Conceptualising Discourse:
The Ancient and Modern Greek Word of συζητώ - συζητέω (συ+ζητώ) in Modern Philosophy Law

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This article undertakes to explain the importance of discourse in the modern philosophy of law. It conceptualises discourse as a step to the comprehensive truth of a phenomenon, which does not exist in most forms of modern methods. Therefore, modern philosophy of law must be sought through a vigorous application of the method of discourse in deducing the diversity of truth-seeking in modern legal doctrine and the application of law in contemporary society. In this article, the author endeavours to systemise that discourse is capable of comprehending a single absolute fact in legal doctrine and law, which is necessary to produce the exact procedures in society. Thus, discourse unfolds the relationship between the known and the unknown into a philosophical principle. It is then conceivable that discourse by its deduction creates societal forms and substances for the investigator to understand the true form and nature of law in society.

Introduction

It is equally important to dive into the structure of knowledge in conception and practice to demystify the idea of the composition of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle's discourse as the beginning of the constitution of ethics and integrity. Knowledge is derived from thoughts, and language is a composition of thought and knowledge (Harman 2015). Therefore, in the building blocks of knowledge, the composition and construction of the sentence are important to transcend the boundaries of theory and practice (Howarth 2000). Methodologically, the composition of knowledge is based on the construction of sentences, extending beyond normal daily life patterns. Therefore, through knowledge and languages, the concept of discourse came about (Bakker 1993). Through the concept of discourse, we can investigate the nature, process, scope and application of ethics and integrity in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle's writings (Dover 1994). Does this leads to the question what is discourse? And why was discourse an important line of inquiry in ancient Greece? Can discourse unfold the relationship between the known and the unknown into a philosophical principle of modern law? In this conceptual questioning we may assume that, in order to examine the philosophical principle of law, we must endeavour to explain the unexamined aspect of law and society. Therefore, in order for society to comprehend the law, we must first seek to understand the true substance of law and society, and how it affects individual

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action, intelligence and ignorance. Discourse allows the investigator to develop and conceptualise the law as a social phenomenon, rather than a rigid object. Hence, through the process of discourse, we may be able to understand the difference between good and bad law. This unique methodology makes prospective knowledge of law apparent in modern legal philosophy.

The concept of discourse can be traced back to the 19th century. The word came from the Latin word 'discursus', which means 'conversation' (McArthur et al. 2018). However, the meaning of the word discourse as a conversation could be seen as a simple interpretation of the symbolic word. Nevertheless, discourse could be related not only to the idea of dialogue but to the ancient and modern Greek word of συζητώ - συζητέω (συ+ζητώ) meaning 'conversation'. Discourse in modern Greek might also mean the method of revealing the truth about phenomena through questioning the substance and the formal state of a subjective object. However, it must also be noted that a simple argument by a philosopher through discourse may not provide a valid explanation of the sound judgement of the law. Therefore, I will conceive that modern discourse should be deduced from rules that direct the intelligence of the person. For the true substance of the legal doctrine and principles of philosophy to become apparent, it must be directed by the light of reasoning and contemplation of thought. From this point of view, we may assume the process of discourse should be confided as a component of authority in seeking to understand the truth but not a complete method of reasoning. Therefore, the magnificence and magnanimity of legal philosophy should be the theoretical implication of the dialectical method of reasoning and discourse. In this conceptual understanding, it is possible to assume that legal philosophy may have other theoretical value without having magnificence or magnanimity. This is to say that the modern legal theory lacks the composition of magnificent yet may have legal value but not moral and ethics, thus, not magnanimous.

