ *Gender Advertisements*, p. 13.

raise questions about the desecration of the *subjects*. Regarding the latter, we are concerned about the image, but this concern is not based within the material instance but with the generic social type depicted and the advertisement. Nayak makes this exact slip when he refers to the subject of the photograph, which carries with it the assumption that the subject is the model in real life. The semantic slip conceals the extent to which the posture belongs to the realm of commercial realism rather than black subjectivity. This equally emerges in the feminist analysis of stereotypes which sought 'realistic' representation about the 'real' lives of women, to have 'real women's bodies' in the advertisement, but at the same time to make a commercial image promote changes to the social order, that is, to make them about the promote social change, that is, to produce another reality. Implicitly, I argue that the cultural analyses critiqued above have not moved far from this position: the singular emphasis upon representation⁸⁶ means that they are forced to look for 'positive images' to challenge the current phallogentric stranglehold. Perhaps this is an outcome of the model of socialisation, upon which this model is implicitly dependent.

Therefore, commercial realism encompasses a form of artifice that defines the photograph: the simulated scenes represent narrative-based action located within the stream of time and place from which inferred meaning is gleaned. The artifice deployed renders the natural expressions crude, simulated and frozen. Hence, all models transformed into subjects in the narrative are united in their artifice. For example, the exchange of looks can seek to bring the viewer into the frame of meaning; the subject makes eye contact, sometimes collusively, as if that someone were there in the flesh.⁸⁷ This echoes Mulvey's notion of the male gaze.⁸⁸ This model does not reject the conventions within the image by which it makes sense to talk of the male gaze, rather it rejects the inference that assumes that this forms identity and organises patterns of desire. On the contrary, this construction is brought about by the slip of model/subject. His point is that we *know* Brutus didn't really kill Caesar when we were at the theatre last; likewise we know that the model and subject are different, that the latter is fictional, even if we suspend this in order that the image work. Without this semantic distinction, the social form dissolves through such a series of misframes. We 'know' the difference between a social interaction and a representation even if we have to 'suspend' this to make the representation work. Interaction and interpretive linguistic activity make such a semantic distinction available and brings the effects of meaning into the conscious realm where it is 'available for use'. Thus, we abandon the analytical distinction so that we can treat the scene naturalistically, that is, accept its subject, despite the fact this has nothing to do with what went on to compose the image.

Asked what is in a particular ad, we might say, 'A family fishing.' What makes us think the four subjects in the picture are in a family relationship to one another is exactly what might make us infer such a relationship with respect to strangers in real life. So, too, on seeing the images of fishing lines in the water. Asked whether we think the four persons who are modeled for the picture are really a family, or if there are hooks at the end of the lines, the

⁸⁶ Moving as it does between the levels highlighted in the introduction to the literature review.

⁸⁷ This is where I have drawn the code 'narrative address' from.

⁸⁸ This is important because it suggests a stability of meaning that does not entirely lie with the reader. I will return to this in more detail.

answer could well be, 'Probably not, but what does it matter?' The point about an ad is what its composer *meant us to infer as to what is going on* in the make-believe picture scene, *not what had actually been going on* in the real doings that were pictured. This is subject, not model. (Goffman:1974:15) (my italics)

Such a semantic distinction does not ground the semiotic analyses undertaken by postmodernism/feminism and so this slip finds its way into the heart of the analyses they undertake. This means the differing levels of representation often go unattended. We want our photographs to say true things about us, and we are prepared to suspend concern for the artifice that creates it. Is this not an interesting way of situating the possible ideological elements of photography while taking the utterances people make about the photograph seriously? Moreover, the knowledge of its artificial construction suggests that the meaning is not operating within the unconscious because its constructedness is at once recognised and ignored. Thus, while he traces very similar forms of exchanges, he locates their operation in quite a different domain from the Mulveyian paradigm: the construction is a phenomenological projection from the cognitive reading of the image to the capacity to 'see' the photograph as space that the viewer temporarily occupies. Therefore, the photograph operates through the phenomenological practices of perception; practices that change over time, up and beyond the basic units or *gestalts* of perception. Furthermore, these practices can be treated ironically, and in doing so, it is possible to disrupt the interpretative practice and dislodge the meanings integrated to the space the viewer temporarily occupies⁸⁹. Moreover, the text is able to present to us a new view on the representation. In this way, it is possible to integrate notions of how the text is able to alter our interpretative horizons: it can bring to the fore what was once merely taken for granted.

THE REPRESENTATION AND THE COMPETENT READER

Goffman emphasises that commercial images reconstitute social space. Therefore, there is no sense in which the space depicted is to be treated as equivalent to physical space, again stressing the semantic distinction between model and subject. Goffman singles out the *regular* features of an image, and he is careful to trace the semiotic elements specific to commercial realism that build upon those regular units. He examines in detail the relationship between the form and content of a type of representation and argues that the combination has a significant impact upon the final product. Arguably, he works with the presupposition that we can adopt codes, categories and words that are used practically within interaction and transform them so that they function in the visual form, for example, but relay the same conventional meanings. Therefore, representative realism must draw upon the conventions of the social and linguistic background and reconfigure them in such a way as to make them produce those same associations within a two-dimensional frame.

By using Goffman's model, I argue that it is possible to integrate the notion of linguistic background into social interaction, and that it is thus public in nature and yet pre-reflexive. The background of meaning is central to how we know things, but often we find it very hard to explain

⁸⁹ A phenomenological parallel is the optical illusion.

what it is we know. The rules that we follow are so complex that they become opaque. What is required is a series of techniques by which we can penetrate certain kinds of meaning to a certain level. By 'keying', Goffman means that we have myriad rules that we apply pre-reflexively when interpreting a text or social interaction. *This places an essential distance between the fact that things are meaningful to use and the fact that this meaning is not a private internalised entity, as psychoanalysis presupposes, but thoroughly public.* This technique is something that we use to get a handle on the polysemy of social and linguistic life, that is, complex forms of meaning. The process of keying institutes the appropriate frames of reference when *doing* interpretation. It is a process in which we know when an instance is an exception and when it is a common daily occurrence, for example. Moreover, it is the system by which we differentiate different kinds of texts and recognise the different level of analysis that is appropriate to a text.

Thus, Goffman is isolating the social competencies that we as social actors employ as part of our interpretive practices. Moreover, the sets of competencies required are bounded by the social and cultural order: those who have not become embodied, socially competent actors in this order may not have the necessary cultural references or keying structures to understand the gesture fully. For example, Russian men can congratulate other men with a kiss on the lips. In Britain, such an exchange between non-kin adult men is almost always considered a homosexual act because of the discourses of sexuality and counter-discursive constructions established by gay pride. Conversely, therefore, a man and a woman in an embrace would generally be assumed to be a couple, particularly if the context is a fashion feature in a women's magazine. The stable contexts of meaning combine with the conventional and standardised codes to produce the appropriate cues. The differentiation does not lie in the integrity of the act, but in the social context and the way these features define what sort of an exchange it is. We use keying skills to differentiate these elements. Thus, part of the complexity of this interpretive technique is the many social interactions it informs and unpacks: it enables one to trace power asymmetry within a social interaction in which the actors participate. Moreover, these interpretive activities are conventional in form and operate most effectively in 'normal cases'. I shall return to the importance of normal cases and circumstances in a moment.

Goffman departs from other writers concerning the image because, before he considers the content, he explores the photograph as a phenomenal object to which he conjoins the phenomenological experience of viewing the object. Goffman asks first what sorts of things go into making a photograph; only then can its meaning be considered. He argues that these two focal points operate prior to the interpretation of the image and are therefore integral to the interpretive practice. The significance that is being drawn from this is that it seems to suggest that the image 'works' because people are readily aware of the highly artificial context and content of the image's scene. Therefore, the fabrication, integral to the fashion image, is an element of the function of the image. He argues that photography, as a specific form of representation, has two special elements: first, the apparent capacity to capture a perspective as the viewer would see it; second, the naturalistic view of a world presented as a controlled, manipulated and staged view. The spontaneity of being caught by the camera is a fake, an artifice produced to stage the narrative. Goffman's departure is to make the artifice of realism central to his analysis, as well as to the interpretations viewers make. Therefore, we are able to keep a keen eye

on the artifice of realism, without branding the viewer who consumes it a cultural dupe, as the postmodernists/feminists are forced to do because only they, somehow, muster the critical distance that prohibits their identification.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

Goffman has outlined persuasively that a condensed form of meaning operates within advertisements, and he has put the case that this is highly conventional in form. I attend to this by differentiating between texts and the interpretive competency required. I argue that reading most advertisements does not *require* that we attend theoretically to the instability of meaning. Advertisements are quite unlike the texts that postmodernists themselves write, in which the polysemic features of language are central to even a surface engagement with them. I relate this accomplishment to the conventional contexts available for use. Interpretation is a fact of life but this does not mean that there are not different sorts of interpretive activities. By this, I mean that we must attend to where the interpretation is taking place, what sort of an entity is subject to interpretation and where it comes from. Sorting out the varying aspects of interpretation enables us to grasp fundamental differences between the interpretation that confronts us within social interaction and the interpretive activities we undertake when we read a text. The fact that, as Goffman readily illustrates, these forms of interpretive competencies interact and that the boundaries between them are blurred is not a problem we face *as users*. We have a common-sense background to draw upon that allows us to make the necessary differentiations.

Interpretative interaction with others is located in space and time in an immediate embodied sense. We are unable to go back and undertake the interpretive activity again. Texts, on the other hand, can be re-read, re-interpreted. I argue that we bring different skills to bear when we interact and make those interpretations as part of the ongoing chain from those that we use when we approach a text. This marks out textual interpretations from social interpretation, even if we metaphorically apply the methods of textual interpretation to the embodied forms of social display. For example, we 'read' people's display and this can say something about their consumption practices, but this must not be taken as an instance of text as body. In this sense, I stress that these meanings are distinctly public in form and function because of the structured contexts from which they emerge.

Moreover, we apply different levels of interpretation to different cultural texts because we ascribe different statuses to them. In this way, we treat advertisements as relatively rudimentary texts, particularly when they are aligned to more complex texts such as novels. Advertisements ought not to be subsumed under the homogenising heading 'Text'. Postmodernism has pursued zealously the notion of the 'death of the author' and argued that we should cease to consider a text according to authorial intention. However, this has been pursued without any differentiation according to the context that produces the text. Advertisements are overtly commercial forms and it is of primary importance that advertisement successfully achieve the association of the language of desire and the product placement. On estimate, a campaign such as that run by Haägen-Dazs can cost about £30 million. If a campaign commits this much investment into persuading people to buy the good, surely this suggests that it aims

to anchor meaning rather than promote a product via the free-floating signifier. My central point is this: a campaign cannot be so ambiguous or so complex as to fail to connect the meanings it generates and the product. Therefore, I reject the notion that advertisements are so unstable as to prohibit a content analysis of their key features. We apply different keying techniques and we expect different forms of cultural content and presentation from them. Arguably, this distinction is taken for granted, but it is nevertheless fully operative.

IN SUMMATION

Goffman argues that advertisements are representations that are about our world. They are condensed representations that draw upon certain socio-cultural features of actual embodied interaction. However, he argues that they can operate successfully only if a number of conditions are met:

1. Goffman provides us with a semantic distinction between the model and the subject that allows us to describe the social reality represented without the epistemological slip that the representation encapsulates 'real reality' in some authentic way.
2. The capacity of the advertisement to represent society is dependent upon the artifice of the codes, props, bodies and stages.
3. The socio-cultural world that is recognisable in the image yet accomplished through artifice does not seem to have an adverse impact upon the reader.
4. On the contrary, the lay reader readily discards the artifice in order that the representation achieved can continue to be about our socio-cultural lives.
5. The social world staged is based in artifice, which means that the codes draw upon the background of embodied social interaction, but then greatly over-emphasise them. The social conventions of face-to-face interaction are 'hyper-ritualised'.

Therefore, the social conventions by which embodied interaction is regularly achieved is drawn upon exaggeratedly so that these features are readily understood without any extra interpretive work. For example, he isolates the use of the male body as a means to act as a barrier to the women's movement. He is suggesting that it mirrors the convention of presentations of the public self. Public male figures are notorious for stating symbolically that 'she is my wife'. Through the exaggeration, readers are readily able to project the embodied sets of meanings that flow from interaction on to the stylised versions in representation. The codes work because of their dependence upon convention, and it is with the conventions of representing gender that I am concerned.

Regarding content analysis as a method, the following conditions apply to its application here:

1. It is beyond the remit of the method to draw inferences about the relationship of representation to the social order more broadly.

2. Equally, it is beyond its scope to make inferential conclusions regarding interpretive activities.
3. I make no claim to replace the causal mechanism of internalisation with another.
4. If we seek to locate the effect of representation, then I propose that we look to its location within interaction. This effectively rejects representation as somehow a causal effect.
5. Advertisements are essentially conventional, which is why I argue that the method of content analysis is applicable.
6. I seek only to draw out the body positions and postures and so identify the extent of their gender differentiation.

In essence, then, the aim of quantifying the gendered nature of representation is to contest its assumed uniformity, which is a direct consequence of the categorical logic that informs the mainstay of semiotic analyses conducted. I argue that this requires a move beyond the form of description that merely contest a single semiotic reading with another single counter example, which undertaking a semiotic analysis of the content would produce. In a sense, the endeavour reflects the need for an overview of the representations, rather than attention to the specificities of the meaning. The consensus regarding the meaning of representation overlooks two central elements: first, it tends to overlook the commodification and sexualisation pressures and the extent to which the markets both target and marketise masculinity; second, it forecloses change that could potentially erode the gendered difference initially identified in the 1970s. The primacy awarded the gendered dichotomy as both the source and the outcome of representation inevitably leads to the reproduction of the dichotomy because there is no source, trajectory or subject that can produce sustained and systematic resistance to it.

GENDERING THE BODY OR CONSTRUCTING THE SUBJECT?

The purpose of quantifying the bodily based codes is to contest the assumption that 'the sign'⁹⁰ constitutes the gendered dichotomy, thereby constituting feminine identity as the absolute other. In chapter 2, I outlined what I consider to be the fundamental difficulties of theory that seeks to define or infer patterns of identification, that is, the formation of subjectivity, through a specific semiotic decoding of an ideological cultural contour. Here, I seek to challenge their assumptions of what the contours of culture actually are. Hence, my results investigate the validity of the following theoretical standpoint: the Symbolic is ordered by the core dualisms of patriarchy so that the active/passive elements are combined with the masculine subject and the feminine object. For example, a number of codes isolate which direction the model is looking: looking down and away is passive and thus feminine, whereas looking directly into the camera is active and thus masculine. For these semiotic analyses to be good empirical description, that is, good description of the Symbolic, then the Symbolic ought to reproduce the structural dualisms of patriarchy. In relation to a content analysis, if the Symbolic is thus structured, the tables generated ought to be categorically distributed by sex, measurable by chi square (statistical difference). If this is the case, the sex of the model will determine the dependent variables; the direction of the gaze, for example. Hence, the codes I have isolated define the position of the body, its gestures and expressions, in order to directly connect the Symbolic structures to determination of the body, that is, how the body as (feminine) object is visually produced.

In essence, I propose that the content, which I defined as the 'what' of the image, is anything but a forgone conclusion and the results offered here therefore aim to contest the assumption that culture is something ordered by a patriarchal Symbolic, which reproduces the (re)presentation of the feminine. On the contrary, I offer this content analysis as a means to: a) examine afresh the content of images; b) to redress the methodological imbalance produced by concentrating solely upon 'how' meaning is constructed. I have argued in chapter 3 that this imbalance leads to the loss of any sense of the basic description of gendered images.

THE ORDER OF ANALYSIS

The results are divided into two rough groups of codifications, beginning with those that identify simple photographic framing techniques, followed by those that pinpoint various forms of bodily gender display. I start by introducing the issue of how we read the body as self-evidently male or female. Crucially, how are bodies represented so that assignment of male or female is made, when the genitals are concealed? My interest here resides in issue of how naturalised gender is produced within the image, namely that this is what a man 'looks like' Correspondingly, it negates the required practices to accomplish what is seemingly natural order of the body. This is important for how we think about the causal relationship between genitals and the gendering of the body. I then trace how frequently the male and female models are pictured together, singly, in mixed or in homosocial groups. The emphasis here is to explore the central ideological anchoring of the image, particularly in terms of the heterosexist presumption and its corresponding dualisms. This is followed by the identification of the distributions of shot length, the type of focus and the combined effect of codifying the image

⁹⁰ 'The sign' has assumed the status of a generic type.

through the generalised form of address. I place particular importance on the extent to which the address is defined by the voyeuristic codification. I build upon this by examining the realist photographic conventions. This form of codification is then located in terms of the social situations in which it is anchored. Here, I identify the gendered contexts of the public and private spheres, as well as the prevalence of specific settings for the interaction between men and women, the detail of the how the public and private domain is integrated into the production of the image and, in particular, the sites for heterosexual romance. There then follows an examination of body gestures. These variables, when combined, give us an overall picture of the current modes of gender codification, especially the extent to which the gestures remain distinctly gendered. I conclude with an analysis of the composite findings, to which I add my own specific concerns regarding the sex/gender distinction.

Note that the presentation of the results will be limited to the sample from 1985-95. This restriction has been imposed because, in places, the sample is too small to provide clear indicative shifts. Also, taking the body as the sampling unit, rather than the advertisement, produced the anomaly of increasing the sample size from the intended 500 to 703. As a result, the sample from *Cosmopolitan* 1975 distorts the statistical calculations of chi square because the ratio of women to men⁹¹ here was 3:1, therefore already producing clear statistical difference. As a result, I will examine shifts from 1975 in terms of the generalised trends within *Cosmopolitan*. Where possible and relevant, I will include the chi score and the degrees of freedom beneath each table. Please note that when a number of cells have small distributions, Chi will produce an expected value that is less than five. This is statistically insignificant and inaccurate, and so in those cases Chi is not included. In these cases, the evidence will be treated as indicative. However, such small values may be indicative of a substantial change in themselves when treated as part of the broader semiotic picture provided by the cultural analyses.

Although included, my results will not contain any sustained analysis of the comparative distributions of the production of the sexed body and its relationship to ethnic minorities for two reasons. First, the overall sample for the ethnic minority groups registers just over 18%⁹². This means that there is a less than 1:5 proportion of black to white models used. The coding is simply too detailed to make any analysis of this proportion effective. Second, with hindsight, this is beyond the scope of what a content analysis can provide. To do so requires addressing theoretically the issue of how structures are layered but without integrating them and, subsequently, that I address the manifest failure of postmodernism/feminism to deal with two or more structures at one time (see Connell:1987; 1995; Giddens:1991; Bourdieu:1977; 1990; Calhoun:1995). One is able to get a sense of how frequently ethnic minorities are used, and that, strictly speaking, this proportion could be said to reflect fairly accurately the ratio of ethnic mix currently existing in Britain.

THE RESULTS

As can be readily identified in figure 1 below, the random sample between 1985-95 has produced a relatively even distribution of men and women represented: 50.79% of the bodies were

⁹¹ Please see Appendix C which shows the breakdown by numbers in 1975.

⁹² Please see Appendix C.

coded as female compared to 47.01% of bodies coded as male. Hence, there is equal visibility of male and female bodies within the fashion advertisements sampled. This sits in stark contrast to the 11 cases, just 1.73%, where the codes are sufficiently ambiguous to deter a secure assignment, meaning that in virtually all cases there are clear conventional secondary or tertiary sexual characteristics with which to assign the sex of the body (Connell:1987). This suggests that the sex of the model is visually codified so that the body appears as *self-evidently* one sex or the other, thereby negating those majority aspects of the body that are common to both bodies. It suggests that we treat secondary characteristics as clear, unambiguous signs of the naturalness of the category of sex. We tend to locate and define the body through genital difference first – that sex *is* the body. In our society, we tend not to think of ‘the’ body but of two bodies, knowable through sex, that produce two oppositional ontological entities. Keying functions in such a way that the body without armpit hair is self-evidently female. This form of keying seems to occur despite our awareness that shaving is a social activity and therefore, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with the “natural body”. Likewise, if the body represented has defined muscle over the breast bone, again the conventions of keying would automatically produce the classification that

Fig. 1 Distribution of the sexed model

Absolute Column % Respondents	Base	sex Q1			
		female	male	androdynous	other
	636 100.00%	323 50.79%	299 47.01%	11 1.73%	3 0.47%

the body is male. Muscle is a ‘natural’ feature of the male body, which again ignores the time spent in the gym *accomplishing* that particular muscle development. The central purpose of our cultural activities, it seems, is to negate these activities of accomplishment.

Furthermore, keying activity, such as this, indicates that we assume a direct correspondence between the secondary characteristics and concealed genitalia. This assumed correspondence is a process which, according to Kessler and McKenna (1978), by-passes the ‘biological failure’ of sex to clearly differentiate or dichotomise the secondary and tertiary characteristics into two distinct groups. Therefore, even when we encounter the myriad of ‘exceptions’ in everyday life, it does not undermine the sanctity of the assumption of correspondence, that is, that certain traits, personal and physical, are male traits. We are faced, then, with the dilemma of the body: it is both the most self-evident of things and yet it is also one of the most intensely constructed entities. I will refer to the body as the male or female sexed model in order to emphasise the visual accomplishment.

Figure 1 indicates that the sex of the body is an accomplished and stable entity that forms the bedrock of the representations sampled here. This legitimates the postmodernist/feminist assumption that sexual difference is the core discursive product that reproduces the dualistic logic of the Symbolic. In addition, postmodernists/feminists would argue that this establishes the initial construction upon which the process of identification is founded. However, there is a central issue at stake for the postmodern/feminist agenda: to what extent is the universal accomplishment of sex within representation sufficient grounds to connect the values of the Symbolic hierarchy to representation and

the identification representation is said to secure? In other words, is the accomplishment of a sexed female body sufficient to assume its place within the Symbolic hierarchy and award to that body the gendered traits of subjectivity? Perhaps one requires more than the mere presence of sexed bodies to assume the gendered Symbolic because the production of the sexed body, which is more or less universal, does not produce the same sets of correspondent meanings, not just cross-culturally, but also within our social order (Herdt:1993). The substitution of the accomplished body with the Symbolic organisation of feminine and masculine as subjective identification patterns means that the various elements involved in the construction they are addressing remains unclear, since they are used interchangeably. Are they delineating the construction of bodies, sexual character or representation? The interchangeability assumes that the accomplished body will secure the passivity of the feminine and that this is self-evident. But does the accomplished body also readily secure feminine traits, or is such a causal connection another instance of the implicit re-introduction of the naturalised body (Shilling:1993)? I return to this in greater detail as part of the evaluation of the results.

In figure 2⁹³, a significant majority of the models sampled were photographed as single models (65.91% of the total sample). Not only does this suggest an emerging trend for simplification in representation techniques (Millum:1975; Liess, Kline and Jhally:1986; Wernick:1991), insofar as it removes the codifications necessary to link the two models, but it also takes away an important anchor by which the heterosexist imperative is secured. For example, there is an approximate ratio of 4.5:1 of single female sexed models to those in a couple. This ratio is the same for male sexed models. It is now, therefore, much harder to secure the ‘feminine as sexual adjunct’ since she is predominantly photographed *without* a man. Moreover, she is just as likely to be photographed alone as a male sexed model.

Fig. 2 The relationship of numbers⁹⁴ to the sex of the model

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		619 100.00%	321 100.00%	298 100.00%
derived q2 Q29	single	408 65.91%	218 67.91%	190 63.76%
	male/female single	48 7.75%	23 7.17%	25 8.39%
	mixed couples	93 15.02%	47 14.64%	46 15.44%
	crowds	70 11.31%	33 10.28%	37 12.42%

Chi = 1.3915, df = 3, there is no significant relationship

⁹³ See Appendix B for details of which logically compatible codes have been amalgamated. Those variables subject to amalgamation are labelled ‘derived’.

⁹⁴ Note that this is a derived table. The combinations are listed in Appendix B. The same applies to all tables labelled ‘derived’.

The extent of this simplification can be demonstrated by comparing the above distributions with those of 1975, pictured below. First, there were no cases where women were photographed in mixed groups; second, this contrasts with a much higher visibility of men within the magazine⁹⁵. Figure 2a suggests that the numbers of mixed couples, and the extent to which the female could be located as a sexual adjunct has significantly reduced by as much as half, down from 33% in 1975 to approximately 15% between 1985-95. It must be noted that, while locating the woman in the man’s presence is one immediate and unambiguous way to codify the power or status differentials, there are ways around this, for not all forms of sexual objectification require the presence of the male body. Yet it is harder to assert the durability of the gendered dichotomies and their organisation through the heterosexist imperative if there are so few cases where the man shows the woman what to do, or protects her and so forth.

Fig. 2a Numbers by 1975, ‘Cosmopolitan’

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		67 100.00%	51 100.00%	16 100.00%
derived q2 Q29	single	24 35.82%	24 47.06%	0 0.00%
	male/female single	10 14.93%	10 19.61%	0 0.00%
	mixed couples	33 49.25%	17 33.33%	16 100.00%
	crowds	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%

Returning to figure 2, the last significant finding here is that in only 7.75% of the total sample between 1985-95 is the body is located within a single sex couple. Again, this frequency is mirrored across the sexed bodies. This indicates a number of things. To begin with, it provides evidence to substantiate my methodological critique of the dominance of semiotics. Returning to Lewis and Rolley, you will find that they isolated coupling as a key feature by which the homoerotic nature of magazine readership is secured. They define coupling as the presence of two same-sex bodies, which may be further connected through the visual narrative. Yet this is hard to sustain when there are so few cases in comparison with the single model, especially if one notes that the sampling unit is the body rather than the advertisement. The 23 bodies located within a potentially homosexual context translate into a maximum of only 11 advertisements out of the 500 sampled. This compares to 218 advertisements for the single female sexed model⁹⁶. Therefore, a specific feature has been noted as an instance that targets the homoerotic and thus produces an unconscious identification with the pre-Oedipal flow of desire. Yet without the overview that a content analysis can provide, theorists like Rolley and Lewis have no way of knowing how representative such a signification is. Now, we are able to identify that the visual

⁹⁵ See Appendix A
⁹⁶ This distribution is mirrored also within the male models: a maximum of 12 advertisements compared to 190 single male model advertisements.

pleasures constructed in women’s magazines cannot be organised as Rolley and Lewis have defined it precisely because the coupling codification is rarely used. Moreover, this code cannot be disregarded by referring to the subjective criteria of the category because it attends to a basic facticity of one or two people. Language cannot function at all if ad facto categorisation of this kind cannot be assumed.

I now turn to the variable that traces the generalised relationship between the models and their environment insofar as a specific relationship between model and objects and/or props is constructed through a narrative (Millum:1975). Figure 3 shows that a significant majority of both male and female sexed models are depicted as having no specific relationship with the props or commodity. Consequently, codifications that subordinate the female sexed model to objects and props, contained within the image, are in decline. Moreover, this trend is also apparent for male sexed models to the extent that they do not appear to be in command of the props/objects either. This is important for two central reasons: first, it further secures the above suggestion that the fashion advertisement is moving

Fig. 3 The relationship between the models and the props 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		620 100.00%	321 100.00%	299 100.00%
derived 5 Q28	model	537 86.61%	281 87.54%	256 85.62%
	model and objs	40 6.45%	19 5.92%	21 7.02%
	objects and model	43 6.94%	21 6.54%	22 7.36%

Chi = 0.5712, df =2, there is no significant relationship

toward a presentational format that is greatly simplified; second, the passive relationship to the object that is said to define the feminine is less apparent as is the masculine association with the active. This suggests a decline in the codifications identified by both Goffman and the postmodernist/feminist analyses. The feminine is not defined by being draped over the car, nor is a manly fragrance secured by the man’s ability to control the fast car. The subordination of the feminine to the commodity does not seem to be a central feature of the presentation, any more than the masculine *doing* the subordinating. How does this compare with 1975?

If we look briefly at figure 3a overleaf, we can see that subordination to the commodity or prop appears to be a central feature within *Cosmopolitan* in 1975. The small sample indicates that at 25.49%, the passive relationship to the props or objects remained a central component the conventions of codification of the feminine. Here, the active/passive dualism appears to be a more appropriate description. Again, this can only be treated as an indication, but one that corresponds with the general trends established during the initial politicisation of the image, as discussed in chapter 2.

Fig. 3a The relationship between model and props 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		67 100.00%	51 100.00%	16 100.00%
derived 5 Q28	model	51 76.12%	37 72.55%	14 87.50%
	model and objs	2 2.99%	1 1.96%	1 6.25%
	objects and model	14 20.90%	13 25.49%	1 6.25%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

The two variables examined thus far begin to alter our expectations of the patterns of gender difference. Variable two shows us that there has been a marked decline in the use of the heterosexual couple as part of the commodification process and that this has brought with it the predominance of the single model. With variable five, we have seen that the single model appears to have no particular relationship with the scene within which the body is contextualised, indicating a weakening relationship between the passive and the feminine to the extent that the accomplishment of the passivity cannot be produced through the props and social cues that surround the female model. Furthermore, the male sexed model does not appear to be defined by his command of the mock social environment either. Hence, the active/passive structure is not an overt feature of the image when relating gender to the props and commodities displayed. On the contrary, this relationship appears to be weakening.

The anticipated reply is that these two facets may be weakened, but there are plenty of other possibilities that can and do anchor the gendered dichotomies. For example, if the body is not subordinated to a specific prop or object, or if the woman is no longer defined via her association with the man, we can look to the broader narrative, the position of the spectator, the clothes themselves and so forth. So it is to these variables that I next turn my attention, beginning with shot length and focus. I will then address the mode of photography, beginning with the narrative address, followed by an analysis of how closely the image is bound to a naturalistic social scene. Of particular import is the extent to which realist modes define the centre of the codification and how the spectator is positioned in terms of the overall naturalism⁹⁷.

CENTRAL FRAMING TECHNIQUES AND THEIR DETERMINATION BY GENDER

The identification of the kinds of camera work used engages directly with the issue of the fetishisation of the feminine Woman through the objectifying frame. It is a central feature to the production of feminised and masculinised presentations of gender and the concomitant production of

⁹⁷ Note: I have rejected an examination of codes 9 and 10, perspective and non-perspective, from variable 6 because these issues are better addressed in Figure 12, pp 120-121.

homoerotic desire. Drawing particularly from Doane (1991) but also Cowie (1991;1997) Kaplan (1997) and Stratton (1996), the short length shot, combined with the soft focus, are the two central techniques used to fetishise the (feminine) body in an unambiguous way. They argue that the close-up ‘cuts’ the body so that the male viewer is able to disavow the threat of the female castrated body. The soft focus adds an additional form of objectification because it semi-masks the body so that the body becomes the central object of desire; soft focus displaces the fact that the lack is real. Following the descriptive analysis that the postmodernist/feminists present, one would expect the feminine to be encoded using the close-up and the soft focus, both of which best facilitate a lingering and fetishistic gaze, as established by the image frame. In contradistinction, one would expect the male sexed body to be photographed predominately using the long shot and the sharp focus, insofar as the oppositional logic suggests that the masculine is conveyed by the marks that are not feminine. Therefore, this school would assert the categorical difference that underpins their analysis to determine, to a significant degree, these forms of codification.

Contrary to the expectation formed by their analysis, figure 4 shows that there is little variation between the length of the shot and the sexed model. The medium shot length is the most frequently used, at 48.95% of the total 1985-95 sample, compared with only 30.92% for the long shot, and surprisingly, only 20.13% for the close-up. Note also that the long shot is used more frequently to codify the female sexed model than the close-up; just over a third. While it remains the case that the body can still be fetishised using the medium shot, this process is made much harder with the long shot when the fetishism has to operate *within* the image (see Doane:1991:46-8;Cowie: 1997:104-5). The close-up ensures that the body dominates the frame and so produces a closeness to the viewer that is singular to the image. Doane accords this closeness a special connection to the feminine state of ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ because the viewer is awarded unconditionally the control of the gaze. What is more

Fig. 4 Shot length and its relationship to sexed model 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		621 100.00%	322 100.00%	299 100.00%
camera Q7	close up	125 20.13%	55 17.08%	70 23.41%
	medium shot	304 48.95%	159 49.38%	145 48.49%
	long shot	192 30.92%	108 33.54%	84 28.09%

Chi = 4.5991, df = 2, there is no significant relationship

significant is that of all the photographs of female sexed models, only 17.08% of the representations use the close-up, compared to 23.41% of male models. While this difference is not significant statistically, the direction of the difference challenges the postmodernists/feminists’ categorical assumption that more female sexed models than male would be photographed using the close-up.

How does this compare with focus use, the second code to which the postmodernist/feminists have given central importance? The importance of the soft codes rests with its capacity to render the feminine iconic by seeming to make the thing desirable in itself (Doane;1991). First, soft focus glosses over the textures to produce a smooth soft surface to the face and body. Second, it is also a key technique by which we conventionally codify the feminine with the emotions of the intellectually adrift, for example dreaminess. In contradistinction, sharp focus attends to the precise detail of things, a quality that has been extended to denote engagement and concentration. If we look at figure 5, we can readily identify that, again, there is no significant difference between the sexed models and the various focuses used to photograph them. Both the male and female sexed models are predominantly photographed using the sharp focus: 66.15% of female cases, compared to 61.74% of all male sexed models photographed. Thus, the realist focus is the predominant codification. Moreover, the direction of difference again runs counter to expectation: the higher frequency does not rest with the masculine. Only 26.40%, that is just over 1:4, of the women photographed were codified using the soft focus as compared to 31.88%, (just under 1:3) of all male sexed models in the sample. Once more, the direction

Fig. 5 Focus and its relationship to the sexed model 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		620 100.00%	322 100.00%	298 100.00%
camera Q7	sharp focus	397 64.03%	213 66.15%	184 61.74%
	soft focus	180 29.03%	85 26.40%	95 31.88%
	out of focus	44 7.10%	25 7.76%	19 6.38%

Chi = 2.2489, df = 2, there is no significant relationship

of difference runs contrary to the expectations raised by postmodernist/feminist analysis: the higher frequency lies with the male sexed models.

In addition, this represents a shift in frequency from 1975. Figure 5a overleaf indicates that the above distributions signal a shift in the codification of both the male and the female sexed model. For example, from the 1975 sample we can see that just over 80% of men shown were codified in sharp focus, which corresponds much more to the kinds of descriptions afforded by the postmodernist/feminist model and surely reflects the context within which the initial semiotic analyses were conducted. In contrast, there is a 3:1 ratio of soft focus to sharp focus, which is more in line with the order of the gendered dichotomy.

Fig. 5a Sexed model by key focus, 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		641 100.00%	49 100.00%	16 100.00%
camera Q7	sharp focus	46 7.18%	33 67.35%	13 81.25%
	soft focus	19 2.96%	16 32.65%	3 18.75%

We can combine the focus with the shot length. The tabulation below shows that the most dominant form of fashion photography combines the medium shot with the realism of the sharp focus (33.43% of the total sample). Second, there is the long shot combined with sharp focus, accounting for 21.07% of the sample. Within these groupings, there is a marginal difference across sex, with the female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of the long shot. Thus, the female sexed model assumes a higher proportion of the codes which, when combined, fetishise the least. In contrast, the close-up is used more frequently on the male sexed body, both within the sharp and soft focus. In fact, 29.47% of male sexed models codified using the soft focus are shot in close-up compared to 24.71% of female sexed models. Thus, the combined codes that are said to fetishise the *most* are used *more* frequently on the male sexed model than the female. Two elements emerge: first, the realist forms of codification assume the greater proportion of the cases assessed; second, the codes that are said to fetishise the body, that is function as a form of disavowal for the lack that it signifies, *par excellence*, are used with a greater frequency on the male sexed model.

Fig. 6 The distribution of camera frames and their relationship to gender

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sharp focus-sex Q1		soft focus-sex Q1	
			female	male	female	male
Base		631 100.00%	213 100.00%	184 100.00%	85 100.00%	95 100.00%
camera Q7	close up	112 17.75%	27 12.68%	36 19.57%	21 24.71%	28 29.47%
	medium shot	286 45.32%	109 51.17%	92 50.00%	42 49.41%	44 46.32%
	long shot	178 28.21%	77 36.15%	56 30.43%	22 25.88%	23 24.21%

$\chi^2 = 16.2049$, $df = 6$, there is a significant relationship at 5%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

It has been shown that the distributions of the above variables further challenge the categoricalism that defines the assignment of meaning and the structural, causal significance of certain

codes within the postmodernist/feminist model. Through their selected semiotic readings, proponents of this model have identified relationships between the signifier and the signified that are said to be definitive of the representations of the feminine and thus integral to the formation of the identity. Yet my results find no statistical difference in the distributions of the shot length or the focus. Furthermore, where minimal difference does appear, the frequencies of use are higher when representing the masculine than the feminine. Arguably, these codes may be overridden by the fetishisation of the body through clothes and the narrative context, as well as the direction of the gaze and so forth. For example, it may be the case that the soft focus is put to minimal use because the feminine as passive is securely anchored through body positions that show the feminine withdrawing from space, that is, the social symbolic is drawn upon to reproduce gendered oppositions. Yet if we combine these results with the finding that codification of the model through use of the prop did not reflect the gendered dichotomy either, then an empirical base is forming that directly challenges the categorical assumptions that define semiotic readings undertaken within the postmodernist/feminist perspective. Furthermore, the notion that the male sexed model has undergone feminisation (Neale:1992; Startton:1996) does not provide a clear basis to explain these apparent contradictions. This is an important point of friction because it brings to the fore the irreconcilable tension: the corporeal accomplishment contradicts Symbolic construction.

NARRATIVE ADDRESS AND CONTEXTUAL REALISM

One source that may secure the Symbolic determination of the gendered body is the specific narrative address. This is established through the interaction of the model’s gaze, the photographer and the spectator. From Mulvey to Dyer to Mayne and Kaplan, all have addressed the division between the masculine and the feminine in terms of who looks away (private voyeur), and who looks and asserts themselves to the viewer (public addressing viewer). The seer/seen axis is elaborated through the structural relationship to power: the ‘seer’ is always the masculine Master. Where the gaze is held by the ‘slave’, this look is temporary, transgressive and surreptitious. However, as figure 7 shows, this

Fig. 7 sex by narrative address, 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		591 100.00%	318 100.00%	273 100.00%
spectatorial address Q22	public addressing viewer	167 28.26%	85 26.73%	82 30.04%
	narrative address	49 8.29%	27 8.49%	22 8.06%
	private voyeur	375 63.45%	206 64.78%	169 61.90%

Chi = 0.7929, df = 2, there is no significant difference

structural relationship is not organised into categorically opposite groups whereby the masculine is defined by the active gaze, and the feminine is defined by the private voyeuristic gaze. In fact, the private voyeur is emerging as the central mode of codification for *both* the male and the female sexed models; 61.90% and 64.74% respectively. What difference exists is statistically insignificant. This compares strikingly with the low frequency with which the direct active gaze is utilised; only 30.04% of male sexed models are thus codified compared to 26.73% of female sexed models. This table establishes that sexual difference does not define how the codification is deployed and thus does not correspond to the active/passive order of the mode of address. Even if we take into account Dyer’s recognition that the private voyeur, while marginal, is applied to the male pin-up, this still fails to recognise the extent to which men are equally subject to the look that cannot be returned. This significant increase may be a result of the equally significant shift to the single model because arguably ‘private voyeur’ is best able to commodify the body via the language of desire. I return to this again in the examination of the facial expressions: do images deploy strategies that negate the passivity of being the seen object and are these strategies used to encode the masculine as the postmodernists/feminists describe. To summarise, the mode of objectification that is said to define the voyeuristic gaze appears to be defining how *both* the sexed bodies are represented.

Figure 7a indicates that in 1975, just over half of the all the female sexed models were codified in a manner that directly draws the viewer into narrative. This compares notably with the fall to just 8.29% of all the images sampled between 1985-1995. This fall seems to suggest that narrative address is no longer considered an effective form of commodification. More important, however, are the implications for identification patterns. Narrative address has a particular format that includes the participation of the viewer in order to complete the narrative. This requires a recognition on behalf of the viewer of the social scene staged and, according to the postmodernist/feminist model, secures the identification axis between the scene and the viewer. Figure 7a suggests that these sorts of identification strongly mark the codifications in 1975 when the mock-up realism of the image was identified during the first run of content analyses. This appears to have all but disappeared by 1985-95

Fig. 7a sex by narrative address 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		66 100.00%	50 100.00%	16 100.00%
spectatorial address Q22	public addressing viewer	4 6.06%	3 6.00%	1 6.25%
	narrative address	35 53.03%	26 52.00%	9 56.25%
	private voyeur	27 40.91%	21 42.00%	6 37.50%

and, with it, the identification patterns assumed. The source of this change is, in part, a knock-on effect of the significant shift to the single model, which blocks this type of narrative interaction.

We have thus far identified the extent to which the narrative address has declined in significance and the extent to which the 'private voyeur' now dominates. The significance of this lies in its separation of the active and passive elements of the narrative. The dominance of the single model codes and the absence of any direct relationship of model and prop leads one to anticipate a significant impact on the image's ability to reproduce wider social relations through spatial relations within the two dimensional frame. Potentially, this may mean the removal of the image's capacity to draw upon wider social relations to reproduce the active/passive axis.

In conjunction with the decline of narrative-driven advertisements, one must re-introduce the massive impact that the single model will have upon how the space is occupied. To reiterate, the use of the single model compared to the heterosexual couple model is approximately 4:1. When we combine this with the fact that many of the models did not have any specific relationship with the visual environment, we find that, overwhelmingly, the symbolic production of the hierarchy through space no

Fig. 8 The effect upon spatial location of single models and heterosexual couples⁹⁸

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	single-sex Q1		mixed couples-sex Q1	
			female	male	female	male
Base		587 100.00%	197 100.00%	171 100.00%	47 100.00%	45 100.00%
spatial Q6	centre	316 53.83%	138 70.05%	139 81.29%	23 48.94%	16 35.56%
	off centre	123 20.95%	52 26.40%	26 15.20%	22 46.81%	23 51.11%
	in front of	31 5.28%	7 3.55%	10 5.85%	11 23.40%	3 6.67%
	level with	15 2.56%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	7 14.89%	8 17.78%
	above	10 1.70%	2 1.02%	0 0.00%	4 8.51%	4 8.89%
	below	10 1.70%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	7 14.89%	3 6.67%
	seated/on top of	45 7.67%	18 9.14%	9 5.26%	11 23.40%	7 15.56%
	underneath	4 0.68%	0 0.00%	1 0.58%	0 0.00%	3 6.67%
	behind	14 2.39%	1 0.51%	0 0.00%	3 6.38%	10 22.22%
	beside	23 3.92%	3 1.52%	0 0.00%	9 19.15%	11 24.44%
	opposite	9 1.53%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	4 8.51%	5 11.11%
	periphery	18 3.07%	5 2.54%	6 3.51%	1 2.13%	6 13.33%

⁹⁸ The proportion of same sex couples means that the distributions are too small to be significant.

longer defines how the model is codified. Or at least, the clues are insufficient to be able to make that interpretation with any regularity. Figure 8 shows exactly how far-reaching this impact is. Both the single model and the heterosexual couple are overwhelmingly depicted centre or just off-centre of the image. With regard to the single model, the table reconfirms that there is an absence of any clear relationship between the model and props, which means that the single model is the sole focal point of the image. This automatically marginalises the other spatial relationships to such an extent that they are of hardly any statistical relevance at all. Regarding the heterosexual couple, the table shows that they too have moved toward a much simplified spatial relationship, which is also organised around the centre focal point. The female sexed model is no more or less likely to be seated on top of a prop or model than the male, nor is she more likely to be positioned in front of him so as to emphasise further his probable larger relative size. Together, these findings signal a significant shift away from ordering the image by a symbolic hierarchical relationship established through the relative occupancy of space within the two-dimensional frame. Relative size is widely used to naturalise sexual dimorphism. Moreover, this provides further evidence that the codification of the image is moving toward a much simplified form, which represents a significant shift from Goffman’s careful analysis of how embodied social hierarchies are performed and highlighted within a two dimensional frame. The evidence here simply does not show a marking-out of social space in terms of these particular gendered hierarchies.

The next two variables address the interrelationships between the scene and the active participation by a particular model with others and the designated social space. Again, preponderance of the single model already curtails the extent to which the following variables are relevant. This necessarily affects the follow-up variable that seeks to define how bodies interact to demarcate, as well as sexualise, space. Goffman isolated a number of key features that identified how the public/private dichotomy was symbolically established. In particular, he examined how the connection of public domain to competency and command was secured through a number of visual barriers. These often cut across the two-dimensional frame. I adopted this not only for a more substantial historical link, but also

Fig. 9 The gender of space or the containment of the feminine

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		562 100.00%	295 100.00%	267 100.00%
derived q12 Q32	contained by self	33 5.87%	24 8.14%	9 3.37%
	contained by self and/or other	41 7.30%	20 6.78%	21 7.87%
	mutual	26 4.63%	13 4.41%	13 4.87%
	non-contained	462 82.21%	238 80.68%	224 83.90%

because it readily achieves the status differentials that define patriarchy through the positions of the body. It directly draws upon how the body performs, and thus reproduces visually, what are in effect

abstract relations. However, as figure 9 shows, this form of hierarchical display, where the male sexed model is in command of the social space so that the female sexed model is confined within his demarcations, has barely any continued relevance. The body is primarily codified by ‘non-containment’, (80.68% for the female sexed model compared to 83.90% for the male). The only marginal difference lies in the extent to which the feminine tends to be self-contained compared to the conventional representations of the masculine. But at only 8.14% of all the females sampled, this is of little consequence. This means that the man does not extend his body in front of the woman to establish a symbolic barrier thereby limiting the movement one can infer would have taken place in the social world. Equally, the female hardly ever contains herself by pulling her limbs in so as not to occupy space. This is a striking rejection of clear codifications that produce the feminine as passive. Consequently, the following variable, number 13, which aimed to identify exactly how the man contained the woman, as in the example above, is shown to be of no relevance. This can be readily demonstrated by identifying the number of automatic exclusions produced as a result of the overwhelming majority of cases identified as ‘non-contained’: 323 of the female cases were excluded, compared to 298 of the male⁹⁹.

I turn next to the central anchor for framing the image, namely the extent to which fashion advertisements codify the commodification process within realist social contexts. The significance of

Fig. 10 The distributions of realist codifications

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		616 100.00%	320 100.00%	296 100.00%
photographic style Q8	naturalistic mock-up	167 27.11%	94 29.38%	73 24.66%
	stylistic	189 30.68%	108 33.75%	81 27.36%
	neutral	260 42.21%	118 36.88%	142 47.97%

Chi = 7.7900, df = 2, therefore there is statistical significance at 5%

this is the extent to which the models are contextualised within ritualistic formats whereby the image ‘looks like my life’. The ‘naturalistic mock-up’ carries the realist format and thus best facilitates identification. Therefore, this codification is crucial both for Goffman’s analysis of how the image works in order to feed back to us our view of the social world as naturally hierarchical, and for the identification patterns that construct the subjectivity undertaking the viewing. If interpellation is at work, then it should be evident here. The postmodernist/feminist analysis seeks to examine how the identification process operates within the naturalisation of the gendered dichotomies because this mode of identification exposes the masochistic features of femininity: the process of identification takes place despite the dominatory version of femininity presented. Thus, ‘naturalistic mock-ups’ must dominate

⁹⁹ Please see Appendix C for the whole distributions left once the majority of sample is suspended.

the codification, if the Symbolic is marked by the patriarchal order. Yet again, my results seem to suggest a shift in the format of the image. Figure 10 introduces some substantial statistical shifts. First, it shows that the 'naturalistic mock-up' is no longer the central form of codification by which the feminine *or* the masculine is set. In only 27.11% of the total sample is there a naturalistic setting, with the female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of this, 29.38% compared to 24.66% for the male sexed model. This would seem to explain why the social divisions of space appear to have marginal presence here. Therefore, the significant difference rests in the extent to which the male sexed model is located within a neutral setting. In 47.97% of cases the male sexed model is located against a blank backdrop where there are no props or scenes of any kind. This means that nearly half have no social contextualisation whatsoever. Note the corresponding significance of the higher frequency of female sexed models within a stylistic codification compared to male sexed models: 33.75% and 27.36% respectively. This is combined with the markedly higher number of male sexed models in a neutral context than female (47.97% compared to 36.88%¹⁰⁰). This shows that the presentation of the male body does not tend to be contextualised, and when it is, this is least likely to be in a realist context.

The stylistic codification is the second most frequent coding for the male sexed model, assuming 27.36%. Here the model is either located within a contradictory setting compared to mock action, or the model himself is exposing the artifice of the image by self-referentially bringing to the fore what actually takes place to produce a naturalistic image. In this way, the techniques of the naturalistic mock-up are exposed by making the artifice the theme of the image. Neutral and stylistic codifications combined make up 75% of the sample of men, which undermines the assurance by which we can legitimately assume that realism continues to define how the male sexed models are codified. Moreover, it removes a considerable number of clues by which we usually make speculative inferences as to 'who' the model might be. Only naturalistic images gives an idea as to the models personality traits, that is how feminine or masculine he is.

With regard to the female sexed model, there is a more or less even distribution across the three codifications, with naturalistic mock-up accounting for just under a third and neutral codification taking the largest proportion at 36.88%. Again, the naturalistic code, which is best able to interpellate identification, is found to have the lowest frequency. Correspondingly, the female model is more likely to be depicted exposing the artifice of the image than securing the naturalness of the female model and the private sphere. Therefore, the realist form that carries forward the ideological patterns, as well as securing the identification of subjectivity via the representation, is shown to be a marginal form of codification for the male and female sexed models. The absence of a naturalistic setting also makes it harder to secure the naturalness of the gendered gesture because the context, which is central to securing the gesture's meaning, is absent. Therefore, to make the gesture apparent, it must be rendered even more obvious, that is further subject to the hyper-ritualisation through which a gesture can be read.

We can get a sense of the extent of the shifts from figure 10a (overleaf). This table reflects the kinds of distributions we would expect from both the feminist content analysis and from Goffman's

¹⁰⁰ When crosstabulated, Chi score registers 6.0527, df = 1, 5% significance level.

analysis. As indicated, in 1975 there is a dominance of the realist format at 66.67% compared to the 29.38% that emerges from 1985 onwards. In addition, the format of the advertisement has yet to take on any surrealism of stylistic codification that is associated with the postmodern cultural turn (Featherstone; 1990; Jameson; 1984). The extensive use of realist features provides an empirical base upon which its influence resided and upon which the postmodernist/feminist semiotic analyses depend. I argue that the data presented here shows that this base is in decline and, with it, go the features of the naturalistic mock-up that are said to interpellate identification.

Fig. 10a Naturalistic coding by sex 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		67 100.00%	51 100.00%	16 100.00%
photographic style Q8	naturalistic mock-up	44 65.67%	34 66.67%	10 62.50%
	stylistic	4 5.97%	3 5.88%	1 6.25%
	neutral	19 28.36%	14 27.45%	5 31.25%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

There are a number of significant shifts suggested by the data presented here. First, it was noted that there has been a massive reduction in the use of the narrative address that implies the participation and thus identification of the viewer. Second, it was noted that the images do not draw upon the symbolic organisation of space in order to recreate the social relations of space we embody. This was further secured through the total decline of aligning the feminine to the private sphere, which was said to determine the ways in which women occupy space. Fourth, this shift is not gender differentiated. Therefore, the male sexed model is just as likely to be codified by the ‘private voyeur’ form as the female sexed model. Then, the social contextualisation of the image was examined, and it was found that the ‘naturalistic mock-up’ no longer defines the context of the body’s presentation, instead both the male and female models are more likely to be located in a neutral context, or in one which draws attention to the artifice inherent to the image. As identified, 42.21% of the total sample is located against a neutral backdrop, which automatically excludes 291 cases from the social setting. This clearly affects the gendering of space. Finally, an important relationship appears to be emerging: as the realist mode declines, so the simplification of the image increases.

THE SOCIAL SCENE

The central issue is whether the social location of each sexed model continues to observe the order established by the gendered dichotomy. The social scene establishes the extent to which social

settings and different kinds of activity are aligned to this dichotomy. However, the results above, particularly the decline in the realist context to the image, has already undermined the extent to which social space will reflect this order: first, it has been identified that the male sexed model is not contextualised socially in nearly 50% of all cases; second, it has been established that the application and exaggeration of social relations regarding space no longer appear to define the construction of the image. Therefore, for those cases that are relevant here, one must identify some clear differences in the context if it is to be described as reflecting the Symbolic world we live in at all. For example, it must provide the appropriate backdrop to establish the activity of the masculine subject, particularly through dynamic scenarios, as well as those that establish the feminine as passive. In addition, one would expect to find here the extensive use of ‘grooming’ or the more non-specific ‘narcissistic’ codifications to locate the explicit eroticisation of male sexed models. This contextualisation is said to aid the negation of the objectification process, and in particular, maintain a structure between the viewer and the viewed whereby the male sexed model leaves the gaze unacknowledged. This directly references Moore’s analyses (1988), as well as drawing upon elements of Wernick’s analysis (1991). Also, it extends the logic of Dyer’s examination of the pin-up which I addressed, namely that the codification negates the significance of the (woman) viewer. Essentially, the codification ‘catches’ the male sexed model in a context where he would be naturally undressed (Finch:1990). This form of negation is not

Fig. 11 Genderising social settings 1985-95¹⁰¹

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		360 100.00%	205 100.00%	155 100.00%
Q51 q25 scenes	socialising	57 15.83%	33 16.10%	24 15.48%
	leisure	28 7.78%	17 8.29%	11 7.10%
	'loving'	56 15.56%	29 14.15%	27 17.42%
	grooming	9 2.50%	5 2.44%	4 2.58%
	urban	45 12.50%	20 9.76%	25 16.13%
	rural	32 8.89%	21 10.24%	11 7.10%
	private min.	20 5.56%	15 7.32%	5 3.23%
	public min.	66 18.33%	39 19.02%	27 17.42%
	other	47 13.06%	26 12.68%	21 13.55%

Chi = 7.4835, df = 8, there is no significant relationship

¹⁰¹ See Appendix B for a the full extent of the amalgamations.

required by the feminine because the objectification it implies is said to be the very essence of the 'feminine as represented'.

Significantly, the table above gives a strong indication that those specific locations in space no longer contextualise gender display in fashion advertisements. The male sexed model is no more likely to be pictured 'socialising' than the female sexed model. Neither is the male model located in the context of leisure or sport, another context whereby the body can be shown while negating the implicit objectification. The two codes, which maintain an echo of the gendered dichotomy, are the rural settings and the private or domestic sphere, but only minimally so. By this I mean that there were only the barest of props or setting established, which was suggestive rather than clearly contextualising. Note also the low frequency of grooming. Even though this had to be amalgamated with 'narcissistic', still only 2.5% of the total sample of male models were coded thus. Strictly speaking, it is not even statistically valid because the nominal number is supposed to exceed 10. Potentially therefore, it may be the case that the male sexed model, while sexualised, no longer mobilises strategies, contexts or looks that negate the implicit 'to-be-looked-at-ness'. In conclusion, these results strongly indicate that social space is no longer ordered by the gendered dichotomy of the public/private.

The final formal feature I wish to introduce, before moving on to the particulars of the body, is the part of spatial variable that examines the more abstract relationship of the model's body or part of body with the two-dimensional plane of the image. I had intended to use these codes for two points of analysis: first, to trace it as a formal feature that identifies the relative importance awarded to each sexed body by the sheer amount of pictorial space the body assumes; and second, to utilise Goffman's analysis, which hinges on the premise that we can treat an image 'as real' if it structurally reproduces status differentials that define social interaction. However, the distributions no longer appear to be defined by such differentials, at least to any significant extent. I turn then to the second feature (which uses the amount of space the body assumes as a point of fixity for the bodily presentations). Thus its second purpose was to address the metaphoric distance placed between the viewer and the body. The second aim relates to the framing produced by the shot length and ways this goes on to frame the whole body. It identifies how much of the body, and 'parts' of the body are contained within the frame. For example, in 'dominates frame entirely' the part of the body depicted will fill the whole frame and, as a result, it will bring the body very close to the viewer. It has the effect of magnifying the flesh and is therefore a crucial code with which to render the flesh an object of desire in itself. For the other codifications, a greater sense of naturalistic perspective is introduced, linking the shot length to the sense of the body within naturalistic perspective¹⁰².

Figure 12 indicates that the formal frame and its positioning of the body fails again to be marked by difference between the sexes. The sex of the model has a marginal affect of the differing distributions, usually about 3%. For example, of all the male sexed models, 19.39% occupied ½ of the visual frame compared to 16.93% of the female sample. The most significant difference lies between those that occupy a third of the space and those that dominate the frame entirely. Again, this difference goes against the expectations formed by the postmodernist/feminist analysis because it is the male

¹⁰² This proved to be a more accurate way of codifying perspective, which is why codes 9 and 10 were dropped from analysis if variable 6.

sexed model that is more likely to be codified using the extreme close-up that effectively eroticises the flesh by making the whole torso fill the two-dimensional frame. Note also that, empirically, this corroborates the shot length discussed earlier, thereby demonstrating the consistency of coding. Of all the female sexed models sampled, 24.21% occupy a third of the visual frame compared to 18.71% of male sexed models. This gives us a sense of the full body at middle distance so that the head and feet correspond to the top and bottom of the page. 17.61% of female sexed models sampled were framed in the extreme close-up compared to 26.87% of males. We can add to the shot length the effect this has on the body presented, producing two distinct modes. First, we have a sense of the body being close to the surface of the image, which gives the bodily presentation the tactility and intimacy of the close-up, particularly of the male sexed model. Second, we have a sense of the whole body in the distance framed by the picture's edge, particularly for the female sexed model. The fact that this contradicts expectations so much cannot be attributed to the coding, as there is very little that this ambiguous about the dividing the image into three, with the female sexed model occupying the centre third.

Fig. 12 The relationship between sexed model and space projected by the image 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		612 100.00%	318 100.00%	294 100.00%
spatial Q6	dominates frame entirely	135 22.06%	56 17.61%	79 26.87%
	3/4	83 13.56%	46 14.47%	37 12.59%
	1/2	111 18.14%	54 16.98%	57 19.39%
	1/3	132 21.57%	77 24.21%	55 18.71%
	1/4	54 8.82%	32 10.06%	22 7.48%
	less 1/4	104 16.99%	59 18.55%	45 15.31%

Chi = 10.5921, df = 5, there is no significant relationship

Thus, on a more methodological note, this illustrates how the variables within taxonomy cross-reference each other and thus act as a check that the coding procedures are extended across the coding frame as a whole. Each variable isolates a specific feature from its interrelated parts, yet an accurate correspondence exists between them which suggests that dependence upon the conventional use of each term establishes a secure base with which to apply the same criteria repeatedly. I argue that this supports my methodological position that each image can be successfully assessed in terms of manifest parts and thus not solely in terms of its unique individual features.

SUMMARY THUS FAR

1. The codes analysed present evidence that key features in the construction of the image cannot be said to be categorically distributed by gender. In fact, there is a marked absence of statistical association.
2. There is a relationship emerging that traces an inverse relationship: as the simplification of the image increases so the codes that construct the image as realist decline. By simplification I mean that the detail of the ideological baggage is being replaced by direct codes that place the body and the clothes worn right at the centre of the image, rather than using props, settings and so forth to tell a story about the sort of men who wear label 'X'. This emerging trend was initially identified in Millum and was also shown to persist, if marginally, by both Liess et al. and Wernick.

THE TAXONOMY OF THE BODY

This section traces how various conventional body positions and expressions are utilised to mark each body and thus connect each body to the broader contours of the Symbolic. The central principle is that the codes seek to isolate what the body must 'do' to readily achieve natural femininity. For example, Goffman drew particular attention to the feminine touch, arguing that this was a specific way the fragility and delicacy of the feminine can be applied to the commodity itself, while the Mulveyian paradigm examines the direction and force of the look to reflect the broader patterns of Symbolic power. I argue that the Symbolic and its associated oppositions ought to filter through and, at the very least, organise the simplest, most manifest features. If sexual difference, as described by the Mulveyian paradigm, defines the everyday visual world, then it ought to be readily apparent, not requiring sophisticated and highly skilled semiotic analysis in order to identify its meaning. This is because, when we undertake ordinary interpretation in the everyday world, we don't attend to meaning in that way (Cavell:1995).

How does the visual image combine the various codifications in order to make the sexing of the body the most unambiguous code to apply? I have argued that what this is examining are the ways in which utilising, grasping and manipulating define the production of the masculine because this is treated as unproblematically *reflecting* the essence of the male body. Self-evident in this treatment of the body is the fact that sex and gender, as defined by Oakley (1972), are treated as equivalent and interchangeable in a common-sense context. For example, the withdrawal from space, be it for reasons of modesty or in response to a potential threat, ought to mark the feminine because this reflects the ideological essence of the female body, namely weak and in need of protection. Therefore, this accomplishes the naturalisation of sexed body. Moreover, it is in this sense that the accomplishment raises the question of 'what the body does' in order to re-established that process of naturalisation. This is what is involved in the negation of the practices of gender accomplishment.

I begin by tracing what part of the body is represented, primarily because it gives us an immediate sense of the diversity or limitation of the body positions and gestures possible. For example, if to accomplish the feminine requires the repeated representations of the torso, which brings the body closer to the picture surface, then this also brings the breast closer to the viewer. The breast is regularly used to achieve the social accomplishment of sex. It deploys the inference that breasted people have

vaginas and are therefore women. To this, we can add the closeness of the face, perhaps as a mechanism to anchor the softness of the skin and the absence of a larynx. It acts as substitute and reference for biological sex. By using these codes, therefore, it is possible to trace the encoding or sexing of the body. I conclude with an analysis of the variable that traces the specific ways that the body can be fetishised. This is followed by an analysis of ‘body type’ (variable eleven), which addresses the physique, appearance and character presentations of the body. This last analysis will take two distinct forms: first, it will begin with a brief account of why this variable was only partially successful; second, I assess the distributions of the types of bodily features. I then return the analysis of the accomplishment of the sexed body that we initially encountered.

THE GENERAL BODY FORM: WHAT PARTS OF THE BODY ‘DO’ GENDER DISPLAY?

Figure 13 below identifies the specific parts of the body framed by the image. The variable establishes the bodily base on which the further detail of the expressions and positions can be added. Those techniques that encode ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’, those said to define representation of the feminine, bring the body to the surface of the picture frame and would surely be applied more frequently to the female sexed model. Here, however, there is clear evidence that many of the gestured codes must be contextualised in terms of the whole body (60.63%), rather than the various bodily fragments (39.37%). This automatically marginalises those codes that break up the integrity of the body and contradicts the semiotic evidence of postmodernism/feminism and, theoretically, presents problems for their model because it is difficult to continue to place central importance upon the fetishisation process, which facilitates the masculine disavowal of lack, when only a minority of images represent the body ‘in bits’. As figure 13 illustrates, the feminine is not codified through the visualisation as a ‘body bit’ any more than the masculine. In fact, the reverse is true, since the distributions contravene the expected direction.

Fig. 13 The representation of ‘body parts’

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		601 100.00%	318 100.00%	283 100.00%
general idiom Q9	full body	365 60.73%	208 65.41%	157 55.48%
	legs cut off	69 11.48%	33 10.38%	36 12.72%
	cut at waist	108 17.97%	49 15.41%	59 20.85%
	face only	59 9.82%	28 8.81%	31 10.95%

Chi = 6.1307, df =3, there is no significant relationship

The results show that, contrary to expectations, it is the male sexed body that is more frequently represented via the face or the torso alone not the female (20.85% and 10.95% of the male sample respectively compared to 15.41% and 9.28% for the female sample). If one cross-tabulates these codes with the shot length, one finds that of the 59 male cases half also dominate the frame and thus appear to bring the body to the picture surface. Cowie noted that this is a particularly intense form of objectification, presumably of the feminine, because the combination brings the flesh so close as to almost denote a degree of (projected) intimacy (1997:105). This kind of codification regularly features in those images that fetishise the female body because the model is not in command of how the body will be viewed, but must passively receive the gaze. Here, it is the male body that is potentially subject to such a gaze. Yet, a third of all the images of the male sexed model are isolated from a direct sense of a body's social and physical relationship to space, replaced instead by the face as an object of beauty alone (Berger: 1974; Pollock: 1991; 1992). If postmodernist/feminist versions of a dichotomous structure pervade culture, this reversal ought not to occur.

Cultural analysis of this kind has assessed single images in terms of this specific mode of beautification and the particular ways that the face becomes akin to the photographer's muse. All such description has then been connected to the ideological ramifications in terms of the passive/active and the subject/object dualisms that organise the image. Yet, a content analysis drawing upon the semiotic codes identified within cultural analysis fails to provide evidence to reconfirm the gendered divide of who is objectified, beautified, made into an object satisfying in itself. This no longer applies solely to the feminine. Moreover, this evidence contradicts a second facet of the postmodern/feminist model, namely that they describe 'anomalous' cases as 'femininisation'. This 'reorganisation' effectively reconnects soft focus, for example, back to the feminine so that the opposition of the male and female is categorically ordered within the Symbolic. So rather than taking such empirical evidence as a weakening of the dimorphic production of the body within the Symbolic, they themselves re-apply that dimorphic logic so that the passive defines the feminine.

Listed in figure 14 overleaf are some simple features that locate the body in symbolic space. The central distribution here is the extent to which a majority of images are codified with the body facing forward: 59.44% of all the female sexed models sampled and 62.29% of the males. Again, this automatically marginalises many of the other codifications included¹⁰³, which I argue, is connected to the increasing simplification of the image identified above. Many of the images coded contain only a single model, very few use props to tell a story about the model, and to this we now add that most models, both male and female, are codified facing forward. 'Twisting' is the second largest proportion, which at 23.55% gives a strong indication of how common facing forward is. Again, this kind of movement, conventionally associated with the over-stated display of clothes, is not characterised by gender difference (barely 2% between them). We must look therefore to the body in profile to trace a substantial difference: namely 25.08% of female compared to 16.84% of male sexed models. Nevertheless, for every female sexed model posing in profile there are over twice as many facing forward.

¹⁰³ Hence the number of amalgamations; see Appendix B.

The endurance of the profile as a form that readily codifies the feminine raises a number of issues. A body in profile does not necessarily ensure that the face will be averting the gaze by seeming to look elsewhere, as the head can be turned to the camera. Yet placing the body in profile does align the postures with the historical traditions of the feminine as representation (Berger: 1974; Dyer 1986). Locating the body in profile also emphasises the sexualisation of the breast by presenting it in silhouette. This potentially sets up a classic pose for the femme fatale: the profile emphasising the curves, primarily of the breast, combined with the directness of the look. There is a second facet connected to the endurance of the profile: emphasising the shape and 'universal' presence of the breast connects it to the 'self-evident' corporeal base of the sexed body. The breast offers 'evidence' of the absolute and categorical foundation of sexual difference. Therefore, it is in connection to the biological body that the profile code remains significant while other gendered postures have significantly diminished, as for example lying down.

Fig. 14 Detailed body positions 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		619 100.00%	322 100.00%	297 100.00%
derived q10 Q30	lying down	27 4.36%	18 5.59%	9 3.03%
	facing forward	376 60.74%	191 59.32%	185 62.29%
	twisting	145 23.42%	78 24.22%	67 22.56%
	back facing camera	40 6.46%	13 4.04%	27 9.09%
	profile	131 21.16%	81 25.16%	50 16.84%
	torso leaning forward	72 11.63%	44 13.66%	28 9.43%
	torso leaning back	32 5.17%	15 4.66%	17 5.72%
	propped BY arms	54 8.72%	32 9.94%	22 7.41%
	propped ON object	55 8.89%	24 7.45%	31 10.44%
	other	20 3.23%	6 1.86%	14 4.71%

Chi = 22.9925, df = 3, there is significance at 1%

Codes like 'lying down' and 'leaning back' simply do not appear to feature much, for either the male or female sexed model. This means that a central mechanism that sexualises the presentation, for example lying on the back with one leg bent, is almost entirely absent, thereby negating the low status implied by the position. Arguably, this results from the increased simplicity of the image, perhaps because the body is best able to display clothes when the postures are at their most simple. But

this equally means that the process that constructs gendered subjectivities in and through these bodily gestural displays is made much more ambiguous. This carries important ideological implications regarding the coherency of the patriarchal dualism. In addition, the model does not appear to be using the imagined projection of facing the viewer to entice or display. Thus, this form of framing further indicates an increasing homogeneity between the ways the male and the female are displayed.

The body is able to impose a fixity upon the possibility of social exchanges depending upon how that body is positioned in relation to the other. Yet, as mentioned, the body performs a perplexing number of possible gestures, which should not be assumed to be in co-ordination. The torso and head, connected by the spine, make for the points of fixity and a phenomenological orientation that limits the ploysemic possibilities of the body. Thus the face, hands, arms and legs secure the detail of the gesticulations made. Hence, I have emphasised the body's ability to anchor representation and interpretation. The next series of tables build upon our sense of the fixity of the presentation using the ways this can be animated and/or anchored to the core dichotomies through gesticulation. I begin with the legs and arms and then move onto the hand, who touches whom, how and how much.

THE BODY AND ITS GESTURES

If display is in any sense ordered by the patriarchal dichotomy at all then this must predominately lie within the gestures. I begin by looking at the legs, which add to the gendering of the body through the differing meanings conveyed through the forms of standing and sitting. Therefore we are paying particular attention to whether the legs are closed or open, extended outwards or not, and so forth.

The first thing to note is that in 42% of the images legs are not represented, which automatically removes a substantial part of the sample. The second element to be combined with this is the large percentage of women who were photographed occupying a third of the image compared to the percentage of men that were shown to dominate the frame, meaning that the visual orientation is not towards the men's legs. But does this imply that the image is orientated to the women's legs? The answer has to be no when one reflects that by occupying a third of the frame, the female is also projected as standing in the middle distance. Given that for a fetish to operate within the photographic frame it needs to be close-up, this somewhat rules fetishisation out as a means of recapturing ideologically the image. One would expect there to be a noted trend, particularly for underwear and hosiery advertisements, where fetishising the female leg is a central part of the marketisation. Yet 'legs only' has been withdrawn from the general idiom (figure 13) because it was shown to be statistically insignificant, registering only 5 cases. This indicates that the markets that these magazines target simply do not carry this kind of commodity, and thus do not codify the feminine through it. By implication then, the representations appear to be organised according to the requirements of commodification rather than the pre-requisites of the hierarchical Symbolic. This surely compounds the notion that images are organised to serve our latent desire, which require the fetish to function in order that (masculine) subjects can disavow the threat that lack poses for them. Most importantly, the influence of the commodification process, rather than the symbolic regime, may well prove to the

determining trajectory within the presentation of gender. Regardless of whether it is more dominant, sexualising the leg via visual codification that disavow does not appear to be emerging as the central feature. Or rather, the decline is marked enough to query assertions that 'the feminine has become synonymous with selling' (Pollock;1992:138). Or rather, both bodies are utilised to sell.

Fig. 15 Gendering the body through the positioning of the legs

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		374 100.00%	211 100.00%	163 100.00%
derived q19 Q35	open when seated	36 9.63%	16 7.58%	20 12.27%
	closed when seated	32 8.56%	24 11.37%	8 4.91%
	crossed and pulled in	17 4.55%	13 6.16%	4 2.45%
	astride	76 20.32%	41 19.43%	35 21.47%
	knee slightly bent forward	48 12.83%	33 15.64%	15 9.20%
	knee bent sideways	22 5.88%	15 7.11%	7 4.29%
	bent fully at the knee	65 17.38%	39 18.48%	26 15.95%
	extended outwards	60 16.04%	32 15.17%	28 17.18%
	walking	17 4.55%	11 5.21%	6 3.68%
	pretend movement	46 12.30%	29 13.74%	17 10.43%
	standing open	36 9.63%	25 11.85%	11 6.75%
	standing closed	44 11.76%	19 9.00%	25 15.34%
	other	49 13.10%	27 12.80%	22 13.50%

$\chi^2 = 19.9127$, $df = 12$, there is no significant relationship

Among those 60% that were photographed presenting the full body, there is no marked diversity in the ways both the male and the female sexed models pose. Hence the cross-tabulation does not register statistical difference. Thus the female sexed model is just as likely to be seated with her legs open as her male counterpart, just as he is equally often depicted with his legs closed when seated¹⁰⁴. Emphasis upon the leg does remain, namely in the posture that bends the knee slightly thereby tilting the hips. This draws attention to the hips as a marker of the sexed body, but also

¹⁰⁴ Potentially, although this needs investigation, the absence difference may well reflect an emphasis upon youth and a 'relaxed attitude' that is set up in opposition to the discipline implied by the erectness of the traditional adulthood. The oppositions of these categories may prove more central to the active codification of specific meanings than gender is appearing to be here.

encloses the tilted hip within an erotic codification. The female sexed model in both cases is twice as likely to embody this posture as the male sexed model. Yet once again, it barely registers 1 in 5 images. In fact, there is a higher frequency of female sexed models extending their legs into space than either of the above. Alternatively, one can look to the convention of crossing the legs and pulling the legs in toward the body. This symbolically associates the female body with appearing not to take up space, as well as displaying an appropriate amount of 'modesty'. Yet this occurs about as frequently as those cases where the female model sits with her legs open.

What conclusions can one draw from this? Principally, that the position of the leg appears to be marked by a degree of diversity that only minimally adheres to the fetishisation and commodification that are conventionally associated with the display of the leg. This offers evidence that challenges Millum and Goffman, who both emphasised how the feminine is often reduced to body bits so that the leg is displayed in a manner that cuts it away from whose leg it is. In addition, the naturalistic postures through which gender is displayed in social interaction are seemingly being replaced by postures that denote 'youth'. Again reflecting the markets within which the images are produced.

I turn next to the various ways that the arm is positioned and how this contributes to the presentation of gender. The first thing to note from figure 16 overleaf is that most of the arm positions are not used particularly. This means that neither sexed model is encoded performing a mock-action, hugging the body or pointing upwards. This singles out 'arms relaxed by side' and 'arms bent' as the two most common types of postures. Furthermore, these are both noticeably gender differentiated. As a proportion, in 40.84% of cases the male sexed models were depicted with their arms relaxed by their sides, compared to 29.35% of females. Conversely, 47.95% of female sexed models had their arms bent, compared to 31.30% of the males. Thus the male model is statistically more likely to have his arms relaxed by his side, and the female sexed model is far more likely to have her arms bent. This registers a significant difference in the gestures, but only in those that appear to be most innocuous.

It is only by considering the possible implications that each coded gesture may carry that some sense can be made of this difference. First, the bent arm has the potential to establish naturalistically the gendered nature of touch, because having the arm bent tends to bring the hand towards the torso and into the centre of the image. Bringing the hand into the centre of the frame, also brings the markers of the hand that 'reflect the facticity of sex'. For example, to convey a sense of delicacy to an object, it tends to be held by the tips of the fingers, with nails that are usually filed and painted; conversely, a product for men is connoted through a grasp. Each position connotes the gendered dichotomy but does so through the physical display of the hand, that is, the combination of the elements that secures the naturalisation of categorical sex difference. Lastly, this posture sets up the potential for the image to reference soft-core pornographic codes through self touch. Often the female sexed model is shown to caress her body (in the most acute cases on or near the erogenous zones). Moreover, while this position sets the contexts for the hand to accomplish the femininity of the body, the corresponding features are not used to secure the masculine. However, the fact that there are a significant number of cases among male models where the hand is held by the side automatically means that the hand cannot secure the masculine of aptitude and skill. The extent to which the male sexed model is codified with his arms by

his side may in fact prove to be a series of codes that reflect the dialectic of the Other insofar as the masculine need not positively represent itself, but rather uses the feminine ‘definitions’ as a means to

Fig. 16 Arm movements and postures by gender¹⁰⁵

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		554 100.00%	292 100.00%	262 100.00%
derived q18 Q36	pointing up/outwards	53 9.57%	26 8.90%	27 10.31%
	relaxed by side	193 34.84%	86 29.45%	107 40.84%
	folded	30 5.42%	17 5.82%	13 4.96%
	arms bent	222 40.07%	140 47.95%	82 31.30%
	resting on legs	41 7.40%	24 8.22%	17 6.49%
	hugging the body	44 7.94%	22 7.53%	22 8.40%
	arm in action	22 3.97%	11 3.77%	11 4.20%
	in mock movement	39 7.04%	22 7.53%	17 6.49%
	leaning	45 8.12%	27 9.25%	18 6.87%
	other	40 7.22%	22 7.53%	18 6.87%

Chi = 17.7606, df = 9, there is a significant association at 5%

signify what it is not. However, this requires that the gestures of the hand reflect a clear trend for specific sorts of gestures or expressions, that is, it requires that a trend emerge of something that is distinctly feminine and unquestionably passive.

Therefore, who is touching whom is central to how that we make sense of the higher proportion of female models with their arm bent. This can be extended to the possible means of displaying the hand, which also carries the markers of natural sex. However, emphasising the possible ways open for the hand to reproduce the Symbolic ought not to obscure the fact that just over a third of the all female cases also had their arms relaxed by side. Such a posture is conventionally read as the ‘body at rest’ and can be defined as the body at its least symbolically invested. However, this is entirely dependent upon a similarly neutral hand position to be properly secured and therefore ought not to be undermined by any substantial evidence that verifies Goffman’s initial findings, namely that femininity is symbolically secured through the extent of the touch as well as the type of touch.

¹⁰⁵ Again this had to be ordered as multiple variable simply because the arms need not be doing the same thing. Therefore, each percentage must be treated as independent and describes only its individual proportion.

Fig.17 Who touches whom?¹⁰⁶

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		555 100.00%	291 100.00%	264 100.00%
hand on whom Q15	touching own body	232 41.80%	138 47.42%	94 35.61%
	touching man's body	24 4.32%	19 6.53%	5 1.89%
	touching woman's body	16 2.88%	1 0.34%	15 5.68%
	own and man's	6 1.08%	5 1.72%	1 0.38%
	own and woman's	4 0.72%	0 0.00%	4 1.52%
	touching commodity	26 4.68%	16 5.50%	10 3.79%
	hand is active/not touching	135 24.32%	64 21.99%	71 26.89%
	no touch/neutral	85 15.32%	35 12.03%	50 18.94%
	other	27 4.86%	13 4.47%	14 5.30%

The first clear distribution shows that if the hand is not held at rest then the model, of either sex, will touch their bodies. Of those models who touch themselves, the female sexed models do it more frequently, approximately a 3:2 ratio to male sexed models. Potentially, therefore an opening is emerging for a significant difference to be secured, providing the type of touch is equally marked by such statistical difference. The second stark result that struck me, which is why I have opted to include the whole table despite half of the codes being statistically insignificant, is how few instances there are of either model interacting via touch. There are four aspects to this: first, the masculine authority is no longer codified via his capacity to guide, lead or condescend by touching the subject with the lower status in the public domain (Goffman:1979:60; Major and Williams:1980; Henley:1977); second, the feminine is not located within the heterosexist matrix by caressing and stroking the man she is with, particularly prevalent when located in the private domain; third, the potential for the homoerotic, secured through touch, is also equally non-existent (the implication that only those who are 'intimate' touch each other); fourth, the objectified feminine is not secured by caressing the commodity either.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, what emerges is that of all those cases where the female model is shown with her arms bent, the likelihood is that the hand goes on to touch a part of her own body, presumably around the torso area. This is crucial for positively securing femininity via the bodily performance required to compose the image. Thus the tactility of the touch with the body is central to construction of passive femininity.

¹⁰⁶ As I have elected to present the whole table here, Chi cannot be calculated because well have half of the cells will have an expected frequency of less than 5 which is deemed significant.

¹⁰⁷ I have genderised the homoerotic here because women are more tactile, ideological speaking, and therefore it does not throw up the 'spectre' of homosexuality in the same way.

Nevertheless, what the data has effectively ruled out is that touch is used either to anchor the male sexed model's higher social status by guiding the female through public space, as Goffman identified, or to establish for example the centrality of feminine care within the domestic setting. Conventionally, these codes are considered primary means to reproduce the active/passive dichotomy.

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

We now have a sense of how the central features of the body position are located in the frame. What has further been identified is not a marked difference between the sexed body and the positions assumed, but the striking similarity and simplicity of the postures chosen. The simplicity is derived from the position the body adopts toward the camera, predominately positioned facing the camera, and sometimes to the side, with a number of the ordinary leg positions. Most importantly, none of the results show a clear gender pattern emerging in that they are sufficiently ambiguous to question the description offered by the postmodernist/feminists. Moreover, it was noted how few images deployed the leg as a fetish with which to secure the disavowal of the male viewer. To this, I noted how few images were marked by the tactile interaction between subjects, despite the fact that 40% of images that featured more than one model. So the potential to for the ideological anchor is there. Instead, the pattern that emerges is one where the highest frequencies involve relatively neutral arm positions: male sexed models are depicted predominantly with their arms down by their sides, and the female sexed models with their arms bent. The postmodernist/feminist response must surely be that the ideological axis of the active/passive is pinned to the self-touch offered by having the arm bent. This introduces a potential for the performance of gender by connecting it to where and how the hand touches the model's own body. Thus we must look to securing the alignment of the feminine as passive through the nature of the touch. This is particularly so when one considers that the results show that the male sexed model is not holding an object, and thus potentially manipulating it or using it as a prop to stage the instruction of a subordinate. The male sexed model is more likely to have the hand at rest, or in fact touching himself (35.47%), rather than *actively* doing something it.

WHERE THE HAND TOUCHES THE BODY AND HOW

I begin by drawing attention to a number of exclusions that automatically impact on this analysis of the feminisation of touch: in total there are 329 cases automatically excluded produced by the filtering system of Snap for Windows.¹⁰⁸ As a result, there have been a number of amalgamations, the most significant of which is that the various erogenous zones had to be combined in order to produce a statistically analysable figure¹⁰⁹. So what do the remaining data show?

Arguably, these next variables ought prove to be a vital anchor for the constitution of the active/passive dichotomy. In addition, where the hand touches the model's own body ought to offer the

¹⁰⁸ For example, those images coded 'face only' clearly have no bearing on this codification.

¹⁰⁹ Please see Appendix B

potential to sexualise the body, particularly by touching the key erogenous zones. This appears to be born out here, with the cross-tabulation registering a statistical association at the 1% level. For

Fig. 18 Identifies what part of the body is touched

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		311 100.00%	179 100.00%	132 100.00%
derived hand q16 Q38	hand on hair	19 6.11%	13 7.26%	6 4.55%
	hips	51 16.40%	36 20.11%	15 11.36%
	legs	41 13.18%	25 13.97%	16 12.12%
	torso	66 21.22%	41 22.91%	25 18.94%
	face	23 7.40%	12 6.70%	11 8.33%
	neck	19 6.11%	14 7.82%	5 3.79%
	erogenous zones	19 6.11%	4 2.23%	15 11.36%
	holding hands	36 11.58%	20 11.17%	16 12.12%
	neutral touch	21 6.75%	11 6.15%	10 7.58%
	holding on	25 8.04%	18 10.06%	7 5.30%
	hands covered	37 11.90%	13 7.26%	24 18.18%
	resting	37 11.90%	19 10.61%	18 13.64%
	other	53 17.04%	31 17.32%	22 16.67%

Chi = 28.5111, df = 12, there is a significant relationship at the 1% level

example, the female sexed model is almost twice as likely to have her hands on her hips as the male sexed model. This introduces a correspondence with the sexing of the body: first, in terms of drawing upon the conventions that define this gesture as one of assertive and confident sexuality in phallic femininity; second, connecting the discourse to the category of the natural body that associates hips with the woman's body. Yet this reading is much undermined by the infrequency of those cases where the feminine is constructed through this posture. They account for only 20.11% (36 out of 179) of the touches possible¹¹⁰. Again, one would expect the female sexed model to be represented as touching her hair significantly more often than the male sexed model. However, it represents only 7.26% of all those

¹¹⁰ Note: because the hand can touch two things at once, it was necessary to operationalise this variable as a multiple variable and thus the percentage must be read as individual proportion of total number of cases in that variable – 32 cases of a possible 179

female models codified here. This is clearly a marginal proportion that somewhat overshadows the categorical, sexed nature of the touch. This also has a critical impact upon the presumptions of the psychoanalytic models. For example, Flugel (1930) argued that the association of feminine sexual attraction with long hair was that the hair is a fetishistic displacement for the castrated state that defines the feminine. Or, to put it in more directly Lacanian/cultural studies terms, the lack that she embodies (Silverman:1991; Millum:1975; Stratton:1996). Therefore, by touching the hair, the feminine model draws attention to its fetishistic properties and thus its sexual attractiveness. However, my data signals a different undercurrent: while the conventional codes of gender presentation continue to be marked by statistical difference, their share of the sample is now marginal. They are no longer the central codes by which the male or the female is represented. In other words, while the feminine touches different zones of the body, establishing a strong statistical association, the proportion is simply too small to be described as structuring the symbolic and certainly too marginal to secure the effective productivity of subjectivity; such small quantities are just too contingent for the reproduction of the social order.

Neither is there an apparent shift to secure the dualisms and the associate forms by increasingly using soft-core pornographic codes: in only 19 cases are the erogenous zones¹¹¹ touched, of which the male sexed model accounts for a higher proportion than the female. In addition, my results show that in all 15 cases where the male model is touching his own body, he is shown to be touching his own genitalia in 5 cases and his own buttocks in 9 cases. To further compound expectations, in none of these cases is the male sexed model caught in moments of narcissistic admiration. Therefore there is no narrative to reconnect the masculine to the active. Rather, most instances occur when the male sexed model is located in the neutral background. The extremely low frequency questions the assumption that the erotic male body must be located in scenes that redefine the erotic as narcissistic (Moore:1988).

This data identifies trends that, I argue, problematise the postmodernist/feminist description. This is because a significant proportion of the sample was excluded because no touch is involved at all. These distributions further impact upon the results, since only 179 (55%) cases out of a possible 323 were found to be touching the body. Within these cases, there is a relatively even distribution across the various body zones, with the torso having the highest frequency, although this does not include the breast. Thus we can conclude that to an extent to the sexed body is produced through touch, insofar as the female sexed model tends to touch herself, in various areas, more than the male sexed model. If there should be a marked difference in the nature of the touch, then it must lie with how the female sexed model touches these various bodily zones.

Yet, as figure 19 shows overleaf, the distributions simply did not follow the categorical order. Again, the data is altered as a result of 185 pre-programmed exclusions, thereby excluding a third of cases from this form of codification¹¹². The distributions that emerge tend to confirm the emergence of a greater simplification in the nature of the representations and a greater degree of homogenisation between the male and female models. For example, the masculine is not constructed by the male model manipulating the object, and neither is the feminine constructed by fingering or fiddling with things.

¹¹¹ Made up of the genitals, the breast and buttock.

¹¹² The decrease from the previous number of exclusion results from the inclusion of the object or commodity.

The female model does not appear to be caressing herself or anything else. On the contrary, the single largest frequency rests with a neutral touch. This requires that the hand be defined by its pragmatic use, be it holding a glass at a table (but not caressing it) carrying a book or using the hand in a basic rudimentary way. Mostly, the hand holding or touching in this manner has a specific ideological connection with the model codified, and as the previous data suggests, the models were rarely constructed narratively to, or engaging with, their environment. This is vital to the data and I will return to this as part of the conclusion of this chapter.

Fig. 19 The type of touch and gender difference¹¹³

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		404 100.00%	234 100.00%	170 100.00%
type of touch Q17	utilising	33 8.17%	18 7.69%	15 8.82%
	expert	1 0.25%	1 0.43%	0 0.00%
	grasping	32 7.92%	20 8.55%	12 7.06%
	manipulating	12 2.97%	5 2.14%	7 4.12%
	fingering	21 5.20%	10 4.27%	11 6.47%
	fiddling	9 2.23%	8 3.42%	1 0.59%
	fondeling	20 4.95%	16 6.84%	4 2.35%
	caressing	43 10.64%	28 11.97%	15 8.82%
	embracing	8 1.98%	4 1.71%	4 2.35%
	holding/neutral	178 44.06%	104 44.44%	74 43.53%
	other	47 11.63%	20 8.55%	27 15.88%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

In figure 3, it was identified that 86.61% of the sample had no specific relationship with the props or commodities. Moreover, the codes that traced the gendering of the hand through touch did not reflect the gender dichotomy either. Together, this trend identifies a shift to a more pragmatic relationship of hand to objects and so removes a fundamental feature that connects the model to the social world. In particular it has become much more difficult to define the 'who' the model, that is,

¹¹³ The chi value cannot be calculated because 22.73% of the cells have an expected value of the less than 5.

what sort of a woman she is. By this, I mean that without these sorts of connotive detail, it is very difficult to look at the model and say: 'she fiddles with things and does not seem to be able to concentrate'. When it is possible to make the inferences between the bodily performance and the sexual character, the image is much better placed to construct patterns of identification and, consequently, construct the 'appropriate' subject position. The images furnish data whereby the body is clearly marked as male or female, but does not appear to be codified further. Thus the findings lead to two central conclusions: first, that codification appears to have withdrawn from the domain of sexual character; second, the secure categorisation of sex appears to take place independently of other social cues.

THE FACE AND THE GAZE

I turn now to the cluster of codes that directly target the various facial expressions and the gendered nature of the gaze. Based upon the postmodernist/feminist analysis, a marked difference in the direction of the gaze and the expressions performed ought to order the distribution of the results. Thus, one expects notable difference in the deployment of the passive gaze, and its associations with looking away so as to avert the eyes, of the head being positioned in profile in order to connote the feminine as 'to-be-looked-at-ness' and so on. One expects also a notable difference in the use of the seductive gaze. This is used to define the feminine as the 'femme fatale' through which to encode phallic femininity. Conversely, the direction of gaze will also trace the extent to which the male body undergoes 'feminisation', using the conventionalised gestures that construct the (male) body as desirable. Equally expected are the masculine (male) codifications, for example through the direct assertion of a look that forces the viewer to appear to be returning the model's directed gaze. Such codes are central to the reproduction the dichotomy where the masculine 'sees' and the other is 'seen'. Also, we would expect there to be ample use of the codes that negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' inherent within modelling by the extensive deployment of 'looking up and out' of the imaginary frame so that male model can negate their objectification (Dyer 1992; 1993). Hence, the aim is to examine the extent and direction of statistical difference in the distributions of the sexed models in this cluster.

However, before the detail is examined, it is necessary to contextualise these results in terms of the limitations set by the corporeal body so that the importance of the expression can be examined. I begin with the head position, which establishes some of the corporeal and material boundaries as to what expressions can be performed. This is followed by analysis of the direction of the gaze, which further limits corporeally the expressions that can be performed, and then I follow this with the expressive gaze.

From the table overleaf, one is struck again by the homogeneity between the male and the female sexed model. For example, only 14.29% of the sample of female sexed models are in profile, which compares to 13.73% of male sexed models. Equally significant is the small percentage this codification holds overall: 14.03% of the total sample. Even if the expectation were for there to be little difference between the male and the female sexed models, one would surely have expected that the coding via the profile would assume a larger quantity overall. Yet this particular presentation, one

which formally presents the model as an object of representation, does not feature much, despite the fact that at the bottom line the models are there to present the goods.

Overall, the largest frequency lies with those models, both male and female, that are facing forward directly at the camera. This accounts for approximately a third of each. This indicates that the cues are focused upon the body itself: the body is predominately facing forward that is most often combined with the face facing forward, assuming the largest single proportion. Perhaps this is because the intense and categorical codifications rest with the construction of the body rather than the construction of sexual character. Irrespective, the direction of the gaze and the expressions are central to the meanings generated. The only code that registers any significance is the larger number of female sexed models shown turning toward the camera. Again, this needs further anchoring with the expressions to see to what extent it is used to invite the gaze. Equally significant, and again contrary to expectation, are the central codes that directly and explicitly denigrate the model: not only is there no marked difference between the male and the female sexed models, but when combined, the 'back of the

Fig. 20 The head position

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		606 100.00%	322 100.00%	284 100.00%
head position Q20	head back	29 4.79%	16 4.97%	13 4.58%
	head down	34 5.61%	14 4.35%	20 7.04%
	head turning away	81 13.37%	45 13.98%	36 12.68%
	head straight ahead	183 30.20%	95 29.50%	88 30.99%
	turning towards camera	106 17.49%	67 20.81%	39 13.73%
	head in profile	85 14.03%	46 14.29%	39 13.73%
	head tilted to one side	48 7.92%	26 8.07%	22 7.75%
	back of head	16 2.64%	5 1.55%	11 3.87%
	other	24 3.96%	8 2.48%	16 5.63%

Chi = 13.5299, df = 8, there is no statistical association

head' and the 'head down' account for just 8.25% of the total sample. This somewhat problematises Nayak's assertion that the concealment of the face is a central technique to denote the subordinate the Black body as otherness. Likewise frequencies this low cannot be elevated to the status of encapsulating the negation of feminine that is central to producing the Master: the masculine is known

by what the feminine is not. Neither body nor subject can be interpellated by such an infrequent codification.

The final element I would like to draw attention to refers to a code borrowed from Goffman. This is the head cant (p 179-86) which he describes as a core mechanism by which to demonstrate the lack of seriousness in women. He argues that the posture is often performed in combination with dreaminess or an adrift expression. He describes it as a form of ‘cutesy-ness’ or submissiveness, especially when the head is dropped onto a man’s shoulder. However, my results suggest that not only is this rarely used (8.07% for females), but again, it is used just as often on the male sexed model (7.75%). The deeper theoretical question is this: does the head cant, for example, maintain its connotative meaning of the gendered nature of sexual character, or does it mean that this connotation is losing its conventional base when used on both males and females? Overall, I argue that my results argue that the latter is the case. The level of the connotative is operating to reproduce naturalised sex so that sex and gender, male and man, are understood common-sensically as interchangeable.

Thus to make sense of the uniformity with which the face is presented, namely facing forward, it is vital that the direction of the gaze and the expressions be examined. In particular, the directions of the gaze, and its social and metaphorical distinctions of the higher and the lower, are key: the feminine looks down and the masculine looks up; the feminine is modest when she turns away, the masculine is assertive, looking directly into the three-dimensional space projected. Yet the results do not reflect this

Fig. 21 The direction and object of the gaze

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		577 100.00%	312 100.00%	265 100.00%
gaze Q23	looking up	31 5.37%	18 5.77%	13 4.91%
	gazing out at viewer	198 34.32%	104 33.33%	94 35.47%
	looking down	53 9.19%	30 9.62%	23 8.68%
	looking away	63 10.92%	39 12.50%	24 9.06%
	staring out of photo frame	59 10.23%	38 12.18%	21 7.92%
	looking at other/obj	63 10.92%	30 9.62%	33 12.45%
	looking straight ahead	59 10.23%	25 8.01%	34 12.83%
	eyes closed	32 5.55%	17 5.45%	15 5.66%
	other	19 3.29%	11 3.53%	8 3.02%

Chi = 9.0518, df = 8, there is not significant relationship

dichotomous organisation of the direction of the gaze with ease. In fact, the distributions further undermine this logic. This striking absence of difference comes from small frequency numbers, equally distributed, of male and female sexed models that had their eyes closed or were looking out of the frame, and so forth. Thus the largest majority, 33.33% of the female sample, compared to 35.47% of the males, were gazing out at the viewer. This is the direction that connects directly with the camera through which the image positions the viewer within the model's field of vision. The data shows that the largest frequency assumes only a third of the sample. The next largest frequency, for example 'looking away', barely reach 10% of the sample. Relationally speaking, this means that gazing at the viewer is by far the most frequent code used. An image is three times more likely to be codified as staring at the viewer than not. This further displaces the marks of the gender dichotomy onto the expression of the gaze itself. Thus, while the variable showed that there is a degree of variation as to which direction is adopted, this does not detract sufficiently from the homogeneity that is increasingly coming to define the core visual order. Moreover, this homogeneity is registered with the codes that are least open, interpretively speaking, that is, they are not based in the esoteric nature of my interpretation, but by the corporeal impositions of the body. I will return to this.