In this method of reasoning, we may assume that modern legal philosophy is not connected to the substantive method of dialectical reasoning and discourse. This lack of indivisible and interdependent is a fundamental problem of modern legal philosophy and legal reasoning. Hence, by taking note of the dialectical method of reasoning and discourse we can provide an adequate meaning of modern legal philosophy. Now, legal philosophy may have been developed by a single act of wisdom, but we cannot acquire perfect knowledge of legal philosophy in a singular manner, except through the experience of the dialectical method of reasoning and discourse (Liberman 2007). Therefore, it seems to me that through the evolution of law and philosophy, the magnificence and magnanimity of legal philosophy can be achieved by the method of dialectical reasoning and discourse. This is partly because the dialectical method of reasoning and discourse presents the investigator with an opportunity to formulate their argument. This argument becomes the beginning of the creation of a compound element of legal principles or in other words from the principle of reasoning. The word legal principle here simply means the starting point of modern legal philosophy. Hence, discourse concerning modern legal philosophy may mean all that is prior to everything.

Hence, whatever was there before may only be found and formed by the process of intellectual argument, which is discourse.

However, Plato and Aristotle expand the word discourse to include abstract ideas of intellectual priority. Though, Greek philosophers before Plato were of the view that the starting point of everything is also the perfect beginning of discourse about that phenomenon. In contrast, Plato and Aristotle pointed out that there are two levels of argument, the first is the opposite of the natural order of all things, and the second is following the natural order of all things (Menn 2002). This might mean that before theory or philosophy is developed, there must be the first course, the argument, and the second course, the formulation of the concept. These two compound approaches deduce the principle of the dialectical method of reasoning and discourse. According to Plato, when we start a debate, we may not be in the immediate position to make sense of the phenomenon, however, the result may be deduced and formulated back to the former as per the evidence. This also correlates with Aristotle's statement that 'the things that are better known to us' are examined against 'the things that are better known by nature' and prior by nature. From this point of view, we may assume that Plato and Aristotle's objective composition of discourse is to reveal the true nature of the substance that is known by nature and also better known to the average person. I will, therefore, conceive that there cannot be a valid legal philosophy without a dialectical method of reasoning and discourse, because both are the starting point of argument to gain both theoretical and practical knowledge of the things that are derived from nature. In this understanding, the process of discourse is to reveal the uncommon to the common, the speculative reasoning of knowledge to the objective reason of knowledge, and the objective reason of knowledge to the subjective reason of knowledge. It is therefore evident here that, as regards the general principle of philosophical investigation, whether speculative or of theoretical or practical reasoning, discourse reveals the truth about all of them.

Therefore, the word discourse goes beyond a simple translation to the word conversation but its relevance cannot be disputed. In ancient Greece, the word discourse carried a number of significant meanings. We can deduce from the ancient Greek approach that the word discourse meant a method of investigation, or an enquiry into the philosophical meaning of a phenomenon or an objective form of existence, but could also mean a conversation or discussion (Nightingale 2000). However, it is not a simple conversation, it is an intellectual dialogue that is derived from a composition of specific thought processes. Accordingly, the word discourse or conversation became the requisite of the perfect quest for knowledge and the development of philosophy in ancient Greece. Another possible way we could conceptualise the word discourse is to see it as a definite process of finding the truth. Hence, to turn a concept into knowledge, we must enlighten the faculty of the mind by reflecting on the process of engagement and the analysis of the various parts of a phenomenon. Therefore, it seems that it does not make much difference if we seek to define discourse as an intellectual exercise or conversation as per Plato, what is fundamentally important is the requisite of the quest for knowledge in the conversation. Accordingly, if the conversation is simply the result of a concept or a revelation about a phenomenon, then there is no reason not

to believe that this conversation is based on a specific thought process. Therefore, a conversation does not have to be a philosophical reasoning but yet can be rational in its process of truth-seeking. So, discourse must not simply be from intellectual processes of questioning and discussion.