Hence the central markers of sexual difference within the Symbolic must include the expressive gaze and the expressions of the mouth, perhaps two of the most important areas of the face with regard to how the face is sexualised. Therefore, these have the capacity to offset the emerging neutrality, one might even say banality, that is increasingly defining many of the other codes. In particular, if the neutral body stance is offset by the use of overt forms of sexualisation, which are also categorically distributed, then this would provide empirical evidence that legitimates the continued assumption regarding the nature of the Symbolic. What sort of evidence does figure 22 furnish overleaf? Firstly, staring, the most neutral expression descriptively, is shown to be the most frequently used for both the male and the female sexed models; secondly, it accounts for a higher proportion of the female sample. This has to be attributed, in part, to the minimal cues of location, body posture props, which are joined now by this neutral expression. Moreover, without more complex cues, it is impossible to 'read' or key (Goffman:1979) an expression.

The second most frequent code is 'assertive'. The proportion of females from the total is 31.42%¹¹⁴. Contrariwise, only 3.72% of 296 female models were recorded as expressing coyness. This combines with the other codes that have also registered a significant decline in the representation of passive femininity; for example shyness and dreaminess. At least here there is some remnant of the former division insofar as the female model is three times more likely to be coded as 'dreamy' than the male sexed model. Another element worth noting is the decline of 'to-be-looked-at-ness', that is, the form of display and self-objectification that functions to attract the gaze. Just 13.85% of the females from the proportion of 296 were clearly marked by this look of invitation and display. Nor could it be clearly stated that this is strictly confined to the feminine, if to a much lesser degree, since 10.04% of the male sexed models also marked their address with the invitation to consume them voyeuristically.

¹¹⁴ Note that this is a multiple variable so that each percentage represents its share of the total independently of the other distributions. Therefore, the sum total of percentages is greater than 100. This is produced from the possible of repeats from codes like 'frowning' 'semi-concealed' and 'raised eyebrows'. See Appendix B.

Much more in keeping with expectation, when guided by the order of the Symbolic, is that the male sexed models register nearly one in five images were they are asserting their gaze. Yet, just as with the female models, the males were mostly staring, with no particular expression and certainly no particular 'insight to the soul' (Hillel:1998; Magli:1989; Schmitt:1989). Note also that there is not that marked a difference regarding the use of Dyer's 'other-worldly'. Note finally the extent to which the male body

Fig. 22 The expressive gaze

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		545 100.00%	296 100.00%	249 100.00%
derived q24 Q39	authoritative	17 3.12%	8 2.70%	9 3.61%
	assertive	95 17.43%	49 16.55%	46 18.47%
	staring	159 29.17%	93 31.42%	66 26.51%
	other-worldly	44 8.07%	21 7.09%	23 9.24%
	dreaminess	27 4.95%	21 7.09%	6 2.41%
	glancing	27 4.95%	14 4.73%	13 5.22%
	surprised	18 3.30%	10 3.38%	8 3.21%
	looking being looked at	66 12.11%	41 13.85%	25 10.04%
	seductive	49 8.99%	19 6.42%	30 12.05%
	coy	18 3.30%	11 3.72%	7 2.81%
	looking	38 6.97%	20 6.76%	18 7.23%
	shy	11 2.02%	9 3.04%	2 0.80%
	reactive	28 5.14%	16 5.41%	12 4.82%
	semi/concealed	48 8.81%	23 7.77%	25 10.04%
	other	45 8.26%	17 5.74%	28 11.24%

$\chi^2 = 24.4863$, $df = 14$, there is significance at 5%

has been coded as seductive, with male sexed models register nearly twice as many instances as females. It is through differences like these that the variable shows up distinctions. However, this does not provide evidence for the Symbolic order, because the difference is in the wrong direction, that is, that the male is codified using the seductive gaze more frequently than the female. This cannot be offset by calling upon the narcissistic context of the seductive look, thereby displacing the seduction to

self-love because other codes have identified the high degree to which most images are free of any clear narrative contextualisation. Only by undertaking the sorts of theoretical contortion critiqued earlier can this evidence be read as confirmation of the postmodern/feminist description of the Symbolic. Note also the low frequency with which the ‘other-worldly’ gaze is used by the male sexed model to resist or negate the objectification. The evidence suggests that the notion of the Symbolic being ordered through the universal categorical opposition is increasingly difficult to sustain.

Given that the gaze did not produce the categorical organisation of the sexed body according to the active/passive dichotomy, it is therefore left to the expressions of the mouth to reflect this dichotomy. The mouth is significant not only through its central place as expressive through speech as well as smiling, laughter, sneering and so forth, but also because of its psychoanalytic significance as a sexual stage of development. The phallic mouth is therefore profoundly important in securing ‘phallic femininity’. For example, Kubrick’s ‘Lolita’ pictures the nymphet sucking a lollipop. Therefore, symbolically it carries the sexual connotations of an orifice of pleasure and invitation. If the postmodernist/feminist model has some descriptive base, then it should express itself through the phallic possibilities that the mouth offers.

The table below identifies that this expressive element is statistically significant: the sex of the model affects the form the mouth takes. Both the male and female model register similar frequencies of an open mouth, which implies that men appear to be represented smiling broadly or laughing just as often as women. However, the male sexed models are more likely to have their mouths closed (nearly 70% of the sample, compared to 55.45% of the female models). The second noted difference is that the female sexed model is twice as likely to have her mouth semi-open. What could be the symbolic significance of this? I propose that the closure of the mouth seals it off as an orifice, while the mouth

Fig. 23 Core features of the mouth

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		560 100.00%	303 100.00%	257 100.00%
derived q21 Q40	mouth open	110 19.64%	63 20.79%	47 18.29%
	mouth semi open	105 18.75%	73 24.09%	32 12.45%
	mouth closed	347 61.96%	168 55.45%	179 69.65%

Chi = 15.0210, df = 2, there is a strong association at 1%

half-open sets up the potential for erotic consumption because it brings into view a space, which can be filled. The open mouth does not seem to be able to do this because it has lost all the essential sexual suggestiveness. This brings two elements to bear: first, the corporeal base is essential for tracing the symbolic elaboration of the body, rather than presuming that symbolic operations fully determine the fleshy matter; second, it begs the question of to what extent this is undermined or secured through

expressions. I turn next to the expressions and then to the cross-tabulation of the above with the expressions in order to delineate their interrelationship.

The first thing to note from figure 24 overleaf is the overwhelmingly marginal use of any expressions at all. ‘Smiling’, for example, assumes only 23.59% of the female sexed models compared to 52.16% of those shown with no identifiable expression. Moreover, these proportions are mirrored for the male sexed models. This further weakens the legitimacy of the categorical order of the Symbolic. It simply cannot be awarded such causal significance when, in a sample of fashion images, the feminine as passive is not ordering how gender is codified. The second striking result is how few images have utilised the ‘phallic mouth/object’ code: only 6.31% of the female sample. This indicates strongly that within this sample, clear pornographic codification is not seeping into mainstream images. Not only that, but the ‘phallicisation of the feminine’ (Stratton:1996) is not established with anything like the frequency implied by the Symbolic order. However, despite these similarities, the extent to which the female sexed model is represented with the mouth semi-open, alongside the notable absence of any expression, may well signify how the mouth is sexualised, that is, by restricting the mouth to a suggestive orifice.

From table 24, it is possible to identify whether the mouth, posed as semi open and without an expression, is used to secure a specific mode of sexualisation of the feminine, as well as providing empirical evidence for the psychoanalytic origins of the eroticisation. What the data reveals is that it

Fig. 24 Mouth expression

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		552 100.00%	301 100.00%	251 100.00%
derived q21 Q40	expressionless	288 52.17%	157 52.16%	131 52.19%
	smiling	123 22.28%	71 23.59%	52 20.72%
	laughing	39 7.07%	18 5.98%	21 8.37%
	pouting	43 7.79%	20 6.64%	23 9.16%
	sulking/snarling	34 6.16%	19 6.31%	15 5.98%
	phallic mouth/object	31 5.62%	19 6.31%	12 4.78%
	other	91 16.49%	65 21.59%	26 10.36%

Chi = 12.5182, df = 6, there is not statistical association

does secure a proportion, but that this must be placed in context with the number of ‘expressionless’ images where the mouth is closed, thereby rendering it a marginal mode of representation. 291 is the total sample of females of which 116, or 39.86%, are codified with their mouths closed and with no

expression. This distribution surely secures the move toward a homogeneity between the representations of men and women. In comparison, the total number of females with their mouths semi-open and expressionless is 22.33%. Therefore, the female model is twice as likely to be captured with no expression at all as sexualised with the mouth semi-open. Nevertheless, this sexualising code is one of clearest forms so far because if we look at the percentage of the male models codified thus, it

Fig. 25 The corporeal base and the expression¹¹⁵

Absolute Respondents		Base	mouth open-sex Q1		mouth semi-open-sex Q1		mouth closed-sex Q1	
			female	male	female	male	female	male
Base		560	62	39	65	26	164	177
derived q21 Q40	expressionless	287	6	1	34	11	116	119
	smiling	121	29	20	17	5	23	27
	laughing	39	15	15	2	2	1	4
	pouting	42	3	2	6	5	10	16
	sulking/snarling	34	2	4	4	1	13	10
	phallic mouth/object	30	11	5	5	5	2	2
	other	75	16	6	15	1	27	10

registers 10.74%, that is half as few. The final point of interest furnished from this analysis is the equal frequency with which the male and the female models smile and laugh fully, heartily, so that their mouths open: 14.46% and 15.12% respectively. Not only is this half as much as when the female model has no expression at all, but it also registers the fact that the male and female models are codified smiling and laughing more or less equally. Again, the empirical evidence fundamentally challenges the notion that the sexed categories are defined by patriarchal Symbolic. On the contrary, apart from key areas of the body itself, the data presented simply cannot be said to be defined by categorical sexual difference where the ‘feminine as other’ operates as a mode of representation for the ‘masculine One’.

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR:

There is a clear trend that shows that the Symbolic does not operate universally to institute sexual difference. In fact, the codes of the body are simple rather than weighted ideological complexity:

1. The model is predominately shown alone;
2. There is no specific narrative link between the social environment, nor is there a direct link, subordinate or otherwise, with props used. In fact, a significant number have no additional props or social setting;

¹¹⁵ I have elected not to include percentages because what is required is the proportion of the female sample as a sum total in comparison with the male sexed model.

3. Neither sexed model is defined by their social status in terms of how they occupy space, or with whom;
4. Both the male and the female sexed models are equally located within the voyeuristic context; neither are visually orientated to the viewer through the narrative;
5. Most of the models, both male and female, are represented using the medium or long shot with sharp focus.

Moving on to the body:

6. Most models are represented facing forward;
7. Those body positions that have been associated with symbolic withdrawal from public space or the demarcation of public ownership of the female in space proved no longer to define representation at all;
8. Neither the male or female was differentiated clearly by whom they touch or how they touch; this is limited to the fact that the female touches herself more than the male does, but not in a particular way that aligns the nature of the touch to the gendered dichotomy;
9. Both the male model and the female model are most often represented with their faces looking forward in the direction of the viewer, but with a neutral facial expression that does not engage the viewer directly, be it expression gaze or mouth;
10. The few differences that are registered do not always follow the direction dictated by the Symbolic order. As was noted, the male model was codified more frequently using the seductive gaze than the female sexed model.

Methodologically:

11. These results cross verify each other as the results for shot length for example correspond to the body idiom which likewise corresponds to the registered decline in the use of staring out of the photograph frame as a technique to negate the 'to-be-looked-ness';
12. The sorts of results that are expected as guided by postmodernism/feminism were registered within the *Cosmopolitan* sample of 1975.

The marked absence of difference is most significant because codes that aim to establish 'who the model is' are in decline, at least according to this extensive sample. The commodification process does not seem to draw upon our gendered world of sexual character, yet maintains a 'commitment' to ensuring the body is always subject to the appropriate assignment of sex. By this, I mean that the clarity by which one could assign the sex of the body is not reflected in assignments of sexual character so that one could straightforwardly say: 'as a female she loses concentration because, as you can see, she keeps daydreaming'. Moreover, one should not resign the attribution of the sexed body to the 'realism' of the image because, as is well known, this is a construction, a visual accomplishment that the camera can undermine at any time. Equally, therefore, the realism must be achieved. As Goffman argues, the image is a thing of artifice, not authenticity. How do we make sense of the ease of sexual attribution in light of the fact that there is no sexual character and no symbolic signs apparent to secure the feminine as passive? I argue that the ideological input of the image rests in the construction of the body, that is, in the 'self-evidence' that sex and gender are one and the same thing. Ideologically therefore,

representations are concerned with underpinning the equivalence of social and biological within the production of the facticity of sex. This is why I have left the variables that explicitly tackle ‘body type’ and sexualisation until last, because I suggest that it is here that the significant construction work resides.

SEXUALISATION

What does this variable reveal? A number of things, some of which run counter to the idea that it is the ‘model as subjectivity’ that is the discursive target rather than the corporeal body. The first thing to note is the high frequency that has classified half the sample as ‘non-sexualised’. This is startling¹¹⁶ at first because it challenges both lay and academic preconceived ideas regarding the extent

Fig. 26 Sexualisation of the body¹¹⁷

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		558 100.00%	292 100.00%	266 100.00%
derived q14 Q41	non-sexualisation	290 51.97%	133 45.55%	157 59.02%
	fully dressed	198 35.48%	124 42.47%	74 27.82%
	reveal shoulder	23 4.12%	19 6.51%	4 1.50%
	reveal stomach/hip bone	36 6.45%	18 6.16%	18 6.77%
	reveal upper chest	35 6.27%	9 3.08%	26 9.77%
	reveal thigh	44 7.89%	40 13.70%	4 1.50%
	reveal/excentuate breast	46 8.24%	41 14.04%	5 1.88%
	underwear	28 5.02%	21 7.19%	7 2.63%
	naked upper chest	35 6.27%	8 2.74%	27 10.15%
	other	24 4.30%	13 4.45%	11 4.14%

of the sexualisation process. One may well be inclined to think that this reflects interpretative error. Yet if one takes stock for a moment, it is possible to place this in some context. We have noted throughout

¹¹⁶ The extent to which the results challenge the orthodoxy was startling to me, particularly as on first viewing I ‘have no results’. Yet, I began to remember the banality of the coding process, where I recognised how uniform many of the images were. Advertising forms such a large part of the visual field, we in fact may only be able to remember the stark examples precisely because they are unusual.

¹¹⁷ Chi is not calculated because, despite amalgamations, there remains 10% of the cells with an expected value of less 5.

the shift toward the simplification of the image. This was identified by looking at the frequency with which the models were facing forward, looking forward, having their arms by their sides, or were staring or had the mouth closed without an expression. One only needs to reflect on the proportions to also contextualise the extent to which the images appear not to be dominated by the sexualisation process.

While most of the female sexed models were fully dressed, they were also encoded as revealing the flesh, mostly the thigh or breast. Similarly, the male model reveals or completely bares his chest, something that the female model rarely does unless in the context of pornography. We also find here that there are equal numbers of cases where the feminine and the masculine direct attention to the groin area. There is an equal frequency (6.61% for the female models and 6.77% for the male) with which they both reveal the lower stomach and hip bone. I suggest that this does indicate that there is a dimorphic logic at work here, but one that is required because sexual difference under-defines our gendered system. The codifications operate by defining what is sexy *in* a woman and what is sexy *in* a man through the apparent differences of the body. Sexiness is defined as being derived from the essence of the sexed body; the sexed body produces either men or women. This reveals how we collapse the social and the biological as part of our social understanding of gender. For example, bodies are natural and have different biological roles in reproduction and yet this so called self-evidence is supported by some women wearing padded bras because they have small breasts and therefore are not feminine enough. Thus, I am arguing that by drawing attention to the few features of corporeal difference (we do, of course, have 26 chromosomes in common and only 1 that is different) we shut attention off from the ways in which corporeal bodies are altered to *meet* the construction of gender difference. Hence, I continue to challenge the postmodern/feminist model of the construction of sex by rejecting idea that the body is constituted according to the reign of the phallus, which re-introduces all those codes that negate lack that have just established as marginal.

Table 27 overleaf adds to that the dimorphic logic of sex by building up further the common sense notion that one physical attribute, say the penis, corresponds with another, for example the presence of muscle. Moreover, what this construction seemingly ignores is that far from being a reflection of the primary attribution, secondary and tertiary features, such as muscle or having pert breasts, are organised and managed in order to produce a regime of gender (Connell:1987) that is common-sensically treated as natural. Society is not involved in 'making babies' and so is not involved in making the adult males either. This status of 'nature' means that no social activity is required. Therefore, little attention is paid to the normative definitions of 'male' as this is outside of the domain of society. Equally, if we look at the hands, almost one in three images have drawn attention to the hand, not so much by the nature of the touch, but rather by the 'look' of the hand. In particular, the tendency for the female model to have her arms bent, thus bringing the hands into the centre of the image, may enable the hand to be displayed, and with it, the practical accomplishments that mark that hand as 'female'. I have in mind the nail varnish and manicure, which 'naturally' is something a woman does. Thus we are beginning to trace the reversal of what is proposed by postmodernism/feminism: what is deemed to of the body is being understood through the matrix of the

social. In contrast, my aim is to contribute to an emphasis that includes ideas of construction but equally draws the corporeal into this process.

The second element that emerges from this table is the extent to which both the male and female models fall into the codes that trace the body beautiful, the singular difference being that the male body had muscle and the female was invariable slim. Both the male and female models are classified as tall. There were twice as many men who had no chest hair (presumably removed) than had

Fig. 27 The body type by sex

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		600 100.00%	315 100.00%	285 100.00%
body type Q11	tall	399 66.50%	195 61.90%	204 71.58%
	small	17 2.83%	12 3.81%	5 1.75%
	muscular	117 19.50%	16 5.08%	101 35.44%
	slim	385 64.17%	234 74.29%	151 52.98%
	skinny	66 11.00%	39 12.38%	27 9.47%
	emaciated	8 1.33%	8 2.54%	0 0.00%
	au naturale	147 24.50%	117 37.14%	30 10.53%
	stylised make-up	63 10.50%	55 17.46%	8 2.81%
	normal make- up	107 17.83%	107 33.97%	0 0.00%
	painted nails	43 7.17%	41 13.02%	2 0.70%
	long nails	54 9.00%	49 15.56%	5 1.75%
	short nails	89 14.83%	48 15.24%	41 14.39%
	body hair id	26 4.33%	5 1.59%	21 7.37%
	body hair unid	100 16.67%	60 19.05%	40 14.04%
	dyed/sculpted hair	98 16.33%	62 19.68%	36 12.63%
short hair		325 54.17%	132 41.90%	193 67.72%
long hair		195 32.50%	143 45.40%	52 18.25%

visible chest hair. Women were just as likely to have short hair as long, but very few men had long hair. Again, the painting of the nails, while not being a significant proportion of women, nevertheless

marked the female models out from the male. Thus marked difference is appearing in terms of bodily display, which is significant by its temporariness and its ongoing accomplishment. This is the practice of masculinity and femininity. When chest hair comes back into fashion, re-gains its sex appeal, so this particular style will vanish. The ideological requirements demanded by the postmodernist/feminists will struggle to deal with these shifts as they require something more continuous in order to be able to construct subjectivity through representation.

It has been noted that the female model is consistently codified occupying a third of the two-dimensional page, and filling the page from top to bottom. This projects the body into the length of the page, which then makes her appear tall. This can be achieved irrespective of whether the model is actually tall or not. Thus the appearance of the body as beautiful is a manifestation as much of how the image functions within its two-dimensional plain (Goffman:1979) as it serves any ideological movement. It is an accomplishment of the artifice of the image more than a result of the pressures of ideological reproduction.

I have elected to suspend any of the sub-categories that targeted the tertiary level of personality¹¹⁸ as part of my examination, namely those that traced the active/passive dichotomy and its associate forms. This is because I abandoned these codes toward the end of the data imputing as I became increasingly aware that the criteria by which I had expected to assess the sexual character could not be applied with any consistency. This was in part a result of poor operationalisation. In particular, the variable was too big without sufficient internal organisation, which assists greatly in applying the criteria with regularity. However, equally important, if not more so, was the significant decline in the realist codifications. Gone from the images were the social space and the sorts of objects and goods that characterise different spaces. There was no formal use of status cues, nothing in fact that we could use to 'read' the presentations of self people offer. I could not code this particular female model as being 'weak' or 'emotional' or of a 'soft' nature because there simply were not enough cues by which such a judgement could be made.

The simplification of the image meant that I was faced with a beautiful body, clearly marked as female, but which did not tell me anything about 'her'. For example, without the props of the private domestic setting, one cannot get an idea of the sorts of things she likes. With the ritualisation of social life, we are able to glean from the staged nature of the image, what sort of 'person' she is constructed as being. This level of meaning does not characterise the advertisements sampled here. In addition therefore, despite the poor codification of variable 26, which sought to identify the core dichotomies, it was always going to fall at the same hurdle: there simply were not enough social cues to abstract with any consistencies whether this particular model could be said to be defined by an element of the core gendered dichotomies. I argue that my results have clearly established the extent to which the image has been greatly simplified so that the inability to read the image necessarily leads to this conclusion.

¹¹⁸ See Appendices B and C

SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of improvements that could be made to the taxonomy, particularly in the light of the results found here. The most apparent improvement would be to have a considerably larger sample size. As it stands, once the initial distributions are in place, there were insufficient cases to cross-tabulate 3 or more variables. The aim was to develop multiple perspectives on the body whereby various positions could be examined in terms of other expressions or gestures. Figure 23 gives an indication of what this would have looked like. However, the effect of the small sample size was exaggerated by the distributions identified. For example, in many of the variables, most of the sample (usually about 60%) clustered around one core sub-variable, which left the remaining 40% to be distributed amongst the remaining sub-variables, often about six or seven. Consequently, some cell values were often split further so as to rule out this comparative analysis. The second central feature would be to develop a number of codes from variable eleven. This would include many more secondary and tertiary sexual characteristics so that one could build a picture of the macro features used to secure the facticity of the dimorphic sexed body.

AND THE IMAGES THEMSELVES?

I conclude this chapter with a brief analysis of a number of images, the aim of which is to recontextualise the codes used to quantify some of the images in circulation. The images included do not represent a collection selected from the random sample but rather reflect: a) those images that caused me to question the assumption that the Symbolic is ordered by clear gendered dichotomisation only; b) those images of women that emerged from my results and appear to represent a drop in the intense ideological production of the 'feminine as passive'. I have chosen these because I think these two elements represent the central findings that challenge the adequacies of the semiotic descriptions taken to task above. I begin with the images of the male models.

From plates 1 and 2, one can glean that the production of the body as male is central despite the poses. In plate 1¹¹⁹ the male model is located within a plain brown background. I have argued that this significantly reduces the ability to anchor him in the public social world, which is a key element of the Symbolic. The second element to notice is the angle of the head. His face is looking downwards, away from the viewer. Ideologically speaking, this is supposed to align the model with the passive because the angle of the head prevents a direct engagement with the viewer. This is consolidated by the addition of the downward gaze. Furthermore, there is no expression on the mouth, which makes the face very still and somewhat isolated. The shirt that he is modelling is positioned to reveal the breast bone. Here the light catches and emphasises the glossiness of skin. Codes such as these usually codify the feminine. The chest may have been waxed, as there is no indication of *any* chest hair, so there is also some indication that this form of masculinity results, in part, from a social practice not ideological construction alone.

His hands are concealed by placing them in his pockets; something that is conventionally associated with men. However, this also conceals one of the central anchors we immediately use in

¹¹⁹ *Esquire* magazine, February 1995.

everyday life to assign the sex of the person. Hands can reveal elements about the social positioning of the person; for example, labourers' hand as opposed to office workers. In conventional gender terms, we look to the size and the presence of veins to assist in sex assignment. Combined, these elements undermine a clear production of masculinity. However, his sex is secured in other ways. For example, the angle of the camera draws attention to the jaw and, in particular, to the fact that he is not clean shaven. This deliberate codification sets the body apart from women's, where facial hair is always removed. The presence facial hair stands in contrast to the hair on his head, which has been stylised and opens up the potential to draw reference to the 1930's haircuts some women had. I am referring to the curl placed over the forehead. I argue that while these elements are sufficient to secure the body as male, they do not unambiguously locate him within the conventions of hegemonic masculinity. The placement of a pink scarf suggests that this image is aimed at a specific market, namely the gay men's market. Perhaps then, the source of the variation of images is derived from the market sector at which the product is self-consciously pitched. Therefore the codification of an image such as this depends upon combining the traditions of the feminine with a sufficient number of markers that secures a male sex assignment. This assignment presents some fundamental problems for the notion of feminisation because the codes do not construct this body as female despite the presence of a 'to-be-looked-ness'.

Plate 2¹²⁰ is predominately coded via the lighting, or brownish tinge that makes the chest appear very velvety. This makes the skin the central focus of the image. Note also that soft focus has been used to create that sense of velvety skin. The central lighting draws attention to the muscle of the body, particularly the breast. His torso fills the page thereby bringing the surface of the skin close to the eye. This reflects Goffman's notion that we are able to imaginatively connect a codification to an actual embodied position. However, active interpretation is not to be treated the same as the meaning created by the interpellated subject. The viewer is placed so as if he/she were standing in close proximity to him. Again, the smoothness seems to suggest that he has waxed his chest. However, this may in fact be an outcome air-brushing the image and draws attention to the artifice of the image. Either way, it removes the image from the actual embodiment of most men. He has his hands folded across his chest, which recalls the way arms are used to conceal women's torsos. In addition, this withdraws the arms; combining the codes to connote modesty. However, the position of the arms also draws attention to the distribution of hair, which assists in securing the body as male. The emphasis upon the chest bone does this also. The second crucial feature is the position of the head. He too is looking downwards, as well as appearing to have his eyes closed. This codification reduces further the capacity of the model to impose his subjectivity thereby making the viewer the subject of the gaze. This is effectively how 'coy' is visually produced. Another additionally element to this image is the fact that the only object in colour is the bottle of beer. The position of the head assists in drawing the gaze directly to the commodity. Moreover, the downward angle of the head implies that the body is subordinate to the object. Conventionally, this would be defined as an objectified body and I suggest that this ought to be extended the male body also, given the evidence presented here. Along side the elements of the body that draw upon our common sense ways of assigning sex, there are a number of tensions included within the image. One is the thumb that indents the skin on the arm holding the bottle. This does

¹²⁰ *Arena* Spring 1995.

convey some uneasiness in the image. The most explicit is the pun 'Poor Homme', which alludes to the French 'pour' or 'for'. This is referencing the wide use of 'pour homme' in perfume advertising, for which the bottle of beer is substituted. Equally, however, it means that the male model is to be pitied.

I have included this image because it directly draws upon the theoretical and empirical critique offered. The semiotic analyses analysed in chapter two would 'deal' with the clash of the male body and the abundance of feminine codification by defining it as an example of feminisation. Yet, to do so is to implicitly acknowledge the prior assignment of the sex of the body because without that prior assignment the notion of feminisation would not be required because the production would reflect the Symbolic order (Mathieu:1996). Furthermore, the instabilities that have been self-consciously included, but applied to the male body, making them ironic. To use irony in this way is to disrupt the free flow of ideological meaning (Rorty:1989). The postmodernist/feminist model has no means to account for this because the constructed subject is the outcome of meaning and never a user of meaning. I refer back to Benhabib's critique here. Ultimately, what is crucial to both these images is the extent to which beautification and commodification define the image. Hence, I argue that these processes should no longer considered processes that target women only, or even predominately.

In contradistinction, I have selected an image that reflects extent to which the images of women have become less riddled with ideology. I argue that my results have unambiguously shown the extent to which the explicit positioning of the woman as passive has declined. This introduces a tension in that the beautification and commodification continue but that this is placed directly on to the body, rather than the construction of a 'character' or the alignment with the private domain, for example. Thus, they supply 'information' only on what a woman looks like, not on how she should behave or feel. I have selected one from *Cosmopolitan* November 2002 on order to give an indication that these sorts of images persist.

Plate 3 exposes, I think, the ways in which a significant proportion of images are composed to draw one's attention directly to the artifice of the image. Just as above, the image is marked by the absence of any social context with which we can glean something as to the 'who' of the model. It was as a result of images like these that I was unable to apply the variable that traced the core dichotomies. She is caught in the middle of an artificial posture that self-consciously draws attention to how the image is constructed. It does not function via naturalistic mock-up; on the contrary, it reveals what actually takes place to compose an image. Her arms extend outwards and her body is captured in movement. A mock-up of a dance move perhaps? At best, one could say that her posture displays the clothes, but then would not one expect that if one were to seek out such advertisements? I think that what is critical for me is how banal the image is and how much the image is ordered around the necessity to the display the clothes; hence the movement. Her hair is held back by fingers, which gives us sight of her face. Her eyes look downwards, but without the symbolic effect of the images above because the angle is a result of the movement and thus does not carry the 'staged' quality of those above. How is one to make an identification with such an image? Perhaps, identification is secured by imaging oneself in the suit? However, this seems a little vague. Or at least it is vague enough to query whether such an image could secure the reproduction of the Symbolic and the subordinated subjectivities it constitutes. Again, it is the explicit commodification process that stands out in this

image, and yet it is so explicit, how could you miss it? I think that if this image is going to be found to make an input in the reproduction of the social order, then we must turn to the how social interaction mediates between ideological construction and the subject. I query that asserting that it operates at an unconscious level is sufficient to explain how an image of this kind operates in the social world. This is important because the data has shown that simplistic images like this that are in circulation.

A SUMMARY

The content analysis undertaken here has provided a set of data that stands in opposition to much of the description and analysis of representation. I think that there are four basic reasons as to why:

1. Unlike much of the research conducted on gender representation, I did not organise my data in such a way that it set out to establish difference, the problem then developed is: what *kind* of difference is being looked for. I sought to avoid this by allowing the distributions themselves to furnish difference, usually defined as 'the findings', or as has emerged, to 'fail' to establish any substantive relationship of difference at all.
2. However, what has emerged from this is an introduction of what unites the images of men and women. I identified that the image has moved, for both men and women, toward a significant simplification, and thus I simultaneously traced the decline in the use of realism; secondly, and most importantly, by not emphasising difference, I was able to identify the extent to which the forms of representation are in fact characterised by homogeneity.
3. Combined, these two shifts undermine the legitimacy with which one can continue to assume that the categorical differences of the Symbolic continues to describe the actual images in circulation.
4. By using a series of codes that are relatively closed, interpretatively speaking, or are guided by clear delineations of their operations, I have generated a bank of empirical data with which to challenge the assumptions of the Symbolic. I argue that this makes the case for the need to return to content analysis so that ideological concerns are linked to how representative, or not, the image subject to semiotic analysis is.
5. The images are organised by taking the gendered body and using the body itself, separate from sexual character, as system through which to commodify and promote the item. I argue that this contributes to the demise of the detail of the social setting and props.

Finally, I return to an issue raised when delineating the difference *within* postmodernism/feminism. The data has shown that *the Symbolic is simply not sufficiently dichotomised to secure the identification patterns that the theory asserts*. What is the consequence for the theory from these cultural applications are drawn? I suggest that this evidenced weakens the claims that they make theoretically and substantiates the necessity to engage both theoretically and empirically.

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BODIES, SEX AND GENDER

I conclude with a reiteration of the general theoretical problems identified with regard to the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism and its application within the visual cultural sphere. I follow this with an introduction of how a model that incorporates the corporeal body, as well as maintaining a sharp eye on ideology, might proceed. I return here to Goffman (1979) and integrate this with Garfinkel's explication of how naturalisation within the practice of gender occurs. Garfinkel (1967) assists in showing the various ways 'genital sex' underdetermines the social, everyday understandings of sex. This provides the background to a model that seeks to explore the social activity that exists between biological sex and gender roles and/or identity, that is, practices common-sensically said to be derived from or rooted in chromosomal sex. What is important to me is that within the social and everyday background, sex and gender do not operate as a semantic distinction. This distinction resides largely within the academy. Garfinkel attends to how sex and gender are linked in the lived embodied world, given that the biological category underdetermines the social operations of sex. Moreover, this offers an alternative to the dualistic logic that has tended to limit the analysis of the sex/gender distinction, yet without ejecting the corporeal; a charge which I have lodged against the Lacanian postmodern feminists throughout this thesis.

I will then extend this analysis by linking it to Lakoff's (1987) notion of family resemblances. This does two things: first, it offers a non-unitary and non-objectivist classification scheme so that the varied practices undertaken to sustain sex (resulting from the failure of biology to achieve this) can be brought more clearly into view; second, by developing the notion of sex as a family resemblance, we are better able to keep a handle on its manifold forms; we do, after all, often mean much more than chromosomal sex when we speak of 'sex'. In particular, we can treat the various elements, for example differing conceptions of motherhood, as an integral part of the cluster contained within how a category of this complexity works because we no longer treat these as objective properties.

I conclude with a research framework that seeks to explore the relationship of representations to social gendered action. What is of central importance is the extent to which representations continue to visualise the normative body, and thus address ideological formations, but emphasise how these are *incorporated* into everyday actions, rather than treating images as *determinants* of that action. I argue that only this emphasis can account for the variability of being women and this is why we need a conceptualisation, like Lakoff's, that can accommodate a much more flexible form of classification so that central, marginal and marginalized forms and practices of being a woman can remain the central theoretical focus.

THEORETICAL CONTESTATIONS

I highlighted what I consider to be a series of fundamental problems with the model offered by the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism. I focused on the over-emphasis on the constitutive function of discourse that, when combined with a certain deployment of Lacanianism, produces a number of problematic theoretical closures. They are:

1. An inadequate theorisation of the subject derived from an over-reliance upon the mirror phase and the concept of interpellation.
2. The model is ahistorical, as it has neither a subject capable of bringing about change, nor a model the Symbolic that can interpellate new subjectivities.
3. A self-evident treatment of the body as object and root of subject positions.
4. A coterminous, but contradictory, reliance upon a disembodied subject; leading to the absolute negation of active female heterosexuality.
5. A restricted model of how an image functions and what images are in circulation.

These closures, brought about by structural determinism, reduce the human condition to a series of structural oppositions, which relies upon defining femininity and masculinity by identifying their various fixed properties: active/passive, subject/object and so on. These dualisms are said to be contained within the language that we speak and thus organises or interpellates the subject. A key example discussed is the prescription that if a male model is photographed looking down and away from the viewer, 'he' is feminised, thereby maintaining the connection between the feminine and the passive. This logic is equally operative when the viewer is addressed. If a woman is to gain pleasure from an image she can only do so by oscillating and assuming masculine patterns of desire. Hence, a subject and/or representation cannot be both feminine and active. Anything identified as 'active', however vaguely, and is born by the female falls outside of this fixed and unitary classification and is either masculinised or pathologised. Such an analysis reveals the ambiguous place of the body in the writings by the postmodernists/feminists discussed here. Only if the subject is disembodied could one really contemplate theoretically ruling out the possibility that some women may experience active heterosexuality, or at least something more complex than elaborated by the postmodernists/feminists discussed here. I suggest that if one concludes that all active desire is masculine desire, one is left wondering about the body because their analysis of desire feels curiously disembodied. Desire is, in fundamental ways, corporeal and is experienced at the level of the flesh, regardless of the fact that desire has social origins.

Yet, I have offered the argument that their theoretical delineation of the disembodied subject operates coterminously with their use of the 'body as a self-evident object'. Hence Lacanian postmodernists/feminists treat the body as an unexamined presupposition upon which the culturally structured process can be 'read'. Oscillation, masculinisation, and so on, are all process that assume sexual dimorphism. Without treating the body as self-evident, they are unable to trace the domination that is said to reside within the visual domain. 'He is feminised' in no way critically targets the primary assignment 'he'. Masculine and feminine are placed 'on top of the body' so that deviation at the level of cultural construction can be traced. In effect, masculine and feminine become patterns of desire that refer to the order of the mind – the construction of the subject – and this has the effect of ensuring that the body remains the sole *raison d'être* of biology. It therefore reproduces the mind/body dualism, and thus fails to tackle its implicit genderisation (Lloyd:1984). In essence, postmodernism/feminism of the kind evaluated here aims to treat the body as a discursive object, a product of cultural forces, but can only do so by ignoring the body at the corporeal level, that is, by accepting the body as self-evident. I

have tried to argue that this effectively re-introduces the sex/gender distinction, but in a far less interrogated way than under Oakley for example. Yet, they equally depend upon the body as self-evident, one that underpins the identification of psychic shifts.

A direct consequence of the fact that these structural dualisms maintain their integrity above the empirical world they are supposed to describe is that it effectively denies individuals the capacity to reflect, challenge and alter the social world through potentially transformative practices. This is why theory of this kind is charged with ahistoricism. There is no social change to account for because they lack a social subject or motor from which social change can emerge. For if we do not act on the world but are only subject to it, then, this seriously limits the quality and variability of action. As I argued, we are merely cultural dupes acting out our roles. This model is forced into a position of ahistoricism, produced by its structural determinism, because the Symbolic is said to speak *through* the subject. Therefore, postmodernism/feminism lacks a 'motor', as it were, to bring about new Symbolic formations. The specific form that this structural determinism takes is particularly problematic, in my view, for this reason: it is dangerously idealist in its resonance. Language systems seem to be immaterial, free standing and fully independent of the embodied subjects that utter the words. One gets no sense that the language system is alive because it forms part of the speech acts *we do*.¹²¹ The strictures that the language system imposes is also the frame through which speech acts emerge (Cavell:1995; Goffman:1974). Moreover, the voice of the speaker is as disembodied as desire. One develops no sense of the 'entity' doing the utterance, so consequently, those who recognise that it is 'real' bodies, with voice boxes, who speak, find themselves in a perverse situation of seeking to 're-establish' that bodies are 'real'. The postmodernists/feminists reviewed here extend a sense of the Symbolic universe that is confined to the (re)presentations made of it. Thus, from their theoretical stance, substantive change need not be of any concern.

The problematic theorisations of the subject and its relationship to the body render the theorists discussed here unable to account for their own consciousness. At best they call upon pre-Oedipal desire. This effectively re-essentialises their own desire and places them back into the order that says they lack sufficient moral regulation to engage in the public world. As Gadamer (1975) argues, seeking to valorise the subordinated term merely achieves the re-affirmation of its subordinate position and thus the patriarchal dualisms that are allegedly their theoretical target. Hence, postmodernists/feminists, and the cultural applications they undertake, have not deconstructed the essence of the woman's body at all, but operate within the very logic they profess to be the object of their critique.

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS AND EMPIRICAL REFUTATION

My theoretical critique highlighted a number of theoretical weaknesses in the theorisation of the body offered by Lacanian postmodernists/feminists. I then went on to challenge directly the ideologically over-determined description of the Symbolic by conducting a content analysis. My

¹²¹ This in part reflects the loose application of the term 'text', which elides all the differences between these texts, including the visual, linguistic, books and bodies.

central theoretical challenge was to suggest that a sign must be sufficiently stable if it is to perform an ideological function. These signs are supposed to make the world recognisable and, for that reason, are not self-consciously elliptical and difficult to pin down as they slip across a web of meaning. In contestation, I simply offered the following proposition: if the universal Symbolic is the source of gendered subjectivity, then it must be characterised by the active/passive and masculine/feminine dichotomies. Thus codes of this kind are straightforward, conventional and quantifiable. However, the data furnished by my content analysis, which used many of their forms of codification, simply does not make the postmodernist/feminist position critiqued here a tenable one. Empirically, women are not repeatedly encoded with variables that define her as passive, coy, shy or confined to the domestic sphere, for example. In fact, the contextual anchor of most of the images was so vague that applying the coding criteria with regard to femininity as character consistently proved difficult; I abandoned my attempt, suggesting that this is largely because the use of realist scenes to anchor the expression have disappeared. I was unable to consistently code the images along the contours of the gendered dichotomy and I included two images that illustrate how images of men cannot easily be recuperated into the domain of the mind (Dyer:1992). In fact, the emphasis on the skin and the use of light indicates that the body is encoded as desirable through its physicality. This theoretically implies that men are codified and positioned in the same ways as women. The content analysis has furnished evidence that there is an emerging trend that indicates an increasing homogenisation of the images of men and women, which signals that men's bodies are increasingly the target of the processes of commodification and sexualisation. This may open up new patterns of desire, both active and passive for men and women.

In contradistinction, semiotics is the preferred method of analysis of postmodern Cultural Studies precisely because it can trace the interaction of the signifier/signified in the production of meaning. Yet, when language and symbols are made to serve an ideological position, all signs come to mean the same thing, in this case, 'the feminine as lack'. This is encapsulated, I think, in their extensive deployment of the neologism '(re)presentation'. This theoretical closure makes the necessity to uncover, and account for, new forms of representation redundant. The subtlety of the semiotic method, attentive to how meaning is constructed, is gone. Instead, we are left with only a few images analysed, whose selection is made without any systematic rigour. This is, I argue, one of the reasons why the manifold shifts in representation have gone by 'un-decoded'. The shifts discussed above create a cultural space to consume the images of men differently, since the image is no longer located within situations that off set or negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of the male within the image. The postmodernist/feminist¹²² emphasis upon the spoken means that they rule out the need to consider the speaker and thus the potential variation he or she introduces. There is no scope for irony (Rorty:1989) or for users to mobilise the inherent instability of language and potentially produce new signs. The models assessed here are fundamentally ahistorical, both in terms of the construction of the subject and in terms of the production of the sign.

¹²² I refer here to the cultural analyses critiqued and their broader location within the strong programme.

Moreover, my argument proposes that it is not possible to recuperate the phallocratic order, namely via feminisation, because all the images clearly establish or mark the body as male. Moreover, where codes were shown to have a high frequency of use, for example the voyeuristic gaze, which is particularly important here, the codes were equally distributed across the male and female models. It is worth noting that the core feature of the voyeuristic coding was that the gaze was *not* reciprocated. This result cannot be put down to interpretative prejudice on my part because the position of the head determines whether or not a gaze can be returned. This is imposed by the materiality of the body; it is not the outcome of discourse constituting the materialisation of the body (Butler:1990). My critique, combined with this evidence, means that it cannot merely be dismissed as a difference in theoretical orientation. I suggest that this empirical data fundamentally weakens the claims made by the postmodernism/feminism criticised here. However, I do not wish to imply I that I consider the image to be free of ideological construction, rather, that the ideological target has shifted to the body itself, to an intensified production of the dimorphic body.

BODIES, IMAGES AND IDEOLOGY

To reiterate, one of the central conclusions drawn from the data is that the ideological content of the image appears to target less 'what kind of woman is she' than that bodies are strictly and absolutely dimorphic. So how should we make sense of this? Garfinkel's (1967) analysis of the relationship between the normative distributions of sex into the dimorphic body and the social practice by which this is accomplished, alongside Goffman's model of the image, seem to me to be pertinent. I begin with Goffman (1979).

As Goffman argues, we are prepared to suspend our knowledge that the image is a construct in order to engage with it. The consequence of the suspension of disbelief is that, as a society, we accept the patterns of the body beautiful as natural and eternal at that point in time, despite it shifting according to the whims of fashion. Goffman has shown that in order for an image to work, it has to hyper-ritualise the scene so that it brings into focus the taken for granted background upon which it depends. Goffman suggests that the essence that makes the image function is its artifice. This carries significant implications in the light of the evidence furnished by my content analysis because the object of codification is not the naturalisation of the social setting, but the naturalisation of the body. This opens up a place to identify the ideological function, namely the production of the normative body, which acts as a yardstick within the social background. The paradox is that when we accept the naturalness of sex within the visual image, that acceptance is an outcome of hyper-ritualising, that is, making visible the cultural rules we use to assign sex. Moreover, it allows us to negate the practice involved in the production of the 'natural sexed body', namely the hours spent in the gym by the model to produce the right contours to reflect the lighting and shadows best (illustrated in plate 2). In turn, these contours then are treated as a natural, and thus naturalised, aspect of the body, that is 'men are muscular'. Another example can be found regarding the technique of airbrushing, which removes all the small 'imperfections' of the body – a pimple here and flesh 'out' of contour there. Most people

'know' that this takes place, yet it does not affect how the image is read. I suggest that this is where the normative body makes its entry because the standard is largely unattainable yet operates as the yardstick by which society judges the bodies of its members. Thus, within these images, we can trace the ideological formation of the body, which is then naturalised as the essence of man or woman. In my view, muscle and facial hair are particularly important features of bodies which are used to secure the body as self-evidently and unambiguously male or female. For example, in plate 1, I suggested that the evidence of facial hair was crucial in ensuring the correct assignment, but does not negate the potential for homoeroticism. I suggest that thinking about images within this framework allows for a more subtle understanding of how they are encoded and naturalised, than drawing upon a structurally determinist model.

Garfinkel, while not occupying an identical theoretical domain as Goffman, nevertheless begins to explore how a cultural background organises ambiguity to anchor or stabilise our notions of 'sex'. In a sense, Goffman uses the notion of hyper-ritualisation and Garfinkel uses aberrant cases to bring the background into view. I bring the two together to link images as a source, but not determinant, of the practices to naturalise sex. By anchoring cultural patterns to sex, society conflates the sociological distinction into one: they are one and the same thing, a 'symptom' of being a man or a woman. Garfinkel addresses the normative order by arguing that what members within this society deem 'the normal', and thus the morally sanctioned, is to be *either female or male* and that membership to one or other is permanent. His exploration of how such a world is constructed looks not to the material reality of sex, but to social accomplishments by which the moral normative position is placed at the centre of all interaction. One of his points, adopted by Kessler (2000), is that we largely assume that the performance corresponds to the physical level of reality: we operate believing that we 'know'. However, what the knowledge is of is the enculturation and embodiment of the meanings of sex and gender. Thus, for Garfinkel, the distinction of sex and gender makes no impact within everyday practice because they are treated as one and the same thing. Therefore, Garfinkel is not suggesting that, for a significant proportion of the time, a person having one set of genitals will not correspond to the public performance demanded of those with a specific genital sex. He does not doubt that in most cases the physical classification of genitals is real. He does not sit alongside radical constructionists who argue that the margins, most notably the intersex (Kessler:2000), make a mockery of the bimodal distribution, whose theories force one into the strange position of having to insist upon the extra discursive qualities of bodies.

Garfinkel is examining the exceptional not to cast doubt on the fact that there are two types of bodies with two differing roles in reproduction, but because the exceptional reveals the background that 'the normal' does not recognise. The naturalisation is complete *because the genitals match* their performance. Garfinkel does, however, make the case that the exceptional, those who fall out of the normative order, reveal something of the social, discursive regime that makes sense of what these body differences *mean and how they are embodied*; that is, having this set of genitals 'of course' means that you sit with your legs closed, crossed, or tucked under the chair. From the example, we already have a woman in mind. When a person's genitals match the gendered performance, the social practices that sustain that relationship become obscured. Thus, what Garfinkel likes about aberrant cases is the extent

to which they have a “remarkable awareness and un-commonsense knowledge of the organisation and operation of social structures that were for those that are able to take their sexual status for granted...seen but not noticed backgrounds” (Garfinkel:1967:118). Encapsulated within this statement are, I think, all sorts of social practices that are important to sustaining bodily dimorphism, while negating corporeal commonality, and merging these with the assumptions and practices of social dimorphism so that it is treated as a universal, ahistorical ‘fact’. I think that the fusing of the biological with the social, thus rendering invisible important parts of our social conduct that is undertaken by both men and women, and diverting attention away from the physical properties men and women share, is what the ideological function of naturalisation is all about. The biological difference, which forms part of the body, is merged with social differences, which are understood to be so different as to be deemed opposite. Kessler and McKenna (1978) also draw attention to the social requirement that gender be made culturally visible through core codes like hair, muscle, deportment and such like. It is here that the significance of the visual domain makes its entry, as social practices draw upon the representations as a source for the codes of hair, muscle, facial hair, eyebrow shape and so on. Kessler and McKenna target the commonsense attitude, namely that one is a woman by virtue of a set of genitalia. They ask then, why should there be such an intense focus upon magnifying that ‘fact’, for example the ‘Wonder Bra’. Their answer is that genitals are simply insufficient to secure the assignment of ‘woman’ to the body that has female genitalia (see also Connell:1987).

Throughout this thesis, there have been on-going references to the sex/gender distinction and its tendency to operate dualistically, so that the body is deemed fully independent of society. One of the issues addressed was the propensity for the social/gender to become more and more peripheral in the explanation for the lived patterns of being a man or a woman. The social element is lost because current practices are ‘lived’ as pre-reflexive embodied features. Consequently, explanations that state that the body has fixed innate features gather favour because they reflect seemingly the fact they are ‘felt’ in the body. This, for me, is a central reason why sex and gender as a distinction needs to be rethought as the analytical axis because it fails sufficiently to tackle the ideological tendency to relocate ‘embodiment’ back into the biological (Delphy:1996). One of the possible reasons is because one ‘lives’ the two elements, interacting and combining them into a seamless sense of self as a woman or man. For example, our emotions ‘feel’ in the body and thus ‘feel’ as if they belong to sex. The outcome is that aggression is naturalised and becomes an innate quality of a man’s body. Equally, the translation of an emotion into the disposition of a specific bodily sex reflects the ideological function that operates when producing absolute dimorphism. For example, within these structured contexts, an aggressive woman transgresses the moral character and its social sanction because, like her body, moral character is deemed to be absolutely dimorphic. As Connell (1987) argues it is the social management of gender that produces categoricalism so that an emotional propensity rapidly moves from particular men, to all men, united by their bodies; it has become a natural and permanent feature of ‘being a man’ and thus stands outside of society. Categoricalism organises the practices so that we come to see genital difference in terms of absolute gender oppositions. Hence, practices move back and forth between the two dualistic terms and manage the ways sex and gender is lived.

What is required then is a model that theorises the relationship between body and society by 'bringing the body into society' (Franks:1991). I offer here a preliminary sketch about how we might move more effectively between the elements of the body and those of the normative order. I draw upon the theoretical space between being in a body, knowing that one is unequivocally male, and the sense of feeling masculine or feminine. I am persuaded by Connell and Garfinkel alike that only a theory of practice can meet this criterion because it is social practice that produces the organisation of the body and the embodied identity that emerged from the body. Practice intervenes so that each member of a social order, no matter how varied these are, can utter the following statement: 'I have these kinds of feelings because I have this set of genitals'. This assumption is not disrupted by the variation in the ways of 'being' a man or a woman, located within various social orders. I believe that only a notion of social practice can manage this.

THE UNFINISHED BODY

One of the issues that leads me to hesitate in accepting the distinction between sex and gender is that the category of sex is thoroughly filled with social content, as well as the bodily fact of genital difference. So much about our gendered practices are based upon the social classification which reflects the ways we organise the signs of sex. We can see this when pubescent boys and girls are trying different ways of being a man or a woman, which runs conterminously with the decision of what sort of a man or woman 'feels' right, if it 'feels' right at all as in the case of transsexuals for example. What is important is that this practice, the learning to incorporate or inculcate the various ways of being a woman, is that it is then naturalised and treated as a naturally occurring disposition of the body. The 'fact' of this process is largely forgotten once naturalisation is complete. Alternatively, we naturalise the assumption that women don't have facial hair – a fact that is 'corroborated' in everyday life. We naturalise the practice and ignore the fact that it is an outcome of an intervention on the body, namely plucking. We allow our transformative practices, those that monitor and manage the body, to slip into the taken-for-granted background. Curiously, this inverts the causal direction: women don't have facial hair because we pluck becomes 'I pluck my facial hair because women don't have facial hair'. This example can be extended to gestures, deportment, posture and so on. Garfinkel's model shows how much of being a natural woman resides in the social background.

Examples such as this tell us that the body is unfinished. Therefore the difference in genitalia is a factor in the negotiations of gender rather than the base, however determining, of gender. For me, emphasising the unfinished nature of the body means that we must attempt to theorise beyond the ranking that implicitly organises our commonsensical understandings of gender. Our social background fuses the scientific knowledge of chromosomal sex so that the assignment of genitalia is said to define something 'primary' of the body. From this follows our sense that the body will go on to produce the corresponding secondary characteristics. This forms such a significant element of social background that we cannot 'understand' practices that fly in the face of this 'truth'. We cannot, for example, accept the practice of 'berdache' (Herdt:1993). To us, this is really about a man pretending to live as a woman because we cannot really understand a social background that does not define men and women through the possession of a particular set of genitals. Transsexualism is a practice that stems from our cultural

background where sex and gender must be aligned if one is to be treated as a woman, as opposed to a man pretending to live as a woman.

I would like to offer a model of sex and gender that seeks to trace the interactions between having a set of genitals, which throws that body into the structured paths of gender, and the negotiations that are then subsequently undertaken. These negotiating practices do something to manage the fact that commonsensically we treat sex and gender as one and the same thing. The practices we undertake slip into the taken for granted parts of our social world, and thus, in 'normal' cases, they go largely unnoticed. Those who fall out of the normative order will be more conscious of the practices that intervene between sex and gender, exposing the ontological relationship that is born from being in a body. A young man's first nocturnal emissions, a sign of the emergence into male adulthood and all shifting physical and ontological issues this implies, may be precisely the point that triggers a profound sense of alienation, and a sense of self that is far stronger than any potential biological dispositions of sex. Thus, it is possible to link the current social practices, the meaning these confer onto the body and individual's sense of dislocation within them. In my view, this draws out nicely the notion of the body as unfinished (Shilling:1993). Having a 'sex' that is material and extra-discursive does not make the body free from these discourses that make sense of it, or the individual negotiation that is undertaken within these discourses. In one respect, Giddens (1991) is right. In 'high modernity', the number of ontological questions that face an individual expand and are rendered more complex by the loss of tradition. Moreover, the massive expansion of technological control of the body offers new sources of embodied self. I think this stands even if Giddens' analysis is not sufficiently embodied (Shilling:1993; Lash and Urry:1994).

IN SUMMATION

By linking naturalisation to the production and content of the image, it is possible to keep an eye on the normative content of an image, without making the act of doing and being a woman a product of the internalisation of the normative content contained in an image. I propose that images act as frames of reference. This emphasises that images offer the normative as a visual standard, which go on to 'merge' into the background so that they can become a naturalised part of the accomplishment of gendered practices. However, this relationship is not a deterministic one, where the macro unambiguously determines the micro-practices. Agency and negotiation intervene between the normative discursive content and its utilisation in practice. Moreover, the space between the normative content and the process of incorporating all or some of its elements helps to explore how and what performances one takes up as opposed to another. Yet, neither is the relationship between the two component parts voluntary. Essentially, our practices draw upon the visual images a society produces and thus lodge within those practices, in *some shape or form*, the structures, discursive or economic, that underpin those actions (Bourdieu:1990; Goffman:1979). Structures thus provide stable contexts from which the background of the lifeworld flows (See Taylor in Calhoun et al. 1993). Images, conventions, bodily gestures act as resources, rather than determinants, to be incorporated in embodied performances. This operates both pre-reflexively and in a consciously motivated way. Most

importantly, the corporeality of the body is central to the production of self; not overridden by the Symbolic. A dynamic exchange is introduced between the discourses to which bodies are subject and our ability to do things with discourse and change what that discourse means. Discourses are not fixed because they operate within the actions we undertake. Thus they do sit outside of action but are reproduced or potentially challenged by what we do. It is in this sense that I think it is possible to locate these practices within the schema Shilling (1993) offers. It keeps in focus the discourses to which bodies are subject. It integrates the meaning of body upon which people act. It leaves open the potential to transform those meanings. And most importantly, it tackles the body directly.

LAKOFF'S VITAL CONTRIBUTION

I argue that the complexity of the relationship between the body and the feeling of gender cannot be appropriately theorised within the classical ideas of how categories work. This is because the objectivist and unitary basis of the classical way of thinking about a category fails to accommodate most socially based classifications. One of the aims of using practice to fill the crucial area resulting from underdetermination of sex by biology is that it brings into view the intervention that takes place between the flesh and the social accomplishment of gender. This is why I continue to think that one of the most persuasive elements of Connell's *Gender and Power* (1987) is his examination of the limitations of categorical logic. Connell suggests that categoricism (54-6) came from a number of sources, one of which is structuralism. He argues that it is both possible and necessary to make generalisations, of which categories like 'women' are essential. However, he argues that serious problems arise when the generalisation is substituted for a normative standard. He argues that this logic is the reason why feminism found itself charged with ethnocentrism. He suggests that feminism leaves itself open to this charge because categoricism prohibits the necessary integration of other forms of embodied existence. I have proposed that this equally applies to Nayak's analysis and is demonstrated by his theoretical inability to combine gender and ethnicity. Connell argues that the more categories that are included, the more internally regular each category must become. It seems to promote the following notion: I am like you in this respect, but different from you in another. To be with those to whom I really belong, we must be the same in all respects¹²³. This is because the model of the category is based upon a notion that there should be a single essence or property that unifies all members. I suspect that this is one of the reasons why some postmodernists/feminists are sceptical about the category 'woman'.

Using Lakoff¹²⁴, I suggest that it is possible to reclaim the category, that there is something called 'woman', without having to work out the singular property that defines all those contained within it. Lakoff's work (1987) offers a framework to draw these elements together. He does this by theorising coherently what categories are. He offers us an application of Wittgenstein's early formulation regarding family resemblances to more empirically vital categories; in this case the

¹²³ Calhoun offers a cogent and stimulating analysis of this logic in his assessment of feminist stand-point theory. He suggests that the politics of recognition would serve better than a politics based upon identity.

¹²⁴ Lakoff also offers a definition of the basic realism that underpins his analysis, and this equally comes to underpin mind. See pp158.

category of 'woman'. As stated, one of the elements that differentiates the various feminist engagements with postmodernism is what the category of 'woman' might mean (Riley:1988; Braidotti:1991; Bordo:1993; Butler:1990; Gatens:1996; Fuss:1990; New:2003). The debate hinges on whether the body can be treated as a point of political unity, or whether 'woman' is purely a product of discourse (Butler) or a terroristic meta-concept that negates difference (Riley). What underpins this debate is the assumption that to function politically, there needs to be a set of properties that unify all women all of the time. Lakoff's model offers us a way out of this by suggesting that no category is unitary in this way.

Lakoff argues that family resemblances can operate in many different ways, depending on the complexity of the category. He suggests that complex categories such as 'mother', which is only one element of 'woman', functions as a cluster. His challenge to classical theory (pp. 74) is that this concept cannot be defined as a set of clear, necessary and sufficient conditions into which all cases will fit. Instead, categories as complex as 'mother' work as a cluster which places the various kinds of mothers in a relationship to the normative 'real' mother. For example, the centre point around which different mothers cluster is the birth model: the person who gives birth is the mother. This initiates the normative model of the biological root of motherhood. Yet, Lakoff shows that this is already insufficient to cope with the number of variations that have become part of our contemporary world. Take for example the development of egg and embryo implants; suddenly the biological root is problematised. Here are some of the variations he offers:

The genetic model: The female who contributes the genetic material is the *mother*.

The nurturance model: The female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the *mother* of that child.

The marital model: the wife of the father is the *mother*.

The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the *mother*. (Lakoff:1987:74-75)

His point is that linguistically, we manage various different kinds of mothers all the time and we manage these variations, drawing them from the background where the cluster resides. Important, for me, is the sense that the political can be drawn upon to work through what type of mothers are in the centre or periphery of the cluster. I am strongly persuaded by Lakoff's model as it opens up discussion and draws in the multi-various ways of being a woman. The ranking comes from the normative, not from the contested terrain of experience. Moreover, he clearly posits this within a background, where the social *and* linguistic reside. Therefore, it offers a theoretical space to fuse Garfinkel's emphasis upon the social as background with Lakoff's development of a linguistic background. Therefore, the pertinent criticisms of some of the fallacious claims by subject centred reason can be tackled head on without risking ejecting the embodied entity that acts in and on the social world. Nor does it lose sight of the fact that linguistic practices are equally involved in the social interactions of gender, reproduced through practice.

The crucial link is that Lakoff's model no longer depends upon the unitary definition of woman, based upon a fixed number of objective, essential properties (Delphy:1996). I am persuaded

that a theorisation of categories, based within the notion of family resemblances, means that we can pull various structures together so that inclusion within a category is no longer dependent upon identity – being the same as another woman or as Reiley questions ‘Am I that Name?’ (1988). Equally, the categories are no longer dependent upon biology, with its resulting determinism. Its strength, I think, resides precisely in its ability to provide theoretical frameworks that operate outside of that dualism by pulling both into categories defined by their clusters and family resemblances. It is no longer *either* society *or* biology, but rather that these are components within social and linguistic systems. Thinking about being a woman places emphasis upon the fact that it must, by definition, contain variability within it; a variability that is sustained and managed through practice. Thus, practice intervenes and alters how we can conceptualise our world but also alters the body itself. The most ‘natural’ of facts, namely that women give birth, has become altered, and with it the conceptualisation of the woman’s body, namely through IVF programmes. The unfinished body is acted upon to create a form of embodiment, notably something between fertility and infertility.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Lakoff’s model demonstrates how it is possible to integrate an internally differentiated category to our understanding of some of our most fundamental categories. He opens up space to pull in apparently marginal instances and reveal how they combine to secure the centre, and potentially normative, definition. I am interested in exploring how we might extend his model within empirical research that specifically targets centre and peripheral cases. My chosen axis is between young and older women, as it draws upon issues of beauty and issues of reproduction. It also opens up space to examine the heterogeneous nature of discourse. Thus, young women are targeted in terms of producing the body beautiful and thus must cope with the inevitable failure (Bordo:1993; Davis:1995). Conversely, older women must construct a sense of body image from a discourse that deems the body redundant (Featherstone and Wernick:1995). Their exclusion from the body beautiful is total and from this they too must build up a body image. Additionally, these two groups are linked via their relationship to reproduction and their bodies. Younger women are bound by the discourse that the body is always aging and thus their reproductive capacity is draining away. Older women belong to this continuum but theirs has already ‘run out’, and with this, so has their purpose, normatively speaking. Both groups are, therefore, subject to specific but interrelated discourses from which a sense of one’s embodied self has to be constructed (Mead:1934). Both represent a differing element of ‘woman’ within that cluster (Lakoff:1987). Moreover, it is possible to layer an additional normative element of the cluster concept of ‘woman’ by drawing upon the ideological position that reproduction plays in rendering some women ‘more womanly’ than others.

I aim to explore this by asking the respective cohort, from a sampling group gathered through snowballing, to keep a diary of daily events that focus upon where their embodiment as young and old women were particularly marked. The diaries will be kept up for three months. This aims to bring into focus elements from the pre-reflexive background, and to do so, time is needed to build up the reflections on a number of interactions. Alongside this, they are to note what images they consume and

from which sources during this period. The interest here lies in the differing strategies between those who are culturally invisible with those targeted by a cultural over production of 'how' to be a woman, with all its changing fads. Again, this draws upon the interplay between the commonsense notion of the 'facticity' of sex and all the strategies that will 'make a real woman out of you'. My focus is not what pleasures they derive during the consumption of the images (Hermes:1995) but how long the images remain with them and how this alters their presentation and sense of self (Tseelon:1995), particularly as the older women's embodiment is deemed to be the antithesis of the 'real' woman (de Beauvoir:1985; MacDonald:1983). The aim is to bring into relief where the sense of self is derived when one is largely without these sources, at least in comparison with the younger women. Conversely, with regard to the young women who are intensively targeted, how does this impact upon their ability to maintain a sustained sense of self. This is particularly important because it draws upon the imposition corporeal body makes upon one's location within the cluster as the body itself alters biologically. Here we can emphasise the corporeal facticity of the body.

The evidence furnished will be thought about in terms of the negotiation all individuals face between the 'I' and the 'me'¹²⁵ (Mead:1934), and the particular structured contexts the body imposes. The second element is to use these diaries as a resource as part of an interview in which the interviewees will reflect upon the entries. I deliberately seek to integrate reflexivity into the research process (Bourdieu and Wacquant:1992) because I am interested in the formation of self over time and the specific interpretative practices required to generate this. Lastly, I aim to bring together the younger and older groups so that the respective discursive positioning to which each group is subject can be discussed and brought into stark contrast. This is the reason for wanting to use snowballing sampling, as I am then able to gather the perspectives between how the individuals see themselves and the performative projections they make, as compared to ideas held by the friendship network. The data therefore aims to target the role of discourse, particularly images, and the negotiations and practices these groups of women undertake to manage the discourse. Potentially, there is a space for the groups to discuss their understanding of their relationship to the normative and the feelings generated by inability to 'live up to them'. Most importantly, the 'talk' generated can then be mapped into a cluster concept, examining where potential points of unity emerge and when difference defines the discussions undertaken.

Methodological guidance will come from Plummer's (1995) decisive and cogent work on life narratives. The diaries aim to pull together reflexive narratives about the lived reality of the various social positions within which their bodies locate them. Thus, it calls upon narratives to produce a series of reflections that pull together structure and action through an engagement with the micro-practices that people do with the system. Plummer's use of stories produces a narrative as well as a means to identify their own vocabulary through which they view the world. Stories produce for the narrator a sense of themselves over time, with the shifting patterns of identity that this necessarily entails. Moreover, from the textual nature of the data, it is possible to pull out the central tropes that not only guide the research as to how, as social subjects, we make sense of the world but also reveal the normative order and their relationship to it, that is, how they categorise their world.

¹²⁵ This sets quite a different theoretical context for the research in comparison to Tseelon (1995).

Thus, the research pulls together an understanding of the self that is de-centred, but without locking the self into the Oedipal complex. Mead's understanding of the interplay between the 'I' and the 'me' offers a cogent alternative to the discursive model that defines the subject as a discursive outcome. It also offers a more sensitive understanding of the self as existing within a time trajectory, which always throws up new things and sees what were once vital parts of self fade. However, this is not free from the influence of structure, but locates the dilemmas of aging as located within the discourses that awarded it meaning. Thus structure and action can be analysed as a dynamic brought together through the practices that people undertake as part of their negotiation to construct a meaningful embodied sense of self.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Fig. 1 Sex by year and magazine

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		686 100.00%	373 100.00%	313 100.00%
time Q27	face 1985	33 4.81%	20 5.36%	13 4.15%
	face 1990	40 5.83%	20 5.36%	20 6.39%
	face 1995	67 9.77%	35 9.38%	32 10.22%
	i-d 1985	80 11.66%	39 10.46%	41 13.10%
	i-d 1990	27 3.94%	13 3.49%	14 4.47%
	i-d 1995	60 8.75%	31 8.31%	29 9.27%
	arena 1987	53 7.73%	8 2.14%	45 14.38%
	arena 1990	40 5.83%	6 1.61%	34 10.86%
	arena 1995	54 7.87%	14 3.75%	40 12.78%
	cosmo 1975	67 9.77%	51 13.67%	16 5.11%
	cosmo 1985	55 8.02%	43 11.53%	12 3.83%
	cosmo 1990	56 8.16%	46 12.33%	10 3.19%
	cosmo 1995	54 7.87%	47 12.60%	7 2.24%

Fig. 2 Ethnicity by year and magazine

Absolute Row % Respondents		Base	ethnic Q3	
			white	minority ethnic groups
Base		688 100.00%	565 82.12%	123 17.88%
time Q27	face 1985	33 100.00%	26 78.79%	7 21.21%
	face 1990	40 100.00%	36 90.00%	4 10.00%
	face 1995	65 100.00%	51 78.46%	14 21.54%
	i-d 1985	82 100.00%	67 81.71%	15 18.29%
	i-d 1990	27 100.00%	13 48.15%	14 51.85%
	i-d 1995	60 100.00%	36 60.00%	24 40.00%
	arena 1987	55 100.00%	48 87.27%	7 12.73%
	arena 1990	39 100.00%	31 79.49%	8 20.51%
	arena 1995	55 100.00%	49 89.09%	6 10.91%
	cosmo 1975	67 100.00%	67 100.00%	0 0.00%
	cosmo 1985	56 100.00%	54 96.43%	2 3.57%
	cosmo 1990	56 100.00%	47 83.93%	9 16.07%
	cosmo 1995	53 100.00%	40 75.47%	13 24.53%

APPENDIX B

Definitions of Content Analysis Variables

The framework below contains the guidelines to the definitions and evaluative criteria of the variables. Most of the categories are bound to the social background that defines them conventionally and at their most simple. In such cases no additional explanatory discussion will be given. When clarification is required, the evaluative criteria will be provided so that alternative manifestations can be ruled out. Where necessary, I have included some of the symbolic associations that the category holds. Note: all variables include ‘other’ unless otherwise stated and all those cases unaccounted for, or esoteric cases. Note the following:

- 1. There are a number of automatic exclusions that have been pre-programmed. Where relevant, these will be included in the tables, denoted N/R (no reply). All figures will be excluded here.
- 2. As a result of a number of marked distributions, certain codes have been amalgamated with other logically compatible codes so that the figures presented can be subject to statistical analysis. All such cases are listed below. The new code is given first, and the merged codes second.
- 3. There have also been 8 codes that I have discarded simply because they do not add anything to the analysis. Again these are listed below.
- 4. Most of the codes listed below are categories that we rarely treat as anything but self-evident, which results in a high degree of uniformity in their application during the coding process.

Q1 SEX: Sex of the model(s).

female		1
male		2
androgynous		3
other		4

Codes 1 and 2, ‘female’ and ‘male’ refer to the sex of the models. Code 3, ‘androgynous’, was only assigned if, after intense inspection, no significant feature was present through which a secure sex assignment could be made. For example, the use of the face alone, when combined with a neutral facial expression and blurry focus, conceals the hair follicles to such an extent that a clear conventional marker of sex is missing. Therefore, the coding is weighted toward re-establishing the social stasis of assumed and categorical sexual dimorphism. A single code would secure sex assignment rather than emphasising the other ambiguous codes that brought it under consideration initially. Code 4, ‘other’, was confined to those cases where the photographic style meant that little could be discerned. This could be because it was too out of focus, for example.

Q2 NUMBERS: Refers to the number and sex of bodies contained within the photographic frame.

single		1
single sex couples		2
single sex female		3
mixed couples		4
crowd		5
other		6

Derived Q29 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3 = 4; code 4 = 5, code 5 = 6.

The aim is to trace the extent of the emergence of homosexual codifications, both implicit and explicit, and the extent to which the heterosexual imperative determines the basic feature of the codification. Code 1, ‘*single*’, refers to the single model/body. Code 2, ‘*single sex couples*’, refers to those images that contain not more than two models of the same sex, thus establishing the potential for overtly gay or lesbian codings. This is adopted from Lewis and Rolley (1997) who argue that single sex coupling is a direct means to establish lesbian codification and pleasure. They refer to the coupling as a means through which identification can be positioned. Code 3, ‘*mixed couples*’, refers to the heterosexual couple. Any image that contains one male with two females is also coded as a heterosexual couple because, I suggest, it references the ‘hyper-masculinity’ model; for example, a ‘James Bond’ figure who can “satisfy any or all women”. Code 4, ‘*crowds*’, refers to those cases that have three or more bodies of any combination of sexes in the frame.

Q3 BLACK/WHITE BODY: To identify if the total absence of black bodies within advertisements has decreased.

white		1
Black/Black Asian		2
other		3

Code 1, ‘*white*’, is anything not defined as black. Code 2, ‘*Black/Black Asian*’, refers to all those that would not be defined as white in a society that normalises ‘white’ and white experience. The combination of colour and ‘Black features’ was used to assign ethnicity. This category examines the assignment of ‘otherness’ that Blacks undergo and how this visually interacts with sexualisation. Again, this involves seeking to unpack ‘self-evidents’ that are fundamentally socially constructed. Code 3, ‘*other*’, is for those cases where the assignment cannot be made.

Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.

clothes		1
perfume		2

The items which were classified as clothes included trousers, shirts etc. as well as underwear, tights, swimwear and shoes. The classification did not include items such as watches and sunglasses. The classification for perfume referred to scents only. It did not include those advertisements promoting cosmetics sold under the same label.

Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and subjugation.

model		1
model and object		2
model and obj/s		3
object and model		4
object/s and model		5
other		6

Derived Q28 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = 6
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The relationship between the model and the commodity is represented in the order of the words in the code: the first value is dominant over the second. It seeks to trace the collective production of control with regard to the props or a central commodity. Therefore, if the man were driving the car we would conventionally associate that object/prop as being under his command; conversely, if the female is draped over the car this is classified as subordinate to the prop. Code 1, ‘*model*’, refers to those cases where the model was either photographed in a neutral setting where there was nothing additional in the image beyond the model him/herself, or was photographed in a situation, for example in the street, where there was no specific *relationship in the narrative* between the context and the model, by which I mean the model/subject was merely ‘passing through’. Code 2, ‘*model and obj/s*’, refers to those cases where the model is in control of the objects, props or commodity. Code 3, ‘*object/s and model*’, refers to the opposite cases where the model is being subjugated or contorted by the objects and/or commodities. Note that the power relationship is implied by the word order of Codes 2 and 3. Code 4, ‘*other*’, is for those images that cannot be clearly coded in any of the above.

Three basic principles were applied to secure regular coding. First, if the model was deploying or manipulating the commodity or props, and therefore it is implied that the model knows about these objects, then this would be coded as controlling the objects. Conversely, if the model was lying on top of, or underneath, the props or commodity, this would then be coded as being subjugated to the prop. Additionally, if the model was being shown how to use something, for example in an office, the person

who is being shown is coded as being subservient to the other model and props because the model is not in control or command of the objects. Conversely, the model as tutor is classified as being in command. Second, if the model was highly sexualised with regard to the commodity or surrounding object, this is also coded as being subjugated to the prop. An example is if the (female) model is virtually naked or positioned in a compromising way with regard to the various props or commodities. Third, if the body is represented only as a body part to display the commodity, this would also be automatically coded as being subjugated to the objects. A classic example of this is for underwear or hosiery where only the pelvis or legs are shown. Often this is secured by having the legs extended in the air, thereby anchoring the sexualisation further.

Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how models are spatially represented – higher and central being related to being in control and dominatory, and lower and periphery being related to subjugation.

Q6A

dominates frame entirely	{ }	1	1/3	{ }	4
3/4	{ }	2	1/4	{ }	5
1/2	{ }	3	less 1/4	{ }	6

The variable has been split into parts, each referring to the specific features of space and the ways it is affected by the photographic process. Note: it is possible to cross reference the consistency of the common sense criteria by cross tabulating it with ‘body parts’, shot length and so on. Code 1, ‘*dominates frame entirely*’, covers those cases where the body of the model has occupied the full frame of the image so that almost no background can be seen. Code 2, ‘*3/4*’, refers to those cases where the frame of the images is also dominated by the body with the exception of some surrounding area; three-quarters of the page will be filled with a body. Code 3, ‘*1/2*’, refers to those cases where the body occupies approximately half of the frame. Thus, there will be roughly equal quarter parts of the page remaining unoccupied by the model’s body. Code 4, ‘*1/3*’, refers to those cases where the body occupies approximately a third of the frame. If this code is used, then the model’s body ought to be able to fit into the frame three times. Code 5, ‘*1/4*’, refers to those cases where the model’s body can be fitted into the frame four times. The divisions are used to aid the coding process. Code 6, ‘*less 1/4*’, therefore refers to those cases where the space depicted in the image is such that the model’s body has little impact upon the space within the representation and is thus peripheral to that image. Alternatively, the model is framed within a crowd.

Q6B

Q6C ABANDONED – it does not make any significant contribution that is not better served by codes elsewhere.

centre		7	perspective		9
off centre		8	non-perspective		10

This second cluster, Q6B, refers specifically to the central focal point of image and interaction. The coding procedure for this variable requires that the centre or foci of the image be pinpointed, and from this the model’s position regarding the centre be judged. The third cluster, Q6C, refers to the ‘realist’ modes of constructing an image. Hence code 1, ‘*perspective*’, will follow the order of perspective within the natural world so that everything moves back to a single point within the image. The code of ‘*non-perspective*’, code 2, refers to those images where the distortions and alterations have been added to the image, or if the body ‘occupies’ the full spread so that the body no longer appears located in space. It can be produced through non-realist editing, camera angles or doctoring the image later. In each case, it disrupts our presumption that the photograph captures things as they ‘really are’. The model’s feet, for example, do not tally with the rest of the body because the camera angle is situated at the model’s feet. This has the effect of placing the body along a perspective line so that the head appears to be very far away. Alternatively, the image may not respond to the established rules of representative visual perspective because the image has been removed from its original context and edited onto another background altogether.

Q6D

in front of		11	behind		17
level with		12	beside		18
above/higher		13	opposite		19
below/lower		14	periphery		20
seated/on top of		15	other		21

The coding of this sub-category employs the following procedure: in the case of two or more models, the one currently being processed will dictate the code selected. Thus, if the female model is taller than the male model, she would be classified as ‘*higher*’ and he would be classified as ‘*lower*’, which is coded separately as a distinct case. To reiterate, the ‘*above*’ sub-variables are applied as they would be according to the background knowledge. They are entirely dependent upon the conventional use to which ‘*behind*’ or ‘*underneath*’ is put within everyday activity. Thus higher and lower refer to the relative height of the models to each other or to other objects. ‘*On top of*’ refers to those cases where the model is lying down, perhaps on a bed. ‘*Underneath*’, ‘*behind*’, ‘*beside*’ and ‘*opposite*’ are coded as according to common sense. ‘*Periphery*’ is the additional sub-variable to the spatial measure of ‘*less than a 1/4*’ and thus has marginal occupancy of space relative to other models or objects.

Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have traditionally been photographed – soft focus relating to dreaminess and passivity and hence femininity.

Q7A			Q7B		
close up		1	sharp focus		4
medium shot		2	soft focus		5
long shot		3	out of focus		6
other		7			

This variable is related to the standard photographic techniques and how their application varies according to the sex of the model. Code 1, ‘close up’, refers to those images where the detail of the body can be discerned. These have tended to be areas such the legs, or the use of profile and so on. ‘Close up’ is read as intending to emphasise a particular detail, and excludes the rest of the body from the frame. This contrasts with code 3, ‘long shot’, which refers to those images where there is considerable detail of the context of the scene, and thus the model appears to be further away from viewer. Consequently, one would expect the full body to be represented here. One would also expect a significant difference in the gendered use of these codes. This draws directly upon the notion of isolating a body part and transforming that part into the fetish. Code 2, ‘medium shot’, refers to those cases that lie in between the two. One expects this to be used in shots that depict scenes inside rooms of various kinds, and the torso in particular.

The second cluster, Q7B, refers to the sorts of focus used. Again there has been exploration as to the ways in which the focus used has come to denote different sorts of gender associations. Based upon the existing debates one would expect the use of ‘soft focus’ to be more prevalent when representing female models than male. Code 4, ‘sharp focus’, refers to the focus that has been associated with actual vision, under normal conditions, and is thus widely used within representative realist formats. Thus, there are clear distinctions between the background and the model, and the perspective would also be naturalistic. Code 5, ‘soft focus’, refers to those shots where the outline is slightly blurred so that the contours of the face are less well defined; hence the detail is removed. The general appeal of this sort of focusing is its softening of the appearance of the body, particularly the skin. Code 6, ‘out of focus’, refers to those images where the image was exactly that, out of focus. This appearance can be recreated by squinting so that the clear boundaries between the environment and the body are completely blurred. Code 7, ‘other’, refers to those cases that fall outside the above sub-variables.

Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around ‘realism’ within visual representation.

naturalisitic mock-up	.	1
stylistic		2
neutral		3

other

4

The categories relate to the various modes through which photography engages in ‘realistic representation’. Thus, Code 1, ‘*naturalistic mock-up*’, refers to those images that represent ‘real life’ both from the ‘naturalness’ of the setting, and the naturalness of the narrative taking place within that environment. One can imagine the same such scene in everyday life because it has been exaggerated or staged so that presentational features appear mundane and ordinary: i.e. visible and unmistakable. It is central to this form of encoding that the viewer/reader looks in on the scene, via the position of the photographer, without the narrative being directed to the viewer¹²⁶. The viewer is, by definition, excluded or absent from the model’s fictional world despite being positioned within the fictional world. In general, the model is surrounded with props and prompts that aid the reader’s social classification of the model or the fiction. The commodity, for example hair spray, is promoted in a scene where, strictly speaking, the model’s hair is now too shiny and too bouncy. Code 2, ‘*stylistic*’, refers to those images that are surreal in resonance. It refers to those styles that are self-consciously anti-naturalistic; for example, where the model is photographed doing an odd action or movement or an ordinary gesture but set against a contradictory background. For example, the model could be acting in a sexualised yet child-like fashion in an industrial wasteland, or be in a fake beach scene wearing winter clothes and pretending to ‘feel cold’. These codes often self-consciously expose the staged nature of all images, which I argue limits the identification process. Code 2 is therefore ‘anti-realistic’.

The code 3, ‘*neutral*’, refers to those cases whereby the model is being photographed in the studio in front of a plain background, a background that is devoid of any props or markers of any kind. It provides no context, surreal or otherwise. The emptiness of the ‘scene’ means that there is very little visually going on apart from the model photographed in the clothes and the body idiom assumed. All these features must be present if the image is to be coded as ‘neutral’. Therefore, the variable is weighted to find the conventional content of images as suggested by the established debates and positions regarding photography and advertising.

Q9 GENERAL IDIOM: This variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 corresponds with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 shows half the body.

full body	1	face only	5
legs cut off	2	chest area only	6
head cut off	3	legs only	7
cut at waist	4	other	8

Code 1, ‘*full body*’, refers to those cases where the whole body can be seen. It includes all those images where the top of the head and the feet are visible. The feet and the lower shin can be

¹²⁶ I have purposely refrained from using voyeur as I wish to distance this analysis from the psychoanalytic model that equates images with identification and desire.

edited from the frame, but the knee must be visible. The forehead too must be visible if the image is to be included in this variable. Code 2, *'legs cut off'*, refers to those cases where there is no knee visible and it is likely that the majority of the thigh is excluded from the frame. The pelvis must be visible. Piloting established that the image tended to either show the knee or remove a majority of the thigh from the frame altogether. Code 3, *'cut at waist'* refers to those cases where there is no leg visible and no pelvis identifiable. The head must be visible. This fragmentation of the body has the impact of making the torso and head the primary focus of the individual and reader/viewer. Code 4, *'face only'*, refers to all those cases where only the shoulders and above are shown. Code 5, *'head cut off'*, refers to all those images where the head is cut from the picture frame or has been concealed in some way. If this is the case, it must override all other parts of the body showing, except for Code 5 and Code 7. The concealment or removal of the head has been given priority over the rest of the body depicted because the removal of the head, while parts or all of the body are showing, is an extreme example of total subjugation to the image and commodity. Code 6, *'chest area only'* refers to those cases where the body has been reduced to the area below the shoulders and above the pelvis. This code will be treated as equally dominatory as *'head cut off'* and for some of the same reasons. In particular, it emphasises a key area that genderises the body, namely the breast and chest hair. Therefore, the coding has opened up a potential for a specific form of fetishisation of the male body. The same fetishisation process is applied to code 7, *'legs only'*, as is the same logic regarding potential distributions. Code 7 refers to those cases where the only parts of the body shown are the hips and legs of the model.

Q10 DETAILED IDIOM: This variable is concerned with the position of the body within the frame.

lying on side	1	torso leaning back	10
lying on back	2	propped BY arms	11
lying on front	3	propped ON object	12
facing forward	4	bowing from the waist	13
twisting away R or L	5	bent down	14
back facing camera	6	bowing from head	15
twisting towards R or L	7	on all fours	16
profile	8	other	17
torso leaning forward	9		

Derived Q30: code 1 = codes 1-3; code 2 = 4; code 3 = code 6; code 4 = codes 5, 7¹²⁷; code 5 = 8; code 6 = code 9; code 7 = code 10; code 8 = code 11; code 9 = code 12; code 10 = codes 13-17

Code 1, *'lying on side'*, refers to those images where the body is lying down on the side of the hips. The body would usually be positioned horizontally to the viewer. It is possible that the body may

¹²⁷ These can be combined because each instance would only be classified as one or the other. In addition, they have been combined to facilitate interpretation; the results do not require the specific detail of the direction of the turn.

be placed in profile, and this would tend to make the focal point of the image the soles of the feet, the top of the head or the side of the body. The focus will distort the perspective of the body in the frame. This anti-naturalistic style ought to be recorded as '*stylistic*' in variable 8, Code 3. Codes 2 and 3, '*lying on back*' and '*front*', refer to those cases where the models are either lying on their chests with their bottoms facing upwards, or with their backs on the surface with their chests facing upwards. Code 2 is defined by the visibility of the sternum which will be facing upwards towards the top of the page or, in terms of the images reality, 'up to the ceiling'. Conversely, if the sternum is concealed and the bottom is visible 'to the skies', one would classify this as Code 2. Code 4 is '*facing forward*'. One would classify an image thus if none of the back is visible. If there is a little twist in the body, it will be classified as facing forward providing that nothing more than the arm socket can be seen on either side of the body. If the beginnings of the shoulder blades can be seen, then the case is not to be classified here. Likewise, one would expect the feet, if included in the frame, to be facing forward also. It is a relatively static posture. Code 6, '*back facing camera*', refers to those cases where the face is out of view and, from the spectator's point of view, the back of the head is visible, as are the buttocks and the back of the knees. The same rule applies as for facing forward, whereby anything that exceeds the visibility of the arm socket is not to be classified as an instance of this variable.

In the case where there is some back or shoulder blade visible, the image is to be classified as either Code 5 or Code 7, depending on the positioning of the twist from the perspective of the viewer/reader. Therefore it is of paramount importance that the coding of this variable be based upon the position of the model from the reader's point of view. Code 5, '*twisting away R or L*', refers to those images where the body is facing forward, and thus the kneecap is facing forward. The result of the twist is to make parts of the back visible. The extent of the twist must appear to be about 90 degrees to qualify as an instance of twisting. Note: this degree of twist is only a guideline for marginal cases. In most cases one ought to look for the feet position, the amount of movement, the extent to which the knees are bent and the extent to which the previously concealed part of the body is becoming visible. Code 7, '*twisting towards L or R*', refers to those where, from the point of view of the reader, a majority of the back is facing them. Correspondingly therefore, if the feet are visible, one would expect to see the back of the heel. It was decided that to note the direction of the twist was of no particular relevance to the research question. However, the starting position from which the body began is of importance since it plays its part in the relationship of the assertiveness of the model to the viewer. For example, if the model is facing forwards and physically turning away, this could well be an instance of the avoidance of the male gaze. Conversely, turning toward the viewer could be an instance of attempting to engage the viewer and thus 'receive' a positive evaluation from the viewer as part of the fiction of the frame. Code 8, '*profile*', also includes those cases which abide by the common-sense features of the profile shot. With regard to boundary cases, one must not exceed the partial visibility of the side of the nose. Likewise, one ought not to be able to see a substantial part of the shoulder. Again, this code is considered to be a feminised one and thus synonymous with 'woman'.

The next two variables have been selected on the basis of their embodied view of the attentiveness of the model to the spectator. There are some occasions where this does not apply, but pilot sampling showed that these were infrequent. They have been included because they represent the

simplest forms through which body position can radically alter the embodied posture. The two sub-variables refer mostly to those cases where the model is seated. Code 9, *'torso leaning forward'*, refers to those cases where, as the chest moves forward, it will hang over the legs or lap of the seated model. Based upon existing debates, one would again expect this to be a highly feminised code. For example, leaning forwards toward the spectator causes the body to overlap itself. This makes the body smaller in terms of the space that it occupies. This physical occupation of space is also accompanied by its 'behavioural' aspects whereby the act of leaning towards the spectator is an embodied impression of being attentive and engaged with the spectator. This is the opposite to Code 10, *'torso leaning back'*, where the body is extended out into space. To lean back is not only a statement of being at ease in space, and therefore having the desire to fill the space, but it also moves the person's face and upper body away from the spectator. It is a form of disengagement, or at least gives an impression of neutrality. Thus, these two positions are marked by their different physical occupancy of space, as well as the different confidence being embodied. Extending the body out into space is a sign of being confident within the body. This is drawn from the sheer physical openness of the body and therefore its potential vulnerability. There is a marked difference between the open body and the closed one which is adopted in times of fear and threat. Therefore, one would expect this body position to reflect the gender dichotomy.

Code 11, *'propped BY arms'*, refers to the sexualisation of Codes 3 and 10. In the case of women, it has the effect of emphasising the bust, and brings with it the sense of seeking to be sexual. This is partly why it is a posture that is often assumed on the beach. One would expect this code also to be significantly genderised. Code 12, *'propped ON object'*, refers to those cases where the body is supported by or leaning against something. This sort of image clearly gives the encoder the opportunity to furnish phallic symbols.

The other series of codes refer to other forms of ritualistic subordination, many of them also conveying deference to the superior body (of the masculine). Code 13, *'bowing from waist'*, is self-evident and is to be used to class all sorts of bowing except where it is only the head that is bent/bowing. The latter has been designated a separate category, Code 15. Code 14, *'bent down'*, refers to the visual forms of status display, as physical low-ness has become bound with moral lowness. *'On all fours'*, Code 16, has been included not only because of its sexual connotations, but also for its connotation of the animality of the subject; the latter form may connect it to the Black body. Code 17 is *'other'*.

Q11 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working definition of physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings. Any code that remains unmarked cannot be reliably ascertained from the photograph either to conform or contradict.

strong	:	:	1	body hair id	:	:	15
weak	:	:	2	body hair unid	:	:	16
tall	:	:	3	dyed/sculpted hair	:	:	17
small	:	:	4	short hair	:	:	18

muscular		5	long hair		19
slim		6	<i>tough</i>		20
skinny		7	<i>emotional</i>		21
emaciated		8	<i>delicate</i>		22
au naturale		9	<i>soft</i>		23
stylised make-up		10	<i>macho</i>		24
normal make-up		11	fat		25
painted nails		12	<i>sporty</i>		26
long nails		13	<i>physically able</i>		27
short nails		14	other		28

This variable was only a partial success, primarily because I could not consistently codify those elements in italics that reference the tertiary elements of sex. Below is an explanation of the conventions I expected to be visually present.

Code 1, ‘*strong*’, refers to those common-sense meanings stereotypically attributed to the male. Its content includes those elements that have been associated with Parson’s ‘instrumental role’, as well as those characteristics applied to the male by Tiger and Fox (1974). This characteristic relates to the independence of the autonomous subject. He has the courage to stand alone, to protect the weak and infirm, displaying those characteristics that combine the essence of man’s strong body with his strength of character. Conversely therefore, ‘*weak*’, Code 2, refers to the opposite, namely all that is feminine and ‘expressive’. Thus the feminine is emotional, usually to excess, unstable, dependent, open to persuasion and a poor judge of character. Note also that both codes refer to the physical state of the body. Likewise, this links the essence of the gendered subject to its location in an essential body. Codes 3 and 4, ‘*tall*’ and ‘*small*’, refer to an additional stereotypical association of men and women’s bodies in terms of each other. As Goffman argues, selecting a female model who is smaller than the male carries the connotations of status difference metaphorically encoded through size. Code 5, ‘*muscular*’, is the stereotypical state of the masculine body. It refers to the physical embodiment of the power that masculinity promises. One ought to be able to see the shifting contours in the skin defined by the muscle. The body is toned, free of loose skin and with minimal exposure of boniness. Therefore, this not only anchors masculinity, but also potentially racialises the body (see chapter 3 ‘Content Analysis: A Resassessment, variable 4). This also brings into view the extent to which Bordo’s model of the disciplined body can be said to be categorically divided along gender lines. ‘*Slim*’, Code 6, delineates the body that is free from fleshiness, fat or other untuned or undisciplined bodily-ness. The skeletal frame is apparent and, unlike the muscular body, cannot rely on the flesh as a protector. The collar bone is prominent, as is the absence of flesh at the top of the jaw and below the ear. The stomach is likely to be relatively flat, and so on. Code 7, ‘*skinny*’, is for the body where the elbow sticks out and the hip bone also has the appearance of protruding so that the stomach appears to hollow inwards. The ribs will be visible through the skin. Often the lighting forms shadows on the angles produced by the bone. Code 8, ‘*emaciated*’, refers to those bodies where the arm is considerably thinner along and around the bone than it is at the elbow. The shoulder blade is highly visible and sticks out. The absence

of flesh is such that the model appears seriously malnourished, so much so that the ridges of the breast bone are visible through the skin. The upper thigh is also extremely thin, so that the pubic bone is always visible even when the legs are together. It is images like these that have courted so much attention regarding the 'harm' the image can do to young girls' body image.

Code 9, '*au naturelle*', refers to those models who have the appearance of not being made up at all: the beauty lies in their purity. The naturalistic mock-up achieves the look of nature; it is known that this must be achieved. The code references the ideological patterning of the mock-up as well as the deeper ideological patterning of the feminine as nature's beauty espoused by the Pre-Raphaelite period, for example. Conversely, '*stylised make-up*' refers to those cases where the make-up is drawing attention to itself by its strangeness, its apparent stance against natural beauty and the wholesome woman. This style of make-up is akin to punk styling and is not necessarily aimed at making the woman look beautiful. It is much more about the creation of an eclectic and esoteric form of imaging, which in part contributes to the self-referential styling of the image. Code 11, '*normal make-up*', is for all those cases where this styling could conceivably be worn within the life-world. It is the sort of style that one would associate with the women's activity of producing prettiness as an ongoing process. It is the fashioning that belongs to the naturalistic mock-up. Codes 12, 13 and 14, '*painted nails*', '*long nails*' and '*short nails*', are self-explanatory. Just as with the above, the use of nails is a means through which the gendered body is produced as an ongoing activity. Thus, just as shaving, plucking, make-up etc. is performed every day, so the preparation of the nails is another means through which the obviousness of sex is produced on a day-to-day basis.

'*Body hair id*', Code 15, refers to those cases where one can clearly see the presence of body hair, be it on the legs, chest, face or armpit etc. This ought to be highly gendered. Body hair is something that is ideologically bound to the masculine just as testosterone is bound to the masculine, and yet both are present in all bodies. Conversely therefore, one would expect there to be a marked gender difference here in '*body hair unid*'. This is to be used if all the flesh exposed is free from the appearance of body hair.

'*Dyed/sculpted hair*' is an additional code (number 17) which seeks to make the presentation of the body anti-naturalistic. One is not viewing this image in terms of it being applicable in everyday life. It is best to consider such hair styles along the lines of a punk-like presentation. '*Short hair*', Code 18, must be short on the neck to be classified as such. Therefore '*long hair*', Code 19, one would associate with the feminine and must conceal the neck in some way. Combined, these codes trace the prevalence of conventional presentations of gender.

'*Tough*', '*emotional*', '*delicate*', '*soft*' (Codes 20–27) have been included as these were additional codes used in the existing content analysis on gender. They have been taken from REFS> and are to be understood as the more detailed versions of the masculine and feminine stereotypes defined by the likes of Tiger and Fox. These are also applicable according to their stereotypes and are thus not to be used in any problematical sense as to what these words mean to us. '*Physically able*' was introduced as a result of observations made during piloting. During piloting, I became increasingly aware that while the models were often slim, it was not the case that most of the models were unable to move through public space, to mobilise their bodies and space and be directed toward their utilitarian

aims. While it was the case that the models were rarely lifting something, it did not follow from my observations that feebleness was a permanent feature of their embodiment. Code 28 refers to those cases that fell outside this bodily agenda.

Q12 CONTAINED BODY:¹²⁸ Containment of the body is aimed at illiciting the degree of self-determination; whether the model is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is autonomous.

contained by self	1	contained by other/obj	5
contained by man	2	mutual containment/embrace	6
contained by woman	3	non-contained	7
contained by object	4	other	8

N/A = Q 9 = 5 removes 63 counts

This variable aims to explore the relationship between the body and its inhabitation of space, and is concerned specifically with the ways that a contained or confined body relates to the status ascribed to that body, as well as the level of autonomy that body is constructed as having. Of particular concern is the gendered dichotomy that places the occupancy of space as masculine and the withdrawal from space as feminine. The latter, for example, has been used to denote modesty and combines with the child-like status ascribed to the feminine. Moreover, this has a direct connection to the corresponding public/private dichotomy. This variable seeks only to classify who or what is doing the containment; the specific postures that embody containment are described in Q13. ‘*Contained by self*’, Code 1, refers to those models whose bodies are withdrawn from social space by holding or containing their *own* body through various body postures. For example, making oneself small by holding all the limbs close to the chest. Alternatively, the model’s legs could be pulled up in some way with her own arms hugging her body. Often this body position is accompanied by a complicit gaze, a ‘god’s eye that monitors her modesty’. This is regarded as an example of minimal self-determination. The timidity within social space and, by implication, social activity, means that this is an example of active passivity¹²⁹. There are no external coercive factors at play which can be drawn upon as an explanation for the withdrawal. Rather it is established as part of the model’s ‘feminine *habitus*’.