However, in common with the principle of discourse in ancient Greece, inquiry distorts the normal formation of thoughts and concepts. Therefore, dialectical ingenuity is achieved by questioning and explaining the normal forms of existence and societal conduct. Applying the method of discourse, simplicity is achieved by revealing the true meaning of a substance, while eliminating unnecessary or false precisions (Roochnik 1987). We can assume that discourse as a method of investigation places much emphasis on the real meaning of substances by disregarding the superficial elements that obscure the real development of knowledge. In this respect, discourse verges toward the development and advancement of knowledge; thus, through this dialectical ingenuity, processes are made evident. In this conceptual understanding, discourse becomes the process of stripping the outer layers of a substance to reveal the accurate truth about its form and expression. An adequate conclusion can be reached in this conception, partly because discourse is concerned with the primary principles which are the basis of philosophical diversity and inclusion. Therefore, philosophy is found in discourse not only in a language singularly deduced to explain the foundation of all premises. I shall attempt to complete this point by conceptualising that this method gives a universal process of communicating ideas without passing through the sphere of difficult particularities (Pater 1902).

All legal philosophies must come from a perfected discourse, therefore legal philosophy is moulded from discourse. Based on this analogy, it can be said that every legal philosophy is to be found a mediating principle which is capable of instructing the law in theory and in practice. Although discourse may be still in essence but not a vibration of thought process, it is still a concept. Increasing realisation in legal philosophy may awaken the faculties of the investigator to glimpse the immeasurable that lies beyond the average imagination and thought process. In this contemplation, discourse has the unquestionable advantage of the realisation of thought processes and legal philosophy. Therefore, when we realise discourse to be the whole thought process or the beginning of all philosophies, we can better comprehend why they are core aspects of theory and are not subject to the dissolution of a modern method of reasoning. This article explains the importance of discourse in the modern philosophy of law. It conceptualises discourse as a step to the comprehensive truth of a phenomenon, which does not exist in most forms of modern methods of reasoning. The article also attempts to pursue the reader to conceptualise the ancient method of reasoning to the contemporary approach to knowledge development. The conclusion opens the reader to the summary of the compound analysis of the patterns of knowledge creation (discourse), through thought processes and validation of one own method of self-questioning and analysis in relation to modern legal philosophy.

A Critical Analysis of Ancient Greek Discourse

Carter (1993), for example, observed one of the many meanings of the word discourse. The author divided the meaning of discourse into two parts. The first related to the themes or the method of language used to contemplate contexts. In this instance, therefore, the method can be related to philosophy, politics, religion or any other form of substance that gives meaning to a thing said or done. The second part of the word discourse was attributed to the word 'spoken'. Though the text is used to illustrate what is written, it does not affect the conceptual explanation of the context of the word discourse in this instance (Carter 1993). Nonetheless, Carter did not provide a detailed account of the different meanings of words 'text' and 'discourse'. However, this point is not apparent in most of the literature that discusses this philosophical context. I will attempt to further the discussion here by saying that distinguishing does not affect the substance of the concept of discourse. This is because discourse allows us to discover the true meaning of a phenomenon and its interaction with society. Therefore, discourse reveals what must be known and is known to the individual. Within these parameters, in the effort to understand what a phenomenon may conceal or hide, the resource of discourse stimulates the mind to reveal the pattern of truth in all probability.

Furthermore, Nunan (1993) observed that the two concepts are not distinct from each other. This is partly because they are used interchangeably and in many instances are treated separately. This seems to follow Carter's point on the correlation between the words text and discourse. Respectively, when one observes the point of analysis in these two authors' claims, there is a correlation between the composition of the process and the substance being investigated if this method is used. A point to note here, is that this method of investigation is used to establish the important distinction between the traditional concept of a sentence and the critical analytical patterns of language used in the examination of a phenomenon. It is possible to assume that discourse is the natural pattern of language used in philosophical investigation. Therefore, the emblematic method of discourse and its process is drawn out from the individual examining the form and substance of his own understanding of the phenomenon and its interaction in society. Through discourse we learn about the phenomenon, we are able to read into a substance, and we build a universal concept that helps to explain the order of things.