Code 2, ‘*contained by man*’, refers to those cases where the demarcation of space and thus, following Goffman (1979: 54-56), ownership of space, is coded through the relative positioning of the man’s and woman’s body. Goffman argues that the ownership and control of space is established

¹²⁸ Note that question 11 has not been included here as it was abandoned during coding. This has been discussed in detail in the above methodology section.

¹²⁹ The notion of active passivity alludes to the fact that all kinds of femininities are practices. Therefore they must be *done*. They are not a state of being, but something that must be ‘performed’. They are an aspect of the social constructed habitus. This will be discussed in more detail when the alternative to post-structuralism is discussed later.

through the extension of limbs into space. For example, the arm will be placed in front of the woman and will therefore act as a barrier to her movement, as well as being a symbolic appearance of 'protecting' her. Additionally, this code establishes the man's right over the woman. The bodily barrier limits where she can go and what she can do. Thus, the key coded features that need to be identified here are whether the masculine body is producing and constructing the masculinity of the space. Other examples of this include the woman being held by the man from behind. This can be compounded by having the woman seated while the claim is made.

Code 3, '*contained by woman*', refers to those very same features and seeks to trace whether the control of space through bodily positioning has been transferred onto the feminine body. Thus, another female or male would have to be blocked in some way by her embodiment, her relative authority, thereby according her control of the space. This would usually be carried within the narrative of the advertisement, for example by her teaching him what to do in the office. Effectively, this sub-variable seeks to address whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. Note that both Codes 2 and 3 are secured further if the body that is contained is also positioned lower in some way, thereby coding status through its relationship with things higher. Codes 2 and 3 can be cross-tabulated against the single sex couple thereby producing some indicative data as to whether explicitly heterosexist postures and relative body positions have been mobilised or rejected in potentially homoerotic scenes.

Code 4, '*contained by object*', is a slight shift from the relationship between embodied states and other bodies. It refers instead to the relationship that the model has to the commodity or object. This is a slight departure from Goffman's particular analysis of how hyper reality is presented. Here, I am referring to those images that have reduced the person to a means of sexual display. Thus, the model can be placed leaning against phallic symbols, or worse still adopt a posture that codes the body as on the verge of being penetrated by the phallic symbol. Other sorts of image that are to be coded within this category are those through which the body is fetishised by being cut down to 'legs only', as for example in a hosiery advertisement. This has taken the notion of containment and the negation of autonomy to its extreme as it is either reduced to mere penetrative flesh, or to an objectified means of display. Within these contexts, there is no self with which to view the spectator. Again it would have been beneficial to differentiate between those objects that confine and those phallic objects that penetrate. Code 5, '*contained by other/object*', seeks only to count those cases where the above ritual subordination is compounded by the presence of the active masculinity. Potentially, because of the way the topography leads the image to establish the boundaries of gender distinction, there could be equal distributions of men and women coded in these ways. However, a sceptical position would expect this to be an unlikely outcome.

Code 6 is '*mutual containment/embrace*'. Coding such an image for heterosexual couples requires that both the male and female are present in the image, that they are embracing, kissing and possibly engaging in minimal foreplay. However, the central element must be that the sexual activity, of whatever kind, is mutual and thus reflects *active* engagement by both. These must be codings where the embrace appears to result from mutual initiation. Thus, the bodies must be moving towards each

other and both bodies must be either going to embrace or already embracing. Therefore, both of the woman’s arms must be raised towards the man and not by her side. Any image that is to be classified under this code must be free of passive body positioning such as described above. The female must not be turning away, blushing, looking down, concealing her mouth, or appearing to be moving away from the man.

Code 7, ‘non-containment’, refers to those images where the body may be single or with other bodies but is able to move freely and act instantly upon a choice or decision or whim. Thus, it would suggest that non-containment relates to the autonomy of the body to move through space at will. The body will not be withdrawing from the social space, nor be directed or guided through the social space. There must certainly not be any physical or symbolic barriers to its movement or occupation of space. Therefore, there are no arms around the body or across the body, for example. Code 8, ‘other’, refers to those cases that do not apply to any of the above or are too ambiguous to be coded consistently and confidently.

Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of some of the ways in which the idiom could visually portray containment.

legs held in by arms		1	other's arm round neck		7
legs crossed and pulled in		2	other's arm round waist		8
held in and hugging self		3	held protectively		9
clinging to other model		4	embracing other/obj		10
confined by product		5	embracED by other/obj		11
contained demarcating			other		12
ownership		6			

N/A: Q9 = 5, Q12 = (6,7). Total numbers excluded are 611 cases.

This variable seeks to trace the central means by which containment is coded. It seeks to trace the very embodied means through which withdrawal from social space is encoded. The aim is to cross-tabulate this with variable 12 in order to see how the different genders mobilise space using which particular gestures and postures. Code 1, ‘legs held in by arms’, refers to the embodied posture where the legs are pulled up towards the chest and kept in place by the arms clasped around them. Not only does it make the physical space smaller, but the limbs also protect and conceal the chest. This posture tends to be adopted when seated on the floor, thereby visually encoding the body as being of low status by being low down. Code 2, ‘legs crossed and pulled in by arms’, refers to a similar posture, but rather than the legs being clasped to the chest, they are just pulled up and thus withdrawn from the occupancy of social space. The crossed legs are held there by the arms. This posture suggests slightly more control within social space as it is not such a closed posture. However, it nevertheless continues to suggest low or little status, again by being on the floor, as well as invoking a child-like posture. Another variation

of this child-like posture is Code 3, where the woman is holding her legs in and hugging herself. Again this withdrawal is conventionally disconnected from confidence and public life.

Code 4, '*clinging to other*', can only be used as a classification if there are two or more models in the frame. The word clinging has been purposely selected to refer to the fact that the model is embracing, or holding on to, the other, without it being reciprocated. Additionally, the word clinging has been used to refer to the clutchiness of the grasp, as if to let go would mean imminent danger. This continues the theme of childishness that these postures suggest. '*Confined by product*', Code 5, refers to those cases where the model is unable to move through social space because of the barrier that the product is imposing. This could be referring to shoes that are so immensely high that mobility is seriously impaired. It could be that the model is captured while they are getting undressed, thereby objectifying the model. Alternatively, the body may be bound. This category aims to distinguish those images where the body is confined from the sub-variable in Q12 which refers to those images where the body has been dissected by the frame and thus is merely the legs upon which the tights are displayed.

The next cluster of three codes seeks to classify those images where one model is claimed by the other as personal property. Thus, it seeks to trace the encodings that take place to trace how 'his woman' is visually proffered. Goffman has described the ways that these sorts of relative statuses are coded through visual barriers or the spacing of the bodies. For example, '*contained demarcating ownership*', Code 6, is where the man stands, the woman is seated and the man has his hand placed on her shoulder. The woman, however, is likely to have her hands cupped in her lap. This makes sure the hands do not touch anything and, through its stillness, gives the posture a degree of passivity. Note that this mock-up of the professional man and his wife is an over-conventionalised mode through which her subordinate status regarding class is conferred. By the same token, it is also the same convention through which her status is understood to be conferred by her husband. Thus, this code is to be used if there are extreme differences in the relative placing of the models, if there are distinct features to the narrative whereby she is visiting his office, for example. Usually, the narrative provides explanations as to why she is out of the domestic setting.

In cases where such narrative aids are absent, one must apply on the codes using the body. The two commonest forms are '*hand around neck or shoulder*' and '*hand around waist*', Codes 6 and 7 respectively. It is important to note that these classifications require the woman to have her hands either folded or hanging down by her side. This suggests non-reciprocation and again gives a degree of passivity to the embodied position. By positioning the arm around the neck or waist, one is following the custom of holding on to one's personal possessions in public so they do not go astray. '*Held protectively*' refers to those images where the demarcation of containment is made in other ways. Usually, these are supported by a narrative where the public arena is perceived to be a dangerous place for the female, and thus the male must continually touch or stand in front of his companion, or shield her, for example. This can be seen in the ways that politicians conduct their wives through public space and was a particular favourite of John Major, although he was/is not alone.

The next pair refers to who is doing the embracing and what they are embracing, and refers specifically to what Goffman describes as the child-like 'snuggling' women do when cuddling men.

Goffman describes it as child-like because it gives the appearance of the female seeking protection, but also the comfort and re-assurance a child receives from its parent’s body and size. Piloting noted that this was applied to the product so that the product afforded comfort as part of its appeal. Again this code has been operationalised to be potentially coded to both male and female models. Thus, Codes 10 and 11, ‘*embracing other/obj*’ and ‘*emracED by other/obj*’, traces who embraces in an attempt to trace those occasions when women are able to embrace and empower the product or other. ‘*Other*’ is used for those cases that were unanticipated.

Q14 TITILATION: Referring to the titilation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By ‘reveal’ I mean that the clothing is lifted or moved or cut to draw attention to and overtly sexualise that part of the body which would conventionally be concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms etc., which are used to hide or conceal breasts and/or genitals.

non-sexualisation	1	underwear	10
fully dressed	2	see-through clothing	11
reveal shoulder	3	covered towel	12
reveal stomach/hip bone	4	naked self-concealment	13
reveal upper chest	5	naked except commodity	14
reveal thigh	6	naked upper chest	15
reveal/accentuate breast	7	fully naked	16
flies up/down	8	other	17
getting dressed	9		

Includes some preprogrammed exclusions: Q9 = 5. This automatically excludes 63 cases.

Q14 = Q41: code 8 = 15, code 9 = codes 8, 9,11,12,13,14,16

This variable seeks to explore how the sex of the model affects what parts of the body are eroticised as well as whether the sex of the model affects the degree to which the body is fetishised. The variables contain an implicit scale of degree beginning with non-sexualisation where there is no visible markings to make the body sexy (although the bodies always remain sexed) through to complete nakedness or naked self-concealment. Nakedness is interpreted as being an extreme form of sexualisation both through the revelation of the flesh and the subjugation to the product. This is a complex variable as it hits at the heart of the multiplicity of the body. It is possible to reveal various parts of the body simultaneously. Therefore there are very few ways in which the variable could be tackled. Note that while there is an analytic scale implicit in this variable, it is not statistically testable.

‘*Non-sexualisation*’ refers to those images that have no visible codings of sexiness. The models must be fully clothed with no flesh being revealed. It is likely that there are no visible signs that the model seeks to incite the viewer by pouting, licking the lips, staring up through the eyebrows

especially if the head is slightly tilted. Conversely, one would expect the mouth to be still as well as the eyes looking forward. ‘*Fully dressed*’, Code 2, refers to those bodies where the sexualisation is either due to a facial expression like those listed above, or because the flesh of the body is being revealed in some way. The revealing of the flesh has been located to five key areas of the body. These tally with the commonly understood erogenous zones of the Western body. They are: revealing the shoulder, revealing the stomach and/or hip bone, revealing the upper chest, revealing the thigh, and revealing or accentuating the breast. The means through which Codes 2 to 7 are represented in the image are varied but follow common-sense expectations. Thus, revealing the breast is a more detailed version of revealing the chest and is generally achieved through having a shirt loosely buttoned. Alternatively, the chest in general could be revealed by the model getting undressed or dressed. Likewise, the revelation of the thigh is dependent upon the skirt being blown, or the ways that the model is being seated, especially with shorts on, for example. The means by which the flesh is revealed is not the particular focus; rather this variable seeks to address mainly what is being revealed.

Not until one comes to more extreme means through which the body is sexualised does one find excessive visibility of flesh. Code 8, ‘*flies up/down*’, and code 9, ‘*getting dressed*’, refer to the specific means by which the genital area can be focused upon, without using explicitly soft porn or page 3-type codes. They draw directly from Moore’s paper where she argues that one of the shifts taking place in the codification of the male body is catching him dressing, as for example in the now infamous mass-audience Levis 501 advertisement where Nick Cayman undresses explicitly in an almost identical way to a strip tease. Additionally, there is the extensive use of highly sexualised bodies to sell underwear, hence Code 10. These sorts of products have extensively used the naked body beautiful. These images often use the mundanity of underwear as a means to sell through explicitly sexualised images. Code 11, ‘*see-through clothing*’, traces those items of clothing that explicitly objectify the body. This, along with underwear, is the most unproblematic example of the way fashion as an industry is exploitative of people’s bodies and images for financial gain. Code 12, ‘*covered towel*’, refers to those images where bathroom scenes are used as a means to stage the body within a naturalistic setting, but one that also allows for the legitimate exposure of flesh. Cologne advertisements in particular use narcissistic grooming scenes as a means to reveal the flesh of the body beautiful. Again this has been drawn directly from Moore’s article where she argues that “it is now possible to represent the male body as a pleasurable object on condition that this pleasure can be contained within a narcissistic/autoerotic discourse.”¹³⁰ It is from the extensive use of these sorts of code that some core data will be drawn. Is this something that differs explicitly between men and women now? And if this is no longer the case, what sorts of empirical problems does this pose Screen theory and other feminist critiques?

Q15 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is touching whom, especially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 corresponds to cases where the hand is active but not touching anyone.

¹³⁰ Moore, S. (1988) ‘Here’s Looking at You, Kid!’ in Gamman, M., Marshment, L. (Ed) *The Female Gaze*. Women’s Press, London.

touching own body	1	touching commodity	6
touching man's body	2	hand is active/not touching	7
touching woman's body	3	no touch/neutral	8
own and man's	4	other	9
own and woman's	5		

Q15 = Q31: q9 = 5,7 and q15 = 6. This has the impact of removing 97 cases automatically.

Q15 = Q31: code 2 = 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = code 6; code 5 = codes 7, 8; code 6 = code 9.

Code 1, *‘touching own body’*, is straightforward and refers to all parts of the body. Codes 2 and 3, *‘touching a man’s body’*, refer to those images where a male or female touches any part of the male model’s body. Conversely, *‘touching a woman’s body’* refers to those cases where the male or female is touching the woman’s body. This allows a number of aspects to be traced. Firstly, it traces the extent to which heterosexual couples are visually encoded or determined through the seal of a touch, as well as whether this is entirely secured through the feminine. Additionally, it can be identified whether single sex couples are shown to be touching, and therefore potentially making the ‘relationship’ between them more explicit. This has a specific gender divide. Firstly, it examines the extent to which males alone are allowed to touch and whether this still invokes the homoerotic and therefore must be repressed between straight men. Conversely, it also allows us, on those occasions where women are touching, to trace the extent to which an element of the homoerotic surfaces and whether it is repressed through the presumed asexualness or sexual passivity of heterosexual women.

Code 6, *‘touching commodity’*, is self-explanatory. Code 7, *‘hand is active/not touching’*, refers to those cases where the hand is visible within the frame and is active in some way but not touching. For example, the fist could be clenched, the hand could be held closed as a result of a sporting activity or used to maintain balance. Additionally, the hands are used to stage a stylistic pose and thus can be used to form impressions like holding a pretend gun, for example. Code 8, *‘no touch/neutral’*, refers to those images where the hand is included in the frame of the images but is at rest and not holding anything. Examples where this code would be used are cases where the hands are at rest and the arms hang loosely beside the body. *‘Other’* refers to those cases that do not apply to any of the above.

Q16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specify what is being touched, which again feeds back to notions concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when ‘both hands’ is coded, this means that both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means either that one hand or arm is concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.

Q16A ABANDONED – Adds nothing to the analysis.

one hand		1
both hands		2

Q16B

hand on/through hair		3	hand forcing ribs forward		13
hand on hip(s)		4	clenched fists		14
hand on leg(s)		5	hand at rest		15
hand on torso		6	leaning on		16
hand on face		7	holding hands		17
hand on neck		8	neutrally touching OWN body		18
hand on bum		9	holding on		19
hand on breasts		10	hands covered		20
hand on genitals		11	other		23
hand behind back		12			

This variable includes the automatic exclusions Q9 = (5,7) and Q15 = (6,7,8). This totals 328 cases unaffected.

Resultant amalgamations: Q16 = Q38: codes 9 = 15, 10 = 16, 11 = 16, 13 = 19, 14 = 8-13, 22, 23.

This variable seeks to break down into greater detail exactly what parts of the body are touched, and to what extent those postures and positions are gender differentiated. This provides a means through which the areas available to touch, and by whom, can be traced. It allows one to identify which areas of the body are barred to one sex, but available to feel and touch to the other sex. The underlying theme being traced here refers to the convention that women are able to touch much more than men. On a more extreme level, women can treat their own bodies as objects. These objects can be caressed and stroked so that the reassuring warmth and pleasure that is gained from women’s bodies is also experienced from the woman’s own body. It is a pleasure that is gained from women’s objectification.

Codes 1 and 2, ‘one hand’ and ‘both hands’, refer to whether the hands are doing the same thing or different things. The relationship between these two aspects does not relate directly to the debate concerning the association of the feminine with the tactile. Rather, it is a means through which the visual symmetry can be traced. To have both hands doing the same thing conveys within the image a simplicity through symmetry. Conversely, having the hands doing different things makes the image busier and tends to make it more active, since there is actually more going on. The relationship between the symmetry and business can be grafted onto the notion of the active and the passive. Since the dichotomy has to be visually elaborated, it is dependent upon the possibilities and potential of

visualisations. Note that because there can potentially be hands touching two different objects or bodies or body parts at the same time, there may well be a considerably larger base number for this variable.

All of the categories are self-evident, with no exceptions. The various parts of the body have been coded. Code 3, '*hand through hair*', refers to those images where the hand touches the hair as if the hair is a source of pleasure and fulfilment for the model. These images usually depict the model with long and extremely glossy hair and, like the 'naturalistic mock up' referred to above, the hair will tend to be extremely shiny. The hair is given the connotation of being an object of pleasure and fulfilment for the model who touches it. It is almost as if the hair comforts the female as a cuddly toy would. The hair is desirable in itself. Psychoanalytically, it is considered that the presence of long hair on women rather than men, and the fact that women continually touch their hair, is a means through which disavowal is achieved for the male. Thus women with long hair are considered to be more attractive, and this is why they draw attention to their hair (see Flugel 1930; Millum 1975).

Code 4, '*hand on hips*', refers to those images that are using this conventionalised body posture to convey the notion of confidence. It suggests a certain impatience. However, this assertiveness could become sexualised by being combined with a phallic facial gesture. We can combine the two to trace exactly how the gesture is anchored. This must be borne in mind, as assertiveness will constitute a shift toward becoming a femme fatale. The pattern that is of interest is whether it is a very gendered gesture and, if so, how this assertiveness is combined with other gestures and whether it is supported or undermined. It refers to those images that are using this conventionalised body posture.

Code 5, '*hands on legs*', will be used to explore the extent to which legs are gendered through touch. Arguably, if the prevailing approaches are accurate descriptions of the masculine and the feminine, one would expect the legs to show up substantial gender differences. The legs have been a long-standing area of the female body that has been eroticised, and since hegemonic patterns have been organised to exclude women from this eroticism, to touch a woman must be part of an emotional relationship cast within romantic discourse. Thus part of the purpose of touching a woman's leg is to display the access that the man is presumed to have to the woman's body. Additionally, since access to the erotic zones of a woman's body is presumed to be open to men, part of the symbolism of touching the leg is that it secures the man's ownership of the woman in a similar way to putting his arm around her waist, as discussed above (Q13). Therefore it is likely that there is a higher frequency of men touching women's legs than vice versa. Conversely, if Code 6, '*hands on torso*', corresponds to expectation then one would expect the torso to be touched by the female model. This does two things in particular. Firstly, it confirms the male model's masculinity as sexually appealing, thereby connecting this appeal to the muscularity of the chest. Secondly, the comparable size of a man's chest to a woman's means that by touching the chest, visually it can appear as if she gleans protection from him. The combinations of their relative size visually encodes the promise of the power of male muscularity. It also confirms that women require such protection.

Codes 7 and 8, '*hand on face*' and '*hand on neck*', refer to the extent to which the face is made a central feature of the codification by leading the eye to it through the touch. According to the existing literature, especially the codes isolated by Goffman, the touching of the face is a distinctly

feminine gesture. The reason is that it moves to objectify the face by conferring its softness on to the softness of the commodity, for example the softness of the smell. If the man does touch the woman's face, this has the effect of conferring significant status differences between the sexes, because such a touch coming from a man is associated with fatherhood, and therefore relegates the female back to a childish status, as so many other codes do.

Code 9, 10 and 11 detail those images where the hand is touching either the bottom, the genitals or the breast of the model. This variable traces to what extent these are considered areas available to touch equally by both sexes or are gender divided. One would expect this to follow a strict pattern of gender difference, especially in the extent to which men would touch these areas considerably more often than women as part of their display of active sexuality.

Code 12, '*hand behind back*', is self-explanatory. It is being interpreted here as part of the ongoing codifications that remove activity from the frame. Code 14, '*clenched fists*', seeks to trace whether hyper-masculine poses are still being widely applied, and whether this is being used as a means to portray masculinity in a surreal and stylistic setting by women.

Code 15, '*hand at rest*', is a neutral hand pose and refers to the sorts of ways the hands are left when not in use. One usually either lets them hang down by one's side, or leaves them flopped or resting in the lap. Henley (1997; 1981) argues that men touch women much more than women touch men. This she based upon observation of intentional touch (Major and Williams 1980:20). If this is the case, one would expect to find neutral hand poses to be a predominately feminine gesture, as well as one that also defines the Other, namely the Black models. It conveys a certain passivity, since the hands are understood to be the major part of the body for skilful manipulation. Code 16, '*leaning on*', refers to those images where the body is being propped up by or leaning on the hands and has straight and locked arms. This form of posture has quite different meanings according to the gendered body. For example, this position is not in any way formal, and is often associated with a nonchalant and therefore male attitude. It has not conventionally been associated with femininity. Added to this is the fact that such a body posture draws attention to the breast by pushing the breast bone forward. Thus for the female body, it is not only 'speaking attitude' but it is also a sexualised position. It is therefore somewhat contradictory and may suggest a type of posture that is assertive and consciously sexy. Code 17, '*holding hands*', seeks to trace the frequency with which this heterosexual hand gesture is used. It is possible to see the extent to which this may have been adopted by same sex couples as a means to bring gay and lesbian relations into popular visual culture. Code 18, '*neutrally touching own body*', is a variable that seeks to trace the possible presence of the ideologically neutral gesture. One would use this code if the touch had the appearance of being a lackadaisical gesture, certainly pre-reflexive and possibly random. This sort of gesture is such that it falls outside those semiotic gestures that aid the classification of passivity or activity. Examples of this could be a hand that appears to have just fallen beside the chair. Code 19, '*holding on*', seeks merely to trace the extent to which men and women touch and hold onto things. One would expect, following Goffman, that this has a considerable gender difference as it has been a long standing convention to have women cling or hold on to a man's body for protection. This variable seeks to identify how much that is still the case. '*Hands covered*', Code 20, refers to those cases where the hand is concealed, for example by being placed in a pocket. Again

this is an informal gesture and suggests a degree of nonchalance that is not associated with passive femininity. ‘Aggressive gesture’, Code 21, seeks to trace the extent to which aggressive masculinity is present and if any cases of femininity as aggressive are ever represented. It is likely that if there are some cases they will be located within the stylistic photographic format. ‘Other’, Code 22, is included for unanticipated cases.

Q17 TYPE OF TOUCH: Relates to the way touch has often been genderised.

utilising	1	fondling	6
expert	2	caressing	7
grasping	3	embracing	8
manipulating	4	holding/neutral	9
fiddling	5	other	10

The pre-programmed exclusions are: Q9 = (5,7), Q15 = (8). Total number of cases excluded is 207.

This variable builds upon the preceding one, identifying how the object or body is touched. It introduces greater descriptive detail regarding the gendered nature of touch. The categories compiled develop those initially identified by Goffman. Goffman’s codifications of the visual forms of ritualisation pay particular attention to the child-like positions and gestures given to women in order to place them in a subordinate position relative to men. As alluded to above, the key distinction Goffman makes centres around the gentleness or weakness with which women touch things as opposed to men. The masculine form of touch could be described better as being more of a grip, firm and confident. Conversely, the feminine touch fondles or fiddles, never really directing or controlling that which is touched. Goffman almost regards it not as a touch, but rather as a caress, as stroking or petting. He argues that it has the effect of reducing all objects to a form of cuddly toy. This is very different to the atmosphere associated with the masculine touch, which is firm and confident and able.

Coding these descriptive categories must be accompanied by background and therefore is culturally embedded. For example, if one was to code the touch as ‘utilising’ one would use the common-sense meaning. The meaning is unproblematic in the sense that we use the word rather than problematise and ask how it comes to be meaningful. Additionally one can use the accompanying narrative. This is the most general category and refers to those cases where additional detail is excluded from the frame. Alternatively, if one was to code ‘expert’, Code 2, one would expect the model to be using a prop to demonstrate that the model was giving advice, teaching and so forth. There are likely to be other markers that establish the status that can act as a guide. Code 3, ‘grasping’, refers to those images where the hand is clutching the object roughly, with a great deal of strength. The touch ought to come from the palm of the hand with the fingers apart and tightened. The veins may even be visible. ‘Manipulating’, Code 4, refers to those images where the object is being applied to something. This ought to take place with the finger tips, but the object touched is functional. Again this kind of touch may in part be dependent upon the narrative of the image. If the conventions of touch are still in use, one would expect these forms of touch to be masculine and thus applied when featuring a male model.

The next cluster of codes can be thought of as the ‘feminine touch’ and the operationalisation of the codes has been heavily influenced by Goffman. Code 5, ‘*fiddling*’, refers to those images where the hand holds the object idly. Much of the touch is confined to fingertips, with the fingertips close together. It is touching for the sake of touching and without an aim, perhaps through boredom or habit. Again, this sort of fidgeting is associated with children, thereby lowering the status of the female model. Code 7, ‘*caressing*’, refers to those images where the fingers stroke the object that is being touched. This can be done with both the front and the back of the hand. The fingers will tend to be close together and lie flat on top of the object or body. There ought to be an appearance of lightness of touch. ‘*Embracing*’, Code 8, refers to those images where the object is cupped in the hands. For example, this could include those images where the perfume bottle is embraced within the cupped hands. The impact is to make the hands a part of the object or commodity. It reduces the hands to the ornamental.

Code 9, ‘*holding/neutral*’, refers to those images where the hand is not expressive in any way. For example, the hand holds onto a banister but it neither grasps it nor fingers nor fiddles with it. The hand uses it, and the hand gesture is almost absent. It is merely one of pragmatism and application. It is not being suggested that this is without significance and therefore signification. In cases where the hand is holding something neutrally and it can be identified as a woman’s hand, this has both a significance and a signification. It suggests something about the ideological traces circulating regarding ‘emphasised femininity’. Code 10, ‘*other*’, is included for unanticipated cases.

Q18 ARMS: The working definition of one and both arms is the same as hand.

one arm	1	resting on leg(s)	8
both arms	2	over the head	9
pointing up/outwards	3	hugging the body	10
extended up	4	arm in action	11
relaxed by side	5	in mock movement	12
folded	6	leaning	13
arms bent	7	other	14

There is one pre-programmed exclusion: Q9 = (5,7) . The base is therefore reduced by 72 counts.

Q18 = Q36: 1=1, 2=2, 3 =3, 4 = 5, 6= 7, 7 = 8, 8 = 10, 9 = 11, 10 = 21, 11 = 13, 12 = 4,9,14

This refers to the use and positioning of the arms within the frame. Part of its significance lies in the extent to which the female body is coded through symmetry and stillness compared to the male body. It also seeks to examine the extent to which the body is used actively and framed through movement. The ‘feminine as passive’ is visually coded through lack of movement, particularly within the public domain. Conversely therefore, it is possible to associate active, moving bodies with masculine codes. Physicalness has been conventionally applied to male bodies. Most of the arm positions selected are a result of piloting, and have been drawn predominantly from naturalistic body

postures. The forms of body postures relate in various ways to the negotiating of space, the occupancy of space and how, through the positions of the arms, the space can become sexualised.

Codes 1 and 2 examine whether the arms are used to achieve a symmetry of image or whether the images tend to be more complex by varying the activity of the arms. This is not specifically concerned with gender difference, but it may prove important regarding the extent of the codification that women's bodies undergo compared with men's. This is not overtly connected with gender. However, part of the existing debates concerns the objectification of the woman's body through display, of which a still, symmetrical, almost unlined body forms a part.

Code 3, '*pointing up/outwards*', refers to those images where the arms are sticking up in the air and above the head or out into space, away from the body. This classifies all those positions that may be framed as a result of movement from dancing or sport. It can either be used as a naturalistic pose or as a stylisation. By combining this variable with photographic style it is possible to identify whether the images that seek to 'reflect real life' tend to use less movement of the body, so that those images that seek to define their style against this prevailing position adopt movement. Code 4, '*relaxed by side*', refers to the arm position at rest when the body is culturally defined as being in its 'natural biological state'. It is considered the most neutral position for the arms to adopt. It would again suggest changes to the nature of the dominant ideological patterns if this proved to be a) a frequently used pose and b) equally coded upon male and female bodies. '*Arms folded*', Code 5, is regarded as a closed gesture rather than an open one because it prohibits the possibility of other gesticulations. It can be used in two distinct ways, depending upon the additional information. It can be either used as a means of being aloof, particularly when standing, or as a barrier or protection, especially if accompanied by other codes of a closed body. As with many of the other preceding codes, the issue of the gesture's specific meaning is not central to the coding process at this point. The differing contexts that affect the meaning assigned can be ascertained through cross-tabulation of the data.

'*Arms bent*', Code 6, refers to those images where the arm is bent, producing an angle at the elbow. This is also considered a neutral body movement and is not considered to be gendered. Thus, if there is a high frequency of this code, again it would seem to suggest that there has been a shift in the hegemonic formations of patriarchy. '*Resting on legs*', Code 7, refers to those cases where the arms are lying or resting on the lap. There is no activity and the hands are relaxed with a slight bend in the fingers. There ought to be a floppy appearance to both arms and hands. Code 8, '*over the head*', refers to those cases where the arms have been held up, with the arms bent so that they close over the head. This use of the arms has the effect of revealing the armpit and thereby sexualising the body. Code 9, '*hugging the body*', refers to those images where the arms are wrapped around the body. Again this posture relates to what Goffman describes as the child-like poses in which women are depicted. Additionally, the gesture of hugging the body is one means whereby the objectified body is used in its objectified form by the woman herself. Thus, the body is a source of pleasure for her as it would be for another. '*Arm in action*' refers to those images where the arms are framed in movement. This code is to be applied when the action that has been framed is a 'realistic one'. By this I mean that it is not difficult to envisage doing the movement in the life-world as part of the activity. Conversely, Code 11, '*in mock movement*', refers to those cases where the movement that has been photographed is a pretend action. It

is a sort of clowning. It can be considered as a mock up of the already hyper reality. ‘*Leaning*’ refers to those images where the arms are being used to prop up the torso. Potentially, this has a slightly different connotation if used by the male or female, in that the act of leaning on the arms can be sexualised by drawing more attention to the already accentuated breast. Conversely, assuming that there is an absence of other codes that undermine this, the posture could be considered an occasion of hegemonic masculinity in that it opens the chest up and therefore leaves it open to attack. The same could also be said for the female, thereby making any sexualisation features present part of the codification of the femme fatale. Code 13 is ‘*other*’.

Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to single and both legs.

Q19A ABANDONED: Does not add anything to the analysis.

one leg		1
both legs		2

Q19B

open when seated		3	bent fully at the knee		13
closed when seated		4	extended outwards		14
open when lying down		5	running		15
closed when lying down		6	walking		16
crossed and pulled in		7	pretend movement		17
crossed and extended					
outward		8	standing open		18
astride		9	standing closed		19
intertwined with obj/other		10	kneeling		20
knee slightly bent point					
forward		11	other		21
knee bent sideways		12			

There are a number of pre-programmed exclusions: Q9 = (2,4,5,6). This automatically removes 274 counts.

Q19 = Q35: 5 = 7, 6 = 9, 7 = 11, 8 = 12, 9 = 13, 10 = 14, 11 = 16, 12 = 17, 13 = 21, 14 = 22, 15 = 5,6,8,10,15,18,19,20,23,24

Codes 1 and 2, ‘*one leg*’ and ‘*both legs*’, again refer to the notion of the symmetry of the body as defined above in Q18. Code 3, ‘*open when seated*’, refers to those images where the body is seated but the legs are apart, therefore the knees must not be touching. The knees ought to be separated so that

the distance between them is greater than the width of the hips. Conversely, Code 4, '*closed when seated*', refers to those images where the body is seated and the legs are closed, or close together. If the knees are not quite touching, they must be close enough to be the same width as the torso. The meanings that surround these postures connect with two elements. Firstly, to sit with the legs apart is to extend the limbs into space, occupying it and imposing the body onto it. This has not been a feature of femininity as historically understood. Also, the posture takes on a moral dimension for it is said that for women to sit with their legs apart invites sexual advances and the condemnation that comes with them. To sit with the legs apart is immodest since it entertains the possibility of revealing the thigh or genitalia, thereby rendering the woman a tart, femme fatale or slut. Thus, it is necessary to trace the extent to which those cases, if any, of a woman sitting with her legs open fell outside the non-sexualisation category.

Codes 5 and 6, '*open when lying down*' and '*closed when lying down*', are self-explanatory and use the same pointers for identification as Codes 3 and 4. Goffman noted that the predominance of women featured lying down was another visual codification whereby their low status compared with men could be confirmed. In addition, it has very close associations with sexual intercourse. Lying down has been a regular pose used in porn. Thus, this posture is marked very heavily by the gender of embodiment. It is also the case that the passivity of the body suggested by the body position adds to the convention that women cannot actively deploy their bodies effectively. Goffman has connected this to the child status with which women are coded. It is considered here that if there is a high frequency of women lying down and with their legs open, possibly not wearing much clothing, then this is an extremely patriarchal image. Code 7, '*legs crossed and pulled in*', refers to the sitting position that children use in school. Once again, Goffman's notion of the childishness of hegemonic patterns of femininity could well come into effect in this posture. The low status of the sitting position is also associated with the fact that one would tend to sit in this way if one were sitting on the ground. This can be placed in opposition to Code 8, '*crossed and/or extended*', where the legs are stretched out. This seems to suggest that the person is at ease with their environment and confident. Again, such obvious occupation of space is something that has been associated with the embodiment of masculinity. '*Astride*', Code 8, is self-explanatory and is also suggestive of someone confident and at ease with their environment. Consequently, one would expect that the male body be marked by these codes. Plus it goes against the convention of associating femininity with physical stillness.

'*Knee slightly bent forward*' is identified in the following way: one of the legs must be straight, with no bend at the knee. The other leg will have a slight bend at the knee which has the effect of lowering the hip on that side of the body. This emphasises both the hips and the bottom area. It also draws attention to the legs. It is a classic pose and has often been used when a woman wants to entice and incite sexual desire. The sexiness of the pose has been added to by being used when standing in doorways. This acts as a kind of frame for the pose. This pose has been used almost exclusively on women, and correspondingly one would expect there to be marked difference in its use here. '*Knee bent sideways*', Code 10, is a variation on the above code. However, having turned the knee outwards, more attention is given to the leg and more of the thigh is potentially revealed.

‘Fully bent at the knee’, Code 11, is basically the same as squatting. The body ought to be lower than it would be if it was standing, with the knees nearer the face. ‘Running’, Code 12, is self-explanatory, as is ‘walking’, Code 11. One would expect these to be used to photograph men more than women because of the action that is necessarily implied. ‘Pretend movement’, Code 13, is the same as the ‘pretend arm movement’ definition above. An example could be a pretend karate kick. ‘Standing open’ and ‘standing closed’ refer to the most basic body stance. Those cases coded as standing closed must have the knees either touching or very close together. Conversely, legs that are coded as being apart must have quite a large space between the knees. The model must be standing still. These codes are taken to be relatively neutral postures that are not widely used in the visualisations of gender difference. It is therefore expected that this will not be a particularly frequent posture, but any cases that are identified will tend to apply to the male body, since women are positioned lower than men, by being seated for example. ‘Kneeling’ is self-explanatory. It is a highly ritualised means to convey deference. However, its associations with courtly behaviour or religious genuflection suggest that this will be a masculine posture, but performed mostly to other men. The variable also includes ‘other’.

HEAD: Head position

head back	1	head tilted to side	7
head down	2	head hidden	8
head straight ahead	3	back of head	9
head turning away	4	head pushed forward	10
turning towards camera	5	other	11
head in profile	6		

There is a pre-programmed exclusion: Q9 = 3,6,7. This eliminates 20 cases.

Q20 = Q42: 1 =1, 2 =2, 3 =3, 4 =4, 5 =5, 6 =6, 7 =8, 8 =10, 9 = 7,9,11

This variable addresses the direction of the face and the position of the head. This is of central importance, as it is fundamental to determining the relationship of the body posture to the sorts of expressions commanded by the facial area. The position of the head not only establishes certain limits to the direction of the gaze, but can also determine the hierarchical relationships between the viewer and the model. Thus to have the head looking down is to impart a sense of the model’s deference and respect to a higher authority. To turn away from the viewer’s gaze suggests modesty and coyness. The direction of the head position is a relatively common-sense means through which certain status relationships can be coded in relatively indisputable terms. To stare directly into another’s eyes is assertive, whereas to turn away from the gaze, to avoid the gaze in this way, is reactive. Head on, direct facial and eye contact are regarded as the most prominent means through which autonomy is asserted facially. Conversely then, to turn away, to avert the gaze, is seen as reactive and a means through which that person is defined by others.

The definitions of this variable are relatively straightforward. It does not employ any unusual features that contravene common-sense understandings. Therefore, there should be little need for clarification regarding the direction and position of the head. Code 1, *'head back'*, refers to those cases where the head has been allowed to flop back against the neck. Consequently, the chin will be pointing upwards, and there will be large amounts of the neck showing. It is the position adopted when one wants to look straight upwards to the sky. This position is not expected to be frequent. Any use of this position is expected to form part of the image-maker's bid to establish an anti-realist image. One would not expect there to be any eye contact made. If the head is described as *'head down'*, Code 2, one would expect the viewer to be able to see the crown of the head. Much of the face is concealed as a result, and the chin ought to be touching the neck or thereabouts. *'Head straight ahead'* refers to those images where the head is facing directly forwards. Both eyes are facing forward, both ears are equally visible. The head should be fully upright. The chin should not be turned towards either shoulder in any way.

'Head turning away', Code 4, is coded for those cases where the body is predominantly facing forward, the shoulders may be twisted slightly, much of the side of the neck is visible, as is the side of the head. One would expect to be able to see one ear. The meaning of this turn can best be secured when considered in conjunction with the direction of the gaze. If the eyes are turning away also, one would conventionally accept this as being the response of someone who wishes to avoid the viewer's gaze. However, if the eyes are looking toward the viewer, it is much more ambiguous because it suggests that the model is looking but contravening the conventions or looking against the grain. *'Turning towards camera'* refers to those images where the body, particularly the shoulders, are twisting towards the position of the camera. Thus the hips would tend to be facing in the opposite direction, causing the torso to twist. Additionally, one would expect the eyes to be looking in the direction toward which the body is turning. Therefore, if the body is turning toward the camera, one would expect the eyes to also be looking in that direction. One would use this code too if the head movement is introducing a greater percentage of the face. If it is the case that more of the face is being concealed through the movement, then one would use Code 4. *'Profile'* is self-explanatory. The margin for the codification comes when both eyes can be seen. If this is the case then one would code it as either twisting away or towards, depending on the other features mentioned above. One would expect this code to be a feminine one, for it both removes the model from the possibility of engaging in eye contact with the viewer, and has the impact upon the face of rendering it artifice. The head becomes statuesque, still, objectified.

'Head hidden' refers to those images where the head is concealed in some way. It may be concealed under a hat, hair or a towel etc. The *'back of head'* is self-explanatory, and as a result there ought to be no facial features visible. Both these variables have been theoretically conceived as being extremely objectifying poses, since there is no possibility of asserting the personhood of the model, no means through which to facially engage or respond to the narrative set up. It is a visual way of blocking the models' narrative from the space in which they have been located. Similarly the child in the classroom is made to turn their back and face away. It removes the person's possibility to engage. It also has the effect of making the person vulnerable to the events or activities that are taking place

‘behind their back’, as they are unable to see what is going on. Code 10, ‘*head pushed forward*’, is not expected to be a common pose, but is potentially a head position nevertheless and could be used as an anti-naturalistic code. It is identified by the presence of the chin being positioned away from the neck. Code 11 is ‘*Other*’.

Q21 MOUTH: Extends the issue of the fetishisation of the body. The mouth is central.

Q21A

mouth closed	I	1	mouth open	II	3
mouth semi-open	II	2			

Q21B

expressionless	II	4	sulking	II	12
smiling	II	5	snarling	II	13
laughing	II	6	phallic mouth/object	II	14
smirking	II	7	finger naive	II	15
half smiling	II	8	finger anxious	II	17
pouting	II	9	clenched jaw	II	18
licking lips	I	10	tongue sticking out	II	19
kissing		11	other	II	20

There are some pre-programmed exclusions: Q9 = (3,6,7) Q20 = (8,9). This eliminates 47 cases.

Q21 = Q40: 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7,8 8=9, 9=12,13, 10=14,15, 11=10,11,16,17,18,19,20

The mouth has been identified as being critical to the overall evaluation of the sexualisation process, since the mouth is a central erogenous zone. The expression of the mouth can also be a central focus whereby the other erotic features that may be present on the body are negated, or it can at least establish contradiction to or conflict with the general embodiment. This can be done through either being expressionless or adopting an assertive or aggressive gesticulation while at the same time revealing flesh. Clearly, this is one of the areas where one would expect there to be a marked difference in the gendered expression. One would expect a high prevalence of ‘phallic mouth’ expressions for those images that seek to adopt and codify the body as a femme fatale. Conversely, one would expect there to be a high frequency of expressions that seek to engage the viewer, thereby establishing emphasised femininity. By seeking to engage the viewer/other, the female is responding to the power difference in social interaction whereby she must entice, engage and respond to please the subject, and by implication therefore please the normative male subject. One would expect the male models to have a very low frequency of expressions that are overtly sexual. This code can be a valuable source of data through which it is possible to explore the extent to which one can talk about feminised male bodies.

Q21A seeks to identify whether the mouth is simply open or closed. This has an effect upon the possible mouth expressions used and when. Code 1, '*mouth closed*', refers to all those images where the mouth is firmly shut with the lips touching. Code 2, '*mouth semi-open*', refers to those images where the lips are slightly parted. It may be possible to see the tips of the teeth. It is also possible to see the tip of the tongue in the mouth. The inside of the mouth may be slightly visible. If this is the case, the back of the mouth will be concealed through the lack of light that can penetrate into the throat. Code 3 is '*mouth open*', and designates those images where the model's mouth is fully open. One ought to be able to see all of the teeth and tongue. Also, the inside of the mouth ought to be visible. It is debatable as to which of these codes is the one most open to sexualisation. I have elected to take mouth closed as the least sexual. The sexualness of the other two codes will depend upon what other sorts of codes are taking place. For example, having the mouth semi-open when the eyes are looking up at the viewer through the eyebrows is conventionally taken as being more sexual than if the mouth were to be fully open. Conversely however, if the mouth is fully open with a phallic object close by, one could reasonably argue that this is more sexualised than if the mouth were semi-open. Thus, these codes are considered to be potentially equally sexualised.

Q21B identifies in more detail the sorts of expressions that are predominantly used and on whom. Code 4, '*expressionless*', refers to those images where there is no particular expression used at all. There is no noticeable evidence of any of the muscles contracting to produce a smile or a grimace. The lips are not being pushed forward to produce a pout. This non-expression results in there being a stillness to the mouth area. There should not be too much attention paid to the code variable. It is not being suggested here that an expressionless mouth is not 'expressive'. It is just that the label aims to denote those times when the mouth has not adopted a particular expression, like smiling or laughing and so on. It is understood here that adopting a non-expressive facial gesture is to express a certain distance or disengagement from the viewer. There is no attempt to entice the viewer or to turn the viewer on. It suggests a certain emotional neutrality or ascetic disposition, since the absence of another expression also means the absence of a mood expressed. Smiling means one is happy, for example. An example of an expressionless mouth as a form of expression is photographs from the turn of the century. In these photographs, the subjects rarely smile and this conveys a certain formality to the proceedings. It is not the case that the same formality is conveyed now, especially considering the naturalistic mock of feminine pleasure that has been so clearly identified. Here the non-expression is expressive by virtue of the absence of the incessant need for women to be rapturous in advertisements. Therefore, in the context of contemporary fashion advertising conventions, one would expect this emotional withdrawal to be something that signifies the masculine.

Code 5 is '*smiling*' and is used as commonly understood. Thus one would expect the ends of the mouth to be turning upwards. It is not necessarily the case that the teeth are visible, but they will tend to be so if the person is modelling 'happiness'. Code 6 is '*laughing*' and in these cases one would expect the teeth to be fully visible. Thus one would expect there to be higher frequency of laughing when the mouth is open. '*Smirking*', Code 7, refers to those cases where the model is laughing through their smile. '*Half smiling*', Code 8, refers to those images where there are traces of what could become a smile. This would be associated with less enthusiasm and greater reticence. Code 9, '*pouting*', refers

to those images where the lips are puckered together to make them appear full and more fleshy. Puckering the lips in this way is a key expression used to sexualise the mouth. This classic pose has been identified as one way through which the female body has been encoded to become an erotic and pleasing object to the viewer, and remains so. '*Licking lips*' refers to those occasions when the tongue is used to increase the sexualisation of the mouth. It draws the viewer's attention to the mouth and the tongue, both of which are highly sexually charged parts of the body, but it reconfirms this association by introducing the moistness of the mouth. Thus it is considered here to be a highly objectifying codification, especially if coupled with '*looking being looked at*' defined below. '*Kissing*' is taken to mean different things according to the relationship of who is doing the kissing, who is kissed or whether it is the result of mutual embrace. This relationship can be identified by cross-tabulating with Q12 as defined above. However, it is expected here that most of the occasions when the model is kissing will be examples of the visual display of the heterosexist imperative. The kiss is therefore bound both by the sexual normalisation that it implies and by the hierarchical essence of 'romantic relationships'. For example, some of these power relationships could be visually displayed by the male kissing the female upon the head, as a parent kisses a child. This sort of visualisation is a development of Goffman's notion of the 'feminine as childish'. Alternatively, it could be the case that the female is kissing the male; if so, it would be interesting to identify the various codes used to establish this as part and parcel of general sexual servicing by women. For example, if the kiss is also accompanied by the gesture of cuddling, or holding onto the male for physical support.

Code 12, '*sulking*', is a broad category to include all those facial expressions where the model is in a bad mood, etc. One would expect the mouth to be twisted, or turning down. This has the effect of tightening the muscles on either side of the chin. It is likely too that the eyes are turned away and therefore seeking to 'avoid eye contact'. '*Snarling*' is an expression where the model has pulled one lip up at the side, thereby making the nostril flare. This is a variation on the possible expressions of aggression and not just non-engagement, but rather active withdrawal from the visual relationship with the viewer. One would not expect these to be widely used within the naturalistic mock-up frame. However, they may well be used to mobilise the face for a stylistic, anti-realistic format. If one follows the analyses under scrutiny here, this format should not affect the deployment of such expressions as a masculine position, and therefore applied to the male model.

'*Phallic mouth*', Code 14, is seeking to examine the extent to which this pornographic code has been assimilated into wider cultural production. Thus the mouth symbolises the act of fellatio. This code is a development of the pout. The pornographic code can be compounded through the use of an object as a substitute phallus. Thus Code 15 is '*phallic mouth with object*'. If this is being used on the male model, this may well suggest that there has been a decrease in the almost obsessive need to assert hegemonic masculinity, for such a sexualisation upon the male body surely introduces the homoerotic into the public visual domain. '*Finger naive*', Code 16, references Goffman's observation that the hands have been a decisive way through which the passivity and childishness of femininity has been conveyed. Goffman identified that the tip of the finger was often placed into the mouth and sucked, or surrounded by the lips. He argues that this effectively reduces the woman to the status of the child because of the basic childishness of the action. Note that one would use this code for such an image if

the finger was in combination with a coy facial expression. If it is accompanied by a deep look through the eyebrows, or a girlie dress with suspenders, one would classify it as Code 15. ‘*Finger anxious*’, Code 17, is an expression that must be accompanied with a frown. The combination of the two work to establish the finger as providing some sort of security. Also, part of its passivity stems from the fact that the person is unable to deal with the situation, and thus devoid of the skill of decision making. It is therefore fundamentally associated with the feminine. ‘*Clenched jaw*’ refers to those occasions where the muscle is seen to be taut and the mouth is firmly shut tight. It is an aggressive pose and suggests annoyance. Thus, working in combination with the visible muscle, one would expect this to be used extensively on the male. ‘*Tongue sticking out*’, Code 19, is an additional means through which the childishness of the model is ascertained. If accompanied with a pout, or the revelation of flesh, or the eyes looking up through the eyebrows, this code can also become sexualised. ‘*Heavily painted lips*’ seeks to trace those examples where the use of lipstick has been applied to sexualise the mouth. It must be very thick and pink or red in colour if it is to be coded thus. It would usually be accompanied by an excessive sheen. Code 21 is ‘*other*’.

Q22 SPECTATORIAL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mise-en-scene = an active relationship with the camera; the viewer = object of the model’s gaze. Code 2 = looking, but in a way that implicates the viewer within the narrative. Code 3 = no exchange between model and viewer and is thus more straightforwardly unproblematic.

public addressing viewer	1	private voyeur	3
narrative address	2	other	4

N/A = Q9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7. This excludes 31 cases automatically.

Spectatorial address is seeking specifically to capture the extent to which the mise-en-scene of the image combines with the positioning of the model in a frame and the viewer. It directly references the ways in which cultural studies, especially those informed by psychoanalysis, argue that passivity is both visually structured and negated if the model is male. This variable seeks to trace the possible exchange of looks that take place in this ‘realistic’ medium. It is directly referencing Mulvey’s arguments regarding the ways the visual form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the myth of representative realism.

The central means through which the codes are to be applied regards the exchange of looks, or lack of them. Thus for Code 1, ‘*public addressing viewer*’, one must have an exchange of looks whereby the model looks directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer into the place of the camera. The gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she positions themselves in relation to the image. To look at such an image is to engage with the model. The description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or her. Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or

desire for the viewer. However, it could equally be one whereby the model appears to be the initiator, through their adoption of a gaze that makes the viewer an object in the exchange. This compares with what has been described as ‘*narrative address*’. Code 2 refers to those images where the viewer is implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the main axis of exchanged looks between one of the models and the viewer. For example, where the female model is looking into the camera and therefore at the viewer while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby making the joke at his expense and between the viewer and model. The central protagonist in such a *mise-en-scene* is the female model since she commands the viewer’s gaze as well as duping her boyfriend. Code 3, ‘*private voyeur*’, refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze of the viewer as well as being oblivious to it. Thus the relationship of the model to the viewer is one where the viewer can peer into the model’s ‘world’ free from the demands of reciprocal behaviour and free to see what they want. It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing, and as a result one would expect this to be much more prevalent when used to photograph women. If such a frame is used to represent men, it is usually accompanied by a gaze of the model that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic. This is what Dyer refers to as the instabilities contained in images of men. In order to disavow the latent passivity of being the object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity, for example displaying their cerebral superiority over the female model by looking up to the heavens, thereby making the body inconsequential to their true being. Alternatively, argues Dyer, the male model can look off, thereby referring to an activity that is beyond the frame of reference of the viewer. To look off to the side is to demonstrate to the viewer that they are of no interest and of no consequence.¹³¹ Such a denigration of the female viewer is compounded by the use of muscle both as a means to signify the power of embodiment that the male body is synonymous with, as well as a means to shift the passivity back onto the viewer. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic gaze on men is such that it could suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus of looking is gendered.

Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/passivity.

looking up	1	looking at other/obj	6
gazing out at viewer	2	looking straight ahead	7
looking down	3	eyes closed	8
looking away	4	other	9
staring out of photo frame	5		

N/A Q23 = Q9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7,10. This automatically excludes 47 cases.

This variable is concerned with tracing the direction of the gaze in terms of the position with the viewer. Eye contact, who can look at whom and when, is intensely reflective of the power relationships that determine and characterise interaction. Thus, if this is combined with the general

¹³¹ Dyer, R. (1992) ‘Don’t look now: the male pin-up’ in *The Sexual Subject: The Screen Reader*’ edited by Caughie, J. and Kuhn, A. Routledge, London. pp267.

composite of the look in the above variable, one will be able to see the extent to which the relations of looks are built around the active and passive nexus. For example, if there is an equal distribution of the voyeuristic pose because the model is looking down, then this would represent a considerable shift in the ways that gender is visually and expressively pinned to the dichotomy. If this is not the case then one needs to examine exactly what it means to be able to unequivocally identify the body as male and identify a variety of codes, some of which used to be the preserve of the feminine. The central coding rule that must be followed here is that all judgements made with regard to the direction of the gaze must be done so from the position of the viewer. It is the most consistent position with which to gauge the direction of the look. Secondly, it is the relationship of the gaze with the viewer that is of interest and importance. Again this draws us back to the attention that has been paid to the gaze in feminist psychoanalytic theory.

Code 1, '*looking up*', refers to those images where the model's eyes are looking upwards towards the sky. This tends to have the effect of making the person look up through their eyebrows. One ought to be able to see a little more of the bottom of the whites of their eyes. Code 2, '*gazing out at viewer*', refers to those images where the model is staring directly out of the photo frame at the viewer. This relationship of looks is achieved by making the model look into the lens of the camera. Consequently, the model will always be looking at the viewer no matter where the viewer stands in relation to the model. This gives the viewer a sense of being the object because no matter where they stand and look at the model, the model will always be establishing eye contact. Within the social relations that have existed, this conforms to the classic established and patriarchal relationships of looks. '*Looking down*' refers to all those models whose gaze is turned downwards towards the floor. The direction of the eyes will mean that the model is looking down, almost as if they are looking down the nose. Looking down has been associated with a number of passive positions with regard to the other subject. It has been associated both with shame, and with deference toward one's elder and better. Additionally, looking down has been associated as a means to avoid a gaze. Thus, if there is an insignificant gender difference here, this may indicate a substantial shift in the formations of an 'emphasised femininity'. '*Looking away*' refers to those cases where the eyes are looking in the opposite direction from that of the viewer's position. Thus for example, if the camera angle is from the left side, the model would be looking towards the right side. This code demonstrates clearly how the rule of the viewer's position is vital to the assignment of the codes.

'*Staring out of photo frame*', Code 5, is another eye position that can only be coded with regard to the viewer's position. The best way to assign this is to consider oneself as the viewer standing against the model's horizon. Thus the origin of the perspective is to be found in that fictional, visual world. The effect is to make the model's gaze appear to be fixed upon something in the distance. It appears as if the gaze goes over the viewer's head to something much more important beyond. '*Looking out at other/obj*' refers to those looks in which the viewer is both visually and narratively positioned as a voyeur. Effectively, what this achieves is to marginalise the significance of the viewer's gaze by making the narrative axis exist within the photo frame and between the signifying elements within the frame. Thus, the model's concern lies not with the viewer but with that upon which the model's gaze is resting. Piloting established this was a relatively infrequent code and as a result it was

decided not to differentiate between whether the object of the gaze was another model or a prop. ‘*Looking straight ahead*’, Code 7, refers to those images where the model is merely looking straight ahead of her. This takes two distinct forms. Firstly, if the head is not facing the point of view of the viewer, but is in profile for example, then the direction of the gaze would be straight ahead from the viewer’s position. Secondly, when the model looks into the camera directly, but is staring deeply so as to appear not to be aware of their surroundings, the implication then is that the viewer would also be glossed over as the model daydreams, being unable to concentrate and fix her gaze upon something in particular. ‘*Eyes closed*’, Code 8, applies according to common-sense rules. It is considered to be a passive form, since one is vulnerable to that which cannot be seen, as well as closed to signification regarding who or what the model is to the viewer. There can be very little performative potential if one has one’s eyes closed. ‘*Other*’ is Code 9.

Q24 EXPRESSIVE GAZE: Aims to add a more descriptive or qualitative dimension to the gaze.

authoritative		1	seductive		10
assertive		2	coy		11
staring		3	looking		12
other-worldly		4	frowning		13
dreaminess		5	turned away/shy		14
glancing		6	concealed		15
surprised		7	semi-concealed		16
raised eyebrows		8	sunglasses		17
looking being looked at		9	other		18

N/A Q24 = Q 9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7,10, Q23 = 8. This excludes 84 cases.

Q21 = Q40: 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8,9, 9=12,13, 10=14,15, 11=10,11,16,17,18,19,20

‘*Authoritative*’ refers to those occasions when the viewer is situated below the model regarding the camera position, and when the model tends to look down along their nose at the viewer. It has the effect of making the model appear haughty, or irritable regarding the meaninglessness or trivia of the activity. If the expression is secured through the camera position relative to the gaze, it must either be connected with the relative status position, or in command of action. On these sorts of occasions, the active masculine ought to come into play. Conversely, an ‘*assertive gaze*’, Code 2, will be one where the stare is held and is hard. There is a sort of gloss generated through the held eye expression, which is unresponsive to the imagined viewer in the room. Hence, the viewer is diegetically built into the frame which the model’s gaze is asserting himself or herself towards. There will tend to be few engaging gestures on the face or the body. The model does not seek to show interest or concern with the ‘outside world’ through expressive gestures. In addition, the model may well be employing other assertive body positions. ‘*Staring*’, Code 3, refers to those cases where the eyes stare somewhat

blankly into space. It is not necessarily directed at the viewer as one would expect with Codes 1 or 2, especially 1. The effect is to produce a glaze over the face in general and eyes in particular.

Code 4, *'other worldly'*, refers directly to Dyer's article where he delineates specific forms of codification that are effective in negating the objectification that the male model must undergo in pin-ups. He argued that by drawing upon the metaphorical convention of 'up' with the mind, the model tends to look up and out of the frame in order to thoroughly disengage from the 'admiration' received. Code 5, *'dreaminess'*, connects to the sense of the model as mentally adrift. Thus the focus is in part suggested by the tension around the eyes which is lacking, as is any formality to the scene depicted. In particular, this code will often use the soft focus to assist in securing the notion of the daydream. Code 6, *'glancing'*, refers to those images where the look is characterised by a rapid engagement. Therefore, the direction of glance will be staged so that it appears contrary to the direction of movement. This signals the brevity of the look. Code 7, *'surprised'*, is classified by the combination of the narrative, as well as the tendency for the mouth to be open and for the eyebrows to be lifted so that the eyes appear bigger. This has been combined with the *'raised eyebrows'*. Code 9, *'looking being looked at'*, relates directly to Mulvey's notion and to the presentation of the feminine that is consciously ordered according to the desires of the onlooker. Therefore, the look is one of response to the active and powerful gaze of the other. *'Seductive'* is identified by the tendency for the model to look up and through their brow directly at the viewer. Therefore, the position of the camera and the viewer tends to be above the model in question. Often this is accompanied by a half smile or a closed mouth. Code 11 operates in the opposite way, in that the model will tend to have the head positioned down, but also at an angle which tends to turn the returned look back to the viewer while also looking up. Code 12 seeks to address those cases where the eyes do not appear to suggest an expression or disposition. In part, it is guided by an absence of muscle use in the face. It represents those occasions, which are rare, when the eyes do not appear to contribute to a meaning generated in the image. Code 13, *'shy'*, is close to coy but the return look is less apparent. Here, the face is turning away and looking down so that no reciprocal exchange is present. *'Frowning'* refers to those cases where the eyebrows are brought forward in disapproval. The last codes attend to those cases where the eyes are concealed, each suggesting or accomplishing a degree of anonymity.

Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an indication of the degree to which space is divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral, thus it is difficult to identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers that it would be difficult to say for example that the model is a working-class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph Lauren. Public min. means that it is a public space but nothing more can be read, and so with private min.

smoking	1	lovers sexual	12
drinking/bar	2	house chores	13
car/driving	3	comforting/care work	14
cafe/resturant	4	movement	15

washing/grooming		5	street		16
sport		6	bourgeois		17
partying		7	countryside		18
romantic scene		8	public min.		19
lovers' tiff		9	private min.		20
narcissistic - sexual		10	other		21
narcissistic - leisure		11			

The pre-programmed exclusions = Q8 = 3. Thus, 300 cases are automatically excluded.

Q25 = Q51: 1=2,4,7, 2=1,3,6, 3=8,9,12, 4=5,11, 5=16, 6=18, 7=20, 8=19, 9=10,13,14,17

The purpose of this variable was to add a generalised context within which the pose was taken, as well as to identify the extent to which the location of gender in space is still marked by gender difference. The object of this variable is not to examine the detailed significations and the relationships between these elements, for example, how they work to make us all instantly recognise this scene as a pub scene. The object is to examine the sorts of settings, which act as stage sets, are frequently used and in what sorts of space gender can be performed. The key difference to which this is referring is of course the public/private dichotomy. The location of gender within these domains has been identified within the feminist movement as one of the key areas through which patriarchal relations are maintained. As argued previously, it was one of the key successes of the massive number of content analyses conducted that they were able to repeatedly show the consistency with which the stereotypical, ideologically laden contexts were used. The consistency of results was such that it became very difficult to dispute the extent to which women were located within the private domain and, not only that, were submerged underneath the massive number of domestic props. The second significant staging that was identified was the extent to which women in these images had become synonymous with mothering. Conversely, men were regularly found within the public domain, particularly in work places. If women were in the public arena they were invariably supported and accompanied by a man. Another key difference between men and women photographed was that only men were staged with leisure activities that took place outside.

Goffman again confirmed the extent to which women were predominately located within the domestic sphere in a majority of the adverts he examined. Additionally, many of the images he examined were fashion advertisements. Clothes can be staged in almost any environment, since most occasions involve clothes at some point. This is because they have become a central resource for the presentation of self or the staging of self within the naturalistic mock-ups of the advertising industry. The central importance that Goffman's work plays here is in establishing that fashion images are not a block for staging the feminine within the private or domestic sphere.

However, from the piloting stage it became quite apparent that there was not the same proliferation of domestic contexts as had been identified before. It is because this was established early on that there are so few codes detailing a range of domestic situations. However, the possibility that the

piloting was inaccurate was taken into account. As a result, there are two distinctly feminine codes which are defined below. These have also been supported by a more general category that is used for those situations with some domestic prompts, for example, but which are marginal in their relationship to the model.

The other central contextualisation that has been explored here is that of the heterosexist imperative. Thus there are a number of narrative situations which directly draw upon the persuasiveness of heterosexuality within culture, as well as the extent to which these act as normalisations. Effectively, if these series of codes are cross-tabulated with the codes that identify who the models are photographed with, this gives a good indication of the sorts of general features that we are dealing with. The central proposition that is being presumed here is that while the single model may still be encoded with the heterosexual imperative, it is of a weaker kind compared to those images where the woman must always be standing, hugging, caressing the man, her protector. The premise remains that those images where a single woman is eroticised, without context and without prompts, provide the basis for far more open readings.

Some of the situations are not so much contexts or places, but rather classic presentations. Thus Code 1, '*smoking*', refers to those occasions where the man or woman is focused around the act of smoking. Part of the importance of smoking is that it has been a central means to draw attention to the mouth and to eroticise it as well. The cigarette has often been a phallic symbol and its extensive use, especially marked by gender difference, would demonstrate a persistence in the centrality of the mouth in sexualising women. Conversely, in most of the images where men are smoking, the cigarette is not near their mouths. On those occasions where the cigarette has been placed near the mouth, the above sub-variable of '*Phallic mouth with object*' will be coded. '*Drinking/bar*', Code 2, refers to all those cases where the stage is in the public arena of a bar. Again, if compared to those cases where the model occupies or withdraws from the space, this will aid the identification of the extent to which a) women are present in public bars at all, and b) if present, they are dependent upon the masculine to protect and secure their safety. Code 3, '*car/driving*', refers to those cases where the woman is subjugated to object. The car has been specifically drawn upon because it has been conventionally used as a phallic symbol with which to subjugate the female. This code also allows us to identify whether this symbol remains highly gendered in terms of who is photographed at the wheel, but in a much more extreme shift, the extent to which men undergo sexualisation via the car. It seeks to identify how some symbols may have been appropriated by gay imagery, and the extent to which it has infiltrated mainstream culture. '*Cafe/restaurant*', Code 4, is the first of the specific scenes that seek to identify the extent to which the heterosexist imperative is almost omnipresent. To eat with one's loved one is a classic and conventional form through which to frame patriarchal heterosexuality.

'*Washing/grooming*', Code 5, refers back to the semiotic analysis done by Moore and seeks to identify the extent to which such contexts have been applied to reveal the flesh of the male models. Additionally, it may show the extent to which this is also applied to women. It would be interesting to identify whether the direction of the gaze shifts the nature of the contextualisation. For example, the camera position could act as if it were a mirror so that the point of view of the viewer is to be directly voyeuristic. It is this sort of codification that marks the scenes with female models, compared to

naturalistic mock-ups where the male will be seen from an angle and thus a much weaker act of voyeurism.

'*Sport*', Code 6, refers to those occasions where the activity of the body is located within the construct of sport. This brings certain contours of the hegemonic construction of masculinity as being both about the skill to which the masculine body can be used and, equally as importantly, about the power that this activity encompasses. This is diametrically opposed to the forms of embodiment that are given over the feminine body. The feminine body has instead been associated with stillness, display cum self-objectification and weakness. The location of physical movement within this context brings into play a whole number of significations and associations that are beyond the scope of this project to decode. However, the central relevance here is that the central feature of hegemonic masculinity as physical prowess is brought into centre stage. Thus, if there are a number of images where it is the female that has been located within the context of sporting activity, as well as being located within naturalistic mock-up, this may signify a shift away from the dominance of the feminine as weak. It is probably unlikely to be the case that there are equal distributions, but it may be that the frequency has nevertheless grown.

'*Partying*' is again self-explanatory and is to be judged according to common-sense categorisation. Its inclusion is based upon the question of whether there has been a move toward groups. Its inclusion is partly to provide a context in which those group photographs can be contextualised.

Code 8, '*romantic scene*', refers to those images where the couple are located within a romantic context. Again only those images that deploy the commonest features conventional to the codification of romance are coded thus. These features include staring into each other's eyes, holding hands, and so on. Another central feature associated with the codification of romance is to have the female clinging onto the male by hugging his arm for example, and perhaps even leaning her head upon his shoulder. Again this traces the extent of the normalisation of heterosexuality, and the power in equalities inherent within this ideology. These images are not overtly sexual in nature, but rather establish an emotional pattern. Conversely, code 9, '*lovers' tiff*', refers to the alternative but related side of romance – the temporary break-up. Part of the conventional content of the break-up is the implicit resolution, the happy ending. Thus this scene is marked by the couples disagreeing, usually with the female being dismissed by the male. It is through her dismissal that her passivity is confirmed, as well as confirming the female as being more emotional. Therefore, part of the resolution entails the male coming to his senses and realising that she is after all what he wants. The resolution is marked by the male achieving what he wants, thereby making his happiness what the female wants. Thus his emotional state becomes the subject of her activity, simultaneously securing her passivity. Her contentment is dependent upon becoming the passive object of the man's desire.

The above two scenes differ from '*lovers/sexual*' in that this scene establishes a different relationship between the male and female because of the absence of the implied domestic bliss. The positioning of the body/bodies is much more explicitly sexual and will tend to 'borrow' codes from soft porn. Thus the wholesomeness of romance has been dropped. Part of what makes these images more overtly sexual is the fact that there is little other to the image than the sexual pleasure on display. Thus

it has a much greater narcissistic element to it. The object of the liaison is sexual gratification, not life-long happiness.

Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations there are, and to what extent the common-sense understandings within the academy concerning the body idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm the stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, I mean that the mode of representation of the female has taken on the conventions that have generally been considered masculine.

subject/object	11	1
activity/passivity	11	2
doer/done to and for	11	3
talker/listener	11	4
sprawled/draped	11	5
occupying/passing through	11	6
protector/protected	11	7
decision maker/decided for	11	8
professional/non-prof	11	9
manual/office	11	10
desirer/sexual object	11	11
subject/prostitute	11	12
subject/virgin	11	13
thinking mind/body	11	14
object/subject	11	15
passive/active	11	16
done to/doer	11	17
listener/talker	11	18
draped/sprawled	11	19
passing/occupying	11	20
decided/decision maker	11	21
non-prof./prof	11	22
body/thinking mind	11	23
sexual object/subject	11	24
non-stereotypical	11	25
conflicting	11	26
inversion	11	27
other	11	28

Q27 TIME: To allow for the comparison of the variables over time.

face 1985	1
face 1990	2
face 1995	3
i-d 1985	4
i-d 1990	5
i-d 1995	6
arena 1987	7
arena 1990	8
arena 1995	9
cosmo 1975	10
cosmo 1985	11
cosmo 1990	12
cosmo 1995	13

APPENDIX C

WHOLE NUMBERS INCLUDE FIGURES FROM 1975, 1985-95

Q1 Sex: Sex of the model(s).

female	374
male	315
androdynous	11
other	3

Q2 NUMBERS: This allows any analysis to relate the issue of how the idiom alters according to the number of models and the possible interaction between them. It is may also have an impact upon the narratives address.

single	440
all female	33
all male	25
mixed couples	126
crowd	72
other	6

Q3 ETHNIC: This variable attempts to link possible patterns in the representation of the body idiom and any ethnic group.

white	568
Black/Black Asian	123
other	10

Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.

clothes	628
perfume	75

Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and subjugation. The relationship is counted according to the first value. For example, if the model preceeds the object then the model is read as dominating the object.

model	607
model and obj	41
model and objs	1
model and group	0
object and model	40
objects and model	11
other	2

Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how Q4 is spatially represented - higher and central being related to control and domination and lower and periphery being related to subjugation. Higher is supposed to relate to the models and above and below to relate to the object. The extent to which the model fills the picture space can also be related to domination. The greater the space taken by the model the lesser the model is subjugated.

dominates frame entirely	145
3/4	99
1/2	127
1/3	141
1/4	70
less 1/4	119

centre	364
off centre	248
perspective	365
non-perspective	276
in front of	67
level with	28
above	22
below	23
seated/on top of	50
underneath	7
behind	50
beside	79
opposite	9
periphery	39
other	8

Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have been traditionally been photographed - soft focus relating to dreaminess and passivity and hence femininity.

close up	140
medium shot	357
long shot	205
sharp focus	449
soft focus	203
out of focus	50
other	7

Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around 'realism' within visual representation. This will feed in later regarding what people actually do with the images that they know are not 'real'. Code 1 refers to the mock-up of everyday life which effectively renders it a stylisation; code 2 is pure style and its conventions are not about the representations of 'real life'; code 3 refers to whether the photographic background is blank.

naturalistic mock-up	212
stylistic	194
neutral	291
other	5

Q9 GENREAL IDIOM: The variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 correspond with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 shows half the body.

full body	409
legs cut off	79
head cut off	8
cut at waist	126
face only	63
chest area	6
legs only	6
other	3

Q10 DETAILED IDIOM: The variable is concerned with the position of the body within the frame.

lying on side	7
lying on back	17
lying on front	10
facing forward	428
twisting away R or L	105
back facing camera	42
twisting towards R or L	57
profile	146
torso leaning forward	76

torso leaning back	37
propped BY arms	62
propped ON object	55
bowing from the waist	8
bent down	1
bowing from head	3
on all fours	3
other	7

Q11 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working defintion of physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings. Any code that remains unmarked it is because it cannot be reliable ascertained from the photograph either to conform or contradict.

strong	73
weak	12
tall	429
small	22
muscular	124
slim	435
skinny	72
emaciated	12
au naturale	153
stylised make-up	66
normal make-up	153
painted nails	70
long nails	83
short nails	99
body hair id	32
body hair unid	120
dyed/sculpted hair	100
short hair	345
long hair	242
tough	259
emotional	314
delicate	117
soft	205
macho	93
fat	6
sporty	53
physically able	449
other	14

Q12 CONTAINED BODY: Containment of the body is supposed to illicit the degree of self-determination; whether it is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is non-contained.

contained by self	36
contained by man	25
contained by woman	9
contained by object	13
contained by other/obj	7
mutual containment/embrace	37
non-contained	511
otherl	2

Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of the some fo the ways in which the idiom could visually portray containment. Note that for codes 7 and 8 arm is in the single because both implies an embrace. One arm demarcates ownership more clearly. Note that 1-4+10 if Q12 = 1 self contained; if Q12 = 4 then Q13 = 5; if Q12 = 2 or 3, then Q13 = 6-9+11

legs held in by arms	7
----------------------	---

legs crossed and pulled in	6
held in and hugging self	19
clinging to other model	1
confined by product	18
contained demarcating ownership	16
other's arm round neck	6
other's arm round waist	2
held protectively	3
embracing other/obj	2
embracED by other/obj	3
other	7

Q14 TITILATION: Referring to the titilation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By reveal I mean that the clothing is lifted or moved or cut to draw attention to overtly sexualise that part of the body which would conventionally be concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms etc., which are used to hide or conceal breasts and/or genitals.

non-sexualisation	316
fully dressed	220
reveal shoulder	24
reveal stomach/hip bone	41
reveal upper chest	54
reveal thigh	48
reveal/excentuate breast	88
flies up/down	8
getting dressed	1
underwear	47
see-through clothing	6
covered towel	0
naked self-concealment	8
naked except commodity	4
naked upper chest	38
fully naked	2
other	4

Q15 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is touching whom, especially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 correspond with whether the hand is active but not touching anyone.

touching own body	268
touching man's body	31
touching woman's body	26
own and man's	8
own and woman's	6
touching commodity	28
hand is active/not touching	142
no touch/neutral	90
other	31

Q16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specify what is being touched which again feeds back to notions concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when 'both hands' is coded this means that both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means that one hand or arm is either concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.

hand on/through hair	26
hand on hip(s)	60
hand on leg(s)	47
hand on torso	87
hand on face	24
hand on neck	21

hand on bum	12
hand on breasts	3
hand on genitals	6
hand behind back	10
hand forcing ribs forward	3
clenched fists	3
hand in rest	43
leaning on	12
holding hands	42
neutrally touching OWN body	23
holding on	35
hands covered	9
hands in pockets	39
aggressive gesture	2
other	33

Q17 TYPE OF TOUCH: Relates to the way touch has often been genderised.

utilising	38
expert	1
grasping	39
manipulating	13
fingering	26
fiddling	10
fondeling	22
caressing	54
embracing	11
holding/neutral	191
other	55

Q18 ARMS: The working definition of one and both arms is the same as hand.

pointing up/outwards	56
extended up	23
relaxed by side	215
folded	30
arms bent	262
resting on leg(s)	45
over the head	12
hugging the body	61
arm in action	24
in mock movement	42
leaning	50
other	17

Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to single and both legs.

open when seated	39
closed when seated	36
open when lying down	6
closed when lying down	4
crossed and pulled in	20
crossed and extended outwards	12
astride	82
intertwined with obj/other	3
knee slightly bent point forward	54
knee bent sideways	27
bent fully at the knee	69
extended outwards	64
running	3
walking	31

pretend movement	52
feet outwards	4
feet forward	4
pigeon toed	3
standing open	39
standing closed	46
kneeling	7
other	12

Q20 HEAD: Head position

head back	34
head down	36
head turning away	92
head straight ahead	211
turning towards camera	123
head in profile	90
head hidden	11
head tilted to side	54
head pushed forward	12
back of head	16
other	3

Q21 MOUTH: Extends the issue of the fetishisation of the body. The mouth is central.

mouth open	136
mouth semi-open	122
mouth closed	378
expressionless	310
smiling	78
laughing	44
smirking	15
half smiling	62
pouting	52
licking lips	2
kissing	8
sulking	16
snarling	18
phallic mouth	36
phallic mouth with object	4
finger naive	0
finger anxious	2
clenched jaw	8
tongue sticking out	5
other	33

Q22 SPECTATORIAL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mis-en-scene = an active relationship with the camera; the viewer = object of models gaze. Code 2 = looking but in a way that implicates the viewer within the narrative, esp. looking being looked at. Code 3 = no exchange between model and viewer and is thus more straight forwardly unproblematic.

public addressing viewer	175
narrative address	86
private voyeur	404
other	5

Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/ passivity.

looking up	31
gazing out at viewer	234
looking down	57

looking away	73
staring out of photo frame	65
looking at other/obj	70
looking straight ahead	64
eyes closed	37
other	21

Q24 EXPRESSIVE GAZE: Aims to add a more descriptive or qualitative dimension to the gaze.

authoritative	41
assertive	198
staring	265
other-worldly	67
dreaminess	52
glancing	39
surprised	9
raised eyebrows	27
looking being looked at	127
seductive	74
coy	39
looking	55
frowning	56
turned away/shy	19
reactive	54
concealed	17
semi-concealed	11
sunglasses	29
other	23

Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an indication of the degree to which space is divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral thus it is difficult to identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers it would be difficult to say that the model is a working class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph Lauren. Public min. means that it is a public space but nothing more can be read and so with private min.

smoking	4
drinking/bar	9
car/driving	3
cafe/resturant	7
grooming	11
sport	8
partying	37
romantic scene	38
lovers tift	9
narcissistic - sexual	5
narcissistic - leisure	20
lovers sexual	22
house chores	0
caring role	2
movement	5
street	41
bourgeois	20
countryside	38
public min.	73
private min.	30
other	28

Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations there are and to what extent the common sense understandings within the academy concerning the body idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm the stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, I mean that the mode of

representation of the female has taken on the conventions that have generally been considered masculine.

subject/object	565
activity/passivity	476
doer/done to and for	336
talker/listener	44
sprawled/draped	185
occupying/passing through	206
protector/protected	72
decision maker/decided for	56
professional/non-prof	33
manual/office	3
desirer/sexual object	345
subject/prostitute	25
subject/virgin	19
thinking mind/body	118
object/subject	389
passive/active	391
done to/doer	238
listener/talker	5
draped/sprawled	39
passing/occupying	122
decided/decision maker	20
non-prof./prof	17
body/thinking mind	125
sexual object/subject	228
non-stereotypical	182
conflicting	209
inversion	72
other	18

Q27 TIME:to allow for the comparison of the variables over time.

face 1985	33
face 1990	41
face 1995	69
i-d 1985	83
i-d 1990	27
i-d 1995	61
arena 1987	56
arena 1990	41
arena 1995	55
cosmo 1975	67
cosmo 1985	56
cosmo 1990	56
cosmo 1995	55

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INTRODUCTION

There has been a long-standing interrogation by feminists regarding the interrelationship between the female body and the social category of 'woman'. Of particular import is the resistance to the notion that femininity is a naturally subordinate correlate to masculinity. The subordinate position of 'woman' is deemed morally legitimate because it stems from natural sexual differences between the bodies of men and women. Early critiques, most notably the sex/gender distinction, have been criticised for not deconstructing sufficiently the association of the female sex to nature. Lacanian postmodernism/feminism has become the central theoretical model that challenges this dualism, but I will suggest that their challenge rests upon dissolving the corporeality of the body because they do not give the body a material dimension outside of discourse. The influence of the Lacanian model of psychoanalysis is crucial here because sexual difference is elevated to the level of the Symbolic. The Symbolic is then defined as constituting sexual difference, that is, rendering the body a discursive and Symbolic effect. Significantly, the Symbolic is always prior to, and determinant of, the subject and so this model is ahistorical; hence it often describes the Symbolic in terms of the 're-presentation of the feminine'. Therefore, it follows that if gender dimorphism is *solely* an outcome of the Symbolic, dichotomisation must be the key feature of the Symbolic. Bodies and representation must directly correspond to that dichotomisation. I challenge this description of the Symbolic universe. Using evidence generated by a content analysis, I demonstrate that a large number of the signs, said to mark sexual difference, simply were not present. The evidence derived from the content analysis shows that conventions used to construct an image are significantly less dimorphic than this model can allow or account for. I suggest that this has major repercussions regarding this particular model of the formation of the subject.

I develop this by suggesting that drawing attention to corporeality need not lead to the re-naturalisation of specific historical and social formations of gender. I offer an alternative, suggesting that sexual difference ought to be understood as *an* element, amongst others, of the category of sex. Only by engaging directly with the body is it possible to identify where and when the body fails to determine the discursive category of sex. In this way, I think it is possible to begin to understand corporeality as an entity that has some existence outside of discourse, yet equally, the body is not wholly independent of such discourse. I think it is necessary to attempt to theorise outside of the constraints of the dualism established by sex and gender and what is therefore necessary is a model that does not give causal priority to 'sex' or 'gender'. Essentially, I think that the category of sex incorporates much more than genital difference. Until the body is tackled directly, the ideological position of the body and/or sex as fundamentally and absolutely distinct from society will continue. Thus, I suggest that postmodernist/feminist theorising, especially that underpinned by Lacanianism, will tend to be confined within dualistic strictures that it politically identifies as a target. Therefore, I will be placing emphasis upon practice so that the practices that intervene on the body to help produce 'sex' can be examined. I suggest images, and their potential influence, need to be included as part of the practice of gender, not the determinate of gender. This opens up a vital space, in my view, to theoretically emphasise that discourse is not uniformly effective. This is necessary if a move toward a non-reductive version of gender is to be achieved.

Guillaumin encapsulates the issue regarding the relationship between 'natural bodies' and 'social selves' thus: 'all human beings are natural but some are more natural than others' (Guillaumin:1996:72). Her rhetoric endeavours to undermine the singularly important maxim of patriarchal ideology: the natural order is just and thus sacrosanct. Implicit within her rhetoric are the principal aims of the feminist project:¹ to de-naturalise the current patterns of femininity by exposing their constructed form; to delineate the power and inequality inherent within them in order to break apart 'natural sex'. Initially, this theoretical and political project was elucidated through the sex/gender distinction, which theorises by making an epistemological differentiation between the body and society: sex is the objective biological category and gender is the social correlate (Oakley:1972). The distinction also elucidates the causal relationship between the constituent parts by radically inverting the direction of causation upon which the ideological maxim depends: gender becomes the mechanism through which feminine identity is formed, not sex. Essentially, the aim was to understand femininity as being produced in the body, not the essence of the body.

The sex/gender critique offers a dual attack. First, that our cultural representations are not about the actual cultural lives of women. Ostensibly, therefore, these representations are, at best, misrepresentations and, at worst, blatantly ideological. Second, that women's cultural lives are not of the fixed biological body, but are cultural patterns and thus are open to being undertaken differently (Oakley:1972). This normative challenge culminates in the following forceful conclusion: there is nothing natural about women's subordination. By taking up the distinction between the biological body and the social category of gender, the critique was able to establish a social connection between representation and women, namely that the restricted nature of the representation was unduly limiting the potential social roles women could fulfil.

Paradoxically, however, the sex/gender distinction cannot keep the body in view because 'sex as an objective category' remains, thus effectively attributing gender to the domain of personality or mind (Connell:1987; Spelman:1982; Fuss:1990). Consequently, essentialist versions of the body re-emerge and reassume a primary role in the constitution of gender. Delphy (1996) argues that this is because an order of sex is established by means of a classification of its essential properties that are deemed independent of, and prior to, any social practice. The problem of 'sex', argues Delphy, is that it leads us to treat as objective properties things that are socially and historically constituted. Herein lies my critical endeavour. I argue that the radicalisation of this distinction by the postmodernist/feminist programme cannot keep the body in view either, and therefore, the postmodernist/feminist position depends equally upon a body that falls outside of the forces of social construction. In short, I argue that their political programme depends upon essentialist foundations from which to theorise the feminine; the pre-Oedipal and/or *jouissance* often fulfil this role. Only then can they 'find something outside' of the comprehensive forces of cultural reproduction. Thus, the critical principle that Guillaumin weaves into her rhetorical device is paradoxically the very logic from which postmodernism/feminism theorises. Postmodernist/feminist theory has failed to overcome the dualistic nature of the sex/gender distinction (Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams:2002; Burkitt:1999; Lloyd:1984), which it claims to

¹ The initial parameters, which questioned directly the notion that biology is destiny, were set by De Beauvoir: 1975.

have deconstructed (Butler:1990; Flax:1990). Essentially, within both approaches, the body remains an un-interrogated, self-evident unit upon which discourse sits. Thus, the body 'disappears' (Ostrander:1988) or slips underneath the discourse that is allegedly constituting it. If the body is immaterial, what places us in the world?; what gives us a perspective in and on the world? We *have* a point of view because we *are* our bodies (Burkitt:1999). I propose therefore that the body is not reducible to discourse and ought to be thought of as an unfinished entity (Shilling: 1993)

Therefore, I suggest that sexual dimorphism is a consequence of intervening and transformative practices, which contribute to the naturalisation of sex in a significant way. These practices are, however, *treated* as the natural and inevitable outcome of the primacy awarded to sex. I have the following example in mind: 'women don't have facial hair, therefore I pluck mine'. The unintended consequence is, of course, to confirm the initial socially based assessment that 'proper' women are hairless. Thus the practices aim to manage the secondary sexual characteristics, like muscle, breasts, hair and so forth. What is crucial is that practices naturalise current patterns of gender appearance. Thus, while these secondary characteristics are deemed to be a direct, unchangeable biological disposition of the body, it takes various social practices to achieve this (Connell:1987). Essentially therefore, the variation of secondary characteristics is measured and regulated against the normative body. My central proposition is that 'natural sex' ought not to be placed outside of the social, as if the biological and social spheres are readily separable, but seen to combine the body one has with the social practices that sustain it, be that in terms of health or gender practices. Thus I seek to include the social intervention upon the body as a part of 'making sex' (Laquer:1991) and that sex needs to be included within the ontological assessment of self (Giddens:1991; see Lash and Urry (1994) for a cogent critique of Giddens' reproduction of the mind/body dualism).

Finally, there is that part sphere of sex that pins sexual/personality characteristics to a set of genitalia. This is what was initially referred to as gender. These characteristics vary a lot as many personality traits belong to the condition of being human rather than derived from the genitals/chromosomal/genetic. Again the normative body makes its entry here because, while it is recognised that a woman can be aggressive, she ought not to be (Franks:1991; Garfinkel:1967). One can hear the residue of the ideas of the 'fairer sex' here. Essentially, therefore, by stressing that practices have an equal role in the functioning of the category of sex, I seek to explore how 'sex', be it genital or chromosomal, underdetermines the social category of sex. Moreover, I believe it offers a space to explore how practice intervenes to reproduce bodily appearance and character that is then naturalised. Images, I suggest, are best understood when they are located within this dynamic rather than being treated as determinates themselves.

I address these questions across the following chapters. In chapter 2, I offer a detailed account of the shift from the sex/gender distinction to the formation of the subject via the semiotic operations of meaning. I argue that this model ejects the body from analysis by over-emphasising the determining effects of meaning. I suggest that this is problematic for a number of reasons: first, the body loses its corporeality in the world and becomes a symbolic effect; second, this ejects the very entity we have to act in and on the world in order to transform, resist or continue current social practices; third, because the subject is reduced to an ideological effect, postmodernism/feminism of this kind cannot account for

their own consciousness without calling upon the residues of non-socialised desire, namely an essentialist notion of the feminine. Hence, postmodernism/feminism of this kind, and its associate semiotic deconstructions, depend upon certain Lacanian psychoanalytic models with which to formulate a model of the subject. I will present the case that utilising Lacanian concepts in this way leads the postmodernist/feminist critique to depend upon functionalist logic, despite the polemical language in which this logic is embedded. Likewise, they eject the body from the social domain, just as Parsons (1951) did before them.

In chapter 3, I offer a methodological defence for the use of content analysis as my chosen method. Drawing upon the work of Goffman (1979), I argue that codes operate conventionally and that this establishes sufficient stability within which to quantify the contents of the images. Moreover, conventions guide how we use codes and signs so that, providing one is attentive to these conventions during codification, the quantitative data generates a macro view of the modes of representation that semiotics cannot achieve. The content analysis consists of 25 variables, which contain some 350 sub-variables. Using this coding frame, I assessed the manifest content of 500 images. The data is assessed using the Chi test of association. The sub-variables reference the ideological features that are said to secure the 'feminine as passive'; for example looking away aligns the gaze with the passive (Dyer: 1986; 1992). It also looks at the formation of the image and how it functions so that a representation is accepted as an 'authentic version of myself'². I draw upon Goffman's *Gender Advertisements* again here to establish that the flow of social life has to be over-emphasised to make it visible to us. He also draws attention to the symbolic effect of representing a three-dimensional world in a two-dimension frame, which allows me to examine the symbolic relationship of space projected within the physical limits of an image.

In chapter 4, I analyse the data generated. My data shows that representation is sufficiently ambiguous to raise serious doubts as to the explanatory adequacy of the postmodernist/feminist position. The data furnished shows that many of the variables said to anchor femininity as lack or passive or 'the other' are simply not present. Thus I conclude that, far from quintessentially defining the feminine as passive, these codes are regularly applied to codify men's bodies. Consequentially, the categorical description that aligns the passive forms of codification to the production of femininity is undermined. I conclude that the codifications are sufficiently ambiguous as to be unable to define whether the woman represented identifies with the Symbolic order and thus her own subordination; in fact, it was often only possible to code the body as female. Thus images target the dimorphic body. I do not make any inferential statements as to the actual lived patterns of femininity, as I do not award the image any causal affectivity independent of its location in practice. This requires empirical research (Bourdieu:1997; Waquant:1993) and I will address this in the conclusion.

Lastly, in chapter 5, I offer some tentative steps that might be taken to resurrect the sex/gender distinction, by emphasising the dynamic between the body and the social order, so that neither entity is given undue theoretical significance (see for example Douglas:1966; 1969; Mauss:1973; and more recently Waquant:1993; Davis:1995;1997). Most importantly, I wish to emphasise that sex and gender are not distinct objects but are, in fact, fuzzy because the body interacts

² This is necessary if the images are to operate within Lacan's mirror phase.

with the social and is modified by the social. Shilling's (1993) notion of the 'unfinished body' is pertinent here. I explore how we might theorise 'gender' in a way that maintains an eye both on the differences and similarities between bodies. I do this by drawing upon Lakoff's work (1987), which offers an opening that can integrate various social practices with the corporeal as a normative object targeted by discourse and as the living entity that places us in the world. Most importantly, I think, is that Lakoff's development of the concept of 'family resemblance' does not force us to hierarchise these elements, replacing this with concepts of maps and sets that stress the interaction between the elements. This way it is possible to examine the body in a way that integrates internal differences amongst women yet maintains equal attention to the public, normative classifications to which women are subject. His model explores the social and embodied implications of the category 'woman', without having to capture the essence that unites all embodied 'women', alongside the complex ways a category is lived. I am particularly interested in the ways that this maintains an emphasis upon the dualistic abstractions, which align the masculine with the active, for example, but equally renders this construction mythical: the average man is no more the 'One' than the average woman is the 'other'.

I conclude this thesis with an overview of how I seek to develop this research empirically. I have emphasised that my theoretical priority is to explore 'women' as internally differentiated at certain points, brought together corporeally at other points, and collectively targeted by the discursive productions of the normative. My engagement with the image is based on accepting that they are influential but not causally determining of the individual. I aim to extend this analysis by examining two groups of women in order to tackle the differences within the category head on. These are young women, who are intensely targeted by images produced within the cultural sphere, and older women who are largely absent. I aim to examine how a sense of oneself, as a woman, is negotiated within two differing contexts, focusing in particular on the contrast between being an overt target of the normative body as the body beautiful and a potentially reproductive body and those who are defined as the opposite, in the sense that they are deemed to be in the 'twilight' both in terms of reproduction and beauty. Theoretically, this provides a context within which to explore the explanatory efficacy of the notion of family resemblances.

This chapter explores the alleged radicalisation of the sex/gender distinction offered by postmodernism/feminism. Representations are made up of signs that collectively make up the Symbolic. The Symbolic is understood as constituting or producing subjects, which is theorised through various mechanisms derived from the psychoanalytic model. Thus, bodies become subjects within the pre-existing cultural formations and, because these formations are ordered by key patriarchal hierarchies, they go on to order gendered subjectivities hierarchically. Thus, the theoretical target of my critique is the model of the Symbolic constitution of the subject, which is highly dependent upon the psychoanalysis of Lacan (1977), as well as Althusser's (1971) concept of interpellation. Proponents argue that this de-centres the subject, deconstructs the myths of the speaking 'I', and, with it, the fallacious notion that the subject is the source of meaning rather than the product of meaning. Their concern is with the constraints that language as a system, that is the Symbolic, imposes and the various ways language organises the polymorphic desires of the infant. Hence, this axis integrates the social system to the production of complicit sets of identities and aims to account for how they feel fixed, personal, instinctual, that is, how cultural formations come to feel 'of the body'. Neither masculine nor feminine subjects belong to the realm of nature but are demonstrably cultural products. This is what I will describe as postmodernism/feminism and I examine, in particular, those who seek to apply this within the cultural images that subjects consume. I propose that Mulvey's work (1975;1993) continues to hold a paradigmatic position in terms of those who seek to deconstruct cultural images in the light of the above critique as to how a specific image of the Symbolic determines subjectivity.

However, I contest that this model effectively de-naturalises the Subject because the dependence upon interpellation and the linguistic construction of the 'I', at best, displaces the body and, at worst, dissipates the body. Without tackling the body head on, it is not possible to tackle the *cultural* dimorphism by which bodies are said to be naturally organised. Therefore, this model has not tackled the constancy of sex and its association with an ahistorical natural order. On the contrary, I propose that this model is utterly reliant on the constancy of sex, by pinpointing the ways the body is drawn upon when postmodernists/feminists theorise even though they never directly address this dependence. While postmodernists/feminists appears to be offering a radical model of the constitution of the subject, through signs and discourse, their dependence upon psychoanalysis reveals how they are dependent upon the body: what throws the girl into the Oedipal crisis is the sight of the penis. Therefore, this model fundamentally problematises fleshy, corporeal bodies. In theoretical terms, it also continues to theorise within the dualisms it claims to deconstruct, emphasising instead the cultural over the biological. Arguably, postmodernism/feminism fails therefore to go beyond the strictures of sex/gender dichotomy.

In order to do so, I trace some of the weaknesses identified regarding the sex/gender distinction, which entails focusing on the theoretical challenges that postmodernists/feminists have launched against the distinction. This necessitates concentrating upon the critique that the sex/gender distinction does not sufficiently challenge the nature/culture dichotomy, which aligns the feminine to the domain of nature and thus legitimates the exclusion of women from the social, economic and political realms. Essentially, the postmodernist/feminist charge is that these realms are not sufficiently

interrogated historically so do not sufficiently de-naturalise our sense that our current order is related to nature in some way. (Guillaumin:1996; Lloyd:1984; Gatens:1996).

Having outlined the central weaknesses of the sex/gender distinction, I trace how postmodernism/feminism has sought to go beyond these limitations. A particular focus will be upon the shift to a notion of the Symbolic and the idea that culture and/or language is largely responsible for the constitution of the gendered subject. Equally, the Symbolic is deemed to be largely responsible for the discourses of the nature/culture dualism. This requires that I present the briefest of overviews of Lacan's reconfiguration of Freudian psychoanalysis in order to provide a context for both how it is used and where I think it fails. I will then explore in some detail how theorists, such as Mulvey (1976), Doane (1991) and Cowie (1997), describe the Symbolic and how the Symbolic goes on to (re)construct masculine and feminine subject positions and provide an account of the structural negation of active female heterosexual desire. Since only the feminine is passive, all sexual objectification is done to the feminine, irrespective of sex assignment of the body in question. By implication, all active heterosexual sexual desire is masculine. A particularly important concept used to (re)present the masculine and feminine is psychic oscillation (Mulvey in Easthope:1993), which aims to mobilise the polymorphic directions that desire can take within the gendered dichotomy. In this way, when a body assigned as male is sexualised, the Symbolic³ determination of that body is feminine. (He) is said to have undergone the process of feminisation (Neale:1992). I ask what, then, is the body? A container?⁴

I argue that Mulvey continues to hold a paradigmatic position *viz a viz* cultural analysis and the formation of the subject because her work remains central to the semiotic engagement with the Symbolic, that is, how meanings construct the feminine. Her work began with the inscription of the masculine/active and feminine/passive into our Symbolic universe. Developments have not superseded this but have merely added to the number of structural positions available by working through the possible combinations. Hence, central to my critique is the assumption that the semiotic function of the sign maintains a determining function between femininity and passivity and its associate dualisms. Moreover, I argue that this is central to its explanatory adequacy because without it the Symbolic becomes heterogeneous and thus too varied to secure 'sex as a discursive construction'. In other words, this model must remove interpretative indeterminacy of culture if culture is to reproduce the social order.