In connection with this point, Trask (1999) explained the distinctiveness of the discourse method. The author concluded that this method was not connected to the speaker or the writer. However, the word discourse was associated with oral or written debates developed by two or more people. When we conceptualise the notion of discourse according to Trask, we arrive at the conclusion that this method is solely for investigation and the analysis of a substance. This is true to some degree, as discourse explains the diversity of the phenomenon which all interactions of society are conceptualised. Therefore, discourse allows us to give an interpretation of a substance according to our conviction and understanding of the diversity of all things. As we look at the process and context of discourse, we

see a diverse concept that, whether we know it or not, simplifies our understanding of things and how these are reflected in societal conduct.

Therefore, it is possible to assume that the notion of discourse contemplates two approaches: the first is the language used and the second is the method of discourse. These two approaches, thus, produce the formal approach and the functional approach to the investigation of a phenomenon. Schiffrin (1998), in particular, uses these two approaches in producing her examination of 'the study of language use above and beyond the sentence'. The author goes further to explain that the formal or structural trend is the first step in attempting to demystify the approaches to discourse. In this understanding, the notion of discourse is an attempt to explore the various patterns of language in an analysis by focusing on the substantive part rather than the whole sentence. This may also follow Schiffrin's findings on this point. According to Schiffrin, discourse is just a form of a higher level of language in the hierarchy of sentences. This hierarchy of sentences seems to follow Harris's work on the theory of discourse. Harris seems to point to the internal composition of discourse. She observes that the utilisation of discourse in the depiction of language is a process of creating internal structural associations with the levels of discourse in an investigation. This association explains the formal links within the discourse (Harris 1952). Likewise, there is what the author refers to as the functional perspective. This functional perspective is associated with intrasentential connections, as well as language use. These two points are valid in theory and practice, partly because discourse in these settings may cause a person to develop what may be defined as philosophic knowledge.

Brown and Yule's (1983) theory seems to follow Schiffrin's and Harris's explanations of discourse in this setting. It is possible to hypothesise that the notion of discourse helps the thinker to deduce the high part of a substance. Therefore, to achieve a meaningful dialogue in philosophy the method of discourse helps to produce the meaning of the known and the unknown. Van Els et al.'s (1984) view contribute to this point and contest that 'the study of language in context will offer a deeper insight into how meaning is attached to utterances than the study of language in isolated sentences.' I am, therefore, of the view that discourse does not allow us to accept an explanation of a phenomenon at the face value. It allows us to search for the hidden agendas and motives which are invisible to the observer but are capable of altering the substantive meaning of what is known and unknown. If we are able to use the concept of discourse instinctively to regard all phenomena as the outer space of hidden truth, we will make great strides towards rationalising the entire nature of a substance. Discourse provides a process for the observer to begin to know the diversities and the inclusivities of all substances in the process of thinking.

An assumption exists that discourse assembles the thinker's mind on the variables of the attribution and deduction of the meaning of a substance. However, it is also adequate to question the validity of this approach in the 21st century of knowledge-seeking. Partly, this is because in the traditional sense, discourse is a linguistic formal or functional language used in the exploration of a phenomenon. Therefore, this concept is associated with a process of truth-seeking in ancient times. Hence, if we are to arrive at a method that conforms to the 21st century of

truth-seeking, how can we determine the use and effect of this method in producing modern outcomes? The answer to this question can be found in the knowledge of the language being used. It can be assumed that rationalisation and the deduction of truth are not exempt from the scientific method of knowledge development in the 21st century. Perhaps a scientific method of truth-seeking might be derived from the principle of discourse. Thus, discourse in modern terms is a step to the comprehensive truth of a phenomenon, which does not exist in most forms of modern methods. It must be sought for through a vigorous application of the method of discourse in deducing the diversity of truth-seeking. I shall endeavour to systemise that discourse is capable of comprehending a single absolute fact, which is necessary to produce the exact procedures in society. Thus, discourse unfolds the relationship between the known and the unknown into a philosophical principle. It is then conceivable that discourse by its deduction creates societal forms and substances for the investigator.