The way that these structural positions are theorised deploys what Connell (1987) has described as categorical logic. These categorical units reorganise the examples that, on the surface, contest the validity of this model's explanation. The emphasis upon construction means that a sense of possible social or cultural change is lost, as is the possibility of variation in representation. By describing the eroticisation of the male body as an instance of 'feminisation', this model is able to maintain the coherency of the key sexual hierarchies; that is the permanent denigration of the feminine. Note that this explanation only works if the self-evidence of the male body is presumed. Primacy is awarded to the structural ordering of the Symbolic, which reconstitutes the body as a circuit of subject positions. In order to do so, it must eject the body, while implicitly drawing upon it in an uncritical,

³ Capitalisation of this kind reflects the embedment of such theory within the Lacanian paradigm.

⁴ I argue that there is a worrying echo of the mind/body dualism here and I suggest that this is derived from their central dependence upon psychoanalysis.

common-sense way.⁵ Hence, current forms of codification go by unrecognised, both politically and empirically. Furthermore, using Nayak's (1997) examination of the Haagen Dazs advertising campaign (1997), I show how the categorical logic that informs the feminist analysis of this kind equally orders the analysis of the representations of 'race'. Moreover, introducing the postmodernist analysis of 'race' reveals the extent to which theory of this kind is unable to combine two or more structures at any one time: does the *white* woman hold the gaze or the black *man*?

Finally, I conclude with an analysis that suggests that this explanatory model implicitly draws upon functionalist reason, as outlined by Parsons (1951; Parsons and Bateson:1956). Parsons also turned to psychoanalysis to explain how a specific set of values, working for the collective good, operate on a deeper level than rational choice: social actors fulfil various social roles because they feel bad if they transgress such obligations. Parsons argued that what are effectively socially contingent and historically specific practices must be internalised and made one's own, and he looked to stereotypical representations to fulfil, in part, this function. Therefore, both models have made identification a system problem, and within both models, the social order is structurally over-determined. The influence of Althusserian thought⁶ on postmodernism/feminism is particularly important to my argument because Althusser's concept of interpellation connects directly the ideological requirements with the formation of the subject, effectively ensuring that the system requirements correspond to the actor's motivated actions. It effectively plays the same role as internalisation. This is the point where the normative departure from Parsons makes its entry. Likewise, both reduce the social order to an internalised psychological state thereby failing to provide an adequate account for both the sources and occurrence of sustained, rational resistance, and the instrumental manipulation of norms according to the expediency of the social context (Goffman:1969). I suggest that 'subject position' and 'social role' perform the same explanatory function and therefore both models fail to address action that falls outside the social order and its norms. At best, action is non-conformist or transgressive, that is temporary, and by implication pathological. One is only left with those residues that have not been 'successfully' socialised; a melancholic performance perhaps?⁷

Equally, therefore, I critique this model arguing that it treats signs as functioning in much the same way as stereotypes. By this I mean that the meaning of the image is homogeneous, determinate and possibly monolithic because anything other than a structurally homogeneous Symbolic cannot secure identification. Furthermore, I argue that signs operate on behalf of the subject position in much the same way as stereotypes were thought to function on behalf of the social role. Thus, I argue that what differentiates postmodernist/feminist cultural analysis from Parsons is not the postmodernist/feminist creation of a radical alternative but merely a difference in their respective normative orientation.

⁵ Therefore, this model draws attention to the uncritical upon the background that naturalises gender patterns rather than making this their object critical analysis.

⁶ I was alerted to the comparative logic by A. Frank (1991). He addresses Turner's analysis of the body. He argues that because Turner addresses the body as a social order problem, the contingency that the socially produced body can force into the interaction is removed from view. The outcome is that the body tends to be a passive receiver that fulfils the system's needs.

⁷ See Riviere (1929)

However before I proceed, a delineation is necessary as to who and what is meant by the cluster 'postmodernism/feminism' because this is by no means a self-evident set of headings, and conceals what is, in fact, a dauntingly heterogeneous movement. I have used this cluster as an abbreviation for those who adopt and apply the psychoanalytic framework to the de-centring of the subject and combine this framework with the concept of interpellation. Thus, theoretical framework of the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism is applied to the cultural visual form. Semiotic analyses attempt to explore the operations of the subject position *already constituted*. Thus they draw heavily on the strong programme and, in my view, reveal some fundamental weaknesses in that programme. Thus, the emphasis upon Lacan has tended to mean that the theorists I critique here concentrate upon the semiotic and ideological formation of the subject by the sign, visual or linguistic. This therefore sets these theorists apart from other feminists who engage with the postmodern, who, like Benhabib (1992) or Scott (1992) consider subjectivity in non-naturalistic ways and yet maintain a distance from some of the stronger claims of postmodernism. I have in mind here the rejection of meta-concepts by Riley (1988), or the rejection of the material base to the world, for example Harbord and Campbell (1998). Adams (1996), for example, consistently explores the production of sexual difference through its Symbolic signification, which continues to be organised by the hierarchy imposed by the Phallus, while Gatens, seeming to offer us a de facto position on the body, reconfigures it through the Oedipus complex. She states:

Given that in this society there is a network of relations obtaining between femininity and femaleness, that is, between the female body and femininity, then there must be a qualitative difference between the kind of femininity 'lived' by women and 'lived' by men.
(Gatens:1996:10)

All well and good. This is certainly something that strikes a chord with a proponent of corporeality as 'in' and 'affecting' the world – as something other than real through its discursive materialisation (Butler: 1993). But then she goes on to state:

Freud's neglect of the effect of the menses on the pubertal girl's psyche is significant. That the flow of blood would have profound psychical significance for her is clear and that this significance would centre around ideas of *castration*, *sexual attack* and socially reinforced shame is highly probable. (Gatens:1996:10)

Why should the menses be linked psychically, or otherwise, to castration, when she previously states a de facto reality to sexual difference? It is the real beginning of the possibility of reproduction, a corporeal possibility, and thus its symbolic significance should surely be rooted in the material base of the body. The use of psychoanalysis, both theoretically and in terms of its semiotic application, rules out other ways of experiencing, visual experiences included. I cannot reconcile the facticity of the body with the psychic determination of the body through castration, an act which has never been carried out or is even close to the corporeal experience of that body. Moreover, I hear a strong echo of Doane here,

who unreservedly asserts that the sight of the penis by a little girl secures the knowledge of her lack. Hence, my main target is those united by their commitment to a strong programme of postmodernism (Benhabib:1992) operating in combination with psychoanalysis and who seek to trace this via semiotic analyses of visual culture.

Equally, I do not wish to unite political aims of those who theoretically contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the 'postmodern', one of the core dividing lines being the sense in which 'women' as a political category should be maintained as the focus and purpose of theorising (Harding: 1990; Gatens: 1996; New: 2003; Scott:1992; Guillaumin:1996 for example) or whether it is overly homogenising and thus potentially dominatory through the negation of difference (hooks:1981; Young:1995; Flax:1990 for example). I therefore aim to challenge the explanatory and political efficacy of a model that places a singular emphasis upon the causal determination of the cultural domain. Thus, part of what emerges from this analysis is the exposure of the theoretical tenet of postmodernism/feminism that is forced to combine psychoanalysis with the immaterial operations of the Symbolic in order to have a distinct field of analysis. To quote Harbord and Campbell, it requires:

a continued dialogue between cultural theory and psychoanalysis...(because) without psychoanalysis, cultural theory has little to challenge the discourses of materiality and with it the rational....In the absence of a psychoanalytic framework, cultural theory lacks a model of subjectivity, a model that is crucial to understanding the way in which culture is *produced* and *operates*. (Harbord and Campbell:1998:1) (my italics)

I argue that using a quasi-transcendental and idealist notion of the feminine – this is what remains, after all, once the material and the rational have been ejected – leads to the inversion of the sex/gender distinction, rather than the surpassing of its limitations. Thus, theorising of this kind reproduces the very sort of dichotomous essentialism it nominally rejects. The crux of my critique targets the postmodern/feminist assumption that the body is 'in the world' through its Symbolic signification only. In contradistinction, we need to hold onto a body that can act in and on the world so that we engage directly with the entity that materially, empirically places us *in* the world (Shilling:1993; Crossley: 1996). As thinking bodies (Burkitt:1999), we negotiate structures and meaning by incorporating and managing them within the micro-practices we undertake.

To reiterate, the combinations of postmodernisms/feminisms is often bewildering, almost to the point that the area where these cohere can only be stated negatively, that is, one can best come away with a sense of what they are not. However, the result is that one is left with a troubling, vague idea of what they actually are. What is the relationship between those who explore these themes in terms of their cultural application and those who pursue them theoretically? What links the cultural application of Riviere's story (Doane:1991) and those who utilises it theoretical and in a more complex way (Butler:1990)? Theory ought to engage in some way with the subjects on whose behalf it theorises, namely women and the discursive constructs that target them. Mulvey's work does undertake an analysis of what the strong programme 'looks like,' in terms of its cultural contours, and the subject position the Symbolic is alleged to form. She is, in some senses, attempting to apply the theoretical

targeted: it considers how the various processes order a specific notion of the 'feminine as role' and how these are integrated with the body to produce the appropriately socialised subject. Parsons' response is that the system's norms become the individual's values and norms. Most importantly, Parsons has adopted Freud's concept: internalisation is the mechanism by which the system is inculcated into the individual. Therefore, the feminine is an internal state made up of the norms and values required to sustain the social system.

The descriptive detail concerning gender can now be grafted on to this model of causation. Hence, role theory¹⁰ is the approach to social structure which locates its basic constraints in stereotyped interpersonal expectations. In this sense, the space or split between biology and society with regard to gender can be identified. It is not our biological make-up that makes us the women and men that we are, but rather the interpersonal exchange of role expectation and role sanctioning that is internalised to become subjective states. Thus, internalised social norms become the reason individuals give for action, which again re-emphasises the importance of representation as a means to convey the social norms to be internalised.¹¹

Oakley's distinction mirrors too closely the notion that the natural cannot be changed. To borrow from Cearley-Harrison and Hood-Williams:

Oakley simply echoed and exacerbated what we 'knew' already....Talcott Parsons' (1949) attempt to argue that the purpose of sex-role differentiation was to minimize the potential strain produced by the occupation system in a mobile class-divided society – which is a wholly and self-containedly sociological explanation – rests finally upon the allegedly biological 'fact' of the bearing and nurturing of children. Two separate explanatory principles, the sociological and the other biological, are at work and the latter constitutes the ultimate basis for the former. (Cearly-Harrison and Hood Williams:2002:18)

Hence, we have come full circle because we find ourselves faced with the following: how much is social therefore?

This reveals the fundamental flaw with the sex/gender distinction, argues Delphy (1996), because it does not sufficiently tackle head on the notion that biological aspects of the body are *socially determining* in a profound way. Thus, it continues to operate within the field that is her object of critique. For example, in the much quoted introduction, Oakley asks: "(I)f biology determines male and female roles, how does it determine them?" (Oakley:1972:15). Men and women's natures need to be worked through in order to sort out the residue of culture that is left. This pushes culture into a derivative, secondary position, thus the naturalisation processes of culture go by unchallenged. This is the part that is open to political transformation because only this falls outside of the (presumed) transhistorical features of natural bodies. The issue has been locked into how much of the social is a

¹⁰ I recognise that the distinction can be applied in other ways, for example psychoanalysis. However, its application within role theory has been central. As New (2003) notes, the realist model lost its way a little for not being sufficiently critical.

¹¹ Although, deeply embedded in this is the struggle between the sense that action is voluntary (Parsons' allegiance to Hobbes) and internalised action (Parsons' indebtedness to Freud).

result of our natures, which is demonstrable by the endless debate regarding nature/nurture. Hence, bodies are defined as unproblematically 'there', constituting the solid, unquestionable common sense entities we call men and women. Bodies are free from symbolic elaboration and thus free from the discursive effects these may have. The cultural domain, which is open to dispute, is thus the world of representations and learning, that is the domain of socialisation. We are socialised into roles; we learn through scripts and stereotypes. This represents an insufficient analysis of culture and its relationship to bodies.

The sex/gender distinction carries over the mind/body dualism also. Again, this reflects, in part, a reliance upon social role theory. For example, Parsons' (1951) logic brings him to the conclusion that norms are the causes of social action; hence, consensus becomes the primary feature of the social order. The effectiveness of role theory¹² is dependent upon accepting that actions are motivated by reasons, and that reasons are, in effect, society's beliefs and norms, which produce the appropriate motivation for action.¹³ Consequently, Parsons needs to explain how the system's requirement for consensual public norms, and thus a functioning society, become internal subjective dispositions¹⁴. Thus, socialisation only targets the mind, while the body is left fully outside of the social realm.

The circularity is repeated with regard to the social order. In order to sustain a social order, it must reproduce its population. Therefore, it is necessary to socialise two distinct sets of people into a functional division of labour: those who reproduce the population and those who reproduce the social structures, the aim of the division being to stress that sexual division of labour was not an outcome of biology but of social functions. However, this becomes even more unconvincing when the notion of universalistic and particularistic values are integrated¹⁵. It rapidly mirrors the constructs of women's natures and thus their affinity to this role. The bodily realm is feminised and the realm of the mind masculinised. Oakley's notion of the role struggles against this conclusion as the sexed body remains firmly separated from the culture and thus she fails to tackle a core dualism that denigrates the feminine.

Therefore, Delphy argues that while Oakley aims to move beyond the remits of biological determinism, she ends up operating within it because she has not tackled head-on the constructed features of the nature/culture dichotomy. Fundamentally, Oakley has awarded ontological primacy to the field of nature. For example, 'women's biological roles' are placed as the foundation upon which issues of gender are placed. I think that the sex/gender distinction falters because it assumes a *strong* causal connection between a bodily function and the cultural understanding derived from that function. I argue that this is far more indeterminate than her framework permits. There are examples where the understanding or meanings that construct gender do not neatly map onto the sexual difference – male/masculine and female/feminine. One need not look to the exotic but to our histories where we can trace the emergence of sex as dualistic and opposite (Laquer:1990). Significantly, the distinction tends

¹² Be it gender role or social role more broadly.

¹³ See J. Bohman (1991) for a more detailed explication of how norms become reasons for action - esp. p. 77.

¹⁴ This attacks head-on the social order problem as defined by Hobbes: that society must overcome the randomness of individual desired ends and conflicts of interest.

¹⁵ Most clearly formulated in Parsons and Shils (1962).

to treat sex and gender as autonomous spheres when perhaps fluidity, or a sense of their interrelatedness may have been, and potentially is, a more fruitful form of theorising. In fact, left as distinct spheres, the distinction tends to mirror Levi Strauss's notion of the raw and the cooked.

This strikes me as central as I aim to open up a space between the historical constancy of sex, things like the process of reproduction which requires both a man and woman who are both able to produce healthy sperm and ovaries, and the huge possibilities regarding what that might mean for a society. Not all bodies, unproblematically defined as man and woman, are allowed or should engage in reproduction, according to society's values. For example, are two bodies, both unambiguously female, awarded the moral sanction to proceed with reproduction?; or, indeed, teenagers who become pregnant or older women who also become pregnant; what does this do to the 'experience' of being pregnant? Alternatively, we can look to menstruation where the cultural symbolism that engulfs it fundamentally alters how it is understood and possible even felt. For example, does a woman within the West understand and experience menstruation in the same ways as a woman who must enter *Purdah* during this part of her cycle? Within this is the discursive intervention that constructs the natural, but the discourse is not 'making the body'.¹⁶

In this sense, I wish to move further than the sex/gender distinction allows. I aim to consider that the cultural is more than the political, in the sense of the rights due a respective body (New:2003). I aim to use this as a means to move issues of corporeality and culture from the strictures of sex/gender and nature/culture dichotomy. This represents part of the postmodernist/feminist challenge, a challenge that I argue is unsuccessful. They merely reverse the causal direction so that culture becomes the paradigm from which 'sex' emerges. Consequently, the body is 'silenced' so to speak; for example an infertile woman cannot be materialised through discourse into being fertile (Butler:1993). Moreover, I argue that postmodernism/feminism, and the accompanying cultural analyses, refer to the corporeal body as obviously and unambiguously sexed, that is in common-sense ways. They use the apparent self-evidence of the body when they need to anchor ideology and its discursive constructions. Without this, one cannot describe semiotic function as feminising; feminisation requires that one carries over ideas about the dimorphic body.

Despite the problems outlined above, the feminist movement, using the sex/gender distinction, produced a formidable critique of the supposition that the division of labour, based upon gender, was equitable or functional. Emergent evidence, and critical reflection, merged with political action to delineate the position that the division of labour was in fact an outcome of sectional interests; those of men's at the expense of women's. This position proffers a number of fundamental challenges to the consensus model of the social order. It stipulates that these respective sets of interests are in conflict and therefore the presumed reciprocity of interests is broken; this problematises the presumed natural basis of rights. In addition, the space between biology and society that the sex/gender distinction forged meant that the relationship between current patterns of representation and gender formation could be the cultural contours were traced and contested¹⁷. This provided a significant critique to many of the

¹⁶ This is where Cealey Harrison and Hood-Williams and I part company. They move too far away from the corporeal, and that elements of the body are extra-discursive.

¹⁷ I recognise that these two contributors do not flow from the same methodological or theoretical position, but the interrogation of culture undertook many forms.

structuralism, namely that “in order to make sense of the epistemic object one need (not) appeal to an epistemic subject at all.” (Benhabib:1992:208) This anti-humanist position has been very influential. Now language is the source of our sense of self – it is prior to us and limits and constrains fundamentally what it is we can say. De Saussure (1972) offers a model of language that sees meaning operate through difference. This meaning is relational in the sense that it requires the combination of the signifier and the signified. These often work as a set of structural opposites: masculine/feminine for example. The signified then builds up into chains of connotive associations which work through substitutions: the rose a sign of love, or coyness as a connotive element to the feminine. Such patterns are traceable through semiotic analysis. But the significance reaches further than this; it offers the possibility of discarding notions of human nature and replaces it with an entity that is an effect of various historical, social and linguistic structures. This de-centres the subject as, unlike Descartes’ thinking subject, we cannot stand outside of these structures from an Archimedean point, and neither can we pledge that the source of what we know or think is derived from an application of an objectivist, rationalist system of knowledge.

This departure is fundamental. ‘Man’ is not a unitary thinker but an outcome of competing structures. ‘He’ is the outcome of language and competing desires. Gone is the ‘myth’ of a self-transparent entity, reaching for full autonomy. The Subject is replaced by subjectivity – a product of competing discourses, controlled by desires, needs and forces whose effects shape and constitute the make-up of subjectivity. This is a fundamental attack upon the presumed unity of the Cartesian subject, therefore it also provides a framework to undo the dualisms that are said to have locked women into subordination. There is no Subject from which women are excluded because of their bodies. Instead, the Subject is rendered fictitious and thus both masculinity and femininity are products of social and discursive forces.

What is of central importance here is the affinity between the de-centred subject and the split subject as theorised by psychoanalysis. To reiterate, this is theoretical context within which the cultural analyses critiqued here were conducted. The human psyche is not unified but fundamentally split. Lacan (1977;1984) argues that the ‘I’ is a linguistic construct, the outcome of the organisation of desire into its socially sanctioned form. The residues are locked into the unconscious, ever present but never directly utterable. Thus, Lacan’s radical re-reading rests with conceptualising the unconscious as the structuralist system of language. Meaning, coming from the unconscious, is contained in the material signifier, or conscious speech. These signifiers are cast out from the signifying system, as they cannot be integrated in conscious discourse since patterns of desire of this kind are socially taboo. In particular, Lacan and Freud are concerned that the incest taboo be repressed¹⁹. Thus desire can only operate through displacements or substitutions of the signifiers that attach the forbidden desire onto something else. For example, the fetish is said to operate in this way. The fusion of Freudian analysis to structural linguistics leads the symptom, as an expression of the unconscious, to be treated as a signifier which *fixes the subject to another signifier*. This fundamentally undoes the pretension of the Cartesian Subject because the subject is a construct through which language speaks and therefore the object of

¹⁹ Although they both recognise that such repressive practice induces trauma, hysteria and other patterns where the unconscious erupts into conscious life.

analysis is the formation of identity as a linguistic function. Importantly, speech is not treated as intentional expression because the constellation of signifiers does not signify for the subject. Thus, the unconscious is awarded priority as the core of subjectivity.

The next important element to consider is that language is now the system through which Oedipalisation occurs. Thus, Lacan places equal emphasis upon directing desire toward the genitals and toward heterosexuality. Thus, the formation of the 'I' is an outcome of the Oedipal complex that organises sexual drives so that the primacy of the genitals is attained to secure heterosexuality²⁰. Lacan de-centres the process by elevating language as the mechanism through which we enter the Symbolic and assume a subject position within that Symbolic universe. Hence, Lacan's model offers a non-rationalist explanation of how sex is translated into sexed subjectivities. Equally, it provides a paradigm with which to connect the formation of the subject to the cultural representations semiotically deconstructed. What is most crucial here is that the Phallus becomes the core signifying mechanism that institutes the normative order of heterosexuality. Subjectivity is formed under the rule of the Phallus which forecloses the possible characteristics the feminine/heterosexual can assume. Lacan concludes the two following problems are crucial to the formation of subjectivity: what is it that produces sexual difference and how does this fix the relationship between the sexes so that gender dimorphism comes to be experienced as an asymmetrical and unequivocal fact of existence? As Grosz states:

For both sexes, though in quite difference ways, the phallus serves as a means of access to the 'domain of the Other'. The Other is understood here in two senses: as a socio-symbolic network regulated according to language-like rules; and as a psychical structure, representative of the social Other, internalised in the form of the unconscious.
(Grosz:1990:117)

What a formidable challenge. It offers up real possibilities for challenging the dualism that naturalises current forms of femininity. Moreover, it offers a frame work within which to embed the images that are critiqued here. Sex no longer stands outside of the culture but is drawn in and constituted by culture. Thus the political focus remains on culture but the system through which culture was interrogated has changed. Culture is formative of the subject and thus the content of that culture is intimately bound to the subjectivities it constitutes. Philosophically, this model offers a system that profoundly challenges the naturalisation of inequality, which ideologically construes that inequality as a natural outcome of sexual difference.

Yet, there remain normative issues here because the order of the Symbolic, which elevates the phallus as the core symbol of sexual difference and the social law through the Father, has been definitively identified as patriarchal. It was noted above that Lacan seeks to structure the unconscious like language and that language operates through difference: thus the phallus is symbolically functional

²⁰ This gauges Butler's insistence that gender is meaningful only through the heterosexist matrix (1992).

because the feminine (body without) symbolises lack.²¹ This poses some problems for feminist politics. What of those sectional interests served by the various cultural constructions, for example? The current cultural and linguistic configurations dominate women, organise inequality and mark the feminine as the other to masculine. The feminist re-configuration of Lacan seeks to work through the consequences for feminine subjectivity. One of the central ways this is done, in terms of cultural analysis at least, is by combining Althusser's (1971) model of culture as ideology to the formation of the subject through interpellation. The mirror phase and interpellation combine mechanisms that make self-identity something that comes from the outside and the concept of interpellation makes the exterior culture riddled with ideology. Again, this demonstrates the extent to which this theory provides the theoretical context for the assessment of the image. In fact, ideology is said to operate in the very constitution of the subject.

What will now follow is an account of the incorporation of semiotics as the method with which to best interrogate culture, alongside the integration of interpellation to link the cultural constructions to an ideological position compatible with feminism. Thus, the aim of the cultural analyses was to incorporate Althusser's notion that cultural configurations are ideological with Lacan's model of the mirror phase. The combination ensures that identities are formed through the identification with cultural configurations. Crucially, ideology is engaged with directly and placed at the heart of the formation of subjectivity. The reign of the phallus is deemed to be an ideological construction rather than a necessary structuring to ensure gendered subjectivity and heterosexuality, as Lacan would argue (Fink:1995). Thus, what is crucial here is the normative departure between the feminist application and that of Lacan.

SIGNS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY

One of the problems that stalled the political development by the sex/gender distinction is that it failed to tackle sufficiently critically the issue of whose reality is the real one. The challenge offered by the cultural and linguistic turn is that it re-defines all images as false, thus removing the need to deal with the various realities of women's lives and images that depict this. Moreover, the analyses critiqued here are able to move directly from the theory upon which it draws to the formation of subject, thereby by-passing issues of action and the social practices that potentially resist the current ideological patterns that subordinate women. Despite paradigmatic shift, they nevertheless took the following questions from the analysis facilitated by the sex/gender distinction: if femininity was not inevitable, what other ways could the feminine be constituted?; what does the symbolic system contribute to this? These questions were best interrogated by semiotics, which offers an analysis of how the signifier and the signified combined to produce the sign.

Semiotics defines representation as a form of cultural practice that belongs to the overall form of discursive production, a normality that allows a strictly de-limited range of variations that are based upon a network of mutually referring references (Barthes:1972; Eco:1976; Panofsky:1970). These references can be seen as legitimators of the hierarchical relations that justified and naturalised

²¹ Lacan's notion of A: not A, the 'not A' denotes the feminine as 'without penis', that is castrated.

gender patterns. The move to examining images within a semiotic framework means that the image is not treated as an icon, dominated purely by a figurative element. Rather, the sign consists of signifying elements that have to be decoded as part of their interaction within a specific visual configuration. In making such an interpretation, one must connect the implied meaning directly to the material signifier through which the meaning is generated.

This shift implies that careful analyses of the single specific construction of the feminine body, the specific modes and sites of representation, as well as discussion of how the signs address the imagined spectator, made a superior contribution than content analysis upon which so much of role stereotypes relied.²² ‘Woman’ is defined as the sign that functions in the (re)production of sexual differentiation for which a certain body image is a signifier. Representation was identified as one of the many social processes by which specific orders of sexual differentiation are ceaselessly constructed, modified, reconstituted and potentially resisted. The adoption of semiotics was based upon the Saussurian model of language, its omnipresence and synchronic structures that are prior to the subject and hence, ‘woman as sign’ aimed to transcend the idea that representations are symptoms of objective causes external to them. Thus, it *aimed* to bring the body into the process of cultural signification. Signs were analysed in their active role in the production of the categories of sexual differentiation. Thus signs constitute sexual difference – not bodies. Corporeality is not confronted and as a result the ideological elements that are bound to that corporeality are not confronted either.²³ Given this emergent theoretical environment, the appropriation of Lacanian analysis, particularly by merging of the synchronic system to the order of the Phallus, provided a system to integrate ‘woman as sign’ to a more thorough model of subjectivity.

The notion of ‘woman as sign’ is an attempt to bring together the fact that ‘woman’ is already a category constituted in society and thus subject to the various signifying ideological practices that sustain this category. The project has now been identified as one that explores the relationship between ‘woman’ and sign in signification systems like film. Pollock summarises the endeavour thus:

Images of women places the emphasis on the problem of the images with regard to the contested ideas about what women are like or would be like. The concept of ‘woman as sign’ makes us doubt that images signify women at all, though they undoubtedly circulate the sign Woman incessantly – and with the purpose of seducing persons of the female persuasion to recognise themselves in these signs and places. Visual images that proffer iconic figurations of the feminine body through rhetorics technically and ideologically aiming at the reality effect – this is, the disavowal of their rhetorical character behind the illusions of direct reproduction, transcription and replication – play a particularly important role in this masquerade. The visual signifier ‘woman’ is potent precisely insofar as the forms of representation, especially those associated within photographic processes, naturalise their constituents and presents

²² The debate in part reflects the broader discussions concerning the appropriateness of the positivist method that dominated at that time.

²³ See Kessler (2000) for an empirical investigation of the normative sexed body. My concern here is that the dichotomy is not tackled and thus the fact that bodies do not secure that dichotomy is left unaddressed.

themselves as mere description of a neutral content. Woman can therefore be simply seen, that is, in 'images of women. (Pollock:1991:205).

The shift to semiotics integrated the critical discussions of ideology, forcing the question of how an all-pervasive ideology functioned within a culture. Specifically, Althusser's influence (1971) extended the reach of ideology beyond its initial remit of the 'ruling ideas of the day' to its permeation into every level of society, even down to a handshake. Henceforth, ideology was understood to serve a system of domination in four key functions. First, legitimisation extends sectorial interests so that they become society's interests. Second, the various state institutions (ISAs) function by targeting and forming the subject so that identification with the social order operates at an unconscious level. Third, culture interpellates the subject: ideology consists in the very process of constituting individuals as subjects of effects of recognition and identification, the outcome of which is that individuals recognise themselves in those ideological patterns. Finally, ideology provides a bridge between the imagined representations, which project a set of conditions that are not really one's own, and the actual material conditions of the subject. False-consciousness belongs, therefore, to the cultural domain: the cultural domain is coterminous with ideology. Mulvey attends to this by examining how an image or *mise-en-scene*²⁴ can be semiotically decoded so that the meaning and the subject position identified.

Mulvey (1975) combines Althusser's definition of ideology, that is, the 'imaginary relationship of individuals to their real relations of existence' (1971:164) with Lacan's theory of the subject's constitution in language. By connecting the two, the relation between power and the subject could be explicated. For example, the reason given why women were not embracing the politics of feminism was because of the connection between ideological cultural patterns and the ideologically-constructed patterns within the unconscious. This position, in particular, is the object of my critique. Thus, my analysis is fourfold:

1. I aim to demonstrate the degree to which Mulvey's initial work continues to set the parameters of the debate, especially with regard to the use of codes and their structural determination and their consequent incitement to pleasure;
2. I challenge this model because it theoretically blocks any notion of a feminine heterosexual desire that is not masochistic and passive in form. I will argue that this reveals the extent to which much of this theory remains dependent upon the notion of the subject position;
3. I will explore how this feminist normative critique is sustained by deploying functionalist logic as the mode of explanation; without it, there is no need or possibility for feminist critique, given the theoretical closures within which this model operates;
4. I will show that their reliance upon psychoanalysis displaces the body by shifting emphasis upon the internal organisation of desire and, with the body lost from analytical view, that such analysis is dependent upon categorical logic to sustain 'the female' as coherent entity;

²⁴ I have not attended to the shift in cultural form because this paradigm does not attend to its potential consequences.

THE DOUBLE PROBLEM OF PRODUCTION OF 'WOMAN' IN FILM

Mulvey addresses the structures of identification and the mechanisms of pleasure that accompany them. She argues that the cinematic use of classical narratives, which are modelled on realism, stimulate and satisfy scopophilic desire. The position of the spectators in the cinema is one of repression of their own exhibitionism and the projection of that repressed desire on to the performer/character. The cinema reproduces the mis-recognition of the mirror phase, thereby stimulating both narcissistic and scopophilic desire. Scopophilia is essentially active since its pleasure is derived from subjecting the object to a controlling gaze. This is said to parallel the spectator's position regarding realist film: one is able to look into a social world without the reciprocity demanded by belonging to that world. Voyeurism is therefore said to define the functioning of the filmic form. Thus, filmic form stimulates narcissism because the spectator projects the desire of self love into the more perfect image, for example the hero who has full diegetic control over the other characters. Mulvey extends the homological analysis by arguing that the narcissistic desire is satisfied through the identification with the alter-ego so that the screen image stands in for the subject's own image. Thus, the film image mimics the more perfect view of the self identified in the mirror phase, which stimulates identification. Most crucially, identification processes have a meaning within the symbolic order that articulates desire.

At this point, the phallogentric binary opposition is shown to be essential: scopophilia is an active pattern of desire and therefore bears the mark of the masculine, thereby instituting female as passive. The subject whose scopophilic desire is satisfied is the man and his selected object is the female. The libido, defined as the active erotic function, is equally aligned as masculine. The identification process is based upon rendering the female form fearless to men by representing it using codes that satisfy in themselves to and for men. Woman becomes simultaneously looked at and displayed. Her appearance is marked with strong visual and erotic codes and she is reduced to being a passive, erotic spectacle, while the man comes to connote narrative or the active subject. With each step, Mulvey builds upon the dualisms: masculine/feminine; active/passive; subject/object of the narrative. The castration complex is central to Mulvey's model because it requires that the image of the woman be a fetishistic one in order to disavow the threat of castration that her body symbolises.

Mulvey goes on to assert that the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of sexual objectification *cannot* be borne by the male figure because those who are 'already in a state of castration' cannot disavow phallic presence. This is why the main narrative is deemed masculine; in addition, it provides space for the identification with the ego ideal, which further demonstrates her dependence upon the mirror phase, reflecting the conception/recognition of the ego. Filmic structures thus give the (male) spectator the pleasure of omnipotence. The male star personifies the more perfect, more complete, more powerful ideal ego. He is *never* the object of the erotic gaze; he is never iconic, unlike woman. Here we see the uncritical use of the female body as castrated. This needs to be critically addressed and the relation to the corporeal tackled – the female body is the male body minus the penis. Moreover, no attention is paid to the shift from the male – a pre-discursive entity – to the cultural inscribed masculine

spectatorial position. If sexing the body is a discursive process, then these elements need to be problematised.

The process of objectification, which fetishises the female body, provides an avenue of escape for men from the fear of castration; therefore they cannot transcend it. Castration does not act upon woman's psyche as a threat but as a real *lack* of her penis. The desire to make good that lack makes the phallus symbolic: 'she is said to speak of castration and nothing else'. This inability to transcend the castration complex means the woman is rendered 'other', bound by symbolic order in which man can live out his fantasies through the linguistic command by imposing them on the silent image of the woman.

Mulvey's original piece, by instituting a generalised dichotomy of the active/passive structure, identifies the negation of female spectatorship contained within realist film. The polemic of her analysis establishes the masochistic nature of feminine desire constituted through the identification between woman and the objectified woman on the screen. In 'Afterthoughts...inspired by *Duel in the Sun*' (in Easthope:1993), Mulvey begins to explore whether the female spectator can experience a deeper, more complex relationship to the filmic text, and whether there is a substantial change in spectatorship with a woman lead. However, Mulvey makes it explicit that she has a particular spectator in mind, namely one who is 'masculinised and is secretly enjoying the freedom, action and control over the diegetic world that identification with the hero provides' (Mulvey:1993:126).

Mulvey draws upon the inherent instability of femininity, which is said to be a direct consequence of a woman's inability to fully resolve the Oedipal and castration complexes: *femininity as a subject position is produced by the condition of being 'castrated', therefore the feminine cannot develop fully the regulative function of the super-ego*. This is ambiguous: is the state of castration metaphoric or the real psychic determination of the feminine? Freud describes the woman's recognition of castration as an awareness of her wound of narcissism. This produces a sense of inferiority: the clitoris is likened to a scar. I argue that this presents the feminine with three structurally determined options:

1. If she holds her mother responsible for her castration and her lack, this will cause her to despise women as men do, which makes her neurotic and inhibited (defined as pathological);
2. She can refuse to abandon the pleasure of the active clitoris, the amputated penis, but must remain masculine (defined as pathological);
3. By exploiting the passive elements of her instinctual drives (reflecting that bodies have the propensity for both the masculine and the feminine) she can transfer her sexual attentions from her mother to her father, first wanting his phallus and then analogously his baby, thus requiring the transfer of pleasure to the vagina (defined as normal).

Therefore in seeking out the masculinised woman in 'Duel in the Sun', Mulvey is exploring a female protagonist who has no stable sexual identity. The feminine subject is seemingly resistant to the Oedipal norm, torn between passive femininity and regressive masculinity. This is played out through her position as determined by her two brothers: passive femininity is established through the brother

who has fully resolved the Oedipal complex, satisfied with his heterosexual object choice and marriage, with the Symbolic at his disposal; regressive masculinity is explored through the brother who struggles against the Symbolic and revels narcissistically in the desire to embody phallic omnipotence. Thus the female protagonist must oscillate between her acceptance of her 'correct' feminine position, via the first brother as object-choice, and her narcissistic brother who guarantees her resistance to femininity. Already, the pre-Oedipal is being drawn upon. Her inability to follow one of the paths fully, to achieve a stable sexual identity²⁵, is said to reflect the positioning of a certain female spectator, namely the type who relinquishes femininity and engages in the masculinisation of identification. Here is another example of the confusion regarding the corporeal. She describes the spectator, which is a social entity, as female and yet uses female in the sense of the objective category of sex (Delphy:1996).

Psychically, oscillation draws upon the inherent instability of the feminine by returning to the active phallic stage before its repression. The 'lack' of the penis renders the feminine unstable because she lacks the necessary capacity for psychic resolution that the castration complex provides. This reflects the positioning of the female spectator, for if she is to receive pleasure she must also engage in the masculinisation of identification. If a woman is to access this desire in the language of the text, she must oscillate uneasily in her 'borrowed transvestite clothes'. Hence, Mulvey's interest in the 'Duel...' lies in what she describes as a 'series of transformations that comment upon the function of "woman" (as opposed to "man") as a narrative signifier and sexual difference as personification of "active" or "passive" elements in a story' (Mulvey, in Easthope:1993:129). Combining of the Lacanian model of the subject and the filmic form works to give desire cultural materiality by inscribing desire in the language of the text. Yet, the terms are all over the place, with corporeal and the cultural used interchangeably – is the absence of the penis an instance of real lack?

To reiterate, the Oedipal complex offers three options, two of which are pathological, offering only temporary transgressions from the passivity of heterosexual femininity. The concept of oscillation encapsulates this by defining the feminine as open, since she is unstable because she cannot fully resolve the Oedipal complex. I suggest that this reflects the normative order of psychoanalysis insofar as the feminine is not properly formed, which directly invokes the dichotomous order that defines the masculine with Reason. Thus, the formation of heterosexual femininity is defined by the absence of active desire. Only within the masculine are the residues of active phallic²⁶ desire to be found, therefore showing how fully operative the phallographic logic is. The dualism of subject/object is being re-inscribed into the explanation, and is thus failing to operate outside of terms that are said to contribute to the subordination of women.

DEVELOPMENTS OF MULVEY'S PARADIGM

Doane's work further contributed to the dichotomy of the feminine as passive by adding the iconic to it. The conceptualisation of 'femininity as iconic' is defined as the "over presence of the image –

²⁵ If she is already in the state of castration, and thus cannot fear the law, then her patterns of desire are more free not less surely? What threat prevents transgression of the already castrated body?

²⁶ Note that this ought also to imply the clitoris, but this element is left out when the 'phallic feminine' is discussed.

she is the image.” (Doane in Caughie and Kuhn:1992:223) Theoretically, Doane supports this assertion by drawing upon what she describes as the significant degree of congruence between certain theories of images and theories of femininity. Doane argues, following Freud, that woman is too close to herself and, hence, she is unable to establish a critical distance between herself and her image that enables her to achieve a ‘second look’. This closeness is likened to the closeness of iconic sign systems, for unlike language where a superior distance is created between the signifier and the referent, the iconic cannot disengage itself sufficiently from the real. Thus, woman is a writing in images, but a writing that is not for her, only *of* her. Woman cannot mobilise the gap or distance that voyeurism requires. The proximity between femininity and image is a direct result of the immediacy of knowledge that the little girl gains upon the sight of the male anatomy. ‘Freud claims that the little girl, upon seeing the penis for the first time, “makes her judgement in a flash’. She has seen it and knows that she is without it and wants to have it. (Doane in Caughie and Kuhn:1992:223).²⁷ This writing of images assigns a special place for woman in the cinematic form and representation while denying her access to that system. Again, there are issues about what the subjectivity is. Is the corporeal involved at all? If so, what are the consequences to describe the feminine as the image? This seems to me to be moving further away from a model that seeks to explore the cultural inscription of the body. Instead, it feels more like the disembodied ‘signifying interior’ that Berthelot (1995) identifies. This model moves ambiguously between the fleshy penis and the symbolic phallus; consequently, is castrated feminine the state of woman? If so, what lies behind this construction? From where or how do they gain the critical distance for their analysis? Something that lingers beneath the constructed perhaps? If their model is to move into the analysis of the formation of the subject, then I suggest that they ought to address these issues.

This shifts language from being the Master of subjectivity to being the tool of the Masculine Master. Hence, Doane follows Mulvey in arguing that the masculinising of the female spectatorial position through the process of oscillation is necessary if Woman is to gain access to the cinematic pleasures. Hence, the feminine proximity to her own body, the image of the body on screen, can only remind her of her castration that cannot be fetishised away. Doane is arguing that the dual effect of the sublimation and repression of femininity has come to determine the cinematic form, both in the plot and the *mise-en-scene*, which psychically re-enacts the dual effect, placing the feminine figure in situations of fetishistic idealisation or voyeuristic punishment. The moment of knowledge for the girl is the initial sight of genital difference and, therefore, Doane is not theoretically floored, in psychoanalytic terms, in developing the notion of femininity as iconic. The nexus of recognition that defines femininity is not signified in language at all because only masculinity can achieve that essential distance to enter the Symbolic and language; the Symbolic (or socially sanctioned) order is again masculine. Thus the structural logic orders the feminine with the passive and now the iconic. This merely extends the dualistic logic and further condemns the feminine to the passive. Where fluidity is integrated, it exists only insofar as unconscious desire shifts

²⁷ This draws directly upon Freud’s analysis of the constitution of femininity within the girl child. In contradistinction, the little boy considers his first sight of female genitalia as insignificant. Only with the threat of castration does he re-read the image he has seen and endow it with a meaning in relation to his own subjectivity. The boy experiences a distance between the look and the threat, and thus his knowledge is achieved through that all important distance. The gap between the visible and the knowable enables him to disavow what he has seen and enables him to fetishise what is fearful later on in adult life.

between the structural positions. Moreover, this fluidity stems directly from the inability of the feminine to form a stable subject position. Hence, this merely reasserts the logic of the phallocratic dualism.

Thus, Doane extends Mulvey's position regarding the instability of femininity: by mobilising this instability, woman is able to use femininity as if it were a mask. Riviere's (1929) case study of an intellectual woman showed that in order to compensate for her assumption of the position of the subject (masculine, according to the binary opposition) of discourse rather than its object, she had produced herself as an excess of femininity.²⁸ Doane sees masquerade as a method whereby the woman can achieve some distance, or 'a simulation of the missing gap or distance' (1991). The masquerade is described as being subversive in its ability to use the space available to destabilise the male gaze by destabilising the image, but it is not an escape because it is a 'pathological response', according to the Symbolic order. It renders the image, femininity, as artifice. Lacan suggests the instability of femininity, its pathological elements, leads to women experiencing desire in a mediated form as 'desire for the unsatisfied desire', while Doane coins the phrase 'the desire to desire' (1991). As Butler notes, resistance, through masquerade, is an ambiguous experience, in the sense that the simulation Doane alludes to is partial and temporary, therefore is not a subject position as such, but rather a transgression that is always melancholic (Butler:1990:104-05).²⁹ It also brings to mind Irigaray who attempts to imagine a femininity that would emerge in a language that was not of the Masculine Master, but rather would let the female body speak (1985a,b). While offering varied critiques of patriarchy, their emphasis upon language, as structure, leaves little outside of discourse. Increasingly, the body is known only as a discursive product. How do they achieve the distance to develop such a position within language?

The detailed discussion of these two highly influential writers shows how the narrative is defined as masculine: only the masculine can assume the position of activity in order to drive the narrative forward; conversely, the feminine subject position provided by the narrative institutes a spectatorial position that is masochistic and pathological in orientation.³⁰ Moreover, the iconic status of the feminine renders the active female spectator a mere simulated, masculinised position.

Other writers have attempted to correct the feminine as passive but because they remain within the psychoanalytic paradigm, this is limited to expanding other subject positions, notably the homoerotic. It therefore stays firmly within the existing paradigm. This entails two distinct avenues: first, by turning to the specific pleasures that women can gain from the images of women; second, by attending to the various modes by which 'masculine as active' is constructed. Byars (1991) and Stacey (1988; 1995), for example, turn to Chodorow (1978), while Studlar (1991) turns to Deleuze as a potential source of pleasure, which necessarily entails accepting the feminine as a fetishistic object. Others, like Erens (1990), Seneca and Arbuthnot (in Erens) examine the pleasures of the subtext. Re-examining the 'masculine as active', but still within structural categories, includes the possibility that the male body may be erotically encoded, which institutes subversive subject positions. Neale (1992),

²⁸ Note also that the notion of transgression as a form of resistance is also limited because to transgress is implicitly to re-affirm the institutionalisation of the Law.

²⁹ Note also that the extent to which transgression is temporary is revealed by its reaffirmation of the law.

³⁰ I refer back to Freud's model that only passive femininity is normal.

for example, argues that this cannot be adequately attended to without looking at how the 'masculine as active' functions visually. My interest concerns the scope of this model to integrate, or at best offer a theoretical space for, an active heterosexual pattern of feminine desire. However, before I turn attention to this, I briefly discuss the structural relationship between the feminine subject position and the feminine (homoerotic) image.

THE PLEASURE OF THE (FEMININE) TEXT OR THE WITHDRAWAL INTO THE PRE-OEDIPAL

The central facet of this alternative approach stems from the narrative structure of melodrama. Byars (1991), for instance, argues that the female-centred narrative, when combined with a distinct mode of camera work, produces points of view that provide specific and positive expressions of female desire. This structure operates in two ways: first, it is assumed that they are watched by an all-female audience; second, the emotional intimacy played out between the characters stimulates 'feminine connectedness'.³¹ The ordering of desire that is produced by same-gender exchanges produces an outlook based upon its relationship with the other rather than disconnected to it. This sense of interconnection with others is reflected in the narratives of melodrama. Melodrama draws upon the remnants of the feminine attachment to the mother, left over from her tenuous resolution of Oedipus complex. The recognition evoked by the women on the screen produces pleasure that can be considered a specific form of female gratification constructed out of the dominatory formations of the family. *Identification between subject and text remains vital to the analysis.* This is why I argue that the mirror phase, instituted by Mulveyian paradigm, maintains its centrality. Moreover, by turning to 'connectedness', Byars seeks to utilise a distinct pattern of desire derived from within the pre-Oedipal. However, this leaves intact the hierarchies of the Oedipal order that has locked the feminine to 'connectedness', that is, the connection between subject and Mother as one, into the pre-Oedipal in the first place.

Arbuthnot and Seneca (1990) examine the capacity for these texts to be read against the grain. The chosen text is *Gentlemen Prefer Blondes*. While they recognise that the surface of the story concerns the quest to find a husband, the main characters are independent and strong, and the exchanges between them reveal a subtext in which they struggle to maintain their intimacy and resist male objectification. For example, while Monroe and Russell are constructed as objects for the male gaze, nevertheless, they always defy the objectification by staring back, assessing the potential 'market' of husbands. However, this assessment is done with solidarity and genuine affection; they point to their tactile intimacy. Moreover, the primacy of this affection is secured by the double wedding. This closure, they argue, secures their relationship and thus makes this film feminist via its subtext. Therefore the pleasure is derived from reading against the grain. Yet, this marks a return to models of thought that Mulvey sought to correct: if reading against the grain is that 'easy', then representation ceases to be of such a central concern.

³¹ This draws upon Chodorow's reconfiguration of Freudianism, as well as potentially integrating the concept of *jouissance* by reflecting that the feminine is less individualised than the masculine.

Stacey also looks at the desiring interactions between two females. In 'Desperately Seeking the Spectator' (1988), Stacey examines the fixation by a housewife upon the formidable counterpart in the film 'Desperately Seeking Susan'. The anchor is derived from the housewife's assumption of her 'mirror image', brought to life by Susan; narratively conveyed through memory loss. In return, Susan, in seeking to identify her impostor, occupies the domestic sphere from which the housewife has taken flight. The narrative concludes when the two characters are finally united. Most importantly of all, this resolution is not accompanied by violent termination of one or both characters. Stacey argues that such a narrative fundamentally undermines masculinisation by centralising the lesbian basis of desire. Therefore, the narrative and visual codes do not allow pure identification or erotic codes of one or other – the exchange exists between the feminine. However, whether this overcomes the problems posed remains uncertain. First, it remains unclear to what extent Susan is in fact the mirror image since the housewife uses Susan as an avenue of escape, not identification. Second, it centres on the potential for lesbian-based desire between women which has had its pathological elements ejected, replaced by a somewhat utopian bond. Third, the centrality of Madonna as Susan locates the film within a wider cultural terrain, at a time when she was intensely heterosexual. It remains to be seen whether the foreground given to the subversive readings maintains the political momentum that initiated the examination of the relationship between representation and the social order in the first place. Does it not in fact suggest that patriarchy is quite a different entity if so many plural positions, readings and pleasures are possible? Perhaps we ought to be thinking more carefully about who are doing these readings (Hermes:1995).

There are a number of points that need to be raised at this point:

1. The notion of the subtext is introducing an empirical subject through the back door because different interpretive elements are being brought to bear that fall outside the psychoanalytic remit;
2. Moreover, the clash between the empirical and the unconscious is more evident when the potential for the homoerotic is pitted against a 'star' with a specific and, in this case, explicit heterosexual persona;
3. Yet these manoeuvres do not deconstruct the phallocratic binary but instead they retreat into a utopian sense of the connectedness developed from the normative departure. They are merely championing what is usually dis-privileged. This invokes the second tenet of liberalism: 'different but equal', which fails to undermine the phallocratic order implicit within it (see Heckman's application of Gadamer here: 1990:16);
4. It still empirically blocks active heterosexual femininity, since the structural regime remains intact.

Cowie equally seeks to move away from what she argues is a premature foreclosure of the Imaginary. The Imaginary fixes the subject but it is also the point at which a central mis-recognition takes place. The outcome is that the subject is never fully fixed and so the subject is able to mobilise this instability in fantasy.³² Thus, the *mise-en-scène* of desire can produce multiple places for the subject of the fantasy and for the viewing subject, who, through identification, may similarly take up

³² Cowie is equally drawing upon Lacan and Rodowick (1982).

any of these multiple positions. These may be defined as active, passive, masculine, feminine, parent or child, mother or daughter, father or son. Cowie argues that the complex of identifications arising for the subject are a result of the castration complex, but that Oedipal relations are not determined by active and passive aims, instead they emerge as passive or active as a result of exigencies of the subject. Cowie in effect asserts that, within the unconscious formation of fantasy, the subject can assume any subject position, thus the feminine is able to oscillate within the unconscious so that desire can assume multiple forms. However, Doane (1989) counters this by arguing that if pleasures within fantasy are accessible and multiple, despite the patriarchal nature of much of the imagery, there remains little for feminism to critique. She argues that feminising (the position) must deal with the constraints and restraints of reading with respect to sexual identities – in effect, the question of power and its textual manifestations resides with the closure of these free forms of fantasy. Cowie's position not only places the (constructed) subject in a spurious position, but it also effectively forecloses both the necessity and possibility of feminist critique.

Each time, the feminist model develops more complex models to 'find' feminine desire, while remaining silent about an obvious source, namely the erotic images of men. Does this open up patterns of meaning that secure different identifications? Apparently not. Moreover, Cowie leaves us with nothing other than a retreat into the unconscious, which negates the conscious level of existence, namely, the patriarchal order which is the source of the problem in the first place. The corporeal body is rapidly being replaced by a cluster of desire that moves between subject positions defined by representation, and yet sex as an objective category continues to be utilised in order to make the 'subject position' coherent and to remind us of the object being represented.

THE CODING OF THE MALE BODY AND ITS PROPENSITY FOR PLEASURE

I begin with Neale's 'Masculinity and Spectacle'.³³ Neale turns his attention to the various codes that produce the male body as an erotic spectacle through the use of close-ups. He argues that the male gaze is turned upon the male protagonist who incites narcissistic identification through the fantasies of power, omnipotence, mastery and control. Therefore, the close-up *triggers desiring patterns in the male viewer*. The central figure remains the male hero, upon whose will or project the external world can impose no limits. Neale argues that narcissism is integral to the fantasies produced by the narrative and its source is the exhibition of the phallic power displayed by the body in action. Most importantly, the close-ups concentrate upon the body in action, in movement, that is, as the embodiment of power. Thus, the narcissistic identification with a hero is a strategy of fantastic identification with the power of the phallus, which the male lacks. Note that this position is fundamentally different to that of the female because feminine narcissism is pathological, because its source of the desire is produced through identification with the passive object on screen. Also, the codes used to make the body erotic are fundamentally different from the feminine because they remain bound to producing the male body in action.

³³ See also Jon Stratton (1996) Nixon (1996)

By implication, an additional dimension to the pleasures experienced is the repressed homoerotic desire satisfied by the erotic codification of the male body. Neale argues that the repression of any explicit avowal of eroticism in the act of looking at the male is structurally linked to a narrative content marked by sadomasochistic fantasies and scenes. The organisation of fetishistic desire dictates that the male spectator will desire to internalise, consume and possess the phallus. In essence, the male body must be combined with violent action in order to assist the disavowal. He concludes by arguing that, given that the central spectatorial axis is organised for the male, it is necessarily the case that the relationship between the spectator and mainstream cinema is repressed and disavowed. If not, mainstream cinema is faced with the spectre of invoking homosexual desire.

Combining the erotic spectacle of the male body to narrative control by the masculine subject leads Neale to argue that the female spectator still cannot look directly. Again, women must experience their desire in a mediated form in order to make good that lack. Any desire that is contained within the film tends to be built up around the diegetic ambiguities between the male protagonists using masculine body codes of representation that are implicitly homoerotic. So, men can be sexual spectacles to women in certain instances, but only via implicitly homoerotic spectacles. Once again, if the female experiences actively-structured desire, she must assume the masculine subject position and thus undergo oscillation.

Alternatively, argues Neale, the male body can be feminised in order to incite the repressed homoerotic desire in men. He singles out Rock Hudson as the object of an erotic look in films usually identified as being aimed at the female audience. He gives an example of a scene in which Rock Hudson is framed in a doorway, caught with his shirt off. However, Neale argues that Hudson is not masculine in his moments of eroticism for women, but rather has become feminised, has adopted the feminine 'object' position. In this approach, the man must undergo an act of oscillation to become feminised so that he can become passive. The character/actor/body is secondary to the structures into which they are inserted, no matter how improbable the structures may be. Neale argues, in confirmation of Mulvey's perspective, that the codes of eroticism are such that 'only women can function as the objects of an explicitly erotic gaze' (Neale:1992:286). The commitment to the structural order persists despite a growing number of examples that appear manifestly to contradict the Symbolic order. This requires ever more complex layers of theory to reorientate or, perhaps, contort the meanings to fit the structural order. I will show that such gymnastics are repeated in order to a) maintain the central axis of the active/passive dichotomy and b) impose the number of subject positions from which the inferences regarding the formation of subjectivity can be drawn.

Alternatively, one can turn to Finch's (1990) development of gay pleasures from programmes organised along a heterosexist diegesis. Addressing the convention that defines melodrama as a feminine genre, Finch asks whether the male viewer can occupy the feminine subject position in order to access the desire organised by a feminine textual form, namely, take the male as an object of desire. Hence, he must implicitly attend to whether oscillation is necessary for a male viewer to gain pleasure for a narrative such as *Dynasty*. My interest stems from whether the absence of the masculine narrative drive where action is controlled by the male lead allows access for feminine desire. Finch develops the nature of the address by introducing a negotiation between 'textual subject place' and the 'spectatorial social position'. This is explored in two ways: first, by assessing the subject positions constructed by

the diegesis; second, through the empirical considerations of how the gay audience use camp to queer their viewing. Having established that the melodrama is on the surface aimed at women, he queries the capacity of *Dynasty* to operate directly for women's pleasure. This is partly attended to via his analysis of hyper-realism of the narrative drive, which blocks the usual structures of identification.³⁴ For example, the character Fallon nearly dies several times, and when she is finally dead, doubt is re-introduced because the body cannot be identified, leaving open the possibility of her return once more. Most importantly, Finch established that, contrary to filmic conventions, men are in the state of undress in *Dynasty*, not women, yet he rebuffs resolutely the notion that this establishes the male body as an object of erotic consumption by women; such an assumption is defined as 'naive' (1990:68).

Finch argues that Mulvey's model explains the various modes through which the codification of the body is produced, especially the use of fragmentation and fetishisation. However, his emphasis upon the spectatorial social position would apparently lead him to reject the way she maps pleasure. In this way, he argues that the pleasure that women gain from *Dynasty* is *not* from erotic contemplation, but from the mirroring of the codification practices so that men's bodies are treated in the same way as women's. He rejects the idea that heterosexual women can experience an active desire from men who are 'caught in moments of undress'. Therefore, the exposure and eroticisation of the male body can be dealt with only through the gay man's position.

Finch identifies the weaknesses of Mulvey's position as the initial negation of a distinct address to women within the woman's genre and the exclusion of extra-textual constructions by the spectator, especially in the determination of sexuality. Usually, when women are eroticised textually, lesbian and heterosexual male spectators are most easily accommodated. The lesbian's transgression, achieved through oscillation, is blurred by the fit of conspiring in the eroticisation of heroines, alongside the masculine spectator. Hence, the lesbian develops the modes of address to access the erotic construction of the feminine. He follows the logic of the Mulveyian paradigm by arguing that

for the female heterosexual spectators, a non-masculine position is an impossible one, for along with gay men, they have to work to convert the hero's actions into spectacle. But women are *not trained*³⁵ to objectify bodies as men are, which implies that *Dynasty's* codification of men along a *Playgirl/Cosmopolitan* discourse enables a gay erotic gaze at men through the relay of a woman's look.....[I]n a hierarchy of erotic pleasure, the gay male spectator who occupies a culturally constituted feminine position is perhaps the one for whom the (erotic) system works. (Finch:1990:69) (my italics)

This produces a somewhat anomalous outcome: despite the overt heterosexism of the diegesis, as Finch identifies through his analysis of the surface liberalism introduced through the characters' exchanges, the most problematic formation of desire is for women looking at the men's bodies, even though they are manifestly on display, and a direct outcome of that very narrative. I argue that it is only if the

³⁴ Note that this point reveals the broader acceptance of the Mulveyian paradigm.

³⁵ Read socialisation?

organisation of desire, as defined by Mulvey, is assumed to operate can Finch state that it is the gay male who has the most ready access to the codification of the male body.

Finch and Neale examine the codification of men with the aim of tracing the potential for a homosexual gaze of men by men. However, despite considering the feminine subject position, neither can provide access to the male body from the feminine subject position. Others have sought to correct this by taking up the issue of masochism introduced by Rodowick (1982). Each time, new levels of complexity are engaged with in order to 'find' pleasures that are blocked because of the ways in which they have defined the Symbolic and its structural organisation of identity. Moreover, because these structures are primary to the formation of the subject, they cannot look directly to what the subject might do. They have excluded the possibility of action from the frame, and thus must look to unconscious circuits of desire to find something other than total domination – except, of course, if the subject identifies with feminine heterosexuality, when she must resign herself to the desire for desire.

Studlar (1991) draws upon the pairing of fetishistic scopophilia with masochism³⁶ by juxtaposing the identification of the masculine spectator with the hero who has diegetic control over the action with the subject position produced when the narrative does not create control over the object. Usually, the masculine character carries the narrative forward through his command of the objects and events, thus serving both the male gaze and the narcissistic desire of the ego-ideal. However, when the narrative is not driven by the command of the hero/ego-ideal, the subject position produced is masochistic because it signals the inability to ensure that control of the sexual object/woman. Studlar is keen to avoid the implied positioning of the woman in the sadistic role and thus turns to Deleuzian notions of masochism because it locates masochistic desire back into the pre-patriarchal symbiosis of plenitude between the mother and child.³⁷

In effect, Studlar's model removes the necessity for the mediation of the male gaze and thus establishes a direct look *between the woman-to-woman gaze*, invoking pre-Oedipal, and thus non-patriarchal sexual pleasure. Studlar concludes that:

Although Dietrich may be constructed according to a masochistic male gaze, the absence of male mediation of the look, as well as the sexual ambiguity of Dietrich's erotic image, encourage a female looking that defies heterosexual norms and the accepted dominance/submission agenda of patriarchal sexual politics. The mechanisms of masochism disturb the power of the 'phallic' gaze to create space for an erotically charged female gaze fixed on the woman star. The result is a system of looking that elicits both the female spectatorial identification with and desire for the powerful femme fatale. (Studlar:1991:248)

³⁶ Studlar is also drawing upon Rodowick here.

³⁷ Within Deleuzian psychodynamics, the masochistic unconscious fantasy aims to disavow the father, thereby re-instituting the connections with the all powerful pre-Oedipal mother. Therefore, unlike the sadist who pursues Oedipal negation of the mother through her destruction, the masochist idealises her, submits to her so that he can be punished by her thereby symbolically punishing and denying the father in himself. The rejection of the father within himself is simultaneously the rejection of phallic sexuality.

The structural determination of the subject/object relations and the positioning of subjectivity *it forms categorically* block any consideration of the positioning of the male star in Marlene Dietrich's films. Hence, there is little consideration of the erotic potential of Gary Cooper in *Morocco*. Where he is discussed, his visual codification is defined as feminised. Therefore, if the female viewer is to access Cooper erotically, and if she is to 'remain' feminine, she can do so only by accessing the 'pathological' patterns of self-objectification. Alternatively, the female viewer can submit to the filmic form, undergo oscillation and access Cooper from the masculinised position. Yet, despite the introduction of the Deleuzian twist, the structural determination persists. Again, the turn to pre-Oedipal does not disrupt the categorical order, but rather introduces ever greater contortionist moves in the endeavour to find a way out of categorical determination of the subject position that defines the feminine as passive.

Ultimately, the turn to Deleuzian analysis merely emphasises the pre-Oedipal elements of psychic formation, which leaves the Oedipal operations intact. I argue that this reflects the broader political normative position: Deleuze's revolutionary position seeks to find a space through which the domination of the Oedipal organisation can be undermined; in contrast, Lacan and Freud look to the formation of psychic energies that supports the current order. The oedipalisation of desire, with the concomitant organisation of subject positions by the Symbolic, is always put beyond question by this model. Thus, to accept the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity is necessarily to accept the emphatic subordination of the feminine because psychoanalytic applications cannot escape the primary and privileged status of the phallus/penis. The dispute rests with the normative evaluations made of the various levels of the psyche; is the inculcation of the social order necessary to avoid the destruction of unlimited desire?³⁸ I draw parallels with the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism here because, in my view, their mutual reliance upon the Oedipal complex, recast as a structuralist operation, necessarily produces these various closures brought about by the structuralist determinism upon which they rely.

Another strategy to wrest Mulvey's paradigm away from these closures is offered by Lewis and Rolley (1997). In '(Ad)dressing the Dyke: Lesbian looks and lesbians looking', they trace the possible lesbian visual pleasures offered by fashion imagery in a field of cultural production that targets exclusively the female and overtly heterosexual audience of 'Cosmopolitan' magazine. Their aim is to explore critically the convention of understanding the process of women's consumption of images as one in which women passively identify with the 'woman-as-sign', subjected to the active male gaze. They contest the over-simplification of the forms of identification and desire inherent within Mulvey's initial theorisation, suggesting that it can be re-configured, by differentiating "desiring *to be*" from 'desiring *to have*', thereby introducing new identifications.

This is explored via women's capacity to assess other women's bodies developed by the use of women's magazines. They argue that the effectiveness of the image is dependent upon a sexual exchange of looks between the photographer, mostly male, and the female model and is initially structured by a heterosexual exchange. This implicitly references the assumption that the manifest

³⁸ This reflects the continued engagement with the Hobbesian problem of the social order.

features of the image will 'obviously' be those that objectify the female model for the male gaze.³⁹ Yet it is known to be consumed only by women, that the female model's desiring looks are consumed by women. This emphasises that the images and the codifications that aim to incite sexual desire are constructed with women in mind; the heterosexual pitch is thus marginalised. The lesbian is able to draw upon the codes in themselves, alongside the knowledge of other lesbian readership and community.⁴⁰ In contradistinction, the heterosexual woman has to relocate her gaze back into the broader structures that codify the woman's body ultimately intended for the male gaze and thus identification must take place among erotically charged images. Again, the broader location of the psychoanalytic model is central, for it offers a means to treat as secondary the empirical or conscious identification replacing them with 'real' lesbian identifications.

This is theoretically substantiated by the core concept of distanciation, understood as dealing with both objectification and narcissism. First, it is concerned with the distancing from the male gaze that objectifies and implicitly dehumanises the woman represented. Thus, the core structural position, namely the passive objectification of the woman in the image, remains of integral importance. Second, it addresses the over-identification that organises the relationship between the female viewer and the image. Ultimately, if she is to remain a part of her conscious identification, the female viewer must place the image and its associated desires back into the heterosexist logic that orders the representation. Only then can she negate the problematisation of her sexuality inherent with women looking at women. She imagines herself into the position of the model and thus projects herself as the passive object of (male) desire. The structural operations work to ensure that the female gaze is defined as masochistic because she submits to the objectification by which her subject position is defined. Therefore, from the heterosexual feminine identification position, the woman can desire only to *be* the passive object, which suggests that Doane's dictum, 'to desire to desire', remains pertinent. The objectification in her case is complete for she can desire only to *be* the object of desire. The central point of differentiation between this and the lesbian gaze is that the latter can encompass the tabooed position denied the heterosexual woman because the lesbian is able to embrace the desire to *have* the woman. Moreover, it reflects also the narcissistic desire of the active stage; implicitly, the subject position is both active and masculine. This illustrates the primacy of the psychoanalytic theory to their model of subjectivity.

However, the feminist normative position leads Rolley and Lewis to seek an escape from the pathology assigned to the (heterosexual) female viewer. Hence, their argument is forced to make another turn. Despite defining this relationship as psychic fantasy, they must reintroduce the conscious level in order to redefine the heterosexual woman's pattern of desire as lesbian, thereby ejecting the pathological elements. This is achieved by emphasising the *empirical* context of a fashion magazine where the viewer is known to be almost always female. Since the image is produced for women's magazines, Lewis and Rolley argue that this viewing context undermines the heterosexual fantasy because the model is knowingly looked at *by other women*. The conscious knowledge of who 'owns' the gaze secures the pleasure as lesbian: the narcissistic projection of the self as the model, coupled

³⁹ Again, this means that the images in general circulation will be marked overtly by the gendered active/passive dichotomy.

⁴⁰ This seems to me to be rather important insofar as it introduces the issue that meanings are derived from practice, in this case lesbian practice, and it is here where their efficacy is derived.

with the desire to be loved as that object/model, is undertaken even when the (empirical) viewer is 'known' to be a woman. They are able to conclude that the pleasures gleaned from women's magazines are lesbian in structure by reintroducing the conscious level, thereby negating the dubious political consequences of the unconscious operations of the heterosexual feminine subject position.

Stacey (1995) offers another example of the clash between the empirical and the unconscious. She attempts to synthesise the empirical descriptions of the pleasures women experienced when watching Hollywood melodrama with the deeper psychoanalytic identifications. The outcome is that the two elements of the book remain thoroughly disconnected insofar as she fails to relate or integrate the unconscious subject positions to the actual explanations given by the women interviewed. This is important for were one to provide some empirical evidence, confined as they be must within conscious utterances, these would be dismissed for they fail to fit with the 'real' unconscious structures. For example, public utterances of active female heterosexuality found in many problem pages, in 'Cosmopolitan' for example, would not be read literally but as utterances that disguise the actual source of the desire as defined by the primary axes within the unconscious. Interpellation and the mirror phase define how the subject is constituted. The Symbolic is ordered by the Phallus, therefore active feminine sexuality is not possible. Once constructed, the subject is fixed and thus the Phallic symbol must reign, which renders the model ahistorical. The Symbolic constitutes a re-presentation. This axis constitutes the subject and thus is awarded primacy over utterance.

In summation, we find the same problems reappearing:

1. When is the empirical or conscious feature to be treated 'as it is' and not a deeper unconscious substitution? The problem of dealing with the empirical leads postmodernism/feminism to talk of 'women as women'.
2. The structural order is sustained so that the subject position is also sustained. Psychoanalysis can be used in this way as the base to imply the actual desire of the subjects and the identifications formed.
3. However, this ensures the continued negation of the active feminine heterosexual desire: it does not exist because it is always redefined as another psychic position.

I suggest that active heterosexuality simply cannot remain a subject position known only through negation, never embodied or lived within the practice of heterosexuality (Jackson:1995). Moreover, I argue that this emerges as a problem only if one fails to recognise that the 'Masculine heterosexual Master' is an ideological fiction just as the absolute negation of active heterosexual femininity is. I argue that this negation is upheld only to sustain a political agenda that seems hell bent on ensuring that patriarchy, as a system that structures the psyche as well as defining the language system in its entirety, dominates at all time, so much so that Harbord and Campbell, for example, are prepared to reject both materialism and reason as the illusions of such a master. I suggest that this is an inevitable outcome of embedding subjectivity within a psychoanalytic paradigm, particularly when the sole emphasis is placed upon identification.

THE PRESENTATIONAL FEATURES OF THE MALE PIN-UP

In contradistinction, I argue that any empirical examples that unambiguously and unquestioningly present an erotic masculine/male figure must present problems for the dichotomous logic I have critiqued. I turn therefore to Dyer (1992) who presents a direct analysis of male images. Dyer addresses the block between the heterosexual woman and the male body. What makes Dyer's article of particular interest is his attention to the empirical evidence of the way in which looks are produced and situated in the context of an interaction. If, asks he, the interaction between the viewer of the image and the subject of the image is constituted through power, how exactly is the relationship within the interaction played out?

Dyer argues that women do look at men, which is at least a break with the structurally led categoricism that defines the Mulveyian paradigm, and singles out the male pin-up model and the male 'star' as two key instances. The images of male stars are defined by a certain instability, particularly when model is encoded as sexual spectacle because sexual objectification of men by women is a violation of the codifications that differentiate the male from the female. He argues that the codification is altered through the personalisation of the mode. By this, Dyer means that each star has his own look defining how his presentation is to be viewed. Therefore, he centres his analysis on how the model organises the looking axis while he is being photographed.

The first codification traces that men do not look modestly away (Berger:1972), but rather look up and off from within their position in the visual environment. Looking off outside the photographic frame, Dyer argues, signifies the lofty heights of the soul and intellect, something that the female cannot reach: 'higher is better than lower; the head is better than the genitals below' (Hoch:1979: Nayak:1997). In addition, Dyer acknowledges cases where the model does not avert the gaze but that the returning stare of the male pin-up differentiates it from the coy, partial but submissive look of the female model. The stare reaches beyond the boundaries of the field of vision established within the frame of the image, asserting his subjectivity. In contradistinction, the female gaze stops at the boundary of the field of vision between the viewer and the model. He then attends to the potential desire available to heterosexual women, noting what has previously been missed, namely that heterosexual women, as 'already castrated', have nothing to fear from transgression since there is no threat.⁴¹ How then is the phallogoc order of the image sustained? First he argues that the male gaze utilises the semiotic to block such identification patterns; hence the importance of the lofty stare. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Star's embodiment, contained within the pin-up, calls upon conventional codes of active masculinity; for example, the man must be doing something.⁴² Dyer identifies how structural relations can be made to work visually and using the most mundane sources to

⁴¹ Again, this draws on a common-sense, unequivocal corporeal fact and leaves unattended the relationship between the corporeal, as flesh, and the fact that this fleshy entity underdetermines the category it is naturalistically supposed to mirror or determine.

⁴² Neale identified that display is often combined with the narrative, often during moments of aggression, so that the spectre of homosexuality is disavowed. Likewise, it has been noted that in *Dynasty*, men were often 'caught' in a moment of undress. Hence the predominance of grooming on these occasions. Suzanne Moore notes this when she addresses the female heterosexual pleasures; see *Here's Looking at You, Kid!* (1988).

codify. Alternatively, the muscular body is emphasised, through lighting and posture, thereby connoting the promise of activity and power. He talks of the strain shown on the body, often signified by the visibly bulging veins. I will return in detail to these elements in my taxonomy as they trace the performance of masculinity and the body rather than defining the image through its relationship to the Oedipus complex. Dyer develops the argument further stressing the integration of the discourses of race with physicality. He notes that this embodiment is one that is 'of the jungle', impetuous and unreasoned. These themes will be taken up again with Nayak's piece (1997).

CRITIQUING THE PHALLIC SIGNIFIER AND THE DETERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION

In summation, I began with a critical account of the sex/gender distinction, identifying that it continued to use sex as an objective category in an insufficiently critical way. To this, I traced the broader re-evaluation of language, the central importance of which is the prior-ness awarded to meaning. The significance is that the analysis of language aimed to deconstruct the subject/object dualism, rendering both the subject and the object fictions generated by meaning. This built upon the existing ideological critique and its causal effect through representation. The development is premised upon the omnipresence of meaning and its active role in category production. To this, postmodernist/feminist critique fused a model of the subject, as defined by Lacan to Althusser's position of the ideological role of culture. Henceforth, this causal nexus aims to trace and explain a number of elements:

1. The unconscious and the sexual desiring patterns thus formed ceased to be treated as pre-given facts, as something essential to the human form. Instead, they must be thought of as constructions, as objects that have histories within and from which the subject is to be found.
2. This institutes the following order: the body is born into language and it is within the terms of language that the human subject is constructed; language is always prior to and constitutive of the subject.
3. In consequence, speech never belongs to the speaker, rather, the 'I' is the outcome of the position within which we emerge in language.
4. Therefore, the Cartesian subject is displaced by the production of subjectivities within the matrices of the structural positions within language. This encapsulates the fundamental appeal that Lacan has to feminist critique. It positions the subject as outcome, as construction, rather than essence, by placing language at the heart of what subjectivity is.
5. This integration of meaning to the social order, organised under the patriarchal banner of the Father, marks the entry of the first structural organisation of meaning: the feminine is passive.
6. Mulvey has applied the dialectic logic of Lacanianism to the seeing/seen axis and integrated into this the second axis of the active/passive.
7. Via the mirror phase, Mulveyian paradigm asserts that the feminine image of the screen must reflect the feminine position of lack. Therefore, the feminine must present itself as the object of desire, but equally disavow the lack that is her symbolic function. Therefore, the feminine as

sexual objectification is categorised as universal and permanent because of the Symbolic order. The essence of the feminine body is to signify lack since, corporeally, she cannot ‘grow’ a penis. It is this point, in particular, that raises the charge of biological determinism.

This oppositional interplay is played out by the objectification inherent in the ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ as well as active function of display.

Thus, the following dualisms are structurally secured:

MASCULINE	FEMININE
SUBJECT	OBJECT
ACTIVE	PASSIVE
DESIRE	TO BE DESIRED
DISTANCIATION	PROXIMITY
SEEING	SEEN (TO-BE-LOOKED-AT-NESS)
NARRATIVE	ICONIC
FETISHIST	FETISHISED

These sets of dualism are supposedly dislodged by the introduction of the tabooed homoerotic desire. However, it can do so only by leaving the feminine/passive axis in place. This reflects the central importance of oscillation: woman mobilises her desire, which is less fixed than the heterosexual masculine subject position, and returns to the phallic stage and disavows her castration.⁴³ She returns to her active stage and the eroticisation of the clitoris, and adopts the position of the masculine. Therefore, the pleasure of the feminine is tied to the pre-oedipal stage where the girl child remains masculinised by means of the active function of the phallic organ; hence the silence that defines the active, heterosexual woman. This is a development of Mulvey’s initial paradigm: heterosexual women’s desire to desire is brought about by their objectification (Doane: 1991). Therefore, the structural order persists and has been expanded, further producing a circuit of subject positions:

1. Men actively desire women and are therefore heterosexual and masculine; defined as Oedipalised desire.
2. Men actively desire men and are therefore homosexual and narcissistic; the object of desire is ‘the same’ and reflects the narcissism prior to Oedipalisation; it is therefore active.
3. Women actively desire women and are therefore homosexual; the object of desire is ‘the same’ and reflects the active phallic stage which is masculine achieved through oscillation. This represents a division between the fact of ‘woman’ and the unconscious desire as masculine.
4. Women that desire to be loved by men are therefore heterosexual, which is an outcome of Oedipalisation and is defined by passive objectification; she can desire only to be the *subordinated* object of desire.

⁴³ However, this is at the cost of her (conscious) moral development, as define by Freud and Lacan.

These structural orderings of desire and identification result from the foreclosure of the content of the image. By fixing the subject through the Symbolic order, they are able to introduce a series of structural relations that stabilise meaning. This emphasises the synchronic features of language: those who are formed by a system, those that have assumed the 'I', are in no position to alter the structures because they define who the 'I' is. Identification is therefore defined by either the failure or success of assuming the Oedipalised subject position. This effectively removes the potential of history and, by implication, social practice to change meaning, which equally reflects the ambiguous position the empirical holds in their explanations. At certain points, it is re-configured as another instance of the unconscious, for example Cowie. At other times, it demonstrates the identification structures, for example Lewis and Rolley.

Hence, the relationship between the Symbolic and the structuralist legacy forecloses categorically the forms the feminine may take because the structures are awarded primacy in the determination of the meaning and subjectivity. I argue that this leads directly to the overly homogenised analysis of cultural forms, thereby sustaining the inferential relationship between passive femininity as the subject formed and language as the causal mechanism that secures it. The semiotic function combines with the structural legacy to impose the universality of the active/passive.

Second, I return to the example of Harbord and Cambell who argue that the psychoanalytic model of the subject is central to the *production* of culture. They are therefore stipulating that the Oedipus complex is primary to the cultural formations we have, which I argue must lead to an additional closure: the 'story' of culture is the (re)presentation of the Oedipus complex. For example, Cowie (see also Gallop:1982; Rose:1986; Emberely:1989) trawls through numerous films identifying how each replays the heterosexual relationship via the complex of exchanges between the mother, father and child. The postmodern project means that feminists of this kind are bound to the 'end of history', but not as synthesis; as Hegel would have it (Descombes:1980), but as the eternal return of the linguistic order. I argue that this is where the idealist model of language is derived. The subject is defined as the outcome of the linguistic order, therefore language is awarded causal priority so that no subject acts on language, uses or transforms language to alter the Symbolic subject positions. Therefore the argument is essentially circular, each element depending upon the other for its coherency. Moreover, because the subject does not 'act'⁴⁴ they must look beneath the subject to the unconscious desiring flows for a trace of non-dominatory desire; hence the need for the theoretical gymnastics (Flower-MacCannell:2000; Harbord and Campbell:1998; Balibar: 1994; Copjec:1994).

To reiterate, the castration complex orders the codification and organisation of the visual presentation. The image of the feminine must be coded through fetishisation in order to disavow the threat of castration that personifies the feminine. In addition, each form of codification situates each subject position. This institutes the third closure. It begins with the location of the feminine as the absolute other of the masculine, and the ejection of the third term, namely the Other as language. Lacan uses the capitalisation as a means to denote that *both* the masculine and feminine (men and women) are subordinate to the Other, that is, language that constitutes them as subjects. This emphasis reflects his position that subjectivity is the outcome of signification through language. This is how language speaks

⁴⁴ Defined as a metaphorical illusion.

through the subject. This re-working establishes the two clear subject positions, namely the deadlock of the subject/object opposition. The tripartite relationship⁴⁵, which is fundamental to Lacan's model, is reduced to a dichotomy so that the feminine functions through her desire to make good her lack: 'she is said to speak castration and nothing else'. The dualism means that only the feminine is subordinate. The feminine cannot transcend this state, and thus cannot alter the state or mechanism that defines her as lack. Again, I would argue that the corporeal is used uncritically.

Another example of the same reductive logic is the seeing/seen axis. Mulvey et al. remove the dialectic operation *within* the subjectivity and redefine it by, and align it with, the existing dichotomies. This dichotomisation further solidifies the structure of 'the feminine as the absolute subordinated other'. Thus, no subject both sees and is seen, rather the Master masculine subject sees and the feminine (slave) is seen. This is how the structural positions emerge when Lacan is reworked according to a feminist normative position: the positions are dualistic rather than tripartite. Only by making the masculine and the feminine dialectic opposites can feminists overcome Lacan's position that both subjects are subordinate to the Law: the power of the Father does not 'belong' to the feminine, neither does it belong to the masculine (man).⁴⁶ Moreover, this dualistic reorganisation implicitly collapses the penis and the phallus because the masculine subject has been conflated with the Law.

Language is treated as a 'quasi-free-standing entity' which is reflected in the 'ness' Mulvey awards the feminine. The centrality of culture is given precedence over and above the things the subject may do. Moreover, the cultural domain colonises the unconscious, the place from which motivation is derived. The unconscious is the source of the real motivations and meanings, thus the truth lies behind the surface patterns of speech. Following this, the significations ordered by the phallus prescribe what is really going on: the active woman is really masculine, because the linguistic regime orders it so. Most importantly, the re-alignment of Lacan's model into a dualistic order introduces categorical logic to the postmodernist/feminist model; hence, the centrality of the 'ness'.

The 'dilemma' between the conscious as regulated (ideological) speech and the unconscious levels of desire is not something that Lacan faces. Lacan argues that to speak the 'I' is to submit to Symbolic order. His normative orientation aims to bring desire that is socially tabooed into the realm of what is socially sanctioned. Therefore, his aim is to bring the Real into the domain of Oedipalised desire. There is, then, a level at which conscious discourse is central. However, by making Lacanianism a proto-ideology, feminists are forced to reject conscious discourse because it is enveloped by what the illegitimate social order requires. Therefore, conscious speech becomes the equivalent part to the ideological position, namely passive femininity, and our speech acts bring forth the normative regime of patriarchy.⁴⁷ By rejecting the order of the Law of the Father, they seek to lift that taboo and thus

⁴⁵ Fundamental to Butler's analysis. It reflects that her analysis is considerably more sophisticated.

⁴⁶ Lacan argues that those men who also make the fallacious assumption that their phallus and the Phallus are one often suffer from impotency caused by the latent fear that the penis will not meet the power of the Phallus. See B. Fink (1995)

⁴⁷ The full impact of this is sometimes ignored, particular by those who seek to manipulate Lacan for libertarian purposes, by which I mean that they seek to liberate the identities and desire produced through the failure of Oedipalisation. Logically speaking, with that failure comes the failure of the 'I' that speaks. I argue that they cannot turn to the notion of the non-discursive language because of their deployment of Derrida elsewhere. He argues that there is no outside from which the insane can speak.

release the 'legitimate' desiring flows of lesbian and gay identifications and so forth. However, this again merely inverts the phallocratic order; it does not deconstruct it sufficiently.

AND THE WOMAN'S BODY?

I have argued that the structural orientation forecloses the analyses of the representations as well as the sorts of identities it is said to form. Most importantly, the ideological over-determination of the Symbolic has removed women and the activities they do from the analyses. Thus, the analysis cannot be anything other than ahistorical and reductive because, by making the social order reside in the psyche, the analysis removes any potential action from consideration, and thus the capacity to change things. This is a direct result of the over-emphasis upon the interpretative effects that form subjectivity. Consequently, this greatly simplifies the richness and diversity of the social world. In fact, as demonstrated in the numbered points above, they have reduced the human condition to four basic categories.

The feminist theory addressed thus far turned to psychoanalysis to account for the fixity of identity and aimed to inscribe the body into social process. The sex/gender distinction was abandoned precisely for its failure to do so. The sex/gender distinction leaves the body outside the domain of social organisation by remaining implicitly dependent upon the mind/body dualism. Butler refers to this as the 'raw body'. The body is treated as a self-contained and ordered entity that biologically fulfils its capacity. Yet, when the sexed body meets with its social organisation, suddenly two essential bodies emerge, reflecting the ideology of a natural hierarchical order of Western culture. This process draws the body into the 'cooked', a product of the discourses of power/knowledge.⁴⁸ These discursive orders are imposed on and constitute the entity of the body itself. As Butler continues, feminism shows that there is nothing but the cooked:

How are the sex/gender and nature/culture dualisms constructed and naturalised in and through one another? What gender hierarchies do they serve, and what relations of subordination do they reify? If the very designation of sex is political, then 'sex', that designation supposed to be the most raw, proves to be always already cooked.

(Butler:1990:38)

Discourse as representation is prior to and formative of 'I'; the feminine is therefore that which language fixes as a position. This model by-passes the body by submerging it beneath the linguistic effect. The absent body, ejected by the discourses of the Symbolic, has been replaced by the subject position. The causal force awarded such construction pushes the corporeal body out of view because

We are left, then, with desiring patterns that are absolutely unknowable or a subjectivity that *is* the ideological subject position.

⁴⁸ The switch to Foucauldian language does not conflict with the psychoanalytic backdrop, because Butler (1990) or Braidotti (1991) for example, argue that the two can be synthesised because both are fundamentally anti-Cartesian.

there is nothing to the body apart from the cooked.⁴⁹ The corporeal is not deemed to bring anything to the cultural, bar the raw material. Again, this emphasises the extent to which the subject is merely an affect of meaning. The discursive forces appear to take on a form of their own and organise the subject position independently of the body. I suggest that if the phallus is, as Lacan (sometimes) argues⁵⁰, merely the signifier of power, rather than bodily difference, then subject position that discourse defines is all there is: the masculinised is a redundant term because this only signifies that shift to the masculinised assumes a female body in the first place. If this were not the case, why is the 'male' category always behind any analysis of oscillation if the signifiers have effectively feminised body? Why the maintenance of the biological signifier? I argue that the fact we must refer to masculine men in order to maintain a feminist position suggests that there is in fact a deeper commitment to the biological body than their chimeric vocabulary suggests. Without the biological body, the subject becomes a product of language as a 'quasi-free-standing entity', and thus there would be no problem regarding the absence of 'women as women'. In fact, it ought not present itself as a problem. To illustrate, I quote Grosz:

(Irigaray's) aim seems to be the exploration of a new theoretical space and language which may be able to undermine the patriarchal and phallogentric domination of the sphere of representations, and, more positively, provide a mode of representation for women as women. If, she argues, women's bodies are inscribed as lack by dominant representational systems which leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity, their limits need to be recognised and transgressed. (Grosz:1990:168-9)

This implicitly refers to the body because without it we are left only with a metaphysical entity.

Returning to Macey's points: to speak is to assume the subject position in language: we are where ideology has positioned us. This reflects the earlier emphasis that the postmodernist/feminist programme puts on Althusser. This closure is responsible for that the postmodernist/feminists' inability to 'find' women as women who could undertake practices of self-determination. Woman, as a 'cooked' subject position is always already in the signification, that is, is already constituted or interpellated by the ideology. Thus, they have defined 'self-determining woman' as a utopian moment. By making the body a Symbolic entity, action is always in full service of the Symbolic, thus there is nowhere to create an alternative subjectivity. Is this not why 'women as women' is such a philosophical conundrum.

Furthermore, postmodernist/feminists owe us another explanation as to how they 'escape' the domination of the rational, so that they are able to rationally theorise the source of their total domination. Unlike Althusser, they have no myth of science with which to assume a position outside of that which language provides (1971:168-70). This is where the essentialist base to their critique is exposed: they draw upon their *jouissance* with which to represent a feminine subject that emerges out from under the full weight of the Symbolic construction. Yet, the very moment that the *jouissance* produces representation ironically locks it back into the Symbolic domain. They have not broken down

⁴⁹ Reflecting the Levi-Straussian legacy, this institutes another dualism.

⁵⁰ See Fink for a thorough if complex account of this 'ambiguity'.

the dualistic term that subordinates it in the first place (Gadamer:1979). Moreover, the absence of any sustained methodological reflexivity (Bourdieu:1992) has caused them to overlook their own activity, the social institution from which it takes place, and consequently, their power. This cannot be recuperated as an instance of masculinised identity because that would make a mockery of their agenda. Perhaps, their inability to account for their own social power stems directly from the fact the 'empirical woman' is such a theoretical conundrum for them. It leads them to overlook the empirical reality of their own lives.

Criticisms of this kind have been registered within feminist debate (Butler and Scott:1992) but the particular offerings of Benhabib (1992) seem to me best placed to identify a space between the closures of subjectivity contained within the Enlightenment programme and the closures that appear within the postmodern programme. *Situating the Self* explores several aspects that have informed directly the analysis provided here. While she engages in the offers made by the postmodernist/feminist programme, she queries the efficacy of inverting the dualistic logic formalised within the Enlightenment project (Pateman:1988; O'Brien:1989; Gatens:1996) by drawing upon the hermeneutic position that explores how this logic merely reasserts the initial direction of the hierarchy (Gadamer:1979; Heckman:1990). I refer here to the essentialist residues of desire that reside beneath the construction. Elements of her work have informed my engagement with practice⁵¹, but here I merely wish to trace how she creates a theoretical space between the radical constructionism of the postmodernist/feminist programme and the philosophic traditions of the Enlightenment. Benhabib concentrates on Flax's ideas (1990) but I think this critique equally applies to the work of Adams (1996), Adams and Cowie (1990) and Probyn (1996) for example.

Benhabib delineates three spheres that unite the concerns of feminism and postmodernism, namely the 'Death of the Subject', the 'Death of Metaphysics' and the 'Death of History'. I will concentrate upon the Death of the Subject since this informs the problematic of the active subject identified above; in my case, active heterosexual desire in women. Benhabib argues that it is possible to take on board the rejection of all essentialist conceptions of human being but only through radical situatedness and contextualisation. Furthermore, it is possible to turn away from ideas of pure consciousness by engaging in the structures of language without essentialising those structures in turn⁵². She argues that the 'Death of the Subject' rapidly leaves the theorist nothing other than a fictional entity that has:

"dissolved into the chain of significations of which it was supposed to be the initiator". Along with this dissolution of the subject into yet "another position in language" disappear concepts of intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity and autonomy. The subject that is but another position in language can no longer master and create that distance between itself and the chain of significations in which it is immersed such that it can reflect upon them and creatively alter them. (Benhabib:1992:214)

⁵¹ This will be introduced as part of the rethink as to the power of the image.

⁵² See Eco for a scathing critique of the essentialisation of 'la' and 'le'.

I suggest that the analysis above shows exactly how that dissolved subject is produced within the Symbolic. The subject that is left is two-dimensional. Following Benhabib, it is our capacity to creatively alter the conditions of existence that makes us human: it is our embodiment that makes us radically situated.

Therefore, that radically situatedness need not force a silence on the body. On the contrary, it is the body that places us in the world and it is the body that forces a person to take a point of view. Bodies are complex and interrelationship between the culture and the body is clearly complex. However, in my view, treating bodies and society as interrelated rather than distinct entities offers us a hermeneutically sensitive alternative to the raw and the cooked. I am a social being partly because I am a body. And as Gatens points out, being a social being is premised on the fact that my body is female. It throws me down certain structured paths, but the paths do not determine fully what sense I will make of them. My body gives me agency to act not only in the world, but on it, in a transformative way. Thus, I challenge the model assessed above by seeking a space between 'sex' as an object outside of society, free of discourse and the subject position that fully constitutes my sense of self. The 'I' is not independent of either but is a product of their interrelatedness.

AND THE HETEROSEXUAL WOMAN?

Throughout, I have been drawing attention to the theoretical negation of the possibility of an active heterosexuality experienced and lived by women. I rebel against the negation because of its ahistoricism: I do not have, nor can I ever have, an active form of sexuality. This seems to me to be premature. Nor does it tally with the changes within which heterosexuality is being explored by women. I do not necessarily think that going to see male strippers is an 'advance' but it seems to suggest a shift in the possibilities to experience desire by women in the act of looking. They do not watch in silence, alone, unlike the setting of a peep show, but view collectively and experience, what may still be transgressive, the desire of looking and are excited by the exhibitionism of the male stripper. I do not see that this can be recuperated into the subject positions offered by psychoanalytically-based cultural analyses.

There are other theoretical issues to be considered too. I can best engage with these by turning to the debates regarding pornography where the link between vision and the erotic is most apparent. One of the points that anti-censorship feminists (Snitow et al.:1984) make is that often defining male sexuality as active introduces an unhelpful dichotomisation, namely that female sexuality is essentially tender and anchored in the connection between mother and child. The ahistoricism of the psychoanalytic model tends to accept uncritically the assumption that heterosexual women's desire is essentially missing, lodged as it is within the notion of the gentle and tender. The dichotomisation is self-defeating. Moreover, it does not really tally with the 'sex talk' documented; for example, Friday's (1992) collection of women's sexual stories. Hardy (1998) suggests that there may in fact be much more in common between the heterosexualities of men and women than is generally acknowledged. I sympathise with this position as it connects with my critique of men and women as opposite rather than different in some ways and the same in others.

Hardy, I think, offers some insightful thoughts about the heterosexuality, and most importantly, he does not shy away from the part power has to play in it. He argues that active/passive structures do enter the sexual imaginations of some men. However, his research suggests that thinking about patterns of desire within a fixed structure of active/passive re-confirms rather than challenges men's thinking regarding the differing sexual patterns of women. Moreover, he argues that positioning the variability of men's actual patterns of desire within the hegemonic formations, as structured in pornography for example, offers an opening for men and women to generate differing patterns of sexual intimacy, rather than locking 'sex talk' to the active/passive structures that Snitow et al. identify as self-defeating. Perhaps a part of that ought to be an opening of the notion of desire women gain from looking. Moreover, as my results show, there has been a marked shift in the codifications of men's bodies, in particular the absence of a social setting with which to negate the objectification implicit within the image.

FUNCTIONALISM THROUGH THE BACKDOOR

I have emphasised the extent to which the cultural analyses above stress the structural reproduction of subjectivity. Thus, there appears to be no voice outside of the positions offered by the Symbolic. Equally, functionalist logic finds itself with the same dilemma. I argue that cultural analyses above do in fact carry an idea of the social self but one that is confined to the 'roles' it has been assigned. Both end up with a bankrupt version of the social actor, one that is two-dimensional. Moreover, both ultimately reside in categorical logic. In order to argue fully how these closures implicitly deploy functionalist reason, I will show how this same logic has been transferred to analysis of representation of race, exposing again the implicit dependence upon interpellation, and psychoanalysis more broadly, in order to connect desire, identification and the social order. By showing how this logic applies equally to representations of race, focusing particularly on how a subject is unable to hold two positions simultaneously, I isolate how fundamental the functionalist reason is to this mode of theorising. I therefore argue that the postmodernists'/feminists' reconfigurations of Lacan operate using a functionalist logic, and hence fall at identical hurdles. Moreover, the categorical logic and the processes of identification critiqued above can be best illustrated using Nayak's analysis of advertisements. The reason I shift to post/colonial theory here is to expose how neither model is able to deal with embodiment, that is, the lived patterns of belonging to more than one social classification at any one time. I will illustrate this below.

CATEGORICAL LOGIC, IDENTIFICATION AND THE 'SUBJECT' OF RACE

Nayak explores how the black body is seen as a source of unstable, order-threatening but intense and extreme desire, as against the moral and order-preserving white body. This discourse is drawn upon to mark out the black body as an entity that is beyond regulation and self-control but, most importantly, as a powerful force that can seduce and thus pollute white moral regulation. Hence, discourse produces 'race' by connecting skin colour to a type of human nature. Yet the mutually

exclusive categories establish a powerful source of transgression and fascination. Nayak argues that the Haagen-Dazs advertisements encode the black bodies within this discourse, therefore marking the black body as intensely sexual and corrupting. This initial delineation already establishes the comparative basis of the categorical logic, but also intimates the clash between the subject positions: who is occupying which side of the dichotomy and when? For example, an advertisement for the campaign, entitled 'Feel Me', displays a black male body unclothed, as 'an objectified figure stood still in time' (Nayak:1997:53). The image deploys codes that freeze the body, rendering it statuesque. The back of the body is the 'subject' of the pose, therefore we know nothing about the man: *he is his body*. This permits a fetishisation of the body operating through the athletic and mythological power of the natural physique. Presumably, this is derived from the discourse that defines the black male to be much more 'of the body'; bound to its capacity for musculature and force. This ideological critique is then combined with the notion of the gaze, because, as I argued above, only then can ideological representation be shown to matter, since the gaze connects the image to the desiring subject. The pose ensures that he remains unaware of the voyeuristic scrutiny of the viewer, and thus the photographic subject cannot assert his subjectivity with a returning gaze.⁵³ The combination of the pose and its location within the broader imperialist dichotomy effectively encodes his 'body as object' and the 'white as the mind'. Again, this draws attention to the possibility that one could substitute male and female for black and white, reflecting the closeness of the ideological critique.

Nayak identifies a core code which he describes as the coupling of fear and forbidden fascination; the codes draw upon the symbolisation of *black masculinity as phallus* (p55). He identifies the body posture of the black model as arched, hardened through musculature, erect and straining, the body itself symbolising a large black penis. Upon his back is a dripping white hand that is losing its form. He argues that when this is combined with the hyper-sexuality of the black man's body, it means that the white ice cream could stand for semen and the uncontrolled emissions of a primitive sexuality. The black man as phallus is confirmed by the removal of the head from the visual frame of the reference. This acts as a symbolic form of castration, a timely reminder of where the real control of this fantasy lies. Nayak concludes that the phallic construction of black masculinities⁵⁴ substitutes penis for personality, thereby 'eclipsing the negro. He is turned into a penis. He *is* the penis' (Nayak:54; quoting Fanon:1970:120). The logic is pursued further so that the phallus continues to secure power, but this time, the phallus being defined by the black man.

At this point, Nayak shifts the domain of analysis: the movement swings from the semiotic domain, with its concern with the constructions of meaning and the broader ideological location that gives these signs their weight, to the defining moment of subjectivity:

Significantly, the 'racial' dichotomy is also informative of white *subjectivity* in a doubly defining moment where the construction of the fantastic black Other simultaneously discloses

⁵³ I will be returning to this because it represents a brief example that encapsulates the slips made regarding the gaze, image, identity and photograph. Goffman traces this very well, and I borrow from his complex analysis to support my position that some images, advertisements in particular, are about 'the world' *but only partially*. He argues that representations of this kind hyper-stylise conventions of interaction.

⁵⁴ The first time a plural is used.

the elaboration of whiteness ... Analysing how such *phobic bodily representations* are put together can expose anxieties that lie within white ethnicity ... For Kobena Mercer, the fear and desire surrounding the black body 'not only demonstrates the disturbances and decentring of dominant versions of white identity, but confronts whiteness with the otherness that enables it to be *constituted as an identity* as such.' (Nayak:1997:56) (my italics)

Hence, he has swung from the frame of semiotics into the effects of the meaning. The codification of a specific kind of image, aiming to sell a specific kind of product, speaks about the desiring patterns and their pathological manifestations *as identity*. The ideology constructs desire within white ethnicity. Moreover, his quote shows that Mercer makes the same errors: he moves from the notion of 'version' to the effective constitution of the identity. Implicitly, the dependence upon interpellation remains central because only then can the formation be said to produce 'a mental orgasm that the "perverse" black body appears capable of inducing [which] is informative of the phantasmal and phobic machinations of whiteness' (p55). This mirrors the form of the feminist cultural analysis above. In addition, Nayak argues that the use of single black bodies has the effect of positioning the 'male' viewer as the fantasy organiser, capable of almost entering the scene and the bodies on display. This parallels the fantasy of omnipotence the masculine assumes by having the phallus. The structural orientation and positioning of the subject leads Nayak to fail to problematise who is viewing this advertisement. If the viewer is assumed to be Black then this problematises the analysis of the black objectification insofar as the viewer is presumed to *have* the phallus and therefore cannot *be* the phallus as well.

This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind is determined by the categorical application of the group in question, which is then elevated to the structural organisation of meaning and the corresponding identity. The outcome is that they are fundamentally unable to cope with two oppressed subject positions at the same time. The (male) black model is defined as 'being the phallus', as the object of desire and fear, which is the very entity by which the whiteness and/or white identity establishes itself. Yet, despite the fact that the eroticisation of the body is said to serve as a fetish for the white imagination, this is reconfigured as an instance of transgressive desire integral to the queer look. Thus, the single codification is made to serve both the reproduction of the normative white order and therefore the negation of the other, yet it also secures the very production of the transgressive identification, namely the queer look. Alternatively, how are we to define the subject position of the white woman? Does the representation position the white (woman) as the subject who is constituted through the negation, or the (white) woman as the very source by which the Master knows himself? This is a fundamental contradiction.

In more general terms, Nayak identifies clearly the various uses of black and white to commodify ice cream sexually; therefore the ideological map is insightful. An ideological map does not have to be free of contradiction *unless treated as causally effective*. However, his analysis falters when extended beyond this domain. This is most clearly manifested when the article breaks away from the advertisement, as both a constitution of power and a source of identification, to how the formations of the body represented can stimulate transgressive desire. Nayak includes here readings by black gay

men of Mapplethorpe's photographs, which the first example copies, and attends to 'pleasures of reading against the grain'. Such examples coalesce to create the 'possibility of subversive readings and radical alliance – "evoking female desire, gay looks and affirming black male identity"' (p60). Yet, the ideological analysis previously asserted forecloses such modes of reading. Just like Cowie, he ought to stipulate where such free subversive readings come from, given the assumption of the interpellation of image and subject. Does it not undermine the order of the Symbolic if so many fail to assume its positions and pleasures? The issue of agency forces a space between the pervasiveness of ideology, in this case racist ideology, and the corresponding construction of identity.

Furthermore, and I am indebted to Connell (1987:185) for pointing out this relatively simple inversion, just as the representations do not speak of the real lives of those represented, neither should we assume, *de facto*, that ideological constructions of meaning say anything about those whose power it protects. White people, or men, for that matter, may well have access to illegitimate power, by virtue of their embodiment, irrespective of whether they seek to act on it. However, the point is, and this is a fundamentally empirical point, the power base is there to act on should the occasion arise. In this way, the structural ordering of power can be understood as something that exists among a group, without one having to argue that this power is dependent upon the unified and homogenised identification. The differentiation aims to open up a space for the asymmetry that exists between the structure and its relationship to power and those who act within them: the structures of power cannot be assumed uniformly to determine those who hold power.

IMAGE, IDENTIFICATION AND THE ANALYTIC DEPENDENCE UPON FUNCTIONALIST REASON

I begin with the reflection that the above analysis is united by approaching the body as 'system problem', namely that its organisation is in line with social structural requirements. Thus, the Law, within postmodernism/feminism, or the order of the whiteness, according to post-colonialist theory, is the starting point. Borrowing from the long-standing interactionist critique that structural Marxists and functional theorists were indistinguishable bar their normative departure, I argue that the same critique applies to alleged postmodern shift. Both models struggle to maintain an emphasis on social or interpretive indeterminacy. When included, it tends to lead to such variability that the (illegitimate) normative order stops the causal mechanism whereby reasons, as defined by the normative order, cause action. Ultimately, I argue, this homology is based upon the wholesale failure by a postmodern agenda to deal with the mediations of power *between* action and structure. I will begin with each part of Parsons' model and follow with examples and concepts that follow such reasoning.

FUNCTIONAL LOGIC AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

The Parsonsian backdrop has as one of its defining features the presupposition that the presence of the normative order is insufficient to assume its determining function in organising the social. Parsons begins by addressing the Hobbesian problem of the social order: random or non-unified

pursuits produce a social order that is dictated by force, fraud and social conflict. The normative order is, therefore, the mechanism that removes the discordance of agents pursuing their own individual ends. Furthermore, without coordination, the alternative means and action of others would be impossible to explain and thus their actions and ends are random. Parsons' development therefore rests upon his insight that the ends pursued through individual action must cohere with the actions of others within a common framework. Moreover, this common framework must be a collective of larger social and cultural processes through which actions can be rendered sensible. To conclude, the normative order explains how reasons as causes of action connect individual action to a larger system of actions.

A connection is therefore required between the wide range of values held by individual members and a broad system of values necessary for the good of that society. Hence, Parsons requires a mechanism whereby the *values of the society become an internal position*, which motivates individuals towards appropriate action. Parsons' answer is internalisation,⁵⁵ and through this concept he integrates three elements. He begins by defining social integration as the product of the collective subscription to commonly held norms and values. Next, he stipulates that such values are 'internalised'. These two elements are then combined: the internalised values do not merely limit egoistic tendencies but *become constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire* appropriate for the collective.

Taking his influence from Durkheim and Freud, Parsons requires that actors discriminate between the various objects in the situation and that social objects be invested with accordant positive or negative cathartic significance (Parsons: 1951:201-26). Following on, the social actor must evaluate possible courses of action in relation to them. These three steps are further guided by culturally transmitted value orientations or 'organised sets of rules and standards' (1951:60). The social rules, once internalised, go on to determine the validity of their cognitive judgements, the appropriate cathartic attachments, for example (compulsory) heterosexuality, and the social actions then undertaken.

The central principles of social organisation are the following. The primary anchor is that the normative rules are the causes of action. By deploying the Freudian concept of internalisation, Parsons is able to develop a system in which internalised value standards are uniquely integrated to institutional activity. Moreover, the internalised values are constitutive in the formation of the objects of desire. For example, in becoming heterosexual, we become subjects that the social order requires and this socially determined subject is equivalent to who we think we are, which further motivates us to marry and defines our desires to have children.

The homology begins with the parallel descriptions. First, the functionalist and the postmodernist/feminist structural models argue that the social values of the order assume an internal position, and both depend upon internalisation as a mechanism to ensure that society's values feel like my values. This is why I have emphasised throughout the elements of psychoanalytic models that seek to look at the formation of the subject in terms of a broader social order problem. The Oedipus complex straddles the formation of the subject in terms of familial context and the formation of the super-ego that must correlate with the moral order. Second, both establish the correlation between the (external)

⁵⁵ The concept represents the later stages of Parsons' work at Harvard: *Towards a General Theory of Action* and *The Social System*.

values of the social order and the subject. Third, these external social values, once internalised, are constitutive of the objects of desire and thus responsible for moral regulation. The postmodernist/feminist agenda seeks to intervene in this constitution and its relationship with the 'moral' order, which leaves the feminine as 'less moral'. I argue that the apparent re-location of the Oedipal complex into the domain of language does not alter the broader employment of functionalist reason. Lacanian application has merely brought these organised sets of rules and standards under the banner of the 'Law of the Father' and made the transmission of the rules operative through language. The normative order is not tightly carried through the system of language. Finally, both establish the normative order as prior to the subject⁵⁶ and formative of a subject that acts according to the appropriate norms and values; the normative order is *inside the subject* and thus motivates him/her to act accordingly.

Parsons recognises that this process is a tenuous one. Making the social system an internal one opens the subject up to the threat or strain of not being able to live up to the demands of the social situation and/or role. This causes painful internal conflict and the loss of self-esteem. This challenges the assumption that only the psychoanalytic model of the subject is able to cope with internal conflict. Moreover, Barnes (1979 in Barnes and Sharpin) rightly notes that Parsons' failure was not that he did not address deviancy or social change; on the contrary, Parsons' attention to deviancy was extensive because he understood that the failure fully to internalise norms and values was ubiquitous within his model. Equally, therefore, Parsons recognises that the formation of the 'subject as internalised norms' is never complete, which is why a system of sanctions and rewards is required. Hence, the maintenance of the social system as subjective disposition is further strengthened by negative sanctioning or threat of having love and praise withdrawn. This further exacerbates the threat of internal conflict and the loss of self-esteem. It cannot be argued therefore that Parsons is closed to internal conflict. He utilises these threats further to stabilise the social system as subjective disposition so that deviation from the standard expectations will be immediately met with negative sanctioning, the loss of social standing and other disadvantageous consequences. This directly parallels Lacan's function of the 'Law of the Father' (1989). The fact that postmodernists/feminists seek to magnify this failure is not a negation of the functional reason but its confirmation: the subject position/role becomes an internalised position; subject is what the system's normative order stipulates, so we can only look to its failure to find 'something outside' of the order. Their 'something outside' is transgressive desire. Likewise, the attainment of heterosexuality by the woman is the moment the normative order has colonised the subject, which is why there is no pleasure for the feminine other than the masochistic desire that this identification secures; hence Mulvey's initial formulation of the male gaze.

Ostensibly, by making social system requirements and the internal subjective states equivalent to each other, Parsons has made the social system and the social role mirror reflections. Althusser's model of interpellation parallels this model, bar the normative departure. The social system is coordinated to meet sectional interests as opposed to collective interests and the social system can function with this essential conflict only if the system becomes an internal and subjective condition.

⁵⁶ Parsons' subject no more represents a natural or essential one than does the postmodernists'/feminists'.

Hence, the subject has a set of internalised values that become their own, which is why they work for the system. This forms the basis for the postmodernist/feminist synthesis between Althusser and Lacan because theorists define alienation as a primary feature of subjectivity. Ostensibly, therefore, social role and subject position are the same thing: the subjective conditions *correlate* with the social requirements of the order; neither includes nor accounts for interpretive indeterminacy.

This exposes the fundamental problem with the postmodernist/feminist applications of Lacan: from where is their own normative evaluation made? Recasting Lacanian dialectic from the internal position in the subject to structural opposites between the feminine other and the Masculine Symbolic Law means they have no speech that is not of the Law, and thus no place to account for how they make such a normative departure. Unlike Althusser (1971), they cannot call upon the critical distance between subject and position brought about by the objectivity of positivist science. Hence, the double effectiveness of the Masculine as the Symbolic locks the feminine as subject into the Real, which, like many theories that mobilise functionalist logic for a radical agenda, must look to some 'quasi-space' that lies outside the socialised subject. In conclusion, therefore, this feminist model comes face to face with failure of normative determinism: making the social action an outcome of psychological disposition means that they cannot account for their normative evaluations. Nor can they account for the public nature of meaning.

THE FAILURES OF NORMATIVE DETERMINISM – BOTH FUNCTIONALIST AND POSTMODERN

In principle, Parsonsian functionalism stresses that institutions can be non-coercively maintained by emphasising that normative order assumes an internal position. Parsons was right to identify the existence of macro norms and values as universal and thus move towards a model of society as containing a normative order. Yet this is precisely where Parsons' problems begin, namely that social orders must be explained in terms of the *motivation* for action:

It is through internalisation of common patterns of value-orientations that a system of social interaction can be stabilised. Put in personality terms, this means that there is an element of super-ego organisation *correlative* with every role-orientation pattern of the individual in question. In every case, the internalisation of a super-ego element means motivation to accept the priority of collective over personal interests, within the appropriate limits on the appropriate occasions. (Parsons:1951:150) (my italics)

Thus, action that is outside the role/subject position is always defined as an instance of temporary transgression or deviancy. Parsons and postmodernists/feminists alike simply have no way of dealing with sustained, systematic form of resistant action that is persistent and ordered; it can never be rational. This action is authentic social action, ipso facto. Barnes argues that his notion of the social, being confined to a psychological disposition, is simply too narrow, and with it rational action is never

dealt with comprehensively. Nowhere does he deal with the interpretive practices that individuals and groups bring to the things they do.

Likewise, the postmodernists/feminists have an equally ambiguous position towards action and, in fact, this reflects why it is rarely 'seen'. I return to the quote from Grosz: 'dominant representational systems ... leave no space for articulating a self-determining femininity'. They question how, and from where, active femininity may emerge. This is only a problem because they have elevated (illegitimate) norms as the causes of the action and, because the subject position is the outcome of internalisation of those norms and values, they cannot 'find' any action that is not defined by those norms. Therefore, action is characterised by compliance.

By tackling motivation in terms of internalised norms and values, Parsons automatically treats them as the causes of action. This remains one of Parsons' fundamental errors. As Heritage succinctly defines it:

this treatment inexorably draws attention away from the logic of action, that is the interpretative bases in which actions are constructed and understood in terms which are meaningful to the actors involved. Starting from a framework which began with the subjective point of view of the actor, Parsons had arrived at an entirely *external* analysis of the norms and values which he treated as constraining and determining conduct. (Heritage:1984:18)

Parsons made what is truly social a condition of acting in accordance with internalised norms and values. Therefore, what is truly *social* in any order must be the outcome of individualised, subjectively motivated actions, produced through the internalisation of the appropriate norms and values. Furthermore, any action that is to count as social must be caused, via constraint and conditioning, by those very same norms and values. In effect, Parsons has reduced the social to clear unambiguous *psychological* states. Again, this parallels the notion that the normative order, redefined as ideology, occupies the subject: the subject is that subject position: the paternal law, via the universality of language, assumes an internalised, psychological dimension. In fact, by re-casting the normative order into a linguistic entity, Lacanianism secures it further by making the very system through which, and by which, we speak. It is the *determining* function awarded to norms and values, equating them with the causes of action, that fundamentally failed to *integrate the micro-practices that people do with the system*. Thus, despite this endeavour to integrate the system and actors, Parsons ends up effectively with a model of the actor that is unable to undertake *social* action. Hence his failure to account for deviancy and social change. The social order is effective through the psychological make-up of the actor; deviation from that order is symptomatic of a pathology or at least, in Parsonsian terms, the non-rational.

Nayak's work also introduces an additional problem, which reflects the emphasis I placed upon his stipulations regarding the subject positions instituted through the representation. Functionalist reason stipulates that the normative order assume an internal position. How then are we to account for a body that assumes two subject positions simultaneously? Or rather, how is the actor to perform, in accordance with the normative order, in two social roles that conflict? In addition, how is a subject to

respond? Do I respond to you because you are a man who happens to be middle class like me, or do I respond to your difference, namely your gender? Nayak thus finds himself confronted with the impossibility of dealing with two structural locations and thus two subject positions that the body intersects at the same time. This is why I argue that cultural analysis of this kind has tended to remain silent regarding such intersections. This form of theorising merely extends the categorical logic by adding one category upon another. Never are the categories integrated. This theorisation cannot consider embodiment, which attempts to fuse together these elements. Rather, the analysis is subject to the same problems as the sex/gender distinction by leaving the naturalised classifications intact. It neither integrates them into the flow of life nor deconstructs the categorical logic that underpins the classification.

Thus, just as Parsons loses sight of action, so too do the postmodernists/feminists when they seek to apply their model. Parsons' actor acts on the basis of his internalised position, in accordance with an organised set of rules. In parallel, actions that define the feminine are those actions that support and reproduce the order. I have argued that only if one adopts Flax's position does the empirical problem of 'women emerge. They have made the patriarchal normative order the very 'soul' of the feminine and, consequently, the motivations and desires are caused by norms of that order. Hence, Benhabib's critique that this leaves us without an active and socially-situated subject.

The overly determining function awarded the internalisation of the norms and values extends beyond the failure to address sustained and rational resistance; it equally distorts both Parsons' and the postmodernist/feminist treatment of regular social action. For example, the creative output of a conversation falls outside analysis. One can discuss, one may have a particularly coherent line of argument composed before the conversation begins and one may abide by the rules of conversation, nevertheless, the exchange and identifying where the conversation ends cannot be defined by adherence to those norms. They cannot determine the nuances that really define a conversation (Gadamer:1979). Such social interactions are sustained without recourse to a normative order. The conversation, in any form, is not the re-performance of the norms. I have in mind here the emerging trend to stress that the representation is a re-presentation, thereby re-establishing the feminine as passive and its associate identification. Just as with Parsons, such an emphasis simplifies greatly the complexity and depth of social interaction and/or interpretive actions which an ongoing activity requires. The indeterminacy that Lacan allows through the slipping signifier has to be foreclosed so that the structural relationship between the feminine as other and the Masculine as the speaking 'I' can be sustained. The consequence is that the signifier returns to the feminine as castrated. The feminist normative criteria require the foreclosure of what meanings can be generated and thus spoken. We have two famous instances of this: first, Kristeva, who argues that 'strictly speaking there is no such thing as a Woman' (1986); second, Spivak (Nelson and Grossberg:1988) makes the same error when she asks whether the Subaltern can speak. Therefore, the subject position is even more determined by the normative order than in Parsons.

However, I argue that, on the contrary, feminists are able to make the critiques they do precisely because the normative order does not attain an internal position. They have identified the capacity of individuals to assume other values where circumstances encourage it, which is precisely the skill that confidence tricksters deploy (Goffman:1969). What such examples show is that, far from

internalising norms and values, which makes them stable and fixed, such stability is the outcome of contexts of action, not of the individual. Again this reflects the critical emphasis I have placed upon the requirement that a subject submit to the law to assume the 'I', as argued by the postmodernists/feminists. I have argued throughout that the postmodern agenda cannot merely seek non-identity and maintain the existence of the social order, illegitimate or otherwise. Thus individuals move between contexts because they have the rational dexterity to adopt new situations, to more situationally appropriate norms. It reveals the extent to which individuals utilise instrumental, rational responses to the demands that a context sets. For example, some homosexuals are only out socially, which means that they are able to draw upon situationally appropriate conventions to pass at work. The normative order cannot be both responsible for the formation of the subject and yet too weak to allow it to be set aside if the context so demands. This runs beneath the critique of the assumption that ideology is effective in the formation of the subject, yet so weak as to provide psychic capacity so that any subject position is available within that circuit. We cannot be both formed through such structural positions and yet free to assume any identification our desire demands. Accepting that we live *with* the normative order and rejecting that we *are* the normative order means that we can account for the variability of interpretation without losing sight of the social context that stabilises interpretive acts that gives them meaning. Thus, most importantly, the rejection of the notion that the normative order assumes an internal position means that we return norms and values to the public domain.⁵⁷ Thus, we are able to consider representations reflexively, while maintaining their location within the social world.

Barnes concludes:

Social action is not co-extensive with normatively constrained action; it extends beyond it. Norms and values are not implanted stably in individual minds; they persist in the public realm not the private, the social context not the individual psyche. Norms and values have no inherent implications which enforce and sustain a social order; on the contrary they are provided with implications by interacting human beings, so that what norms imply can in no sense explain how people interact. Accordingly, we can conclude, without equivocation or qualification, that normative determinism fails. (Barnes:1979:36)

Likewise, the postmodernist/feminist agenda equally fails to describe social action because it redefines the normative order as ideological and seeks to locate the effectivity of the normative order within the formation of the subject. This model, in a bid to pursue a radical agenda, equally brings about exclusion of social action, replacing it instead with privatised, highly concealed motivations. Moreover, just as Parsons ends up with a model of the actor who often is unable to give the real determining or motivating forces behind his/her action unless the description happens to correspond with the determinative subjective elements (Bohman:1991:36), the postmodernist/feminist cannot integrate the conscious descriptions and meanings that actors award their own action into the model of social

⁵⁷ I am indebted to Barnes for pointing out that the internalisation of the normative order signals the privatisation of the linguistic, normative domain. I develop this in the conclusion.

causation. This is why pleasure is addressed via the concealed homoerotic orientation, an orientation that is equally concealed from the conscious subject.

IN CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter, I have argued that the postmodernist/feminist model assumes an inferential relationship between the representation of the masculine/active and feminine/passive axis and the correlated formation of the subject position as subjectivity. By further embedding this axis within the psychoanalytic model of subjectivity, postmodernism/feminism forecloses the forms of codification and meaning that the representation can assume and thus forecloses the subjectivities it positions. Moreover, I argued that the broader psychoanalytic context reveals an implicit dependence upon functionalist reason that ostensibly organises the structural imperatives of the social order as equivalent to the social roles or subject positions performed: the subject *is* the normative order. This description asserts that the nature of the Symbolic operation is such that it will construct modes of codification that categorically distribute the feminine with the passive. Only then can the feminine be utilised to define the masculine as its opposite, with the consequence that the feminine is defined as the absolute Other. I also added that, theoretically, the sign in fact is as the stereotypes were, in the sense that there remains an implicit commitment to the notion that the representation could furnish an authentic identity.

CONTENT ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL REASSESSMENT

The empirical work undertaken here seeks to investigate the validity of the assumed descriptions and codes derived from this inferential relationship. I propose that in order to challenge the postmodernist/feminist description it is necessary to trace anew the extent to which the Symbolic, which assumes sexual difference is the primary difference, remains the pervasive determinant of representation and, if so, in what form. I do so by undertaking a content analysis of fashion advertisements because only by engaging with the manifest and generalised features of a collection of images can we get a sense of the extent to which the feminine is actually *categorically* connected to the passive. I argue that if the feminine as passive defines the Symbolic, then it must be apparent within our universe of representations, fashion advertisements included. Semiotics can readily produce a number of instances where the meaning is clearly marked by the gendered oppositions of the Symbolic. However, I argue that the increasing dominance of semiotic analyses, which produce intricate maps of meaning of a handful of images, is at the expense of the generalisable contours. Resulting from the tendency to give disproportionate attention to *how* meaning is produced at the expense of *what* generalised features are manifest within representation, I propose that we are no longer familiar with the manifest features of representation.

Therefore, I argue that we need to readdress the basic features of images: is it still the case that core-gendered dichotomies of the Symbolic empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of representation? I attend to this by applying a taxonomy of the body that combines specific gendered gestures and postures with the broader techniques that construct the image. Together, these conventionalised features connect to the discursive features of the Symbolic that produce sexual difference. I have isolated codes that are paradigmatic to the postmodern/feminist agenda, as well as identifying codes that correspond to key elements of their agenda. Hence, the taxonomy is guided by two principles:

1. The final meaning ought to ensure that the feminine-as-passive is manifestly apparent.
2. This level of meaning is graspable using content analysis because the meaning attended to is conventional and not unduly complex.

I am suggesting that if content analysis is strictly confined to '*what* is in the image' it can make an effective contribution to cultural analysis.

Principally, content analysis must concern itself with conventional patterns of representation that are regular and manifest. By locating the nature of a category within the conventions that form it, one can place some distance between its historical association with objectivism and inappropriate truth claims regarding a cultural form, while systematically collating generalised forms of representation. I will attend to this level analysis by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, regarding the productive codification of gender. Only if the content analysis strongly indicates that the categorical distribution is empirically dominant can the strength of their claims regarding the fixity of the Symbolic and the sexual difference it produces be considered legitimate. Moreover, I argue that the overt interrelationship between the advertisement image and the economic base within which it is produced limits the complexity of the 'advertisement as text', because advertisements are first and

foremost economic: they must secure consumption. Therefore, I suggest that there is a level of meaning found in the cultural form of advertising that is conventional, regular and thoroughly public. Content analysis is able systematically to access this level of meaning. In fact, it is best placed to analyse the manifest features of meaning providing it is *confined* to its conventional level.

METHOD AND REPRESENTATION

The chapter begins with a discussion of the principal aims of the empirical research and introduces some of the central methodological issues involved. I will draw out from a summary of the postmodernist/feminist model the combined theoretical and methodological weaknesses that are a consequence of sole dependence upon semiotics. I will then follow this by explaining why my aims are best examined using content analysis, despite its weaknesses, particularly positivistic associations, and its supersedence by semiotics. Hence, this initial introduction examines the relationship between the theoretical aims and the methods chosen, particularly their respective strengths and weaknesses.

I go on to describe why fashion advertisements were selected, the magazines from which the sample was taken and the sampling technique and the use of chi-square to analyse the frequency data generated. I also provide a description of the statistics package 'Snap for Windows', explaining the different formats and the impact that filtering and suspending elements of the sample population has upon the results.

A detailed description of the taxonomy⁵⁸ follows, paying particular attention to sources and debates that it references and analyses. Alongside the codes identified by the postmodernists/feminists, I have also included a number of variables that draw directly upon Goffman's 'Gender Advertisements' (1979). In particular, I have adopted from Goffman the way frames draw upon specific features of social interaction and stylise them (see Leiss et al. (1986) for an alternative application). In this way, 'hyper-realistic' codifications function by making seemingly 'realistic' representations of ourselves. Through the hyper-ritualistic transformations, images can appear to be 'about our social world' and yet fundamentally divorced from that reality; for example, relative positions in space can be reproduced within the two-dimensional frame and thus convey the same conventions of status. The same model of identifying regular units that guide the composition of the commercial image has been used here. The notion of commercial realism appeals because it foregrounds the centrality of the economic function, and combines this with the mode of representation it produces.

This is followed by a discussion of the methodological departure that is specific to this research. Unlike many forms of research examining sex scales or other stereotypes, I have refrained from defining those features that are feminine as part of the operationalisation. As an alternative, I have isolated a series of codes that have been used to describe gender, but I do not organise, prior to the data analysis, which descriptive term reflects which gender. Connell (1987) discusses the categorical nature of much of the research on sexual type and character, which I argue equally defines the logic that is also present in the feminist studies discussed above. I argue that the alignment of gendered codes to the sexed body prior to the data analysis reproduces the 'truth' that these very same categories continue to

⁵⁸ For a detailed description of the evaluative criteria used for each code developed, see appendix.

describe the gender well. My aim is to avoid such closures as well as expand upon the existing discussion of the categorical nature of much of the research surrounding 'the feminine'.

The final section presents the reasons why I have elected to undertake a quantitative method within a more broadly interpretive model. Attention will focus upon the justification for the quantification of meaning, paying particular attention to defending the position that signs can be dissected according to specific categories, and that these categories do not merely reflect some form of discursive imposition. The notion of the conventional origins, rather than objectivist origins, of the category is central here.

AIMS

The taxonomy aims to problematise the assumptions that underpin the dominant explanatory models in feminist Cultural Studies and the postmodern philosophical models that inform it. They focus upon the deep features of the social order that are determined by essential dualistic terms; terms derived initially from Lévi-Strauss and reconfigured into essential linguistic structures by Derrida⁵⁹ (Delphy:1996; Cowie:1997). I argue that the structural legacy that remains implicit within this model removes the prospect that social dimensions can change and shift in a qualitative sense, rather than emerging as another example or presentation of the same (denoted the neologism '(re)presentation') (Descombes:1986). In particular, it removes from the view the possibilities that representations of gender could converge insofar as they begin to share key presentational features. This would problematise the categoricalism that defines their analysis. I have suggested that one of the outcomes of this theoretical model is its failure to identify both the extent to which the masculine is now sexualised and commodified and, most importantly, that these processes may in fact be converging with the feminine so that the male body is codified using the same visual techniques. In the preceding chapter, I offered a critique of the reorganisation of an example that 'on surface' appears to contradict the Symbolic order as in fact constituting another instance of the Symbolic, often by using the imaginary to reassert the binary logic.

Thus, a singularly important element remains the presumed universality of the signs. This is partly derived from the content analyses conducted during the late 1960s and early 1970s where the universality of certain features were *empirically demonstrated*. Hence, I aim to re-examine the extent to which the dichotomies traced still empirically underpin and organise the manifest features of representation. I will do this by looking at the difference, or potential absence of difference, between the codification of men and women: how is the body codified and where does the gender differentiation lie? Describing the manifest forms of gender display that advertisements put to use traces anew the general trends in gender advertisements, and this raises a number of core research questions:

1. Is it still possible to describe the modes of representation in dichotomous terms?

⁵⁹ This is important because it is also the source that treats the representation as real in a way a corporeal body is real; that is, the body dissolves into a discursive register rather than being an entity that both limits what that register can be and also limits an individual's capacity to represent a feature of that register, under normal circumstances. Berthelot, *Body and Society*, 1995.

2. To what extent have these representations remained the same over time?
3. Is the core dichotomy of masculine activity and feminine passivity still *the* central ideological feature?

Together these form the following problematic:

4. What are the relationships between men and women and the codes, props, contexts and body positions that maintain objectification and commodification as gendered processes within representation?

I cannot stress enough that *no inferential statement is made or presumed about the relationship of representation to identity*. On the contrary, the overall aim of this thesis is to contest this very inference. Neither do I claim that the data generated can be generalised to extend to the genre of advertisements per se, let alone all representations of men and women. I suggest only that if the postmodernist/feminist argument is to hold true at all then the description it provides ought to be applicable here. I argue that to make an effective critique of the paradigmatic hold that the postmodernist/feminist description and analysis have within the academic community, it is necessary to apply systematically their terms to the images in circulation.

CENTRAL METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Content analysis refers to a standard set of statistically manipulable symbols representing the presence, the intensity or the frequency of some characteristics relevant to social science.
(Roberts:1997:14)

I elected to conduct a content analysis precisely because it aims to trace *standard symbols* that can be systematically applied to a sample population. This goes some way to balancing the current dominance of semiotics that attends to the detailed specificities of a single image. By producing systematic descriptive data, content analysis identifies the central features that define the representations in that particular cultural field or cultural market. This macro perspective furnishes patterns that are almost impossible to identify unless large numbers are assessed according to the same criteria, and, despite certain issues addressed in a moment, this remains one of its central empirical contributions. In particular, without a 'survey' of representation, we face the following dilemma: one example is presented as an instance of cultural change and another may be offered as a counter example; which application is actually representative of change or social status? In theory, this could continue indefinitely unless a context is provided in which we have a sense of how 'representative' either illustration is. Conducting a content analysis provides systematic organisation and operationalisation of the criteria by which an image is to be analysed. When combined, the systematic framework organises the data in ways that separate the material from the impressions one forms and the tertiary levels of interpretation (Panofsky:1970) in which one readily engages. Yet what one loses in the subtlety of interpretation that attending the tertiary level provides one gains in critical distance.

Berelson (1971) has set a number of methodological parameters that guide the application of this method. First, Berelson argues that content analysis can best follow the scientific research criteria if the operationalisation utilises systematic procedures, which integrate objective practices into the coding frame. Second, he argues that this principle therefore requires that the content subject to statistical manipulation must be of a manifest form only. Therefore, he argues that there ought to be a picture of the general context so that those elements that are factual and their associate meanings can be quantified. There is a specific departure that I make regarding the conventions of content analysis. I redefine my categories as systematic rather than objective. By making this shift, I wish to import the notion that the categories are reflexively constructed so that they connect to both the area under analysis and to specific community interpreters. The assumption that meaning can be unproblematically divided into its manifest and 'latent' forms illustrates one of the grounds on which positivistic applications of content analysis have been so thoroughly rejected. This is why I have endeavoured to pin my categories to those that have emerged from the postmodernist/feminist analysis. Therefore, my categories are not necessarily universal, but they are sufficiently public within the terms of the debates and critiques here to be applicable in a systematic way.

There is an additional impact that treating the categories as conventional and regular rather than objective has upon the status of the statistical analysis. I recognise that 'statistical analysis is only as good as its operationalisation', which is why the contexts, both socio-historical and linguistic, have a direct bearing upon the categorisation and that the specific conventions that I draw upon have been made as visible as possible. Therefore, I make no claim that the categories contained here are final, or 'hard facts', or mind-independent features that reveal something 'fundamentally true'. Arguably, such claims were always outside the remit of content analysis. I argue only that reflexive and systematic application of the codes provides a context so that it is possible to engage in a critical commentary with the postmodernist/feminist descriptions of the gendered body.

Next, the results of such analysis cannot be extended beyond the sample population. This principle is one that Liess, Kline and Jhally (1986) advocate also. This means that any results obtained from the taxonomy cannot be extended beyond the population of fashion advertisements. Therefore, I make no assertions that the shifts that may occur reflect some broader shifts in the Symbolic. Abiding by this strict principle of application does not affect the critique made: the postmodernist/feminist analysis asserts that the gendered dualisms are primary and thus they must be apparent in most mainstream, if not all, representation. Therefore, if these dualisms are not found to organise the representations analysed here, this undermines their claims for the centrality and unity of the Symbolic and sexual difference. Following Berelson, I do not seek to extend the specific features identified here to other forms of representation, but argue that the empirically identified manifest content contests the presumed universality and categorical distributions of the cultural signs in circulation.

Unlike Krippendorff (1980), Berelson (1971) argues that content analysis cannot furnish inferential statements regarding impact or effect of the communication. Again, Liess et al. (1986) equally regard this as outside the remit of content analysis. They argue that the most beneficial outcome of conducting a content analysis is derived from the patterns that emerge from processing large sample sizes. This also stands in opposition to other forms of analysis proposed by Cartwright

(1953 in Berelson:1971), for example, who advocates the extension of content analysis to behaviour observation, such as 'NVC' studies in psychology. This hits at the centre of the debates concerning content analysis among its practitioners: whether content analysis should and can provide inferences regarding the encoding process and what the audiences do with the product. Following Berelson and Leiss et al., I argue this extends content analysis beyond its remit; coding observation removes the centrality of conscious intentional meaning that combines with the embodied performance, which does not lend itself to quantification.

I have also queried the inferential relationship presumed between representation and identity by arguing that the descriptive detail of an image is insufficient to describe the 'effects' on, formation of or interpretations of the subject. This reflects both my theoretical concerns of tracing the general contours of a group of gender representation, as well as providing defining limits of what a 'survey' application can reveal. I will make the case below that advertisements function through simplification of the social world and thus do not operate through anything like the same complexity of exchange that marks streams of interactions within the lived social world. I make no claims that what is presented here is 'a definitive statement' on the representations under consideration. This is not, therefore, the only way these images could be approached.

Shapiro and Markoff argue:

the effort to analyse a society or personality, or to learn something of importance about it exclusively by means of a content analysis of some of its literary products, is, in our view, based upon much more questionable methodological principles than the more modest (but sufficiently difficult) effort to measure one or more variables by means of some kind of processing of the text. (1997:17)

In other words, grappling with meaning is not a sufficient base from which to make inferences about interpretive activities or the formation of subjectivities. This suggests that perhaps what caused content analysis to lose favour is not just the emergence of a paradigmatic shift in the model of signification, but that it had been extended beyond its proper parameters. Content analysis tended to shift from identifying stereotypes to tracing the effects in the formation of sexual character; for example the output of the *Social Roles* journal.

METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

However, demarcating more clearly the appropriate domain of application may improve matters, but it falls short of answering the deeper critique that semiotics launches, particularly those regarding the nature of meaning: semiotics refutes that meaning can be captured when communication is broken down into discrete categories of form and content. The central methodological departure that semiotics introduces is that meaning is an internal structure. The object of analysis is therefore to learn how the signifier, or the material vehicle, carries the signified to the interpreter. This is said to constitute a paradigmatic departure because it rejects outright the notion that meaning can be manifest

or on the surface (Dyer:1993; Leiss et al:1986). The semiotic model argues that meaning is dependent upon the place of any particular item within an entire system. Thus, isolating any element significantly alters the meaning of that element, as well as the whole structure. For example, it may well be the connotive feature of the sign that is the centre of the meaning, but this connotation is secured only through its relationship; 'BEANZ MEANZ HEINZ', for example. This is partly countered by the appeal to the distinction between the denotative and the connotative. The denotation aims to trace a particular concept or category upon which the connotation was placed. Thus, all significations are of this form (denotative) or a derivative of this form (connotative). However, the Saussurian distinction that separates the signifier from the signified is a theoretical distinction only: the meaning is both elements at the same time (Barthes:1978). Moreover, as each derivative develops it builds up these associations, wherein each single signifier generates several signifieds in succession. Thus each concept has a chain of potential associations, each one building up chains of its own so much that the immediate mental concept or denotation becomes more abstract. In the end, the denotation can be impossible to find as it is encompassed by ever more meaning. The denotative object or concept can no longer be merely itself. Thus, stable categories cannot be isolated from this chain because they are in effect the workings of the content and the connotation. It queries whether the object can maintain the meaning of what it merely is.

This is the main area of the critique that is launched at content analysis: one cannot isolate a category because it is 'taking over' play of implied, connotative meaning. Moreover, it is argued that the connotative meaning increasingly assumes central position, that is, the Symbolic order is primary. For example, Sawschuk (1989) examines an advertisement from a Dior campaign and draws our attention to two elements. First, she addresses the gendering of the word 'Coloniales', which she argues signifies woman as the colonised subject at the same time as she is elevated to the level of the exotic. Second, she draws attention to the headscarf, which with closer inspection is in fact the flower anthurium. She argues that the centrality of the flower is not one of illusion necessarily but has to do with the phallic signification of the stamen. Thus, the connotative takes centre stage, defining the meanings by which the woman's face is encoded, which requires both the flower to be the substituted phallus and the feminine 'e' to anchor the meaning of the image. This displaces the importance of quantity or frequency because the meaning of the items within the message has no understandable context, without establishing their interrelation.⁶⁰

However, implicit within this model of signification is the notion that meaning cannot be stable. Only the combination of the context and the specific interactions of the signifier and signified can trace meaning. This may well be the base from which all meaning emerges once the propositional foundations of objectivist models of language are rejected. However, this needs to be combined with the fact that even simple statements are derived from the same interactions, but they are nevertheless a stable feature of social interactions, so that we do not treat basic categories of language as problematic (Goffman; Lakoff; Eco). If we cannot treat language as regular, conventional and stable, that is, stable enough to count certain examples, then we are rejecting the notion that meaning is ready at hand

⁶⁰ This also gives an indication of the case with which difference has been brought into the analysis of commercial culture.

(Cavell:1995). This implies that each set of interactions is equally specific. If this were the case, there can be no generalisable or conventional features to meaning, each meaning being singular and new. This seems to negate the public and conventional nature of meaning, that is, meaning that is in social circulation. I argue that convention is central to how meaning operates, in fact, to how anything is meaningful at all (Cavell:1995; Taylor:1985). It is in this sense that I have emphasised that content analysis (a) must be confined to the manifest features and (b) provides no evidence from which to make inferences beyond the sample population. To this I add that as competent linguistic users, we can practically apply a category at its denotative level, even if in effect this is an artificial distinction in the production of meaning (Cavell:1995). Even if meaning cannot be finalised, this does not mean that meaning can never be stable and thus treated as foundational for pragmatic reasons (Benhabib:1992).

Yet this does not clarify when semiotics is an essential method and when content analysis is appropriate. When is the meaning conventional and when is it more complex, thus requiring an analysis of its specificities? I turn briefly to the three levels of meaning to which Panofsky (1970) refers in order to elucidate how we might differentiate them.⁶¹ The first level he develops is described as that of the primary subject matter, which consists of lights, colour, shape and movement, that is, those features that contribute to the elementary understanding of representation, whether of people, objects, gestures, poses or expressions and the interrelations that comprise events. This level of meaning corresponds well with the notion of manifest meaning, which operates on the surface. I argue that content analysis is able to contend with this level of meaning. The secondary level is associated with the more complex composite and conventional sets of meaning that relate to the wider culture. He gives the examples of particular motifs that are linked to themes and concepts. These motifs combine to form sets of images and combinations of images that form stories and allegories. Where my codes connect to the wider culture they do so because they have been drawn out from the various semiotic readings, and belong to and are recognised by a specific community with whom I am in contention. Finally, Panofsky describes the level of meaning that is most complex as the intrinsic meaning that combines with underlying principles, which reveal the basic attitudes of a nation, a period, class and so forth. This is comparable to Gadamer's notion of the interpretive horizon (1975).

This model establishes some boundaries between levels of meaning to which content analysis can be applied and the levels of meaning that can be grasped only by semiotics. Clearly, opting for a systematic approach to the content of advertisements is necessarily at the expense of the more subtle and deeper engagement with meaning that semiotics provides. However, this in itself is insufficient grounds to reject content analysis, since it mirrors, in a sense, the 'cost benefit' analysis between quantitative and qualitative research: a strength of one is the weakness of the other. When images are treated as a population, we are able to identify generalised trends: when images are examined singularly, we are able to trace the interactions required for the production of meaning. We exchange the 'what' of the image for the 'how' of the image. Yet, despite the strength of semiotics in exploring how meanings connect and interact, it nevertheless faces problems also. My main criticism refers to the absence of a systematic methodological approach with which much of this form of analysis is

⁶¹ Panofsky's study applies specifically to his analysis of paintings, but I think as a guide it is applicable to most symbolic artefacts.

undertaken within Cultural Studies as a whole. One should never generalise from specific and limited examples, however valid the data furnished.

Returning to the historical emergence of semiotics within Cultural Studies, I have embedded this within the broad contours of representation that the survey of the images, that is, content analysis, had established. However, what occurs now is that single images, sometimes a few, are selected and analysed in such a way that they are assumed to describe the macro ordering of ideology. The examples analysed are then taken as examples of the (re)presentation of ideological forces. At no point have the images selected gone through any systematic procedures. Unlike in qualitative analysis in the social sciences, those interviewed have been systematically selected from the relevant sample population. The findings that are generated out of these unstructured interviews are extended beyond the specific individuals; that is, the results are high in validity, because of the strict sampling procedures initially followed. Therefore, the small sample co-exists in regard to its relationship with the wider population. In no cases during my literature research was I introduced to reasons why these particular images were selected. Therefore, there are no checks or balances in place with which to prevent the selection from being guided, consciously or otherwise, precisely because they are instances that reflect their model of argument. For example, in Krockers and Krockers' *Panic Bodies* (1988), Faurshou and Sawchuck both selected the same Christian Dior advertisement to show that the feminine and the oriental are both the Other to the Law of the Father. Alternatively, Doane (1988), Cowie (1997) and Mayne (1993) have all undertaken analysis of *Now Voyager*. This surely carries the implication that the advertisement was picked because it demonstrates the argument, rather than forming or adjusting the argument as a result of the empirical evidence.

Second, I argue that the postmodernist/feminist applications of semiotics, applied as part of a broader ideological critique, readily make inferences regarding the effects upon subject (position formed). This is why psychoanalysis is central to their model of argument. They use it and the meanings produced through the Symbolic both as the base by which the image functions and the base by which the image can be assumed to be representative; the latter being premised upon the universality of the Oedipal story and its subsequent organisation of the feminine as passive. Therefore, they are using an analysis of how meaning is formed and extending it inferentially to describe the identification process the subject positions constituted. I argue that this is equally beyond the remit of semiotics.

Therefore, the appropriateness of content analysis rests with the following issues: what sort of meaning is produced within the form of the advertisement?; how do we get a handle on the various levels of meaning to which a systematic analysis is appropriate? First, I argue that advertisements are not defined by high levels of complexity and that the blanket term of 'text' obscures the considerable differences between them and thus the appropriate methods to analyse them. Second, the methodological link between the complexity and subtlety of the tertiary level and the regular manifest levels of meaning, with which I argue advertisements deal, is convention. A successful advertisement is one where the targeted consumer connects the commodifying meaning to the product in question. Next, where advertisements tell stories, in this case about what men and women are, they do so by drawing from the complex flow of gendered interactions, condensing them so that they are readily identified and

presenting them back as realistic versions of those interactions. Barthes (1972) argues that this is how advertisements contribute the production of modern myths, while Goffman (1979) upon whom I explicitly draw, defines this as the hyper-ritualisation. However, before I discuss in more detail the relationship between the advertisement and the social presentations made, I will describe the sampling procedure and the population source and define the categories operationalised.

Essentially this entails a defence of counting the respective frequencies of the codes as they occur on the bodies of men and women. I counter the charge that the categories I have developed are merely an interpretive imposition in two ways: first, a significant number of the categories in fact identify only the body position, posture and so on that are featured within the two-dimensional frame; second, where more complex codes have been used, these draw upon publicly accepted codes that are recognised as central to representation of the genderised active/passive dualism. The codes are therefore either drawn from embodied categories (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Johnson: 1987) or reference directly ideological patterns that the postmodernist/feminist programme identifies as key to the (re)presentation of the feminine as passive.

To question the homogenised description of postmodernism/feminism requires attending anew to the manifest content of representations. Therefore, I aim to challenge directly the closures identified above in three distinct ways:

1. If the gendered dichotomy is operative in the way postmodernists/feminists define it, then this ought to be readily available to interpretation, by which I mean that it ought to be 'on the surface' rather than requiring complex semiotic readings from all readers. The abstractions that stipulate that representation is an outcome of a phallic order of signification are the primary target.
2. It is necessary to re-engage with what an image 'is'. Goffman argues that in order to understand its relationship to power it is necessary to pay attention to its resource, its production, which is dependent upon those resources, and the cultural meanings involved in the latter; I therefore query that the power lies in the image.
3. The abstractions dissipate the body as an entity and, in consequence, the body as locus of action is dispelled. I return the body by examining what the body must *do* to be self-evidently passive, that is, identifying how the body performs the supposedly determining dualism. I therefore seek to trace the manifest content by examining how the body itself performs these presentational features.

In this way, the taxonomy pays specific attention to the visual conventions of the body - *what is the body doing when it does passivity?* - which are combined with the specific conventions of the image.

I have organised the masculine and feminine according to the ways the body is conventionally positioned and what the body must *do* visually to perform the semiotic effect of passivity, as well as looking at 'who' does that performance. I have attempted to take a step back to see anew what might be involved in this accomplishment. This directly reflects the influence of Goffman's examination of the 'presentation self' (1969) when it is re-cast into the domain of representation (1974). By emphasising the materiality of the body, I have sought to use it as a base, thereby starting with 'body as action' rather than the 'body as system outcome'. I break down the broader ideological contours to identify the

units of the body that combine to produce them. Therefore, the emphasis is placed upon what the corporeal body can *do* in presentation, instead of treating it as the *outcome* of representation. I seek to shift the emphasis a little by considering the ways in which the body is involved in the representation and then locate this representation back into the social world. In this way, I want to think of the representation and its impact in terms of locations in social action where poses may be taken up, perhaps in different domains of social interaction. This shifts the emphasis away from merely defining our postures as the outcome of a prior representation. Thinking about the active body introduces a space wherein we transform ourselves, perhaps only minimally by ridding the posture of its artifice, but at least acknowledging that we are competent users and interpreters of those presentations. I propose that we ought to consider inverting the direction of causes, namely that we have the representations we do because they rely upon our conventions of embodied interaction. This is, in effect, what I mean when I say that we should not only examine the body as system or structural outcome.

As well as addressing the specific features of the body and its codes, I have also drawn upon various codes identified by postmodernism/feminism. My aim here is to apply the codes and turn them back upon themselves, as it were, that is, use their own criteria to assess just how frequently the feminine is represented and codified using the soft focus, for example. A central defence of the use of content analysis rests on the fact that I am drawing upon a bank of established codifications, both as a public source by which to apply the codes, but also that the public recognition ensures that the codes are not merely a set of (private) discursive impositions. Postmodernist/feminist argument is dependent upon anchoring the code of specific sets of meaning that re-confirm the reign of the phallus. Thus, they have isolated codes such as soft focus, different forms of concealing the face, different direction of looks to demonstrate the symbolic production of the feminine as fetish, for example. The elaboration of a semiotic reading from specific codes is not the remit of the content analysis either. I have merely applied these codes on the basis that a majority ought to be prevalent and categorically distributed in order to make the case they do. Therefore, I mobilise their criteria to trace the potential shifts in representation.

FASHION ADVERTISEMENTS

The sample is confined to fashion advertising, notably because if one seeks the specific elaborations of a commodified and sexualised femininity within hegemonic cultural forms, one would expect to find it within this intensely visual domain. Therefore, I argue that this weights the analysis towards re-establishing categorical sexual difference. Hence, I begin with the specific elements that relate to feminist critique. First, fashion directly links the presentation of femininity to the economic realm. Second, the advertisement can utilise almost any social scene, be it within the public or private domain, because clothes are a universal feature of social life. Therefore the image makers have at their disposal a whole range of ideological tools (Lash and Urry:1994; Featherstone:1982:1991; Wernick:1991 Jameson:1984), for example, placing single women in the domestic sphere and always accompanied by men in public space (Goffman:1979). Third, fashion is a central domain for the institution of various disciplines imposed upon the female body, particularly dieting regimes. This links

directly with other contemporary debates on the health of body, for example the stiletto heel: the shoe damages the foot as well as altering the position and shape of the spine, thus placing it under considerable strain (Bordo;1993; Sawuschuk in Krocke and Krocke:1989). Fourth, by examining fashion one is able to integrate the foundation of postmodernist/feminist critique to the wider normative assumptions regarding the essential feminine body. This is the 'real and natural body' that is subject to distortion and control in order to meet the aesthetic of extreme thinness that renders the real woman's body child-like.

Regarding more broadly sociological issues, considering fashion firmly locates us within the problem of the body for it signals the possibilities for intentional elaboration of the body as a manipulable, material surface and form within certain social structural possibilities. Not only is the latter signalled by the increasing capacity of people to integrate various commodities into a specific style, but it also marks the entry of social structure in that this governs the sense that can be made of the development of a style. This connects back to the position outlined above that signs are manipulable within highly regular and structured contexts. Moreover, it reveals the extent to which the corporeal body forms a significant base to these practices (Shilling:1993).

An additional and distinctly sociological interrogation of the body also makes its point for entry here: clothes remain a central and regular practice undertaken to accomplish accurate sex assignment. Plucking eyebrows; shaving legs; walking in way that makes wearing high heels possible, which impacts upon the muscle development in the legs; wearing skirts which alter how one can sit, especially if it is short; colour; the way the shirt buttons up: these are all common-sense, relatively unseen features of accomplishing gender. As we all pre-reflexively assign sex where genital confirmation is not possible, the detail of 'sex' that we read every day is carried by the clothes we wear (Kessler and McKenna:1978; Kessler:1994; Garfinkel:1967). The unquestioning commitment we have to 'two absolute sexes, and that I am most definitely one' is carried through the clothes with which we perform our gender. For example, breasts are more frequently used to convey a social gender than to perform a specific biological function. Thus, clothes play a central role in the discursive construction of sex upon which the decisions as to what clothes we wear is built, as well as the kind of femininity a woman may want to perform. Thus, clothes are central to 'keying' or practical and performative accomplishment of sex.

MAGAZINE SAMPLE

The magazines chosen are *Cosmopolitan*, *Arena*, *The Face* and *i-D*.⁶² They have the same target audience age of 18 to 35 years. There are no lifestyle magazines targeted solely at men outside this target age group and also there are no lifestyle magazines of comparable genre that are targeted at both men and women outside this age group like *The Face* for example. *Arena* and *Cosmopolitan* are single-sex magazines. Both magazines contain generic features on fashion, style, interviews, reviews as well as tips on who should wear what, on what sorts of figures and so on. *Cosmopolitan* magazine

⁶² In addition, I could also be assured unrestricted access as they are all held at national libraries, as well as avoiding the conditions of use that are often imposed by the magazines' libraries.

describes itself as 'an intelligent woman's sparkling best friend. Punchy, provocative, and pertinent articles that inform and entertain'.⁶³ Thus, it sets up its discourse as being for and about the 'independent woman'. It is published by National Magazine Company, one of the biggest publishing houses in the UK, which also has a sizeable share of the US market. The recorded circulation figures for *Cosmopolitan* magazine are large at 456,131 readers (*Willings Press Guide*, 1996). Clearly, then, it has significant power within the market, suggesting that it secures the most hegemonic configurations out of the magazines selected; defined as such by its market position and the assumption that it serves 'sectional interests'. *Cosmopolitan* is, arguably, an example of how the commercialisation of the discourse of feminism has co-opted and de-politicised the feminist agenda by making feminism an issue of lifestyle.

An additional reason for selecting *Cosmopolitan* is that it is the prototype of young women's magazines. It was launched in 1971 and has been central in the production of the 'young woman who can have it all'. This sample has been extended back to 1975, which indicates how the representation seems to have shifted since then. The cases assessed will be examined through a number of key clusters in order to tease out some sense of shifting formations of femininity in a magazine that has a privileged position in defining femininity.

The other three magazines reflect different market shares, as well as supplying both the youth and men's markets. *Arena* magazine describes itself as 'general interest magazine for men on the arts, film and fashion'. This magazine has built up a reputation among its target audience as being for the professional single man who takes an 'interest in all things cultured' while maintaining his 'straight' sexuality (Mort:1996:Nixon:1996). *The Face* and *i-D* are youth magazines read by both men and women. The latter emphasises style and fashion, and concentrates on youth sub-cultures, such as the dance scene. Both these magazines are self-consciously stylistic in the sense that they have redrawn the boundaries between the mundane, design and mass culture by bringing slick design and presentation to the layout and interviews.⁶⁴ They do not contain generic features such as problem pages or guides to achieving a flat stomach in ten weeks (see *Men's Health* magazine). Thus, of the four magazines chosen, two are targeted at single-sex audiences and the other two are 'style' or 'youth' magazines. As stated, the magazines have also been selected on the basis of their varying publishers. *The Face* and *Arena* magazine are both published by Wagadon Publishing Ltd.

Wagadon was launched in 1980 with *The Face*. This magazine was considered 'ground-breaking' at the time. Since then, it has come to be a middle-sized publishing company, but with considerable clout because of its original creative input to the magazine markets.⁶⁵ Its circulation figures have fallen since its heyday in the mid-1980s because of the growth of similar magazines but it still maintains a circulation of 107,192 (*Willings*, 1996). *Arena* magazine was launched by Wagadon in 1986. Some difficulties were faced when it was launched as a result of the fact that men as a group were resistant to being identified as such, which is highly significant. As Mort (1996) argues, men were

⁶³ *Willings Press Guide*, 1996. P.348. All other magazine descriptions are also derived from *Willings Press Guide*.

⁶⁴ For a non-academic reference see *The Guardian*, 24th November 1997, or the *Independent on Sunday*, 30th November 1997.

⁶⁵ See *The Guardian*, 24th November 1997 or Mort:1996.

used to being the 'One'⁶⁶ and found the prospect of being defined and identified as having distinct interest from cars to grooming somewhat disempowering. The circulation figure for *Arena* magazine is 76,879 (Willings, 1996). *i-D* magazine is published by Level Print Ltd, a small publishing house. Its estimated circulation is about 40,000 per month (Willings, 1996). These figures suggest that it is subject to fewer of the commercial pressures dictated by the mass-market sector. It is also a competitor of *The Face*. This raises the issue as to whether the images contained are also non-mainstream and therefore outside the hegemonic concerns of culture.

Together, the magazines provide scope to analyse the extent to which representations of femininity and masculinity are homogeneous, irrespective of the magazine's pitch. For example, is there as high a frequency of macho images of men in both kinds of magazines or do the different target audiences affect the gendered nature of the presentations of the body? If the magazine is aimed at and read by men does it significantly affect the way women are portrayed compared with the way that women are portrayed in a women's magazine? This may reveal any differing stereotypes that one sex has of the other or, alternatively, how one sex wishes the other sex to be represented and thus consumed. Does *Cosmopolitan* magazine predominantly represent men as romantic heroes or as sexual studs, for example?

SAMPLING

The sample is made up of twenty advertisements per magazine and two magazines per year taken from 1975, 1985/7, 1990, 1995. The bulk of the analysis will concentrate upon the time span from 1985/7 to 1995.⁶⁷ The sample is selected from the April and September issues. The six-month period helps to ensure that the results were not overly affected by the pure stylistics of the magazine, thus preventing any results from being an outcome of short-lived trends rather than any substantive shift in the modes of representation. If the former were the case, one would expect a high frequency to cluster around a single period. In addition, April and September were chosen because this would ensure a balance in the amount of flesh revealed, as these months correspond to the 'fashion seasons'. This is necessary in order to prevent the variable that traces patterns of sexualisation from being skewed.

The random sample was selected by counting the number of advertisements per issue and dividing this number by twenty. The random selection starts with the first fashion or perfume advertisement. Thereafter, another image, for example the third, would be selected, thereby achieving an evenly distributed sample of twenty images. The sample to be selected from in each magazine includes the inside cover through to the back cover of the magazine. The front cover of the magazine was not included in the sample as it has a particular semiotic construction that targets the promotion of the magazine's features rather than the commodities selected here. Moreover, the semiotic construction is more discursive in nature, using headline-like, verbal constructions that connect the magazine to sex

⁶⁶ Although he provides little evidence for this. Moreover, should this not produce problems for the Symbolic order since 'to be the One' is an outcome of being able to define the Other?

⁶⁷ The starting years 1987 and 1985 differ because the emergence of men's 'lifestyle' magazines did not take place until the late 1980s. *Arena* magazine was first published in December 1986; therefore, the first issue was taken from 1987.

and relationships to broader discourses of sex. These strict selection rules were adhered to so that the sampling was repeated across the different magazines, ensuring that the differing magazine layouts did not distort the sample.

An important distinction to note is between the sampling unit and the actual cases processed. The sampling unit is the advertisement and the case is the individual body. I chose to select the bodies within an image in a bid to maintain an eye upon the relationships between them. However, this produced an anomaly: while twenty evenly distributed advertisements were selected, the object coded was the body or *bodies* contained within any single image. It went by unnoticed because a majority of the piloting had been conducted on contemporary magazines that rarely use more than one model per image. Hence, while the sampling frame selected twenty advertisements, this would not necessarily lead to the processing of twenty bodies. The outcome was a significant growth in the sample size. It rose from the intended 500 to the actual number of 703. However, the random sampling did also balance out the case distribution across the magazines. The average number of total cases per magazine was 158.25. The largest deviation from the mean was 171. Thus, there is a relatively even distribution. To reiterate, the decision to select the advertisement as the unit of analysis stems from the aim to identify the relative positions and status between the models within each sampling unit. I sought to maintain a holistic sense of the image as a whole. While the method collates the relative distributions, an attempt to convey a more complex set of interconnections was inappropriate. This is discussed in more detail when variable twenty-four is considered.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The logic behind the categorisations is to produce frequency data from which information about the relative distributions of the codes of body elaboration between the male and female figures can be ascertained. The object of the statistical analysis is to examine the extent to which the independent variable (sex) determines the frequencies of the dependent variables (codes of body elaboration). The operationalisation of the taxonomy is such that only nominal frequency data can be recorded, consequently, I use chi-square as the statistical test because it places no upper limit on the size of the tabulation. This test evaluates whether the difference between the observed frequencies and expected frequencies under the null hypothesis can be attributed to factors other than sampling fluctuations or to factors other than chance. Chi-square is a test of difference that shows whether the distributions are statistically significant. Significance is judged by the score, which if of a certain value, strongly states that a relationship exists between the variables measured.

Note also that the variables are unrelated. Thus, the framework does not measure the differing response of the same subject to various sets of conditions and this excludes the possible use of stronger inferential statistics. Unlike correlation, it cannot describe *how* one variable affects another, be it in a positive or negative direction. The chi-square test states only whether *a* relationship exists or not. Inferential statistics like correlation are able to identify overall trends as to where or with which variables the significance lies; chi-square does not. Therefore, where a difference is measurable, it is insufficient to secure the endurance of the dualisms in question. For example, statistical significance

may be a result of marked difference where the masculine has a higher frequency of 'looking down and to the side', a code that we associate with the feminine. Chi does not describe relationships thus and we cannot assume that the difference confirms the persistence of the gendered dichotomy. Therefore, when difference is statistically significant, I have taken care to relate this to distributions of each individual code in order to avoid assuming that the distributions reflect the conventions of the gendered code.

Furthermore, my concern is *not* to produce inferential statistics as this would entail developing a model of sexual scales or stereotypes. These models of sexual scales, no matter how detailed they become, are effective only insofar as they rely implicitly upon sexual dimorphism (Maccoby and Jacklin:1975). I reject the operationalisation of sexual scales⁶⁸ because they most often reproduce the integrity of the masculine and feminine sexual types: correlations like 'the slimmer the model, the more feminine' by definition maintain the dichotomous sets of associations. Connell argues that the operationalisation of much sex scales research is ostensibly responsible for the 'confirmation' and endurance of the internal unity of category of femininity.⁶⁹ Any results found are dependent upon the prior legitimacy of the measures, that is, they are dependent upon assuming that *only* femininity is defined and measurable through thinness. As this logic is extended, it means that different measures for the masculine are operationalised. At best, scales can describe stereotypical expectations. They cannot describe gender because most of the traits selected for analysis describe most men *and* women at some time or other. For example, stereotypically we ascribe aggression to the masculine. Thus, the codification reflects the dimorphic logic because the masculine is all of these things and the feminine is a different set of traits. Even if this staggered into a scale so that the respondent or image is measured by 'more or less' masculine, it still presumes that this trait or code 'belongs' to the masculine and by implication is not of the feminine. Hence, the prior operationalisation rules out that the masculine may be equally associated with thinness. Different frequencies in distribution are seemingly entrenched because the male and the female are always assessed with different criteria (see Millum:1976). In contradistinction, the categories operationalised here are not defined as masculine or feminine *prior to data collection*, instead any potential difference is established by the actual distributions themselves. Potentially, therefore, this could reflect *either* categorical difference or gender plurality. Hence, the test of association describes numerical relationships between the distributions produced.

The last departure concerns the convention of refuting the null hypothesis. Quantitative research stipulates that the null hypothesis be phrased thus: *there is no relationship between the IV (the sex of the model) and the DV (the codes used to represent it)*. The outcome, however, is that researchers are bound to find difference in order to have a body of results. This is particularly important in undertaking gender research because it has the unintended result of seeking to find *sexual difference* rather than *similarity*. I do not seek to prove or disprove anything, contrariwise, my aim is purely descriptive. I do not claim to explain how ideology connects to the social world by conducting a content analysis. I seek only to trace the frequency of use of the categories that postmodernists/feminists assume to be universally present and categorically distributed. Thus, my aim is not to describe the correlation or make casual connections, but rather to identify if the differences in

⁶⁸ This aims to bring Connell's analysis of sexual scales to bear on the method.

⁶⁹ R. W. Connell, p. 171

the frequencies are due to factors other than chance. Neither therefore do I define what those factors may be. To reiterate, the single most important shift to the operationalisation is not to organise the codes into masculine and feminine types or groups. I have elected to allow the results to define what is a masculine code, a feminine one, or whether, in fact, it is empirically used equally across both body types. This research is particularly interested in exploring latter possibility.

DATA AND ITS ORGANISATION

The package allows the coding frame to be programmed in such a way that if certain prior cases were recorded it would automatically mean that some questions would be excluded in the future. This is one reason for the varying sample sizes across the differing variables. The pre-programmed exclusions ensure greater accuracy and save time (see Cottle:1997 [www.Soc. Res. Online](http://www.Soc.Res.Online)). As stated, the extent of detail in the taxonomy was included to ensure that any potential variability was recorded. The detail was also maintained because the package can be re-programmed so that those categories with an expected value of five or less could be merged together, which then enables those cases to be statistically assessed. Only those categories that are mutually exclusive can be combined. For example, twisting away and twisting forward may be merged together because the body can be only one or the other. They can either re-group in a more general category or merge into the 'other' category.

Note that the tabulated data included in the next chapter has a slightly different format from the original. This is operative only within a previously designated variable. The amalgamated cells are entitled 'derived'. It was necessary to do this, as the detail of the coding frame was not required. As stated above, the extent of the detail was included in order that the regularity or variability of the image could be traced rather than imposed by pre-determined codifications. The rearrangement of the variable can be examined as it is included in the appendix. Care has been taken to ensure that any amalgamations made are done so in accordance with the logic of the taxonomy. Moreover, I have ensured that each of the sub-variables that have been collapsed together is not counted twice as a frequency.

KEY PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE OPERATIONALISATION OF THE TAXONOMY

As stated, I have generated a number of codes that target the body in order to examine what the body must do to perform femininity. For this, I have drawn heavily upon Goffman's analysis of the body and its performance within the visual form, as well as Goffman's notion that the naturalistic within representation can function only through its artifice. He argues that this is necessary to make visible or accessible the myriad of behavioural styles that we use but do not recognise:⁷⁰

these expressions turn out to be illustrations of ritual like behaviour which portray an ideal conception of the two sexes and their structural relationship to each other, accomplishing this

⁷⁰ This reflects Goffman's indebtedness to Wittgenstein's notion of the social and linguistic background.

in part by indicating, again ideally, the alignment of the actor in the social situation.
(Goffman:1979:89)

His central tenet therefore proposes that the veneer of social reality in the advertisement is produced by the codification practices of hyper-ritualisation. Hyper-ritualisation encompasses the intensification of standardised and simplified forms of ritual taken from social life. Moreover, we can take this process as real (but temporarily only) because of the absence of complex cues that define embodied social interaction that extends *through time*. Advertisements work, he argues, by condensing social scenes that make them available for immediate consumption. They are idealised representations under the auspices of the way things really are. So, when a man lights a cigarette for a woman the presupposition is that the female is worthy of his assistance, yet this assistance implies that she is limited in some way and that she should be helped out with even the simplest things. The fact that this is taken up from rituals performed in real life and then magnified is not sufficient to collapse the distinction between the social world and the representation. Nor is it sufficient to assume that, because the social act is magnified in the ritualisation, the status differentials represented do not draw upon real differentials in status within the corpus of display from which the code is drawn. By linking the two fields through convention, Goffman introduces a foundation that is sociologically sensitive because he uses our standard practices as the stable contexts, which he then transforms, through hyper-ritualisation, making them distinct from the resources from which they are drawn.

The notion of ritualisation relates more broadly to the idea that advertisements belong to a system of social communication that draws directly upon symbolic forms of behaviour *as a resource*. This genre creates meaningful visual constructs by compressing common sense and familiar features of the social world. Hence, they reference, but do not mirror, many of the conventional features of embodied interaction that we depend upon all the time. In a sense, one can consider these meaningful constructs as part of our vocabulary of body display. Nevertheless, argues Goffman, while realist forms make a resource from this vocabulary, they can make the constructs visible only by grossly exaggerating them. This returns to the social world because they bring into view things that we essentially take for granted. Hence, the rituals are recognisable but they are not the same.

In addition, Goffman draws attention to regularity of the modes of display used. Again, this differentiates embodied display from those represented insofar as the conventionalised elements are considerably more limited in range. This establishes an anomaly in that the images may 'look' like we do, but only by radically simplifying what we do. Goffman's formula, which I have used here, argues that advertisements use units that stylise a scene¹ and social display, which key into our systems of recognition; for example gestalts, poses, gestures, expressions and props. In effect, we are able to use our social competencies, more or less pre-reflexively, as part of our imaginative projections that connect primary gestalts to visual and socialised space. Together, these form conceptual units that emerge from close visual analysis to produce the identification of recurrent patterns of portrayal. The conceptual units in themselves, once formed as part of the coding frame, become 'abstract notions from an empirical perspective' (Jhally:1990:146) and, once abstracted, the codes cannot return to the background whence they came.

THE CODES OF THE BODY

The taxonomy includes twenty-seven variables. The number of codes within each category is variable. The sub-categories number approximately 350. All the variables have 'other' included unless it could be categorically assured that no unanticipated cases could occur. These included the time span of the sample, the sample magazines and the commodities included, namely perfume and fashion items. Note that the detail of the commodity promoted was not included, despite recognising that it may alter the codification of the image under analysis. This is because a single photograph could have any number of items on display on one model. In addition, piloting highlighted that there were instances when the particular fashion item for sale was highly obscured. Identification was always possible because of the anchorage of the fashion label. Thus, the style of the image is entirely dependent upon the model's body, which suggests that there is an intensification of the commodification and sexualisation processes in the images. As stated, the operationalisation of the taxonomy was tightly integrated to the categories traced by existing and accepted research subject to critique here.

Variable one⁷¹ begins with the sex of the body, which is classified as either '*male*' or '*female*', '*androgynous*' or '*other*'. The identification of the sex of the model uses the everyday methods by which sex is assigned in social activity, given that genital inspection is not possible (Garfinkel:1967; Kessler and McKenna:1978; Kessler:2000). Thus, assignment was fundamentally premised upon that background knowledge we use, yet do not 'know', to assign sex. Code three classifies those instances where a part of the body is photographed, without any particular phenomenological key to its sex, or it excludes other common forms of cultural elaboration that conventionally assign sex. I am particularly interested in the codification used to make the gender of the body apparent, namely the secondary and tertiary sexual characteristics by which most sex assignment is undertaken. These are guided by the conventions of the sexed body so that if one were to describe a body as having developed muscle on the arm and as seated with the legs wide open, we are much more likely to assign the male sex to that body than the female sex. If the body turned out to be that of the female, we would tend to treat it as an 'exception' that proves the rule. This is the basic conventional level to which the taxonomy attends. This connects with Goffman's model by drawing upon our social practices of gender and magnifying these elements in order that we key the appropriate sex assignment within representation. For example, the model with its back to the camera will use a number of overt codifications so that we are able to assign the model a sex, when many of these secondary and tertiary features are missing as a result of the body position. Thus, they magnify the elements of 'normal sexed body'. These presentational features, which are treated as evidence for the truth of sex, are conventional practices at the secondary and tertiary level that Agnes⁷² proved to be a master.

Variable two counts the number of bodies included in the image, which includes '*single body*', '*mixed-sex/single-sex couples*' through to '*groups*'. This variable is central for the identification of the

⁷¹ For more detailed description of each individual code and the rules of its application, see Appendix B.

⁷² Agnes showed how sex is accomplished in interaction because she successfully passed as a woman. See 'Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in an intersexed person, part 1' (pp. 116-85) and especially the 'postscript' in Garfinkel, op. cit.

extent to which advertisements are still noticeably marked by the heterosexist imperative. I argue that staging the body within this frame provides the central context that readily anchors both the active/passive elements of the dichotomy but also secures the marginalisation of homosexual relationships and homoerotic desire more generally. In terms of the latter, I am drawing directly upon Lewis and Rolley's (1997) notion of coupling as a means to access lesbian desire. Logically this can be extended to gay desire patterns also. Combining the female sexed model with the male sexed is the simplest way of securing normalisation of the heterosexuality. From this context, many other elements of the gendered dichotomy can be secured with the use of further codification. The ownership and direction of the gaze are of central importance here.

Variable three identifies the ratio of white models to minority ethnic models used. This variable seeks to identify the extent to which Britain's black population has become visible within the frame of the body beautiful and, if so, to trace the extent to which the ethnicity of the body significantly affects the coding of the body idiom, especially the extent of sexualisation and nudity (*see* Nayak:1997; hooks:1981; 1992; 1996; Young:1995; Hoch:1979; Kaplan:1997). Potentially, it is possible to trace the extent to which the overt sexual codification is also racialised, by combining the language of desire and excess of the advertising genre⁷³ to the excess assigned to the black body. The assignment of ethnicity in this category again uses the background knowledge through which the Black body is produced and labelled in everyday life. White and black are discursive productions that deal with and remove the actual ambiguity of embodiment; thus, the background as the criterion for the categorisation does not negate that fact that there are an infinite number of ambiguities within ethnicity. The categories are not independent of the discourse of the everyday where they function. There is no 'truth' to the categories, they are instead the common-sense meanings through which they function, regardless of the fact of the black body.⁷⁴ Again, basic 'keying' or 'common sense' labelling processes are used (Goffman:1974).

Variable four identifies the product advertised, either a perfume or fashion item. This variable considers whether the kind of commodity significantly affects the sorts of coding that the body idiom undergoes. While it will not be subject to specific analysis, I have included a differentiation between the commodities in order to ensure that included in the sample is the specific visual relationship between the commodity and the body included as part of the overall sample. For example, it introduces the scope for extensive use of nudity, as well as including a particularly intense form of commodification in that the smell must be awarded a social and cultural significance. In addition, it provides a space to assess the endurance of a codification to which Goffman explicitly draws attention, namely the extension of the object, its delicacy, for example, through the combination of the product and the fragility of the feminine caress (Goffman:1979:29). The product placement by means of emphasis established by the touch not only enhances the product placement but also genderises the

⁷³ Again drawn from Liess, Kline and Jhally, who historically locate their analysis within the shifts in the pitch of the advertisement. In the first half of the book, they address the expansion of language of desire that is coterminous with the decline of the functional language. In essence, they argue that the shift represents a move from 'what can the product do?' to 'how does this product make me feel?'

⁷⁴ Again, this reflects my overall resistance to the scepticism that often accompanies discursive analysis. There is a materiality to the body upon which racism works, which is quite unlike the discursive construction of patterns of desire.

product and the model. However, these sorts of issues will be examined within the respective codifications rather than leading with the product type.⁷⁵

The fifth variable, entitled '*model*', traces the relationship between the model and any potential commodity or prop, for example, bodily subjugation to a perfume bottle. Here the body itself is made to shadow the shape of the bottle. The variable seeks only to count the number of cases where the model has control of the commodity and the cases where the model is subjugated to the prop or commodity. Thus, it seeks to identify only the *generalised* trends of the positioning of the model (Millum:1975:189). Sampling revealed that this mode of codification is conventional and thus utilises a series of standardised visual techniques to commodify the body, of which the example above is one of the most common. The second mechanism to define the general patterns of power to objects, space and props traces the gendered dichotomy according to the relationship the model has with his or her surroundings. As discussed above, the core guiding rule for this variable is the extent to which the model could said to be in control of his or her environment. Thus, the male who is located in the office is often presented giving instructions to the (female) secretary. To reiterate, the significance of fashion advertising is that clothes have a ubiquitous presence within social interaction. Therefore, the potential of very diverse settings and narratives is considerable. Note, clothes have not been automatically coded as subjugating the model because this tends to conflate clothing items that differ in their potential to be dominatory. For example, excessively frilly clothes lock the female model directly into the traditions of hegemonic, emphasised femininity, in the way that dungarees worn by a female do not, in the sense that they are not conventionally gendered, nor do they hinder or dictate the movement, sitting position and so forth (Connell:1987:183-7). I am not concerned with the particular item of clothing but rather the relationship to social status and the presentations of gendered made through it.

Variable six begins by locating the body in the projection of space, if a naturalistic mode, or on the two-dimensional plane, if not. The codes range from '*dominating the frame*' through to '*less than ¼*'. The amount of space therefore reflects the length of shot but also keys into the symbolic organisation of the two-dimensional plane. For example, if the woman occupies half of the two-dimensional plane and the man occupies only a third, conventionally, we would align this to her greater visibility compared to the male. Contrariwise, if the male is made more central, we would expect this to be accompanied by additional codification that aligns his position with power. These first sets of codes aim to contextualise the other modes of codification. In most normal cases the bigger the space occupied, the more central that figure is made. A notable exception to this is that the first code '*dominates frame entirely*'. Here the body dominates the frame of the image, which has the effect of bringing the body to the surface of the picture frame. The gaze is able to linger upon the detail of the flesh.

This is followed by a series of codes that trace the relative location of the sexed model in space. The codification is based upon the conventional spatial orientations by which we live; for example, we talk of a lowly serf; we look up to role models (Lakoff and Johnson:1980; Johnson:1987). Likewise, if the male is predominately in the centre of the frame, it places the female in a secondary

⁷⁵ For the proportion of the sample that is made up of perfume and clothes items, *please see* Appendix C.

relationship to the space within the image, identified in codes 'centre' and 'off-centre'. The fact that the centre is of primary importance remains a part of the cultural tradition of status relations as well as of core metaphoric organisation: 'he was at the centre of the affair'. Thus, each spatial classification in variable six relates to a certain social position, especially those images that re-create a social setting. 'Higher' and 'central' express greater control and social standing than 'lower' and 'periphery'. The second half of the variable relates to other relative spatial positions between the models photographed, 'opposite', 'centre', for example. This sort of organisation is readily transferred into our visual representation, especially those commercially based that require ready and instant comprehension. Socially, we tend to consider the occupation of space, *relative to others*, the priority of those with power. This clearly connects back to the significance given the heterosexual couple and the gender differentiation of space. It concerns women's inability to command space, for example, needing assistance with the chair to sit at the table.

This is what Goffman describes as the ritualisation of subordination (Goffman:1979:41) He suggests that a classic way that one displays deference, for example, is by lowering oneself physically in some form of prostration. Correspondingly therefore, we can visually display superiority or disdain by holding the body erect and high, the head looking up, which reflects the metaphorical conventions that Lakoff and Johnson trace in *Metaphors We Live By*. Most importantly, Goffman adds that advertisers *draw in and endorse* the claimed universality of the theme (Goffman:1979:40). He then identifies also conventional spaces through which status differentiation could be seen to 'naturally take place'. He isolates places such as beds and particularly floors, where the less clean can be encoded. To this, I add that sexual availability has also been conventionally located in such places.

Finally, included in the spatial variable are two distinct codes, '*perspective*' and '*non-perspective*'. These specify in a generalised way whether the overall frame of the image is realist or otherwise and thus the extent to which the visual spacing establishes a view within the image that 'reflects' that of the naked eye. Note, that the analysis of these sub-categories is combined with the analysis of variable seven below.

Variable seven relates to the camera work and categorises an image according to the length of shot and the focus used. The first cluster identifies the focus length and is divided into three broad categories: '*long shot*', '*medium shot*', and '*close-up*'. Moreover, this type of codification is awarded central importance to the formation of the feminine. For example Cowie (1997) argues that this is due to the removal of time and space from the frame, which facilitates the transvestism inherent in the point of view it establishes. Doane similarly argues that close-up provides the quintessential example of:

the meaningful moment of the close-up, for the spectator, the scale of the close-up corresponds less than other shots to the dictates of perspectival realism. And this being-the-gaze-for-the-other is, of course, most adequate as a description of the female subject (Doane:1991: 47).

Each shot length determines the size of the body within the photographic frame, and thus determines how much of the body is exposed. There ought to be a high degree of correspondence between these

sub-categories and the preceding variable: the longer the shot, the 'smaller' the body and thus the less 'physical' space the body appears to occupy visually. One would therefore expect there to be a higher degree of coincidence between the distributions of the '*dominating the frame*' and the use of the close-up.

Doane, in particular, has argued that the short-length shot has been used upon female bodies as a means to fetishise the female body and thus disavow the threat that this body symbolises to the masculine (see also Cowie and Adams:1990; Cowie:1997; Adams:1996; Erens:1991; Doane:1987; 1991; Dyer:1992; Kaplan:1997; special issue of *Camera Obscura*, 1989; Stacey:1988;1994; Mayne:1991; 1994). The use of the short-length shot means that the camera is able to move across a fragmented body, thereby highlighting the surface of the dissected body and rendering it fetishistic. Conversely, one would not expect this code to be widely applied to the male body if it is not available to the processes of fetishisation as defined by the male body 'having the phallus'. The man must, minimally at least, represent the active autonomous subject and therefore cannot have that subjectivity visually negated. If this is not the case, the man is said to have undergone feminisation, thereby ensuring that the gendered dichotomy is left intact. However, this poses the dilemma: if the model is codified using visual practices that define the feminine, thus is feminised, what are we to make out of this feminisation process, if nevertheless the model is clearly identifiable as male, that is, codified with the magnified social resources that accomplish the assignment as male? The central issue is the clash of the 'feminisation' with the direct and clear codification of male; neither codification is premised upon the assumption that the codification speaks 'the truth of his sex', but nevertheless corresponds to the cultural production of the male.

Returning to the postmodernists/feminists, one would expect these cases to tally with the other sub-variables that code the occupancy of space, as well as to be a determining factor in what parts of the body are represented; hence their importance for fetishisation. Following Doane, one would also expect that soft focus is predominately used upon the female form as a visual means to encode passivity as well as to assist the process of disavowal. Thus, this form of codification is treated as quintessentially feminine. The softness of the image is treated as an extension of the translucent veil that conceals her lack. Moore (1988) and Wernick (1991) have traced the use of soft lighting but limit its use strictly to the *contexts of the man's auto-eroticism*. Therefore, as viewers, the best we can do is peer into his auto-eroticism; hence the extensive use of bathroom and grooming scenes. Moreover, these are 'natural occasions' when the man would be revealing his torso anyway. Thus they argue that the naturalistic setting defines the moments when the male body can be displayed. Moore concludes that it is only in the context of auto-eroticism that the soft focus and mellow lighting can be legitimately applied to the male body without erupting the spectre of homosexuality and the possibility of an overt active female eroticism (Moore:1988:44).

Next, the taxonomy traces the use of specific focuses, which again draws on their argument that the soft focus is a distinct form with which the feminine is represented. One would expect there to be a high frequency of use on the female body. The soft focus is also said to assist the disavowal process by contributing to the substitution of the missing phallus by displacing her lack on to another object. The soft focus is said to contribute to the codification of the feminine as object of desire. By

drawing upon Lacan, postmodernism/feminism positions the image as the reflection of the feminine as lack so that the image signals her status as the object of desire, but also positions the image of woman as threatening. Codifications like soft focus work to suppress the fear through objectification.

These elements are then built upon again in variable eight, which traces the form of the photograph. This has been divided into three sections: '*naturalistic mock-up*', '*stylistic*' and '*neutral*'. The first refers to the widespread and much documented use of realism in photography. Note that the issue of realism is defined above as operating on two levels. The first aspect refers to the 'realism' of the scene depicted. The ideological content has been gauged according to how much like 'real life' it is. This would include scenes such as getting dressed in a bedroom or other daily activities like hailing a cab. These scenes respond to our common-sense expectations of the features of life. In order for the normalcy of the scene to be recognised, argues Goffman, it is necessary to hyper-ritualise these mundane features, thereby bringing them into view as opposed to remaining concealed within the background. The scenes 'look like real life' but in no way belong to the realm of the real. Mulveyian paradigm does not attend to the exaggeration of the codes in the image, but the medium of the photograph is such that it allows the viewer to gaze at it as if it were the more real, more perfect reflection of the self during the mirror phase. Furthermore, the Mulveyian paradigm argues that the realist and its associate narratives are an essential feature by which the feminine is connected to the passive so that the male protagonist is secured in his (sexual) active potency. Thus, this particular coding uses the identification patterns that such an image establishes as its primary means to operate ideologically. Following Mulvey et al. one would expect this to be a dominant feature of the gender representations, and of femininity in particular, confined as she is by her 'to-be-looked-at-ness'.

The second aspect of realism concerns the particular ways that photography can capture perspective or three-dimensionality within a two-dimensional frame. One of the particular qualities that photography has is its ability to capture a scene 'objectively', as if the viewer were actually there. The *impression* given is that the visual space depicted represents the scene as it would be seen by the naked eye. It assumes that the frame and editing have not distorted the view in any way. However, the actual framing and editing remain implicit, obscuring the perspective and ideology contained within. This sort of construction is more often associated with a voyeuristic position. The Mulveyian paradigm argues that this ideological transformation is something that women are particularly subject to, so much so that this form of encoding has become synonymous with femininity. In addition, this variable draws upon the presumption of identification that underpins much of the work critiqued here.

This variable also addresses the potential for at least minimally more surrealist, non-naturalistic or stylistic modes of photography that was traced during sampling and is treated as anti-realist in its form. This is how it resists the construction of ideological identification patterns. It is achieved through highly artificial gestures, self-conscious or self-referential codes that quote back to the advertisement its naturalistic illusions. These images mock the pose and defeat it as posture or gesture that can be adopted as an expressive gesture by the viewer. Also, within such an image there is the impression that the model is mocking or satirising the act of modelling. The second feature of this code refers to those images in which the model is presenting an ordinary gesture but is set against a contradictory background. For example, the model could be in a fake beach scene wearing winter

clothes and pretending to feel cold. This code does not seek to give this feminine presentation the veneer of authenticity. Collectively, these features expose some of the formal features of construction of realism and thus they resist securing patterns of identification.

The third refers to those images identified as part of the operationalisation process where some images had no explicit setting at all, surreal or otherwise. I observed that the background was often just white or coloured. If there is extensive use of codes two and three, this poses the question of the extent to which identification can be presumed to be a key feature of consuming advertisements. Potentially this could undermine Mulvey's argument since not only does this represent the feminine differently, but it also acts against the Symbolic and its concomitant identification patterns.

Variable nine refers to those aspects of the debates regarding the extent to which the female body is fragmented and therefore commodified and fetishised compared to the male body. The variable ranges from the '*full body*' through to the '*head only*'. The object of this variable is to trace substantively what parts of the body are depicted, how often and what parts of the fragmented body is represented. It is a simple and effective way to trace those parts of body that fetishistic conventions mobilise. This can then be related to the debates concerning the ideological impact of the framing of the body within representation, as well as the extent to which this divides along gender lines. For example, one would expect that there would be significantly more images of women being reduced to a fetishised leg than of men.⁷⁶ Potentially, therefore, the results of this code could confirm Pollock's maxim that the fragmentation of the female body is extensively used to sell, as well as confirm Doane's argument that the fragmentation of the body as image is a necessary form of representation that seeks to disavow the threat of castration that the female represents. The variable also includes the code '*face only*'. This variable also returns to Nayak (1997), who draws attention to the ways in which the concealment of the head is used to transform the body to the object. The dismembered body is free to receive any connotations by way of the viewer's 'reading'. The second benefit that this operationalisation brings to the analysis is that the coding of the parts of the body is effectively free from evaluative influence: the parts of the body are absolutely known within a society. This is a central premise of the taxonomy: that, while the body is subject to symbolic elaboration of the most extensive kind, within that social background and its historicist roots, those categories and symbols are of the most natural kind (see for example, Douglas:1973; O'Neill:1985; Mauss:1973). Bodily metaphors of this kind remain relatively stable over quite long periods of time.

Further detail is added by isolating the various potential body positions (variable ten). The aim of the variable is twofold: first, it seeks to trace how the sex of the model affects the position taken up within the image; second, how these positions relate to the 'subordination' or 'domination' that the various positions impose. As argued above, fashion can be advertised in a seemingly infinite number of ways and therefore it carries no bars as to the ways the models are required to pose. I argue that, because of the universal presence of clothes, the sorts of positions adopted are not determined by the restrictions imposed by the commodity, but stem from the conventionalised presentations of the sexed body. The proposition here is that if the representations of body positions convey stereotypical versions of the sex, thus establishing identification, then these sorts of poses adopted ought to vary markedly by

⁷⁶ See Appendix B, for the ideological associations connected to the other codes.

the sex of the model. Additionally, the various positions may be organised by the conventionalised postures through which subordination and domination are ritualised. Thus, the variable seeks to trace whether the sexed dichotomy is linked to the relations of power between men and women.

The variable has, where possible, enabled me to endeavour to capture the movement of the body, the displays of the body, as well as isolate body positions that tap into the undercurrent themes of the gendering of domination and subordination. Examples of the codes are '*lying on the side*', '*twisting away*', '*back facing camera*' and so on.⁷⁷ Theoretically, these positions have been classed as visualisation of ritual subordination (Goffman:1979). Therefore, according to postmodernist/feminist agenda, one would expect this to be significantly affected by the sex of the model. Specifically, one would expect this to be used extensively upon women because of the implied (sexual) passivity of lying down with regard to another (male) gaze. Each position can therefore be referred back to its context and the ideological significance attributed. For example, following Nayak, one would expect there to be a high frequency of black models whose face was obscured in some way so that the gaze cannot be reciprocated.

The next level of detail refers to the embodied presentations of the model and, in particular, focuses upon the physical appearance of the body. Many of the codes in this variable are drawn directly from the secondary literature, particularly the recurrent codes used within sex scales (Connell:1987). I have directly adopted these classifications where the category of sex is combined with sexual character, for example '*emotional*'. This variable also traces the detailed ways in which the body is gendered and/or sexed. Relating this to my specific concerns, this variable is also where the secondary and practically accomplished marks of sex are accomplished. The marks range from painted nails and long or short hair to the presence or absence of body hair, musculature and impressions of weight. Note that the coding criteria of this variable insists all images are read as they appear, rather than through an empirical lens of how the images are actually composed;⁷⁸ for example, that '*naturalness*' is a cosmetic effect. This does two things: first, it avoids speculations concerning the extent of cosmetic intervention to produce the appearance of naturalness in each individual image; second, accepting the image in terms of its final production is much closer to how the image is to be interpreted if it is to function to construct passive femininity. We naturalise the signification process, argues Goffman. If the reader approaches the image 'knowing' that the images are highly structured, then ideology as an entity becomes an entirely different operation. We read images as they appear: signs function when they are treated as they appear.

Variables twelve and thirteen deal with the containment of the body in the represented physical space. This builds upon the spatial location in as much as withdrawing from space is something that is commonly associated with subordination and vulnerability. The first variable delineates who or what contains the model and therefore deals directly with the issue of power. In

⁷⁷ There have been some adjustments regarding the codification of this variable. The actual results did not warrant such a detailed classification. Therefore, some of them have been amalgamated. Note, however, those that have cannot be repeated in other sub-variables and thus there is no distortion produced by some cases being counted twice. See Appendix B for greater detail and definition of application.

⁷⁸ Again, this reflects Goffman's analysis that as consumers of an image, we are quite happy with this blurring between the real and the fake.

particular, a body contained or confined relates to the status ascribed to that body, as well as the level of autonomy that body is constructed as having. In particular, the ascription of status is often marked by the use of the body as barriers to demarcate ownership. Goffman (1979:54-6) argues that often the man will extend his arm into space in such a way that it effectively prohibits any 'intrusion' by another. The variable progresses from the most patriarchal to the least. As it indicates complicity on behalf of the woman, the most dominatory position is classified as the woman who voluntarily contains her own body and therefore withdraws from (public) space. This is followed by the code '*contained by man*', in which a series of blocks may be placed in front of the woman, thus constraining her ability to move through space freely. This is classified as less dominatory because of the woman's potential resistance to his confinement.

I have also included a variable that reflects the potential reversal of this form of containment. For example, it may be the case that the female is now the boss and imposes the same limitations on the lower male workers. Therefore, it would usually require that this reversal be bound by a narrative in order that the relative differences in social status be included as part of the scene. In effect, this sub-variable seeks to consider whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume the dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. I have also extended the logic of Goffman's analysis to the concerns of the cultural critique in that they have been effective in demonstrating that this same restriction or domination can be symbolically carried by an object, usually phallic. Lastly, I have addressed the various codifications that address the mutual containment, in which case all of the above must be absent and both models must be embraced by the other. The sexual consumption of one body by the other, usually male of female, must also be absent. The evidence of sexual gratification has to be equal, as well as the absence of relative positioning to secure differential status and so on.

These cases where heterosexuality meets with patriarchy and heterosexism refer to a complex web of social relations and structures and remains a contentious issue within the feminist movement. However, following Stevi Jackson (1995), it cannot be assumed above all else that heterosexual relationships can mean *only* domination for women and that correspondingly all representations of heterosexual relationships are entirely ideological and therefore pernicious to heterosexual women. It is of course difficult, as the ideology of heterosexist romance is often bound up in the images of equality. However, also within those images, there must also be the codes in which his authority, the primacy of his pleasure and her willingness to please it are manifestly present. It remains to be seen how pervasive these images are, but it is possible that the images represent reciprocal desire, rather than the more general relationship of women being desired and men doing the desiring. If there are enough cases to make such images a minority trend, but nevertheless a trend, there needs to be discussion as to what we think these might mean. Moreover, it may not necessarily be the case that those images that are encoded as mutual desire are heterosexual couples. As Lexis and Rolley (1997) have argued, there has been a shift in the patterns of desire represented so that an accessible lesbian spectatorial position can be adopted regarding 'twin' images. These images are composed of two women entwined and made up to look like each other. They argue that this offers a space through which lesbian desire can be experienced. In such cases, there would be two women embracing mutually and desire in the women

would be embodied in the form of a pout, a smile or semi-nudity. This variable concludes with '*non-containment*', where the body stance cannot be said to be withdrawing in any sense.

The second variable in this cluster details the most regular body positions adopted to signify the various forms of containment. It concerns the embodied positions adopted to perform passivity. This is then a central variable that traces how a body may be positioned in social space to 'do' passivity. One example of self-containment is to have the woman seated with her arms folded around her legs and her legs pulled up to her chest. Another example traces the frequency by which the man places his arm in front of or around the woman, thereby marking ownership. Note that there is an automatic coding operation here in which if the preceding variable is marked non-contained it automatically skips out this variable.⁷⁹

Variable fourteen seeks to trace the various codes used to sexualise or fetishise the model by means of the dress and the various ways the flesh is revealed. By 'reveal', I mean that the clothing is removed, unbuttoned or lifted to draw attention to an area of flesh. This references the psychoanalytical contributions as to how fetishism works. Accordingly, those theorising within the Mulveyian paradigm must insist that this marks the female body categorically, not only that there be marked differences. Furthermore, by including the various ways that the body itself conceals its own nudity, the extent of sexualisation within the image can be specified. Examples are '*revealing of the shoulder*', '*hip*', '*breast*', '*see-through clothing*', through to '*fully naked*'. The latter example reflects the decision to include advertisements that signified through the logo alone rather than restricting the sample to advertisements of specific items of clothing. The code '*fully dressed*' refers to bodies sexualised by facial expressions, for example the pout. The securing of sexualisation via the face is treated elsewhere in the taxonomy. The code '*non-sexualisation*' refers to those images only where the model is fully dressed, devoid of a descriptive background and has no visible facial expressions. In addition, here the model must be fully clothed, without any parts of the body exposed. I argue that this is a non-sexualised image because there is nothing specifically erotic about the codification. I argue that the central features are those that commodify the image rather than commodify *and* sexualise the model.

Variables fifteen to seventeen trace the presentation of the hand. Variable fifteen traces who is touching whose body.⁸⁰ Also included are codes identifying cases where the hand is inactive; both are classified as relatively ungendered. Variable sixteen traces the parts of the body that are touched and variable seventeen traces what kind of touch is involved. Again drawing on Goffman, women were depicted touching things much more than men. The hand is used to trace the outlines of things or to fiddle with things. He argues that this mode of 'barely' touching contrasts strongly with a competent or utilitarian mode of touch, which grasps things or manipulates them. I have applied this by combining it with specific codes that trace what is touched as well as how it is touched. This taps into another convention in which women are seen to caress much more, as part of the private domain of caring. Thus, not only do women touch other people much more but they also touch themselves much more. Additionally, this draws specific attention to the gendering of the hand through daily practical accomplishments such as nail varnish, manicures, length of the nails and so on. One is able to trace the

⁷⁹ All pre-programmed exclusions are listed in Appendix B.

⁸⁰ Note that this includes the commodity itself, following Goffman's observation.

extent to which gender is secured by practice, and is therefore relatively open-ended, rather than the structure or social order reduced to a move in language. The cross-tabulations enable us to trace how gendered the touch is by examining who is touched, by whom and where. Each categorisation relates to the dimensions of the gendered dichotomy; for example, '*utilising*' has distinctly active connotations.