For instance, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle used discourse as a method of dialogue in the process of truth-seeking (Graham 1992). When close attention is paid to the interactions between Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, it becomes apparent that the method of discourse was a process used by these philosophers to respond to philosophical challenges and reasoning. For instance, Socrates used short questions and answers to address the issue of virtue. The method of discourse allowed Socrates to deduce an alternative and better course of action in his approach to truth-seeking (Srinivasan 2000). Socrates was able to provide a new explanation of virtue within his process of short questions and answers. A new reference to Socrates' quest to understand the meaning of virtue was established by simply asking what virtue is. Even though Socrates and Protagoras in the previous interactions attempted to address the issue of virtue, the short question and answer method led to a renewed investigation into this concept and its importance in society (Vlastos 1972). It is possible to assume, therefore, that, the previous interaction not only failed to provide an adequate account of what virtue is, but it also failed to include the composition of virtue in the discussion. Hence the interaction resulted in a vague explanation of the concept of virtue (Pettersson 2017). Discourse in this understanding can be devised to deduce almost any desired phase of reason or philosophy. Through the use of the emblematic method of discourse alone, the abnormality can be ratified and subnormality raised to a normal state of knowledge. Socrates, therefore, was able to discover the true meaning of virtue through questioning the true substance of the state of character, and the evidence produced by the source (Woodruff 1976).

Nevertheless, Socrates' discourse did not provide everything we need to know about virtue. It paved the way for Plato to elaborate on the underlying differences in his discourse on the issue of virtue (Price 2011). What is important to conceptualise here is that Socrates and Protagoras' discourse led to the notion of quality of virtue. They arrived at this point by examining the physical evidence of virtue and, for example, whether it could be taught or not. If it could be taught, how could it be taught in society? The answer to this question is rather difficult for them to contemplate in the substance of their discourse. Therefore, they were not able to provide an accurate distinction between the features that make virtue an

important principle of society or human beings *per se*. The issue with this lack of distinction, however, is not associated with the discourse but is rather the result of a lack of crucial information on the concept of virtue. Likewise, this lack of information distracted from the quest to find from it the proper course. A possible way this issue should have been resolved was by first investigating the composition of virtue, and what was the true form and substance of virtue, before seeking to discover whether it was indeed possible to teach virtue or contemplate it. Socrates and Protagoras' discussion took the middle ground approach to this problem. As a consequence, the investigation took a wrong turn from the start of the discourse, which led to their misconstruction of the philosophical meaning of virtue. Therefore, as far as the dialogue is concerned, Socrates' view on virtue is problematic in its form and substance. It can also be assumed here that discourse does not only provide meaning to a phenomenon but it also exposes the irregularities associated with the interpretation of philosophical concepts.

In terms of our present analysis, the deficiency in Protagoras's inquiry into virtue is not the discourse or the process of questioning the substance itself. The doubt is in the underlying view of whether virtue can be taught in society. Accordingly, a reasonable proposition here is to understand the aim of the discourse in different conceptual settings. Likewise, Socrates' presentation in the discussion with Hippocrates is not compelling (Schofield 2018). It is possible to deduce from Socrates's conversation with Hippocrates that there is an element of naivety in Protagoras's skills and ability to stimulate the mind to arrive at philosophical reasoning. This point holds true: if one applies his/her point of discourse with the sophist, they will arrive at the conclusion that there is an element of disparity in the approaches. In other words, without the proper knowledge and skills, Protagoras' teaching may have affected the way we approach philosophical phenomena, just as bad theory affects policy and societal formation. Therefore, discourse allows an emblematic method to express the true fact, and from the realisation of this fact new explanations for the creativeness of a substance emerge. Discourse is a peculiar response and the process of understanding a phenomenon through the borders of language for the expression and explanation of thoughts through the power of questioning. Thus, the dialectical method of reasoning and legal philosophy can both be understood under the common concept of discourse, in so far as they are processes that need to reveal the conservation in the existing pattern of the known and the unknown knowledge. However, it is possible to also conceive that knowledge or legal philosophy cannot be known initially from a mere conversation, because on its own, does not reveal substantive knowledge about a phenomenon. Though, we must recognise it contributes to the foundation of knowledge or legal philosophy, by using the common notion that is not attributed to the substance of the known and the unknown. Hence, the fact that we can recognise the presence of thought processes in a conversation might be the main reason why the ancient Greeks saw it as part of the discourse. From this point of view, we may conclude that some existing truth or substance can be found in the ancient Greek notion of conversation, which can be attributed to the necessary requirements of discourse.