The taxonomy further codifies the body idiom by the positioning of the limbs (variables eighteen and nineteen). By tracing the various positions of the arms and legs, it is possible to trace how the body is gendered through movement: the active body is conventionally connected to the masculine, while the feminine is pinned to a motionless body. Contrariwise, the Mulveyian paradigm has emphasised that action defines the masculine. Regarding my separate concerns, this demonstrates the theoretical commitment to the material body, that is, what does the body have 'do' visually to represent hegemonic patterns of masculinity? Consequently, the taxonomy consistently tackles the material embodied positions adopted to convey symbolic meanings that are not innate to the body. Passivity has to be enacted, not merely assumed to be symbolically imposed by the Law. Therefore, movement as part of the promise of power⁸¹ ought to be one of the consistent ways with which the male body is encoded. To reiterate, I argue that if the structurally determined dichotomy still organises the representation of masculinity and femininity, then this categorical difference must be encoded in part by the movement of the body. The taxonomy is able to build upon this by tracing the respective positions of the 'performative body parts'.

The next cluster of variables (twenty to twenty-four) traces the various features concerning the head, face and gaze and is central to the postmodernist/feminist argument regarding the categorically gendered nature of codification of the body. This cluster directly examines the frequency and the continuing value of the Mulvey paradigm. I argue that the structure of the gaze needs to be empirically present to be operative in the way she describes it. Variable twenty identifies the various positions of the head. The position of the head determines, and thus excludes, possible looks and interactions between the viewer and the model within the image, which is central if we are to examine the structure of the exchange of looks. Again, this variable has isolated the various head positions in detail in order that the image dictate the frequency of use. It includes therefore '*head back*', '*head down*' and so on, leading to '*head in profile*'. Its additional significance is that it exposes the materiality of the body that I argued is lost in models that trace the Oedipal organisation of the body. The symbolic ordering of the body cannot overcome the fact that a structure of exchanges that takes place in looking is negated if the head is looking upwards. Even an example like this exposes the categorical nature of structurally determined description because to argue that this represents the feminine attempting to avoid the masculine gaze is to impose a specific inscription upon the image that reflects the theoretically determined normative position implicitly assumed. The image cannot be always reorganised to fit the structural imperative imposed and justified by recourse to the Oedipal organisation of the body. I have argued above that this is exactly what the notion of 'feminisation' does: it negates certain coding shifts by recuperating them into the linguistically structural and thus universal dichotomy, while ignoring that feminisation assumes a 'common-sense' assign of sex: it has been established 'he's a feminised man'.

⁸¹ Reflecting the analyses of Dyer.

To the head position the mouth is added (variable twenty-one). Examples include '*pouting*', '*kissing*', '*phallic mouth*', '*phallic mouth with object*' and so on. This variable explores the extent to which the mouth is central to the sexualisation of the body. Arguably, the mouth is subject to specific and intensive cultural elaborations, which mark the mouth out as one of the central erotic areas of the body. As a result, the mouth is an intensely symbolic domain, which, if the dichotomies presumed do in fact order the presentation, ought to be clearly marked by categorical difference. For example, using the mouth and cigarette is a central technique for the femme fatale. The eroticisation can be intensified by having the head tilted backwards slightly in order that the viewer can look inside the mouth.

Additionally, it is central to the genderising of the body by means of practical regular accomplishments. For example, this variable draws attention to lipstick to produce a clearly gendered body. If there is a high frequency, it suggests that there has been a massive inroad of pornographic codes into mainstream magazines and, consequently, a marked difference in the expressive mouth will be treated as a significant evidence for the continuation of a subordinated sexual femininity as the postmodernists/feminists define it. Note also there are a number of codes that have been included that specifically target what has come to be known as the 'Lolita effect' (Silverman:1994; Stratton:1996). This may be connected to other codes in the taxonomy where specifically child-like characteristics have been included. The use of child-like poses also integrates the elements of status back into the visual field (Goffmann:1979). This further connects to the debates regarding the discursive discipline of women's 'natural flesh'. One would not expect there to be a high frequency of cases where the male body is encoded in this way. Therefore, if a high frequency is traced within the female sample, specific tables will be built excluding the male population of the sample. It is possible to delineate the extent to which the body is securely coded in this way, or whether other childish postures are set in contradiction to the gaze.

The next variable in this cluster identifies the direction of the gaze (variable twenty-two) as well as the spectatorial address (variable twenty-three). The latter variable refers to the mode of address contained within the image. There are three altogether and the coding follows strictly the descriptions and definitions provided by the postmodernist/feminist model. The variable moves from the most active position adopted by the model towards the imagined viewer to the most passive position between model and viewer. Thus, the primary access in this variable concerns the set-up between the model's gaze and the imagined viewer *at the point when the photograph is taken*. This structures the image so that the relationship is re-established when the viewer sees the image, even if the viewer reads against the grain of the image. Code 1, '*public addressing viewer*', traces an exchange of looks constructed by the model looking directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer in the place of the camera: the gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she positions himself or herself to the image. Hence, to look at such an image is to engage with the model. The description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or her. Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or desire for the viewer, but it need not necessarily be the case. For example, the model appears as the initiator of a sexual exchange by adopting a gaze that makes the viewer the object in the exchange. It can therefore apply equally to male and female models.

This compares with what has been described as '*narrative address*'. Code 2 refers to those images in which the viewer is implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the main axis of exchange between one of the models and the viewer, while clearly excluding the other model/character. For example, the female model looks into the camera and therefore at the viewer, while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby excluding the boyfriend/model from the central exchange of looks. The implication is that the boyfriend/model is being laughed at, therefore making the joke private to viewer and model. This draws upon the film form. The central protagonist in such a *mise-en-scène* is the female model since she both commands the viewer's gaze and dupes her boyfriend. Similarly, the male model could place the viewer at the centre of the narrative by covertly initiating the male viewer's gaze at another woman, while in the presence of the presumed girlfriend. Not only does such a narrative assert the heterosexist assumption, but it also connotes the convention that the exchange is *between* the men because the *object* of exchange is the woman.

Code 3, '*private voyeur*', refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze of the viewer as well as being oblivious to it. Thus, the relationship of the model to the viewer is one where the viewer can peer into the model's 'world' free from the demands of reciprocity and free to see or impose what he or she wants. It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing and, as a result, one would expect this be much more prevalent when used to photograph women. This exposes the extent to which psychoanalysis underpins the analyses subject to critique. If such a frame is used pictorially to represent men, a male gaze that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic usually accompanies it. Dyer defines the instabilities contained in images of men thus: in order to disavow the latent passivity of being an object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity. For example, by displaying his cerebral superiority by looking up to the heavens, the male model makes his own body inconsequential to his true being. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic gaze on men is such that it could suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus is said to determine whether the gaze is gendered.

To conclude, the variable seeks to trace the possible exchange of looks that take place in this 'realistic' medium. More specifically, spectatorial address captures the extent to which the passive position of the female model in a frame and the active position of the (presumed) male viewer structure the *mise-en-scène*. It directly references the ways in which postmodernism/feminism, and Cultural Studies more generally, argue that passivity is visually structured, which then must be negated if the model is male. This directly references Mulvey's paradigmatic position regarding the ways the visual form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the myth of representative realism.

The expression of the gaze (variable twenty-three) adds detail to the above structure of the exchange of looks. It details the extent to which the exchange of the gaze is further disambiguated by the expressions that accompany them. Some codes target the active side of the gendered dichotomy, most notably the codes that identify the '*authoritative*', '*assertive*' and '*other-worldly*' gazes, while the passive features are pinned to codes such as '*coy*', '*dreamy*', '*shy*' and so on.⁸² The expressions encompass both the direction of the eyes and the use of the eyebrows to anchor the meaning further. Note also that certain features of the expressive gaze are secured by the direction of the look and the

⁸² Many of these terms have been lifted from Millum's *The Images of Women*, 1976.

head position, which will have been detailed beforehand. The codes used within the advertisement itself and the operationalisation undertaken here mean that the reading of the code and its mode of display are not treated as synonymous to the gestures used in embodied interaction. The codes of display are not a part of a broader flow of interaction that takes place within time, the conclusion of which is not controlled by either interlocutor. Each gesture works through its stylisation, that is, through the exaggeration of the common features of a gesture. Again, I return to Goffman for justification: these expressions are not complex like the real material social interactions upon which they are based: they function because they are dependent upon conventionalised hyper-realistic forms and this is what makes them instantly recognisable. Therefore, I argue that codes contained within commercial images are both highly staged and thoroughly dislocated from real time and space. Moreover, the staged nature of the image is further compounded by the fact that is seen and 'reflected back', via the directions of the photographer, to the model throughout the shoot, which further problematises the relationship between the viewer and viewed because the image is mediated through the photographer. There are, then, various ways in which the image exaggerates 'naturalistic' expressions in order that it be 'read' as intended.

Variable twenty-four is a departure from those that specifically target the body. Rather, it traces the use of social scenes to stage the narrative presented, thus further removing ambiguity from the meaning. Certain social settings are accompanied by relatively fixed conventions about what is understood to take place there. Therefore, it introduces the ideological elements of social space into the representation: the feminine is equated with the private/domestic sphere. The codes selected range from scenes of a '*lovers' tiff*' to the '*countryside*', '*cafes*' to '*bars*' and so forth. The scenes act as ideological contexts within which the body idiom is located and by doing so automatically exclude inappropriate keying of interpretive practices. Furthermore, the variable extends the ideological grounding of the image within broader sets of hegemonic relations. For example, it provides a mechanism to trace those representations of social space that remain highly dichotomised; the feminine remaining private, for example. Variable twenty-six identifies both the magazine and the year. When used as part of the results, this is broken up into two to facilitate ease of interpretation.

Variable twenty-five traces the macro structural features of the image according to the gendered dichotomies. Each sub-variable contains a hierarchised pair: the first value is the one applied to the man, the second value is applied to the woman. For example, one would expect the masculine to be equated with the assumption of the subject and the feminine with the particular form of objectification; hence the masculine is the mind (as defined by Dyer) and the feminine the body (as identified by feminist cultural theory). If this relationship is reversed, 'the mind' will be positioned as the second value, which has been constructed as the feminine side. The variable contains codes that count the potential frequency of both. The aim was to trace two elements simultaneously: first, the respective distributions of the masculine and feminine as determined by the theoretical account of the dichotomy; second, the interdependence between the active/passive, mind/body, narrative/image descriptions. By doing so, it was intended to identify the extent to which visual representation contributed to its reproduction, or whether there was emergent evidence that the structural dichotomy was weakening.

However, this operationalisation was not successful because it was too cumbersome and thus failed to measure what it set out to identify. This was in part a result of a distinct set of distributions that broke up the logic of the dualisms far more significantly than piloting had suggested. Second, it underestimated the extent to which the method restricted such relational analysis. It was operationalised thus in order maintain a sense of the interrelationship between the two opposites, which was why the advertisement was defined as the coding unit. The cumbersome nature of the coding directly led to statistically invalid results. Unlike the other variable codes, these do not exist as separate entities, which makes the application of chi invalid. I have therefore excluded analysis of this variable. The second major problem with the operationalisation more broadly is that a number of the variables are simply too long and, as a result, many of the findings are obscured by the sheer size of the tables. When this has occurred, I have broken them up into smaller logical clusters.⁸³

In summation, the central emphasis of this taxonomy is to trace the positions, gestures, contexts and photographic codes that, in general terms, produce the images that surround us. When the codes have been more descriptive, I have adhered to the semiotics discussed above for the criteria of application. However, most of the codes contained isolated body parts: how much is shown, what is shown, how the body represents itself in an advertisement in order to 'do' gender. I have chosen the most basic features with which to do this. Therefore, while I recognise the critiques to which content analysis is subject, I suggest that if we are to treat many of my variables as inherently problematic, then we must ask if meaning can work at all. I have sought to restrict the codification to the most basic features of an advertisement, aiming to limit any potential ambiguity that characterises the interpretive meanings that organise social life. I attend to a level of analysis that Goffman defines thus:

[the book is about] the organisation of experience – something that an individual actor can take into his mind – and not the organisation of society. [He makes no claim whatsoever to be] talking about the core matters of sociology – social organisation and social structure. I am not addressing the structure of social life but the structure of experience individuals have at any moment of their social lives. I personally hold society to be first in every way and individual's current involvements to be second; this report deals only with matters that are second.
(Goffman:1974:13)

This informs my rejection of the inferences that regularly emerge from the axis between representation as social order and identity. As argued, we should desist from assuming that certain identifications are made as a result of the linguistic or representational order. However, I recognise that the adoption of such a tenet is insufficient justification for the return to the quantification of meaning. Thus, what follows is a detailed exploration of certain public practices upon which more complex interpretations are made. I argue that we can treat certain categories as constructed, but nevertheless foundational: the construction operates foundationally once it is taken for granted, that is, it belongs to the social and linguistic background. To this, I add that these basic categories are dependent upon a certain facticity of the body that provides a resting place, as it were, from which language is made meaningful. Therefore,

⁸³ These can be examined in Appendix B.

I reject the radical sceptical position adopted toward language to which content analysis is particularly vulnerable.

To reiterate, Goffman argues that there is a direct relationship between the meaningful social world we live in and the representations that we make of this world. However, he queries the assumption that these representations are more than a direct mirror reflection of the social world they nevertheless encapsulate. He is, therefore, targeting the very assumption I have critiqued above: images can be about the world in which we live in a direct way, but this does not justify the causal leap that the postmodernists make, that somehow *they are that world*. Goffman is explicit as to how the representative and the real are bound to each other, without further pinning this to a structuralist model of social reproduction and its formation of appropriate identities; he therefore excludes the reduction that culture operates as a psychological disposition. He remains sociological about the image but makes fundamental distinctions between the social and the cultural that I think can make a considerable contribution to feminist analysis.

METHODOLOGY, CONVENTION AND THE IMAGE WITHIN THE FIELD OF COMMERCIALISED AESTHETIC REALISM

Goffman⁸⁴ begins by asking what sort of a thing is the photographic image. He argues that ambiguity in photography lies in our linguistic incapacity to distinguish what the photographic image is 'of'. With regard to the stage, we have the semantic distinction between character and actor to discriminate between the real and the temporary, but such a distinction is missing with regard to photography. A photograph can be said to be 'of' the subject, as well as 'of' the model: it merges them both by concealing the difference that is then taken for granted. An example of such a blur is the instance when the framing of a 'model' is staged so that the 'subject' appears surprised by having her photograph taken. Other examples include rigged photographs where the model and the scene are real but are brought together to induce radically wrong inferences about what is taking place so that the viewer is misled. Photographic forms of representative realism work precisely because the number and depth of cues are insufficient to indicate what is really going on. Goffman argues that the result of the failure to sustain the semantic distinction is that we treat photography as if we are concerned with one kind of problem, when in fact we are concerned with another, substantively ignored.⁸⁵ Consequently, the staged nature of image is lost when it is successful in staging the real.

Significantly, Goffman links the staging of the 'material world' to the advertisement form and defines this relationship as 'commercial realism'. This directly draws together the mode of visual presentation to the social field in which it takes place; hence, his considerations are explicitly market oriented. Commercial realism employs *standardised* scenes and props to pass the scene off as a potentially real one. Furthermore, it provides a particularly acute example of the ambiguity between model and subject. For example, an image that depicts a nude but well-known woman will raise questions about the modesty of the *model*; a picture that features some nuns idolising a car is likely to

⁸⁴ The following analysis of Goffman's contribution is taken from section 2 of *Gender Advertisements*.

⁸⁵ *Gender Advertisements*, p. 13.

raise questions about the desecration of the *subjects*. Regarding the latter, we are concerned about the image, but this concern is not based within the material instance but with the generic social type depicted and the advertisement. Nayak makes this exact slip when he refers to the subject of the photograph, which carries with it the assumption that the subject is the model in real life. The semantic slip conceals the extent to which the posture belongs to the realm of commercial realism rather than black subjectivity. This equally emerges in the feminist analysis of stereotypes which sought 'realistic' representation about the 'real' lives of women, to have 'real women's bodies' in the advertisement, but at the same time to make a commercial image promote changes to the social order, that is, to make them about the promote social change, that is, to produce another reality. Implicitly, I argue that the cultural analyses critiqued above have not moved far from this position: the singular emphasis upon representation⁸⁶ means that they are forced to look for 'positive images' to challenge the current phallogentric stranglehold. Perhaps this is an outcome of the model of socialisation, upon which this model is implicitly dependent.

Therefore, commercial realism encompasses a form of artifice that defines the photograph: the simulated scenes represent narrative-based action located within the stream of time and place from which inferred meaning is gleaned. The artifice deployed renders the natural expressions crude, simulated and frozen. Hence, all models transformed into subjects in the narrative are united in their artifice. For example, the exchange of looks can seek to bring the viewer into the frame of meaning; the subject makes eye contact, sometimes collusively, as if that someone were there in the flesh.⁸⁷ This echoes Mulvey's notion of the male gaze.⁸⁸ This model does not reject the conventions within the image by which it makes sense to talk of the male gaze, rather it rejects the inference that assumes that this forms identity and organises patterns of desire. On the contrary, this construction is brought about by the slip of model/subject. His point is that we *know* Brutus didn't really kill Caesar when we were at the theatre last; likewise we know that the model and subject are different, that the latter is fictional, even if we suspend this in order that the image work. Without this semantic distinction, the social form dissolves through such a series of misframes. We 'know' the difference between a social interaction and a representation even if we have to 'suspend' this to make the representation work. Interaction and interpretive linguistic activity make such a semantic distinction available and brings the effects of meaning into the conscious realm where it is 'available for use'. Thus, we abandon the analytical distinction so that we can treat the scene naturalistically, that is, accept its subject, despite the fact this has nothing to do with what went on to compose the image.

Asked what is in a particular ad, we might say, 'A family fishing.' What makes us think the four subjects in the picture are in a family relationship to one another is exactly what might make us infer such a relationship with respect to strangers in real life. So, too, on seeing the images of fishing lines in the water. Asked whether we think the four persons who are modeled for the picture are really a family, or if there are hooks at the end of the lines, the

⁸⁶ Moving as it does between the levels highlighted in the introduction to the literature review.

⁸⁷ This is where I have drawn the code 'narrative address' from.

⁸⁸ This is important because it suggests a stability of meaning that does not entirely lie with the reader. I will return to this in more detail.

answer could well be, 'Probably not, but what does it matter?' The point about an ad is what its composer *meant us to infer as to what is going on* in the make-believe picture scene, *not what had actually been going on* in the real doings that were pictured. This is subject, not model. (Goffman:1974:15) (my italics)

Such a semantic distinction does not ground the semiotic analyses undertaken by postmodernism/feminism and so this slip finds its way into the heart of the analyses they undertake. This means the differing levels of representation often go unattended. We want our photographs to say true things about us, and we are prepared to suspend concern for the artifice that creates it. Is this not an interesting way of situating the possible ideological elements of photography while taking the utterances people make about the photograph seriously? Moreover, the knowledge of its artificial construction suggests that the meaning is not operating within the unconscious because its constructedness is at once recognised and ignored. Thus, while he traces very similar forms of exchanges, he locates their operation in quite a different domain from the Mulveyian paradigm: the construction is a phenomenological projection from the cognitive reading of the image to the capacity to 'see' the photograph as space that the viewer temporarily occupies. Therefore, the photograph operates through the phenomenological practices of perception; practices that change over time, up and beyond the basic units or *gestalts* of perception. Furthermore, these practices can be treated ironically, and in doing so, it is possible to disrupt the interpretative practice and dislodge the meanings integrated to the space the viewer temporarily occupies⁸⁹. Moreover, the text is able to present to us a new view on the representation. In this way, it is possible to integrate notions of how the text is able to alter our interpretative horizons: it can bring to the fore what was once merely taken for granted.

THE REPRESENTATION AND THE COMPETENT READER

Goffman emphasises that commercial images reconstitute social space. Therefore, there is no sense in which the space depicted is to be treated as equivalent to physical space, again stressing the semantic distinction between model and subject. Goffman singles out the *regular* features of an image, and he is careful to trace the semiotic elements specific to commercial realism that build upon those regular units. He examines in detail the relationship between the form and content of a type of representation and argues that the combination has a significant impact upon the final product. Arguably, he works with the presupposition that we can adopt codes, categories and words that are used practically within interaction and transform them so that they function in the visual form, for example, but relay the same conventional meanings. Therefore, representative realism must draw upon the conventions of the social and linguistic background and reconfigure them in such a way as to make them produce those same associations within a two-dimensional frame.

By using Goffman's model, I argue that it is possible to integrate the notion of linguistic background into social interaction, and that it is thus public in nature and yet pre-reflexive. The background of meaning is central to how we know things, but often we find it very hard to explain

⁸⁹ A phenomenological parallel is the optical illusion.

what it is we know. The rules that we follow are so complex that they become opaque. What is required is a series of techniques by which we can penetrate certain kinds of meaning to a certain level. By 'keying', Goffman means that we have myriad rules that we apply pre-reflexively when interpreting a text or social interaction. *This places an essential distance between the fact that things are meaningful to use and the fact that this meaning is not a private internalised entity, as psychoanalysis presupposes, but thoroughly public.* This technique is something that we use to get a handle on the polysemy of social and linguistic life, that is, complex forms of meaning. The process of keying institutes the appropriate frames of reference when *doing* interpretation. It is a process in which we know when an instance is an exception and when it is a common daily occurrence, for example. Moreover, it is the system by which we differentiate different kinds of texts and recognise the different level of analysis that is appropriate to a text.

Thus, Goffman is isolating the social competencies that we as social actors employ as part of our interpretive practices. Moreover, the sets of competencies required are bounded by the social and cultural order: those who have not become embodied, socially competent actors in this order may not have the necessary cultural references or keying structures to understand the gesture fully. For example, Russian men can congratulate other men with a kiss on the lips. In Britain, such an exchange between non-kin adult men is almost always considered a homosexual act because of the discourses of sexuality and counter-discursive constructions established by gay pride. Conversely, therefore, a man and a woman in an embrace would generally be assumed to be a couple, particularly if the context is a fashion feature in a women's magazine. The stable contexts of meaning combine with the conventional and standardised codes to produce the appropriate cues. The differentiation does not lie in the integrity of the act, but in the social context and the way these features define what sort of an exchange it is. We use keying skills to differentiate these elements. Thus, part of the complexity of this interpretive technique is the many social interactions it informs and unpacks: it enables one to trace power asymmetry within a social interaction in which the actors participate. Moreover, these interpretive activities are conventional in form and operate most effectively in 'normal cases'. I shall return to the importance of normal cases and circumstances in a moment.

Goffman departs from other writers concerning the image because, before he considers the content, he explores the photograph as a phenomenal object to which he conjoins the phenomenological experience of viewing the object. Goffman asks first what sorts of things go into making a photograph; only then can its meaning be considered. He argues that these two focal points operate prior to the interpretation of the image and are therefore integral to the interpretive practice. The significance that is being drawn from this is that it seems to suggest that the image 'works' because people are readily aware of the highly artificial context and content of the image's scene. Therefore, the fabrication, integral to the fashion image, is an element of the function of the image. He argues that photography, as a specific form of representation, has two special elements: first, the apparent capacity to capture a perspective as the viewer would see it; second, the naturalistic view of a world presented as a controlled, manipulated and staged view. The spontaneity of being caught by the camera is a fake, an artifice produced to stage the narrative. Goffman's departure is to make the artifice of realism central to his analysis, as well as to the interpretations viewers make. Therefore, we are able to keep a keen eye

on the artifice of realism, without branding the viewer who consumes it a cultural dupe, as the postmodernists/feminists are forced to do because only they, somehow, muster the critical distance that prohibits their identification.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

Goffman has outlined persuasively that a condensed form of meaning operates within advertisements, and he has put the case that this is highly conventional in form. I attend to this by differentiating between texts and the interpretive competency required. I argue that reading most advertisements does not *require* that we attend theoretically to the instability of meaning. Advertisements are quite unlike the texts that postmodernists themselves write, in which the polysemic features of language are central to even a surface engagement with them. I relate this accomplishment to the conventional contexts available for use. Interpretation is a fact of life but this does not mean that there are not different sorts of interpretive activities. By this, I mean that we must attend to where the interpretation is taking place, what sort of an entity is subject to interpretation and where it comes from. Sorting out the varying aspects of interpretation enables us to grasp fundamental differences between the interpretation that confronts us within social interaction and the interpretive activities we undertake when we read a text. The fact that, as Goffman readily illustrates, these forms of interpretive competencies interact and that the boundaries between them are blurred is not a problem we face *as users*. We have a common-sense background to draw upon that allows us to make the necessary differentiations.

Interpretative interaction with others is located in space and time in an immediate embodied sense. We are unable to go back and undertake the interpretive activity again. Texts, on the other hand, can be re-read, re-interpreted. I argue that we bring different skills to bear when we interact and make those interpretations as part of the ongoing chain from those that we use when we approach a text. This marks out textual interpretations from social interpretation, even if we metaphorically apply the methods of textual interpretation to the embodied forms of social display. For example, we 'read' people's display and this can say something about their consumption practices, but this must not be taken as an instance of text as body. In this sense, I stress that these meanings are distinctly public in form and function because of the structured contexts from which they emerge.

Moreover, we apply different levels of interpretation to different cultural texts because we ascribe different statuses to them. In this way, we treat advertisements as relatively rudimentary texts, particularly when they are aligned to more complex texts such as novels. Advertisements ought not to be subsumed under the homogenising heading 'Text'. Postmodernism has pursued zealously the notion of the 'death of the author' and argued that we should cease to consider a text according to authorial intention. However, this has been pursued without any differentiation according to the context that produces the text. Advertisements are overtly commercial forms and it is of primary importance that advertisement successfully achieve the association of the language of desire and the product placement. On estimate, a campaign such as that run by Haägen-Dazs can cost about £30 million. If a campaign commits this much investment into persuading people to buy the good, surely this suggests that it aims

to anchor meaning rather than promote a product via the free-floating signifier. My central point is this: a campaign cannot be so ambiguous or so complex as to fail to connect the meanings it generates and the product. Therefore, I reject the notion that advertisements are so unstable as to prohibit a content analysis of their key features. We apply different keying techniques and we expect different forms of cultural content and presentation from them. Arguably, this distinction is taken for granted, but it is nevertheless fully operative.

IN SUMMATION

Goffman argues that advertisements are representations that are about our world. They are condensed representations that draw upon certain socio-cultural features of actual embodied interaction. However, he argues that they can operate successfully only if a number of conditions are met:

1. Goffman provides us with a semantic distinction between the model and the subject that allows us to describe the social reality represented without the epistemological slip that the representation encapsulates 'real reality' in some authentic way.
2. The capacity of the advertisement to represent society is dependent upon the artifice of the codes, props, bodies and stages.
3. The socio-cultural world that is recognisable in the image yet accomplished through artifice does not seem to have an adverse impact upon the reader.
4. On the contrary, the lay reader readily discards the artifice in order that the representation achieved can continue to be about our socio-cultural lives.
5. The social world staged is based in artifice, which means that the codes draw upon the background of embodied social interaction, but then greatly over-emphasise them. The social conventions of face-to-face interaction are 'hyper-ritualised'.

Therefore, the social conventions by which embodied interaction is regularly achieved is drawn upon exaggeratedly so that these features are readily understood without any extra interpretive work. For example, he isolates the use of the male body as a means to act as a barrier to the women's movement. He is suggesting that it mirrors the convention of presentations of the public self. Public male figures are notorious for stating symbolically that 'she is my wife'. Through the exaggeration, readers are readily able to project the embodied sets of meanings that flow from interaction on to the stylised versions in representation. The codes work because of their dependence upon convention, and it is with the conventions of representing gender that I am concerned.

Regarding content analysis as a method, the following conditions apply to its application here:

1. It is beyond the remit of the method to draw inferences about the relationship of representation to the social order more broadly.

2. Equally, it is beyond its scope to make inferential conclusions regarding interpretive activities.
3. I make no claim to replace the causal mechanism of internalisation with another.
4. If we seek to locate the effect of representation, then I propose that we look to its location within interaction. This effectively rejects representation as somehow a causal effect.
5. Advertisements are essentially conventional, which is why I argue that the method of content analysis is applicable.
6. I seek only to draw out the body positions and postures and so identify the extent of their gender differentiation.

In essence, then, the aim of quantifying the gendered nature of representation is to contest its assumed uniformity, which is a direct consequence of the categorical logic that informs the mainstay of semiotic analyses conducted. I argue that this requires a move beyond the form of description that merely contest a single semiotic reading with another single counter example, which undertaking a semiotic analysis of the content would produce. In a sense, the endeavour reflects the need for an overview of the representations, rather than attention to the specificities of the meaning. The consensus regarding the meaning of representation overlooks two central elements: first, it tends to overlook the commodification and sexualisation pressures and the extent to which the markets both target and marketise masculinity; second, it forecloses change that could potentially erode the gendered difference initially identified in the 1970s. The primacy awarded the gendered dichotomy as both the source and the outcome of representation inevitably leads to the reproduction of the dichotomy because there is no source, trajectory or subject that can produce sustained and systematic resistance to it.

GENDERING THE BODY OR CONSTRUCTING THE SUBJECT?

The purpose of quantifying the bodily based codes is to contest the assumption that 'the sign'⁹⁰ constitutes the gendered dichotomy, thereby constituting feminine identity as the absolute other. In chapter 2, I outlined what I consider to be the fundamental difficulties of theory that seeks to define or infer patterns of identification, that is, the formation of subjectivity, through a specific semiotic decoding of an ideological cultural contour. Here, I seek to challenge their assumptions of what the contours of culture actually are. Hence, my results investigate the validity of the following theoretical standpoint: the Symbolic is ordered by the core dualisms of patriarchy so that the active/passive elements are combined with the masculine subject and the feminine object. For example, a number of codes isolate which direction the model is looking: looking down and away is passive and thus feminine, whereas looking directly into the camera is active and thus masculine. For these semiotic analyses to be good empirical description, that is, good description of the Symbolic, then the Symbolic ought to reproduce the structural dualisms of patriarchy. In relation to a content analysis, if the Symbolic is thus structured, the tables generated ought to be categorically distributed by sex, measurable by chi square (statistical difference). If this is the case, the sex of the model will determine the dependent variables; the direction of the gaze, for example. Hence, the codes I have isolated define the position of the body, its gestures and expressions, in order to directly connect the Symbolic structures to determination of the body, that is, how the body as (feminine) object is visually produced.

In essence, I propose that the content, which I defined as the 'what' of the image, is anything but a forgone conclusion and the results offered here therefore aim to contest the assumption that culture is something ordered by a patriarchal Symbolic, which reproduces the (re)presentation of the feminine. On the contrary, I offer this content analysis as a means to: a) examine afresh the content of images; b) to redress the methodological imbalance produced by concentrating solely upon 'how' meaning is constructed. I have argued in chapter 3 that this imbalance leads to the loss of any sense of the basic description of gendered images.

THE ORDER OF ANALYSIS

The results are divided into two rough groups of codifications, beginning with those that identify simple photographic framing techniques, followed by those that pinpoint various forms of bodily gender display. I start by introducing the issue of how we read the body as self-evidently male or female. Crucially, how are bodies represented so that assignment of male or female is made, when the genitals are concealed? My interest here resides in issue of how naturalised gender is produced within the image, namely that this is what a man 'looks like' Correspondingly, it negates the required practices to accomplish what is seemingly natural order of the body. This is important for how we think about the causal relationship between genitals and the gendering of the body. I then trace how frequently the male and female models are pictured together, singly, in mixed or in homosocial groups. The emphasis here is to explore the central ideological anchoring of the image, particularly in terms of the heterosexist presumption and its corresponding dualisms. This is followed by the identification of the distributions of shot length, the type of focus and the combined effect of codifying the image

⁹⁰ 'The sign' has assumed the status of a generic type.

through the generalised form of address. I place particular importance on the extent to which the address is defined by the voyeuristic codification. I build upon this by examining the realist photographic conventions. This form of codification is then located in terms of the social situations in which it is anchored. Here, I identify the gendered contexts of the public and private spheres, as well as the prevalence of specific settings for the interaction between men and women, the detail of the how the public and private domain is integrated into the production of the image and, in particular, the sites for heterosexual romance. There then follows an examination of body gestures. These variables, when combined, give us an overall picture of the current modes of gender codification, especially the extent to which the gestures remain distinctly gendered. I conclude with an analysis of the composite findings, to which I add my own specific concerns regarding the sex/gender distinction.

Note that the presentation of the results will be limited to the sample from 1985-95. This restriction has been imposed because, in places, the sample is too small to provide clear indicative shifts. Also, taking the body as the sampling unit, rather than the advertisement, produced the anomaly of increasing the sample size from the intended 500 to 703. As a result, the sample from *Cosmopolitan* 1975 distorts the statistical calculations of chi square because the ratio of women to men⁹¹ here was 3:1, therefore already producing clear statistical difference. As a result, I will examine shifts from 1975 in terms of the generalised trends within *Cosmopolitan*. Where possible and relevant, I will include the chi score and the degrees of freedom beneath each table. Please note that when a number of cells have small distributions, Chi will produce an expected value that is less than five. This is statistically insignificant and inaccurate, and so in those cases Chi is not included. In these cases, the evidence will be treated as indicative. However, such small values may be indicative of a substantial change in themselves when treated as part of the broader semiotic picture provided by the cultural analyses.

Although included, my results will not contain any sustained analysis of the comparative distributions of the production of the sexed body and its relationship to ethnic minorities for two reasons. First, the overall sample for the ethnic minority groups registers just over 18%⁹². This means that there is a less than 1:5 proportion of black to white models used. The coding is simply too detailed to make any analysis of this proportion effective. Second, with hindsight, this is beyond the scope of what a content analysis can provide. To do so requires addressing theoretically the issue of how structures are layered but without integrating them and, subsequently, that I address the manifest failure of postmodernism/feminism to deal with two or more structures at one time (see Connell:1987; 1995; Giddens:1991; Bourdieu:1977; 1990; Calhoun:1995). One is able to get a sense of how frequently ethnic minorities are used, and that, strictly speaking, this proportion could be said to reflect fairly accurately the ratio of ethnic mix currently existing in Britain.

THE RESULTS

As can be readily identified in figure 1 below, the random sample between 1985-95 has produced a relatively even distribution of men and women represented: 50.79% of the bodies were

⁹¹ Please see Appendix C which shows the breakdown by numbers in 1975.

⁹² Please see Appendix C.

coded as female compared to 47.01% of bodies coded as male. Hence, there is equal visibility of male and female bodies within the fashion advertisements sampled. This sits in stark contrast to the 11 cases, just 1.73%, where the codes are sufficiently ambiguous to deter a secure assignment, meaning that in virtually all cases there are clear conventional secondary or tertiary sexual characteristics with which to assign the sex of the body (Connell:1987). This suggests that the sex of the model is visually codified so that the body appears as *self-evidently* one sex or the other, thereby negating those majority aspects of the body that are common to both bodies. It suggests that we treat secondary characteristics as clear, unambiguous signs of the naturalness of the category of sex. We tend to locate and define the body through genital difference first – that sex *is* the body. In our society, we tend not to think of ‘the’ body but of two bodies, knowable through sex, that produce two oppositional ontological entities. Keying functions in such a way that the body without armpit hair is self-evidently female. This form of keying seems to occur despite our awareness that shaving is a social activity and therefore, strictly speaking, has nothing to do with the “natural body”. Likewise, if the body represented has defined muscle over the breast bone, again the conventions of keying would automatically produce the classification that

Fig. 1 Distribution of the sexed model

Absolute Column % Respondents	Base	sex Q1			
		female	male	androdynous	other
	636 100.00%	323 50.79%	299 47.01%	11 1.73%	3 0.47%

the body is male. Muscle is a ‘natural’ feature of the male body, which again ignores the time spent in the gym *accomplishing* that particular muscle development. The central purpose of our cultural activities, it seems, is to negate these activities of accomplishment.

Furthermore, keying activity, such as this, indicates that we assume a direct correspondence between the secondary characteristics and concealed genitalia. This assumed correspondence is a process which, according to Kessler and McKenna (1978), by-passes the ‘biological failure’ of sex to clearly differentiate or dichotomise the secondary and tertiary characteristics into two distinct groups. Therefore, even when we encounter the myriad of ‘exceptions’ in everyday life, it does not undermine the sanctity of the assumption of correspondence, that is, that certain traits, personal and physical, are male traits. We are faced, then, with the dilemma of the body: it is both the most self-evident of things and yet it is also one of the most intensely constructed entities. I will refer to the body as the male or female sexed model in order to emphasise the visual accomplishment.

Figure 1 indicates that the sex of the body is an accomplished and stable entity that forms the bedrock of the representations sampled here. This legitimates the postmodernist/feminist assumption that sexual difference is the core discursive product that reproduces the dualistic logic of the Symbolic. In addition, postmodernists/feminists would argue that this establishes the initial construction upon which the process of identification is founded. However, there is a central issue at stake for the postmodern/feminist agenda: to what extent is the universal accomplishment of sex within representation sufficient grounds to connect the values of the Symbolic hierarchy to representation and

the identification representation is said to secure? In other words, is the accomplishment of a sexed female body sufficient to assume its place within the Symbolic hierarchy and award to that body the gendered traits of subjectivity? Perhaps one requires more than the mere presence of sexed bodies to assume the gendered Symbolic because the production of the sexed body, which is more or less universal, does not produce the same sets of correspondent meanings, not just cross-culturally, but also within our social order (Herdt:1993). The substitution of the accomplished body with the Symbolic organisation of feminine and masculine as subjective identification patterns means that the various elements involved in the construction they are addressing remains unclear, since they are used interchangeably. Are they delineating the construction of bodies, sexual character or representation? The interchangeability assumes that the accomplished body will secure the passivity of the feminine and that this is self-evident. But does the accomplished body also readily secure feminine traits, or is such a causal connection another instance of the implicit re-introduction of the naturalised body (Shilling:1993)? I return to this in greater detail as part of the evaluation of the results.

In figure 2⁹³, a significant majority of the models sampled were photographed as single models (65.91% of the total sample). Not only does this suggest an emerging trend for simplification in representation techniques (Millum:1975; Liess, Kline and Jhally:1986; Wernick:1991), insofar as it removes the codifications necessary to link the two models, but it also takes away an important anchor by which the heterosexist imperative is secured. For example, there is an approximate ratio of 4.5:1 of single female sexed models to those in a couple. This ratio is the same for male sexed models. It is now, therefore, much harder to secure the ‘feminine as sexual adjunct’ since she is predominantly photographed *without* a man. Moreover, she is just as likely to be photographed alone as a male sexed model.

Fig. 2 The relationship of numbers⁹⁴ to the sex of the model

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		619 100.00%	321 100.00%	298 100.00%
derived q2 Q29	single	408 65.91%	218 67.91%	190 63.76%
	male/female single	48 7.75%	23 7.17%	25 8.39%
	mixed couples	93 15.02%	47 14.64%	46 15.44%
	crowds	70 11.31%	33 10.28%	37 12.42%

Chi = 1.3915, df = 3, there is no significant relationship

⁹³ See Appendix B for details of which logically compatible codes have been amalgamated. Those variables subject to amalgamation are labelled ‘derived’.

⁹⁴ Note that this is a derived table. The combinations are listed in Appendix B. The same applies to all tables labelled ‘derived’.

The extent of this simplification can be demonstrated by comparing the above distributions with those of 1975, pictured below. First, there were no cases where women were photographed in mixed groups; second, this contrasts with a much higher visibility of men within the magazine⁹⁵. Figure 2a suggests that the numbers of mixed couples, and the extent to which the female could be located as a sexual adjunct has significantly reduced by as much as half, down from 33% in 1975 to approximately 15% between 1985-95. It must be noted that, while locating the woman in the man’s presence is one immediate and unambiguous way to codify the power or status differentials, there are ways around this, for not all forms of sexual objectification require the presence of the male body. Yet it is harder to assert the durability of the gendered dichotomies and their organisation through the heterosexist imperative if there are so few cases where the man shows the woman what to do, or protects her and so forth.

Fig. 2a Numbers by 1975, ‘Cosmopolitan’

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		67 100.00%	51 100.00%	16 100.00%
derived q2 Q29	single	24 35.82%	24 47.06%	0 0.00%
	male/female single	10 14.93%	10 19.61%	0 0.00%
	mixed couples	33 49.25%	17 33.33%	16 100.00%
	crowds	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%

Returning to figure 2, the last significant finding here is that in only 7.75% of the total sample between 1985-95 is the body is located within a single sex couple. Again, this frequency is mirrored across the sexed bodies. This indicates a number of things. To begin with, it provides evidence to substantiate my methodological critique of the dominance of semiotics. Returning to Lewis and Rolley, you will find that they isolated coupling as a key feature by which the homoerotic nature of magazine readership is secured. They define coupling as the presence of two same-sex bodies, which may be further connected through the visual narrative. Yet this is hard to sustain when there are so few cases in comparison with the single model, especially if one notes that the sampling unit is the body rather than the advertisement. The 23 bodies located within a potentially homosexual context translate into a maximum of only 11 advertisements out of the 500 sampled. This compares to 218 advertisements for the single female sexed model⁹⁶. Therefore, a specific feature has been noted as an instance that targets the homoerotic and thus produces an unconscious identification with the pre-Oedipal flow of desire. Yet without the overview that a content analysis can provide, theorists like Rolley and Lewis have no way of knowing how representative such a signification is. Now, we are able to identify that the visual

⁹⁵ See Appendix A
⁹⁶ This distribution is mirrored also within the male models: a maximum of 12 advertisements compared to 190 single male model advertisements.

pleasures constructed in women’s magazines cannot be organised as Rolley and Lewis have defined it precisely because the coupling codification is rarely used. Moreover, this code cannot be disregarded by referring to the subjective criteria of the category because it attends to a basic facticity of one or two people. Language cannot function at all if ad facto categorisation of this kind cannot be assumed.

I now turn to the variable that traces the generalised relationship between the models and their environment insofar as a specific relationship between model and objects and/or props is constructed through a narrative (Millum:1975). Figure 3 shows that a significant majority of both male and female sexed models are depicted as having no specific relationship with the props or commodity. Consequently, codifications that subordinate the female sexed model to objects and props, contained within the image, are in decline. Moreover, this trend is also apparent for male sexed models to the extent that they do not appear to be in command of the props/objects either. This is important for two central reasons: first, it further secures the above suggestion that the fashion advertisement is moving

Fig. 3 The relationship between the models and the props 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		620 100.00%	321 100.00%	299 100.00%
derived 5 Q28	model	537 86.61%	281 87.54%	256 85.62%
	model and objs	40 6.45%	19 5.92%	21 7.02%
	objects and model	43 6.94%	21 6.54%	22 7.36%

Chi = 0.5712, df =2, there is no significant relationship

toward a presentational format that is greatly simplified; second, the passive relationship to the object that is said to define the feminine is less apparent as is the masculine association with the active. This suggests a decline in the codifications identified by both Goffman and the postmodernist/feminist analyses. The feminine is not defined by being draped over the car, nor is a manly fragrance secured by the man’s ability to control the fast car. The subordination of the feminine to the commodity does not seem to be a central feature of the presentation, any more than the masculine *doing* the subordinating. How does this compare with 1975?

If we look briefly at figure 3a overleaf, we can see that subordination to the commodity or prop appears to be a central feature within *Cosmopolitan* in 1975. The small sample indicates that at 25.49%, the passive relationship to the props or objects remained a central component the conventions of codification of the feminine. Here, the active/passive dualism appears to be a more appropriate description. Again, this can only be treated as an indication, but one that corresponds with the general trends established during the initial politicisation of the image, as discussed in chapter 2.

Fig. 3a The relationship between model and props 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		67 100.00%	51 100.00%	16 100.00%
derived 5 Q28	model	51 76.12%	37 72.55%	14 87.50%
	model and objs	2 2.99%	1 1.96%	1 6.25%
	objects and model	14 20.90%	13 25.49%	1 6.25%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

The two variables examined thus far begin to alter our expectations of the patterns of gender difference. Variable two shows us that there has been a marked decline in the use of the heterosexual couple as part of the commodification process and that this has brought with it the predominance of the single model. With variable five, we have seen that the single model appears to have no particular relationship with the scene within which the body is contextualised, indicating a weakening relationship between the passive and the feminine to the extent that the accomplishment of the passivity cannot be produced through the props and social cues that surround the female model. Furthermore, the male sexed model does not appear to be defined by his command of the mock social environment either. Hence, the active/passive structure is not an overt feature of the image when relating gender to the props and commodities displayed. On the contrary, this relationship appears to be weakening.

The anticipated reply is that these two facets may be weakened, but there are plenty of other possibilities that can and do anchor the gendered dichotomies. For example, if the body is not subordinated to a specific prop or object, or if the woman is no longer defined via her association with the man, we can look to the broader narrative, the position of the spectator, the clothes themselves and so forth. So it is to these variables that I next turn my attention, beginning with shot length and focus. I will then address the mode of photography, beginning with the narrative address, followed by an analysis of how closely the image is bound to a naturalistic social scene. Of particular import is the extent to which realist modes define the centre of the codification and how the spectator is positioned in terms of the overall naturalism⁹⁷.

CENTRAL FRAMING TECHNIQUES AND THEIR DETERMINATION BY GENDER

The identification of the kinds of camera work used engages directly with the issue of the fetishisation of the feminine Woman through the objectifying frame. It is a central feature to the production of feminised and masculinised presentations of gender and the concomitant production of

⁹⁷ Note: I have rejected an examination of codes 9 and 10, perspective and non-perspective, from variable 6 because these issues are better addressed in Figure 12, pp 120-121.

homoerotic desire. Drawing particularly from Doane (1991) but also Cowie (1991;1997) Kaplan (1997) and Stratton (1996), the short length shot, combined with the soft focus, are the two central techniques used to fetishise the (feminine) body in an unambiguous way. They argue that the close-up ‘cuts’ the body so that the male viewer is able to disavow the threat of the female castrated body. The soft focus adds an additional form of objectification because it semi-masks the body so that the body becomes the central object of desire; soft focus displaces the fact that the lack is real. Following the descriptive analysis that the postmodernist/feminists present, one would expect the feminine to be encoded using the close-up and the soft focus, both of which best facilitate a lingering and fetishistic gaze, as established by the image frame. In contradistinction, one would expect the male sexed body to be photographed predominately using the long shot and the sharp focus, insofar as the oppositional logic suggests that the masculine is conveyed by the marks that are not feminine. Therefore, this school would assert the categorical difference that underpins their analysis to determine, to a significant degree, these forms of codification.

Contrary to the expectation formed by their analysis, figure 4 shows that there is little variation between the length of the shot and the sexed model. The medium shot length is the most frequently used, at 48.95% of the total 1985-95 sample, compared with only 30.92% for the long shot, and surprisingly, only 20.13% for the close-up. Note also that the long shot is used more frequently to codify the female sexed model than the close-up; just over a third. While it remains the case that the body can still be fetishised using the medium shot, this process is made much harder with the long shot when the fetishism has to operate *within* the image (see Doane:1991:46-8;Cowie: 1997:104-5). The close-up ensures that the body dominates the frame and so produces a closeness to the viewer that is singular to the image. Doane accords this closeness a special connection to the feminine state of ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’ because the viewer is awarded unconditionally the control of the gaze. What is more

Fig. 4 Shot length and its relationship to sexed model 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		621 100.00%	322 100.00%	299 100.00%
camera Q7	close up	125 20.13%	55 17.08%	70 23.41%
	medium shot	304 48.95%	159 49.38%	145 48.49%
	long shot	192 30.92%	108 33.54%	84 28.09%

Chi = 4.5991, df = 2, there is no significant relationship

significant is that of all the photographs of female sexed models, only 17.08% of the representations use the close-up, compared to 23.41% of male models. While this difference is not significant statistically, the direction of the difference challenges the postmodernists/feminists’ categorical assumption that more female sexed models than male would be photographed using the close-up.

How does this compare with focus use, the second code to which the postmodernist/feminists have given central importance? The importance of the soft codes rests with its capacity to render the feminine iconic by seeming to make the thing desirable in itself (Doane;1991). First, soft focus glosses over the textures to produce a smooth soft surface to the face and body. Second, it is also a key technique by which we conventionally codify the feminine with the emotions of the intellectually adrift, for example dreaminess. In contradistinction, sharp focus attends to the precise detail of things, a quality that has been extended to denote engagement and concentration. If we look at figure 5, we can readily identify that, again, there is no significant difference between the sexed models and the various focuses used to photograph them. Both the male and female sexed models are predominantly photographed using the sharp focus: 66.15% of female cases, compared to 61.74% of all male sexed models photographed. Thus, the realist focus is the predominant codification. Moreover, the direction of difference again runs counter to expectation: the higher frequency does not rest with the masculine. Only 26.40%, that is just over 1:4, of the women photographed were codified using the soft focus as compared to 31.88%, (just under 1:3) of all male sexed models in the sample. Once more, the direction

Fig. 5 Focus and its relationship to the sexed model 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		620 100.00%	322 100.00%	298 100.00%
camera Q7	sharp focus	397 64.03%	213 66.15%	184 61.74%
	soft focus	180 29.03%	85 26.40%	95 31.88%
	out of focus	44 7.10%	25 7.76%	19 6.38%

Chi = 2.2489, df = 2, there is no significant relationship

of difference runs contrary to the expectations raised by postmodernist/feminist analysis: the higher frequency lies with the male sexed models.

In addition, this represents a shift in frequency from 1975. Figure 5a overleaf indicates that the above distributions signal a shift in the codification of both the male and the female sexed model. For example, from the 1975 sample we can see that just over 80% of men shown were codified in sharp focus, which corresponds much more to the kinds of descriptions afforded by the postmodernist/feminist model and surely reflects the context within which the initial semiotic analyses were conducted. In contrast, there is a 3:1 ratio of soft focus to sharp focus, which is more in line with the order of the gendered dichotomy.

Fig. 5a Sexed model by key focus, 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		641 100.00%	49 100.00%	16 100.00%
camera Q7	sharp focus	46 7.18%	33 67.35%	13 81.25%
	soft focus	19 2.96%	16 32.65%	3 18.75%

We can combine the focus with the shot length. The tabulation below shows that the most dominant form of fashion photography combines the medium shot with the realism of the sharp focus (33.43% of the total sample). Second, there is the long shot combined with sharp focus, accounting for 21.07% of the sample. Within these groupings, there is a marginal difference across sex, with the female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of the long shot. Thus, the female sexed model assumes a higher proportion of the codes which, when combined, fetishise the least. In contrast, the close-up is used more frequently on the male sexed body, both within the sharp and soft focus. In fact, 29.47% of male sexed models codified using the soft focus are shot in close-up compared to 24.71% of female sexed models. Thus, the combined codes that are said to fetishise the *most* are used *more* frequently on the male sexed model than the female. Two elements emerge: first, the realist forms of codification assume the greater proportion of the cases assessed; second, the codes that are said to fetishise the body, that is function as a form of disavowal for the lack that it signifies, *par excellence*, are used with a greater frequency on the male sexed model.

Fig. 6 The distribution of camera frames and their relationship to gender

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sharp focus-sex Q1		soft focus-sex Q1	
			female	male	female	male
Base		631 100.00%	213 100.00%	184 100.00%	85 100.00%	95 100.00%
camera Q7	close up	112 17.75%	27 12.68%	36 19.57%	21 24.71%	28 29.47%
	medium shot	286 45.32%	109 51.17%	92 50.00%	42 49.41%	44 46.32%
	long shot	178 28.21%	77 36.15%	56 30.43%	22 25.88%	23 24.21%

$\chi^2 = 16.2049$, $df = 6$, there is a significant relationship at 5%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

It has been shown that the distributions of the above variables further challenge the categoricalism that defines the assignment of meaning and the structural, causal significance of certain

codes within the postmodernist/feminist model. Through their selected semiotic readings, proponents of this model have identified relationships between the signifier and the signified that are said to be definitive of the representations of the feminine and thus integral to the formation of the identity. Yet my results find no statistical difference in the distributions of the shot length or the focus. Furthermore, where minimal difference does appear, the frequencies of use are higher when representing the masculine than the feminine. Arguably, these codes may be overridden by the fetishisation of the body through clothes and the narrative context, as well as the direction of the gaze and so forth. For example, it may be the case that the soft focus is put to minimal use because the feminine as passive is securely anchored through body positions that show the feminine withdrawing from space, that is, the social symbolic is drawn upon to reproduce gendered oppositions. Yet if we combine these results with the finding that codification of the model through use of the prop did not reflect the gendered dichotomy either, then an empirical base is forming that directly challenges the categorical assumptions that define semiotic readings undertaken within the postmodernist/feminist perspective. Furthermore, the notion that the male sexed model has undergone feminisation (Neale:1992; Startton:1996) does not provide a clear basis to explain these apparent contradictions. This is an important point of friction because it brings to the fore the irreconcilable tension: the corporeal accomplishment contradicts Symbolic construction.

NARRATIVE ADDRESS AND CONTEXTUAL REALISM

One source that may secure the Symbolic determination of the gendered body is the specific narrative address. This is established through the interaction of the model’s gaze, the photographer and the spectator. From Mulvey to Dyer to Mayne and Kaplan, all have addressed the division between the masculine and the feminine in terms of who looks away (private voyeur), and who looks and asserts themselves to the viewer (public addressing viewer). The seer/seen axis is elaborated through the structural relationship to power: the ‘seer’ is always the masculine Master. Where the gaze is held by the ‘slave’, this look is temporary, transgressive and surreptitious. However, as figure 7 shows, this

Fig. 7 sex by narrative address, 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		591 100.00%	318 100.00%	273 100.00%
spectatorial address Q22	public addressing viewer	167 28.26%	85 26.73%	82 30.04%
	narrative address	49 8.29%	27 8.49%	22 8.06%
	private voyeur	375 63.45%	206 64.78%	169 61.90%

Chi = 0.7929, df = 2, there is no significant difference

structural relationship is not organised into categorically opposite groups whereby the masculine is defined by the active gaze, and the feminine is defined by the private voyeuristic gaze. In fact, the private voyeur is emerging as the central mode of codification for *both* the male and the female sexed models; 61.90% and 64.74% respectively. What difference exists is statistically insignificant. This compares strikingly with the low frequency with which the direct active gaze is utilised; only 30.04% of male sexed models are thus codified compared to 26.73% of female sexed models. This table establishes that sexual difference does not define how the codification is deployed and thus does not correspond to the active/passive order of the mode of address. Even if we take into account Dyer’s recognition that the private voyeur, while marginal, is applied to the male pin-up, this still fails to recognise the extent to which men are equally subject to the look that cannot be returned. This significant increase may be a result of the equally significant shift to the single model because arguably ‘private voyeur’ is best able to commodify the body via the language of desire. I return to this again in the examination of the facial expressions: do images deploy strategies that negate the passivity of being the seen object and are these strategies used to encode the masculine as the postmodernists/feminists describe. To summarise, the mode of objectification that is said to define the voyeuristic gaze appears to be defining how *both* the sexed bodies are represented.

Figure 7a indicates that in 1975, just over half of the all the female sexed models were codified in a manner that directly draws the viewer into narrative. This compares notably with the fall to just 8.29% of all the images sampled between 1985-1995. This fall seems to suggest that narrative address is no longer considered an effective form of commodification. More important, however, are the implications for identification patterns. Narrative address has a particular format that includes the participation of the viewer in order to complete the narrative. This requires a recognition on behalf of the viewer of the social scene staged and, according to the postmodernist/feminist model, secures the identification axis between the scene and the viewer. Figure 7a suggests that these sorts of identification strongly mark the codifications in 1975 when the mock-up realism of the image was identified during the first run of content analyses. This appears to have all but disappeared by 1985-95

Fig. 7a sex by narrative address 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		66 100.00%	50 100.00%	16 100.00%
spectatorial address Q22	public addressing viewer	4 6.06%	3 6.00%	1 6.25%
	narrative address	35 53.03%	26 52.00%	9 56.25%
	private voyeur	27 40.91%	21 42.00%	6 37.50%

and, with it, the identification patterns assumed. The source of this change is, in part, a knock-on effect of the significant shift to the single model, which blocks this type of narrative interaction.

We have thus far identified the extent to which the narrative address has declined in significance and the extent to which the 'private voyeur' now dominates. The significance of this lies in its separation of the active and passive elements of the narrative. The dominance of the single model codes and the absence of any direct relationship of model and prop leads one to anticipate a significant impact on the image's ability to reproduce wider social relations through spatial relations within the two dimensional frame. Potentially, this may mean the removal of the image's capacity to draw upon wider social relations to reproduce the active/passive axis.

In conjunction with the decline of narrative-driven advertisements, one must re-introduce the massive impact that the single model will have upon how the space is occupied. To reiterate, the use of the single model compared to the heterosexual couple model is approximately 4:1. When we combine this with the fact that many of the models did not have any specific relationship with the visual environment, we find that, overwhelmingly, the symbolic production of the hierarchy through space no

Fig. 8 The effect upon spatial location of single models and heterosexual couples⁹⁸

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	single-sex Q1		mixed couples-sex Q1	
			female	male	female	male
Base		587 100.00%	197 100.00%	171 100.00%	47 100.00%	45 100.00%
spatial Q6	centre	316 53.83%	138 70.05%	139 81.29%	23 48.94%	16 35.56%
	off centre	123 20.95%	52 26.40%	26 15.20%	22 46.81%	23 51.11%
	in front of	31 5.28%	7 3.55%	10 5.85%	11 23.40%	3 6.67%
	level with	15 2.56%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	7 14.89%	8 17.78%
	above	10 1.70%	2 1.02%	0 0.00%	4 8.51%	4 8.89%
	below	10 1.70%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	7 14.89%	3 6.67%
	seated/on top of	45 7.67%	18 9.14%	9 5.26%	11 23.40%	7 15.56%
	underneath	4 0.68%	0 0.00%	1 0.58%	0 0.00%	3 6.67%
	behind	14 2.39%	1 0.51%	0 0.00%	3 6.38%	10 22.22%
	beside	23 3.92%	3 1.52%	0 0.00%	9 19.15%	11 24.44%
	opposite	9 1.53%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	4 8.51%	5 11.11%
	periphery	18 3.07%	5 2.54%	6 3.51%	1 2.13%	6 13.33%

⁹⁸ The proportion of same sex couples means that the distributions are too small to be significant.

longer defines how the model is codified. Or at least, the clues are insufficient to be able to make that interpretation with any regularity. Figure 8 shows exactly how far-reaching this impact is. Both the single model and the heterosexual couple are overwhelmingly depicted centre or just off-centre of the image. With regard to the single model, the table reconfirms that there is an absence of any clear relationship between the model and props, which means that the single model is the sole focal point of the image. This automatically marginalises the other spatial relationships to such an extent that they are of hardly any statistical relevance at all. Regarding the heterosexual couple, the table shows that they too have moved toward a much simplified spatial relationship, which is also organised around the centre focal point. The female sexed model is no more or less likely to be seated on top of a prop or model than the male, nor is she more likely to be positioned in front of him so as to emphasise further his probable larger relative size. Together, these findings signal a significant shift away from ordering the image by a symbolic hierarchical relationship established through the relative occupancy of space within the two-dimensional frame. Relative size is widely used to naturalise sexual dimorphism. Moreover, this provides further evidence that the codification of the image is moving toward a much simplified form, which represents a significant shift from Goffman’s careful analysis of how embodied social hierarchies are performed and highlighted within a two dimensional frame. The evidence here simply does not show a marking-out of social space in terms of these particular gendered hierarchies.

The next two variables address the interrelationships between the scene and the active participation by a particular model with others and the designated social space. Again, preponderance of the single model already curtails the extent to which the following variables are relevant. This necessarily affects the follow-up variable that seeks to define how bodies interact to demarcate, as well as sexualise, space. Goffman isolated a number of key features that identified how the public/private dichotomy was symbolically established. In particular, he examined how the connection of public domain to competency and command was secured through a number of visual barriers. These often cut across the two-dimensional frame. I adopted this not only for a more substantial historical link, but also

Fig. 9 The gender of space or the containment of the feminine

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		562 100.00%	295 100.00%	267 100.00%
derived q12 Q32	contained by self	33 5.87%	24 8.14%	9 3.37%
	contained by self and/or other	41 7.30%	20 6.78%	21 7.87%
	mutual	26 4.63%	13 4.41%	13 4.87%
	non-contained	462 82.21%	238 80.68%	224 83.90%

because it readily achieves the status differentials that define patriarchy through the positions of the body. It directly draws upon how the body performs, and thus reproduces visually, what are in effect

abstract relations. However, as figure 9 shows, this form of hierarchical display, where the male sexed model is in command of the social space so that the female sexed model is confined within his demarcations, has barely any continued relevance. The body is primarily codified by ‘non-containment’, (80.68% for the female sexed model compared to 83.90% for the male). The only marginal difference lies in the extent to which the feminine tends to be self-contained compared to the conventional representations of the masculine. But at only 8.14% of all the females sampled, this is of little consequence. This means that the man does not extend his body in front of the woman to establish a symbolic barrier thereby limiting the movement one can infer would have taken place in the social world. Equally, the female hardly ever contains herself by pulling her limbs in so as not to occupy space. This is a striking rejection of clear codifications that produce the feminine as passive. Consequently, the following variable, number 13, which aimed to identify exactly how the man contained the woman, as in the example above, is shown to be of no relevance. This can be readily demonstrated by identifying the number of automatic exclusions produced as a result of the overwhelming majority of cases identified as ‘non-contained’: 323 of the female cases were excluded, compared to 298 of the male⁹⁹.

I turn next to the central anchor for framing the image, namely the extent to which fashion advertisements codify the commodification process within realist social contexts. The significance of

Fig. 10 The distributions of realist codifications

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		616 100.00%	320 100.00%	296 100.00%
photographic style Q8	naturalistic mock-up	167 27.11%	94 29.38%	73 24.66%
	stylistic	189 30.68%	108 33.75%	81 27.36%
	neutral	260 42.21%	118 36.88%	142 47.97%

Chi = 7.7900, df = 2, therefore there is statistical significance at 5%

this is the extent to which the models are contextualised within ritualistic formats whereby the image ‘looks like my life’. The ‘naturalistic mock-up’ carries the realist format and thus best facilitates identification. Therefore, this codification is crucial both for Goffman’s analysis of how the image works in order to feed back to us our view of the social world as naturally hierarchical, and for the identification patterns that construct the subjectivity undertaking the viewing. If interpellation is at work, then it should be evident here. The postmodernist/feminist analysis seeks to examine how the identification process operates within the naturalisation of the gendered dichotomies because this mode of identification exposes the masochistic features of femininity: the process of identification takes place despite the dominatory version of femininity presented. Thus, ‘naturalistic mock-ups’ must dominate

⁹⁹ Please see Appendix C for the whole distributions left once the majority of sample is suspended.

the codification, if the Symbolic is marked by the patriarchal order. Yet again, my results seem to suggest a shift in the format of the image. Figure 10 introduces some substantial statistical shifts. First, it shows that the 'naturalistic mock-up' is no longer the central form of codification by which the feminine *or* the masculine is set. In only 27.11% of the total sample is there a naturalistic setting, with the female sexed model assuming a slightly higher proportion of this, 29.38% compared to 24.66% for the male sexed model. This would seem to explain why the social divisions of space appear to have marginal presence here. Therefore, the significant difference rests in the extent to which the male sexed model is located within a neutral setting. In 47.97% of cases the male sexed model is located against a blank backdrop where there are no props or scenes of any kind. This means that nearly half have no social contextualisation whatsoever. Note the corresponding significance of the higher frequency of female sexed models within a stylistic codification compared to male sexed models: 33.75% and 27.36% respectively. This is combined with the markedly higher number of male sexed models in a neutral context than female (47.97% compared to 36.88%¹⁰⁰). This shows that the presentation of the male body does not tend to be contextualised, and when it is, this is least likely to be in a realist context.

The stylistic codification is the second most frequent coding for the male sexed model, assuming 27.36%. Here the model is either located within a contradictory setting compared to mock action, or the model himself is exposing the artifice of the image by self-referentially bringing to the fore what actually takes place to produce a naturalistic image. In this way, the techniques of the naturalistic mock-up are exposed by making the artifice the theme of the image. Neutral and stylistic codifications combined make up 75% of the sample of men, which undermines the assurance by which we can legitimately assume that realism continues to define how the male sexed models are codified. Moreover, it removes a considerable number of clues by which we usually make speculative inferences as to 'who' the model might be. Only naturalistic images gives an idea as to the models personality traits, that is how feminine or masculine he is.

With regard to the female sexed model, there is a more or less even distribution across the three codifications, with naturalistic mock-up accounting for just under a third and neutral codification taking the largest proportion at 36.88%. Again, the naturalistic code, which is best able to interpellate identification, is found to have the lowest frequency. Correspondingly, the female model is more likely to be depicted exposing the artifice of the image than securing the naturalness of the female model and the private sphere. Therefore, the realist form that carries forward the ideological patterns, as well as securing the identification of subjectivity via the representation, is shown to be a marginal form of codification for the male and female sexed models. The absence of a naturalistic setting also makes it harder to secure the naturalness of the gendered gesture because the context, which is central to securing the gesture's meaning, is absent. Therefore, to make the gesture apparent, it must be rendered even more obvious, that is further subject to the hyper-ritualisation through which a gesture can be read.

We can get a sense of the extent of the shifts from figure 10a (overleaf). This table reflects the kinds of distributions we would expect from both the feminist content analysis and from Goffman's

¹⁰⁰ When crosstabulated, Chi score registers 6.0527, df = 1, 5% significance level.

analysis. As indicated, in 1975 there is a dominance of the realist format at 66.67% compared to the 29.38% that emerges from 1985 onwards. In addition, the format of the advertisement has yet to take on any surrealism of stylistic codification that is associated with the postmodern cultural turn (Featherstone; 1990; Jameson; 1984). The extensive use of realist features provides an empirical base upon which its influence resided and upon which the postmodernist/feminist semiotic analyses depend. I argue that the data presented here shows that this base is in decline and, with it, go the features of the naturalistic mock-up that are said to interpellate identification.

Fig. 10a Naturalistic coding by sex 1975

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	cosmo 1975-sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		67 100.00%	51 100.00%	16 100.00%
photographic style Q8	naturalistic mock-up	44 65.67%	34 66.67%	10 62.50%
	stylistic	4 5.97%	3 5.88%	1 6.25%
	neutral	19 28.36%	14 27.45%	5 31.25%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

There are a number of significant shifts suggested by the data presented here. First, it was noted that there has been a massive reduction in the use of the narrative address that implies the participation and thus identification of the viewer. Second, it was noted that the images do not draw upon the symbolic organisation of space in order to recreate the social relations of space we embody. This was further secured through the total decline of aligning the feminine to the private sphere, which was said to determine the ways in which women occupy space. Fourth, this shift is not gender differentiated. Therefore, the male sexed model is just as likely to be codified by the ‘private voyeur’ form as the female sexed model. Then, the social contextualisation of the image was examined, and it was found that the ‘naturalistic mock-up’ no longer defines the context of the body’s presentation, instead both the male and female models are more likely to be located in a neutral context, or in one which draws attention to the artifice inherent to the image. As identified, 42.21% of the total sample is located against a neutral backdrop, which automatically excludes 291 cases from the social setting. This clearly affects the gendering of space. Finally, an important relationship appears to be emerging: as the realist mode declines, so the simplification of the image increases.

THE SOCIAL SCENE

The central issue is whether the social location of each sexed model continues to observe the order established by the gendered dichotomy. The social scene establishes the extent to which social

settings and different kinds of activity are aligned to this dichotomy. However, the results above, particularly the decline in the realist context to the image, has already undermined the extent to which social space will reflect this order: first, it has been identified that the male sexed model is not contextualised socially in nearly 50% of all cases; second, it has been established that the application and exaggeration of social relations regarding space no longer appear to define the construction of the image. Therefore, for those cases that are relevant here, one must identify some clear differences in the context if it is to be described as reflecting the Symbolic world we live in at all. For example, it must provide the appropriate backdrop to establish the activity of the masculine subject, particularly through dynamic scenarios, as well as those that establish the feminine as passive. In addition, one would expect to find here the extensive use of ‘grooming’ or the more non-specific ‘narcissistic’ codifications to locate the explicit eroticisation of male sexed models. This contextualisation is said to aid the negation of the objectification process, and in particular, maintain a structure between the viewer and the viewed whereby the male sexed model leaves the gaze unacknowledged. This directly references Moore’s analyses (1988), as well as drawing upon elements of Wernick’s analysis (1991). Also, it extends the logic of Dyer’s examination of the pin-up which I addressed, namely that the codification negates the significance of the (woman) viewer. Essentially, the codification ‘catches’ the male sexed model in a context where he would be naturally undressed (Finch:1990). This form of negation is not

Fig. 11 Genderising social settings 1985-95¹⁰¹

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		360 100.00%	205 100.00%	155 100.00%
Q51 q25 scenes	socialising	57 15.83%	33 16.10%	24 15.48%
	leisure	28 7.78%	17 8.29%	11 7.10%
	'loving'	56 15.56%	29 14.15%	27 17.42%
	grooming	9 2.50%	5 2.44%	4 2.58%
	urban	45 12.50%	20 9.76%	25 16.13%
	rural	32 8.89%	21 10.24%	11 7.10%
	private min.	20 5.56%	15 7.32%	5 3.23%
	public min.	66 18.33%	39 19.02%	27 17.42%
	other	47 13.06%	26 12.68%	21 13.55%

Chi = 7.4835, df = 8, there is no significant relationship

¹⁰¹ See Appendix B for a the full extent of the amalgamations.

required by the feminine because the objectification it implies is said to be the very essence of the 'feminine as represented'.

Significantly, the table above gives a strong indication that those specific locations in space no longer contextualise gender display in fashion advertisements. The male sexed model is no more likely to be pictured 'socialising' than the female sexed model. Neither is the male model located in the context of leisure or sport, another context whereby the body can be shown while negating the implicit objectification. The two codes, which maintain an echo of the gendered dichotomy, are the rural settings and the private or domestic sphere, but only minimally so. By this I mean that there were only the barest of props or setting established, which was suggestive rather than clearly contextualising. Note also the low frequency of grooming. Even though this had to be amalgamated with 'narcissistic', still only 2.5% of the total sample of male models were coded thus. Strictly speaking, it is not even statistically valid because the nominal number is supposed to exceed 10. Potentially therefore, it may be the case that the male sexed model, while sexualised, no longer mobilises strategies, contexts or looks that negate the implicit 'to-be-looked-at-ness'. In conclusion, these results strongly indicate that social space is no longer ordered by the gendered dichotomy of the public/private.

The final formal feature I wish to introduce, before moving on to the particulars of the body, is the part of spatial variable that examines the more abstract relationship of the model's body or part of body with the two-dimensional plane of the image. I had intended to use these codes for two points of analysis: first, to trace it as a formal feature that identifies the relative importance awarded to each sexed body by the sheer amount of pictorial space the body assumes; and second, to utilise Goffman's analysis, which hinges on the premise that we can treat an image 'as real' if it structurally reproduces status differentials that define social interaction. However, the distributions no longer appear to be defined by such differentials, at least to any significant extent. I turn then to the second feature (which uses the amount of space the body assumes as a point of fixity for the bodily presentations). Thus its second purpose was to address the metaphoric distance placed between the viewer and the body. The second aim relates to the framing produced by the shot length and ways this goes on to frame the whole body. It identifies how much of the body, and 'parts' of the body are contained within the frame. For example, in 'dominates frame entirely' the part of the body depicted will fill the whole frame and, as a result, it will bring the body very close to the viewer. It has the effect of magnifying the flesh and is therefore a crucial code with which to render the flesh an object of desire in itself. For the other codifications, a greater sense of naturalistic perspective is introduced, linking the shot length to the sense of the body within naturalistic perspective¹⁰².

Figure 12 indicates that the formal frame and its positioning of the body fails again to be marked by difference between the sexes. The sex of the model has a marginal affect of the differing distributions, usually about 3%. For example, of all the male sexed models, 19.39% occupied ½ of the visual frame compared to 16.93% of the female sample. The most significant difference lies between those that occupy a third of the space and those that dominate the frame entirely. Again, this difference goes against the expectations formed by the postmodernist/feminist analysis because it is the male

¹⁰² This proved to be a more accurate way of codifying perspective, which is why codes 9 and 10 were dropped from analysis if variable 6.

sexed model that is more likely to be codified using the extreme close-up that effectively eroticises the flesh by making the whole torso fill the two-dimensional frame. Note also that, empirically, this corroborates the shot length discussed earlier, thereby demonstrating the consistency of coding. Of all the female sexed models sampled, 24.21% occupy a third of the visual frame compared to 18.71% of male sexed models. This gives us a sense of the full body at middle distance so that the head and feet correspond to the top and bottom of the page. 17.61% of female sexed models sampled were framed in the extreme close-up compared to 26.87% of males. We can add to the shot length the effect this has on the body presented, producing two distinct modes. First, we have a sense of the body being close to the surface of the image, which gives the bodily presentation the tactility and intimacy of the close-up, particularly of the male sexed model. Second, we have a sense of the whole body in the distance framed by the picture's edge, particularly for the female sexed model. The fact that this contradicts expectations so much cannot be attributed to the coding, as there is very little that this ambiguous about the dividing the image into three, with the female sexed model occupying the centre third.

Fig. 12 The relationship between sexed model and space projected by the image 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		612 100.00%	318 100.00%	294 100.00%
spatial Q6	dominates frame entirely	135 22.06%	56 17.61%	79 26.87%
	3/4	83 13.56%	46 14.47%	37 12.59%
	1/2	111 18.14%	54 16.98%	57 19.39%
	1/3	132 21.57%	77 24.21%	55 18.71%
	1/4	54 8.82%	32 10.06%	22 7.48%
	less 1/4	104 16.99%	59 18.55%	45 15.31%

Chi = 10.5921, df = 5, there is no significant relationship

Thus, on a more methodological note, this illustrates how the variables within taxonomy cross-reference each other and thus act as a check that the coding procedures are extended across the coding frame as a whole. Each variable isolates a specific feature from its interrelated parts, yet an accurate correspondence exists between them which suggests that dependence upon the conventional use of each term establishes a secure base with which to apply the same criteria repeatedly. I argue that this supports my methodological position that each image can be successfully assessed in terms of manifest parts and thus not solely in terms of its unique individual features.

SUMMARY THUS FAR

1. The codes analysed present evidence that key features in the construction of the image cannot be said to be categorically distributed by gender. In fact, there is a marked absence of statistical association.
2. There is a relationship emerging that traces an inverse relationship: as the simplification of the image increases so the codes that construct the image as realist decline. By simplification I mean that the detail of the ideological baggage is being replaced by direct codes that place the body and the clothes worn right at the centre of the image, rather than using props, settings and so forth to tell a story about the sort of men who wear label 'X'. This emerging trend was initially identified in Millum and was also shown to persist, if marginally, by both Liess et al. and Wernick.

THE TAXONOMY OF THE BODY

This section traces how various conventional body positions and expressions are utilised to mark each body and thus connect each body to the broader contours of the Symbolic. The central principle is that the codes seek to isolate what the body must 'do' to readily achieve natural femininity. For example, Goffman drew particular attention to the feminine touch, arguing that this was a specific way the fragility and delicacy of the feminine can be applied to the commodity itself, while the Mulveyian paradigm examines the direction and force of the look to reflect the broader patterns of Symbolic power. I argue that the Symbolic and its associated oppositions ought to filter through and, at the very least, organise the simplest, most manifest features. If sexual difference, as described by the Mulveyian paradigm, defines the everyday visual world, then it ought to be readily apparent, not requiring sophisticated and highly skilled semiotic analysis in order to identify its meaning. This is because, when we undertake ordinary interpretation in the everyday world, we don't attend to meaning in that way (Cavell:1995).

How does the visual image combine the various codifications in order to make the sexing of the body the most unambiguous code to apply? I have argued that what this is examining are the ways in which utilising, grasping and manipulating define the production of the masculine because this is treated as unproblematically *reflecting* the essence of the male body. Self-evident in this treatment of the body is the fact that sex and gender, as defined by Oakley (1972), are treated as equivalent and interchangeable in a common-sense context. For example, the withdrawal from space, be it for reasons of modesty or in response to a potential threat, ought to mark the feminine because this reflects the ideological essence of the female body, namely weak and in need of protection. Therefore, this accomplishes the naturalisation of sexed body. Moreover, it is in this sense that the accomplishment raises the question of 'what the body does' in order to re-established that process of naturalisation. This is what is involved in the negation of the practices of gender accomplishment.

I begin by tracing what part of the body is represented, primarily because it gives us an immediate sense of the diversity or limitation of the body positions and gestures possible. For example, if to accomplish the feminine requires the repeated representations of the torso, which brings the body closer to the picture surface, then this also brings the breast closer to the viewer. The breast is regularly used to achieve the social accomplishment of sex. It deploys the inference that breasted people have

vaginas and are therefore women. To this, we can add the closeness of the face, perhaps as a mechanism to anchor the softness of the skin and the absence of a larynx. It acts as substitute and reference for biological sex. By using these codes, therefore, it is possible to trace the encoding or sexing of the body. I conclude with an analysis of the variable that traces the specific ways that the body can be fetishised. This is followed by an analysis of ‘body type’ (variable eleven), which addresses the physique, appearance and character presentations of the body. This last analysis will take two distinct forms: first, it will begin with a brief account of why this variable was only partially successful; second, I assess the distributions of the types of bodily features. I then return the analysis of the accomplishment of the sexed body that we initially encountered.

THE GENERAL BODY FORM: WHAT PARTS OF THE BODY ‘DO’ GENDER DISPLAY?

Figure 13 below identifies the specific parts of the body framed by the image. The variable establishes the bodily base on which the further detail of the expressions and positions can be added. Those techniques that encode ‘to-be-looked-at-ness’, those said to define representation of the feminine, bring the body to the surface of the picture frame and would surely be applied more frequently to the female sexed model. Here, however, there is clear evidence that many of the gestured codes must be contextualised in terms of the whole body (60.63%), rather than the various bodily fragments (39.37%). This automatically marginalises those codes that break up the integrity of the body and contradicts the semiotic evidence of postmodernism/feminism and, theoretically, presents problems for their model because it is difficult to continue to place central importance upon the fetishisation process, which facilitates the masculine disavowal of lack, when only a minority of images represent the body ‘in bits’. As figure 13 illustrates, the feminine is not codified through the visualisation as a ‘body bit’ any more than the masculine. In fact, the reverse is true, since the distributions contravene the expected direction.

Fig. 13 The representation of ‘body parts’

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		601 100.00%	318 100.00%	283 100.00%
general idiom Q9	full body	365 60.73%	208 65.41%	157 55.48%
	legs cut off	69 11.48%	33 10.38%	36 12.72%
	cut at waist	108 17.97%	49 15.41%	59 20.85%
	face only	59 9.82%	28 8.81%	31 10.95%

Chi = 6.1307, df =3, there is no significant relationship

The results show that, contrary to expectations, it is the male sexed body that is more frequently represented via the face or the torso alone not the female (20.85% and 10.95% of the male sample respectively compared to 15.41% and 9.28% for the female sample). If one cross-tabulates these codes with the shot length, one finds that of the 59 male cases half also dominate the frame and thus appear to bring the body to the picture surface. Cowie noted that this is a particularly intense form of objectification, presumably of the feminine, because the combination brings the flesh so close as to almost denote a degree of (projected) intimacy (1997:105). This kind of codification regularly features in those images that fetishise the female body because the model is not in command of how the body will be viewed, but must passively receive the gaze. Here, it is the male body that is potentially subject to such a gaze. Yet, a third of all the images of the male sexed model are isolated from a direct sense of a body's social and physical relationship to space, replaced instead by the face as an object of beauty alone (Berger: 1974; Pollock: 1991; 1992). If postmodernist/feminist versions of a dichotomous structure pervade culture, this reversal ought not to occur.

Cultural analysis of this kind has assessed single images in terms of this specific mode of beautification and the particular ways that the face becomes akin to the photographer's muse. All such description has then been connected to the ideological ramifications in terms of the passive/active and the subject/object dualisms that organise the image. Yet, a content analysis drawing upon the semiotic codes identified within cultural analysis fails to provide evidence to reconfirm the gendered divide of who is objectified, beautified, made into an object satisfying in itself. This no longer applies solely to the feminine. Moreover, this evidence contradicts a second facet of the postmodern/feminist model, namely that they describe 'anomalous' cases as 'femininisation'. This 'reorganisation' effectively reconnects soft focus, for example, back to the feminine so that the opposition of the male and female is categorically ordered within the Symbolic. So rather than taking such empirical evidence as a weakening of the dimorphic production of the body within the Symbolic, they themselves re-apply that dimorphic logic so that the passive defines the feminine.

Listed in figure 14 overleaf are some simple features that locate the body in symbolic space. The central distribution here is the extent to which a majority of images are codified with the body facing forward: 59.44% of all the female sexed models sampled and 62.29% of the males. Again, this automatically marginalises many of the other codifications included¹⁰³, which I argue, is connected to the increasing simplification of the image identified above. Many of the images coded contain only a single model, very few use props to tell a story about the model, and to this we now add that most models, both male and female, are codified facing forward. 'Twisting' is the second largest proportion, which at 23.55% gives a strong indication of how common facing forward is. Again, this kind of movement, conventionally associated with the over-stated display of clothes, is not characterised by gender difference (barely 2% between them). We must look therefore to the body in profile to trace a substantial difference: namely 25.08% of female compared to 16.84% of male sexed models. Nevertheless, for every female sexed model posing in profile there are over twice as many facing forward.

¹⁰³ Hence the number of amalgamations; see Appendix B.

The endurance of the profile as a form that readily codifies the feminine raises a number of issues. A body in profile does not necessarily ensure that the face will be averting the gaze by seeming to look elsewhere, as the head can be turned to the camera. Yet placing the body in profile does align the postures with the historical traditions of the feminine as representation (Berger: 1974; Dyer 1986). Locating the body in profile also emphasises the sexualisation of the breast by presenting it in silhouette. This potentially sets up a classic pose for the femme fatale: the profile emphasising the curves, primarily of the breast, combined with the directness of the look. There is a second facet connected to the endurance of the profile: emphasising the shape and 'universal' presence of the breast connects it to the 'self-evident' corporeal base of the sexed body. The breast offers 'evidence' of the absolute and categorical foundation of sexual difference. Therefore, it is in connection to the biological body that the profile code remains significant while other gendered postures have significantly diminished, as for example lying down.

Fig. 14 Detailed body positions 1985-95

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		619 100.00%	322 100.00%	297 100.00%
derived q10 Q30	lying down	27 4.36%	18 5.59%	9 3.03%
	facing forward	376 60.74%	191 59.32%	185 62.29%
	twisting	145 23.42%	78 24.22%	67 22.56%
	back facing camera	40 6.46%	13 4.04%	27 9.09%
	profile	131 21.16%	81 25.16%	50 16.84%
	torso leaning forward	72 11.63%	44 13.66%	28 9.43%
	torso leaning back	32 5.17%	15 4.66%	17 5.72%
	propped BY arms	54 8.72%	32 9.94%	22 7.41%
	propped ON object	55 8.89%	24 7.45%	31 10.44%
	other	20 3.23%	6 1.86%	14 4.71%

Chi = 22.9925, df = 3, there is significance at 1%

Codes like 'lying down' and 'leaning back' simply do not appear to feature much, for either the male or female sexed model. This means that a central mechanism that sexualises the presentation, for example lying on the back with one leg bent, is almost entirely absent, thereby negating the low status implied by the position. Arguably, this results from the increased simplicity of the image, perhaps because the body is best able to display clothes when the postures are at their most simple. But

this equally means that the process that constructs gendered subjectivities in and through these bodily gestural displays is made much more ambiguous. This carries important ideological implications regarding the coherency of the patriarchal dualism. In addition, the model does not appear to be using the imagined projection of facing the viewer to entice or display. Thus, this form of framing further indicates an increasing homogeneity between the ways the male and the female are displayed.

The body is able to impose a fixity upon the possibility of social exchanges depending upon how that body is positioned in relation to the other. Yet, as mentioned, the body performs a perplexing number of possible gestures, which should not be assumed to be in co-ordination. The torso and head, connected by the spine, make for the points of fixity and a phenomenological orientation that limits the ploysemic possibilities of the body. Thus the face, hands, arms and legs secure the detail of the gesticulations made. Hence, I have emphasised the body's ability to anchor representation and interpretation. The next series of tables build upon our sense of the fixity of the presentation using the ways this can be animated and/or anchored to the core dichotomies through gesticulation. I begin with the legs and arms and then move onto the hand, who touches whom, how and how much.

THE BODY AND ITS GESTURES

If display is in any sense ordered by the patriarchal dichotomy at all then this must predominately lie within the gestures. I begin by looking at the legs, which add to the gendering of the body through the differing meanings conveyed through the forms of standing and sitting. Therefore we are paying particular attention to whether the legs are closed or open, extended outwards or not, and so forth.

The first thing to note is that in 42% of the images legs are not represented, which automatically removes a substantial part of the sample. The second element to be combined with this is the large percentage of women who were photographed occupying a third of the image compared to the percentage of men that were shown to dominate the frame, meaning that the visual orientation is not towards the men's legs. But does this imply that the image is orientated to the women's legs? The answer has to be no when one reflects that by occupying a third of the frame, the female is also projected as standing in the middle distance. Given that for a fetish to operate within the photographic frame it needs to be close-up, this somewhat rules fetishisation out as a means of recapturing ideologically the image. One would expect there to be a noted trend, particularly for underwear and hosiery advertisements, where fetishising the female leg is a central part of the marketisation. Yet 'legs only' has been withdrawn from the general idiom (figure 13) because it was shown to be statistically insignificant, registering only 5 cases. This indicates that the markets that these magazines target simply do not carry this kind of commodity, and thus do not codify the feminine through it. By implication then, the representations appear to be organised according to the requirements of commodification rather than the pre-requisites of the hierarchical Symbolic. This surely compounds the notion that images are organised to serve our latent desire, which require the fetish to function in order that (masculine) subjects can disavow the threat that lack poses for them. Most importantly, the influence of the commodification process, rather than the symbolic regime, may well prove to the

determining trajectory within the presentation of gender. Regardless of whether it is more dominant, sexualising the leg via visual codification that disavow does not appear to be emerging as the central feature. Or rather, the decline is marked enough to query assertions that 'the feminine has become synonymous with selling' (Pollock;1992:138). Or rather, both bodies are utilised to sell.

Fig. 15 Gendering the body through the positioning of the legs

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		374 100.00%	211 100.00%	163 100.00%
derived q19 Q35	open when seated	36 9.63%	16 7.58%	20 12.27%
	closed when seated	32 8.56%	24 11.37%	8 4.91%
	crossed and pulled in	17 4.55%	13 6.16%	4 2.45%
	astride	76 20.32%	41 19.43%	35 21.47%
	knee slightly bent forward	48 12.83%	33 15.64%	15 9.20%
	knee bent sideways	22 5.88%	15 7.11%	7 4.29%
	bent fully at the knee	65 17.38%	39 18.48%	26 15.95%
	extended outwards	60 16.04%	32 15.17%	28 17.18%
	walking	17 4.55%	11 5.21%	6 3.68%
	pretend movement	46 12.30%	29 13.74%	17 10.43%
	standing open	36 9.63%	25 11.85%	11 6.75%
	standing closed	44 11.76%	19 9.00%	25 15.34%
	other	49 13.10%	27 12.80%	22 13.50%

$\chi^2 = 19.9127$, $df = 12$, there is no significant relationship

Among those 60% that were photographed presenting the full body, there is no marked diversity in the ways both the male and the female sexed models pose. Hence the cross-tabulation does not register statistical difference. Thus the female sexed model is just as likely to be seated with her legs open as her male counterpart, just as he is equally often depicted with his legs closed when seated¹⁰⁴. Emphasis upon the leg does remain, namely in the posture that bends the knee slightly thereby tilting the hips. This draws attention to the hips as a marker of the sexed body, but also

¹⁰⁴ Potentially, although this needs investigation, the absence difference may well reflect an emphasis upon youth and a 'relaxed attitude' that is set up in opposition to the discipline implied by the erectness of the traditional adulthood. The oppositions of these categories may prove more central to the active codification of specific meanings than gender is appearing to be here.

encloses the tilted hip within an erotic codification. The female sexed model in both cases is twice as likely to embody this posture as the male sexed model. Yet once again, it barely registers 1 in 5 images. In fact, there is a higher frequency of female sexed models extending their legs into space than either of the above. Alternatively, one can look to the convention of crossing the legs and pulling the legs in toward the body. This symbolically associates the female body with appearing not to take up space, as well as displaying an appropriate amount of 'modesty'. Yet this occurs about as frequently as those cases where the female model sits with her legs open.

What conclusions can one draw from this? Principally, that the position of the leg appears to be marked by a degree of diversity that only minimally adheres to the fetishisation and commodification that are conventionally associated with the display of the leg. This offers evidence that challenges Millum and Goffman, who both emphasised how the feminine is often reduced to body bits so that the leg is displayed in a manner that cuts it away from whose leg it is. In addition, the naturalistic postures through which gender is displayed in social interaction are seemingly being replaced by postures that denote 'youth'. Again reflecting the markets within which the images are produced.

I turn next to the various ways that the arm is positioned and how this contributes to the presentation of gender. The first thing to note from figure 16 overleaf is that most of the arm positions are not used particularly. This means that neither sexed model is encoded performing a mock-action, hugging the body or pointing upwards. This singles out 'arms relaxed by side' and 'arms bent' as the two most common types of postures. Furthermore, these are both noticeably gender differentiated. As a proportion, in 40.84% of cases the male sexed models were depicted with their arms relaxed by their sides, compared to 29.35% of females. Conversely, 47.95% of female sexed models had their arms bent, compared to 31.30% of the males. Thus the male model is statistically more likely to have his arms relaxed by his side, and the female sexed model is far more likely to have her arms bent. This registers a significant difference in the gestures, but only in those that appear to be most innocuous.

It is only by considering the possible implications that each coded gesture may carry that some sense can be made of this difference. First, the bent arm has the potential to establish naturalistically the gendered nature of touch, because having the arm bent tends to bring the hand towards the torso and into the centre of the image. Bringing the hand into the centre of the frame, also brings the markers of the hand that 'reflect the facticity of sex'. For example, to convey a sense of delicacy to an object, it tends to be held by the tips of the fingers, with nails that are usually filed and painted; conversely, a product for men is connoted through a grasp. Each position connotes the gendered dichotomy but does so through the physical display of the hand, that is, the combination of the elements that secures the naturalisation of categorical sex difference. Lastly, this posture sets up the potential for the image to reference soft-core pornographic codes through self touch. Often the female sexed model is shown to caress her body (in the most acute cases on or near the erogenous zones). Moreover, while this position sets the contexts for the hand to accomplish the femininity of the body, the corresponding features are not used to secure the masculine. However, the fact that there are a significant number of cases among male models where the hand is held by the side automatically means that the hand cannot secure the masculine of aptitude and skill. The extent to which the male sexed model is codified with his arms by

his side may in fact prove to be a series of codes that reflect the dialectic of the Other insofar as the masculine need not positively represent itself, but rather uses the feminine ‘definitions’ as a means to

Fig. 16 Arm movements and postures by gender¹⁰⁵

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		554 100.00%	292 100.00%	262 100.00%
derived q18 Q36	pointing up/outwards	53 9.57%	26 8.90%	27 10.31%
	relaxed by side	193 34.84%	86 29.45%	107 40.84%
	folded	30 5.42%	17 5.82%	13 4.96%
	arms bent	222 40.07%	140 47.95%	82 31.30%
	resting on legs	41 7.40%	24 8.22%	17 6.49%
	hugging the body	44 7.94%	22 7.53%	22 8.40%
	arm in action	22 3.97%	11 3.77%	11 4.20%
	in mock movement	39 7.04%	22 7.53%	17 6.49%
	leaning	45 8.12%	27 9.25%	18 6.87%
	other	40 7.22%	22 7.53%	18 6.87%

Chi = 17.7606, df = 9, there is a significant association at 5%

signify what it is not. However, this requires that the gestures of the hand reflect a clear trend for specific sorts of gestures or expressions, that is, it requires that a trend emerge of something that is distinctly feminine and unquestionably passive.

Therefore, who is touching whom is central to how that we make sense of the higher proportion of female models with their arm bent. This can be extended to the possible means of displaying the hand, which also carries the markers of natural sex. However, emphasising the possible ways open for the hand to reproduce the Symbolic ought not to obscure the fact that just over a third of the all female cases also had their arms relaxed by side. Such a posture is conventionally read as the ‘body at rest’ and can be defined as the body at its least symbolically invested. However, this is entirely dependent upon a similarly neutral hand position to be properly secured and therefore ought not to be undermined by any substantial evidence that verifies Goffman’s initial findings, namely that femininity is symbolically secured through the extent of the touch as well as the type of touch.

¹⁰⁵ Again this had to be ordered as multiple variable simply because the arms need not be doing the same thing. Therefore, each percentage must be treated as independent and describes only its individual proportion.

Fig.17 Who touches whom?¹⁰⁶

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		555 100.00%	291 100.00%	264 100.00%
hand on whom Q15	touching own body	232 41.80%	138 47.42%	94 35.61%
	touching man's body	24 4.32%	19 6.53%	5 1.89%
	touching woman's body	16 2.88%	1 0.34%	15 5.68%
	own and man's	6 1.08%	5 1.72%	1 0.38%
	own and woman's	4 0.72%	0 0.00%	4 1.52%
	touching commodity	26 4.68%	16 5.50%	10 3.79%
	hand is active/not touching	135 24.32%	64 21.99%	71 26.89%
	no touch/neutral	85 15.32%	35 12.03%	50 18.94%
	other	27 4.86%	13 4.47%	14 5.30%

The first clear distribution shows that if the hand is not held at rest then the model, of either sex, will touch their bodies. Of those models who touch themselves, the female sexed models do it more frequently, approximately a 3:2 ratio to male sexed models. Potentially, therefore an opening is emerging for a significant difference to be secured, providing the type of touch is equally marked by such statistical difference. The second stark result that struck me, which is why I have opted to include the whole table despite half of the codes being statistically insignificant, is how few instances there are of either model interacting via touch. There are four aspects to this: first, the masculine authority is no longer codified via his capacity to guide, lead or condescend by touching the subject with the lower status in the public domain (Goffman:1979:60; Major and Williams:1980; Henley:1977); second, the feminine is not located within the heterosexist matrix by caressing and stroking the man she is with, particularly prevalent when located in the private domain; third, the potential for the homoerotic, secured through touch, is also equally non-existent (the implication that only those who are 'intimate' touch each other); fourth, the objectified feminine is not secured by caressing the commodity either.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, what emerges is that of all those cases where the female model is shown with her arms bent, the likelihood is that the hand goes on to touch a part of her own body, presumably around the torso area. This is crucial for positively securing femininity via the bodily performance required to compose the image. Thus the tactility of the touch with the body is central to construction of passive femininity.

¹⁰⁶ As I have elected to present the whole table here, Chi cannot be calculated because well have half of the cells will have an expected frequency of less than 5 which is deemed significant.

¹⁰⁷ I have genderised the homoerotic here because women are more tactile, ideological speaking, and therefore it does not throw up the 'spectre' of homosexuality in the same way.

Nevertheless, what the data has effectively ruled out is that touch is used either to anchor the male sexed model's higher social status by guiding the female through public space, as Goffman identified, or to establish for example the centrality of feminine care within the domestic setting. Conventionally, these codes are considered primary means to reproduce the active/passive dichotomy.

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

We now have a sense of how the central features of the body position are located in the frame. What has further been identified is not a marked difference between the sexed body and the positions assumed, but the striking similarity and simplicity of the postures chosen. The simplicity is derived from the position the body adopts toward the camera, predominately positioned facing the camera, and sometimes to the side, with a number of the ordinary leg positions. Most importantly, none of the results show a clear gender pattern emerging in that they are sufficiently ambiguous to question the description offered by the postmodernist/feminists. Moreover, it was noted how few images deployed the leg as a fetish with which to secure the disavowal of the male viewer. To this, I noted how few images were marked by the tactile interaction between subjects, despite the fact that 40% of images that featured more than one model. So the potential to for the ideological anchor is there. Instead, the pattern that emerges is one where the highest frequencies involve relatively neutral arm positions: male sexed models are depicted predominantly with their arms down by their sides, and the female sexed models with their arms bent. The postmodernist/feminist response must surely be that the ideological axis of the active/passive is pinned to the self-touch offered by having the arm bent. This introduces a potential for the performance of gender by connecting it to where and how the hand touches the model's own body. Thus we must look to securing the alignment of the feminine as passive through the nature of the touch. This is particularly so when one considers that the results show that the male sexed model is not holding an object, and thus potentially manipulating it or using it as a prop to stage the instruction of a subordinate. The male sexed model is more likely to have the hand at rest, or in fact touching himself (35.47%), rather than *actively* doing something it.