I will complete this part by illustrating that discourse set the reaction in which the philosophy of forms or patterns that are not yet known can be scrutinised. Take, for insistence, Zeno, who was of the view that reality could only be quantified as a wholeness, which was changing constantly and in permanent flux (Cooper 2015). What is interesting in this dialogue is that it is always been assumed that Parmenides' and Zeno's concepts are associated with reality as one thing. Therefore, when we view the philosophical path of Parmenides and Zeno, we are contemplating all reality as one thing. The point of the discourse here is that Parmenides and Zeno accepted all reality as inseparable. Plato on the other hand addressed Protogroras in his discourse on the measure of all things. Protagoras saw reality as a compound process that led to relativism (Adams 2013). From this discourse, the true meaning of reality is fanciful and likened to a cleverly drawn picture. It is, thus, established by these philosophers that reality may but slightly resemble the unity of all things. The physical appearance is still part of the non-physical appearance if one conceptualises this point in modern language. The discourse method helps with the discerning of philosophical ideas into simple physical explanations of life and societal formation. So, discourse is employed throughout the process of philosophical challenge, for by it two definite ends are achieved (Nightingale 2000). As regards the concept of discourse, there is no doubt that they can be perceived clearly and distinctively in the ancient Greek notion of truth-seeking. Otherwise, they will not have been a common method of intellectual reasoning, although some methods of discourse may not be equally quantified as intellectual, because they may not be perceived equally as truth-seeking. I am of the view that it is not, however, because a person's faculty of knowing what derives from their thought process is limited but maybe because their common skills and concept of reasoning are opposed to the prejudiced opinions of their environment. Consequently, one cannot easily grasp the truth or knowledge, even though other people who have maybe liberated from those prejudices perceive them very clearly. Therefore, it is unlikely for me to conceive discourse as problematic or lacking intellectual rigour.

Moving on, Plato addressed the Sophists, who saw physicality as the sole existing reality. The concept of reality was very difficult for these philosophers to contemplate in an extraordinary sense. Thus, their ideas about reality were conceptualised in knowledge and the belief that to move away from this world, one only required an act of persuasion (Ambuel 2007). Plato's addressing the Sophists in this discourse was his attempt to give meaning to what was permanent in the world in terms of its specification, in a constructive manner, and the impermanent appearance of the world. Plato's quest was to explain and understand the world of appearance, either in consideration or in the insertion of what constituted truth or a belief. The Theaetetus, on the other hand, sought to find truth or the meaning of knowledge. The point of discussion here is imperative. We are not attempting to explain what reality or the composition of reality is here. What we are concerned with is the method used to deduce the truth of the compound components of reality in this philosophical interaction and whether it can be applied to modern legal philosophy. We can therefore reach these conclusions from the methods used in demystifying reality: first, discourse instinctively

allowed these philosophers to reveal the constitution of their reasoning by interpreting the true meaning of reality as they believed it to be; secondly, discourse allowed these philosophers to stimulate their minds to deduce the originality in the concept of reality, thereby saving a peculiar method of their own rational thinking process. Therefore, by rendering the death of original thoughts, new thoughts are developed through truth-seeking. An assumption, though, can arise here that discourse encourages originality in thinking, and hence is a product of the philosophical interaction.

Aristotle's rhetoric is another example of discourse as a method of truth-seeking. In this conceptual approach, Aristotle's way of structuring rhetoric and reasoning has its foundation in the principles of discourse. Through rhetoric, Aristotle is able to create technê, which is the basis of conceptualising reasoning in the theory of language (Angier 2010). However, Aristotle's rhetoric is not exempt from scrutiny; for example, some critics accused him of following the sophistry method of persuasion within a philosophical discussion. In an attempt to review this criticism, the inconsistency in Aristotle's approach does not illustrate a fundamental gap in his method of reasoning. However, it should be assumed that his approach correlates with the UnPlatonic explanation of the language developed by Aristotle regardless of his support for the Platonic paradigm of alêtheia (Zerba 1990). However, it is possible to conceive that the things we perceive as either concept, philosophy or science of the known and the unknown have their foundation in the first course of discourse. Therefore, it is worth the effort to attempt to consider each of the points separately, as a form of substance. By the term substance, we can reveal the truth about a concept that exists in such a way that it needs nothing else in order to permeate our thought process. In relation to modern legal philosophy, the method of discourse reduces obscurity in explaining the relationship between the diverse social phenomenon and law.

Meaning discourse quantifies the law to be a substance, something that needs absolutely nothing else, except it can be understood and explained through its relationship with society. Based on this evidence, we may reach the assumption that the Ancient Greek approach to discourse should be exactly the same way contemporary scholars attribute or quantify law in action. The same can be said about Aristotle's approach to discourse in his own conceptual understanding, which can be said to be attributed to a conversation triggered by thought processes or reasoning. Similarly, if we attempt to separate time from the notion of duration, we find that the latter is normally explained, and represented as a measure of motion, therefore, it is only a pattern of thought process, for we are not able to conceptualise the real duration of time in motion to the absence of the compound elements that are not in motion. This evident from the fact suggests that if two theories are interrelated, we do not acknowledge one more than the other because both provide an explanation of the same phenomena or enhance it. However, it is possible to conceive that to measure the duration of any phenomenon we must compare it with the during of the greater part and the most consistent motions from which we say to be years and day as the foundation, and we conceive all as the completeness of time. Hence, the difference in concepts can only be illustrated by the mode of thinking about the phenomenon being understood.

It is possible to conceptualise that Aristotle's emphasis was not on Plato's forms, but on the concept of truth-seeking as a method that is an examination that enhances the Greek philosophical way of thinking about a substance and its link to society and conducts. Therefore, Aristotle's rhetoric is an endorsement of his approach to truth-seeking. This is evident in his introductory chapters of Rhetoric, where he stresses that the aim of rhetoric is to illustrate the facts, 'what is or is not, what has or has not happened' (Cope 1867). By this method, Aristotle is able to construct a discourse through the mode of question and answer in order to arrive at the core of the issue. Rhetoric, therefore, is a secondary method of association in philosophical discourse by which the mind is able to conceptualise and deduce a phenomenon into an objective analysis. Therefore, the nature of Aristotle's rhetoric is to assume the nature and expression of reasoning to a ceaseless establishment of societal structures and forms (Rorty 1996).

However, it is possible to also see that according to the principle of language as a mode of expression, rhetoric undermines the validity of this thought. Likewise, Aristotle's contention and analyses on the particular aspect of rhetoric may also undermine the language of expression. On a conceptual level, the construction of the traditional opinions demonstrates language to be a composition of, and not solely a secondary course of, the subject or a substantive fact. On this theoretical point, Aristotle did not advance his position on this point nor explicitly address the course of its permeation in reasoning (Cope 1867). This gap may lead one to question this approach as a substantive method of philosophical reasoning. Thus, Aristotle's rhetoric may have the tendency to turn philosophical reasoning from a consideration of truth-seeking to cherishing the baseless notions of needless questions and divisions. While discourse enables endless philosophical reasoning and construction, its significance is in its ability to deduce vibrant knowledge and develop the principles humanity concerns itself with. In Aristotle's rhetoric, the question becomes how to choose the proper fork or frock for a formal banquet. In this respect, it is important to rest the mind upon the pettiness of accomplishment of thoughts and representation, until the natural state of the substance is achieved in its conceptual form. However, one should not be very excited by the insignificant and bewildering point in Aristotle's rhetoric, which is oblivious to the deficiency and gap created by its lack of tangibility and mediocrity.