WHERE THE HAND TOUCHES THE BODY AND HOW

I begin by drawing attention to a number of exclusions that automatically impact on this analysis of the feminisation of touch: in total there are 329 cases automatically excluded produced by the filtering system of Snap for Windows.¹⁰⁸ As a result, there have been a number of amalgamations, the most significant of which is that the various erogenous zones had to be combined in order to produce a statistically analysable figure¹⁰⁹. So what do the remaining data show?

Arguably, these next variables ought prove to be a vital anchor for the constitution of the active/passive dichotomy. In addition, where the hand touches the model's own body ought to offer the

¹⁰⁸ For example, those images coded 'face only' clearly have no bearing on this codification.

¹⁰⁹ Please see Appendix B

potential to sexualise the body, particularly by touching the key erogenous zones. This appears to be born out here, with the cross-tabulation registering a statistical association at the 1% level. For

Fig. 18 Identifies what part of the body is touched

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		311 100.00%	179 100.00%	132 100.00%
derived hand q16 Q38	hand on hair	19 6.11%	13 7.26%	6 4.55%
	hips	51 16.40%	36 20.11%	15 11.36%
	legs	41 13.18%	25 13.97%	16 12.12%
	torso	66 21.22%	41 22.91%	25 18.94%
	face	23 7.40%	12 6.70%	11 8.33%
	neck	19 6.11%	14 7.82%	5 3.79%
	erogenous zones	19 6.11%	4 2.23%	15 11.36%
	holding hands	36 11.58%	20 11.17%	16 12.12%
	neutral touch	21 6.75%	11 6.15%	10 7.58%
	holding on	25 8.04%	18 10.06%	7 5.30%
	hands covered	37 11.90%	13 7.26%	24 18.18%
	resting	37 11.90%	19 10.61%	18 13.64%
	other	53 17.04%	31 17.32%	22 16.67%

Chi = 28.5111, df = 12, there is a significant relationship at the 1% level

example, the female sexed model is almost twice as likely to have her hands on her hips as the male sexed model. This introduces a correspondence with the sexing of the body: first, in terms of drawing upon the conventions that define this gesture as one of assertive and confident sexuality in phallic femininity; second, connecting the discourse to the category of the natural body that associates hips with the woman's body. Yet this reading is much undermined by the infrequency of those cases where the feminine is constructed through this posture. They account for only 20.11% (36 out of 179) of the touches possible¹¹⁰. Again, one would expect the female sexed model to be represented as touching her hair significantly more often than the male sexed model. However, it represents only 7.26% of all those

¹¹⁰ Note: because the hand can touch two things at once, it was necessary to operationalise this variable as a multiple variable and thus the percentage must be read as individual proportion of total number of cases in that variable – 32 cases of a possible 179

female models codified here. This is clearly a marginal proportion that somewhat overshadows the categorical, sexed nature of the touch. This also has a critical impact upon the presumptions of the psychoanalytic models. For example, Flugel (1930) argued that the association of feminine sexual attraction with long hair was that the hair is a fetishistic displacement for the castrated state that defines the feminine. Or, to put it in more directly Lacanian/cultural studies terms, the lack that she embodies (Silverman:1991; Millum:1975; Stratton:1996). Therefore, by touching the hair, the feminine model draws attention to its fetishistic properties and thus its sexual attractiveness. However, my data signals a different undercurrent: while the conventional codes of gender presentation continue to be marked by statistical difference, their share of the sample is now marginal. They are no longer the central codes by which the male or the female is represented. In other words, while the feminine touches different zones of the body, establishing a strong statistical association, the proportion is simply too small to be described as structuring the symbolic and certainly too marginal to secure the effective productivity of subjectivity; such small quantities are just too contingent for the reproduction of the social order.

Neither is there an apparent shift to secure the dualisms and the associate forms by increasingly using soft-core pornographic codes: in only 19 cases are the erogenous zones¹¹¹ touched, of which the male sexed model accounts for a higher proportion than the female. In addition, my results show that in all 15 cases where the male model is touching his own body, he is shown to be touching his own genitalia in 5 cases and his own buttocks in 9 cases. To further compound expectations, in none of these cases is the male sexed model caught in moments of narcissistic admiration. Therefore there is no narrative to reconnect the masculine to the active. Rather, most instances occur when the male sexed model is located in the neutral background. The extremely low frequency questions the assumption that the erotic male body must be located in scenes that redefine the erotic as narcissistic (Moore:1988).

This data identifies trends that, I argue, problematise the postmodernist/feminist description. This is because a significant proportion of the sample was excluded because no touch is involved at all. These distributions further impact upon the results, since only 179 (55%) cases out of a possible 323 were found to be touching the body. Within these cases, there is a relatively even distribution across the various body zones, with the torso having the highest frequency, although this does not include the breast. Thus we can conclude that to an extent to the sexed body is produced through touch, insofar as the female sexed model tends to touch herself, in various areas, more than the male sexed model. If there should be a marked difference in the nature of the touch, then it must lie with how the female sexed model touches these various bodily zones.

Yet, as figure 19 shows overleaf, the distributions simply did not follow the categorical order. Again, the data is altered as a result of 185 pre-programmed exclusions, thereby excluding a third of cases from this form of codification¹¹². The distributions that emerge tend to confirm the emergence of a greater simplification in the nature of the representations and a greater degree of homogenisation between the male and female models. For example, the masculine is not constructed by the male model manipulating the object, and neither is the feminine constructed by fingering or fiddling with things.

¹¹¹ Made up of the genitals, the breast and buttock.

¹¹² The decrease from the previous number of exclusion results from the inclusion of the object or commodity.

The female model does not appear to be caressing herself or anything else. On the contrary, the single largest frequency rests with a neutral touch. This requires that the hand be defined by its pragmatic use, be it holding a glass at a table (but not caressing it) carrying a book or using the hand in a basic rudimentary way. Mostly, the hand holding or touching in this manner has a specific ideological connection with the model codified, and as the previous data suggests, the models were rarely constructed narratively to, or engaging with, their environment. This is vital to the data and I will return to this as part of the conclusion of this chapter.

Fig. 19 The type of touch and gender difference¹¹³

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		404 100.00%	234 100.00%	170 100.00%
type of touch Q17	utilising	33 8.17%	18 7.69%	15 8.82%
	expert	1 0.25%	1 0.43%	0 0.00%
	grasping	32 7.92%	20 8.55%	12 7.06%
	manipulating	12 2.97%	5 2.14%	7 4.12%
	fingering	21 5.20%	10 4.27%	11 6.47%
	fiddling	9 2.23%	8 3.42%	1 0.59%
	fondeling	20 4.95%	16 6.84%	4 2.35%
	caressing	43 10.64%	28 11.97%	15 8.82%
	embracing	8 1.98%	4 1.71%	4 2.35%
	holding/neutral	178 44.06%	104 44.44%	74 43.53%
	other	47 11.63%	20 8.55%	27 15.88%

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR

In figure 3, it was identified that 86.61% of the sample had no specific relationship with the props or commodities. Moreover, the codes that traced the gendering of the hand through touch did not reflect the gender dichotomy either. Together, this trend identifies a shift to a more pragmatic relationship of hand to objects and so removes a fundamental feature that connects the model to the social world. In particular it has become much more difficult to define the ‘who’ the model, that is,

¹¹³ The chi value cannot be calculated because 22.73% of the cells have an expected value of the less than 5.

what sort of a woman she is. By this, I mean that without these sorts of connotive detail, it is very difficult to look at the model and say: 'she fiddles with things and does not seem to be able to concentrate'. When it is possible to make the inferences between the bodily performance and the sexual character, the image is much better placed to construct patterns of identification and, consequently, construct the 'appropriate' subject position. The images furnish data whereby the body is clearly marked as male or female, but does not appear to be codified further. Thus the findings lead to two central conclusions: first, that codification appears to have withdrawn from the domain of sexual character; second, the secure categorisation of sex appears to take place independently of other social cues.

THE FACE AND THE GAZE

I turn now to the cluster of codes that directly target the various facial expressions and the gendered nature of the gaze. Based upon the postmodernist/feminist analysis, a marked difference in the direction of the gaze and the expressions performed ought to order the distribution of the results. Thus, one expects notable difference in the deployment of the passive gaze, and its associations with looking away so as to avert the eyes, of the head being positioned in profile in order to connote the feminine as 'to-be-looked-at-ness' and so on. One expects also a notable difference in the use of the seductive gaze. This is used to define the feminine as the 'femme fatale' through which to encode phallic femininity. Conversely, the direction of gaze will also trace the extent to which the male body undergoes 'feminisation', using the conventionalised gestures that construct the (male) body as desirable. Equally expected are the masculine (male) codifications, for example through the direct assertion of a look that forces the viewer to appear to be returning the model's directed gaze. Such codes are central to the reproduction the dichotomy where the masculine 'sees' and the other is 'seen'. Also, we would expect there to be ample use of the codes that negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' inherent within modelling by the extensive deployment of 'looking up and out' of the imaginary frame so that male model can negate their objectification (Dyer 1992; 1993). Hence, the aim is to examine the extent and direction of statistical difference in the distributions of the sexed models in this cluster.

However, before the detail is examined, it is necessary to contextualise these results in terms of the limitations set by the corporeal body so that the importance of the expression can be examined. I begin with the head position, which establishes some of the corporeal and material boundaries as to what expressions can be performed. This is followed by analysis of the direction of the gaze, which further limits corporeally the expressions that can be performed, and then I follow this with the expressive gaze.

From the table overleaf, one is struck again by the homogeneity between the male and the female sexed model. For example, only 14.29% of the sample of female sexed models are in profile, which compares to 13.73% of male sexed models. Equally significant is the small percentage this codification holds overall: 14.03% of the total sample. Even if the expectation were for there to be little difference between the male and the female sexed models, one would surely have expected that the coding via the profile would assume a larger quantity overall. Yet this particular presentation, one

which formally presents the model as an object of representation, does not feature much, despite the fact that at the bottom line the models are there to present the goods.

Overall, the largest frequency lies with those models, both male and female, that are facing forward directly at the camera. This accounts for approximately a third of each. This indicates that the cues are focused upon the body itself: the body is predominately facing forward that is most often combined with the face facing forward, assuming the largest single proportion. Perhaps this is because the intense and categorical codifications rest with the construction of the body rather than the construction of sexual character. Irrespective, the direction of the gaze and the expressions are central to the meanings generated. The only code that registers any significance is the larger number of female sexed models shown turning toward the camera. Again, this needs further anchoring with the expressions to see to what extent it is used to invite the gaze. Equally significant, and again contrary to expectation, are the central codes that directly and explicitly denigrate the model: not only is there no marked difference between the male and the female sexed models, but when combined, the 'back of the

Fig. 20 The head position

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		606 100.00%	322 100.00%	284 100.00%
head position Q20	head back	29 4.79%	16 4.97%	13 4.58%
	head down	34 5.61%	14 4.35%	20 7.04%
	head turning away	81 13.37%	45 13.98%	36 12.68%
	head straight ahead	183 30.20%	95 29.50%	88 30.99%
	turning towards camera	106 17.49%	67 20.81%	39 13.73%
	head in profile	85 14.03%	46 14.29%	39 13.73%
	head tilted to one side	48 7.92%	26 8.07%	22 7.75%
	back of head	16 2.64%	5 1.55%	11 3.87%
	other	24 3.96%	8 2.48%	16 5.63%

Chi = 13.5299, df = 8, there is no statistical association

head' and the 'head down' account for just 8.25% of the total sample. This somewhat problematises Nayak's assertion that the concealment of the face is a central technique to denote the subordinate the Black body as otherness. Likewise frequencies this low cannot be elevated to the status of encapsulating the negation of feminine that is central to producing the Master: the masculine is known

by what the feminine is not. Neither body nor subject can be interpellated by such an infrequent codification.

The final element I would like to draw attention to refers to a code borrowed from Goffman. This is the head cant (p 179-86) which he describes as a core mechanism by which to demonstrate the lack of seriousness in women. He argues that the posture is often performed in combination with dreaminess or an adrift expression. He describes it as a form of ‘cutesy-ness’ or submissiveness, especially when the head is dropped onto a man’s shoulder. However, my results suggest that not only is this rarely used (8.07% for females), but again, it is used just as often on the male sexed model (7.75%). The deeper theoretical question is this: does the head cant, for example, maintain its connotative meaning of the gendered nature of sexual character, or does it mean that this connotation is losing its conventional base when used on both males and females? Overall, I argue that my results argue that the latter is the case. The level of the connotative is operating to reproduce naturalised sex so that sex and gender, male and man, are understood common-sensically as interchangeable.

Thus to make sense of the uniformity with which the face is presented, namely facing forward, it is vital that the direction of the gaze and the expressions be examined. In particular, the directions of the gaze, and its social and metaphorical distinctions of the higher and the lower, are key: the feminine looks down and the masculine looks up; the feminine is modest when she turns away, the masculine is assertive, looking directly into the three-dimensional space projected. Yet the results do not reflect this

Fig. 21 The direction and object of the gaze

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		577 100.00%	312 100.00%	265 100.00%
gaze Q23	looking up	31 5.37%	18 5.77%	13 4.91%
	gazing out at viewer	198 34.32%	104 33.33%	94 35.47%
	looking down	53 9.19%	30 9.62%	23 8.68%
	looking away	63 10.92%	39 12.50%	24 9.06%
	staring out of photo frame	59 10.23%	38 12.18%	21 7.92%
	looking at other/obj	63 10.92%	30 9.62%	33 12.45%
	looking straight ahead	59 10.23%	25 8.01%	34 12.83%
	eyes closed	32 5.55%	17 5.45%	15 5.66%
	other	19 3.29%	11 3.53%	8 3.02%

Chi = 9.0518, df = 8, there is not significant relationship

dichotomous organisation of the direction of the gaze with ease. In fact, the distributions further undermine this logic. This striking absence of difference comes from small frequency numbers, equally distributed, of male and female sexed models that had their eyes closed or were looking out of the frame, and so forth. Thus the largest majority, 33.33% of the female sample, compared to 35.47% of the males, were gazing out at the viewer. This is the direction that connects directly with the camera through which the image positions the viewer within the model's field of vision. The data shows that the largest frequency assumes only a third of the sample. The next largest frequency, for example 'looking away', barely reach 10% of the sample. Relationally speaking, this means that gazing at the viewer is by far the most frequent code used. An image is three times more likely to be codified as staring at the viewer than not. This further displaces the marks of the gender dichotomy onto the expression of the gaze itself. Thus, while the variable showed that there is a degree of variation as to which direction is adopted, this does not detract sufficiently from the homogeneity that is increasingly coming to define the core visual order. Moreover, this homogeneity is registered with the codes that are least open, interpretively speaking, that is, they are not based in the esoteric nature of my interpretation, but by the corporeal impositions of the body. I will return to this.

Hence the central markers of sexual difference within the Symbolic must include the expressive gaze and the expressions of the mouth, perhaps two of the most important areas of the face with regard to how the face is sexualised. Therefore, these have the capacity to offset the emerging neutrality, one might even say banality, that is increasingly defining many of the other codes. In particular, if the neutral body stance is offset by the use of overt forms of sexualisation, which are also categorically distributed, then this would provide empirical evidence that legitimates the continued assumption regarding the nature of the Symbolic. What sort of evidence does figure 22 furnish overleaf? Firstly, staring, the most neutral expression descriptively, is shown to be the most frequently used for both the male and the female sexed models; secondly, it accounts for a higher proportion of the female sample. This has to be attributed, in part, to the minimal cues of location, body posture props, which are joined now by this neutral expression. Moreover, without more complex cues, it is impossible to 'read' or key (Goffman:1979) an expression.

The second most frequent code is 'assertive'. The proportion of females from the total is 31.42%¹¹⁴. Contrariwise, only 3.72% of 296 female models were recorded as expressing coyness. This combines with the other codes that have also registered a significant decline in the representation of passive femininity; for example shyness and dreaminess. At least here there is some remnant of the former division insofar as the female model is three times more likely to be coded as 'dreamy' than the male sexed model. Another element worth noting is the decline of 'to-be-looked-at-ness', that is, the form of display and self-objectification that functions to attract the gaze. Just 13.85% of the females from the proportion of 296 were clearly marked by this look of invitation and display. Nor could it be clearly stated that this is strictly confined to the feminine, if to a much lesser degree, since 10.04% of the male sexed models also marked their address with the invitation to consume them voyeuristically.

¹¹⁴ Note that this is a multiple variable so that each percentage represents its share of the total independently of the other distributions. Therefore, the sum total of percentages is greater than 100. This is produced from the possible of repeats from codes like 'frowning' 'semi-concealed' and 'raised eyebrows'. See Appendix B.

Much more in keeping with expectation, when guided by the order of the Symbolic, is that the male sexed models register nearly one in five images were they are asserting their gaze. Yet, just as with the female models, the males were mostly staring, with no particular expression and certainly no particular 'insight to the soul' (Hillel:1998; Magli:1989; Schmitt:1989). Note also that there is not that marked a difference regarding the use of Dyer's 'other-worldly'. Note finally the extent to which the male body

Fig. 22 The expressive gaze

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		545 100.00%	296 100.00%	249 100.00%
derived q24 Q39	authoritative	17 3.12%	8 2.70%	9 3.61%
	assertive	95 17.43%	49 16.55%	46 18.47%
	staring	159 29.17%	93 31.42%	66 26.51%
	other-worldly	44 8.07%	21 7.09%	23 9.24%
	dreaminess	27 4.95%	21 7.09%	6 2.41%
	glancing	27 4.95%	14 4.73%	13 5.22%
	surprised	18 3.30%	10 3.38%	8 3.21%
	looking being looked at	66 12.11%	41 13.85%	25 10.04%
	seductive	49 8.99%	19 6.42%	30 12.05%
	coy	18 3.30%	11 3.72%	7 2.81%
	looking	38 6.97%	20 6.76%	18 7.23%
	shy	11 2.02%	9 3.04%	2 0.80%
	reactive	28 5.14%	16 5.41%	12 4.82%
	semi/concealed	48 8.81%	23 7.77%	25 10.04%
	other	45 8.26%	17 5.74%	28 11.24%

$\chi^2 = 24.4863$, $df = 14$, there is significance at 5%

has been coded as seductive, with male sexed models register nearly twice as many instances as females. It is through differences like these that the variable shows up distinctions. However, this does not provide evidence for the Symbolic order, because the difference is in the wrong direction, that is, that the male is codified using the seductive gaze more frequently than the female. This cannot be offset by calling upon the narcissistic context of the seductive look, thereby displacing the seduction to

self-love because other codes have identified the high degree to which most images are free of any clear narrative contextualisation. Only by undertaking the sorts of theoretical contortion critiqued earlier can this evidence be read as confirmation of the postmodern/feminist description of the Symbolic. Note also the low frequency with which the ‘other-worldly’ gaze is used by the male sexed model to resist or negate the objectification. The evidence suggests that the notion of the Symbolic being ordered through the universal categorical opposition is increasingly difficult to sustain.

Given that the gaze did not produce the categorical organisation of the sexed body according to the active/passive dichotomy, it is therefore left to the expressions of the mouth to reflect this dichotomy. The mouth is significant not only through its central place as expressive through speech as well as smiling, laughter, sneering and so forth, but also because of its psychoanalytic significance as a sexual stage of development. The phallic mouth is therefore profoundly important in securing ‘phallic femininity’. For example, Kubrick’s ‘Lolita’ pictures the nymphet sucking a lollipop. Therefore, symbolically it carries the sexual connotations of an orifice of pleasure and invitation. If the postmodernist/feminist model has some descriptive base, then it should express itself through the phallic possibilities that the mouth offers.

The table below identifies that this expressive element is statistically significant: the sex of the model affects the form the mouth takes. Both the male and female model register similar frequencies of an open mouth, which implies that men appear to be represented smiling broadly or laughing just as often as women. However, the male sexed models are more likely to have their mouths closed (nearly 70% of the sample, compared to 55.45% of the female models). The second noted difference is that the female sexed model is twice as likely to have her mouth semi-open. What could be the symbolic significance of this? I propose that the closure of the mouth seals it off as an orifice, while the mouth

Fig. 23 Core features of the mouth

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		560 100.00%	303 100.00%	257 100.00%
derived q21 Q40	mouth open	110 19.64%	63 20.79%	47 18.29%
	mouth semi open	105 18.75%	73 24.09%	32 12.45%
	mouth closed	347 61.96%	168 55.45%	179 69.65%

Chi = 15.0210, df = 2, there is a strong association at 1%

half-open sets up the potential for erotic consumption because it brings into view a space, which can be filled. The open mouth does not seem to be able to do this because it has lost all the essential sexual suggestiveness. This brings two elements to bear: first, the corporeal base is essential for tracing the symbolic elaboration of the body, rather than presuming that symbolic operations fully determine the fleshy matter; second, it begs the question of to what extent this is undermined or secured through

expressions. I turn next to the expressions and then to the cross-tabulation of the above with the expressions in order to delineate their interrelationship.

The first thing to note from figure 24 overleaf is the overwhelmingly marginal use of any expressions at all. ‘Smiling’, for example, assumes only 23.59% of the female sexed models compared to 52.16% of those shown with no identifiable expression. Moreover, these proportions are mirrored for the male sexed models. This further weakens the legitimacy of the categorical order of the Symbolic. It simply cannot be awarded such causal significance when, in a sample of fashion images, the feminine as passive is not ordering how gender is codified. The second striking result is how few images have utilised the ‘phallic mouth/object’ code: only 6.31% of the female sample. This indicates strongly that within this sample, clear pornographic codification is not seeping into mainstream images. Not only that, but the ‘phallicisation of the feminine’ (Stratton:1996) is not established with anything like the frequency implied by the Symbolic order. However, despite these similarities, the extent to which the female sexed model is represented with the mouth semi-open, alongside the notable absence of any expression, may well signify how the mouth is sexualised, that is, by restricting the mouth to a suggestive orifice.

From table 24, it is possible to identify whether the mouth, posed as semi open and without an expression, is used to secure a specific mode of sexualisation of the feminine, as well as providing empirical evidence for the psychoanalytic origins of the eroticisaiton. What the data reveals is that it

Fig. 24 Mouth expression

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		552 100.00%	301 100.00%	251 100.00%
derived q21 Q40	expressionless	288 52.17%	157 52.16%	131 52.19%
	smiling	123 22.28%	71 23.59%	52 20.72%
	laughing	39 7.07%	18 5.98%	21 8.37%
	pouting	43 7.79%	20 6.64%	23 9.16%
	sulking/snarling	34 6.16%	19 6.31%	15 5.98%
	phallic mouth/object	31 5.62%	19 6.31%	12 4.78%
	other	91 16.49%	65 21.59%	26 10.36%

Chi = 12.5182, df = 6, there is not statistical association

does secure a proportion, but that this must be placed in context with the number of ‘expressionless’ images where the mouth is closed, thereby rendering it a marginal mode of representation. 291 is the total sample of females of which 116, or 39.86%, are codified with their mouths closed and with no

expression. This distribution surely secures the move toward a homogeneity between the representations of men and women. In comparison, the total number of females with their mouths semi-open and expressionless is 22.33%. Therefore, the female model is twice as likely to be captured with no expression at all as sexualised with the mouth semi-open. Nevertheless, this sexualising code is one of clearest forms so far because if we look at the percentage of the male models codified thus, it

Fig. 25 The corporeal base and the expression¹¹⁵

Absolute Respondents		Base	mouth open-sex Q1		mouth semi-open-sex Q1		mouth closed-sex Q1	
			female	male	female	male	female	male
Base		560	62	39	65	26	164	177
derived q21 Q40	expressionless	287	6	1	34	11	116	119
	smiling	121	29	20	17	5	23	27
	laughing	39	15	15	2	2	1	4
	pouting	42	3	2	6	5	10	16
	sulking/snarling	34	2	4	4	1	13	10
	phallic mouth/object	30	11	5	5	5	2	2
	other	75	16	6	15	1	27	10

registers 10.74%, that is half as few. The final point of interest furnished from this analysis is the equal frequency with which the male and the female models smile and laugh fully, heartily, so that their mouths open: 14.46% and 15.12% respectively. Not only is this half as much as when the female model has no expression at all, but it also registers the fact that the male and female models are codified smiling and laughing more or less equally. Again, the empirical evidence fundamentally challenges the notion that the sexed categories are defined by patriarchal Symbolic. On the contrary, apart from key areas of the body itself, the data presented simply cannot be said to be defined by categorical sexual difference where the ‘feminine as other’ operates as a mode of representation for the ‘masculine One’.

OBSERVATIONS THUS FAR:

There is a clear trend that shows that the Symbolic does not operate universally to institute sexual difference. In fact, the codes of the body are simple rather than weighted ideological complexity:

1. The model is predominately shown alone;
2. There is no specific narrative link between the social environment, nor is there a direct link, subordinate or otherwise, with props used. In fact, a significant number have no additional props or social setting;

¹¹⁵ I have elected not to include percentages because what is required is the proportion of the female sample as a sum total in comparison with the male sexed model.

3. Neither sexed model is defined by their social status in terms of how they occupy space, or with whom;
4. Both the male and the female sexed models are equally located within the voyeuristic context; neither are visually orientated to the viewer through the narrative;
5. Most of the models, both male and female, are represented using the medium or long shot with sharp focus.

Moving on to the body:

6. Most models are represented facing forward;
7. Those body positions that have been associated with symbolic withdrawal from public space or the demarcation of public ownership of the female in space proved no longer to define representation at all;
8. Neither the male or female was differentiated clearly by whom they touch or how they touch; this is limited to the fact that the female touches herself more than the male does, but not in a particular way that aligns the nature of the touch to the gendered dichotomy;
9. Both the male model and the female model are most often represented with their faces looking forward in the direction of the viewer, but with a neutral facial expression that does not engage the viewer directly, be it expression gaze or mouth;
10. The few differences that are registered do not always follow the direction dictated by the Symbolic order. As was noted, the male model was codified more frequently using the seductive gaze than the female sexed model.

Methodologically:

11. These results cross verify each other as the results for shot length for example correspond to the body idiom which likewise corresponds to the registered decline in the use of staring out of the photograph frame as a technique to negate the 'to-be-looked-ness';
12. The sorts of results that are expected as guided by postmodernism/feminism were registered within the *Cosmopolitan* sample of 1975.

The marked absence of difference is most significant because codes that aim to establish 'who the model is' are in decline, at least according to this extensive sample. The commodification process does not seem to draw upon our gendered world of sexual character, yet maintains a 'commitment' to ensuring the body is always subject to the appropriate assignment of sex. By this, I mean that the clarity by which one could assign the sex of the body is not reflected in assignments of sexual character so that one could straightforwardly say: 'as a female she loses concentration because, as you can see, she keeps daydreaming'. Moreover, one should not resign the attribution of the sexed body to the 'realism' of the image because, as is well known, this is a construction, a visual accomplishment that the camera can undermine at any time. Equally, therefore, the realism must be achieved. As Goffman argues, the image is a thing of artifice, not authenticity. How do we make sense of the ease of sexual attribution in light of the fact that there is no sexual character and no symbolic signs apparent to secure the feminine as passive? I argue that the ideological input of the image rests in the construction of the body, that is, in the 'self-evidence' that sex and gender are one and the same thing. Ideologically therefore,

representations are concerned with underpinning the equivalence of social and biological within the production of the facticity of sex. This is why I have left the variables that explicitly tackle ‘body type’ and sexualisation until last, because I suggest that it is here that the significant construction work resides.

SEXUALISATION

What does this variable reveal? A number of things, some of which run counter to the idea that it is the ‘model as subjectivity’ that is the discursive target rather than the corporeal body. The first thing to note is the high frequency that has classified half the sample as ‘non-sexualised’. This is startling¹¹⁶ at first because it challenges both lay and academic preconceived ideas regarding the extent

Fig. 26 Sexualisation of the body¹¹⁷

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		558 100.00%	292 100.00%	266 100.00%
derived q14 Q41	non-sexualisation	290 51.97%	133 45.55%	157 59.02%
	fully dressed	198 35.48%	124 42.47%	74 27.82%
	reveal shoulder	23 4.12%	19 6.51%	4 1.50%
	reveal stomach/hip bone	36 6.45%	18 6.16%	18 6.77%
	reveal upper chest	35 6.27%	9 3.08%	26 9.77%
	reveal thigh	44 7.89%	40 13.70%	4 1.50%
	reveal/excentuate breast	46 8.24%	41 14.04%	5 1.88%
	underwear	28 5.02%	21 7.19%	7 2.63%
	naked upper chest	35 6.27%	8 2.74%	27 10.15%
	other	24 4.30%	13 4.45%	11 4.14%

of the sexualisation process. One may well be inclined to think that this reflects interpretative error. Yet if one takes stock for a moment, it is possible to place this in some context. We have noted throughout

¹¹⁶ The extent to which the results challenge the orthodoxy was startling to me, particularly as on first viewing I ‘have no results’. Yet, I began to remember the banality of the coding process, where I recognised how uniform many of the images were. Advertising forms such a large part of the visual field, we in fact may only be able to remember the stark examples precisely because they are unusual.

¹¹⁷ Chi is not calculated because, despite amalgamations, there remains 10% of the cells with an expected value of less 5.

the shift toward the simplification of the image. This was identified by looking at the frequency with which the models were facing forward, looking forward, having their arms by their sides, or were staring or had the mouth closed without an expression. One only needs to reflect on the proportions to also contextualise the extent to which the images appear not to be dominated by the sexualisation process.

While most of the female sexed models were fully dressed, they were also encoded as revealing the flesh, mostly the thigh or breast. Similarly, the male model reveals or completely bares his chest, something that the female model rarely does unless in the context of pornography. We also find here that there are equal numbers of cases where the feminine and the masculine direct attention to the groin area. There is an equal frequency (6.61% for the female models and 6.77% for the male) with which they both reveal the lower stomach and hip bone. I suggest that this does indicate that there is a dimorphic logic at work here, but one that is required because sexual difference under-defines our gendered system. The codifications operate by defining what is sexy *in* a woman and what is sexy *in* a man through the apparent differences of the body. Sexiness is defined as being derived from the essence of the sexed body; the sexed body produces either men or women. This reveals how we collapse the social and the biological as part of our social understanding of gender. For example, bodies are natural and have different biological roles in reproduction and yet this so called self-evidence is supported by some women wearing padded bras because they have small breasts and therefore are not feminine enough. Thus, I am arguing that by drawing attention to the few features of corporeal difference (we do, of course, have 26 chromosomes in common and only 1 that is different) we shut attention off from the ways in which corporeal bodies are altered to *meet* the construction of gender difference. Hence, I continue to challenge the postmodern/feminist model of the construction of sex by rejecting idea that the body is constituted according to the reign of the phallus, which re-introduces all those codes that negate lack that have just established as marginal.

Table 27 overleaf adds to that the dimorphic logic of sex by building up further the common sense notion that one physical attribute, say the penis, corresponds with another, for example the presence of muscle. Moreover, what this construction seemingly ignores is that far from being a reflection of the primary attribution, secondary and tertiary features, such as muscle or having pert breasts, are organised and managed in order to produce a regime of gender (Connell:1987) that is common-sensically treated as natural. Society is not involved in 'making babies' and so is not involved in making the adult males either. This status of 'nature' means that no social activity is required. Therefore, little attention is paid to the normative definitions of 'male' as this is outside of the domain of society. Equally, if we look at the hands, almost one in three images have drawn attention to the hand, not so much by the nature of the touch, but rather by the 'look' of the hand. In particular, the tendency for the female model to have her arms bent, thus bringing the hands into the centre of the image, may enable the hand to be displayed, and with it, the practical accomplishments that mark that hand as 'female'. I have in mind the nail varnish and manicure, which 'naturally' is something a woman does. Thus we are beginning to trace the reversal of what is proposed by postmodernism/feminism: what is deemed to of the body is being understood through the matrix of the

social. In contrast, my aim is to contribute to an emphasis that includes ideas of construction but equally draws the corporeal into this process.

The second element that emerges from this table is the extent to which both the male and female models fall into the codes that trace the body beautiful, the singular difference being that the male body had muscle and the female was invariable slim. Both the male and female models are classified as tall. There were twice as many men who had no chest hair (presumably removed) than had

Fig. 27 The body type by sex

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		600 100.00%	315 100.00%	285 100.00%
body type Q11	tall	399 66.50%	195 61.90%	204 71.58%
	small	17 2.83%	12 3.81%	5 1.75%
	muscular	117 19.50%	16 5.08%	101 35.44%
	slim	385 64.17%	234 74.29%	151 52.98%
	skinny	66 11.00%	39 12.38%	27 9.47%
	emaciated	8 1.33%	8 2.54%	0 0.00%
	au naturale	147 24.50%	117 37.14%	30 10.53%
	stylised make-up	63 10.50%	55 17.46%	8 2.81%
	normal make- up	107 17.83%	107 33.97%	0 0.00%
	painted nails	43 7.17%	41 13.02%	2 0.70%
	long nails	54 9.00%	49 15.56%	5 1.75%
	short nails	89 14.83%	48 15.24%	41 14.39%
	body hair id	26 4.33%	5 1.59%	21 7.37%
	body hair unid	100 16.67%	60 19.05%	40 14.04%
	dyed/sculpted hair	98 16.33%	62 19.68%	36 12.63%
short hair		325 54.17%	132 41.90%	193 67.72%
long hair		195 32.50%	143 45.40%	52 18.25%

visible chest hair. Women were just as likely to have short hair as long, but very few men had long hair. Again, the painting of the nails, while not being a significant proportion of women, nevertheless

marked the female models out from the male. Thus marked difference is appearing in terms of bodily display, which is significant by its temporariness and its ongoing accomplishment. This is the practice of masculinity and femininity. When chest hair comes back into fashion, re-gains its sex appeal, so this particular style will vanish. The ideological requirements demanded by the postmodernist/feminists will struggle to deal with these shifts as they require something more continuous in order to be able to construct subjectivity through representation.

It has been noted that the female model is consistently codified occupying a third of the two-dimensional page, and filling the page from top to bottom. This projects the body into the length of the page, which then makes her appear tall. This can be achieved irrespective of whether the model is actually tall or not. Thus the appearance of the body as beautiful is a manifestation as much of how the image functions within its two-dimensional plain (Goffman:1979) as it serves any ideological movement. It is an accomplishment of the artifice of the image more than a result of the pressures of ideological reproduction.

I have elected to suspend any of the sub-categories that targeted the tertiary level of personality¹¹⁸ as part of my examination, namely those that traced the active/passive dichotomy and its associate forms. This is because I abandoned these codes toward the end of the data imputing as I became increasingly aware that the criteria by which I had expected to assess the sexual character could not be applied with any consistency. This was in part a result of poor operationalisation. In particular, the variable was too big without sufficient internal organisation, which assists greatly in applying the criteria with regularity. However, equally important, if not more so, was the significant decline in the realist codifications. Gone from the images were the social space and the sorts of objects and goods that characterise different spaces. There was no formal use of status cues, nothing in fact that we could use to 'read' the presentations of self people offer. I could not code this particular female model as being 'weak' or 'emotional' or of a 'soft' nature because there simply were not enough cues by which such a judgement could be made.

The simplification of the image meant that I was faced with a beautiful body, clearly marked as female, but which did not tell me anything about 'her'. For example, without the props of the private domestic setting, one cannot get an idea of the sorts of things she likes. With the ritualisation of social life, we are able to glean from the staged nature of the image, what sort of 'person' she is constructed as being. This level of meaning does not characterise the advertisements sampled here. In addition therefore, despite the poor codification of variable 26, which sought to identify the core dichotomies, it was always going to fall at the same hurdle: there simply were not enough social cues to abstract with any consistencies whether this particular model could be said to be defined by an element of the core gendered dichotomies. I argue that my results have clearly established the extent to which the image has been greatly simplified so that the inability to read the image necessarily leads to this conclusion.

¹¹⁸ See Appendices B and C

SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of improvements that could be made to the taxonomy, particularly in the light of the results found here. The most apparent improvement would be to have a considerably larger sample size. As it stands, once the initial distributions are in place, there were insufficient cases to cross-tabulate 3 or more variables. The aim was to develop multiple perspectives on the body whereby various positions could be examined in terms of other expressions or gestures. Figure 23 gives an indication of what this would have looked like. However, the effect of the small sample size was exaggerated by the distributions identified. For example, in many of the variables, most of the sample (usually about 60%) clustered around one core sub-variable, which left the remaining 40% to be distributed amongst the remaining sub-variables, often about six or seven. Consequently, some cell values were often split further so as to rule out this comparative analysis. The second central feature would be to develop a number of codes from variable eleven. This would include many more secondary and tertiary sexual characteristics so that one could build a picture of the macro features used to secure the facticity of the dimorphic sexed body.

AND THE IMAGES THEMSELVES?

I conclude this chapter with a brief analysis of a number of images, the aim of which is to recontextualise the codes used to quantify some of the images in circulation. The images included do not represent a collection selected from the random sample but rather reflect: a) those images that caused me to question the assumption that the Symbolic is ordered by clear gendered dichotomisation only; b) those images of women that emerged from my results and appear to represent a drop in the intense ideological production of the 'feminine as passive'. I have chosen these because I think these two elements represent the central findings that challenge the adequacies of the semiotic descriptions taken to task above. I begin with the images of the male models.

From plates 1 and 2, one can glean that the production of the body as male is central despite the poses. In plate 1¹¹⁹ the male model is located within a plain brown background. I have argued that this significantly reduces the ability to anchor him in the public social world, which is a key element of the Symbolic. The second element to notice is the angle of the head. His face is looking downwards, away from the viewer. Ideologically speaking, this is supposed to align the model with the passive because the angle of the head prevents a direct engagement with the viewer. This is consolidated by the addition of the downward gaze. Furthermore, there is no expression on the mouth, which makes the face very still and somewhat isolated. The shirt that he is modelling is positioned to reveal the breast bone. Here the light catches and emphasises the glossiness of skin. Codes such as these usually codify the feminine. The chest may have been waxed, as there is no indication of *any* chest hair, so there is also some indication that this form of masculinity results, in part, from a social practice not ideological construction alone.

His hands are concealed by placing them in his pockets; something that is conventionally associated with men. However, this also conceals one of the central anchors we immediately use in

¹¹⁹ *Esquire* magazine, February 1995.

everyday life to assign the sex of the person. Hands can reveal elements about the social positioning of the person; for example, labourers' hand as opposed to office workers. In conventional gender terms, we look to the size and the presence of veins to assist in sex assignment. Combined, these elements undermine a clear production of masculinity. However, his sex is secured in other ways. For example, the angle of the camera draws attention to the jaw and, in particular, to the fact that he is not clean shaven. This deliberate codification sets the body apart from women's, where facial hair is always removed. The presence facial hair stands in contrast to the hair on his head, which has been stylised and opens up the potential to draw reference to the 1930's haircuts some women had. I am referring to the curl placed over the forehead. I argue that while these elements are sufficient to secure the body as male, they do not unambiguously locate him within the conventions of hegemonic masculinity. The placement of a pink scarf suggests that this image is aimed at a specific market, namely the gay men's market. Perhaps then, the source of the variation of images is derived from the market sector at which the product is self-consciously pitched. Therefore the codification of an image such as this depends upon combining the traditions of the feminine with a sufficient number of markers that secures a male sex assignment. This assignment presents some fundamental problems for the notion of feminisation because the codes do not construct this body as female despite the presence of a 'to-be-looked-ness'.

Plate 2¹²⁰ is predominately coded via the lighting, or brownish tinge that makes the chest appear very velvety. This makes the skin the central focus of the image. Note also that soft focus has been used to create that sense of velvety skin. The central lighting draws attention to the muscle of the body, particularly the breast. His torso fills the page thereby bringing the surface of the skin close to the eye. This reflects Goffman's notion that we are able to imaginatively connect a codification to an actual embodied position. However, active interpretation is not to be treated the same as the meaning created by the interpellated subject. The viewer is placed so as if he/she were standing in close proximity to him. Again, the smoothness seems to suggest that he has waxed his chest. However, this may in fact be an outcome air-brushing the image and draws attention to the artifice of the image. Either way, it removes the image from the actual embodiment of most men. He has his hands folded across his chest, which recalls the way arms are used to conceal women's torsos. In addition, this withdraws the arms; combining the codes to connote modesty. However, the position of the arms also draws attention to the distribution of hair, which assists in securing the body as male. The emphasis upon the chest bone does this also. The second crucial feature is the position of the head. He too is looking downwards, as well as appearing to have his eyes closed. This codification reduces further the capacity of the model to impose his subjectivity thereby making the viewer the subject of the gaze. This is effectively how 'coy' is visually produced. Another additionally element to this image is the fact that the only object in colour is the bottle of beer. The position of the head assists in drawing the gaze directly to the commodity. Moreover, the downward angle of the head implies that the body is subordinate to the object. Conventionally, this would be defined as an objectified body and I suggest that this ought to be extended the male body also, given the evidence presented here. Along side the elements of the body that draw upon our common sense ways of assigning sex, there are a number of tensions included within the image. One is the thumb that indents the skin on the arm holding the bottle. This does

¹²⁰ *Arena* Spring 1995.

convey some uneasiness in the image. The most explicit is the pun 'Poor Homme', which alludes to the French 'pour' or 'for'. This is referencing the wide use of 'pour homme' in perfume advertising, for which the bottle of beer is substituted. Equally, however, it means that the male model is to be pitied.

I have included this image because it directly draws upon the theoretical and empirical critique offered. The semiotic analyses analysed in chapter two would 'deal' with the clash of the male body and the abundance of feminine codification by defining it as an example of feminisation. Yet, to do so is to implicitly acknowledge the prior assignment of the sex of the body because without that prior assignment the notion of feminisation would not be required because the production would reflect the Symbolic order (Mathieu:1996). Furthermore, the instabilities that have been self-consciously included, but applied to the male body, making them ironic. To use irony in this way is to disrupt the free flow of ideological meaning (Rorty:1989). The postmodernist/feminist model has no means to account for this because the constructed subject is the outcome of meaning and never a user of meaning. I refer back to Benhabib's critique here. Ultimately, what is crucial to both these images is the extent to which beautification and commodification define the image. Hence, I argue that these processes should no longer considered processes that target women only, or even predominately.

In contradistinction, I have selected an image that reflects extent to which the images of women have become less riddled with ideology. I argue that my results have unambiguously shown the extent to which the explicit positioning of the woman as passive has declined. This introduces a tension in that the beautification and commodification continue but that this is placed directly on to the body, rather than the construction of a 'character' or the alignment with the private domain, for example. Thus, they supply 'information' only on what a woman looks like, not on how she should behave or feel. I have selected one from *Cosmopolitan* November 2002 on order to give an indication that these sorts of images persist.

Plate 3 exposes, I think, the ways in which a significant proportion of images are composed to draw one's attention directly to the artifice of the image. Just as above, the image is marked by the absence of any social context with which we can glean something as to the 'who' of the model. It was as a result of images like these that I was unable to apply the variable that traced the core dichotomies. She is caught in the middle of an artificial posture that self-consciously draws attention to how the image is constructed. It does not function via naturalistic mock-up; on the contrary, it reveals what actually takes place to compose an image. Her arms extend outwards and her body is captured in movement. A mock-up of a dance move perhaps? At best, one could say that her posture displays the clothes, but then would not one expect that if one were to seek out such advertisements? I think that what is critical for me is how banal the image is and how much the image is ordered around the necessity to the display the clothes; hence the movement. Her hair is held back by fingers, which gives us sight of her face. Her eyes look downwards, but without the symbolic effect of the images above because the angle is a result of the movement and thus does not carry the 'staged' quality of those above. How is one to make an identification with such an image? Perhaps, identification is secured by imaging oneself in the suit? However, this seems a little vague. Or at least it is vague enough to query whether such an image could secure the reproduction of the Symbolic and the subordinated subjectivities it constitutes. Again, it is the explicit commodification process that stands out in this

image, and yet it is so explicit, how could you miss it? I think that if this image is going to be found to make an input in the reproduction of the social order, then we must turn to the how social interaction mediates between ideological construction and the subject. I query that asserting that it operates at an unconscious level is sufficient to explain how an image of this kind operates in the social world. This is important because the data has shown that simplistic images like this that are in circulation.

A SUMMARY

The content analysis undertaken here has provided a set of data that stands in opposition to much of the description and analysis of representation. I think that there are four basic reasons as to why:

1. Unlike much of the research conducted on gender representation, I did not organise my data in such a way that it set out to establish difference, the problem then developed is: what *kind* of difference is being looked for. I sought to avoid this by allowing the distributions themselves to furnish difference, usually defined as 'the findings', or as has emerged, to 'fail' to establish any substantive relationship of difference at all.
2. However, what has emerged from this is an introduction of what unites the images of men and women. I identified that the image has moved, for both men and women, toward a significant simplification, and thus I simultaneously traced the decline in the use of realism; secondly, and most importantly, by not emphasising difference, I was able to identify the extent to which the forms of representation are in fact characterised by homogeneity.
3. Combined, these two shifts undermine the legitimacy with which one can continue to assume that the categorical differences of the Symbolic continues to describe the actual images in circulation.
4. By using a series of codes that are relatively closed, interpretatively speaking, or are guided by clear delineations of their operations, I have generated a bank of empirical data with which to challenge the assumptions of the Symbolic. I argue that this makes the case for the need to return to content analysis so that ideological concerns are linked to how representative, or not, the image subject to semiotic analysis is.
5. The images are organised by taking the gendered body and using the body itself, separate from sexual character, as system through which to commodify and promote the item. I argue that this contributes to the demise of the detail of the social setting and props.

Finally, I return to an issue raised when delineating the difference *within* postmodernism/feminism. The data has shown that *the Symbolic is simply not sufficiently dichotomised to secure the identification patterns that the theory asserts*. What is the consequence for the theory from these cultural applications are drawn? I suggest that this evidenced weakens the claims that they make theoretically and substantiates the necessity to engage both theoretically and empirically.

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BODIES, SEX AND GENDER

I conclude with a reiteration of the general theoretical problems identified with regard to the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism and its application within the visual cultural sphere. I follow this with an introduction of how a model that incorporates the corporeal body, as well as maintaining a sharp eye on ideology, might proceed. I return here to Goffman (1979) and integrate this with Garfinkel's explication of how naturalisation within the practice of gender occurs. Garfinkel (1967) assists in showing the various ways 'genital sex' underdetermines the social, everyday understandings of sex. This provides the background to a model that seeks to explore the social activity that exists between biological sex and gender roles and/or identity, that is, practices common-sensically said to be derived from or rooted in chromosomal sex. What is important to me is that within the social and everyday background, sex and gender do not operate as a semantic distinction. This distinction resides largely within the academy. Garfinkel attends to how sex and gender are linked in the lived embodied world, given that the biological category underdetermines the social operations of sex. Moreover, this offers an alternative to the dualistic logic that has tended to limit the analysis of the sex/gender distinction, yet without ejecting the corporeal; a charge which I have lodged against the Lacanian postmodern feminists throughout this thesis.

I will then extend this analysis by linking it to Lakoff's (1987) notion of family resemblances. This does two things: first, it offers a non-unitary and non-objectivist classification scheme so that the varied practices undertaken to sustain sex (resulting from the failure of biology to achieve this) can be brought more clearly into view; second, by developing the notion of sex as a family resemblance, we are better able to keep a handle on its manifold forms; we do, after all, often mean much more than chromosomal sex when we speak of 'sex'. In particular, we can treat the various elements, for example differing conceptions of motherhood, as an integral part of the cluster contained within how a category of this complexity works because we no longer treat these as objective properties.

I conclude with a research framework that seeks to explore the relationship of representations to social gendered action. What is of central importance is the extent to which representations continue to visualise the normative body, and thus address ideological formations, but emphasise how these are *incorporated* into everyday actions, rather than treating images as *determinants* of that action. I argue that only this emphasis can account for the variability of being women and this is why we need a conceptualisation, like Lakoff's, that can accommodate a much more flexible form of classification so that central, marginal and marginalized forms and practices of being a woman can remain the central theoretical focus.

THEORETICAL CONTESTATIONS

I highlighted what I consider to be a series of fundamental problems with the model offered by the strong programme of postmodernism/feminism. I focused on the over-emphasis on the constitutive function of discourse that, when combined with a certain deployment of Lacanianism, produces a number of problematic theoretical closures. They are:

1. An inadequate theorisation of the subject derived from an over-reliance upon the mirror phase and the concept of interpellation.
2. The model is ahistorical, as it has neither a subject capable of bringing about change, nor a model the Symbolic that can interpellate new subjectivities.
3. A self-evident treatment of the body as object and root of subject positions.
4. A coterminous, but contradictory, reliance upon a disembodied subject; leading to the absolute negation of active female heterosexuality.
5. A restricted model of how an image functions and what images are in circulation.

These closures, brought about by structural determinism, reduce the human condition to a series of structural oppositions, which relies upon defining femininity and masculinity by identifying their various fixed properties: active/passive, subject/object and so on. These dualisms are said to be contained within the language that we speak and thus organises or interpellates the subject. A key example discussed is the prescription that if a male model is photographed looking down and away from the viewer, 'he' is feminised, thereby maintaining the connection between the feminine and the passive. This logic is equally operative when the viewer is addressed. If a woman is to gain pleasure from an image she can only do so by oscillating and assuming masculine patterns of desire. Hence, a subject and/or representation cannot be both feminine and active. Anything identified as 'active', however vaguely, and is born by the female falls outside of this fixed and unitary classification and is either masculinised or pathologised. Such an analysis reveals the ambiguous place of the body in the writings by the postmodernists/feminists discussed here. Only if the subject is disembodied could one really contemplate theoretically ruling out the possibility that some women may experience active heterosexuality, or at least something more complex than elaborated by the postmodernists/feminists discussed here. I suggest that if one concludes that all active desire is masculine desire, one is left wondering about the body because their analysis of desire feels curiously disembodied. Desire is, in fundamental ways, corporeal and is experienced at the level of the flesh, regardless of the fact that desire has social origins.

Yet, I have offered the argument that their theoretical delineation of the disembodied subject operates coterminously with their use of the 'body as a self-evident object'. Hence Lacanian postmodernists/feminists treat the body as an unexamined presupposition upon which the culturally structured process can be 'read'. Oscillation, masculinisation, and so on, are all process that assume sexual dimorphism. Without treating the body as self-evident, they are unable to trace the domination that is said to reside within the visual domain. 'He is feminised' in no way critically targets the primary assignment 'he'. Masculine and feminine are placed 'on top of the body' so that deviation at the level of cultural construction can be traced. In effect, masculine and feminine become patterns of desire that refer to the order of the mind – the construction of the subject – and this has the effect of ensuring that the body remains the sole *raison d'être* of biology. It therefore reproduces the mind/body dualism, and thus fails to tackle its implicit genderisation (Lloyd:1984). In essence, postmodernism/feminism of the kind evaluated here aims to treat the body as a discursive object, a product of cultural forces, but can only do so by ignoring the body at the corporeal level, that is, by accepting the body as self-evident. I

have tried to argue that this effectively re-introduces the sex/gender distinction, but in a far less interrogated way than under Oakley for example. Yet, they equally depend upon the body as self-evident, one that underpins the identification of psychic shifts.

A direct consequence of the fact that these structural dualisms maintain their integrity above the empirical world they are supposed to describe is that it effectively denies individuals the capacity to reflect, challenge and alter the social world through potentially transformative practices. This is why theory of this kind is charged with ahistoricism. There is no social change to account for because they lack a social subject or motor from which social change can emerge. For if we do not act on the world but are only subject to it, then, this seriously limits the quality and variability of action. As I argued, we are merely cultural dupes acting out our roles. This model is forced into a position of ahistoricism, produced by its structural determinism, because the Symbolic is said to speak *through* the subject. Therefore, postmodernism/feminism lacks a 'motor', as it were, to bring about new Symbolic formations. The specific form that this structural determinism takes is particularly problematic, in my view, for this reason: it is dangerously idealist in its resonance. Language systems seem to be immaterial, free standing and fully independent of the embodied subjects that utter the words. One gets no sense that the language system is alive because it forms part of the speech acts *we do*.¹²¹ The strictures that the language system imposes is also the frame through which speech acts emerge (Cavell:1995; Goffman:1974). Moreover, the voice of the speaker is as disembodied as desire. One develops no sense of the 'entity' doing the utterance, so consequently, those who recognise that it is 'real' bodies, with voice boxes, who speak, find themselves in a perverse situation of seeking to 're-establish' that bodies are 'real'. The postmodernists/feminists reviewed here extend a sense of the Symbolic universe that is confined to the (re)presentations made of it. Thus, from their theoretical stance, substantive change need not be of any concern.

The problematic theorisations of the subject and its relationship to the body render the theorists discussed here unable to account for their own consciousness. At best they call upon pre-Oedipal desire. This effectively re-essentialises their own desire and places them back into the order that says they lack sufficient moral regulation to engage in the public world. As Gadamer (1975) argues, seeking to valorise the subordinated term merely achieves the re-affirmation of its subordinate position and thus the patriarchal dualisms that are allegedly their theoretical target. Hence, postmodernists/feminists, and the cultural applications they undertake, have not deconstructed the essence of the woman's body at all, but operate within the very logic they profess to be the object of their critique.

METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS AND EMPIRICAL REFUTATION

My theoretical critique highlighted a number of theoretical weaknesses in the theorisation of the body offered by Lacanian postmodernists/feminists. I then went on to challenge directly the ideologically over-determined description of the Symbolic by conducting a content analysis. My

¹²¹ This in part reflects the loose application of the term 'text', which elides all the differences between these texts, including the visual, linguistic, books and bodies.

central theoretical challenge was to suggest that a sign must be sufficiently stable if it is to perform an ideological function. These signs are supposed to make the world recognisable and, for that reason, are not self-consciously elliptical and difficult to pin down as they slip across a web of meaning. In contestation, I simply offered the following proposition: if the universal Symbolic is the source of gendered subjectivity, then it must be characterised by the active/passive and masculine/feminine dichotomies. Thus codes of this kind are straightforward, conventional and quantifiable. However, the data furnished by my content analysis, which used many of their forms of codification, simply does not make the postmodernist/feminist position critiqued here a tenable one. Empirically, women are not repeatedly encoded with variables that define her as passive, coy, shy or confined to the domestic sphere, for example. In fact, the contextual anchor of most of the images was so vague that applying the coding criteria with regard to femininity as character consistently proved difficult; I abandoned my attempt, suggesting that this is largely because the use of realist scenes to anchor the expression have disappeared. I was unable to consistently code the images along the contours of the gendered dichotomy and I included two images that illustrate how images of men cannot easily be recuperated into the domain of the mind (Dyer:1992). In fact, the emphasis on the skin and the use of light indicates that the body is encoded as desirable through its physicality. This theoretically implies that men are codified and positioned in the same ways as women. The content analysis has furnished evidence that there is an emerging trend that indicates an increasing homogenisation of the images of men and women, which signals that men's bodies are increasingly the target of the processes of commodification and sexualisation. This may open up new patterns of desire, both active and passive for men and women.

In contradistinction, semiotics is the preferred method of analysis of postmodern Cultural Studies precisely because it can trace the interaction of the signifier/signified in the production of meaning. Yet, when language and symbols are made to serve an ideological position, all signs come to mean the same thing, in this case, 'the feminine as lack'. This is encapsulated, I think, in their extensive deployment of the neologism '(re)presentation'. This theoretical closure makes the necessity to uncover, and account for, new forms of representation redundant. The subtlety of the semiotic method, attentive to how meaning is constructed, is gone. Instead, we are left with only a few images analysed, whose selection is made without any systematic rigour. This is, I argue, one of the reasons why the manifold shifts in representation have gone by 'un-decoded'. The shifts discussed above create a cultural space to consume the images of men differently, since the image is no longer located within situations that off set or negate the 'to-be-looked-at-ness' of the male within the image. The postmodernist/feminist¹²² emphasis upon the spoken means that they rule out the need to consider the speaker and thus the potential variation he or she introduces. There is no scope for irony (Rorty:1989) or for users to mobilise the inherent instability of language and potentially produce new signs. The models assessed here are fundamentally ahistorical, both in terms of the construction of the subject and in terms of the production of the sign.

¹²² I refer here to the cultural analyses critiqued and their broader location within the strong programme.

Moreover, my argument proposes that it is not possible to recuperate the phallocratic order, namely via feminisation, because all the images clearly establish or mark the body as male. Moreover, where codes were shown to have a high frequency of use, for example the voyeuristic gaze, which is particularly important here, the codes were equally distributed across the male and female models. It is worth noting that the core feature of the voyeuristic coding was that the gaze was *not* reciprocated. This result cannot be put down to interpretative prejudice on my part because the position of the head determines whether or not a gaze can be returned. This is imposed by the materiality of the body; it is not the outcome of discourse constituting the materialisation of the body (Butler:1990). My critique, combined with this evidence, means that it cannot merely be dismissed as a difference in theoretical orientation. I suggest that this empirical data fundamentally weakens the claims made by the postmodernism/feminism criticised here. However, I do not wish to imply that I consider the image to be free of ideological construction, rather, that the ideological target has shifted to the body itself, to an intensified production of the dimorphic body.

BODIES, IMAGES AND IDEOLOGY

To reiterate, one of the central conclusions drawn from the data is that the ideological content of the image appears to target less 'what kind of woman is she' than that bodies are strictly and absolutely dimorphic. So how should we make sense of this? Garfinkel's (1967) analysis of the relationship between the normative distributions of sex into the dimorphic body and the social practice by which this is accomplished, alongside Goffman's model of the image, seem to me to be pertinent. I begin with Goffman (1979).

As Goffman argues, we are prepared to suspend our knowledge that the image is a construct in order to engage with it. The consequence of the suspension of disbelief is that, as a society, we accept the patterns of the body beautiful as natural and eternal at that point in time, despite it shifting according to the whims of fashion. Goffman has shown that in order for an image to work, it has to hyper-ritualise the scene so that it brings into focus the taken for granted background upon which it depends. Goffman suggests that the essence that makes the image function is its artifice. This carries significant implications in the light of the evidence furnished by my content analysis because the object of codification is not the naturalisation of the social setting, but the naturalisation of the body. This opens up a place to identify the ideological function, namely the production of the normative body, which acts as a yardstick within the social background. The paradox is that when we accept the naturalness of sex within the visual image, that acceptance is an outcome of hyper-ritualising, that is, making visible the cultural rules we use to assign sex. Moreover, it allows us to negate the practice involved in the production of the 'natural sexed body', namely the hours spent in the gym by the model to produce the right contours to reflect the lighting and shadows best (illustrated in plate 2). In turn, these contours then are treated as a natural, and thus naturalised, aspect of the body, that is 'men are muscular'. Another example can be found regarding the technique of airbrushing, which removes all the small 'imperfections' of the body – a pimple here and flesh 'out' of contour there. Most people

'know' that this takes place, yet it does not affect how the image is read. I suggest that this is where the normative body makes its entry because the standard is largely unattainable yet operates as the yardstick by which society judges the bodies of its members. Thus, within these images, we can trace the ideological formation of the body, which is then naturalised as the essence of man or woman. In my view, muscle and facial hair are particularly important features of bodies which are used to secure the body as self-evidently and unambiguously male or female. For example, in plate 1, I suggested that the evidence of facial hair was crucial in ensuring the correct assignment, but does not negate the potential for homoeroticism. I suggest that thinking about images within this framework allows for a more subtle understanding of how they are encoded and naturalised, than drawing upon a structurally determinist model.

Garfinkel, while not occupying an identical theoretical domain as Goffman, nevertheless begins to explore how a cultural background organises ambiguity to anchor or stabilise our notions of 'sex'. In a sense, Goffman uses the notion of hyper-ritualisation and Garfinkel uses aberrant cases to bring the background into view. I bring the two together to link images as a source, but not determinant, of the practices to naturalise sex. By anchoring cultural patterns to sex, society conflates the sociological distinction into one: they are one and the same thing, a 'symptom' of being a man or a woman. Garfinkel addresses the normative order by arguing that what members within this society deem 'the normal', and thus the morally sanctioned, is to be *either female or male* and that membership to one or other is permanent. His exploration of how such a world is constructed looks not to the material reality of sex, but to social accomplishments by which the moral normative position is placed at the centre of all interaction. One of his points, adopted by Kessler (2000), is that we largely assume that the performance corresponds to the physical level of reality: we operate believing that we 'know'. However, what the knowledge is of is the enculturation and embodiment of the meanings of sex and gender. Thus, for Garfinkel, the distinction of sex and gender makes no impact within everyday practice because they are treated as one and the same thing. Therefore, Garfinkel is not suggesting that, for a significant proportion of the time, a person having one set of genitals will not correspond to the public performance demanded of those with a specific genital sex. He does not doubt that in most cases the physical classification of genitals is real. He does not sit alongside radical constructionists who argue that the margins, most notably the intersex (Kessler:2000), make a mockery of the bimodal distribution, whose theories force one into the strange position of having to insist upon the extra discursive qualities of bodies.

Garfinkel is examining the exceptional not to cast doubt on the fact that there are two types of bodies with two differing roles in reproduction, but because the exceptional reveals the background that 'the normal' does not recognise. The naturalisation is complete *because the genitals match* their performance. Garfinkel does, however, make the case that the exceptional, those who fall out of the normative order, reveal something of the social, discursive regime that makes sense of what these body differences *mean and how they are embodied*; that is, having this set of genitals 'of course' means that you sit with your legs closed, crossed, or tucked under the chair. From the example, we already have a woman in mind. When a person's genitals match the gendered performance, the social practices that sustain that relationship become obscured. Thus, what Garfinkel likes about aberrant cases is the extent

to which they have a “remarkable awareness and un-commonsense knowledge of the organisation and operation of social structures that were for those that are able to take their sexual status for granted...seen but not noticed backgrounds” (Garfinkel:1967:118). Encapsulated within this statement are, I think, all sorts of social practices that are important to sustaining bodily dimorphism, while negating corporeal commonality, and merging these with the assumptions and practices of social dimorphism so that it is treated as a universal, ahistorical ‘fact’. I think that the fusing of the biological with the social, thus rendering invisible important parts of our social conduct that is undertaken by both men and women, and diverting attention away from the physical properties men and women share, is what the ideological function of naturalisation is all about. The biological difference, which forms part of the body, is merged with social differences, which are understood to be so different as to be deemed opposite. Kessler and McKenna (1978) also draw attention to the social requirement that gender be made culturally visible through core codes like hair, muscle, deportment and such like. It is here that the significance of the visual domain makes its entry, as social practices draw upon the representations as a source for the codes of hair, muscle, facial hair, eyebrow shape and so on. Kessler and McKenna target the commonsense attitude, namely that one is a woman by virtue of a set of genitalia. They ask then, why should there be such an intense focus upon magnifying that ‘fact’, for example the ‘Wonder Bra’. Their answer is that genitals are simply insufficient to secure the assignment of ‘woman’ to the body that has female genitalia (see also Connell:1987).

Throughout this thesis, there have been on-going references to the sex/gender distinction and its tendency to operate dualistically, so that the body is deemed fully independent of society. One of the issues addressed was the propensity for the social/gender to become more and more peripheral in the explanation for the lived patterns of being a man or a woman. The social element is lost because current practices are ‘lived’ as pre-reflexive embodied features. Consequently, explanations that state that the body has fixed innate features gather favour because they reflect seemingly the fact they are ‘felt’ in the body. This, for me, is a central reason why sex and gender as a distinction needs to be rethought as the analytical axis because it fails sufficiently to tackle the ideological tendency to relocate ‘embodiment’ back into the biological (Delphy:1996). One of the possible reasons is because one ‘lives’ the two elements, interacting and combining them into a seamless sense of self as a woman or man. For example, our emotions ‘feel’ in the body and thus ‘feel’ as if they belong to sex. The outcome is that aggression is naturalised and becomes an innate quality of a man’s body. Equally, the translation of an emotion into the disposition of a specific bodily sex reflects the ideological function that operates when producing absolute dimorphism. For example, within these structured contexts, an aggressive woman transgresses the moral character and its social sanction because, like her body, moral character is deemed to be absolutely dimorphic. As Connell (1987) argues it is the social management of gender that produces categoricalism so that an emotional propensity rapidly moves from particular men, to all men, united by their bodies; it has become a natural and permanent feature of ‘being a man’ and thus stands outside of society. Categoricalism organises the practices so that we come to see genital difference in terms of absolute gender oppositions. Hence, practices move back and forth between the two dualistic terms and manage the ways sex and gender is lived.

What is required then is a model that theorises the relationship between body and society by 'bringing the body into society' (Franks:1991). I offer here a preliminary sketch about how we might move more effectively between the elements of the body and those of the normative order. I draw upon the theoretical space between being in a body, knowing that one is unequivocally male, and the sense of feeling masculine or feminine. I am persuaded by Connell and Garfinkel alike that only a theory of practice can meet this criterion because it is social practice that produces the organisation of the body and the embodied identity that emerged from the body. Practice intervenes so that each member of a social order, no matter how varied these are, can utter the following statement: 'I have these kinds of feelings because I have this set of genitals'. This assumption is not disrupted by the variation in the ways of 'being' a man or a woman, located within various social orders. I believe that only a notion of social practice can manage this.

THE UNFINISHED BODY

One of the issues that leads me to hesitate in accepting the distinction between sex and gender is that the category of sex is thoroughly filled with social content, as well as the bodily fact of genital difference. So much about our gendered practices are based upon the social classification which reflects the ways we organise the signs of sex. We can see this when pubescent boys and girls are trying different ways of being a man or a woman, which runs conterminously with the decision of what sort of a man or woman 'feels' right, if it 'feels' right at all as in the case of transsexuals for example. What is important is that this practice, the learning to incorporate or inculcate the various ways of being a woman, is that it is then naturalised and treated as a naturally occurring disposition of the body. The 'fact' of this process is largely forgotten once naturalisation is complete. Alternatively, we naturalise the assumption that women don't have facial hair – a fact that is 'corroborated' in everyday life. We naturalise the practice and ignore the fact that it is an outcome of an intervention on the body, namely plucking. We allow our transformative practices, those that monitor and manage the body, to slip into the taken-for-granted background. Curiously, this inverts the causal direction: women don't have facial hair because we pluck becomes 'I pluck my facial hair because women don't have facial hair'. This example can be extended to gestures, deportment, posture and so on. Garfinkel's model shows how much of being a natural woman resides in the social background.

Examples such as this tell us that the body is unfinished. Therefore the difference in genitalia is a factor in the negotiations of gender rather than the base, however determining, of gender. For me, emphasising the unfinished nature of the body means that we must attempt to theorise beyond the ranking that implicitly organises our commonsensical understandings of gender. Our social background fuses the scientific knowledge of chromosomal sex so that the assignment of genitalia is said to define something 'primary' of the body. From this follows our sense that the body will go on to produce the corresponding secondary characteristics. This forms such a significant element of social background that we cannot 'understand' practices that fly in the face of this 'truth'. We cannot, for example, accept the practice of 'berdache' (Herdt:1993). To us, this is really about a man pretending to live as a woman because we cannot really understand a social background that does not define men and women through the possession of a particular set of genitals. Transsexualism is a practice that stems from our cultural

background where sex and gender must be aligned if one is to be treated as a woman, as opposed to a man pretending to live as a woman.

I would like to offer a model of sex and gender that seeks to trace the interactions between having a set of genitals, which throws that body into the structured paths of gender, and the negotiations that are then subsequently undertaken. These negotiating practices do something to manage the fact that commonsensically we treat sex and gender as one and the same thing. The practices we undertake slip into the taken for granted parts of our social world, and thus, in 'normal' cases, they go largely unnoticed. Those who fall out of the normative order will be more conscious of the practices that intervene between sex and gender, exposing the ontological relationship that is born from being in a body. A young man's first nocturnal emissions, a sign of the emergence into male adulthood and all shifting physical and ontological issues this implies, may be precisely the point that triggers a profound sense of alienation, and a sense of self that is far stronger than any potential biological dispositions of sex. Thus, it is possible to link the current social practices, the meaning these confer onto the body and individual's sense of dislocation within them. In my view, this draws out nicely the notion of the body as unfinished (Shilling:1993). Having a 'sex' that is material and extra-discursive does not make the body free from these discourses that make sense of it, or the individual negotiation that is undertaken within these discourses. In one respect, Giddens (1991) is right. In 'high modernity', the number of ontological questions that face an individual expand and are rendered more complex by the loss of tradition. Moreover, the massive expansion of technological control of the body offers new sources of embodied self. I think this stands even if Giddens' analysis is not sufficiently embodied (Shilling:1993; Lash and Urry:1994).

IN SUMMATION

By linking naturalisation to the production and content of the image, it is possible to keep an eye on the normative content of an image, without making the act of doing and being a woman a product of the internalisation of the normative content contained in an image. I propose that images act as frames of reference. This emphasises that images offer the normative as a visual standard, which go on to 'merge' into the background so that they can become a naturalised part of the accomplishment of gendered practices. However, this relationship is not a deterministic one, where the macro unambiguously determines the micro-practices. Agency and negotiation intervene between the normative discursive content and its utilisation in practice. Moreover, the space between the normative content and the process of incorporating all or some of its elements helps to explore how and what performances one takes up as opposed to another. Yet, neither is the relationship between the two component parts voluntary. Essentially, our practices draw upon the visual images a society produces and thus lodge within those practices, in *some shape or form*, the structures, discursive or economic, that underpin those actions (Bourdieu:1990; Goffman:1979). Structures thus provide stable contexts from which the background of the lifeworld flows (See Taylor in Calhoun et al. 1993). Images, conventions, bodily gestures act as resources, rather than determinants, to be incorporated in embodied performances. This operates both pre-reflexively and in a consciously motivated way. Most

importantly, the corporeality of the body is central to the production of self; not overridden by the Symbolic. A dynamic exchange is introduced between the discourses to which bodies are subject and our ability to do things with discourse and change what that discourse means. Discourses are not fixed because they operate within the actions we undertake. Thus they do sit outside of action but are reproduced or potentially challenged by what we do. It is in this sense that I think it is possible to locate these practices within the schema Shilling (1993) offers. It keeps in focus the discourses to which bodies are subject. It integrates the meaning of body upon which people act. It leaves open the potential to transform those meanings. And most importantly, it tackles the body directly.

LAKOFF'S VITAL CONTRIBUTION

I argue that the complexity of the relationship between the body and the feeling of gender cannot be appropriately theorised within the classical ideas of how categories work. This is because the objectivist and unitary basis of the classical way of thinking about a category fails to accommodate most socially based classifications. One of the aims of using practice to fill the crucial area resulting from underdetermination of sex by biology is that it brings into view the intervention that takes place between the flesh and the social accomplishment of gender. This is why I continue to think that one of the most persuasive elements of Connell's *Gender and Power* (1987) is his examination of the limitations of categorical logic. Connell suggests that categoricism (54-6) came from a number of sources, one of which is structuralism. He argues that it is both possible and necessary to make generalisations, of which categories like 'women' are essential. However, he argues that serious problems arise when the generalisation is substituted for a normative standard. He argues that this logic is the reason why feminism found itself charged with ethnocentrism. He suggests that feminism leaves itself open to this charge because categoricism prohibits the necessary integration of other forms of embodied existence. I have proposed that this equally applies to Nayak's analysis and is demonstrated by his theoretical inability to combine gender and ethnicity. Connell argues that the more categories that are included, the more internally regular each category must become. It seems to promote the following notion: I am like you in this respect, but different from you in another. To be with those to whom I really belong, we must be the same in all respects¹²³. This is because the model of the category is based upon a notion that there should be a single essence or property that unifies all members. I suspect that this is one of the reasons why some postmodernists/feminists are sceptical about the category 'woman'.

Using Lakoff¹²⁴, I suggest that it is possible to reclaim the category, that there is something called 'woman', without having to work out the singular property that defines all those contained within it. Lakoff's work (1987) offers a framework to draw these elements together. He does this by theorising coherently what categories are. He offers us an application of Wittgenstein's early formulation regarding family resemblances to more empirically vital categories; in this case the

¹²³ Calhoun offers a cogent and stimulating analysis of this logic in his assessment of feminist stand-point theory. He suggests that the politics of recognition would serve better than a politics based upon identity.

¹²⁴ Lakoff also offers a definition of the basic realism that underpins his analysis, and this equally comes to underpin mind. See pp158.

category of 'woman'. As stated, one of the elements that differentiates the various feminist engagements with postmodernism is what the category of 'woman' might mean (Riley:1988; Braidotti:1991; Bordo:1993; Butler:1990; Gatens:1996; Fuss:1990; New:2003). The debate hinges on whether the body can be treated as a point of political unity, or whether 'woman' is purely a product of discourse (Butler) or a terroristic meta-concept that negates difference (Riley). What underpins this debate is the assumption that to function politically, there needs to be a set of properties that unify all women all of the time. Lakoff's model offers us a way out of this by suggesting that no category is unitary in this way.

Lakoff argues that family resemblances can operate in many different ways, depending on the complexity of the category. He suggests that complex categories such as 'mother', which is only one element of 'woman', functions as a cluster. His challenge to classical theory (pp. 74) is that this concept cannot be defined as a set of clear, necessary and sufficient conditions into which all cases will fit. Instead, categories as complex as 'mother' work as a cluster which places the various kinds of mothers in a relationship to the normative 'real' mother. For example, the centre point around which different mothers cluster is the birth model: the person who gives birth is the mother. This initiates the normative model of the biological root of motherhood. Yet, Lakoff shows that this is already insufficient to cope with the number of variations that have become part of our contemporary world. Take for example the development of egg and embryo implants; suddenly the biological root is problematised. Here are some of the variations he offers:

The genetic model: The female who contributes the genetic material is the *mother*.

The nurturance model: The female adult who nurtures and raises a child is the *mother* of that child.

The marital model: the wife of the father is the *mother*.

The genealogical model: The closest female ancestor is the *mother*. (Lakoff:1987:74-75)

His point is that linguistically, we manage various different kinds of mothers all the time and we manage these variations, drawing them from the background where the cluster resides. Important, for me, is the sense that the political can be drawn upon to work through what type of mothers are in the centre or periphery of the cluster. I am strongly persuaded by Lakoff's model as it opens up discussion and draws in the multi-various ways of being a woman. The ranking comes from the normative, not from the contested terrain of experience. Moreover, he clearly posits this within a background, where the social *and* linguistic reside. Therefore, it offers a theoretical space to fuse Garfinkel's emphasis upon the social as background with Lakoff's development of a linguistic background. Therefore, the pertinent criticisms of some of the fallacious claims by subject centred reason can be tackled head on without risking ejecting the embodied entity that acts in and on the social world. Nor does it lose sight of the fact that linguistic practices are equally involved in the social interactions of gender, reproduced through practice.

The crucial link is that Lakoff's model no longer depends upon the unitary definition of woman, based upon a fixed number of objective, essential properties (Delphy:1996). I am persuaded

that a theorisation of categories, based within the notion of family resemblances, means that we can pull various structures together so that inclusion within a category is no longer dependent upon identity – being the same as another woman or as Reiley questions ‘Am I that Name?’ (1988). Equally, the categories are no longer dependent upon biology, with its resulting determinism. Its strength, I think, resides precisely in its ability to provide theoretical frameworks that operate outside of that dualism by pulling both into categories defined by their clusters and family resemblances. It is no longer *either* society *or* biology, but rather that these are components within social and linguistic systems. Thinking about being a woman places emphasis upon the fact that it must, by definition, contain variability within it; a variability that is sustained and managed through practice. Thus, practice intervenes and alters how we can conceptualise our world but also alters the body itself. The most ‘natural’ of facts, namely that women give birth, has become altered, and with it the conceptualisation of the woman’s body, namely through IVF programmes. The unfinished body is acted upon to create a form of embodiment, notably something between fertility and infertility.

FUTURE RESEARCH

Lakoff’s model demonstrates how it is possible to integrate an internally differentiated category to our understanding of some of our most fundamental categories. He opens up space to pull in apparently marginal instances and reveal how they combine to secure the centre, and potentially normative, definition. I am interested in exploring how we might extend his model within empirical research that specifically targets centre and peripheral cases. My chosen axis is between young and older women, as it draws upon issues of beauty and issues of reproduction. It also opens up space to examine the heterogeneous nature of discourse. Thus, young women are targeted in terms of producing the body beautiful and thus must cope with the inevitable failure (Bordo:1993; Davis:1995). Conversely, older women must construct a sense of body image from a discourse that deems the body redundant (Featherstone and Wernick:1995). Their exclusion from the body beautiful is total and from this they too must build up a body image. Additionally, these two groups are linked via their relationship to reproduction and their bodies. Younger women are bound by the discourse that the body is always aging and thus their reproductive capacity is draining away. Older women belong to this continuum but theirs has already ‘run out’, and with this, so has their purpose, normatively speaking. Both groups are, therefore, subject to specific but interrelated discourses from which a sense of one’s embodied self has to be constructed (Mead:1934). Both represent a differing element of ‘woman’ within that cluster (Lakoff:1987). Moreover, it is possible to layer an additional normative element of the cluster concept of ‘woman’ by drawing upon the ideological position that reproduction plays in rendering some women ‘more womanly’ than others.

I aim to explore this by asking the respective cohort, from a sampling group gathered through snowballing, to keep a diary of daily events that focus upon where their embodiment as young and old women were particularly marked. The diaries will be kept up for three months. This aims to bring into focus elements from the pre-reflexive background, and to do so, time is needed to build up the reflections on a number of interactions. Alongside this, they are to note what images they consume and

from which sources during this period. The interest here lies in the differing strategies between those who are culturally invisible with those targeted by a cultural over production of 'how' to be a woman, with all its changing fads. Again, this draws upon the interplay between the commonsense notion of the 'facticity' of sex and all the strategies that will 'make a real woman out of you'. My focus is not what pleasures they derive during the consumption of the images (Hermes:1995) but how long the images remain with them and how this alters their presentation and sense of self (Tseelon:1995), particularly as the older women's embodiment is deemed to be the antithesis of the 'real' woman (de Beauvoir:1985; MacDonald:1983). The aim is to bring into relief where the sense of self is derived when one is largely without these sources, at least in comparison with the younger women. Conversely, with regard to the young women who are intensively targeted, how does this impact upon their ability to maintain a sustained sense of self. This is particularly important because it draws upon the imposition corporeal body makes upon one's location within the cluster as the body itself alters biologically. Here we can emphasise the corporeal facticity of the body.

The evidence furnished will be thought about in terms of the negotiation all individuals face between the 'I' and the 'me'¹²⁵ (Mead:1934), and the particular structured contexts the body imposes. The second element is to use these diaries as a resource as part of an interview in which the interviewees will reflect upon the entries. I deliberately seek to integrate reflexivity into the research process (Bourdieu and Wacquant:1992) because I am interested in the formation of self over time and the specific interpretative practices required to generate this. Lastly, I aim to bring together the younger and older groups so that the respective discursive positioning to which each group is subject can be discussed and brought into stark contrast. This is the reason for wanting to use snowballing sampling, as I am then able to gather the perspectives between how the individuals see themselves and the performative projections they make, as compared to ideas held by the friendship network. The data therefore aims to target the role of discourse, particularly images, and the negotiations and practices these groups of women undertake to manage the discourse. Potentially, there is a space for the groups to discuss their understanding of their relationship to the normative and the feelings generated by inability to 'live up to them'. Most importantly, the 'talk' generated can then be mapped into a cluster concept, examining where potential points of unity emerge and when difference defines the discussions undertaken.

Methodological guidance will come from Plummer's (1995) decisive and cogent work on life narratives. The diaries aim to pull together reflexive narratives about the lived reality of the various social positions within which their bodies locate them. Thus, it calls upon narratives to produce a series of reflections that pull together structure and action through an engagement with the micro-practices that people do with the system. Plummer's use of stories produces a narrative as well as a means to identify their own vocabulary through which they view the world. Stories produce for the narrator a sense of themselves over time, with the shifting patterns of identity that this necessarily entails. Moreover, from the textual nature of the data, it is possible to pull out the central tropes that not only guide the research as to how, as social subjects, we make sense of the world but also reveal the normative order and their relationship to it, that is, how they categorise their world.

¹²⁵ This sets quite a different theoretical context for the research in comparison to Tseelon (1995).

Thus, the research pulls together an understanding of the self that is de-centred, but without locking the self into the Oedipal complex. Mead's understanding of the interplay between the 'I' and the 'me' offers a cogent alternative to the discursive model that defines the subject as a discursive outcome. It also offers a more sensitive understanding of the self as existing within a time trajectory, which always throws up new things and sees what were once vital parts of self fade. However, this is not free from the influence of structure, but locates the dilemmas of aging as located within the discourses that awarded it meaning. Thus structure and action can be analysed as a dynamic brought together through the practices that people undertake as part of their negotiation to construct a meaningful embodied sense of self.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Fig. 1 Sex by year and magazine

Absolute Column % Respondents		Base	sex Q1	
			female	male
Base		686 100.00%	373 100.00%	313 100.00%
time Q27	face 1985	33 4.81%	20 5.36%	13 4.15%
	face 1990	40 5.83%	20 5.36%	20 6.39%
	face 1995	67 9.77%	35 9.38%	32 10.22%
	i-d 1985	80 11.66%	39 10.46%	41 13.10%
	i-d 1990	27 3.94%	13 3.49%	14 4.47%
	i-d 1995	60 8.75%	31 8.31%	29 9.27%
	arena 1987	53 7.73%	8 2.14%	45 14.38%
	arena 1990	40 5.83%	6 1.61%	34 10.86%
	arena 1995	54 7.87%	14 3.75%	40 12.78%
	cosmo 1975	67 9.77%	51 13.67%	16 5.11%
	cosmo 1985	55 8.02%	43 11.53%	12 3.83%
	cosmo 1990	56 8.16%	46 12.33%	10 3.19%
	cosmo 1995	54 7.87%	47 12.60%	7 2.24%

Fig. 2 Ethnicity by year and magazine

Absolute Row % Respondents		Base	ethnic Q3	
			white	minority ethnic groups
Base		688 100.00%	565 82.12%	123 17.88%
time Q27	face 1985	33 100.00%	26 78.79%	7 21.21%
	face 1990	40 100.00%	36 90.00%	4 10.00%
	face 1995	65 100.00%	51 78.46%	14 21.54%
	i-d 1985	82 100.00%	67 81.71%	15 18.29%
	i-d 1990	27 100.00%	13 48.15%	14 51.85%
	i-d 1995	60 100.00%	36 60.00%	24 40.00%
	arena 1987	55 100.00%	48 87.27%	7 12.73%
	arena 1990	39 100.00%	31 79.49%	8 20.51%
	arena 1995	55 100.00%	49 89.09%	6 10.91%
	cosmo 1975	67 100.00%	67 100.00%	0 0.00%
	cosmo 1985	56 100.00%	54 96.43%	2 3.57%
	cosmo 1990	56 100.00%	47 83.93%	9 16.07%
	cosmo 1995	53 100.00%	40 75.47%	13 24.53%

APPENDIX B

Definitions of Content Analysis Variables

The framework below contains the guidelines to the definitions and evaluative criteria of the variables. Most of the categories are bound to the social background that defines them conventionally and at their most simple. In such cases no additional explanatory discussion will be given. When clarification is required, the evaluative criteria will be provided so that alternative manifestations can be ruled out. Where necessary, I have included some of the symbolic associations that the category holds. Note: all variables include ‘other’ unless otherwise stated and all those cases unaccounted for, or esoteric cases. Note the following:

- 1. There are a number of automatic exclusions that have been pre-programmed. Where relevant, these will be included in the tables, denoted N/R (no reply). All figures will be excluded here.
- 2. As a result of a number of marked distributions, certain codes have been amalgamated with other logically compatible codes so that the figures presented can be subject to statistical analysis. All such cases are listed below. The new code is given first, and the merged codes second.
- 3. There have also been 8 codes that I have discarded simply because they do not add anything to the analysis. Again these are listed below.
- 4. Most of the codes listed below are categories that we rarely treat as anything but self-evident, which results in a high degree of uniformity in their application during the coding process.

Q1 SEX: Sex of the model(s).

female		1
male		2
androgynous		3
other		4

Codes 1 and 2, ‘female’ and ‘male’ refer to the sex of the models. Code 3, ‘androgynous’, was only assigned if, after intense inspection, no significant feature was present through which a secure sex assignment could be made. For example, the use of the face alone, when combined with a neutral facial expression and blurry focus, conceals the hair follicles to such an extent that a clear conventional marker of sex is missing. Therefore, the coding is weighted toward re-establishing the social stasis of assumed and categorical sexual dimorphism. A single code would secure sex assignment rather than emphasising the other ambiguous codes that brought it under consideration initially. Code 4, ‘other’, was confined to those cases where the photographic style meant that little could be discerned. This could be because it was too out of focus, for example.

Q2 NUMBERS: Refers to the number and sex of bodies contained within the photographic frame.

single		1
single sex couples		2
single sex female		3
mixed couples		4
crowd		5
other		6

Derived Q29 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3 = 4; code 4 = 5, code 5 = 6.

The aim is to trace the extent of the emergence of homosexual codifications, both implicit and explicit, and the extent to which the heterosexual imperative determines the basic feature of the codification. Code 1, ‘*single*’, refers to the single model/body. Code 2, ‘*single sex couples*’, refers to those images that contain not more than two models of the same sex, thus establishing the potential for overtly gay or lesbian codings. This is adopted from Lewis and Rolley (1997) who argue that single sex coupling is a direct means to establish lesbian codification and pleasure. They refer to the coupling as a means through which identification can be positioned. Code 3, ‘*mixed couples*’, refers to the heterosexual couple. Any image that contains one male with two females is also coded as a heterosexual couple because, I suggest, it references the ‘hyper-masculinity’ model; for example, a ‘James Bond’ figure who can “satisfy any or all women”. Code 4, ‘*crowds*’, refers to those cases that have three or more bodies of any combination of sexes in the frame.

Q3 BLACK/WHITE BODY: To identify if the total absence of black bodies within advertisements has decreased.

white		1
Black/Black Asian		2
other		3

Code 1, ‘*white*’, is anything not defined as black. Code 2, ‘*Black/Black Asian*’, refers to all those that would not be defined as white in a society that normalises ‘white’ and white experience. The combination of colour and ‘Black features’ was used to assign ethnicity. This category examines the assignment of ‘otherness’ that Blacks undergo and how this visually interacts with sexualisation. Again, this involves seeking to unpack ‘self-evidents’ that are fundamentally socially constructed. Code 3, ‘*other*’, is for those cases where the assignment cannot be made.

Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.

clothes		1
perfume		2

The items which were classified as clothes included trousers, shirts etc. as well as underwear, tights, swimwear and shoes. The classification did not include items such as watches and sunglasses. The classification for perfume referred to scents only. It did not include those advertisements promoting cosmetics sold under the same label.

Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and subjugation.

model		1
model and object		2
model and obj/s		3
object and model		4
object/s and model		5
other		6

Derived Q28 = code 2 = codes 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = 6

The relationship between the model and the commodity is represented in the order of the words in the code: the first value is dominant over the second. It seeks to trace the collective production of control with regard to the props or a central commodity. Therefore, if the man were driving the car we would conventionally associate that object/prop as being under his command; conversely, if the female is draped over the car this is classified as subordinate to the prop. Code 1, ‘*model*’, refers to those cases where the model was either photographed in a neutral setting where there was nothing additional in the image beyond the model him/herself, or was photographed in a situation, for example in the street, where there was no specific *relationship in the narrative* between the context and the model, by which I mean the model/subject was merely ‘passing through’. Code 2, ‘*model and obj/s*’, refers to those cases where the model is in control of the objects, props or commodity. Code 3, ‘*object/s and model*’, refers to the opposite cases where the model is being subjugated or contorted by the objects and/or commodities. Note that the power relationship is implied by the word order of Codes 2 and 3. Code 4, ‘*other*’, is for those images that cannot be clearly coded in any of the above.

Three basic principles were applied to secure regular coding. First, if the model was deploying or manipulating the commodity or props, and therefore it is implied that the model knows about these objects, then this would be coded as controlling the objects. Conversely, if the model was lying on top of, or underneath, the props or commodity, this would then be coded as being subjugated to the prop. Additionally, if the model was being shown how to use something, for example in an office, the person

who is being shown is coded as being subservient to the other model and props because the model is not in control or command of the objects. Conversely, the model as tutor is classified as being in command. Second, if the model was highly sexualised with regard to the commodity or surrounding object, this is also coded as being subjugated to the prop. An example is if the (female) model is virtually naked or positioned in a compromising way with regard to the various props or commodities. Third, if the body is represented only as a body part to display the commodity, this would also be automatically coded as being subjugated to the objects. A classic example of this is for underwear or hosiery where only the pelvis or legs are shown. Often this is secured by having the legs extended in the air, thereby anchoring the sexualisation further.

Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how models are spatially represented – higher and central being related to being in control and dominatory, and lower and periphery being related to subjugation.

Q6A

dominates frame entirely	{ }	1	1/3	{ }	4
3/4	{ }	2	1/4	{ }	5
1/2	{ }	3	less 1/4	{ }	6

The variable has been split into parts, each referring to the specific features of space and the ways it is affected by the photographic process. Note: it is possible to cross reference the consistency of the common sense criteria by cross tabulating it with ‘body parts’, shot length and so on. Code 1, ‘*dominates frame entirely*’, covers those cases where the body of the model has occupied the full frame of the image so that almost no background can be seen. Code 2, ‘*3/4*’, refers to those cases where the frame of the images is also dominated by the body with the exception of some surrounding area; three-quarters of the page will be filled with a body. Code 3, ‘*1/2*’, refers to those cases where the body occupies approximately half of the frame. Thus, there will be roughly equal quarter parts of the page remaining unoccupied by the model’s body. Code 4, ‘*1/3*’, refers to those cases where the body occupies approximately a third of the frame. If this code is used, then the model’s body ought to be able to fit into the frame three times. Code 5, ‘*1/4*’, refers to those cases where the model’s body can be fitted into the frame four times. The divisions are used to aid the coding process. Code 6, ‘*less 1/4*’, therefore refers to those cases where the space depicted in the image is such that the model’s body has little impact upon the space within the representation and is thus peripheral to that image. Alternatively, the model is framed within a crowd.

Q6B

Q6C ABANDONED – it does not make any significant contribution that is not better served by codes elsewhere.

centre		7	perspective		9
off centre		8	non-perspective		10

This second cluster, Q6B, refers specifically to the central focal point of image and interaction. The coding procedure for this variable requires that the centre or foci of the image be pinpointed, and from this the model’s position regarding the centre be judged. The third cluster, Q6C, refers to the ‘realist’ modes of constructing an image. Hence code 1, ‘*perspective*’, will follow the order of perspective within the natural world so that everything moves back to a single point within the image. The code of ‘*non-perspective*’, code 2, refers to those images where the distortions and alterations have been added to the image, or if the body ‘occupies’ the full spread so that the body no longer appears located in space. It can be produced through non-realist editing, camera angles or doctoring the image later. In each case, it disrupts our presumption that the photograph captures things as they ‘really are’. The model’s feet, for example, do not tally with the rest of the body because the camera angle is situated at the model’s feet. This has the effect of placing the body along a perspective line so that the head appears to be very far away. Alternatively, the image may not respond to the established rules of representative visual perspective because the image has been removed from its original context and edited onto another background altogether.

Q6D

in front of		11	behind		17
level with		12	beside		18
above/higher		13	opposite		19
below/lower		14	periphery		20
seated/on top of		15	other		21

The coding of this sub-category employs the following procedure: in the case of two or more models, the one currently being processed will dictate the code selected. Thus, if the female model is taller than the male model, she would be classified as ‘*higher*’ and he would be classified as ‘*lower*’, which is coded separately as a distinct case. To reiterate, the ‘*above*’ sub-variables are applied as they would be according to the background knowledge. They are entirely dependent upon the conventional use to which ‘*behind*’ or ‘*underneath*’ is put within everyday activity. Thus higher and lower refer to the relative height of the models to each other or to other objects. ‘*On top of*’ refers to those cases where the model is lying down, perhaps on a bed. ‘*Underneath*’, ‘*behind*’, ‘*beside*’ and ‘*opposite*’ are coded as according to common sense. ‘*Periphery*’ is the additional sub-variable to the spatial measure of ‘*less than a 1/4*’ and thus has marginal occupancy of space relative to other models or objects.

Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have traditionally been photographed – soft focus relating to dreaminess and passivity and hence femininity.

Q7A

Q7B

close up		1	sharp focus		4
medium shot		2	soft focus		5
long shot		3	out of focus		6
other		7			

This variable is related to the standard photographic techniques and how their application varies according to the sex of the model. Code 1, ‘close up’, refers to those images where the detail of the body can be discerned. These have tended to be areas such the legs, or the use of profile and so on. ‘Close up’ is read as intending to emphasise a particular detail, and excludes the rest of the body from the frame. This contrasts with code 3, ‘long shot’, which refers to those images where there is considerable detail of the context of the scene, and thus the model appears to be further away from viewer. Consequently, one would expect the full body to be represented here. One would also expect a significant difference in the gendered use of these codes. This draws directly upon the notion of isolating a body part and transforming that part into the fetish. Code 2, ‘medium shot’, refers to those cases that lie in between the two. One expects this to be used in shots that depict scenes inside rooms of various kinds, and the torso in particular.

The second cluster, Q7B, refers to the sorts of focus used. Again there has been exploration as to the ways in which the focus used has come to denote different sorts of gender associations. Based upon the existing debates one would expect the use of ‘soft focus’ to be more prevalent when representing female models than male. Code 4, ‘sharp focus’, refers to the focus that has been associated with actual vision, under normal conditions, and is thus widely used within representative realist formats. Thus, there are clear distinctions between the background and the model, and the perspective would also be naturalistic. Code 5, ‘soft focus’, refers to those shots where the outline is slightly blurred so that the contours of the face are less well defined; hence the detail is removed. The general appeal of this sort of focusing is its softening of the appearance of the body, particularly the skin. Code 6, ‘out of focus’, refers to those images where the image was exactly that, out of focus. This appearance can be recreated by squinting so that the clear boundaries between the environment and the body are completely blurred. Code 7, ‘other’, refers to those cases that fall outside the above sub-variables.

Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around ‘realism’ within visual representation.

naturalisitic mock-up	.	1
stylistic		2
neutral		3

other

4

The categories relate to the various modes through which photography engages in ‘realistic representation’. Thus, Code 1, ‘*naturalistic mock-up*’, refers to those images that represent ‘real life’ both from the ‘naturalness’ of the setting, and the naturalness of the narrative taking place within that environment. One can imagine the same such scene in everyday life because it has been exaggerated or staged so that presentational features appear mundane and ordinary: i.e. visible and unmistakable. It is central to this form of encoding that the viewer/reader looks in on the scene, via the position of the photographer, without the narrative being directed to the viewer¹²⁶. The viewer is, by definition, excluded or absent from the model’s fictional world despite being positioned within the fictional world. In general, the model is surrounded with props and prompts that aid the reader’s social classification of the model or the fiction. The commodity, for example hair spray, is promoted in a scene where, strictly speaking, the model’s hair is now too shiny and too bouncy. Code 2, ‘*stylistic*’, refers to those images that are surreal in resonance. It refers to those styles that are self-consciously anti-naturalistic; for example, where the model is photographed doing an odd action or movement or an ordinary gesture but set against a contradictory background. For example, the model could be acting in a sexualised yet child-like fashion in an industrial wasteland, or be in a fake beach scene wearing winter clothes and pretending to ‘feel cold’. These codes often self-consciously expose the staged nature of all images, which I argue limits the identification process. Code 2 is therefore ‘anti-realistic’.

The code 3, ‘*neutral*’, refers to those cases whereby the model is being photographed in the studio in front of a plain background, a background that is devoid of any props or markers of any kind. It provides no context, surreal or otherwise. The emptiness of the ‘scene’ means that there is very little visually going on apart from the model photographed in the clothes and the body idiom assumed. All these features must be present if the image is to be coded as ‘neutral’. Therefore, the variable is weighted to find the conventional content of images as suggested by the established debates and positions regarding photography and advertising.

Q9 GENERAL IDIOM: This variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 corresponds with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 shows half the body.

full body	1	face only	5
legs cut off	2	chest area only	6
head cut off	3	legs only	7
cut at waist	4	other	8

Code 1, ‘*full body*’, refers to those cases where the whole body can be seen. It includes all those images where the top of the head and the feet are visible. The feet and the lower shin can be

¹²⁶ I have purposely refrained from using voyeur as I wish to distance this analysis from the psychoanalytic model that equates images with identification and desire.

edited from the frame, but the knee must be visible. The forehead too must be visible if the image is to be included in this variable. Code 2, *'legs cut off'*, refers to those cases where there is no knee visible and it is likely that the majority of the thigh is excluded from the frame. The pelvis must be visible. Piloting established that the image tended to either show the knee or remove a majority of the thigh from the frame altogether. Code 3, *'cut at waist'* refers to those cases where there is no leg visible and no pelvis identifiable. The head must be visible. This fragmentation of the body has the impact of making the torso and head the primary focus of the individual and reader/viewer. Code 4, *'face only'*, refers to all those cases where only the shoulders and above are shown. Code 5, *'head cut off'*, refers to all those images where the head is cut from the picture frame or has been concealed in some way. If this is the case, it must override all other parts of the body showing, except for Code 5 and Code 7. The concealment or removal of the head has been given priority over the rest of the body depicted because the removal of the head, while parts or all of the body are showing, is an extreme example of total subjugation to the image and commodity. Code 6, *'chest area only'* refers to those cases where the body has been reduced to the area below the shoulders and above the pelvis. This code will be treated as equally dominatory as *'head cut off'* and for some of the same reasons. In particular, it emphasises a key area that genderises the body, namely the breast and chest hair. Therefore, the coding has opened up a potential for a specific form of fetishisation of the male body. The same fetishisation process is applied to code 7, *'legs only'*, as is the same logic regarding potential distributions. Code 7 refers to those cases where the only parts of the body shown are the hips and legs of the model.

Q10 DETAILED IDIOM: This variable is concerned with the position of the body within the frame.

lying on side	1	torso leaning back	10
lying on back	2	propped BY arms	11
lying on front	3	propped ON object	12
facing forward	4	bowing from the waist	13
twisting away R or L	5	bent down	14
back facing camera	6	bowing from head	15
twisting towards R or L	7	on all fours	16
profile	8	other	17
torso leaning forward	9		

Derived Q30: code 1 = codes 1-3; code 2 = 4; code 3 = code 6; code 4 = codes 5, 7¹²⁷; code 5 = 8; code 6 = code 9; code 7 = code 10; code 8 = code 11; code 9 = code 12; code 10 = codes 13-17

Code 1, *'lying on side'*, refers to those images where the body is lying down on the side of the hips. The body would usually be positioned horizontally to the viewer. It is possible that the body may

¹²⁷ These can be combined because each instance would only be classified as one or the other. In addition, they have been combined to facilitate interpretation; the results do not require the specific detail of the direction of the turn.

be placed in profile, and this would tend to make the focal point of the image the soles of the feet, the top of the head or the side of the body. The focus will distort the perspective of the body in the frame. This anti-naturalistic style ought to be recorded as '*stylistic*' in variable 8, Code 3. Codes 2 and 3, '*lying on back*' and '*front*', refer to those cases where the models are either lying on their chests with their bottoms facing upwards, or with their backs on the surface with their chests facing upwards. Code 2 is defined by the visibility of the sternum which will be facing upwards towards the top of the page or, in terms of the images reality, 'up to the ceiling'. Conversely, if the sternum is concealed and the bottom is visible 'to the skies', one would classify this as Code 2. Code 4 is '*facing forward*'. One would classify an image thus if none of the back is visible. If there is a little twist in the body, it will be classified as facing forward providing that nothing more than the arm socket can be seen on either side of the body. If the beginnings of the shoulder blades can be seen, then the case is not to be classified here. Likewise, one would expect the feet, if included in the frame, to be facing forward also. It is a relatively static posture. Code 6, '*back facing camera*', refers to those cases where the face is out of view and, from the spectator's point of view, the back of the head is visible, as are the buttocks and the back of the knees. The same rule applies as for facing forward, whereby anything that exceeds the visibility of the arm socket is not to be classified as an instance of this variable.

In the case where there is some back or shoulder blade visible, the image is to be classified as either Code 5 or Code 7, depending on the positioning of the twist from the perspective of the viewer/reader. Therefore it is of paramount importance that the coding of this variable be based upon the position of the model from the reader's point of view. Code 5, '*twisting away R or L*', refers to those images where the body is facing forward, and thus the kneecap is facing forward. The result of the twist is to make parts of the back visible. The extent of the twist must appear to be about 90 degrees to qualify as an instance of twisting. Note: this degree of twist is only a guideline for marginal cases. In most cases one ought to look for the feet position, the amount of movement, the extent to which the knees are bent and the extent to which the previously concealed part of the body is becoming visible. Code 7, '*twisting towards L or R*', refers to those where, from the point of view of the reader, a majority of the back is facing them. Correspondingly therefore, if the feet are visible, one would expect to see the back of the heel. It was decided that to note the direction of the twist was of no particular relevance to the research question. However, the starting position from which the body began is of importance since it plays its part in the relationship of the assertiveness of the model to the viewer. For example, if the model is facing forwards and physically turning away, this could well be an instance of the avoidance of the male gaze. Conversely, turning toward the viewer could be an instance of attempting to engage the viewer and thus 'receive' a positive evaluation from the viewer as part of the fiction of the frame. Code 8, '*profile*', also includes those cases which abide by the common-sense features of the profile shot. With regard to boundary cases, one must not exceed the partial visibility of the side of the nose. Likewise, one ought not to be able to see a substantial part of the shoulder. Again, this code is considered to be a feminised one and thus synonymous with 'woman'.

The next two variables have been selected on the basis of their embodied view of the attentiveness of the model to the spectator. There are some occasions where this does not apply, but pilot sampling showed that these were infrequent. They have been included because they represent the

simplest forms through which body position can radically alter the embodied posture. The two sub-variables refer mostly to those cases where the model is seated. Code 9, *‘torso leaning forward’*, refers to those cases where, as the chest moves forward, it will hang over the legs or lap of the seated model. Based upon existing debates, one would again expect this to be a highly feminised code. For example, leaning forwards toward the spectator causes the body to overlap itself. This makes the body smaller in terms of the space that it occupies. This physical occupation of space is also accompanied by its ‘behavioural’ aspects whereby the act of leaning towards the spectator is an embodied impression of being attentive and engaged with the spectator. This is the opposite to Code 10, *‘torso leaning back’*, where the body is extended out into space. To lean back is not only a statement of being at ease in space, and therefore having the desire to fill the space, but it also moves the person’s face and upper body away from the spectator. It is a form of disengagement, or at least gives an impression of neutrality. Thus, these two positions are marked by their different physical occupancy of space, as well as the different confidence being embodied. Extending the body out into space is a sign of being confident within the body. This is drawn from the sheer physical openness of the body and therefore its potential vulnerability. There is a marked difference between the open body and the closed one which is adopted in times of fear and threat. Therefore, one would expect this body position to reflect the gender dichotomy.

Code 11, *‘propped BY arms’*, refers to the sexualisation of Codes 3 and 10. In the case of women, it has the effect of emphasising the bust, and brings with it the sense of seeking to be sexual. This is partly why it is a posture that is often assumed on the beach. One would expect this code also to be significantly genderised. Code 12, *‘propped ON object’*, refers to those cases where the body is supported by or leaning against something. This sort of image clearly gives the encoder the opportunity to furnish phallic symbols.

The other series of codes refer to other forms of ritualistic subordination, many of them also conveying deference to the superior body (of the masculine). Code 13, *‘bowing from waist’*, is self-evident and is to be used to class all sorts of bowing except where it is only the head that is bent/bowing. The latter has been designated a separate category, Code 15. Code 14, *‘bent down’*, refers to the visual forms of status display, as physical low-ness has become bound with moral lowness. *‘On all fours’*, Code 16, has been included not only because of its sexual connotations, but also for its connotation of the animality of the subject; the latter form may connect it to the Black body. Code 17 is *‘other’*.

Q11 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working definition of physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings. Any code that remains unmarked cannot be reliably ascertained from the photograph either to conform or contradict.

strong	1	body hair id	15
weak	2	body hair unid	16
tall	3	dyed/sculpted hair	17
small	4	short hair	18

muscular		5	long hair		19
slim		6	<i>tough</i>		20
skinny		7	<i>emotional</i>		21
emaciated		8	<i>delicate</i>		22
au naturale		9	<i>soft</i>		23
stylised make-up		10	<i>macho</i>		24
normal make-up		11	fat		25
painted nails		12	<i>sporty</i>		26
long nails		13	<i>physically able</i>		27
short nails		14	other		28

This variable was only a partial success, primarily because I could not consistently codify those elements in italics that reference the tertiary elements of sex. Below is an explanation of the conventions I expected to be visually present.

Code 1, ‘*strong*’, refers to those common-sense meanings stereotypically attributed to the male. Its content includes those elements that have been associated with Parson’s ‘instrumental role’, as well as those characteristics applied to the male by Tiger and Fox (1974). This characteristic relates to the independence of the autonomous subject. He has the courage to stand alone, to protect the weak and infirm, displaying those characteristics that combine the essence of man’s strong body with his strength of character. Conversely therefore, ‘*weak*’, Code 2, refers to the opposite, namely all that is feminine and ‘expressive’. Thus the feminine is emotional, usually to excess, unstable, dependent, open to persuasion and a poor judge of character. Note also that both codes refer to the physical state of the body. Likewise, this links the essence of the gendered subject to its location in an essential body. Codes 3 and 4, ‘*tall*’ and ‘*small*’, refer to an additional stereotypical association of men and women’s bodies in terms of each other. As Goffman argues, selecting a female model who is smaller than the male carries the connotations of status difference metaphorically encoded through size. Code 5, ‘*muscular*’, is the stereotypical state of the masculine body. It refers to the physical embodiment of the power that masculinity promises. One ought to be able to see the shifting contours in the skin defined by the muscle. The body is toned, free of loose skin and with minimal exposure of boniness. Therefore, this not only anchors masculinity, but also potentially racialises the body (see chapter 3 ‘Content Analysis: A Resassessment, variable 4). This also brings into view the extent to which Bordo’s model of the disciplined body can be said to be categorically divided along gender lines. ‘*Slim*’, Code 6, delineates the body that is free from fleshiness, fat or other untuned or undisciplined bodily-ness. The skeletal frame is apparent and, unlike the muscular body, cannot rely on the flesh as a protector. The collar bone is prominent, as is the absence of flesh at the top of the jaw and below the ear. The stomach is likely to be relatively flat, and so on. Code 7, ‘*skinny*’, is for the body where the elbow sticks out and the hip bone also has the appearance of protruding so that the stomach appears to hollow inwards. The ribs will be visible through the skin. Often the lighting forms shadows on the angles produced by the bone. Code 8, ‘*emaciated*’, refers to those bodies where the arm is considerably thinner along and around the bone than it is at the elbow. The shoulder blade is highly visible and sticks out. The absence

of flesh is such that the model appears seriously malnourished, so much so that the ridges of the breast bone are visible through the skin. The upper thigh is also extremely thin, so that the pubic bone is always visible even when the legs are together. It is images like these that have courted so much attention regarding the 'harm' the image can do to young girls' body image.

Code 9, '*au naturelle*', refers to those models who have the appearance of not being made up at all: the beauty lies in their purity. The naturalistic mock-up achieves the look of nature; it is known that this must be achieved. The code references the ideological patterning of the mock-up as well as the deeper ideological patterning of the feminine as nature's beauty espoused by the Pre-Raphaelite period, for example. Conversely, '*stylised make-up*' refers to those cases where the make-up is drawing attention to itself by its strangeness, its apparent stance against natural beauty and the wholesome woman. This style of make-up is akin to punk styling and is not necessarily aimed at making the woman look beautiful. It is much more about the creation of an eclectic and esoteric form of imaging, which in part contributes to the self-referential styling of the image. Code 11, '*normal make-up*', is for all those cases where this styling could conceivably be worn within the life-world. It is the sort of style that one would associate with the women's activity of producing prettiness as an ongoing process. It is the fashioning that belongs to the naturalistic mock-up. Codes 12, 13 and 14, '*painted nails*', '*long nails*' and '*short nails*', are self-explanatory. Just as with the above, the use of nails is a means through which the gendered body is produced as an ongoing activity. Thus, just as shaving, plucking, make-up etc. is performed every day, so the preparation of the nails is another means through which the obviousness of sex is produced on a day-to-day basis.

'*Body hair id*', Code 15, refers to those cases where one can clearly see the presence of body hair, be it on the legs, chest, face or armpit etc. This ought to be highly gendered. Body hair is something that is ideologically bound to the masculine just as testosterone is bound to the masculine, and yet both are present in all bodies. Conversely therefore, one would expect there to be a marked gender difference here in '*body hair unid*'. This is to be used if all the flesh exposed is free from the appearance of body hair.

'*Dyed/sculpted hair*' is an additional code (number 17) which seeks to make the presentation of the body anti-naturalistic. One is not viewing this image in terms of it being applicable in everyday life. It is best to consider such hair styles along the lines of a punk-like presentation. '*Short hair*', Code 18, must be short on the neck to be classified as such. Therefore '*long hair*', Code 19, one would associate with the feminine and must conceal the neck in some way. Combined, these codes trace the prevalence of conventional presentations of gender.

'*Tough*', '*emotional*', '*delicate*', '*soft*' (Codes 20–27) have been included as these were additional codes used in the existing content analysis on gender. They have been taken from REFS> and are to be understood as the more detailed versions of the masculine and feminine stereotypes defined by the likes of Tiger and Fox. These are also applicable according to their stereotypes and are thus not to be used in any problematical sense as to what these words mean to us. '*Physically able*' was introduced as a result of observations made during piloting. During piloting, I became increasingly aware that while the models were often slim, it was not the case that most of the models were unable to move through public space, to mobilise their bodies and space and be directed toward their utilitarian

aims. While it was the case that the models were rarely lifting something, it did not follow from my observations that feebleness was a permanent feature of their embodiment. Code 28 refers to those cases that fell outside this bodily agenda.

Q12 CONTAINED BODY:¹²⁸ Containment of the body is aimed at illiciting the degree of self-determination; whether the model is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is autonomous.

contained by self	1	contained by other/obj	5
contained by man	2	mutual containment/embrace	6
contained by woman	3	non-contained	7
contained by object	4	other	8

N/A = Q 9 = 5 removes 63 counts

This variable aims to explore the relationship between the body and its inhabitation of space, and is concerned specifically with the ways that a contained or confined body relates to the status ascribed to that body, as well as the level of autonomy that body is constructed as having. Of particular concern is the gendered dichotomy that places the occupancy of space as masculine and the withdrawal from space as feminine. The latter, for example, has been used to denote modesty and combines with the child-like status ascribed to the feminine. Moreover, this has a direct connection to the corresponding public/private dichotomy. This variable seeks only to classify who or what is doing the containment; the specific postures that embody containment are described in Q13. ‘*Contained by self*’, Code 1, refers to those models whose bodies are withdrawn from social space by holding or containing their *own* body through various body postures. For example, making oneself small by holding all the limbs close to the chest. Alternatively, the model’s legs could be pulled up in some way with her own arms hugging her body. Often this body position is accompanied by a complicit gaze, a ‘god’s eye that monitors her modesty’. This is regarded as an example of minimal self-determination. The timidity within social space and, by implication, social activity, means that this is an example of active passivity¹²⁹. There are no external coercive factors at play which can be drawn upon as an explanation for the withdrawal. Rather it is established as part of the model’s ‘feminine *habitus*’.

Code 2, ‘*contained by man*’, refers to those cases where the demarcation of space and thus, following Goffman (1979: 54-56), ownership of space, is coded through the relative positioning of the man’s and woman’s body. Goffman argues that the ownership and control of space is established

¹²⁸ Note that question 11 has not been included here as it was abandoned during coding. This has been discussed in detail in the above methodology section.

¹²⁹ The notion of active passivity alludes to the fact that all kinds of femininities are practices. Therefore they must be *done*. They are not a state of being, but something that must be ‘performed’. They are an aspect of the social constructed habitus. This will be discussed in more detail when the alternative to post-structuralism is discussed later.

through the extension of limbs into space. For example, the arm will be placed in front of the woman and will therefore act as a barrier to her movement, as well as being a symbolic appearance of 'protecting' her. Additionally, this code establishes the man's right over the woman. The bodily barrier limits where she can go and what she can do. Thus, the key coded features that need to be identified here are whether the masculine body is producing and constructing the masculinity of the space. Other examples of this include the woman being held by the man from behind. This can be compounded by having the woman seated while the claim is made.

Code 3, '*contained by woman*', refers to those very same features and seeks to trace whether the control of space through bodily positioning has been transferred onto the feminine body. Thus, another female or male would have to be blocked in some way by her embodiment, her relative authority, thereby according her control of the space. This would usually be carried within the narrative of the advertisement, for example by her teaching him what to do in the office. Effectively, this sub-variable seeks to address whether containment of this kind is still bound strictly to gender. As repeatedly argued, I simply do not want to assume dichotomous distribution, but rather allow this association to re-emerge empirically if it remains the case. Note that both Codes 2 and 3 are secured further if the body that is contained is also positioned lower in some way, thereby coding status through its relationship with things higher. Codes 2 and 3 can be cross-tabulated against the single sex couple thereby producing some indicative data as to whether explicitly heterosexist postures and relative body positions have been mobilised or rejected in potentially homoerotic scenes.

Code 4, '*contained by object*', is a slight shift from the relationship between embodied states and other bodies. It refers instead to the relationship that the model has to the commodity or object. This is a slight departure from Goffman's particular analysis of how hyper reality is presented. Here, I am referring to those images that have reduced the person to a means of sexual display. Thus, the model can be placed leaning against phallic symbols, or worse still adopt a posture that codes the body as on the verge of being penetrated by the phallic symbol. Other sorts of image that are to be coded within this category are those through which the body is fetishised by being cut down to 'legs only', as for example in a hosiery advertisement. This has taken the notion of containment and the negation of autonomy to its extreme as it is either reduced to mere penetrative flesh, or to an objectified means of display. Within these contexts, there is no self with which to view the spectator. Again it would have been beneficial to differentiate between those objects that confine and those phallic objects that penetrate. Code 5, '*contained by other/object*', seeks only to count those cases where the above ritual subordination is compounded by the presence of the active masculinity. Potentially, because of the way the topography leads the image to establish the boundaries of gender distinction, there could be equal distributions of men and women coded in these ways. However, a sceptical position would expect this to be an unlikely outcome.

Code 6 is '*mutual containment/embrace*'. Coding such an image for heterosexual couples requires that both the male and female are present in the image, that they are embracing, kissing and possibly engaging in minimal foreplay. However, the central element must be that the sexual activity, of whatever kind, is mutual and thus reflects *active* engagement by both. These must be codings where the embrace appears to result from mutual initiation. Thus, the bodies must be moving towards each

other and both bodies must be either going to embrace or already embracing. Therefore, both of the woman’s arms must be raised towards the man and not by her side. Any image that is to be classified under this code must be free of passive body positioning such as described above. The female must not be turning away, blushing, looking down, concealing her mouth, or appearing to be moving away from the man.

Code 7, ‘non-containment’, refers to those images where the body may be single or with other bodies but is able to move freely and act instantly upon a choice or decision or whim. Thus, it would suggest that non-containment relates to the autonomy of the body to move through space at will. The body will not be withdrawing from the social space, nor be directed or guided through the social space. There must certainly not be any physical or symbolic barriers to its movement or occupation of space. Therefore, there are no arms around the body or across the body, for example. Code 8, ‘other’, refers to those cases that do not apply to any of the above or are too ambiguous to be coded consistently and confidently.

Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of some of the ways in which the idiom could visually portray containment.

legs held in by arms		1	other's arm round neck		7
legs crossed and pulled in		2	other's arm round waist		8
held in and hugging self		3	held protectively		9
clinging to other model		4	embracing other/obj		10
confined by product		5	embracED by other/obj		11
contained demarcating			other		12
ownership		6			

N/A: Q9 = 5, Q12 = (6,7). Total numbers excluded are 611 cases.

This variable seeks to trace the central means by which containment is coded. It seeks to trace the very embodied means through which withdrawal from social space is encoded. The aim is to cross-tabulate this with variable 12 in order to see how the different genders mobilise space using which particular gestures and postures. Code 1, ‘legs held in by arms’, refers to the embodied posture where the legs are pulled up towards the chest and kept in place by the arms clasped around them. Not only does it make the physical space smaller, but the limbs also protect and conceal the chest. This posture tends to be adopted when seated on the floor, thereby visually encoding the body as being of low status by being low down. Code 2, ‘legs crossed and pulled in by arms’, refers to a similar posture, but rather than the legs being clasped to the chest, they are just pulled up and thus withdrawn from the occupancy of social space. The crossed legs are held there by the arms. This posture suggests slightly more control within social space as it is not such a closed posture. However, it nevertheless continues to suggest low or little status, again by being on the floor, as well as invoking a child-like posture. Another variation

of this child-like posture is Code 3, where the woman is holding her legs in and hugging herself. Again this withdrawal is conventionally disconnected from confidence and public life.

Code 4, '*clinging to other*', can only be used as a classification if there are two or more models in the frame. The word clinging has been purposely selected to refer to the fact that the model is embracing, or holding on to, the other, without it being reciprocated. Additionally, the word clinging has been used to refer to the clutchiness of the grasp, as if to let go would mean imminent danger. This continues the theme of childishness that these postures suggest. '*Confined by product*', Code 5, refers to those cases where the model is unable to move through social space because of the barrier that the product is imposing. This could be referring to shoes that are so immensely high that mobility is seriously impaired. It could be that the model is captured while they are getting undressed, thereby objectifying the model. Alternatively, the body may be bound. This category aims to distinguish those images where the body is confined from the sub-variable in Q12 which refers to those images where the body has been dissected by the frame and thus is merely the legs upon which the tights are displayed.

The next cluster of three codes seeks to classify those images where one model is claimed by the other as personal property. Thus, it seeks to trace the encodings that take place to trace how 'his woman' is visually proffered. Goffman has described the ways that these sorts of relative statuses are coded through visual barriers or the spacing of the bodies. For example, '*contained demarcating ownership*', Code 6, is where the man stands, the woman is seated and the man has his hand placed on her shoulder. The woman, however, is likely to have her hands cupped in her lap. This makes sure the hands do not touch anything and, through its stillness, gives the posture a degree of passivity. Note that this mock-up of the professional man and his wife is an over-conventionalised mode through which her subordinate status regarding class is conferred. By the same token, it is also the same convention through which her status is understood to be conferred by her husband. Thus, this code is to be used if there are extreme differences in the relative placing of the models, if there are distinct features to the narrative whereby she is visiting his office, for example. Usually, the narrative provides explanations as to why she is out of the domestic setting.

In cases where such narrative aids are absent, one must apply on the codes using the body. The two commonest forms are '*hand around neck or shoulder*' and '*hand around waist*', Codes 6 and 7 respectively. It is important to note that these classifications require the woman to have her hands either folded or hanging down by her side. This suggests non-reciprocation and again gives a degree of passivity to the embodied position. By positioning the arm around the neck or waist, one is following the custom of holding on to one's personal possessions in public so they do not go astray. '*Held protectively*' refers to those images where the demarcation of containment is made in other ways. Usually, these are supported by a narrative where the public arena is perceived to be a dangerous place for the female, and thus the male must continually touch or stand in front of his companion, or shield her, for example. This can be seen in the ways that politicians conduct their wives through public space and was a particular favourite of John Major, although he was/is not alone.

The next pair refers to who is doing the embracing and what they are embracing, and refers specifically to what Goffman describes as the child-like 'snuggling' women do when cuddling men.

Goffman describes it as child-like because it gives the appearance of the female seeking protection, but also the comfort and re-assurance a child receives from its parent’s body and size. Piloting noted that this was applied to the product so that the product afforded comfort as part of its appeal. Again this code has been operationalised to be potentially coded to both male and female models. Thus, Codes 10 and 11, ‘*embracing other/obj*’ and ‘*emracED by other/obj*’, traces who embraces in an attempt to trace those occasions when women are able to embrace and empower the product or other. ‘*Other*’ is used for those cases that were unanticipated.

Q14 TITILATION: Referring to the titilation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By ‘reveal’ I mean that the clothing is lifted or moved or cut to draw attention to and overtly sexualise that part of the body which would conventionally be concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms etc., which are used to hide or conceal breasts and/or genitals.

non-sexualisation	1	underwear	10
fully dressed	2	see-through clothing	11
reveal shoulder	3	covered towel	12
reveal stomach/hip bone	4	naked self-concealment	13
reveal upper chest	5	naked except commodity	14
reveal thigh	6	naked upper chest	15
reveal/accentuate breast	7	fully naked	16
flies up/down	8	other	17
getting dressed	9		

Includes some preprogrammed exclusions: Q9 = 5. This automatically excludes 63 cases.

Q14 = Q41: code 8 = 15, code 9 = codes 8, 9,11,12,13,14,16

This variable seeks to explore how the sex of the model affects what parts of the body are eroticised as well as whether the sex of the model affects the degree to which the body is fetishised. The variables contain an implicit scale of degree beginning with non-sexualisation where there is no visible markings to make the body sexy (although the bodies always remain sexed) through to complete nakedness or naked self-concealment. Nakedness is interpreted as being an extreme form of sexualisation both through the revelation of the flesh and the subjugation to the product. This is a complex variable as it hits at the heart of the multiplicity of the body. It is possible to reveal various parts of the body simultaneously. Therefore there are very few ways in which the variable could be tackled. Note that while there is an analytic scale implicit in this variable, it is not statistically testable.

‘*Non-sexualisation*’ refers to those images that have no visible codings of sexiness. The models must be fully clothed with no flesh being revealed. It is likely that there are no visible signs that the model seeks to incite the viewer by pouting, licking the lips, staring up through the eyebrows

especially if the head is slightly tilted. Conversely, one would expect the mouth to be still as well as the eyes looking forward. ‘*Fully dressed*’, Code 2, refers to those bodies where the sexualisation is either due to a facial expression like those listed above, or because the flesh of the body is being revealed in some way. The revealing of the flesh has been located to five key areas of the body. These tally with the commonly understood erogenous zones of the Western body. They are: revealing the shoulder, revealing the stomach and/or hip bone, revealing the upper chest, revealing the thigh, and revealing or accentuating the breast. The means through which Codes 2 to 7 are represented in the image are varied but follow common-sense expectations. Thus, revealing the breast is a more detailed version of revealing the chest and is generally achieved through having a shirt loosely buttoned. Alternatively, the chest in general could be revealed by the model getting undressed or dressed. Likewise, the revelation of the thigh is dependent upon the skirt being blown, or the ways that the model is being seated, especially with shorts on, for example. The means by which the flesh is revealed is not the particular focus; rather this variable seeks to address mainly what is being revealed.

Not until one comes to more extreme means through which the body is sexualised does one find excessive visibility of flesh. Code 8, ‘*flies up/down*’, and code 9, ‘*getting dressed*’, refer to the specific means by which the genital area can be focused upon, without using explicitly soft porn or page 3-type codes. They draw directly from Moore’s paper where she argues that one of the shifts taking place in the codification of the male body is catching him dressing, as for example in the now infamous mass-audience Levis 501 advertisement where Nick Cayman undresses explicitly in an almost identical way to a strip tease. Additionally, there is the extensive use of highly sexualised bodies to sell underwear, hence Code 10. These sorts of products have extensively used the naked body beautiful. These images often use the mundanity of underwear as a means to sell through explicitly sexualised images. Code 11, ‘*see-through clothing*’, traces those items of clothing that explicitly objectify the body. This, along with underwear, is the most unproblematic example of the way fashion as an industry is exploitative of people’s bodies and images for financial gain. Code 12, ‘*covered towel*’, refers to those images where bathroom scenes are used as a means to stage the body within a naturalistic setting, but one that also allows for the legitimate exposure of flesh. Cologne advertisements in particular use narcissistic grooming scenes as a means to reveal the flesh of the body beautiful. Again this has been drawn directly from Moore’s article where she argues that “it is now possible to represent the male body as a pleasurable object on condition that this pleasure can be contained within a narcissistic/autoerotic discourse.”¹³⁰ It is from the extensive use of these sorts of code that some core data will be drawn. Is this something that differs explicitly between men and women now? And if this is no longer the case, what sorts of empirical problems does this pose Screen theory and other feminist critiques?

Q15 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is touching whom, especially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 corresponds to cases where the hand is active but not touching anyone.

¹³⁰ Moore, S. (1988) ‘Here’s Looking at You, Kid!’ in Gamman, M., Marshment, L. (Ed) *The Female Gaze*. Women’s Press, London.

touching own body	1	touching commodity	6
touching man's body	2	hand is active/not touching	7
touching woman's body	3	no touch/neutral	8
own and man's	4	other	9
own and woman's	5		

Q15 = Q31: q9 = 5,7 and q15 = 6. This has the impact of removing 97 cases automatically.

Q15 = Q31: code 2 = 2, 3; code 3 = codes 4, 5; code 4 = code 6; code 5 = codes 7, 8; code 6 = code 9.

Code 1, *‘touching own body’*, is straightforward and refers to all parts of the body. Codes 2 and 3, *‘touching a man’s body’*, refer to those images where a male or female touches any part of the male model’s body. Conversely, *‘touching a woman’s body’* refers to those cases where the male or female is touching the woman’s body. This allows a number of aspects to be traced. Firstly, it traces the extent to which heterosexual couples are visually encoded or determined through the seal of a touch, as well as whether this is entirely secured through the feminine. Additionally, it can be identified whether single sex couples are shown to be touching, and therefore potentially making the ‘relationship’ between them more explicit. This has a specific gender divide. Firstly, it examines the extent to which males alone are allowed to touch and whether this still invokes the homoerotic and therefore must be repressed between straight men. Conversely, it also allows us, on those occasions where women are touching, to trace the extent to which an element of the homoerotic surfaces and whether it is repressed through the presumed asexualness or sexual passivity of heterosexual women.

Code 6, *‘touching commodity’*, is self-explanatory. Code 7, *‘hand is active/not touching’*, refers to those cases where the hand is visible within the frame and is active in some way but not touching. For example, the fist could be clenched, the hand could be held closed as a result of a sporting activity or used to maintain balance. Additionally, the hands are used to stage a stylistic pose and thus can be used to form impressions like holding a pretend gun, for example. Code 8, *‘no touch/neutral’*, refers to those images where the hand is included in the frame of the images but is at rest and not holding anything. Examples where this code would be used are cases where the hands are at rest and the arms hang loosely beside the body. *‘Other’* refers to those cases that do not apply to any of the above.

Q16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specify what is being touched, which again feeds back to notions concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when ‘both hands’ is coded, this means that both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means either that one hand or arm is concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.

Q16A ABANDONED – Adds nothing to the analysis.

one hand		1
both hands		2

Q16B

hand on/through hair		3	hand forcing ribs forward		13
hand on hip(s)		4	clenched fists		14
hand on leg(s)		5	hand at rest		15
hand on torso		6	leaning on		16
hand on face		7	holding hands		17
hand on neck		8	neutrally touching OWN body		18
hand on bum		9	holding on		19
hand on breasts		10	hands covered		20
hand on genitals		11	other		23
hand behind back		12			

This variable includes the automatic exclusions Q9 = (5,7) and Q15 = (6,7,8). This totals 328 cases unaffected.

Resultant amalgamations: Q16 = Q38: codes 9 = 15, 10 = 16, 11 = 16, 13 = 19, 14 = 8-13, 22, 23.

This variable seeks to break down into greater detail exactly what parts of the body are touched, and to what extent those postures and positions are gender differentiated. This provides a means through which the areas available to touch, and by whom, can be traced. It allows one to identify which areas of the body are barred to one sex, but available to feel and touch to the other sex. The underlying theme being traced here refers to the convention that women are able to touch much more than men. On a more extreme level, women can treat their own bodies as objects. These objects can be caressed and stroked so that the reassuring warmth and pleasure that is gained from women’s bodies is also experienced from the woman’s own body. It is a pleasure that is gained from women’s objectification.

Codes 1 and 2, ‘one hand’ and ‘both hands’, refer to whether the hands are doing the same thing or different things. The relationship between these two aspects does not relate directly to the debate concerning the association of the feminine with the tactile. Rather, it is a means through which the visual symmetry can be traced. To have both hands doing the same thing conveys within the image a simplicity through symmetry. Conversely, having the hands doing different things makes the image busier and tends to make it more active, since there is actually more going on. The relationship between the symmetry and business can be grafted onto the notion of the active and the passive. Since the dichotomy has to be visually elaborated, it is dependent upon the possibilities and potential of

visualisations. Note that because there can potentially be hands touching two different objects or bodies or body parts at the same time, there may well be a considerably larger base number for this variable.

All of the categories are self-evident, with no exceptions. The various parts of the body have been coded. Code 3, '*hand through hair*', refers to those images where the hand touches the hair as if the hair is a source of pleasure and fulfilment for the model. These images usually depict the model with long and extremely glossy hair and, like the 'naturalistic mock up' referred to above, the hair will tend to be extremely shiny. The hair is given the connotation of being an object of pleasure and fulfilment for the model who touches it. It is almost as if the hair comforts the female as a cuddly toy would. The hair is desirable in itself. Psychoanalytically, it is considered that the presence of long hair on women rather than men, and the fact that women continually touch their hair, is a means through which disavowal is achieved for the male. Thus women with long hair are considered to be more attractive, and this is why they draw attention to their hair (see Flugel 1930; Millum 1975).

Code 4, '*hand on hips*', refers to those images that are using this conventionalised body posture to convey the notion of confidence. It suggests a certain impatience. However, this assertiveness could become sexualised by being combined with a phallic facial gesture. We can combine the two to trace exactly how the gesture is anchored. This must be borne in mind, as assertiveness will constitute a shift toward becoming a femme fatale. The pattern that is of interest is whether it is a very gendered gesture and, if so, how this assertiveness is combined with other gestures and whether it is supported or undermined. It refers to those images that are using this conventionalised body posture.

Code 5, '*hands on legs*', will be used to explore the extent to which legs are gendered through touch. Arguably, if the prevailing approaches are accurate descriptions of the masculine and the feminine, one would expect the legs to show up substantial gender differences. The legs have been a long-standing area of the female body that has been eroticised, and since hegemonic patterns have been organised to exclude women from this eroticism, to touch a woman must be part of an emotional relationship cast within romantic discourse. Thus part of the purpose of touching a woman's leg is to display the access that the man is presumed to have to the woman's body. Additionally, since access to the erotic zones of a woman's body is presumed to be open to men, part of the symbolism of touching the leg is that it secures the man's ownership of the woman in a similar way to putting his arm around her waist, as discussed above (Q13). Therefore it is likely that there is a higher frequency of men touching women's legs than vice versa. Conversely, if Code 6, '*hands on torso*', corresponds to expectation then one would expect the torso to be touched by the female model. This does two things in particular. Firstly, it confirms the male model's masculinity as sexually appealing, thereby connecting this appeal to the muscularity of the chest. Secondly, the comparable size of a man's chest to a woman's means that by touching the chest, visually it can appear as if she gleans protection from him. The combinations of their relative size visually encodes the promise of the power of male muscularity. It also confirms that women require such protection.

Codes 7 and 8, '*hand on face*' and '*hand on neck*', refer to the extent to which the face is made a central feature of the codification by leading the eye to it through the touch. According to the existing literature, especially the codes isolated by Goffman, the touching of the face is a distinctly

feminine gesture. The reason is that it moves to objectify the face by conferring its softness on to the softness of the commodity, for example the softness of the smell. If the man does touch the woman's face, this has the effect of conferring significant status differences between the sexes, because such a touch coming from a man is associated with fatherhood, and therefore relegates the female back to a childish status, as so many other codes do.

Code 9, 10 and 11 detail those images where the hand is touching either the bottom, the genitals or the breast of the model. This variable traces to what extent these are considered areas available to touch equally by both sexes or are gender divided. One would expect this to follow a strict pattern of gender difference, especially in the extent to which men would touch these areas considerably more often than women as part of their display of active sexuality.

Code 12, '*hand behind back*', is self-explanatory. It is being interpreted here as part of the ongoing codifications that remove activity from the frame. Code 14, '*clenched fists*', seeks to trace whether hyper-masculine poses are still being widely applied, and whether this is being used as a means to portray masculinity in a surreal and stylistic setting by women.

Code 15, '*hand at rest*', is a neutral hand pose and refers to the sorts of ways the hands are left when not in use. One usually either lets them hang down by one's side, or leaves them flopped or resting in the lap. Henley (1997; 1981) argues that men touch women much more than women touch men. This she based upon observation of intentional touch (Major and Williams 1980:20). If this is the case, one would expect to find neutral hand poses to be a predominately feminine gesture, as well as one that also defines the Other, namely the Black models. It conveys a certain passivity, since the hands are understood to be the major part of the body for skilful manipulation. Code 16, '*leaning on*', refers to those images where the body is being propped up by or leaning on the hands and has straight and locked arms. This form of posture has quite different meanings according to the gendered body. For example, this position is not in any way formal, and is often associated with a nonchalant and therefore male attitude. It has not conventionally been associated with femininity. Added to this is the fact that such a body posture draws attention to the breast by pushing the breast bone forward. Thus for the female body, it is not only 'speaking attitude' but it is also a sexualised position. It is therefore somewhat contradictory and may suggest a type of posture that is assertive and consciously sexy. Code 17, '*holding hands*', seeks to trace the frequency with which this heterosexual hand gesture is used. It is possible to see the extent to which this may have been adopted by same sex couples as a means to bring gay and lesbian relations into popular visual culture. Code 18, '*neutrally touching own body*', is a variable that seeks to trace the possible presence of the ideologically neutral gesture. One would use this code if the touch had the appearance of being a lackadaisical gesture, certainly pre-reflexive and possibly random. This sort of gesture is such that it falls outside those semiotic gestures that aid the classification of passivity or activity. Examples of this could be a hand that appears to have just fallen beside the chair. Code 19, '*holding on*', seeks merely to trace the extent to which men and women touch and hold onto things. One would expect, following Goffman, that this has a considerable gender difference as it has been a long standing convention to have women cling or hold on to a man's body for protection. This variable seeks to identify how much that is still the case. '*Hands covered*', Code 20, refers to those cases where the hand is concealed, for example by being placed in a pocket. Again

this is an informal gesture and suggests a degree of nonchalance that is not associated with passive femininity. ‘Aggressive gesture’, Code 21, seeks to trace the extent to which aggressive masculinity is present and if any cases of femininity as aggressive are ever represented. It is likely that if there are some cases they will be located within the stylistic photographic format. ‘Other’, Code 22, is included for unanticipated cases.

Q17 TYPE OF TOUCH: Relates to the way touch has often been genderised.

utilising	1	fondling	6
expert	2	caressing	7
grasping	3	embracing	8
manipulating	4	holding/neutral	9
fiddling	5	other	10

The pre-programmed exclusions are: Q9 = (5,7), Q15 = (8). Total number of cases excluded is 207.

This variable builds upon the preceding one, identifying how the object or body is touched. It introduces greater descriptive detail regarding the gendered nature of touch. The categories compiled develop those initially identified by Goffman. Goffman’s codifications of the visual forms of ritualisation pay particular attention to the child-like positions and gestures given to women in order to place them in a subordinate position relative to men. As alluded to above, the key distinction Goffman makes centres around the gentleness or weakness with which women touch things as opposed to men. The masculine form of touch could be described better as being more of a grip, firm and confident. Conversely, the feminine touch fondles or fiddles, never really directing or controlling that which is touched. Goffman almost regards it not as a touch, but rather as a caress, as stroking or petting. He argues that it has the effect of reducing all objects to a form of cuddly toy. This is very different to the atmosphere associated with the masculine touch, which is firm and confident and able.

Coding these descriptive categories must be accompanied by background and therefore is culturally embedded. For example, if one was to code the touch as ‘utilising’ one would use the common-sense meaning. The meaning is unproblematic in the sense that we use the word rather than problematise and ask how it comes to be meaningful. Additionally one can use the accompanying narrative. This is the most general category and refers to those cases where additional detail is excluded from the frame. Alternatively, if one was to code ‘expert’, Code 2, one would expect the model to be using a prop to demonstrate that the model was giving advice, teaching and so forth. There are likely to be other markers that establish the status that can act as a guide. Code 3, ‘grasping’, refers to those images where the hand is clutching the object roughly, with a great deal of strength. The touch ought to come from the palm of the hand with the fingers apart and tightened. The veins may even be visible. ‘Manipulating’, Code 4, refers to those images where the object is being applied to something. This ought to take place with the finger tips, but the object touched is functional. Again this kind of touch may in part be dependent upon the narrative of the image. If the conventions of touch are still in use, one would expect these forms of touch to be masculine and thus applied when featuring a male model.

The next cluster of codes can be thought of as the ‘feminine touch’ and the operationalisation of the codes has been heavily influenced by Goffman. Code 5, ‘*fiddling*’, refers to those images where the hand holds the object idly. Much of the touch is confined to fingertips, with the fingertips close together. It is touching for the sake of touching and without an aim, perhaps through boredom or habit. Again, this sort of fidgeting is associated with children, thereby lowering the status of the female model. Code 7, ‘*caressing*’, refers to those images where the fingers stroke the object that is being touched. This can be done with both the front and the back of the hand. The fingers will tend to be close together and lie flat on top of the object or body. There ought to be an appearance of lightness of touch. ‘*Embracing*’, Code 8, refers to those images where the object is cupped in the hands. For example, this could include those images where the perfume bottle is embraced within the cupped hands. The impact is to make the hands a part of the object or commodity. It reduces the hands to the ornamental.

Code 9, ‘*holding/neutral*’, refers to those images where the hand is not expressive in any way. For example, the hand holds onto a banister but it neither grasps it nor fingers nor fiddles with it. The hand uses it, and the hand gesture is almost absent. It is merely one of pragmatism and application. It is not being suggested that this is without significance and therefore signification. In cases where the hand is holding something neutrally and it can be identified as a woman’s hand, this has both a significance and a signification. It suggests something about the ideological traces circulating regarding ‘emphasised femininity’. Code 10, ‘*other*’, is included for unanticipated cases.

Q18 ARMS: The working definition of one and both arms is the same as hand.

one arm	1	resting on leg(s)	8
both arms	2	over the head	9
pointing up/outwards	3	hugging the body	10
extended up	4	arm in action	11
relaxed by side	5	in mock movement	12
folded	6	leaning	13
arms bent	7	other	14

There is one pre-programmed exclusion: Q9 = (5,7) . The base is therefore reduced by 72 counts.

Q18 = Q36: 1=1, 2=2, 3 =3, 4 = 5, 6= 7, 7 = 8, 8 = 10, 9 = 11, 10 = 21, 11 = 13, 12 = 4,9,14

This refers to the use and positioning of the arms within the frame. Part of its significance lies in the extent to which the female body is coded through symmetry and stillness compared to the male body. It also seeks to examine the extent to which the body is used actively and framed through movement. The ‘feminine as passive’ is visually coded through lack of movement, particularly within the public domain. Conversely therefore, it is possible to associate active, moving bodies with masculine codes. Physicalness has been conventionally applied to male bodies. Most of the arm positions selected are a result of piloting, and have been drawn predominantly from naturalistic body

postures. The forms of body postures relate in various ways to the negotiating of space, the occupancy of space and how, through the positions of the arms, the space can become sexualised.

Codes 1 and 2 examine whether the arms are used to achieve a symmetry of image or whether the images tend to be more complex by varying the activity of the arms. This is not specifically concerned with gender difference, but it may prove important regarding the extent of the codification that women's bodies undergo compared with men's. This is not overtly connected with gender. However, part of the existing debates concerns the objectification of the woman's body through display, of which a still, symmetrical, almost unlined body forms a part.

Code 3, '*pointing up/outwards*', refers to those images where the arms are sticking up in the air and above the head or out into space, away from the body. This classifies all those positions that may be framed as a result of movement from dancing or sport. It can either be used as a naturalistic pose or as a stylisation. By combining this variable with photographic style it is possible to identify whether the images that seek to 'reflect real life' tend to use less movement of the body, so that those images that seek to define their style against this prevailing position adopt movement. Code 4, '*relaxed by side*', refers to the arm position at rest when the body is culturally defined as being in its 'natural biological state'. It is considered the most neutral position for the arms to adopt. It would again suggest changes to the nature of the dominant ideological patterns if this proved to be a) a frequently used pose and b) equally coded upon male and female bodies. '*Arms folded*', Code 5, is regarded as a closed gesture rather than an open one because it prohibits the possibility of other gesticulations. It can be used in two distinct ways, depending upon the additional information. It can be either used as a means of being aloof, particularly when standing, or as a barrier or protection, especially if accompanied by other codes of a closed body. As with many of the other preceding codes, the issue of the gesture's specific meaning is not central to the coding process at this point. The differing contexts that affect the meaning assigned can be ascertained through cross-tabulation of the data.

'*Arms bent*', Code 6, refers to those images where the arm is bent, producing an angle at the elbow. This is also considered a neutral body movement and is not considered to be gendered. Thus, if there is a high frequency of this code, again it would seem to suggest that there has been a shift in the hegemonic formations of patriarchy. '*Resting on legs*', Code 7, refers to those cases where the arms are lying or resting on the lap. There is no activity and the hands are relaxed with a slight bend in the fingers. There ought to be a floppy appearance to both arms and hands. Code 8, '*over the head*', refers to those cases where the arms have been held up, with the arms bent so that they close over the head. This use of the arms has the effect of revealing the armpit and thereby sexualising the body. Code 9, '*hugging the body*', refers to those images where the arms are wrapped around the body. Again this posture relates to what Goffman describes as the child-like poses in which women are depicted. Additionally, the gesture of hugging the body is one means whereby the objectified body is used in its objectified form by the woman herself. Thus, the body is a source of pleasure for her as it would be for another. '*Arm in action*' refers to those images where the arms are framed in movement. This code is to be applied when the action that has been framed is a 'realistic one'. By this I mean that it is not difficult to envisage doing the movement in the life-world as part of the activity. Conversely, Code 11, '*in mock movement*', refers to those cases where the movement that has been photographed is a pretend action. It

is a sort of clowning. It can be considered as a mock up of the already hyper reality. ‘*Leaning*’ refers to those images where the arms are being used to prop up the torso. Potentially, this has a slightly different connotation if used by the male or female, in that the act of leaning on the arms can be sexualised by drawing more attention to the already accentuated breast. Conversely, assuming that there is an absence of other codes that undermine this, the posture could be considered an occasion of hegemonic masculinity in that it opens the chest up and therefore leaves it open to attack. The same could also be said for the female, thereby making any sexualisation features present part of the codification of the femme fatale. Code 13 is ‘*other*’.

Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to single and both legs.

Q19A ABANDONED: Does not add anything to the analysis.

one leg		1
both legs		2

Q19B

open when seated		3	bent fully at the knee		13
closed when seated		4	extended outwards		14
open when lying down		5	running		15
closed when lying down		6	walking		16
crossed and pulled in		7	pretend movement		17
crossed and extended					
outward		8	standing open		18
astride		9	standing closed		19
intertwined with obj/other		10	kneeling		20
knee slightly bent point					
forward		11	other		21
knee bent sideways		12			

There are a number of pre-programmed exclusions: Q9 = (2,4,5,6). This automatically removes 274 counts.

Q19 = Q35: 5 = 7, 6 = 9, 7 = 11, 8 = 12, 9 = 13, 10 = 14, 11 = 16, 12 = 17, 13 = 21, 14 = 22, 15 = 5,6,8,10,15,18,19,20,23,24

Codes 1 and 2, ‘*one leg*’ and ‘*both legs*’, again refer to the notion of the symmetry of the body as defined above in Q18. Code 3, ‘*open when seated*’, refers to those images where the body is seated but the legs are apart, therefore the knees must not be touching. The knees ought to be separated so that

the distance between them is greater than the width of the hips. Conversely, Code 4, '*closed when seated*', refers to those images where the body is seated and the legs are closed, or close together. If the knees are not quite touching, they must be close enough to be the same width as the torso. The meanings that surround these postures connect with two elements. Firstly, to sit with the legs apart is to extend the limbs into space, occupying it and imposing the body onto it. This has not been a feature of femininity as historically understood. Also, the posture takes on a moral dimension for it is said that for women to sit with their legs apart invites sexual advances and the condemnation that comes with them. To sit with the legs apart is immodest since it entertains the possibility of revealing the thigh or genitalia, thereby rendering the woman a tart, femme fatale or slut. Thus, it is necessary to trace the extent to which those cases, if any, of a woman sitting with her legs open fell outside the non-sexualisation category.

Codes 5 and 6, '*open when lying down*' and '*closed when lying down*', are self-explanatory and use the same pointers for identification as Codes 3 and 4. Goffman noted that the predominance of women featured lying down was another visual codification whereby their low status compared with men could be confirmed. In addition, it has very close associations with sexual intercourse. Lying down has been a regular pose used in porn. Thus, this posture is marked very heavily by the gender of embodiment. It is also the case that the passivity of the body suggested by the body position adds to the convention that women cannot actively deploy their bodies effectively. Goffman has connected this to the child status with which women are coded. It is considered here that if there is a high frequency of women lying down and with their legs open, possibly not wearing much clothing, then this is an extremely patriarchal image. Code 7, '*legs crossed and pulled in*', refers to the sitting position that children use in school. Once again, Goffman's notion of the childishness of hegemonic patterns of femininity could well come into effect in this posture. The low status of the sitting position is also associated with the fact that one would tend to sit in this way if one were sitting on the ground. This can be placed in opposition to Code 8, '*crossed and/or extended*', where the legs are stretched out. This seems to suggest that the person is at ease with their environment and confident. Again, such obvious occupation of space is something that has been associated with the embodiment of masculinity. '*Astride*', Code 8, is self-explanatory and is also suggestive of someone confident and at ease with their environment. Consequently, one would expect that the male body be marked by these codes. Plus it goes against the convention of associating femininity with physical stillness.

'*Knee slightly bent forward*' is identified in the following way: one of the legs must be straight, with no bend at the knee. The other leg will have a slight bend at the knee which has the effect of lowering the hip on that side of the body. This emphasises both the hips and the bottom area. It also draws attention to the legs. It is a classic pose and has often been used when a woman wants to entice and incite sexual desire. The sexiness of the pose has been added to by being used when standing in doorways. This acts as a kind of frame for the pose. This pose has been used almost exclusively on women, and correspondingly one would expect there to be marked difference in its use here. '*Knee bent sideways*', Code 10, is a variation on the above code. However, having turned the knee outwards, more attention is given to the leg and more of the thigh is potentially revealed.

‘Fully bent at the knee’, Code 11, is basically the same as squatting. The body ought to be lower than it would be if it was standing, with the knees nearer the face. ‘Running’, Code 12, is self-explanatory, as is ‘walking’, Code 11. One would expect these to be used to photograph men more than women because of the action that is necessarily implied. ‘Pretend movement’, Code 13, is the same as the ‘pretend arm movement’ definition above. An example could be a pretend karate kick. ‘Standing open’ and ‘standing closed’ refer to the most basic body stance. Those cases coded as standing closed must have the knees either touching or very close together. Conversely, legs that are coded as being apart must have quite a large space between the knees. The model must be standing still. These codes are taken to be relatively neutral postures that are not widely used in the visualisations of gender difference. It is therefore expected that this will not be a particularly frequent posture, but any cases that are identified will tend to apply to the male body, since women are positioned lower than men, by being seated for example. ‘Kneeling’ is self-explanatory. It is a highly ritualised means to convey deference. However, its associations with courtly behaviour or religious genuflection suggest that this will be a masculine posture, but performed mostly to other men. The variable also includes ‘other’.

HEAD: Head position

head back	1	head tilted to side	7
head down	2	head hidden	8
head straight ahead	3	back of head	9
head turning away	4	head pushed forward	10
turning towards camera	5	other	11
head in profile	6		

There is a pre-programmed exclusion: Q9 = 3,6,7. This eliminates 20 cases.

Q20 = Q42: 1 =1, 2 =2, 3 =3, 4 =4, 5 =5, 6 =6, 7 =8, 8 =10, 9 = 7,9,11

This variable addresses the direction of the face and the position of the head. This is of central importance, as it is fundamental to determining the relationship of the body posture to the sorts of expressions commanded by the facial area. The position of the head not only establishes certain limits to the direction of the gaze, but can also determine the hierarchical relationships between the viewer and the model. Thus to have the head looking down is to impart a sense of the model’s deference and respect to a higher authority. To turn away from the viewer’s gaze suggests modesty and coyness. The direction of the head position is a relatively common-sense means through which certain status relationships can be coded in relatively indisputable terms. To stare directly into another’s eyes is assertive, whereas to turn away from the gaze, to avoid the gaze in this way, is reactive. Head on, direct facial and eye contact are regarded as the most prominent means through which autonomy is asserted facially. Conversely then, to turn away, to avert the gaze, is seen as reactive and a means through which that person is defined by others.

The definitions of this variable are relatively straightforward. It does not employ any unusual features that contravene common-sense understandings. Therefore, there should be little need for clarification regarding the direction and position of the head. Code 1, *'head back'*, refers to those cases where the head has been allowed to flop back against the neck. Consequently, the chin will be pointing upwards, and there will be large amounts of the neck showing. It is the position adopted when one wants to look straight upwards to the sky. This position is not expected to be frequent. Any use of this position is expected to form part of the image-maker's bid to establish an anti-realist image. One would not expect there to be any eye contact made. If the head is described as *'head down'*, Code 2, one would expect the viewer to be able to see the crown of the head. Much of the face is concealed as a result, and the chin ought to be touching the neck or thereabouts. *'Head straight ahead'* refers to those images where the head is facing directly forwards. Both eyes are facing forward, both ears are equally visible. The head should be fully upright. The chin should not be turned towards either shoulder in any way.

'Head turning away', Code 4, is coded for those cases where the body is predominantly facing forward, the shoulders may be twisted slightly, much of the side of the neck is visible, as is the side of the head. One would expect to be able to see one ear. The meaning of this turn can best be secured when considered in conjunction with the direction of the gaze. If the eyes are turning away also, one would conventionally accept this as being the response of someone who wishes to avoid the viewer's gaze. However, if the eyes are looking toward the viewer, it is much more ambiguous because it suggests that the model is looking but contravening the conventions or looking against the grain. *'Turning towards camera'* refers to those images where the body, particularly the shoulders, are twisting towards the position of the camera. Thus the hips would tend to be facing in the opposite direction, causing the torso to twist. Additionally, one would expect the eyes to be looking in the direction toward which the body is turning. Therefore, if the body is turning toward the camera, one would expect the eyes to also be looking in that direction. One would use this code too if the head movement is introducing a greater percentage of the face. If it is the case that more of the face is being concealed through the movement, then one would use Code 4. *'Profile'* is self-explanatory. The margin for the codification comes when both eyes can be seen. If this is the case then one would code it as either twisting away or towards, depending on the other features mentioned above. One would expect this code to be a feminine one, for it both removes the model from the possibility of engaging in eye contact with the viewer, and has the impact upon the face of rendering it artifice. The head becomes statuesque, still, objectified.

'Head hidden' refers to those images where the head is concealed in some way. It may be concealed under a hat, hair or a towel etc. The *'back of head'* is self-explanatory, and as a result there ought to be no facial features visible. Both these variables have been theoretically conceived as being extremely objectifying poses, since there is no possibility of asserting the personhood of the model, no means through which to facially engage or respond to the narrative set up. It is a visual way of blocking the models' narrative from the space in which they have been located. Similarly the child in the classroom is made to turn their back and face away. It removes the person's possibility to engage. It also has the effect of making the person vulnerable to the events or activities that are taking place

‘behind their back’, as they are unable to see what is going on. Code 10, ‘*head pushed forward*’, is not expected to be a common pose, but is potentially a head position nevertheless and could be used as an anti-naturalistic code. It is identified by the presence of the chin being positioned away from the neck. Code 11 is ‘*Other*’.

Q21 MOUTH: Extends the issue of the fetishisation of the body. The mouth is central.

Q21A

mouth closed	I	1	mouth open	II	3
mouth semi-open	II	2			

Q21B

expressionless	II	4	sulking	II	12
smiling	II	5	snarling	II	13
laughing	II	6	phallic mouth/object	II	14
smirking	II	7	finger naive	II	15
half smiling	II	8	finger anxious	II	17
pouting	II	9	clenched jaw	II	18
licking lips	I	10	tongue sticking out	II	19
kissing		11	other	II	20

There are some pre-programmed exclusions: Q9 = (3,6,7) Q20 = (8,9). This eliminates 47 cases.

Q21 = Q40: 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7,8 8=9, 9=12,13, 10=14,15, 11=10,11,16,17,18,19,20

The mouth has been identified as being critical to the overall evaluation of the sexualisation process, since the mouth is a central erogenous zone. The expression of the mouth can also be a central focus whereby the other erotic features that may be present on the body are negated, or it can at least establish contradiction to or conflict with the general embodiment. This can be done through either being expressionless or adopting an assertive or aggressive gesticulation while at the same time revealing flesh. Clearly, this is one of the areas where one would expect there to be a marked difference in the gendered expression. One would expect a high prevalence of ‘phallic mouth’ expressions for those images that seek to adopt and codify the body as a femme fatale. Conversely, one would expect there to be a high frequency of expressions that seek to engage the viewer, thereby establishing emphasised femininity. By seeking to engage the viewer/other, the female is responding to the power difference in social interaction whereby she must entice, engage and respond to please the subject, and by implication therefore please the normative male subject. One would expect the male models to have a very low frequency of expressions that are overtly sexual. This code can be a valuable source of data through which it is possible to explore the extent to which one can talk about feminised male bodies.

Q21A seeks to identify whether the mouth is simply open or closed. This has an effect upon the possible mouth expressions used and when. Code 1, '*mouth closed*', refers to all those images where the mouth is firmly shut with the lips touching. Code 2, '*mouth semi-open*', refers to those images where the lips are slightly parted. It may be possible to see the tips of the teeth. It is also possible to see the tip of the tongue in the mouth. The inside of the mouth may be slightly visible. If this is the case, the back of the mouth will be concealed through the lack of light that can penetrate into the throat. Code 3 is '*mouth open*', and designates those images where the model's mouth is fully open. One ought to be able to see all of the teeth and tongue. Also, the inside of the mouth ought to be visible. It is debatable as to which of these codes is the one most open to sexualisation. I have elected to take mouth closed as the least sexual. The sexualness of the other two codes will depend upon what other sorts of codes are taking place. For example, having the mouth semi-open when the eyes are looking up at the viewer through the eyebrows is conventionally taken as being more sexual than if the mouth were to be fully open. Conversely however, if the mouth is fully open with a phallic object close by, one could reasonably argue that this is more sexualised than if the mouth were semi-open. Thus, these codes are considered to be potentially equally sexualised.

Q21B identifies in more detail the sorts of expressions that are predominantly used and on whom. Code 4, '*expressionless*', refers to those images where there is no particular expression used at all. There is no noticeable evidence of any of the muscles contracting to produce a smile or a grimace. The lips are not being pushed forward to produce a pout. This non-expression results in there being a stillness to the mouth area. There should not be too much attention paid to the code variable. It is not being suggested here that an expressionless mouth is not 'expressive'. It is just that the label aims to denote those times when the mouth has not adopted a particular expression, like smiling or laughing and so on. It is understood here that adopting a non-expressive facial gesture is to express a certain distance or disengagement from the viewer. There is no attempt to entice the viewer or to turn the viewer on. It suggests a certain emotional neutrality or ascetic disposition, since the absence of another expression also means the absence of a mood expressed. Smiling means one is happy, for example. An example of an expressionless mouth as a form of expression is photographs from the turn of the century. In these photographs, the subjects rarely smile and this conveys a certain formality to the proceedings. It is not the case that the same formality is conveyed now, especially considering the naturalistic mock of feminine pleasure that has been so clearly identified. Here the non-expression is expressive by virtue of the absence of the incessant need for women to be rapturous in advertisements. Therefore, in the context of contemporary fashion advertising conventions, one would expect this emotional withdrawal to be something that signifies the masculine.

Code 5 is '*smiling*' and is used as commonly understood. Thus one would expect the ends of the mouth to be turning upwards. It is not necessarily the case that the teeth are visible, but they will tend to be so if the person is modelling 'happiness'. Code 6 is '*laughing*' and in these cases one would expect the teeth to be fully visible. Thus one would expect there to be higher frequency of laughing when the mouth is open. '*Smirking*', Code 7, refers to those cases where the model is laughing through their smile. '*Half smiling*', Code 8, refers to those images where there are traces of what could become a smile. This would be associated with less enthusiasm and greater reticence. Code 9, '*pouting*', refers

to those images where the lips are puckered together to make them appear full and more fleshy. Puckering the lips in this way is a key expression used to sexualise the mouth. This classic pose has been identified as one way through which the female body has been encoded to become an erotic and pleasing object to the viewer, and remains so. '*Licking lips*' refers to those occasions when the tongue is used to increase the sexualisation of the mouth. It draws the viewer's attention to the mouth and the tongue, both of which are highly sexually charged parts of the body, but it reconfirms this association by introducing the moistness of the mouth. Thus it is considered here to be a highly objectifying codification, especially if coupled with '*looking being looked at*' defined below. '*Kissing*' is taken to mean different things according to the relationship of who is doing the kissing, who is kissed or whether it is the result of mutual embrace. This relationship can be identified by cross-tabulating with Q12 as defined above. However, it is expected here that most of the occasions when the model is kissing will be examples of the visual display of the heterosexist imperative. The kiss is therefore bound both by the sexual normalisation that it implies and by the hierarchical essence of 'romantic relationships'. For example, some of these power relationships could be visually displayed by the male kissing the female upon the head, as a parent kisses a child. This sort of visualisation is a development of Goffman's notion of the 'feminine as childish'. Alternatively, it could be the case that the female is kissing the male; if so, it would be interesting to identify the various codes used to establish this as part and parcel of general sexual servicing by women. For example, if the kiss is also accompanied by the gesture of cuddling, or holding onto the male for physical support.

Code 12, '*sulking*', is a broad category to include all those facial expressions where the model is in a bad mood, etc. One would expect the mouth to be twisted, or turning down. This has the effect of tightening the muscles on either side of the chin. It is likely too that the eyes are turned away and therefore seeking to 'avoid eye contact'. '*Snarling*' is an expression where the model has pulled one lip up at the side, thereby making the nostril flare. This is a variation on the possible expressions of aggression and not just non-engagement, but rather active withdrawal from the visual relationship with the viewer. One would not expect these to be widely used within the naturalistic mock-up frame. However, they may well be used to mobilise the face for a stylistic, anti-realistic format. If one follows the analyses under scrutiny here, this format should not affect the deployment of such expressions as a masculine position, and therefore applied to the male model.

'*Phallic mouth*', Code 14, is seeking to examine the extent to which this pornographic code has been assimilated into wider cultural production. Thus the mouth symbolises the act of fellatio. This code is a development of the pout. The pornographic code can be compounded through the use of an object as a substitute phallus. Thus Code 15 is '*phallic mouth with object*'. If this is being used on the male model, this may well suggest that there has been a decrease in the almost obsessive need to assert hegemonic masculinity, for such a sexualisation upon the male body surely introduces the homoerotic into the public visual domain. '*Finger naive*', Code 16, references Goffman's observation that the hands have been a decisive way through which the passivity and childishness of femininity has been conveyed. Goffman identified that the tip of the finger was often placed into the mouth and sucked, or surrounded by the lips. He argues that this effectively reduces the woman to the status of the child because of the basic childishness of the action. Note that one would use this code for such an image if

the finger was in combination with a coy facial expression. If it is accompanied by a deep look through the eyebrows, or a girlie dress with suspenders, one would classify it as Code 15. ‘*Finger anxious*’, Code 17, is an expression that must be accompanied with a frown. The combination of the two work to establish the finger as providing some sort of security. Also, part of its passivity stems from the fact that the person is unable to deal with the situation, and thus devoid of the skill of decision making. It is therefore fundamentally associated with the feminine. ‘*Clenched jaw*’ refers to those occasions where the muscle is seen to be taut and the mouth is firmly shut tight. It is an aggressive pose and suggests annoyance. Thus, working in combination with the visible muscle, one would expect this to be used extensively on the male. ‘*Tongue sticking out*’, Code 19, is an additional means through which the childishness of the model is ascertained. If accompanied with a pout, or the revelation of flesh, or the eyes looking up through the eyebrows, this code can also become sexualised. ‘*Heavily painted lips*’ seeks to trace those examples where the use of lipstick has been applied to sexualise the mouth. It must be very thick and pink or red in colour if it is to be coded thus. It would usually be accompanied by an excessive sheen. Code 21 is ‘*other*’.

Q22 SPECTATORIAL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mise-en-scene = an active relationship with the camera; the viewer = object of the model’s gaze. Code 2 = looking, but in a way that implicates the viewer within the narrative. Code 3 = no exchange between model and viewer and is thus more straightforwardly unproblematic.

public addressing viewer	1	private voyeur	3
narrative address	2	other	4

N/A = Q9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7. This excludes 31 cases automatically.

Spectatorial address is seeking specifically to capture the extent to which the mise-en-scene of the image combines with the positioning of the model in a frame and the viewer. It directly references the ways in which cultural studies, especially those informed by psychoanalysis, argue that passivity is both visually structured and negated if the model is male. This variable seeks to trace the possible exchange of looks that take place in this ‘realistic’ medium. It is directly referencing Mulvey’s arguments regarding the ways the visual form reflects both the patriarchal structuring of culture and the myth of representative realism.

The central means through which the codes are to be applied regards the exchange of looks, or lack of them. Thus for Code 1, ‘*public addressing viewer*’, one must have an exchange of looks whereby the model looks directly into the camera. This has the effect of positioning the viewer into the place of the camera. The gaze of the model is directed at the viewer regardless of where he or she positions themselves in relation to the image. To look at such an image is to engage with the model. The description of this gaze as active refers to the fact that the model makes the viewer look at him or her. Potentially, such an assertion can be minimised by making the expression one of enticement or

desire for the viewer. However, it could equally be one whereby the model appears to be the initiator, through their adoption of a gaze that makes the viewer an object in the exchange. This compares with what has been described as ‘*narrative address*’. Code 2 refers to those images where the viewer is implicated in the story being told. This is usually achieved by making the main axis of exchanged looks between one of the models and the viewer. For example, where the female model is looking into the camera and therefore at the viewer while also laughing at her boyfriend, thereby making the joke at his expense and between the viewer and model. The central protagonist in such a *mise-en-scene* is the female model since she commands the viewer’s gaze as well as duping her boyfriend. Code 3, ‘*private voyeur*’, refers to those images where the model is contained within the gaze of the viewer as well as being oblivious to it. Thus the relationship of the model to the viewer is one where the viewer can peer into the model’s ‘world’ free from the demands of reciprocal behaviour and free to see what they want. It is therefore a passive form of photographic framing, and as a result one would expect this to be much more prevalent when used to photograph women. If such a frame is used to represent men, it is usually accompanied by a gaze of the model that seeks to dispel or undermine the power dynamic. This is what Dyer refers to as the instabilities contained in images of men. In order to disavow the latent passivity of being the object of a gaze, the model is endowed with gestures to assert their activity, for example displaying their cerebral superiority over the female model by looking up to the heavens, thereby making the body inconsequential to their true being. Alternatively, argues Dyer, the male model can look off, thereby referring to an activity that is beyond the frame of reference of the viewer. To look off to the side is to demonstrate to the viewer that they are of no interest and of no consequence.¹³¹ Such a denigration of the female viewer is compounded by the use of muscle both as a means to signify the power of embodiment that the male body is synonymous with, as well as a means to shift the passivity back onto the viewer. Potentially, the extensive use of the voyeuristic gaze on men is such that it could suggest a shift in the extent to which the active/passive nexus of looking is gendered.

Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/passivity.

looking up	1	looking at other/obj	6
gazing out at viewer	2	looking straight ahead	7
looking down	3	eyes closed	8
looking away	4	other	9
staring out of photo frame	5		

N/A Q23 = Q9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7,10. This automatically excludes 47 cases.

This variable is concerned with tracing the direction of the gaze in terms of the position with the viewer. Eye contact, who can look at whom and when, is intensely reflective of the power relationships that determine and characterise interaction. Thus, if this is combined with the general

¹³¹ Dyer, R. (1992) ‘Don’t look now: the male pin-up’ in *The Sexual Subject: The Screen Reader*’ edited by Caughie, J. and Kuhn, A. Routledge, London. pp267.

composite of the look in the above variable, one will be able to see the extent to which the relations of looks are built around the active and passive nexus. For example, if there is an equal distribution of the voyeuristic pose because the model is looking down, then this would represent a considerable shift in the ways that gender is visually and expressively pinned to the dichotomy. If this is not the case then one needs to examine exactly what it means to be able to unequivocally identify the body as male and identify a variety of codes, some of which used to be the preserve of the feminine. The central coding rule that must be followed here is that all judgements made with regard to the direction of the gaze must be done so from the position of the viewer. It is the most consistent position with which to gauge the direction of the look. Secondly, it is the relationship of the gaze with the viewer that is of interest and importance. Again this draws us back to the attention that has been paid to the gaze in feminist psychoanalytic theory.

Code 1, '*looking up*', refers to those images where the model's eyes are looking upwards towards the sky. This tends to have the effect of making the person look up through their eyebrows. One ought to be able to see a little more of the bottom of the whites of their eyes. Code 2, '*gazing out at viewer*', refers to those images where the model is staring directly out of the photo frame at the viewer. This relationship of looks is achieved by making the model look into the lens of the camera. Consequently, the model will always be looking at the viewer no matter where the viewer stands in relation to the model. This gives the viewer a sense of being the object because no matter where they stand and look at the model, the model will always be establishing eye contact. Within the social relations that have existed, this conforms to the classic established and patriarchal relationships of looks. '*Looking down*' refers to all those models whose gaze is turned downwards towards the floor. The direction of the eyes will mean that the model is looking down, almost as if they are looking down the nose. Looking down has been associated with a number of passive positions with regard to the other subject. It has been associated both with shame, and with deference toward one's elder and better. Additionally, looking down has been associated as a means to avoid a gaze. Thus, if there is an insignificant gender difference here, this may indicate a substantial shift in the formations of an 'emphasised femininity'. '*Looking away*' refers to those cases where the eyes are looking in the opposite direction from that of the viewer's position. Thus for example, if the camera angle is from the left side, the model would be looking towards the right side. This code demonstrates clearly how the rule of the viewer's position is vital to the assignment of the codes.

'*Staring out of photo frame*', Code 5, is another eye position that can only be coded with regard to the viewer's position. The best way to assign this is to consider oneself as the viewer standing against the model's horizon. Thus the origin of the perspective is to be found in that fictional, visual world. The effect is to make the model's gaze appear to be fixed upon something in the distance. It appears as if the gaze goes over the viewer's head to something much more important beyond. '*Looking out at other/obj*' refers to those looks in which the viewer is both visually and narratively positioned as a voyeur. Effectively, what this achieves is to marginalise the significance of the viewer's gaze by making the narrative axis exist within the photo frame and between the signifying elements within the frame. Thus, the model's concern lies not with the viewer but with that upon which the model's gaze is resting. Piloting established this was a relatively infrequent code and as a result it was

decided not to differentiate between whether the object of the gaze was another model or a prop. ‘*Looking straight ahead*’, Code 7, refers to those images where the model is merely looking straight ahead of her. This takes two distinct forms. Firstly, if the head is not facing the point of view of the viewer, but is in profile for example, then the direction of the gaze would be straight ahead from the viewer’s position. Secondly, when the model looks into the camera directly, but is staring deeply so as to appear not to be aware of their surroundings, the implication then is that the viewer would also be glossed over as the model daydreams, being unable to concentrate and fix her gaze upon something in particular. ‘*Eyes closed*’, Code 8, applies according to common-sense rules. It is considered to be a passive form, since one is vulnerable to that which cannot be seen, as well as closed to signification regarding who or what the model is to the viewer. There can be very little performative potential if one has one’s eyes closed. ‘*Other*’ is Code 9.

Q24 EXPRESSIVE GAZE: Aims to add a more descriptive or qualitative dimension to the gaze.

authoritative		1	seductive		10
assertive		2	coy		11
staring		3	looking		12
other-worldly		4	frowning		13
dreaminess		5	turned away/shy		14
glancing		6	concealed		15
surprised		7	semi-concealed		16
raised eyebrows		8	sunglasses		17
looking being looked at		9	other		18

N/A Q24 = Q 9 = 3,6,7, Q20 = 7,10, Q23 = 8. This excludes 84 cases.

Q21 = Q40: 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8,9, 9=12,13, 10=14,15, 11=10,11,16,17,18,19,20

‘*Authoritative*’ refers to those occasions when the viewer is situated below the model regarding the camera position, and when the model tends to look down along their nose at the viewer. It has the effect of making the model appear haughty, or irritable regarding the meaninglessness or trivia of the activity. If the expression is secured through the camera position relative to the gaze, it must either be connected with the relative status position, or in command of action. On these sorts of occasions, the active masculine ought to come into play. Conversely, an ‘*assertive gaze*’, Code 2, will be one where the stare is held and is hard. There is a sort of gloss generated through the held eye expression, which is unresponsive to the imagined viewer in the room. Hence, the viewer is diegetically built into the frame which the model’s gaze is asserting himself or herself towards. There will tend to be few engaging gestures on the face or the body. The model does not seek to show interest or concern with the ‘outside world’ through expressive gestures. In addition, the model may well be employing other assertive body positions. ‘*Staring*’, Code 3, refers to those cases where the eyes stare somewhat

blankly into space. It is not necessarily directed at the viewer as one would expect with Codes 1 or 2, especially 1. The effect is to produce a glaze over the face in general and eyes in particular.

Code 4, *‘other worldly’*, refers directly to Dyer’s article where he delineates specific forms of codification that are effective in negating the objectification that the male model must undergo in pin-ups. He argued that by drawing upon the metaphorical convention of ‘up’ with the mind, the model tends to look up and out of the frame in order to thoroughly disengage from the ‘admiration’ received. Code 5, *‘dreaminess’*, connects to the sense of the model as mentally adrift. Thus the focus is in part suggested by the tension around the eyes which is lacking, as is any formality to the scene depicted. In particular, this code will often use the soft focus to assist in securing the notion of the daydream. Code 6, *‘glancing’*, refers to those images where the look is characterised by a rapid engagement. Therefore, the direction of glance will be staged so that it appears contrary to the direction of movement. This signals the brevity of the look. Code 7, *‘surprised’*, is classified by the combination of the narrative, as well as the tendency for the mouth to be open and for the eyebrows to be lifted so that the eyes appear bigger. This has been combined with the *‘raised eyebrows’*. Code 9, *‘looking being looked at’*, relates directly to Mulvey’s notion and to the presentation of the feminine that is consciously ordered according to the desires of the onlooker. Therefore, the look is one of response to the active and powerful gaze of the other. *‘Seductive’* is identified by the tendency for the model to look up and through their brow directly at the viewer. Therefore, the position of the camera and the viewer tends to be above the model in question. Often this is accompanied by a half smile or a closed mouth. Code 11 operates in the opposite way, in that the model will tend to have the head positioned down, but also at an angle which tends to turn the returned look back to the viewer while also looking up. Code 12 seeks to address those cases where the eyes do not appear to suggest an expression or disposition. In part, it is guided by an absence of muscle use in the face. It represents those occasions, which are rare, when the eyes do not appear to contribute to a meaning generated in the image. Code 13, *‘shy’*, is close to coy but the return look is less apparent. Here, the face is turning away and looking down so that no reciprocal exchange is present. *‘Frowning’* refers to those cases where the eyebrows are brought forward in disapproval. The last codes attend to those cases where the eyes are concealed, each suggesting or accomplishing a degree of anonymity.

Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an indication of the degree to which space is divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral, thus it is difficult to identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers that it would be difficult to say for example that the model is a working-class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph Lauren. Public min. means that it is a public space but nothing more can be read, and so with private min.

smoking	1	lovers sexual	12
drinking/bar	2	house chores	13
car/driving	3	comforting/care work	14
cafe/resturant	4	movement	15

washing/grooming	5	street	16
sport	6	bourgeois	17
partying	7	countryside	18
romantic scene	8	public min.	19
lovers' tiff	9	private min.	20
narcissistic - sexual	10	other	21
narcissistic - leisure	11		

The pre-programmed exclusions = Q8 = 3. Thus, 300 cases are automatically excluded.

Q25 = Q51: 1=2,4,7, 2=1,3,6, 3=8,9,12, 4=5,11, 5=16, 6=18, 7=20, 8=19, 9=10,13,14,17

The purpose of this variable was to add a generalised context within which the pose was taken, as well as to identify the extent to which the location of gender in space is still marked by gender difference. The object of this variable is not to examine the detailed significations and the relationships between these elements, for example, how they work to make us all instantly recognise this scene as a pub scene. The object is to examine the sorts of settings, which act as stage sets, are frequently used and in what sorts of space gender can be performed. The key difference to which this is referring is of course the public/private dichotomy. The location of gender within these domains has been identified within the feminist movement as one of the key areas through which patriarchal relations are maintained. As argued previously, it was one of the key successes of the massive number of content analyses conducted that they were able to repeatedly show the consistency with which the stereotypical, ideologically laden contexts were used. The consistency of results was such that it became very difficult to dispute the extent to which women were located within the private domain and, not only that, were submerged underneath the massive number of domestic props. The second significant staging that was identified was the extent to which women in these images had become synonymous with mothering. Conversely, men were regularly found within the public domain, particularly in work places. If women were in the public arena they were invariably supported and accompanied by a man. Another key difference between men and women photographed was that only men were staged with leisure activities that took place outside.

Goffman again confirmed the extent to which women were predominately located within the domestic sphere in a majority of the adverts he examined. Additionally, many of the images he examined were fashion advertisements. Clothes can be staged in almost any environment, since most occasions involve clothes at some point. This is because they have become a central resource for the presentation of self or the staging of self within the naturalistic mock-ups of the advertising industry. The central importance that Goffman's work plays here is in establishing that fashion images are not a block for staging the feminine within the private or domestic sphere.

However, from the piloting stage it became quite apparent that there was not the same proliferation of domestic contexts as had been identified before. It is because this was established early on that there are so few codes detailing a range of domestic situations. However, the possibility that the

piloting was inaccurate was taken into account. As a result, there are two distinctly feminine codes which are defined below. These have also been supported by a more general category that is used for those situations with some domestic prompts, for example, but which are marginal in their relationship to the model.

The other central contextualisation that has been explored here is that of the heterosexist imperative. Thus there are a number of narrative situations which directly draw upon the persuasiveness of heterosexuality within culture, as well as the extent to which these act as normalisations. Effectively, if these series of codes are cross-tabulated with the codes that identify who the models are photographed with, this gives a good indication of the sorts of general features that we are dealing with. The central proposition that is being presumed here is that while the single model may still be encoded with the heterosexual imperative, it is of a weaker kind compared to those images where the woman must always be standing, hugging, caressing the man, her protector. The premise remains that those images where a single woman is eroticised, without context and without prompts, provide the basis for far more open readings.

Some of the situations are not so much contexts or places, but rather classic presentations. Thus Code 1, '*smoking*', refers to those occasions where the man or woman is focused around the act of smoking. Part of the importance of smoking is that it has been a central means to draw attention to the mouth and to eroticise it as well. The cigarette has often been a phallic symbol and its extensive use, especially marked by gender difference, would demonstrate a persistence in the centrality of the mouth in sexualising women. Conversely, in most of the images where men are smoking, the cigarette is not near their mouths. On those occasions where the cigarette has been placed near the mouth, the above sub-variable of '*Phallic mouth with object*' will be coded. '*Drinking/bar*', Code 2, refers to all those cases where the stage is in the public arena of a bar. Again, if compared to those cases where the model occupies or withdraws from the space, this will aid the identification of the extent to which a) women are present in public bars at all, and b) if present, they are dependent upon the masculine to protect and secure their safety. Code 3, '*car/driving*', refers to those cases where the woman is subjugated to object. The car has been specifically drawn upon because it has been conventionally used as a phallic symbol with which to subjugate the female. This code also allows us to identify whether this symbol remains highly gendered in terms of who is photographed at the wheel, but in a much more extreme shift, the extent to which men undergo sexualisation via the car. It seeks to identify how some symbols may have been appropriated by gay imagery, and the extent to which it has infiltrated mainstream culture. '*Cafe/restaurant*', Code 4, is the first of the specific scenes that seek to identify the extent to which the heterosexist imperative is almost omnipresent. To eat with one's loved one is a classic and conventional form through which to frame patriarchal heterosexuality.

'*Washing/grooming*', Code 5, refers back to the semiotic analysis done by Moore and seeks to identify the extent to which such contexts have been applied to reveal the flesh of the male models. Additionally, it may show the extent to which this is also applied to women. It would be interesting to identify whether the direction of the gaze shifts the nature of the contextualisation. For example, the camera position could act as if it were a mirror so that the point of view of the viewer is to be directly voyeuristic. It is this sort of codification that marks the scenes with female models, compared to

naturalistic mock-ups where the male will be seen from an angle and thus a much weaker act of voyeurism.

'*Sport*', Code 6, refers to those occasions where the activity of the body is located within the construct of sport. This brings certain contours of the hegemonic construction of masculinity as being both about the skill to which the masculine body can be used and, equally as importantly, about the power that this activity encompasses. This is diametrically opposed to the forms of embodiment that are given over the feminine body. The feminine body has instead been associated with stillness, display cum self-objectification and weakness. The location of physical movement within this context brings into play a whole number of significations and associations that are beyond the scope of this project to decode. However, the central relevance here is that the central feature of hegemonic masculinity as physical prowess is brought into centre stage. Thus, if there are a number of images where it is the female that has been located within the context of sporting activity, as well as being located within naturalistic mock-up, this may signify a shift away from the dominance of the feminine as weak. It is probably unlikely to be the case that there are equal distributions, but it may be that the frequency has nevertheless grown.

'*Partying*' is again self-explanatory and is to be judged according to common-sense categorisation. Its inclusion is based upon the question of whether there has been a move toward groups. Its inclusion is partly to provide a context in which those group photographs can be contextualised.

Code 8, '*romantic scene*', refers to those images where the couple are located within a romantic context. Again only those images that deploy the commonest features conventional to the codification of romance are coded thus. These features include staring into each other's eyes, holding hands, and so on. Another central feature associated with the codification of romance is to have the female clinging onto the male by hugging his arm for example, and perhaps even leaning her head upon his shoulder. Again this traces the extent of the normalisation of heterosexuality, and the power in equalities inherent within this ideology. These images are not overtly sexual in nature, but rather establish an emotional pattern. Conversely, code 9, '*lovers' tiff*', refers to the alternative but related side of romance – the temporary break-up. Part of the conventional content of the break-up is the implicit resolution, the happy ending. Thus this scene is marked by the couples disagreeing, usually with the female being dismissed by the male. It is through her dismissal that her passivity is confirmed, as well as confirming the female as being more emotional. Therefore, part of the resolution entails the male coming to his senses and realising that she is after all what he wants. The resolution is marked by the male achieving what he wants, thereby making his happiness what the female wants. Thus his emotional state becomes the subject of her activity, simultaneously securing her passivity. Her contentment is dependent upon becoming the passive object of the man's desire.

The above two scenes differ from '*lovers/sexual*' in that this scene establishes a different relationship between the male and female because of the absence of the implied domestic bliss. The positioning of the body/bodies is much more explicitly sexual and will tend to 'borrow' codes from soft porn. Thus the wholesomeness of romance has been dropped. Part of what makes these images more overtly sexual is the fact that there is little other to the image than the sexual pleasure on display. Thus

it has a much greater narcissistic element to it. The object of the liaison is sexual gratification, not life-long happiness.

Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations there are, and to what extent the common-sense understandings within the academy concerning the body idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm the stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, I mean that the mode of representation of the female has taken on the conventions that have generally been considered masculine.

subject/object	11	1
activity/passivity	11	2
doer/done to and for	11	3
talker/listener	11	4
sprawled/draped	11	5
occupying/passing through	11	6
protector/protected	11	7
decision maker/decided for	11	8
professional/non-prof	11	9
manual/office	11	10
desirer/sexual object	11	11
subject/prostitute	11	12
subject/virgin	11	13
thinking mind/body	11	14
object/subject	11	15
passive/active	11	16
done to/doer	11	17
listener/talker	11	18
draped/sprawled	11	19
passing/occupying	11	20
decided/decision maker	11	21
non-prof./prof	11	22
body/thinking mind	11	23
sexual object/subject	11	24
non-stereotypical	11	25
conflicting	11	26
inversion	11	27
other	11	28

Q27 TIME: To allow for the comparison of the variables over time.

face 1985	11	1
face 1990	11	2
face 1995	11	3
i-d 1985	11	4
i-d 1990	11	5
i-d 1995	11	6
arena 1987	11	7
arena 1990	11	8
arena 1995	11	9
cosmo 1975	11	10
cosmo 1985	11	11
cosmo 1990	11	12
cosmo 1995	11	13

APPENDIX C

WHOLE NUMBERS INCLUDE FIGURES FROM 1975, 1985-95

Q1 Sex: Sex of the model(s).

female	374
male	315
androdynous	11
other	3

Q2 NUMBERS: This allows any analysis to relate the issue of how the idiom alters according to the number of models and the possible interaction between them. It is may also have an impact upon the narratives address.

single	440
all female	33
all male	25
mixed couples	126
crowd	72
other	6

Q3 ETHNIC: This variable attempts to link possible patterns in the representation of the body idiom and any ethnic group.

white	568
Black/Black Asian	123
other	10

Q4 ADVERT: Identifying what the advert is selling.

clothes	628
perfume	75

Q5 MODEL: This variable is concerned with the relationship between the commodity, the model and subjugation. The relationship is counted according to the first value. For example, if the model preceeds the object then the model is read as dominating the object.

model	607
model and obj	41
model and objs	1
model and group	0
object and model	40
objects and model	11
other	2

Q6 SPATIAL: This refers to how Q4 is spatially represented - higher and central being related to control and domination and lower and periphery being related to subjugation. Higher is supposed to relate to the models and above and below to relate to the object. The extent to which the model fills the picture space can also be related to domination. The greater the space taken by the model the lesser the model is subjugated.

dominates frame entirely	145
3/4	99
1/2	127
1/3	141
1/4	70
less 1/4	119

centre	364
off centre	248
perspective	365
non-perspective	276
in front of	67
level with	28
above	22
below	23
seated/on top of	50
underneath	7
behind	50
beside	79
opposite	9
periphery	39
other	8

Q7 CAMERA: This relates to how men and women have been traditionally been photographed - soft focus relating to dreaminess and passivity and hence femininity.

close up	140
medium shot	357
long shot	205
sharp focus	449
soft focus	203
out of focus	50
other	7

Q8 PHOTOGRAPHIC STYLE: This concerns the issue around 'realism' within visual representation. This will feed in later regarding what people actually do with the images that they know are not 'real'. Code 1 refers to the mock-up of everyday life which effectively renders it a stylisation; code 2 is pure style and its conventions are not about the representations of 'real life'; code 3 refers to whether the photographic background is blank.

naturalistic mock-up	212
stylistic	194
neutral	291
other	5

Q9 GENREAL IDIOM: The variable identifies approximately that part of the body which is contained within the photographic frame. Note that code 2 correspond with 3/4 of the body being shown; code 4 shows half the body.

full body	409
legs cut off	79
head cut off	8
cut at waist	126
face only	63
chest area	6
legs only	6
other	3

Q10 DETAILED IDIOM: The variable is concerned with the position of the body within the frame.

lying on side	7
lying on back	17
lying on front	10
facing forward	428
twisting away R or L	105
back facing camera	42
twisting towards R or L	57
profile	146
torso leaning forward	76

torso leaning back	37
propped BY arms	62
propped ON object	55
bowing from the waist	8
bent down	1
bowing from head	3
on all fours	3
other	7

Q11 BODY TYPE: This variable seeks to roughly classify the body type. The working defintion of physically able is that the model seems able to manipulate and act in and on his or her surroundings. Any code that remains unmarked it is because it cannot be reliable ascertained from the photograph either to conform or contradict.

strong	73
weak	12
tall	429
small	22
muscular	124
slim	435
skinny	72
emaciated	12
au naturale	153
stylised make-up	66
normal make-up	153
painted nails	70
long nails	83
short nails	99
body hair id	32
body hair unid	120
dyed/sculpted hair	100
short hair	345
long hair	242
tough	259
emotional	314
delicate	117
soft	205
macho	93
fat	6
sporty	53
physically able	449
other	14

Q12 CONTAINED BODY: Containment of the body is supposed to illicit the degree of self-determination; whether it is contained by a male or an object, or whether he or she is non-contained.

contained by self	36
contained by man	25
contained by woman	9
contained by object	13
contained by other/obj	7
mutual containment/embrace	37
non-contained	511
otherl	2

Q13 CONTAINED IDIOM: A list of the some fo the ways in which the idiom could visually portray containment. Note that for codes 7 and 8 arm is in the single because both implies an embrace. One arm demarcates ownership more clearly. Note that 1-4+10 if Q12 = 1 self contained; if Q12 = 4 then Q13 = 5; if Q12 = 2 or 3, then Q13 = 6-9+11

legs held in by arms	7
----------------------	---

legs crossed and pulled in	6
held in and hugging self	19
clinging to other model	1
confined by product	18
contained demarcating ownership	16
other's arm round neck	6
other's arm round waist	2
held protectively	3
embracing other/obj	2
embracED by other/obj	3
other	7

Q14 TITILATION: Referring to the titilation or 'fetishisation' of the body through dress and the degree to which this continues to have a strong gender divide. By reveal I mean that the clothing is lifted or moved or cut to draw attention to overtly sexualise that part of the body which would conventionally be concealed. By naked self concealment I mean those parts of the body, legs or arms etc., which are used to hide or conceal breasts and/or genitals.

non-sexualisation	316
fully dressed	220
reveal shoulder	24
reveal stomach/hip bone	41
reveal upper chest	54
reveal thigh	48
reveal/excentuate breast	88
flies up/down	8
getting dressed	1
underwear	47
see-through clothing	6
covered towel	0
naked self-concealment	8
naked except commodity	4
naked upper chest	38
fully naked	2
other	4

Q15 HAND ON WHOM: This has been specified because of the overall importance of who is touching whom, especially with regard to aggressive sexuality. Code 5 correspond with whether the hand is active but not touching anyone.

touching own body	268
touching man's body	31
touching woman's body	26
own and man's	8
own and woman's	6
touching commodity	28
hand is active/not touching	142
no touch/neutral	90
other	31

Q16 TOUCHING WHAT: Seeks to specify what is being touched which again feeds back to notions concerning stereotypes and sexual aggression. Note that when 'both hands' is coded this means that both hands are doing the same activity; if one hand is coded then it means that one hand or arm is either concealed in some way or that the two hands are doing different things.

hand on/through hair	26
hand on hip(s)	60
hand on leg(s)	47
hand on torso	87
hand on face	24
hand on neck	21

hand on bum	12
hand on breasts	3
hand on genitals	6
hand behind back	10
hand forcing ribs forward	3
clenched fists	3
hand in rest	43
leaning on	12
holding hands	42
neutrally touching OWN body	23
holding on	35
hands covered	9
hands in pockets	39
aggressive gesture	2
other	33

Q17 TYPE OF TOUCH: Relates to the way touch has often been genderised.

utilising	38
expert	1
grasping	39
manipulating	13
fingering	26
fiddling	10
fondeling	22
caressing	54
embracing	11
holding/neutral	191
other	55

Q18 ARMS: The working definition of one and both arms is the same as hand.

pointing up/outwards	56
extended up	23
relaxed by side	215
folded	30
arms bent	262
resting on leg(s)	45
over the head	12
hugging the body	61
arm in action	24
in mock movement	42
leaning	50
other	17

Q19 LEGS: The same working definition applies to single and both legs.

open when seated	39
closed when seated	36
open when lying down	6
closed when lying down	4
crossed and pulled in	20
crossed and extended outwards	12
astride	82
intertwined with obj/other	3
knee slightly bent point forward	54
knee bent sideways	27
bent fully at the knee	69
extended outwards	64
running	3
walking	31

pretend movement	52
feet outwards	4
feet forward	4
pigeon toed	3
standing open	39
standing closed	46
kneeling	7
other	12

Q20 HEAD: Head position

head back	34
head down	36
head turning away	92
head straight ahead	211
turning towards camera	123
head in profile	90
head hidden	11
head tilted to side	54
head pushed forward	12
back of head	16
other	3

Q21 MOUTH: Extends the issue of the fetishisation of the body. The mouth is central.

mouth open	136
mouth semi-open	122
mouth closed	378
expressionless	310
smiling	78
laughing	44
smirking	15
half smiling	62
pouting	52
licking lips	2
kissing	8
sulking	16
snarling	18
phallic mouth	36
phallic mouth with object	4
finger naive	0
finger anxious	2
clenched jaw	8
tongue sticking out	5
other	33

Q22 SPECTATORIAL ADDRESS: This refers to the mode of address contained within the photograph. Public means directly addressing the viewer. The construction of the mis-en-scene = an active relationship with the camera; the viewer = object of models gaze. Code 2 = looking but in a way that implicates the viewer within the narrative, esp. looking being looked at. Code 3 = no exchange between model and viewer and is thus more straight forwardly unproblematic.

public addressing viewer	175
narrative address	86
private voyeur	404
other	5

Q23 GAZE: This aims to roughly guide the relationship between the gaze and activity/ passivity.

looking up	31
gazing out at viewer	234
looking down	57

looking away	73
staring out of photo frame	65
looking at other/obj	70
looking straight ahead	64
eyes closed	37
other	21

Q24 EXPRESSIVE GAZE: Aims to add a more descriptive or qualitative dimension to the gaze.

authoritative	41
assertive	198
staring	265
other-worldly	67
dreaminess	52
glancing	39
surprised	9
raised eyebrows	27
looking being looked at	127
seductive	74
coy	39
looking	55
frowning	56
turned away/shy	19
reactive	54
concealed	17
semi-concealed	11
sunglasses	29
other	23

Q25 SITUATION: Adds context to the pose. It also gives an indication of the degree to which space is divided or genderised. This links back to issues of stereotyping. Q8 = 3 = neutral thus it is difficult to identify the ideological content or mystification. There are so few signifiers it would be difficult to say that the model is a working class boy who has made it good and hence wears Ralph Lauren. Public min. means that it is a public space but nothing more can be read and so with private min.

smoking	4
drinking/bar	9
car/driving	3
cafe/resturant	7
grooming	11
sport	8
partying	37
romantic scene	38
lovers tift	9
narcissistic - sexual	5
narcissistic - leisure	20
lovers sexual	22
house chores	0
caring role	2
movement	5
street	41
bourgeois	20
countryside	38
public min.	73
private min.	30
other	28

Q26 STEREOTYPES: This allows a basic counting of the number of stereotypical representations there are and to what extent the common sense understandings within the academy concerning the body idiom and advertising is as unproblematic as is assumed. Note that marking the code is to confirm the stereotype and that the masculine corresponds to the first value. By inversion, I mean that the mode of

representation of the female has taken on the conventions that have generally been considered masculine.

subject/object	565
activity/passivity	476
doer/done to and for	336
talker/listener	44
sprawled/draped	185
occupying/passing through	206
protector/protected	72
decision maker/decided for	56
professional/non-prof	33
manual/office	3
desirer/sexual object	345
subject/prostitute	25
subject/virgin	19
thinking mind/body	118
object/subject	389
passive/active	391
done to/doer	238
listener/talker	5
draped/sprawled	39
passing/occupying	122
decided/decision maker	20
non-prof./prof	17
body/thinking mind	125
sexual object/subject	228
non-stereotypical	182
conflicting	209
inversion	72
other	18

Q27 TIME:to allow for the comparison of the variables over time.

face 1985	33
face 1990	41
face 1995	69
i-d 1985	83
i-d 1990	27
i-d 1995	61
arena 1987	56
arena 1990	41
arena 1995	55
cosmo 1975	67
cosmo 1985	56
cosmo 1990	56
cosmo 1995	55

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