In addition, Aristotle's programmatic end to his reasoning may have hindered him from either viewing or understanding the problematic aspects of his rhetoric. However, Rhetoric invites us to examine the argument in a way that discloses the significant patterns of power in language. The power of language, therefore, through validation and experiment produces the reality that we sort to represent in our discussion (Nussbaum 1982). Also, while we recognise this method of language construction as a modern form of reason, it is deeply ingrained in the former conception of language in the West. However, its diminishing is partly due to the strong legacy of Platonism. This legacy impacted Aristotle and his work throughout his lifetime. To contribute to Aristotle's legacy, I will conceive his rhetoric to create two kinds of theoretical distinction. One is between the language used, in the strict sense, and the substance of which it is a discourse, the other is between the two methods of investigation, which is the philosophical method of

reasoning and discourse. The first type of distinction can be separated from the act he perceives as a particular substance clearly in his thought process without resulting in discourse, which can be said to be distinctive from discourse without the substantive form of methodology language of thought. Thus, this may have shaped and distinguished his method of reasoning from others. However, Aristotle's concept is just an extension of discourse and can also be taken as a substance without any hostility. This is partly because if we seek to view his discourse as a distinctive substance, then we would need to look at other discourse as subsisting concepts and, in this way, we may confuse the idea of discourse as utopia.

For truth-seeking, we may acknowledge that something is called a tree; this may be because we conceptualise it to be a tree by ourselves. Therefore, the meaning of a substance is subject to the application of the appropriate language to describe its meaning and form. When attempting to examine a substance via Aristotle's rhetoric, the philosopher's mind is confronted with nothing but the limitation of languages and the constant strangling of a combination of terms. As the philosopher passes through the different aspects of discourse, he/she must come to terms with all the relatively inconsequential views concerning the substance investigated. In this instance, it is possible to assume that through further investigation of the substance the philosopher will begin to reveal the inner constitution, and with constant inquiry, he/she may be able to discriminate the false from the real. The truth is revealed not by the language but by the method of inquiry and reasoning. Yet, the mystery of the false and real which expands throughout the discourse is what must be discovered and developed.

Conclusion

This article has undertaken to explain the importance of discourse in antiquity and ancient Greek. Drawing on the classic understanding of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle a comparison was drawn between the phenomenon of discourse in ancient Greek and modern legal philosophy. Here I argued that discourse reveals the substantive truth about modern legal philosophy. Modern legal philosophy must move rhythmically and majestically upon the themes of discourse. Therefore, a possibility arises in the harmony between discourse to be a sum in a single thought of the principle of modern philosophy. This means that our conception of modern legal philosophy deserves consideration in the ancient Greek methodological principle of discourse. To contemplate, the universal principle of law is the beginning of understanding what informs law and behaviours in society. Discourse reveals the discipline whereby a person is rendered capable of appreciating the principle of law.

I will conclude by stating the following conceptual principles, discourse allows the investigator to comprehend and appreciate the growth and recognition process whereby society is reconciled to the law. If we are able to incorporate discourse into modern legal philosophy, the mystery of obedience to the law becomes evident in our conceptual analysis. Therefore, the path to obedience to

the law becomes clear, and we are on the road to the concept of absolute legal philosophy. This means we must incline to neither side nor depart from the true nature of knowledge. If we are able to attain this point in modern legal philosophy, we shall find absoluteness in the consummation of discourse in understanding the obedience of law in society which is conceived at the development of morality. The current modern legal philosophy fails because departing from the true nature of discourse would assume law belongs to another realm of conduct rather than society itself. In this understanding, the article has attempted to allot an end peculiar to modern legal philosophy, and though uncounted millenniums depart inevitably toward that archetypal concept patterned for discourse, which is prior to the move away from an adequate understanding of the various compounds of obedience to the law. Therefore, legal philosophy is of a similar kind and shares a common origin and path with discourse.

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